Dio’s Rome, Vol II. by Cassius Dio

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HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER, A.B. (Harvard), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins), Acting Professor of Greek in Lehigh University

SECOND VOLUME _Extant Books 36-44 (B.C. 69-44)_.




Book Thirty-six

Book Thirty-seven

Book Thirty-eight

Book Thirty-nine

Book Forty

Book Forty-one

Book Forty-two

Book Forty-three

Book Forty-four



Metellus subdues Crete by force (chapters 1, 2)[1]

Mithridates and Tigranes renew the war (chapter 3).

Lucullus does not take advantage of his victory: a successor is appointed: he captures Tigranocerta (chapter 4).

Arsaces, the Parthian, lends aid to neither party (chapter 5).

Lucullus, after a rather disastrous conflict, besieges and captures Nisibis (chapters 6-8).

Meanwhile he loses the Armenias: Fabius is conquered (chapters 10, 11).

Triarius follows Mithridates to Comana: is afterwards overcome by him (chapters 12-15).

Uprising in Lucullus’s army: Mithridates regains everything (chapters 16-19).

Insolence of the pirates (chapters 20-23).

The consequent war, in spite of opposition on the part of many, is by the Gabinian law entrusted to Pompey and is very quickly brought to an end (chapters 23-37).

Cornelian laws in regard to canvassing for office and edicts of praetors: the Roscian in regard to seats for the knights: the Manilian in regard to the voting of freedmen (chapters 38-42).

The Mithridatic war by the Manilian law is given in charge of Pompey (chapters 43, 44).

Pompey vanquishes Mithridates in a night battle (chapters 45-50).

Tigranes, the father, surrenders himself: his son is put in chains (chapters 51-53).

An attack of the Albani is repulsed (chapter 54).


Q. Hortensius, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Coss. (B.C. 69 = a.u. 685.)

L. Caecilius Metellus (dies,[2] then) Q. Marcius Rex alone.(B.C. 68 = a.u. 686.)

M. Acilius Glabrio, C. Calpurnius Piso. (B.C. 67 = a.u. 687.)

L. Volcatius Tullus, M. Aemilius Lepidus. (B.C. 66 = a.u. 688.)


The beginning of this book is missing in the MSS. The gist of the lost portion may in all probability be gathered from the following sentences of Xiphilinus (p. 3, R. Steph.):

“When the consuls drew lots, Hortensius obtained the war against the Cretans. Because of his fondness, however, for residence in the capital, and because of the courts (in which his influence was only second to Cicero’s) he voluntarily relinquished the campaign in favor of his colleague and himself remained at home. Metellus accordingly started for Crete …

“Lucius Lucullus at about this period worsted the lords of Asia,–Mithridates and Tigranes the Armenian,–in the war, and having compelled them, to avoid a pitched battle proceeded to besiege Tigranocerta. The barbarians did him serious injury by means of their archery as well as by the naphtha which they poured over his engines. This chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that whatever it touches it is sure to burn to a cinder, and it can not be extinguished by any liquid. As a consequence Tigranes recovered courage and marched forth with an army of such huge proportions that he actually laughed heartily at the appearance of the Romans present there. He is said to have remarked that in cases where they came to make war only a few presented themselves, but when it was an embassy, many came. However, his amusement was of short duration, and he forthwith discovered how far courage and skill surpass any mere numbers. Relics of his subsequent flight were found by the soldiers in the shape of his tiara and the band that goes around it; and they gave them to Lucullus. In his fear that these marks might lead to his recognition and capture he had pulled them off and thrown them away.”

[B.C. 69 (_a.u._ 685)]

[-1-] … and because he had enjoyed the extremes of fortune in both respects, he allowed it. For after his many defeats and victories no fewer, he had a firm belief that he had in consequence become more versed in generalship. His foes accordingly busied themselves as if they were then for the first time beginning war, sending an embassy to their various neighbors, including among others Arsaces the Parthian, although he was hostile to Tigranes on account of some disputed territory. This they offered to vacate for him, and proceeded to malign the Romans, saying that the latter, should they conquer them while isolated, would immediately make a campaign against him. Every victorious force was inherently insatiable of success and put no bound to acquisition, and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave him alone.

[-2-] While they were so engaged, Lucullus did not follow up Tigranes, but allowed him to reach safety quite at leisure. Because of this he was charged by the citizens, as well as others, with refusing to end the war, in order that he might retain his command a longer time. Therefore they then restored the province of Asia to the praetors, and later, when he apparently acted in this way again, sent to him the consul of that year, to relieve him. Tigranocerta he did seize when the foreigners that dwelt with the natives revolted to the side of the Armenians. The most of these were Cilicians who had once been deported, and they let in the Romans during the night. Thereupon everything was laid waste except what belonged to the Cilicians; and many wives of the principal chiefs Lucullus held, when captured, free from outrage: by this action he won over their husbands also. He received further Antiochus, king of Commagene (the Syrian country near the Euphrates and the Taurus), and Alchaudonius, an Arabian chieftain, and others who had made proposals for peace.

[-3-] From them he learned of the embassy sent by Tigranes and Mithridates to Arsaces, and despatched to him, on his part, some of the allies with threats, in case he should aid the foe, and promises, if he should espouse the Roman cause. Arsaces at that time (for he still nourished anger against Tigranes and felt no suspicion toward the Romans) sent a counter-embassy to Lucullus, and established friendship and alliance. Later, at sight of Secilius,[3] who had come to him, he began to suspect that the emissary was there to spy out the country and his power. It was for this cause, he thought, and not for the sake of the agreement which had already been made that a man distinguished in warfare had been sent. Hence he no longer rendered them any help. On the other hand, he made no opposition, but stood aloof from both parties, naturally wishing neither to grow strong. He decided that an evenly balanced contest between them would bring him the greatest safety.

[B.C. 68 (_a.u._ 686)]

[-4-] Besides these transactions Lucullus this year subdued many parts of Armenia. In the year of Quintus Marcius (Note by the author.–By this I mean that although he was not the only consul appointed, he was the only one that held office. Lucius Metellus, elected with him, died in the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead resigned before entering upon office, wherefore no one else was appointed.),–in this year, then, when summer was half way through (in the spring it was impossible to invade hostile territory by reason of the cold), Lucullus entered upon a campaign and devastated some land purposing to draw the barbarians, while defending it, imperceptibly into battle. As he could not rouse them for all that, he attacked. [-5-]In this engagement the opposing cavalry gave the Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe approached the infantry; indeed, whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus assisted the horse, the adversaries of the Romans would turn to flight. Far from suffering harm, however, they shot backward at those pursuing them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. Such wounds were dangerous and hard to heal. This was because they used double arrow-points and furthermore poisoned them, so that the missiles, whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or were drawn out, would quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, having no attachment, would be left within.

[-6-] Lucullus, since many were being wounded, some were dying, and some were being maimed, and provisions at the same time were failing them, retired from that place and marched against Nisibis. This city is built in the region called Mesopotamia (Author’s note.–Mesopotamia is the name given to all the country between the Tigris and Euphrates.) and now belongs to us, being considered a colony of ours. But at that time Tigranes, who had seized it from the Parthians, had deposited in it his treasuries and most of his other possessions, and had stationed his brother as guard over it. Lucullus reached this city in summer time, and although he directed his attacks upon it in no half-hearted fashion, he effected nothing. For the walls being of brick, double and of great thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither shaken down nor dug through and consequently Tigranes was not lending them assistance.[-7-] When winter set in, and the barbarians were behaving rather carelessly, inasmuch as they had the upper hand and were all but expecting to drive out the Romans, Lucullus waited for a night without a moon, when there was a violent storm of thunder and rain, so that the foe, not being able to see ahead or hear a sound, left the outer city (all but a few of them) and the intervening moat. He then assailed the wall at many points, ascending it without difficulty from the mounds, and easily slew the guards, not many in number, who had been left behind upon it. In this way he filled up a part of the moat–the barbarians had broken down the bridges in advance–and got across, since in the downpour neither archery nor fire could harm him. Immediately he captured nearly everything, for the inner circle was not very strong by reason of the confidence felt in the outer works beyond it. Among those that fled to the acropolis, whom he subsequently caused to capitulate, was the brother of Tigranes. He also obtained considerable money and passed the winter there.

[-8-] Nisibis, then, he overpowered as described, but many localities of Armenia and the other countries around Pontus he lost. Tigranes had not aided the town in question through the idea that it could not be captured, but had hurried to the aforementioned places to see if he could acquire them before Lucullus, while the latter was occupied near the other city. Despatching Mithridates to his native land, Tigranes himself entered his own district of Armenia. There he was opposed by Lucius Fannius, whom he cut off and besieged, however, until Lucullus ascertaining it sent assistance. [-9-]Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded the other Armenia and surrounding neighborhood, where he fell upon and destroyed many of the Romans to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they were wandering about the country. Others he annihilated in battle, and thereby won back speedily most of the positions. For the men of that land were well disposed toward him because of kinship and because of his being hereditary monarch: they hated the Romans because the latter were foreigners and because they had been ill treated by those set over them. Consequently they sided with Mithridates and afterward conquered Marcus Fabius, leader of the Romans in that place. The Thracians, who had formerly been mercenaries under Mithridates, but were then with Fabius, and the slaves present in the Roman camp gave them vigorous assistance. Thracians sent ahead by Fabius to reconnoitre brought back to him no reliable report, and later, when Mithridates suddenly fell upon him as he was proceeding along in a rather unguarded fashion, they joined in the attack on the Romans. At the same instant the slaves (to whom the barbarians had proclaimed freedom) took a hand in the work. They would have crushed their adversaries, had not Mithridates while occupied with the enemy–although over seventy years old he was in the battle–been hit with a stone. This caused the barbarians to fear that he might die; and while they halted battle on this account, Fabius and the others were able to escape to safety.[-10-] The Roman general was subsequently shut up and besieged in Cabira, but was rescued by Triarius. The latter was in that vicinity on his way from Asia to Lucullus. Having learned what had happened he collected as large a force as was possible with the resources at hand and in his advance so alarmed Mithridates (probably by the size of the Roman detachment) as to make him withdraw before Triarius came in view. At this the Romans took courage, and pursuing the enemy as far as Comana, whither he had retired, won a victory over him. Mithridates was in camp on the opposite side of the river from the point where the Romans approached, and was anxious to join battle while they were worn out from the march. Accordingly he himself met them first, and directed that at the crisis of the battle others should cross from another direction, by a bridge, to take part in the attack. But whereas he fought an equal conflict a long time he was deprived of reinforcements by the confusion on the bridge across which many were pushing at one time, crowded all, together.

[-11-] Thereafter they both retreated to their own fortifications and rested, for it was now winter. Comana belongs to the present territory of Cappadocia and was reported to have preserved right through to that time the Tauric statue of Artemis and the race of Agamemnon. As to how these reached them or how remained there I can find no certain account, since there are various stories. But what I understand accurately I will state. There are two cities in Cappadocia not far apart and of the same name which contend for the same honors. Their myths and the relics they exhibit are alike, and both treasure a sword, which is supposedly the very one connected with the story of Iphigenia.

[B.C. 67 (_a.u._ 687)]

[-12-] To resume our narrative. The following year, in the consulship of Manius Acilius and Gaius Piso, Mithridates encamped against Triarius near Gaziura, trying to challenge and provoke him to battle; for incidentally he himself practiced watching the Romans and trained his army to do so. His hope was to engage and vanquish Triarius before Lucullus came up and thus get back the rest of the province. As he could not arouse him, he sent some men to Dadasa, a garrison where the Romans’ baggage was deposited, in order that his opponent by defending it might be drawn into conflict. And so it was. Triarius for a time fearing the numbers of Mithridates and expecting Lucullus, whom he had sent for,[4] remained quiet. But when news came of the siege of Dadasa, and the soldiers in fear for the place got disturbed and kept threatening that if no one would lead them out they would go to the rescue at their own bidding, he reluctantly left his position. As he was now moving forward the barbarians fell upon him, surrounded and overwhelmed by their numbers those near at hand, and encompassed with cavalry and killed those who, not knowing that the river had been directed into the plain, had fled thither.[-13-] They would have destroyed them utterly, had not one of the Romans, pretending to come from the allies of Mithridates–no few of whom, as I have said, were along with the expedition on an equal footing with the Romans,–approached the leader, as if wishing to make some communication, and wounded him. To be sure, the fellow was immediately seized and put to death, but the barbarians were so disheartened in view of the occurrence that many of the Romans escaped.

When Mithridates had had his wound cured, he suspected that there were some others, too, of the enemy in the camp. So he held a review of the soldiers as if with a different purpose, and gave the order that they should retire singly to their tents with speed. Then he despatched the Romans, who were thus left alone. [-14-] At this juncture the arrival of Lucullus gave the idea to some that he would conquer Mithridates easily, and soon recover all that had been let slip: however, he effected nothing. For his antagonist, entrenched on the high ground near Talaura, would not come out against him, and the other Mithridates from Media, son-in-law of Tigranes, fell upon the Romans while scattered, and killed many of them. Likewise the approach of Tigranes himself was announced.

Then there was mutiny in the army; for the Valerians,[5] who had been exempted from military service and afterward had started on a campaign again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of the victory and ensuing idleness, and also because they had had provisions in abundance and the bulk of the management, Lucullus being absent on many errands. But it was chiefly because a certain Publius Clodius (whom some called Claudius) under the influence of an innate love of revolution solidified the seditious element among them, though his sister was united in wedlock to Lucullus. They were especially wrought up at that time, moreover, through hearing that Acilius the consul, who had been sent out to relieve Lucullus for reasons mentioned, was drawing near. They held him in slight repute, regarding him as a mere private citizen. [-15-]Lucullus was in a dilemma both for these reasons and because Marcius[6] (consul the year before Acilius), who was en route to Cilicia, the province he was destined to govern, had refused a request of his for aid. He hesitated to depart through a barren country and feared to stand his ground: hence he set out against Tigranes, to see if he could repulse the latter while off his guard and tired from the march, and thus put a stop, to a certain extent, to the mutiny of the soldiers. He attained neither object. The army accompanied him to a certain spot from which it was possible to turn aside into Cappadocia, and all with one consent without a word turned off in that direction. The Valerians, indeed, learning that they had been exempted from the campaign by the authorities at home, withdrew altogether.

[-16-] Let no one wonder that Lucullus, who had proved himself of all men most versed in warfare, and was the first Roman to cross the Taurus with an army and for hostile operations, who had vanquished two powerful kings and would have captured them if he had chosen to end the war quickly, was unable to rule his fellow-soldiers, and that they were always revolting and finally left him in the lurch. He required a great deal of them, was difficult of access, strict in his demands for labor, and inexorable in his punishments: he did not understand how to win over a man by argument, or to attach him to himself by kindliness, or to make a comrade of him by sharing honors or wealth,–all of which means are necessary, especially in a large body, and most of all in a body of soldiers. Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty that was a fair return for their dangers, obeyed him: but when they encountered trouble and fell into fear instead of hopes, they no longer heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men (he enrolled the Valerians again) and kept them without the slightest show of revolt. So much does man differ from man.

[-17-] After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all his domain and wrought dire devastation in Cappadocia, since neither Lucullus defended it, under the excuse that Acilius was near, nor Acilius himself. For the latter, who in the first place was hurrying on to rob Lucullus of the fruits of victory, now, when he learned what had taken place, did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. As for Marcius, the pretext which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. When he reached Cilicia he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and Clodius who had revolted under Lucullus, and, fearing a repetition of the doings at Nisibis, he put him in command of the fleet; for Marcius, too, had one of his sisters as wife. Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians, with whom the people were then at variance. There, likewise, he caused some to revolt, and his activity nearly cost him his life.

[-18-] … he spares.[7] In his eagerness for supremacy he assailed even the Cretans who had come to terms with him, and not heeding their objection that there was a state of truce he hastened to do them harm before Pompey came up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so kept quiet: in fact, he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take charge of the cities. Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the villages, but on failing to persuade him made no active opposition. Metellus, after many other outrages, captured by treachery the city Eleuthera and extorted money from it. The traitors had repeatedly at night saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took by storm Lappa, in spite of Octavius’s occupancy, and did the latter no harm, but put to death the Cilicians, his followers. [-19-]Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there the victims of oppression, and then, when the detachment of Metellus had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hieropydna, by whose side he fought. Aristion, on the retreat from Cydonia about that time, had conquered one Lucius Bassus who sailed out to oppose him, and had gained possession of Hieropydna. They held out for a while, but at the approach of Metellus left the fortification and put to sea. There they encountered a storm, and were driven ashore, losing many men. Henceforth Metellus was master of the entire island.

In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages and had never owned a foreign lord, were enslaved; and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his title. He was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes (whom he had also captured) march in his triumph. For Pompey had got them away beforehand by persuading one of the tribunes that it was to him they had submitted and not to Metellus.

[-20-] I will now relate the progress of Pompey’s career. The pirates, occupied in plundering, kept troubling continually those who sailed as well as the dwellers on land. There was never a time when piracy was not practiced, nor may it cease so long as the nature of mankind remains the same. But formerly plundering was limited to certain localities and small bands operating only during the regular season on sea and on land; whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places, and many cities had been uprooted, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives even, and fear confronted men in everything, large numbers turned to plundering. Now the bandit organizations on the mainland, being rather in sight of towns, which could thus perceive a source of injury close by, proved not so very difficult to overwhelm and were somehow broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. While the Romans were busy with antagonists they flourished. They sailed about to many quarters, adding to their band all of like condition, and some of these, after the fashion of allies, assisted many others.[-21-] How much they accomplished with the help of the outsiders has been told. When those nations were overthrown, instead of ceasing they did much serious damage alone by themselves to the Romans and Roman allies. They were no longer in small force, but were accustomed to sail in great expeditions; and they had generals, so that they had acquired a great reputation. They robbed and harried first and foremost sailors: for such not even the winter season was any longer safe; the pirates through daring and through practice and through success were now showing absolute fearlessness in their seamanship. Second, they pillaged even craft lying in harbors. If any one ventured to put out against them, usually he was defeated and perished; but even if he conquered he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason of the speed of their ships. Accordingly, they would return after a little, as if victors, to ravage and set in flames not only farms and country districts, but also whole cities. But other places they conciliated, so as to gain apparently friendly naval stations and winter quarters.

[-22-] As they progressed by these means it became customary for them to go into the interior, and they did much mischief even among those who had no sea-traffic. This is the way they treated not only those outside of their body of allies, but the land of Italy itself. Believing that they would obtain greater gains from that quarter and that they would terrify all others still more, if they refused to hold their hands even from that country, they sailed into the very harbor of Ostia, and also of other cities in the vicinity, burned the ships and ravaged everything. Finally, as no setback occurred, they took up their abode on the land, disposing of whatever men they did not kill, and of the spoils they took quite fearlessly, as if in their own territory. And though some plundered in one region and others elsewhere,–it not being possible for the same persons to do harm the whole length of the sea,–they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another that they sent money and assistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to nearest kin. One of the largest elements in their strength was that those who helped any of them all would honor, and those who came into collision with any of them all would despoil.

[-23-] To such an extent did the supremacy of the pirates grow that their hostility became a matter of moment, constant, admitting no precaution, implacable. The Romans, of course, from time to time heard and saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; but they gave no serious attention to it when they ought. On the contrary, they would send out fleets and generals, according as they were stirred by individual reports, but effected nothing; instead, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were finally reduced to extremities. Then at last they came together and deliberated many days as to what steps must be taken. Wearied by the continued dangers and noting how great and far reaching was the war raised against them, and believing, too, that it was impossible to assail the pirates all at once or individually, because the latter gave mutual assistance and it was impracticable to drive them back everywhere at once, the people fell into a dilemma and into great despair of making any successful stroke. In the end one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set forth his plan: he was either prompted by Pompey or wished to do him some favor; certainly he was not impelled by any love of the common welfare, for he was the vilest of men: his plan was that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full powers over all, who should command for three years and have the use of a huge force, with many lieutenants. He did not actually utter the name of Pompey, but it was easy to see that if once the multitude should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him. [-24-] So it turned out. His motion was carried and immediately all save the senate began to favor Pompey. That body was in favor of enduring anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than to put so great command into Pompey’s hands. In fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very halls of the senate, but he eluded them somehow. When the people learned the intention of the senators they raised an uproar, going to the point of making a rush at them as they sat assembled: and if the elders had not gotten out of the way, the populace would without doubt have killed them. They all scattered and secreted themselves except Gaius Piso the consul (it was in his year and Acilius’s that these events took place), who was arrested and condemned to perish for the others; but Gabinius begged him off. After this the leading men themselves gladly held their peace on condition of being allowed to live, but used influence on the nine tribunes, to have them oppose Gabinius. All of the latter, however, except a Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, out of fear of the multitude would not say a word in opposition; and those two men, who had the courage, were unable to redeem any of their promises by either word or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the motion was to be ratified, things went as follows.

Pompey, who was thoroughly anxious to command, and already by reason of his own ambition and the zeal of the populace no longer so much regarded this commission as an honor as the failure to win it a disgrace, seeing the opposition of those in power had a wish to appear as if compulsion were being used. In general he was as little as possible in the habit of revealing his real desires, but still more on this occasion did he feign reluctance, because of the ensuing jealousy, should he of his own accord lay claim to the leadership, and because of the glory if he should be appointed unwillingly as the one most worthy to command.

[-25-] He now came forward and said: “Quirites, I rejoice at the honor laid upon me by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred upon them by the citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honors at your hands, scarcely know how to be worthily pleased at the present contingency. However, I do not think that you should be so insatiable with regard to my services, nor that I should incessantly be in some position of command. For I have labored since childhood, and as you know, you should be promoting others as well. Do you not recall how many toils I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest youth, or how many labors in Sicily and in Africa before I had quite reached the age of iuvenis, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain, while I was not as yet a senator? I shall not say that you have shown yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labors. How could I? Quite the reverse, in addition to the many other important favors of which you have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was trusted to undertake the post of general against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able, and that I held a triumph, contrary to custom, after resigning it, brought me the greatest honor. I only say that I have undergone many anxieties and many dangers, that I am worn out in body and wearied in soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, nor calculate that I have lived just so many years. For if you count up the campaigns that I have made and the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in number than my years, and by this means you will more readily believe that I can no longer withstand the anxieties and the hardships.”

[-26-] “Some one might possibly reply: ‘But you see that all such opportunities for toil are causes of jealousy and hatred.’ This feature you hold in no account–you ought not properly even to pretend to regard it–but to me it would prove most grievous. And I must admit that I am not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the midst of wars as by such exhibitions. For what person in his right mind could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him, and who would feel the heart to carry out any public enterprise, if destined in case of failure to submit to punishment and if successful to be the object of rancorous envy? In view of these and other considerations allow me to remain at peace and attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many who are both willing and able to serve as admirals, both younger and older men, so that your choice from so numerous a company becomes easy. Of course I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in warfare, but–not seeming to favor any by mentioning names–equally so is A or B.”

[-27-] At this point in his harangue Gabinius, interrupting, cried: “Pompey’s behavior in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character. He does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it without thought when granted him. An upright man has no business, generally speaking, to desire the annoyances incident to office, and it is Pompey’s way to undertake all tasks imposed upon him only with due consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding safety. Precipitation in promises and in action, more hasty than the occasion demands, causes the downfall of many; but exactitude at the start as well as in execution possesses a constant value and is to the advantage of all. You must choose not what would satisfy Pompey, but what is of benefit to the state. Not office seekers, but those who have capacity should be appointed to the business in hand; the former exist in very large numbers, but any other such man as my candidate you will not find. You recall, further, how many reverses of a serious nature we endured in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that we found no one else among young or old adapted to it except the man before you; and that we sent him to the field in place of both consuls, although at that time he had not yet reached a mature age and was not a member of the senate. I should be glad if we did have many able men, and if I ought to pray for such, I would so pray: since, however, this ability does not depend on prayer or come of its own accord to any one, but a man has to be born with a natural bent for it, to learn what is pertinent and practice what is fitting and beyond everything to enjoy good fortune, which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man, you must all unanimously, whenever such an one is found, both support him and make the fullest use of him even if he does not wish it. Such violence proves most noble both to him who exerts it and to him who suffers it,–to the former because he would be preserved by it, and to the latter because it would preserve the citizens, in whose behalf the excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and soul.

[-28-] “Do you think that whereas this Pompey when a youth could conduct campaigns, be general, increase our possessions, preserve those of our allies, and acquire those of our adversaries, now, in the prime of life, when every man fairly surpasses himself, with a mass of additional experience gained from wars he could not prove most useful to you? Will you reject, now that he has reached man’s estate, him whom while iuvenis you chose to lead? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you committed those wars? Will you not, now that you have most amply tested his mettle, commit the present emergency, no less pressing than former ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent dangers ere you had applied any accurate test at all? Will you not send out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, whom before he could yet properly hold office you elected against Sertorius? Rather, do not for a moment adopt any other course; and Pompey, do you heed your country, and me. By her you were borne, by her you were reared. You must be a slave to whatever is for her advantage, not shrinking from any hardship or danger to secure it. And should it become necessary for you to lose your life, you must in that case not await your fated day but embrace whatever death meets you. [-29-] But truly I am ridiculous to give you this advice,–you who in so many great conflicts have exhibited both your bravery and your love for your country. Heed me, therefore, and these citizens here; do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on all the more for this very reason to a goal which is the friendship of the majority and the common advantage of us all, and scorn your traducers. Or, if you are willing to grieve them a little, take command for this very reason, that you may distress them by serving and winning glory contrary to their expectations, and that you may in person set an ending worthy of yourself beside your former accomplishments, by ridding us of many great evils.”

[-30-] When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius strove to make a dissenting speech; but as he did not receive leave to speak he proceeded to oppose the casting of a vote. Gabinius was incensed, and delayed the balloting regarding Pompey, but introduced a new motion concerning the same man. The first seventeen tribes to register an opinion decided that Trebellius was at fault and might be no longer tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the same way, was he barely induced to maintain silence. Roscius, seeing this, did not dare utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a little of Pompey’s supremacy. At this gesticulation of his the crowd gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads was so startled that it fell as if smitten by lightning. After that Roscius kept not only his tongue but his hand still. Catulus was for remaining silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch as he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was Gabinius’s hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits. Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and delivered an address about as follows:

[-31-] “That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible: and similarly the cause of Sulla’s frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man’s nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws. For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.

“Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done.

[-33-] “This is the first and most important point I have to mention. Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and praetors and those serving in their place can take offices and leaderships in a way prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but assign a strange and previously non-existent position of command to a private individual? [-34-] If there should be any necessity of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent,–I mean the dictator. However, because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else dictator,–on condition that he shall sway for not more than the time ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country, except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplishing anything. But if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of lawless lust for rule have often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you all alike understand.

[-35-] “About this, then, I shall say no more. Who can fail to know that on general principles it is neither decent nor advantageous to commit matters to any one man, or for any one man to be put in charge of all the blessings we own, even if he be the best man conceivable? Great honors and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. I ask you, however, to consider my next assertion,–that it is not possible for one man to preside over the entire sea and to manage the entire war properly. You must, if you shall in the least do what is needful, make war on them everywhere at once, so that they may neither unite, nor by finding a refuge among those not attacked, become hard to capture. Any one man who might be in command could by no manner of means accomplish this. For how on about the same days could he fight in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands? Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. [-36-] In case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be: ‘Would it not be much juster and more advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent command from you? What prevents such a course?’ By this plan they will pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they effect. By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for his victory will belong not to himself but to another?

“Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for many helpers to be given to whomever is elected. Our final consideration is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant alone for his assistance. Every one of you would agree that my proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and not merely in reference to the case of the freebooters. Aside from that, notice how it looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of ‘pirates’ and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time …” [8]

[-37-] … and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and armaments that he might wish to take. These measures as well as the others which the senate decided to be necessary to their effectiveness in any given case that body ratified even against its will. Its action was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to allow the subordinate officers to hold enlistments in Gallia Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously enraged and would straightway have cast him out of office, had not Pompey begged him off. So after making preparations as the business and his judgment demanded he patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly himself and partly through the agency of his under officers, and subdued the greater part of it that very year. For whereas the force that he directed was vast both in point of fleet and in point of heavy-armed infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, his kindness to those who made terms with him was equally vast, so that he won over great numbers by such procedure. Persons defeated by his troops who made trial of his clemency went over to his side very readily. For besides other ways in which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant and cities that needed inhabitants, in order that they might never again through poverty fall into need of criminal exertions. Among the other cities settled in this way was the one called in commemoration Pompeiopolis. It is in the coast region of Cilicia and had been sacked by Tigranes. Soli was its original name.

[-38-] Besides these events in the year of Acilius and Piso, an ordinance directed at men convicted of bribery regarding offices was framed by the consuls themselves, to the effect that no one of those involved should either hold office or be a senator, and should furthermore be subject to a fine. For now that the power of the tribunes had returned to its ancient state, and many of the persons whose names had been stricken off by the censors were aspiring to get back the rank of senator by one means or another, a great many political unions and combinations were formed aiming at all the offices. The consuls took this course not because they were angry at the affair–they themselves were shown to have been actively engaged, and Piso, who was indicted by several persons on this charge, escaped being brought to trial only by purchasing exemption–but because pressure had been exerted by the senate. The reason for this was that one Gaius Cornelius, while tribune, undertook to lay very severe penalties upon such unions, and the populace sided with him. The senate, being aware that an excessive punishment threatened has some deterrent force, but that men are then not easily found to accuse or condemn the guilty, since the latter will be in desperate danger, whereas moderation stimulates many to accusations and does not divert condemnations, was desirous of remodeling his proposition somehow, and bade the consuls frame it as a law.[-39-] Now when the comitiae had been announced in advance and accordingly no law could be enacted till they were held, the canvassers kept doing much evil in this intervening time, to such an extent that assassinations occurred. As a consequence the senators voted that the law should be introduced before the elections and a body-guard be given to the consuls. Cornelius, angry at this, submitted a proposal that the senators be not allowed to grant office to any one seeking it in a way not prescribed by law, nor to vote away any other prerogative of the people. This had been the law from very early times: it was not, however, being observed in practice. Thereupon arose a great uproar, since many of the senate and Piso in particular resisted; the crowd broke his staves to pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb. Seeing the rush they made, Cornelius for the time being before calling for any vote dismissed the assembly: later he added to the law that the senate should invariably hold a preliminary consultation about these cases and that it be compulsory to have the preliminary degree ratified by the people.[-40-] So he secured the passage of both that law and another now to be explained.

All the praetors themselves compiled and published the principles according to which they intended to try cases; for all the decrees regarding contracts had not yet been laid down. Now since they were not in the habit of doing this once for all and did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them and incidentally a number of clauses naturally appeared in some one’s favor or to some one’s hurt, he moved that they should at the very start announce the principles they would use, and not swerve from them at all. In fine, the Romans took such good care about that time to have no bribery, that in addition to punishing those convicted they furthermore honored the accusers. For instance, when Marcus Cotta dismissed the quaestor Publius Oppius because of bribery and suspicion of conspiracy, though he himself had made great profit out of Bithynia, they exalted Gaius Carbo who thereupon accused Cotta, with consular honors, notwithstanding he had served as tribune merely. Subsequently the latter himself was governor of Bithynia and erred no less widely than Cotta; he was, in his turn, accused by his son and convicted. Some persons, of course, can more easily censure others than admonish themselves, and when it comes to their own case commit very readily deeds for which they think their neighbors deserving of punishment. Hence they can not, from the mere fact that they prosecute others, inspire confidence in their own detestation of the acts in question.

[-41-] As for Lucius Lucullus, he finished his term of office as city praetor, but on being chosen by lot thereafter to serve as governor of Sardinia he refused, detesting the business because of the throng who were fostering corruption in foreign lands. That he was suited for the place he had given the fullest proof. Acilius once commanded the chair from which he had heard cases to be broken in pieces because Lucullus seeing Acilius pass by did not rise from his seat: yet the praetor did not give way to rage, and after that both he and his fellow officials tried cases standing up on account of the consul’s action.

[-42-] Roscius likewise introduced a law, and so did Gaius Manilius, at the time when they were tribunes. The former received some praise for his,–for it consisted in marking off sharply the seats of the knights in theatres from the other locations,–but Manilius came near having to stand trial. He had granted the class of freedmen, some of whom he got together from the populace on the last day of the year and toward evening, the right to vote with those who had freed them. The senate learned of it immediately on the following day, the first of the month, the day on which Lucius Tullius and Aemilius Lepidus entered upon the consulship, and rejected his law.

[B.C. 66 (_a.u._ 688)]

He, then, in fear because the populace was terribly angry, at first ascribed the idea to Crassus and some others; as no one believed him, however, he paid court to Pompey even in the latter’s absence, especially because he knew that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him. He went so far as to offer him command of the war against Tigranes and against Mithridates, and the governorship of Bithynia and Cilicia at the same time.

[-43-] Now irritation and opposition had developed even then on the part of the nobles particularly because Marcius and Acilius were making peace before the period of their command had expired. And the populace, although a little earlier it had sent the men to establish a government over the conquered territory, regarding the war as at an end from the letters which Lucullus sent them, nevertheless voted to do as Manilius proposed. Those who urged them most to this course were Caesar and Marcus Cicero. These men seconded the measure not because they thought it advantageous to the state nor because they wished to do Pompey a favor. Inasmuch, however, as things were certain to turn out that way, Caesar cultivated the good will of the multitude: he saw, in the first place, how much stronger they were than the senate and further he paved the way for a similar vote some time to be passed for his own profit. Incidentally, too, he was willing to render Pompey more envied and invidious as a result of the honors conferred upon him, so that the people might get their fill of him more quickly. Cicero saw fit to play politics and was endeavoring to make it clear to both populace and nobles that to whichever side he should attach himself, he would substantially benefit them. He was accustomed to fill a double role and espoused now the cause of one party and again that of the other, to the end that he might be sought after by both. A little while before he had said that he chose the side of the optimates and for that reason wished to be aedile rather than tribune; but now he went over to the side of the rabble.[-44-] Soon after, as a suit was instituted by the nobles against Manilius and the latter was striving to cause some delay about it, Cicero tried to thwart him, and only after obstinate objection did he put off his case till the following day, offering as an excuse that the year was drawing to a close. He was enabled to do this by the fact that he was praetor and president of the court. But since the crowd was still discontented he entered their assembly, presumably compelled thereto by the tribunes, where he inveighed against the senate and promised to speak in support of Manilius. For this he fell into ill repute generally, and was termed “deserter.” [Probably spurious: “because Caesar cultivated the populace from the beginning, whereas Cicero usually played a double part; sometimes he sided with the people, sometimes with the assembly, and for this reason he was termed ‘deserter.'”–Mai, p. 552]: but a tumult that immediately arose prevented the court from being convened. Publius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla (a nephew of that great Sulla) who had been appointed consuls and then convicted of bribery, plotted to kill their accusers, Gotta and Torquatus, Lucii, especially after the latter had been convicted in turn. Among others who had been suborned were Gnaeus Piso and Lucius Catiline, a man of great audacity; he had himself sought the office and was on this account inclined to anger. They were unable, however, to accomplish anything because the plot was announced beforehand and a body-guard given to Cotta and Torquatus by the senate. Indeed, a decree would have been pronounced against them, had not one of the tribunes opposed it. And since even so Piso showed signs of audacity, the senate being afraid he would cause some riot sent him straightway to Spain on the pretext that he was to look after some disorder.[-45-] He there met his death at the hands of natives whom he had wronged.

Pompey was at first making ready to sail to Crete and to Metellus, and when he learned the decrees that had been passed pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of the opposite faction with always loading business upon him so that he might meet some reverse. In reality he received the news with the greatest joy, and no longer regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points wherever anything had been left unsettled, he made preparations for the war with the barbarians.

Meanwhile, wishing to test the disposition of Mithridates, he sent Metrophanes bearing friendly proposals to him. Mithridates at that time held him in contempt; for Arsaces, king of the Parthians, having died about this period he expected to conciliate Phraates, his successor. But Pompey speedily contracted friendship with Phraates on the same terms and persuaded him to invade in advance the Armenia belonging to Tigranes. When Mithridates ascertained this he was alarmed and by means of an embassy immediately arranged a treaty. As for Pompey’s command that he lay down his arms and deliver up the deserters, he had no chance to deliberate; for the large number of deserters who were in his camp hearing it and fearing they should be delivered up, and the barbarians fearing that they should be compelled to fight without them, raised an uproar. And they would have done some harm to the king, had he not by pretending falsely that he had sent the envoys not for the truce but to spy out the Roman troops, with difficulty kept them in check.

[-46-]Pompey, therefore, having decided that he must needs fight, in the course of his other preparations made an additional enlistment of the Valerians. When he was now in Galatia, Lucullus met him. The latter declared the whole conflict over, and said there was no further need of an expedition and that for this reason also the men sent by the senate for the administration of the districts had arrived. Failing to persuade him to retire Lucullus turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, a lover of war, a lover of office, and so on. Pompey, paying him but slight attention, forbade every one any longer to obey his commands and pressed on against Mithridates, being in haste to join issue with him as quickly as possible.

[-47-] The king for a time kept fleeing, since he was inferior in numbers: he continually devastated the country before him, gave Pompey a long chase, and made him feel the want of provisions. But when the Roman invaded Armenia both for the above reasons and because he wanted to capture it while abandoned, Mithridates fearing it would be occupied before his advent also entered the country. He took possession of a strong hill opposite and there rested with his entire army, hoping to exhaust the Romans by lack of provisions, while he could get abundance from many quarters, being in a subject territory. He kept sending down some of his cavalry into the plain, which was bare, and injured considerably those who encountered them; after such a movement he would receive large accessions of deserters.

Pompey was not bold enough to assail them in that position, but he moved his camp to another spot where the surrounding country was wooded and he would be troubled less by the cavalry and bowmen of his adversaries, and there he set an ambuscade where an opportunity offered. Then with some few he openly approached the camp of the barbarians, threw them into disorder, and enticing them to the point he wished killed a large number. Encouraged by this, he sent some one way, some another, over the country after provisions.

[-48-] When Pompey went on procuring these in safety and through certain men’s help had become master of the land of Anaitis, which belongs to Armenia and is dedicated to some god after whom it is named, and many others kept seceding to him, while the soldiers of Marcius were added to his force, Mithridates becoming frightened no longer kept his position, but immediately started unobserved in the night, and thereafter by night marches advanced into the Armenia of Tigranes. Pompey followed on, eager to secure a battle. This, however, he could not do by day, for they would not come out of their camp, and he did not venture the attempt by night, fearing his ignorance of the country, until they got near the frontier. Then, knowing that they would escape, he was compelled to have a night battle. Having decided on this course he started off before them at noontime, unobserved of the barbarians, by the road along which they were to march.

Finding a sunken part of the road, between some low hills, he there stationed his army on the higher ground and awaited the enemy. When the enemy entered the sunken way, with confidence and without an advance guard (since they had suffered no injury previously and now at last were gaining safety, so that they expected that the Romans would no longer follow them), he fell upon them in the darkness. There was no illumination from heaven and they had no kind of light.

[-49-] The nature of the ensuing battle I will now describe. First, all the trumpeters together at a signal sounded the attack, next the soldiers and all the multitude raised a shout, some rattling their spears against their shields, and others stones against the bronze implements. The hollowed mountains took up and gave back their din with most frightful effect, so that the barbarians, hearing them suddenly in the night and the wilderness, were terribly alarmed, thinking they had encountered some supernatural phenomenon. Directly the Romans from the heights smote them at all points with stones, arrows, and javelins, inevitably wounding some by reason of their numbers, and reduced them to every extremity of evil. They were not drawn up in line of battle, but for marching, and both men and women were moving about in the same place with horses and camels and all sorts of implements; some were borne on coursers, others on chariots, covered wagons, and carts indiscriminately; and some getting wounded already and others expecting to be wounded caused confusion, in consequence of which they were more easily slain, since they kept becoming entangled one with another. This was what they endured while they were still being struck from afar off. But when the Romans after exhausting their long-distance ammunition charged down upon them, the edges of the force were slaughtered, one blow sufficing for their death, since the majority were unarmed, and the center was crushed together, as all by reason of the encompassing fear fell toward it. So they perished, pushed about and trampled down by one another without being able to defend themselves or venture any movement against the enemy. For whereas they were strongest in cavalry and bowmen, they were unable to see before them in the darkness and unable to make any manoeuvre in the defile.

When the moon rose, some rejoiced, with the idea that in the light they could certainly ward off some one. And they would have been benefited a little, if the Romans had not had the moon behind them, and so produced much illusion both in sight and in action, while assailing them now on this side and now on that. For the attackers, being many in number and all in one body, casting the deepest imaginable shadow, baffled their opponents before they had yet come into conflict with them. The barbarians thinking them near would strike the empty air in vain and when they reached common ground would be wounded in the shadow where they were not expecting it. Thus numbers of them were killed and the captives were not fewer than the slain. Many also escaped, among them Mithridates.

[-50-] The latter’s next move was to hasten to Tigranes. On sending couriers to him, however, he found no friendship awaiting him, because Tigranes’ son had risen against him, and while holding the youth under guard[9] the father suspected that Mithridates, his grandfather, had been responsible for the quarrel. For this reason far from receiving him Tigranes even arrested and threw into prison the men sent ahead by him. Failing therefore of the hoped-for refuge he turned aside into Colchis, and thence on foot reached Maeotis and the Bosphorus, using persuasion with some and force with others. He recovered the territory, too, having terrified Machares, his son, who had espoused the cause of the Romans and was then ruling it, to such an extent that he would not even come into his presence. And him Mithridates caused to be killed through his associates to whom he promised to grant immunity and money.

In the course of these events Pompey sent men to pursue him: when, however, he outstripped them by fleeing across the Phasis, the Roman leader colonized a city in the territory where he had been victorious, bestowing it upon the wounded and the more elderly of his soldiers. Many of those living round about voluntarily joined the settlement and later generations of them are in existence even now, being called Nicopolitans [10] and paying tribute to the province of Cappadocia.

[-51-] While Pompey was thus engaged, Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, taking with him some of the foremost men because the father was not ruling to suit them, fled for refuge to Phraates; and, though the latter, in view of the agreements made with Pompey, stopped to consider what it was advisable to do, persuaded to invade Armenia. They came, actually, as far as the Artaxatians, subduing all the country before them, and assailed those men likewise. Tigranes the elder in fear of them had fled to the mountains. But since it seemed that time was required for the siege, Phraates left a part of the force with his own son and retired to his native country. Thereupon the father took the field against the young Tigranes, thus isolated, and conquered him. The latter, in his flight, set out at first for Mithridates, his grandfather; but when he learned that he had been defeated and was rather in need of aid than able to assist any one, he went over to the Romans. Pompey, employing him as a guide, made an expedition into Armenia and against his father.

[-52-] The latter, learning this, in fear immediately sent heralds to him for peace, and delivered up the envoys of Mithridates. When, on account of the opposition of his son, he could gain no moderate terms, and even as things were Pompey had crossed the Araxes and drawn near the Artaxatians, then at last Tigranes surrendered the town to him and came voluntarily into the midst of his camp. The old king had arrayed himself so far as possible in a way to indicate his former dignity and his present humbled condition, in order that he might seem to his enemy worthy of respect and pity. He had put off his tunic shot with white and the all-purple candys, but wore his tiara and headband. Pompey, however, sent an attendant and made him descend from his horse; for Tigranes was riding up as if to enter the very fortification, mounted on horseback according to the custom of his people. But when the Roman general saw him entering actually on foot, with fillet cast off, and prostrate on the earth doing obeisance, he felt an impulse of pity; so starting up hastily he raised him, bound on the headband and seated him upon a chair close by, and he encouraged him, telling him among other things that he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia but had gained the friendship of the Romans. By these words Pompey restored his spirits, and then invited him to dinner.

[-53-] But the son, who sat on the other side of Pompey, did not rise at the approach of his father nor greet him in any other way, and furthermore, though invited to dinner, did not present himself. Wherefore he incurred Pompey’s most cordial hatred. Now, on the following day, when the Roman heard the recitals of both, he restored to the elder all his ancestral domain. What he had acquired later, to be sure,–these were chiefly portions of Cappadocia and Syria, as well as Phoenicia and the large Sophanenian tract bordering on Armenia,–he took away, and demanded money of him besides. To the younger he assigned Sophanene only. And inasmuch as this was where the treasures were, the young man began a dispute about them, and not gaining his point–for Pompey had no other source from which to obtain the sums agreed upon–he became vexed and planned to escape by flight.

Pompey, being informed of this beforehand, kept the youth under surveillance without bonds and sent to those who were guarding the money, bidding them give it all to his father. But they would not obey, stating that it was necessary for the young man, to whom the country was now held to belong, to give them this command. Then Pompey sent him to the forts. He, finding them all locked up, approached close and reluctantly ordered that they be opened. When the keepers obeyed as little as before, asserting that he issued the command not of his own free will, but under compulsion, Pompey was irritated and put Tigranes in chains.

Thus the elder secured the treasures, and Pompey passed the winter in the land of Anaitis and near the river Cyraus, after dividing his army into three portions. From Tigranes he received plenty of everything and far more money than had been agreed upon. For this reason especially he shortly afterward enrolled the king among his friends and allies and brought the latter’s son to Rome under guard.

[-54-] The quiet of his winter quarters, however, was not unbroken. Oroeses, king of the Albanians dwelling beyond the Cyrnus, made an expedition against them just at the time of the Saturnalia. He was impelled partly by a wish to do a favor to Tigranes the younger, who was a friend of his, but mostly by the fear that the Romans would invade Albania, and he cherished the idea that if he should fall upon them in the winter, when they were not expecting hostilities and were not encamped in one body, he would surely achieve some success. Oroeses himself descended upon Metellus Celer, in whose charge Tigranes was, and sent others against Pompey and against Lucius Flaccus, the commander of the third division, in order that all might be thrown into confusion at once, and so not assist one another.

In spite of all, he accomplished nothing at any point. Celer vigorously repulsed Grosses. Flaccus, being unable to preserve the whole circuit of the ditch intact by reason of its size, constructed another within it. This fixed in his opponents’ minds the impression that he was afraid, and so he enticed them within an outer ditch, where by a charge upon them when they were not looking for it he slaughtered many in close conflict and many in flight. Meanwhile Pompey, having received advance information of the attempt which the barbarians had made on the rest, to their surprise encountered beforehand the detachment that was proceeding against him, conquered it, and at once hurried on just as he was against Oroeses. The latter, indeed, he did not overtake; for Oroeses, after the repulse by Celer, had fled on being informed of the failures of the rest; many of the Albanians, however, he overwhelmed near the crossing of the Cyrnus and killed. After this he made a truce at their request. For although on general principles he was extremely anxious to make a return invasion of their country, he was glad to postpone the war because of the winter.



The following is contained in the Thirty-seventh of Dio’s Rome: I

How Pompey fought against the Asiatic Iberians (chapters 1-7).

How Pompey annexed Pontus to Bithynia: how Pompey brought Syria and Phoenicia under his sway (chapters 8, 9).

How Mithridates died (chapters 10-14).

About the Jews (chapters 15-19).

How Pompey after settling affairs in Asia returned to Rome (chapters 20-23).

About Cicero and Catiline and their transactions (chapters 24-42).

About Caesar and Pompey and Crassus and their sworn fellowship (chapters 43-58).

Duration of time, six years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated:

L. Aurelius M.F. Cotta, L. Manlius L.F. (B.C. 65 == a.u. 689.)

L. Caesar, C. Marcius C.F. Figulus. (B.C. 64 == a.u. 690.)

M. Tullius M.F. Cicero, C. Antonius M.F. (B.C. 63 == a.u. 691.)

Decimus Iunius M.F. Silanus, L. Licinius L.F. Murena. (B.C. 62 == a. u. 692.)

M. Pupius M.F. Piso, M. Valerius M.F. Messala Niger (B.C. 61 == a.u. 693.)

L. Afranius A.F., C. Caecilius C.F. Celer. (B.C. 60 == a.u. 694.)


[B.C. 65 (_a.u._ 689)]

[-1-] The following year after these exploits and in the consulship of Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus, he engaged in warfare against both the Albanians and the Iberians. With the latter of these he was compelled to become embroiled quite contrary to his plan. The Iberians dwell on both sides of the Cyrnus, adjoining on the one hand the Albanians and on the other the Armenians. Arthoces, their king, fearing that Pompey would direct his steps against him, too, sent envoys to him on a pretence of peace, but prepared to attack the invader at a time when, feeling secure, he should be therefore off his guard. Pompey learning of this betimes was in good season in making an incursion into the territory of Arthoces, ere the latter had made ready sufficiently or had occupied the pass on the frontier, which was well nigh impregnable. He marched on, indeed, to the city called Acropolis,[11] before Arthoces ascertained that he was at hand. At that moment he was right at the narrowest point, where the Cyrnus[12] flows on the one side and the Caucasus extends on the other, and had fortified the mountain in order to guard the pass. Arthoces, panic-stricken, had no chance to array his forces, but crossed the river, burning down the bridge; and those within the wall, in view of his flight and a defeat they had sustained in battle, surrendered. Pompey made himself master of the thoroughfares, left a garrison in charge of them, and advancing from that point subjugated all the territory within the river boundary. [-2-] But when he was on the point of crossing the Cyrnus also, Arthoces sent to him requesting peace and promising voluntarily to furnish him control of the bridge and provisions. Both of these promises the king fulfilled as if he intended to come to terms, but terrified when he saw his adversary already across he fled away to the Pelorus, another river that flowed through his dominions. The man that he might have hindered from crossing he avoided by running away after drawing him on.

Pompey, seeing this, pursued after, overtook and conquered him. By a charge he got into close quarters with the enemy’s bowmen before they could show their skill, and in the briefest time routed them. When things took this turn, Arthoces crossed the Pelorus and fled, burning the bridge over that stream too: of the rest some were killed in hand-to-hand fights, and some while fording the river on foot. Many, also, scattered through the woods, survived for a few days by shooting from the trees, which were exceedingly tall, but soon the trees were cut down at the base and they also were destroyed. Under these conditions Arthoces again sent a herald to Pompey for peace, and forwarded gifts. These the other accepted, in order that the king in his hope to secure a truce might not proceed farther in any direction; but he did not agree to grant peace till the petitioner should first convey to him his children as hostages. Thus Pompey waited for a time until in the course of the summer the Pelorus became fordable in places, and then the Romans crossed over; their passage was especially easy as they met no one to hinder them. Then Arthoces sent his children to him and finally concluded a treaty.

[-3-] Pompey, learning directly that the Phasis was not distant, decided to descend along its course to Colchis and thence to march to the Bosphorus against Mithridates. He advanced as planned, traversing the territory of the Colchians and their neighbors, using persuasion in some quarters and inspiring fear in others. There perceiving that his route on land led through many unknown and hostile tribes, and that the sea journey was rather difficult on account of the country’s having no harbors and on account of the people inhabiting the region, he ordered the fleet to blockade Mithridates so as to watch that the latter did not set sail in any direction and to cut off his importation of provisions, while he himself turned his steps against the Albanians. He took what was not the shortest path, but went inland to Armenia in order that such action, coupled with the truce, might enable him to find them not expecting him. And the Cyrnus, too, he crossed at a point where it had become passable because of summer, ordering the cavalry to cross down stream with the baggage animals next, and the infantry afterward. The object was that the horses should break the violence of the current with their bodies, and if even so any one of the pack animals should be swept off its feet it might collide with the men going alongside and not be carried further down. From there he marched to Cambyse without suffering any injury at the hands of the enemy, but through the influence of the scorching heat and consequent thirst he in common with, the whole army experienced hardship in his progress even at night over the greater part of the road. Their guides, being some of the captives, did not lead them by the most suitable route, and the river was of no advantage to them; for the water, of which they drank great quantities, was very cold and made a number sick.

When no resistance to them developed at this place either, they marched on to the Abas, carrying supplies of water only; everything else they received by the free gift of the natives, and for this reason they committed no depredations.

[-4-] After they had already got across the river, Oroeses was announced as coming up. Pompey was anxious to lead him into conflict somehow before he should find out the number of the Romans, for fear that when he learned it he might retreat. Accordingly he marshaled his cavalry first, giving them notice beforehand what they should do; and keeping the rest behind them in a kneeling position and covered with their shields he made these last remain motionless, so that Oroeses should not ascertain their presence until he came close up. Thereupon the latter, in contempt for the cavalry who were alone, as he thought, joined battle with them, and when after a little they purposely turned to flight, pursued them at full speed. Then the infantry suddenly rising stood apart to furnish their own men a safe means of escape through their midst, but received the enemy, who were heedlessly bent on pursuit, and surrounded a number of them. So these soldiers cut down those caught inside the circle; and the cavalry, some of whom went round on the right and some on the other side of them, assailed in the rear those outside. Each of these bodies slaughtered many in that place and others who had fled into the woods they burned to death, and they cried out, “Ha! ha! the Saturnalia!” with reference to the attack made at that festival by the Albanians.

[-5-] After accomplishing this and overrunning the country, Pompey granted peace to the Albanians, and on the arrival of heralds concluded a truce with some of the other tribes that dwell along the Caucasus as far as the Caspian Sea, where the mountains, which begin at the Pontus, come to an end. Phraates likewise sent to him, wishing to renew the covenants. The sight of Pompey’s onward rush and the fact that his lieutenants were also subjugating the rest of Armenia and that region of Pontus and that Grabinius had advanced across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris filled him with fear of them, and he was anxious to confirm the agreement. He effected nothing, however. Pompey, in view of the existing conditions and the hopes which they inspired, held him in contempt and replied scornfully to the ambassadors, among other things demanding back the territory of Corduene, concerning which Phraates was having a dispute with Tigranes. When the envoys made no answer, inasmuch as they had received no instructions on this point, he wrote a few words to Phraates, but instead of waiting for any answer suddenly despatched Afranius into the territory, and having occupied it without a battle gave it to Tigranes.

[B.C. 65]

Afranius, returning through Mesopotamia to Syria, contrary to the agreement made with the Parthian, wandered from the way and endured much evil by reason of the winter and lack of supplies. Indeed, he would have perished, had not Carraeans, colonists of the Macedonians who dwelt somewhere in that vicinity, supported him and helped him forward.

[-6-] This was the treatment that Pompey[13]out of the fullness of his power accorded Phraates, thereby indicating very clearly to those desiring personal profit that everything depends on armed force, and he who is victorious by its aid wins inevitably the right to lay down what laws he pleases. Furthermore, he did violence to the title of that ruler, in which Phraates delighted before all the world and before the Romans themselves, and by which the latter had always addressed him. For whereas he was called “king of kings,” Pompey clipped off the phrase “of kings” and wrote “to the king,” with merely that direction, in spite of the fact that he had given this title to the captive Tigranes even contrary to their custom when he celebrated the triumph over him in Rome. Phraates, consequently, although he feared and was subservient to him, was vexed at this, feeling that he had been deprived of the kingdom; and he sent ambassadors, reproaching him with all the injustice he had done, and forbade him to cross the Euphrates.

[-7-] As Pompey made no reasonable reply, the other immediately instituted a campaign in the spring against Tigranes, being accompanied by the latter’s son, to whom he had given his daughter in marriage. This was in the consulship Of Lucius Caesar and Gaius Figulus.

[B.C. 64 (_a.u._ 690)]

In the first battle Phraates was beaten, but later was victorious in his turn. And when Tigranes invoked the assistance of Pompey, who was in Syria, he sent ambassadors to the Roman commander, making many accusations and throwing out numerous hints against the Romans, so that Pompey was both ashamed and alarmed. As a result the latter lent no aid to Tigranes and took no hostile measures against Phraates, giving as an excuse that no such expedition had been assigned to him and that Mithridates was still in arms. He declared himself satisfied with what had been effected and said that he feared in striving for additional results he might meet with reverses, as had Lucullus.

Such was the trend of his philosophy: he maintained that to make personal gains was outrageous and to aim at the possessions of others unjust, as soon as he was no longer able to use them. Through dread of the forces of the Parthian, therefore, and fear of the unsettled state of affairs he did not take up this war in spite of many solicitations. As for the barbarians’ complaints, he disparaged them, offering no counter-argument, but asserting that the dispute which the prince had with Tigranes concerned some boundaries, and that three men should decide the case for them. These he actually sent, and they were enrolled as arbitrators by the two kings, who then settled all their mutual complaints. For Tigranes was angry at not having obtained assistance, and Phraates wished the Armenian ruler to survive, so that in case of need he might some day have him as an ally against the Romans. They both understood well that whichever of them should conquer the other would simply help on matters for the Romans and would himself become easier for them to subdue. For these reasons, then, they were reconciled.

Pompey passed the winter in Aspis, winning over the sections that were still resisting, and took Symphorion,[14] a fort which Stratonice betrayed to him. She was the wife of Mithridates, and in anger toward him because she had been abandoned sent the garrison out pretendedly to collect supplies and let the Romans in, although her child was with … [15] …

[B.C. 65 (_a.u._ 689)]

[-8-] … [not (?)] for this alone in his aedileship he (C. Jul. Caesar) received praise, but because he had also conducted both the Roman and the Megalesian games on the most expensive scale and had further arranged contests of gladiators in the most magnificent manner. Of the sums expended on them a portion was raised by him in conjunction with his colleague Marcus Bibulus, but another portion by him privately; and his individual expenditure on the spectacles so much surpassed, that he appropriated to himself the glory for them, and was thought to have taken the whole cost on himself. Even Bibulus joked about it saying that he had suffered the same fate as Pollux: for, although that hero possessed a temple in common with his brother Castor, it was named only for the latter.

[-9-] All this contributed to the Romans’ joy, but they were quite disturbed at the portents of that year. On the Capitol many statues were melted by thunderbolts, among other images one of Jupiter, set upon a pillar, and a likeness of the she-wolf with Romulus and Remus, mounted on a pedestal, fell down; also the letters of the tablets on which the laws were inscribed ran together and became indistinct. Accordingly, on the advice of the soothsayers, they offered many expiatory sacrifices and voted that a larger statue of Jupiter should be set up, looking toward the east and the Forum, in order that the conspiracies by which they were distraught might dissolve.

Such were the occurrences of that year. The censors also became involved in a dispute regarding the dwellers beyond the Po: one thought it wise to admit them to citizenship, and another not; so they did not perform any of their duties, but resigned their office. Their successors, too, did nothing in the following year, for the reason that the tribunes hindered them in regard to the list of the senate, in fear lest they themselves should be dropped from that assembly. Meantime all those who were resident aliens in Rome, except those who dwelt in what is now Italy, were banished on the motion of one Gaius Papius, a tribune, because they were getting to be in the majority and were not thought fit persons to dwell among the citizens.

[B.C. 64(_a.u._ 690)]

[-10-] In the ensuing year, with Figulus and Lucius Caesar in office, notable events were few, but worthy of remembrance in view of the contradictions in human affairs. For the man[16] who had slain Lucretius at the instance of Sulla and another[17] who had murdered many of the persons proscribed by him were tried for the slaughter and punished,–Julius Caesar being most instrumental in bringing this about. Thus the changes of affairs often render those once thoroughly powerful exceedingly weak. But though this matter went contrary to the expectation of the majority, they were equally surprised that Catiline, who had incurred guilt on those same grounds (for he, too, had put out of the way many similar persons), was acquitted. The result was that he became far worse and for that reason also perished.

[B.C. 63 (_a.u._ 691)]

For, when Marcus Cicero was consul with Gaius Antonius, and Mithridates no longer inflicted any injury upon the Romans but had destroyed his own self, Catiline undertook to set up a new government, and by banding together the allies against the state threw the people into fear of a mighty conflict. Now each of these occurrences came about as follows.

[-11-] Mithridates himself did not give way under his disasters, but trusting more in his will than in his power, especially while Pompey was lingering in Syria, planned to reach the Ister through Scythia, and from that point to invade Italy. As he was by nature given to great projects and had experienced many failures and many successes, he regarded nothing as beyond his ability to venture or to hope. If he missed he preferred to perish conjointly with his kingdom, with pride unblemished, rather than to live deprived of it in inglorious humility. On this idea he grew strong. For in proportion as he wasted away through weakness of body, the more steadfast did he grow in strength of mind, so that he even revived the infirmity of the former by the reasonings of the latter.

The rest who were his associates, as the position of the Romans kept getting always more secure and that of Mithridates weaker,–among other things the greatest earthquake that had ever occurred destroyed many of their cities–became estranged; the military also mutinied and unknown persons kidnapped some of his children, whom they conveyed to Pompey.

[-12-] Thereupon he detected and punished some; others he chastised from mere suspicion: no one could any longer trust him; of his remaining children, even, he put to death one of whom he grew suspicious. Seeing this, one of his sons, Pharnaces, impelled at once by fear of the king and an expectation that he would get the kingdom from the Romans, being now of man’s estate, plotted against him. He was detected, for many both openly and secretly meddled constantly with all he was doing; and if the body-guard had had even the slightest good will toward their aged sovereign, the conspirator would immediately have met his just deserts. As it was, Mithridates, who had proved himself most wise in all matters pertaining to a king, did not recognize the fact that neither arms nor multitude of subjects are of value to any one, without friendship on the part of the people; nay, the more dependents a person has (unless he holds them faithful to him) the greater burden they are to him. At any rate Pharnaces, followed both by the men he had made ready in advance, and by those whom his father had sent to arrest him (and these he very easily made his own) hastened straight on against the father himself. The old king was in Panticapaeum when he learned this, and sent ahead some soldiers against his son, saying that he himself would soon follow them. These also Pharnaces quickly diverted from their purpose, inasmuch as they did not love Mithridates either, and after receiving the voluntary submission of the city, put to death his father, who had fled for refuge into the palace.

[-13-] The latter had tried to make way with himself, and after removing beforehand by poison his wives and remaining children, he had swallowed what was left to the last drop. Neither by that means nor by the sword was he able to induce death with his own hands. For the poison, although deadly, did not prevail over him, since he had inured his constitution to it, taking every day precautionary antidotes in large doses: and the force of the sword blow was lessened on account of the weakness of his hand, caused by his age and the interference of those around him, and on account of the effect of the poison, of whatever sort it was. When, therefore, he failed to pour out his life through his own efforts and seemed to linger beyond the proper time, those whom he had sent against his son fell upon him and hastened his end with swords and spear points. Mithridates, who had experienced the most varied and tremendous fortune, found the close of his life equally far from being simple. He desired to die against his will, and though anxious to kill himself was not able; but first by poison and then by the sword at once became a suicide and was slain by his foes.

[-14-] Pharnaces embalmed his body and sent it to Pompey as a proof of what had been done, and surrendered himself and his dominions. The Roman showed Mithridates no indignity, on the contrary commanding that he be buried among the graves of his ancestors; for, feeling that his hostility had been extinguished with his life, he indulged in no vain anger against the dead body. The kingdom of Bosporus, however, he granted to Pharnaces as the wages of his bloody deed, and enrolled him among his friends and allies.

After the death of Mithridates all portions of his dominions, except a few, were subjugated. Garrisons which at that date were still holding a few fortifications outside of Bosporus, did not immediately come to terms,–not so much because they were minded to resist him as because they were afraid that some persons might confiscate beforehand the money which they were guarding and lay the blame upon them: hence they waited, wishing to exhibit everything to Pompey himself.[-15-] When, then, the regions in that quarter had been subdued, and Phraates remained quiet, while Syria and Phoenicia were in a state of calm, the conqueror turned against Aretas. The latter was king of the Arabians, now slaves to the Romans as far as the Red Sea. Previously he had done the greatest injury to Syria and had on this account become involved in a battle with the Romans who were defending it: he was defeated by them, but nevertheless continued hostile at that time. Upon him and his neighbors Pompey made a descent, overcame them without effort, and handed them over to a garrison. Thence he proceeded against Palestine, in Syria, because its inhabitants were harming Phoenicia. Their rulers were two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, who[18] were themselves quarreling, as it chanced, and stirring up the cities concerning the priesthood (for so they called their kingdom) of their God, whoever he is.

Pompey immediately brought to his side without a battle Hyrcanus, who had no force worthy of note, and by confining Aristobulus in a certain spot compelled him to come to terms. And when he would surrender neither money nor garrison,[19] Pompey threw him into prison. After this he more easily overcame the rest, but in the siege of Jerusalem found trouble. [-16-]Most of the city he took without exertion, as he was received by the party of Hyrcanus, but the temple itself, which the others had occupied in advance, he did not capture without labor. It was on high ground and strengthened by its own defences, and if they had continued defending it on all days alike, he could not have got possession of it. As it was, they made an exception of what were called the days of Saturn,[20] and by doing no work at all on them offered the Romans an opportunity in this vacant interval to batter down the wall. The latter on learning this superstition of theirs, made no serious attempt the rest of the time, but on those days, when they came around in succession, assaulted most vigorously. Thus the holders were captured on the day of Saturn, making no defence, and all the money was plundered. The kingdom was given to Hyrcanus, and Aristobulus was carried back to Rome.

This was the course of events at that time in Palestine. That is the name that has been applied from of old to the whole race, which extends from Phoenicia to Egypt along the inner sea. They have also another name that has been acquired,–i.e., the country has been called Judaea, and the people themselves Jews. [-17-]I do not know from what source this title was first given them, but it applies also to all the rest of mankind, although of foreign race, who cherish their customs. This nation exists among the Romans also, and though often diminished has increased to a very great extent and has won its way to the right of freedom in its observances. They are distinguished from the rest of mankind in every detail of life, so to speak, and especially by the fact that they do not honor any of the usual gods, but reverence mightily one particular divinity. They never had any statue in Jerusalem itself, but believing him to be inexpressible, invisible, they worship him in the most extravagant fashion on earth. They built to him a temple that was extremely large and beautiful, except in so far as it was void and roofless, and dedicated the day called the day of Saturn, on which, among many other most peculiar actions, they undertake no serious occupation.

Now as for him, who he is and why he has been so honored, and how they got their superstition about accounts have been given by many, no one of which pertains to this history.

[-18-] The custom of referring the days to the seven stars called planets was established by the Egyptians, but has spread to all men, though it was instituted comparatively not long ago. At any rate the original Greeks in no case understood it, so far as I am aware. But since it is becoming quite habitual to all the rest of mankind and to the Romans themselves, and this is to them already in a way an hereditary possession, I wish to make a few brief statements about it, telling how and in what way it has been so arranged.

I have heard two accounts, in general not difficult of comprehension, and containing some one’s theories. If one apply the so-called “principle of the tetrachord” (which is believed to constitute the basis of music) in order to these stars, by which the whole universe of heaven is divided into regular intervals, as each one of them revolves, and beginning at the outer orbit assigned to Saturn, then omitting the next two name the master of the fourth, and after him passing over two others reach the seventh, and in the return cycle approach them by the names of the days, one will find all the days to be in a kind of musical connection with the arrangement of the heavens.

[-19-] This is one of the accounts: the other is as follows. If you begin at the first one to count the hours of the day and of the night, assigning the first to Saturn, the next to Jupiter, the third to Mars, the fourth to Sol,[21] the fifth to Venus, the sixth to Mercury, and the seventh to Luna,[20] according to the order of the cycles the Egyptians observe in their system, and if you repeat the process, covering thus the twenty-four hours, you will find that the first hour of the following day comes to the sun. And if you carry on the operation throughout the next twenty-four hours, by the same method as outlined above, you will consecrate the first hour of the third day to the moon, and if you proceed similarly through the rest, each day will receive the god that appertains to it. This, then, is the tradition.[22]

[-20-] Pompey, when he had accomplished what has been related, went again to the Pontus and after taking charge of the forts returned to Asia and thence to Greece and Italy. He had won many battles; had brought into subjection many potentates and kings, some by going to war with them and some by treaty, he had colonized eight cities, had created many lands and sources of revenue for the Romans, and had established and organized most of the nations in the continent of Asia then belonging to them with their own laws and governments, so that even to this day they use the laws that he laid down.

But although these achievements were great and had been equaled by no earlier Roman, one might ascribe them both to good fortune and to his fellow campaigners. The performance for which credit particularly attaches to Pompey himself, which is forever worthy of admiration, I will now proceed to set forth.

[-21-] He had enormous power both on sea and on land; he had supplied himself with vast sums of money from captives; he had made friends with numerous potentates and kings; and he had kept practically all the communities which he ruled well disposed through benefits bestowed. And although by these means he might have occupied Italy and have taken possession of the whole Roman sway, since the majority would have accepted him voluntarily, and if any had resisted they would certainly have capitulated through weakness, yet he did not choose to do this. Instead, as soon as he had crossed to Brundusium he gave up of his own accord all his powers, without waiting for any vote to be passed concerning the matter by the senate or the people, not troubling himself even about using them in the course of the triumph. For since he understood that the careers of Marius and Sulla were held in abomination by all mankind, he did not wish to cause them any fear even for a few days that they should undergo any similar experiences. Consequently he did not so much as acquire any name from his exploits, although he might have taken many.

As for the triumphal celebration–I mean that one which is considered the chief,–although according to most ancient precedents it is not lawful that it be held without those who aided the victory, he nevertheless accepted it, as it had been voted to him. He conducted the procession in honor of all his wars at once, including in it many trophies beautifully arrayed to represent each of his deeds, even the smallest: and after them all came one huge one, arrayed in costly fashion and bearing an inscription to the effect that it was a World Trophy. He did not, however, add any other title to his name, but was satisfied with that of Magnus only, which, as is known, he had gained even before these achievements. Nor did he get any other extravagant privilege awarded him: only he did use once such as had been voted him in absence. These were that he should wear the laurel wreath on the occasion of all meetings at any time, and should be clad in the robe of office at all of them, as well as in the triumphal garb at the horse-races. They were granted him chiefly through the cooeperation of Caesar, and contrary to the judgment of Marcus Cato.

[-22-] Regarding the former a statement has already been made as to who he was, and it has been related[23] that he cultivated the common people, and while generally striving to depose Pompey from his high position, still made a friend of him in cases where he was sure of pleasing the populace and gaining influence himself. But this Cato belonged to the family of the Porcii and emulated the great Cato, except that he had enjoyed a better Greek education than the former. He promoted assiduously the interests of the multitude and admired no one man, being excessively devoted to the common weal; suspicious of sovereignty, he hated everything that had grown above its fellows, but loved everything mediocre through pity for its weakness. He showed himself a passionate adherent of the populace as did no one else, and indulged in outspokenness beyond the limits of propriety, even when it involved danger. All this he did not with a view to power or glory or any honor, but solely for the sake of a life of independence, free from the dictation of tyrants. Such was the nature of the man who now for the first time came forward before the people and opposed the measures under consideration, not out of any hostility to Pompey, but because they transgressed time-honored customs.

[-23-] These honors, then, they granted Pompey in his absence, but none when he had come home, though they would certainly have added others, had he wished it; upon some other men, indeed, who had been less successful than he, they often bestowed many extravagant distinctions. That they did so unwillingly, however, is clear.

Pompey knew well that all the gifts granted by the common people to those who have any influence and are in positions of authority contain the suggestion, no matter how willingly they are voted, of having been granted through force applied out of the resources of the strong. He knew that such honors bring no glory to those who receive them, because it is believed that they were obtained not from willing donors, but under compulsion, and not from good will, but as a result of flattery. Hence he did not permit any one to propose any measure whatever. This course he declared far better than to reject what has been voted to one. The latter method brought hatred for the high position that led to such measures being passed, and connoted arrogance and insolence in not accepting what is granted by your superiors or at all events by your peers. By the former method you possessed in very fact the democratic name and behavior both, not indicated but existent. For having received almost all the offices and positions of command contrary to ancient precedent, he refused to accept all such others as were destined to bring him only envy and hatred even from the very givers, without enabling him to benefit any one or be benefited.

[-24-] All this took place in course of time. Temporarily the Romans had a respite from war for the remainder of the year, so that they even held the so-called _augurium salutis_ after a long interval. This is a kind of augury, which consists of an enquiry whether the god allows them to request welfare for the State, as if it were unholy even to make a request for it until the action received sanction. That day of the year was observed on which no army went out to war, or was taking defensive measures against any, or was fighting a battle. For this reason, amid the constant perils (especially those of a civil nature), it was not held. In general it was very difficult for them to secure exactly the day which should be free from all those disturbances, and furthermore it was most ridiculous, when they were voluntarily causing one another unspeakable woes through factional conflicts and were destined to suffer ills whether they were beaten or victorious, that they should still ask safety from the divine power.

[-25-] Notwithstanding, it was in some way possible at that time for the divination to be held, but it did not prove to be pure. Some strange birds flew up and made the augury of no effect. Other unlucky omens, too, developed. Many thunderbolts fell from a clear sky, the earth was mightily shaken, and human apparitions were visible in many places, and in the West flashes ran up into heaven, so that any one, even an ignorant fellow, was bound to know in advance what was signified by them. For the tribunes united with Antonius, the consul, who was much like themselves in character, and some one of them supported for office the children of those exiled by Sulla, while a second was for granting to Publius Paetus and to Cornelius Sulla, who had been convicted with him, the right to be members of the senate and to hold office. Another made a motion for a cancellation of debts, and for allotments of land to be made both in Italy and in the subject territory. These motions were taken in hand betimes by Cicero and those who were of the same mind as he, and were quashed before any action resulted from them.

[-26-] Titus Labienus, however, by indicting Gaius Rabirius for the murder of Saturninus caused them the greatest disorder. For Saturninus had been killed some thirty-six years earlier, and the steps taken against him by the consuls of the period had been at the direction of the senate: as a result of the present action the senate was likely to lose authority over its votes. Consequently the whole system of government was stirred up. Rabirius did not admit the murder, but denied it. The tribunes were eager to overthrow completely the power and the reputation of the senate and were preparing for themselves in advance authority to do whatever they pleased. For the calling to account of acts that had received the approval of the senate and had been committed so many years before tended to give immunity to those who were undertaking anything similar, and curtailed the punishments they could inflict. Now the senate in general thought it shocking for a man of senatorial rank who was guilty of no crime and now well advanced in years to perish, and were all the more enraged because the dignity of the government was being attacked, and control of affairs was being entrusted to the vilest men.

[-27-] Hence arose turbulent exhibitions of partisanship and contentions about the court, the one party demanding that it should not be convened and the other that it should sit. When the latter party won, because of Caesar and some others, there was strife again regarding the trial. Caesar himself was judge with Lucius Caesar; for the charge against Rabirius was not a simple one, but the so-called _perduellio-:–and they condemned him, although they had not been chosen according to precedent by the people, but by the praetor himself, which was not permitted. Rabirius yielded, and would certainly have been convicted before the popular court also, had not Metellus Celer who was an augur and praetor hindered it. For since nothing else would make them heed him and they were unconcerned that the trial had been held in a manner contrary to custom, he ran up to Janiculum before they had cast any vote whatever, and pulled down the military signal, so that it was no longer lawful for them to reach a decision.

[-28-] Now this matter of the signal is about as follows. In old times there were many enemies dwelling near the city, and the Romans (according to the account) fearing that while they were holding an assembly foes might occupy Janiculum to attack the city decided that not all should vote at once, but that some men under arms should by turns always guard that spot. So they garrisoned it as long as the assembly lasted, but when it was about to be dissolved, the signal was pulled down and the guards departed. Regularly no business was any longer allowed to be transacted unless the post were garrisoned. It was permissible only in the case of assemblies which collected by companies, for these were outside the wall and all who had arms were obliged to attend them. Even to this day it is done from religious grounds.

So on that occasion, when the signal was pulled down, the assembly was dissolved and Rabirius saved. Labienus, indeed, had the right to go to court again, but he did not do this.

[-29-] As for Catiline, his ruin was accomplished in the following way and for the reasons which I shall narrate. He had been seeking the consulship even then, and contriving every conceivable way to get appointed, when the senate decreed, chiefly at the instance of Cicero, that a banishment of ten years should be added by law to the penalties imposed for bribery. Catiline thought, as was doubtless true, that this ruling had been made on his account, and planned, by collecting a small band, to slay Cicero and some other foremost men on the very day of the election, in order that he might immediately be chosen consul. This project he was unable, however, to carry out. Cicero learned of the plot beforehand, informed the senate of it, and delivered a long accusation against him. Being unsuccessful, however, in persuading them to vote any of the measures he asked–this was because his announcement was not regarded as credible and he was suspected of having uttered false charges against the men on account of personal enmity–Cicero became frightened, seeing that he had given Catiline additional provocation, and he did not venture to enter the assembly alone, as had been his custom, but he took his friends along prepared to defend him if any danger threatened; and he wore for his own safety and because of their hostility a breastplate beneath his clothing, which he would purposely uncover. For this reason and because anyway some report had been spread of a plot against him, the populace was furiously angry and the fellow conspirators of Catiline through fear of him became quiet. [-30-] In this way new consuls were chosen, and Catiline no longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero and his adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth. He assembled from Rome itself the lowest characters and such as were always eager for a revolution and as many as possible of the allies, by promising them cancellation of debts, redistribution of lands, and everything else by which he was most likely to allure them. Upon the foremost and most powerful of them (of whose number was Antonius the consul) he imposed the obligation of taking the oath in an unholy manner. He sacrificed a boy, and after administering the oath over his entrails, tasted the inwards in company with the rest. Those who cooeperated with him most were: In Rome, the consul and Publius Lentulus, who, after his consulship, had been expelled from the senate (he was now acting as praetor, in order to gain senatorial rank again); at Faesulae, where the men of his party were collecting, one Gaius Mallius, who was most experienced in military matters (he had served with Sulla’s centurions) and the greatest possible spendthrift. Everything that he had gained at that epoch, although a vast sum, he had consumed by evil practices, and was eager for other similar exploits. Afranius, returning through Mesopotamia to Syria, contrary to the agreement made with the Parthian, [B.C. 65] wandered from the way and endured much evil by reason of the winter and lack of supplies. Indeed, he would have perished, had not Carraeans, colonists of the Macedonians who dwelt somewhere in that vicinity, supported him and helped him forward.

[-31-] While they were making these preparations, information came to Cicero, first of what was occurring in the city, through some letters which did not indicate the writer but were given to Crassus and some other influential men. On their publication a decree was passed that a state of disorder existed and that a search should be made for those responsible for it. Next came the news from Etruria, whereupon they voted to the consuls in addition the guardianship of the city and of all its interests, as they had been accustomed to have: for to this decree was subjoined the command that they should take care that no injury happen to the republic. When this had been done and a garrison stationed at many points, there was no further sign of revolution in the city, insomuch that Cicero was even falsely charged with sycophancy; but messages from the Etruscans confirmed the accusation, and thereupon he prepared an indictment for violence against Catiline.

[-32-] The latter at first accepted it with entire readiness as if supported by a good conscience, and made ready for the trial, even offering to surrender himself to Cicero so that the latter could watch and see that he did not escape anywhere. As Cicero, however, refused to take charge of him, he voluntarily took up his residence at the house of Metellus the praetor, in order that he might be as free as possible from the suspicion of promoting a revolution until he should gain some additional strength from the conspirators in that very town. But he made no headway at all, because Antonius through fear shrank back and Lentulus was anything but an energetic sort of person. Accordingly, he gave them notice to assemble by night in a particular house, where he met them without Metellus’s knowledge and upbraided them for their timorousness and weakness. Next he set forth in detail how great punishments they would suffer if they were detected and how many desirable things they would obtain if successful, and by means so encouraged and incited them, that two men promised to rush into Cicero’s house at daybreak and murder him there.

[-33-] Information of this, too, was given in advance: for Cicero, being a man of influence, had through his speeches by either conciliation or intimidation gained many followers, who reported such occurrences to him: and the senate voted that Catiline should leave the city. The latter was glad enough to withdraw on this excuse and went to Faesulae, where he prepared an out and out war. He took the consular name and dress and proceeded to organize the men previously collected by Mallius, meanwhile gaining accessions first of freemen, and second of slaves.

The Romans consequently condemned him for violence, ordered Antonius to the war (being ignorant, of course, of their conspiracy), and themselves changed their apparel. The crisis kept Cicero likewise where he was. The government of Macedonia had fallen to him by lot, but he did not set out for that country,–retiring in favor of his colleague on account of his occupation in the prosecutions,–nor for Hither Gaul, which he had obtained in its place, on account of the immediate situation. Instead, he charged himself with the protection of the city, but sent Metellus to Gaul to prevent Catiline from alienating it.

[-34-] It was extremely well for the Romans that he remained. For Lentulus made preparations to burn down the city and commit wholesale slaughter with the aid of his fellow conspirators and of Allobroges, who chanced to be there on an embassy: these also he persuaded to join him[24] and the others implicated in the revolution in their undertaking. The consul learning of their purpose arrested the men sent to carry it out and brought them with their letter into the senate-chamber, where, by granting them immunity, he proved all the conspiracy. As a consequence Lentulus was forced by the senate to resign the praetorship, and was kept under guard along with the others arrested while the remnant of the society was being sought for. These measures pleased the populace equally: especially so, when, during a speech of Cicero’s on the subject, the statue of Jupiter was set up on the Capitol at the very time of the assembly, and by instructions of the soothsayers was placed so as to face the East and the Forum. For these prophets had decided that some conspiracy would be brought to light by the erection of the statue, and when its setting up coincided with the time of the conspirators’ arrest, the people magnified the divine power and were the more angry at those charged with the disturbance.

[-35-] A report went abroad that Crassus was also among them, and one of the men arrested, too, gave this information; still, not many believed it. Some, in the first place, thought they had no business to suspect him of such a thing; others regarded it as a trumped-up charge emanating from the guilty parties, in order that the latter might thereby get some help from him, because he possessed the greatest influence. And if it did seem credible to any persons, at least they did not see fit to ruin a man who was foremost among them and to disquiet the city still more. Consequently this charge fell through utterly.

Now many slaves, and freemen as well, some through fear and others for pity of Lentulus and the rest, made preparations to deliver them all

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