The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker’s and the actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right.
“At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: ‘I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks’s Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I can’t use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.’
“Question.–When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?
“Answer.–I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M. of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: ‘Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt.’
“This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, between three and four o’clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:–
“‘Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.’
“In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, when the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker.”
To place in juxtaposition Hooker’s testimony and Sedgwick’s, in no wise militates against the latter.
There is one broad criticism which may fairly he passed upon Sedgwick’s withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that his remaining in position might be of some assistance to his chief, instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks’s Ford, against even Lee with his twenty-four thousand.
But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have destroyed his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was able to make.
Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have, accomplished so much. But if we assume, that having an eye to the numbers and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to the character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was bound to dispute further the possession of Banks’s Ford, in order to lend a questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by comparison the conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general commanding, bottled up behind their defences at Chancellorsville!
XXXIII.
HOOKER’S FURTHER PLANS.
Hooker states: “Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee’s army, except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.
“As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it would be more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin’s Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night between the 5th and 6th of May.”
Now, the Franklin’s Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had been fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning the Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made, is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open country he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1.
“Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th and 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front.” Be it remembered that the “desperate move” was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against at the outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered up to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as good authority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he assumed, in condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we had taken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia.
All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum, who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles; while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,) says: “I understood from him” (Couch) “always that he was in favor of fighting then.” Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat; but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to show the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated.
Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, in full force,–Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to this purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed himself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly refrained from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the profession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark; that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance of disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be the last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; and the effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be greatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, and daily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomac should not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of the Republican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and then attempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. These grounds largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief’s determination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons, which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the men had started had given out, and there had been no considerable issue since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusually careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made for supplying the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noon till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a ten-days’ absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of almost a predetermination to accept defeat.
Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of the others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at any moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of these circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he might judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the possibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross again so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in condition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received almost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed that communications were still open, and that the operations of the Cavalry Corps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. On the coming Sunday, the time of service of thirty-eight regiments was up. Many of these conditions could have been eliminated from the problem, if measures had been seasonably taken; but they now became critical elements in the decision to be made. And Hooker, despite his well-earned reputation as a fighting man, was unable to arrive at any other than the conclusion which Falstaff so cautiously enunciated, from beneath his shield, at the battle of Shrewsbury, that “the better part of valor is discretion.”
XXXIV.
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.
Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared a new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt. Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on the east, of the United-States Ford road. “A continuous cover and abattis was constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott’s Dam, around to the mouth of Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in good order, and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M., and lasted till late at night. The movement to re-cross was begun by the artillery, as per order, at 7.30 and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to submerge the banks at the ends of the bridges on the north bank, and the velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away.” “The upper bridge was speedily taken up, and used to piece out the ends of the other two, and the passage was again made practicable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this cause.” “No troops took up position in the new line except the rearguard, composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which was done about daylight on the 6th.” “The proper dispositions were made for holding this line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and then it quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing.” (Warren.) The last of the army re-crossed about eight A.M., May 6.
Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:–
“A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his staff re-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order to see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side of the river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was looking after them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed as directed, an engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had been carried away, or were being carried away, by the flood. I found the chief engineer, Capt. Comstock; and we proceeded together to examine the bridges, and we found that they were all utterly impassable. I then proceeded to Gen. Meade’s camp, and reported the condition of affairs to him. All communication with Gen. Hooker being cut off, Gen. Meade called the corps commanders together; and, as the result of that conference, I believe, by order of Gen. Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop the movement of the artillery, which was withdrawn from the lines, and let them resume their positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my return to the bridges, I found that one had been re-established, and the batteries that were down there had commenced re-crossing the river. I then sought Gen. Hooker up, on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain we could not all cross over in a night. I stated to him that I doubted whether we could more than get the artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he refused to postpone the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made by the enemy, nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to place batteries on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and to command which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own responsibility. A cannonade ensued, and they were driven off with loss, and one of their caissons exploded: we lost three or four men killed, and a few horses, in this affair. That is about all that I remember.”
Gen. Barnes’s brigade assisted in taking up the bridges; and all were safely withdrawn by four P.M. on Wednesday, under superintendence of Major Spaulding of the engineer brigade.
All who participated in this retreat will remember the precarious position of the masses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-heads as in a cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawn breath of relief as the hours after dawn passed, and no further disposition to attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtless profoundly grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire across the Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest they needed so much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, who was, it seems, on the north side of the river during these critical moments, that the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a final assault on the part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, and the unmolested retreat turned into another passage of the Beresina. Providentially, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had expended almost its last round of ammunition previous to this time.
But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medical officers and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days later under a flag of truce.
The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:–
FEDERAL LOSS.
General Headquarters and Engineers . . . 9 First Corps . . . . . . . . 299 Second Corps . . . . . . . . 1,923 Third Corps . . . . . . . . 4,119 Fifth Corps . . . . . . . . 700 Sixth Corps . . . . . . . . 4,610 Eleventh Corps . . . . . . . . 2,412 Twelfth Corps . . . . . . . . 2,822 Pleasonton’s Brigade . . . . . . 202 Cavalry Corps under Stoneman . . . . 189 ——
17,285
CONFEDERATE LOSS.
Jackson’s Corps,–
Early’s division . . . . . . . 851 A. P. Hill’s division . . . . . . 2,583 Trimble’s (Colston) division . . . . 1,868 D. H. Hill’s (Rodes) division . . . . 2,178
Longstreet’s Corps,–
Anderson’s division . . . . . . 1,180 McLaws’s division . . . . . . 1,379 Artillery . . . . . . . . . 227 Cavalry . . . . . . . . . 11 ——
10,277
Prisoners . . . . . . . . . 2,000 ——
12,277
Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as general on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other.
Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: “I lost under those operations” (viz., the Chancellorsville campaign) “one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance. Of course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and knapsacks.”
The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. And, while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them that they captured thirteen.
The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to the shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristic to a degree.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 6, 1863.
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49.
The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on the achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources.
In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it represents.
By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command it.
By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and passage of the river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride.
We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received.
We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen colors, captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed hors du combat eighteen thousand of our foe’s chosen troops.
We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores, damaged his communications, captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation.
We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitration of battle.
By command of Major-Gen. Hooker.
S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 7, 1863.
With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.
Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance He has wrought.
It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due unto His name.
Let us not forget in our rejoicing the brave soldiers who have fallen in defence of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example.
The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success.
The following letter from the President of the Confederate States is communicated to the army as an expression of his appreciation of their success:–
“I have received your despatch, and reverently unite with you in giving praise to God for the success with which he has crowned our arms. In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to yourself and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great victories which our army has achieved. The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and the wounded.”
R. E. LEE, General.
The following is equally characteristic:–
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 13, 1863. To his Excellency, President of the United States.
Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? If so, do not answer me.
Jackson is dead, and Lee beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General Commanding.
XXXV.
OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.
As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding day for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The order read as follows:–
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 12, 1863. Commanding Officer, Cavalry Corps.
I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you will march at seven o’clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy’s position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat.
To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, by the people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert suspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in pursuit of Jones’s guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock, some point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your advance.
In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh Lee’s brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command.
At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your forward movement. From there it is expected that you will push forward to the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton’s Junction, destroying along your whole route the railroad-bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines of telegraphic communication, etc. The general directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually.
As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will avail himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest positions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order to check or prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and out of supplies.
Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit.
If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, on the march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the general as the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted, and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands.
The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the enemy’s communication with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those lines; and he wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy’s whereabouts, and attack him wherever you find him.
If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the Aquia Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges, etc., or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our complete success.
You may rely upon the general’s being in communication with you before your supplies are exhausted.
Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.
A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o’clock for Kelly’s Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Ford and Banks’s Ford, to threaten and hold those places.
It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, and encamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April 14, it moved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, which, after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. Beverly Ford, some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank occupied. Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th were made. Gen. Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at Kelly’s Ford during the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the Confederates to that point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish.
During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river was no longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains.
As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion of torrents. Nor are more than a few hours necessary to raise these rivers and runs, and even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Gregg mentions in his report that a small stream, which, on the 13th, could be crossed at one step, had swelled to such a flood, that when, on the 15th, a regiment was obliged to cross it, there were lost one man and two horses by drowning.
So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it would probably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing the rest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. And this was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses.
On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go into camp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, until the 27th.
The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing how keen Mr. Lincoln’s intuitions occasionally were.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C., April 15, 1863. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross; and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:–
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MORRISVILLE, VA., April 28, 1863. Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps.
I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that the instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such points as you may determine between Kelly’s and Rappahannock Fords, and for a portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Ford and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into execution that part of your original instructions, which relates to the enemy’s forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to be considered as masking the column which is directed to move, by forced marches, to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond Railroad.
You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to unite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near that line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your instructions, as before referred to, will remain the same.
You will direct all your force to cross to-night, or, if that shall not be practicable, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over before eight o’clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your pack-animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at Kelly’s Ford.
You will please furnish the officers in command of these two columns with a copy of this, and of your original instructions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, WM. L. CANDLER,
Captain and Aide-de-Camp.
These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is not modified by the second to any great extent; and the primary object of both is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee’s main communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.
The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28, were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the one column was to go at once about its work, while the other masked its march, and after joined it.
Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together,–the distance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day,–and finally crossed the Rappahannock by five P.M. of the 29th, a portion of his troops using Kelly’s Ford, in connection with Slocum’s column.
He then assembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his maps before them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans.
Averell, with his own division, Davis’s brigade of Pleasonton’s division, and Tidball’s battery, was instructed to push for Culpeper Court House; while Stoneman, with Gregg’s division, Buford’s reserve brigade, and Robertson’s battery, moved on Stevensburg.
It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night (29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force in his front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt. Drummond, with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, to Brandy Station, to bring intelligence of Averell’s movements. The latter had, however, not reached that place. And, learning later in the evening that he had leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where the forces had crossed, Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemy in his front over to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond.
This order read as follows:–
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, April 30, 1863.
BRIG.-GEN. AVERELL, Commanding, etc.
The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. J. ALEXANDER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of his instructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman’s column, so soon as he had masked the latter’s movement towards the Aquia and Richmond Railroad.
On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple of days with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired to Ely’s Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed in command of his division.
The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman’s column were left with the main army, till the expected junction should be made by its advance south of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days’ rations; but he relied upon Hooker’s assurance that he would be up with him before these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, the generals and their staffs setting the example, took with them only what they could carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenching rain, which fell plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first few nights. Stoneman seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing his work thoroughly, and issued stirring orders to his subordinates, calling upon them for every exertion which they were capable of making.
On reaching Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded by the Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six miles below, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, to uncover Raccoon Ford. The main body was then put over.
Stoneman’s column was in the saddle by two A.M. of the 31st. But it proved to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he was obliged to wait for daylight.
He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reached during the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearing up the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the same point; and at ten A.M., May 2, the entire force was at Louisa.
From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertain the meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which had passed up from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Parties were also sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, to destroy whatever material could be found there. Still another destroyed Carr’s Bridge on the North Anna.
The balance of the force was set to work to break up the Virginia Central; and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, tanks, and cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twisted over bonfires.
The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, arriving at Thompson’s Cross-roads at ten P.M. of May 2, headquarters were established at this point.
Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of his instructions, and to have substituted for them ideas originating in his own brain. He assembled his officers, and informed them that “we had dropped like a shell in that region of country, and he intended to burst it in every direction.”
Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, as he was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great object to be achieved, be contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with the Second New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to operate, the former against the railroad-bridges over the Chickahominy, and the latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched Wyndham, of the First New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and destroy the canal-aqueduct over the Rivanna river, and if possible make a dash at the railroad-bridge over the Appomattox; while two regiments under Gregg were to follow down the South Anna to destroy its bridges, followed by the Fifth United-States Cavalry to see that the destruction was complete.
These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus left with five hundred men of Buford’s reserve, or else to push through to Gloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circumstances should dictate.
In pursuance of these orders, Gregg’s column, which, on May 2, had burned the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the South Anna, as far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the stream, and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by some infantry, and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attack this force, and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed the bridge at Yanceyville.
Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himself hidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached Hungary Station at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and several miles of road, passed the Virginia Central at Meadow’s Bridge, which he likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in the vicinity, and camped at night in the rear of Hanover.
On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way a train of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn in depots. He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them.
Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a number of bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; but was unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by an infantry force with part of a battery.
Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south of the town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed some wagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot and some material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. He was, however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the capital, though he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing.
On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met some resistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but, retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point.
Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large amount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges over the James-River canal. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to destroy the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to have delayed him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James river to Elk Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the canal as far as possible. He returned to Thompson’s Cross-roads the same day with W. H. Fitz Lee at his heels.
Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford’s reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming’s Cross-roads; but without effect upon the movements of the command. And another squadron crossed sabres with the enemy at Shannon’s.
Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at the time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to Richmond in one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following close upon them.
To quote Stoneman’s own reasons, the six days’ rations with which he left camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there had been ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from the stores destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague rumors having reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; having accomplished, as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell having been withdrawn, thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,–Stoneman sent Buford with six hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and a small party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched his main body to Orange Court House.
At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs; thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th.
On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly’s, having to swim about twenty yards.
Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then returned to camp.
During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the roads had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th.
Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: “This failure is the more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country in rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth of Stoneman’s force.”
And further:–
“Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more than a few days’ rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his army, or forced him to retreat.”
They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be of use, found in their line of march. “The citizens were in many cases entirely stripped of the necessaries of life.”
Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough to throw his main body in Lee’s rear, so as substantially to cut his communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To accomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which should keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity of Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was beyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a rallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene of operations. Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.
If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and day for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee’s line of supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of his operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick.
Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but it would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more.
His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple of guns.
And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the raiders got back to camp.
Hooker’s criticism in this instance is quite just: “On the 4th, the cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy’s communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations.”
XXXVI.
HOOKER’S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general result of the movement:–
“I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand.”
“I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance.” “In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the nation required a victory.” “I would like to speak somewhat further of this matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of some of Gen. McClellan’s admirers, and I do not know but of others, to circulate erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged in that fight.”
And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: “My impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should add in my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this move, I had a million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboats in readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, in order to replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would be whipped by manoeuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearer Richmond than himself.”
Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of the campaign of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward the attempt. But assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomac stands alone in his measure of the importance of the movement, or of the disastrous nature of the defeat.
XXXVII.
SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 5, 1863. To the Commanding Officer,
Confederate Forces, Chancellorsville, Va.
I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial- party on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for the wounded officers and soldiers of my command.
Very respectfully, etc.,
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 6, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. J. HOOKER,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
General,–I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the necessities of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, under other circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will accord to your dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my own; but, if there is any thing which your medical director here requires which we cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from you such medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Consideration for your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I learn, their comfort would be greatly promoted by additional medical attendance and medical supplies.
I have the honor to be,
Respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 6, 1863, 4.30 P.M.
HIS EXCELLENCY A. LINCOLN,
President of the United States.
Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of eleven A.M. and 12.30. The army had previously re-crossed the river, and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing.
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., May 7, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
My dear Sir,–The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy’s communications. What next? If possible I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemy’s communication being broken; but neither for this reason or any other do I wish any thing done in desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army.
Yours, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863.
His Excellency, President of the United States.
I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and in answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend operations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against. After its occurrence the chances of success were so much lessened, that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At all events, a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other case it was certain to follow the absence of success. I may add that this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I may except one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose details are not wanted of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to recommend it: it will be one in which the operations of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal supervision.
Very respectfully, etc.,
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 7, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
General,–The reasons that prevented me from complying with your request with reference to your wounded no longer existing, I have the honor to inform you that you can extend to them such attentions as they may require. All persons whom it may he necessary to send within my lines for this purpose will remain until the wounded are finally disposed of. The burial of your dead has already been provided for.
I have directed that those of your wounded who desire it, shall be paroled and transferred within your lines, should you be willing to receive them; those in the vicinity of Chancellorsville at the United-States Mine Ford, and those on the battlefield of Salem Church at Banks’s Ford or Fredericksburg. As your wounded generally occupy the few houses in the vicinity of the late battle-field, the transportation of this army cannot be employed in conveying them to the river until my own wounded have been removed to a place of shelter. As soon as this can be accomplished, I will cause such of your wounded as may desire to be paroled, to be delivered at the points above indicated, upon being advised of your willingness to receive them. In the mean time they shall have such care as is given to my own.
I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday in case the original may not have reached you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863, 8 P.M. GEN. R. E. LEE,
Commanding Confederate Forces at Fredericksburg, Va.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications of May 6 and 7 this moment. If agreeable to you, I would like to send medical supplies and attendance to my wounded, and, at such times as the state of the stream will permit, send ambulances for them via the fords designated in your communications, viz., United-States and Banks’s Fords. I will, with your consent, send parties to those fords with supplies at an early hour to-morrow. The swollen state of the Rappahannock probably preventing the crossing of any vehicles with supplies, I shall have to depend upon you for transportation for them. I will receive the wounded at the points named as soon as it can be done. I will send an officer to Chancellorsville, with your consent, to arrange the details, which, judging from your letter, with the state of the river, cannot now be determined by correspondence. Upon an intimation from you as to any deficiency in your immediate necessities of medical supplies of your own, by reason of their use for my wounded or other causes, I shall with pleasure replace them. I would be obliged for approximate information concerning the number of wounded, that a sufficient amount of supplies may be forwarded. I would be under obligations for an early reply.
Very respectfully, etc.,
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. (Copy furnished medical director.)
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 9, 1863. GEN. R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
The relatives and friends of several of the officers of this army who fell in the recent battles, have visited my headquarters with the view, if possible, of proceeding to the battle-fields to recover the bodies of those near to them. I therefore have the honor to ask whether any person will be permitted to visit the battle-fields for the purpose indicated, or whether any arrangement can be made for sending to the lines of this army the bodies of such of our fallen officers as may have friends here seeking for them.
Very respectfully, etc.,
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 10, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER,
Commanding United-States Forces on the Rappahannock.
General,–In reply to your communication of the 9th inst., I have the honor to state that it will give me pleasure to afford every facility to relatives and friends of officers killed in the late battles, to recover their bodies; but I have no means of identifying them, or of ascertaining the fields on which they fell. If you will have me informed, I will cause search to be made.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General.
APPENDIX.
In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the Lowell Institute, in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, by the following gentlemen:–
Feb. 16. Introduction. Gen. Charles Devens of Boston. Feb. 19. Pope’s Campaign. Col. Jed. Hotchkiss of Staunton, Va. Feb. 23. Antietam. Gen. George H. Gordon of Boston. Feb. 26. Chancellorsville. Col. Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army. March 2. Stonewall Jackson. Col. W. Allan of McDonough, Md. March 5. Gettysburg. Gen. Francis A. Walker of Boston. March 9. The Northern Volunteer. Col. T. L. Livermore of Boston. March 12. The Southern Volunteer. Major H. Kyd Douglas of Hagerstown, Md. March 16. Chattanooga. Gen. William F. Smith of Wilmington, Del. March 19. The Wilderness. John C. Ropes, Esq., of Boston. March 23. Franklin and Nashville. Col. Henry Stone of Boston. March 26. The Last Campaign. Col. Fred. C. Newhall of Philadelphia.
These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest study of their respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumes published by them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth told was apparent in the presence of three Confederate officers among the number; and the special feature of the course seemed to be, that not only was the truth spoken in the most unvarnished manner, but that it was listened to with marked approval by overflowing audiences.
Perhaps the most invidious subject fell to my lot. What I said was merely a summary of the foregoing pages. But one point in my lecture aroused the ire of some of Gen. Hooker’s partisans, and was made the subject of attacks so bitter that virulence degenerated into puerility. The occasion of this rodomontade was a meeting of Third-Corps veterans, and its outcome was a series of resolutions aimed at the person who had dared to reflect on Gen. Hooker’s capacity, and to refer to the question of Gen. Hooker’s habitual use of stimulants. The public mention of my name was as sedulously avoided as a reference to his satanic majesty is wont to be in the society of the superstitious; but the exuberance of the attack must have afforded unbounded satisfaction to its authors, as it very apparently did to the audience.
Following are the resolutions, which are of mild flavor compared to their accompanying seasoning of speeches:–
RESOLUTIONS.
The veterans of the Third Army Corps assembled here to-day, soldiers who served under Gen. Joseph Hooker in his division, corps, and army, re-affirm their lifelong affection for their old commander, their admiration for his brilliant achievements as one of the prominent generals of our armies, and protest against the recent revival of unjust assaults made on his conduct at Chancellorsville. Whether, after _one of the most noted tactical victories of modern times_, having placed the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock River on the flank of Lee, he might have gained a still farther advanced position; whether the failure of the cavalry to fully accomplish what was expected of it; whether the disaster to the Eleventh Corps and the delay in the advance of the Sixth Corps,–are to be attributed to errors of judgment of Gen. Hooker or of the subordinate commanders, are points which will be discussed again and again with profit to the military student. But we, who witnessed his successful generalship at Williamsburg, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run, and Antietam, have no language at our command strong enough to express our contempt for any one who, twenty years after the war, affirms that on any occasion in battle, with the lives of his men and the cause of his country in his keeping, Gen. Hooker was incapacitated for performing his whole duty as an officer by either the use of liquor or by the want of it.
We protest against oft-repeated statements that “Fighting Joe Hooker,” while one of the bravest and ablest division commanders in the army, was possibly equal to handling a corps, but proved a failure as an independent commander. Assigned to the Army of the Potomac in January, 1863, after the disaster at Fredericksburg and the failure of oft- repeated campaigns, our army demoralized by defeat, desertions, and dissensions, Gen. Hooker re-organized his forces, stopped desertions, brought back to their colors thousands of absentees, and in three months revived confidence, re-established discipline, and enabled his army to take the field unsurpassed in loyalty, courage, and efficiency, as was shown at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. We say Chancellorsville because, although not a victory for us, the campaign _inflicted on the enemy losses at least equal to our own_; and we say also Gettysburg because that victory was won by the army Hooker had re-organized, and led with such matchless skill from Falmouth to the eve of the battle.
Whatever ambition he may have had to command armies, it did not prevent his cheerfully serving his country under junior officers, giving them faithful support, and his record shows no instance of his removal from command by his superiors.
Here in his native State, amid the homes of so many of his old brigade, the survivors of the Third Army Corps, all witnesses of his genius, valor, and devotion to duty, indorse his record as a soldier, as a gentleman, and as a patriot, and sincerely believe that history will assign to Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker a place among the greatest commanders of the late civil war.
The italics are mine. “One of the most noted tactical victories of modern times,” applied to Chancellorsville, is refreshing. Equally so is the exultant claim that “we inflicted on the enemy losses at least equal to our own.” The infliction of loss on the enemy has always been understood by military men to be an incident rather than the object of war.
The following reply in “The Boston Herald” of April 11, 1886, explains itself:–
TO THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD.
In the call for the meeting of the Third Corps Gettysburg Re-union Association, held at Music Hall on Fast Day, was the following clause:–
“Loyalty to the memory of our beloved commander, Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker, makes it a duty, on this occasion, to protest against unjust and uncalled-for criticisms on his military record as commander of the Army of the Potomac.”
It having been intimated to me by some old brother officers of the Third Corps, that my late Lowell lecture on Chancellorsville was the occasion of this proposed protest, I wrote to the chairman of the committee which called the meeting, asking for an opportunity to reply to this protest, within such bounds as even-handedness and the purposes of the meeting would allow. The committee answered that it could not see the propriety of turning the occasion into a public debate, and referred me to the press. I do not object to their decision, made, no doubt, upon what appeared to them sufficient grounds; but as the occasion was turned into a public debate–one-sided, to be sure–I ask you for space, to reply in your valued columns.
As an old Third-Corps man, I attended the meeting at Music Hall. The treasurer did not object to selling me a ticket to the dinner. I expected to hear some new facts about Hooker and Chancellorsville. I expected to hear some new deductions from old facts. I do not consider myself beyond making an occasional lapse even in a carefully prepared piece of work, and am always open to correction. But, to my surprise (with the exception of a conjecture that Lee’s object in his march into Pennsylvania was to wreck the anthracite-coal industry), there was not one single fact or statement laid before the meeting, or the company at dinner, which has not already been, in its minutest details, canvassed and argued at a length covering hundreds of pages in the volumes on Chancellorsville, by Hotchkiss and Allen, Swinton, Bates, the Comte de Paris, Doubleday, and myself, not to speak of numberless and valuable brochures by others. The bulk of the time devoted to talking on this occasion was used in denunciation of the wretch–in other words, myself–who alleged that Joseph Hooker was drunk at Chancellorsville, or at any other time. This denunciation began with a devout curse in the chaplain’s prayer, culminated in a set of fierce resolutions, and ended with the last after-dinner speech.
One thing particularly struck me. There was no one, of all who spoke, who began to say as many things in favor of Joseph Hooker as I for years have done; and not in fleeting words, but printed chapters. There was plenty of eulogy, in nine-tenths of which I joined with all my heart. But it was of the soldiers’-talk order,–cheering and honest and loyal, appealing to the sentiments rather than the intelligence. What I have said of Hooker has been solid praise of his soldierly worth, shown to be borne out by the facts. Barring, in all I say, the five fighting days at Chancellorsville, I have yet to find the man who has publicly, and in print, eulogized Hooker as I have done; and no one among the veterans gathered together Fast Day applauded with more sincerity than I, all the tributes to his memory. For though, as some one remarked, it is true that I “fought mit Sigel,” and decamped from Chancellorsville with the Eleventh Corps; it is also true that I passed through the fiery ordeal of the Seven Days, and fought my way across the railroad-cutting at Manassas, side by side with Joseph Hooker, under the gallant leadership of that other hero Philip Kearney. It was very evident that but few of the speakers, as well as auditors, had themselves heard or read what I actually said. The result of “coaching” for the occasion by some wire-puller was painfully apparent. Let us see what was said. I give the entire paragraph from my Lowell lecture:–
“It has been surmised that Hooker, during this campaign, was incapacitated by a habit of which, at times, he had been the victim. There is, rather, evidence that he was prostrated by too much abstemiousness, when a reasonable use of stimulants might have kept his nervous system at its normal tension. It was certainly not the use of alcohol, during this time, which lay at the root of his indecision.”
If that is an accusation that Hooker was then drunk, if it does not rather lean toward an exculpation from the charge of drunkenness, then I can neither write nor read the English language. As is well known, the question of Hooker’s sudden and unaccountable loss of power, during the fighting half of this campaign, coupled with the question of drunkenness, has been bandied to and fro for years. The mention alone of Chancellorsville has been enough, ever since that day, to provoke a query on this very subject, among civilians and soldiers alike. In a lecture on the subject, I deemed it judicious to lay this ghost as well as might be. Had I believed that Hooker was intoxicated at Chancellorsville, I should not have been deterred by the fear of opposition from saying so. Hooker’s over-anxious friends have now turned into a public scandal what was generally understood as an exoneration, by intentionally distorting what was said into an implication that Hooker was so besotted as to be incapable of command. What I have written of his marching the army to this field and to the field of Gettysburg is a full answer to such unnecessary perversion. Let these would-be friends of Hooker remember that this calumny is of their own making, not mine. I am as sorry for it, as they ought to be. If the contempt expressed in the resolutions they passed had been silent, instead of boisterous, Hooker’s memory would have suffered far less damage.
Gens. Sickles and Butterfield are doubtless good witnesses, though they sedulously refrained from any testimony on the subject, contenting themselves with declamation. But they are not the only good witnesses. After the loss of a leg at Gettysburg, I was ordered to duty in the War Department, where I served in charge of one or other bureau for seven years. I have heard this Hooker question discussed in all its bearings, in the office of the Secretary of War or Adjutant-General, by nearly every leading officer of the army, hundreds of whom had known Hooker from West Point up. I have had abundant opportunity of forming an opinion, and I have expressed it. Let him who garbles its meaning, bear the blame.
This action by many veterans of the Third Corps–even though procured by design from their thoughtless and open soldier’s nature–is, however, much more sweeping and important. To the world at large it is a general condemnation of every thing which can be said in criticism of Hooker. It will reach far and wide, and in this light I desire to say what I do. The resolutions passed at the meeting explicitly protest against the statement that Hooker proved a failure as an independent commander. This needs notice at greater length than the question of sobriety or drunkenness. Few have studied the details of the campaign of Chancellorsville as carefully as I; but one other author has spread the facts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent criticism before the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much greater length four years ago, in my “History of Chancellorsville;” the reception of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been its own best excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on record his explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he stated his views as follows: “I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand. . . . In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and greater results were expected from it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no general battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so.”
To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeen thousand men is, to say the least, abnormal.
In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said: “Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight. . . . So far as my experience extends, there are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than while it is pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion shall be written, it will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not an exception.”
This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick, Slocum, Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple, Wright, Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous, is a mild phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparing criticism. Hooker also concisely stated his military rule of action: “Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter.” And in his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening the campaign, came the true ring of the always gallant corps commander, “Let your watchword be ‘Fight!’ and let all your orders be, ‘Fight, fight, fight!'”
I might here say that the only attempt, on Fast Day, to exculpate Hooker for the disaster of Chancellorsville was not of an order which can be answered. When one speaker asks, “If Gen. Hooker tells us that it was wise to withdraw across the river, is not that enough for you and me, my comrades?” I can only say that history is not so easily satisfied. To another speaker, who states that when Hooker had planted himself in Lee’s flank by crossing the river, Lee ought, by all the rules of war, to have retreated, but when he didn’t he upset all Hooker’s calculations; that when Jackson made his “extra hazardous” march around Hooker’s flank, he ought, by all rules of war, to have been destroyed, but when he was not he upset all Hooker’s calculations, and that therefore Hooker was forced to retreat,–it is quite beyond my ability to reply. When Gen. Sickles throws the blame upon Howard for the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, by reading the 9.30 A.M. order, without saying one word about Hooker’s actions, change of plans, and despatches from that hour till the attack at 6 P.M., he makes any thinking man question seriously the sincerity of what he calls history. When Gen. Butterfield indulges in innuendoes against Gen. Meade, whose chief of staff he was, and insults his memory in the effort to exculpate the Third Corps from a charge no one has ever made, or thought of making, against it, the fair-minded can only wonder why he goes out of his way to call any one to task for criticising Hooker. Not one word was spoken on Fast Day which does not find its full and entire answer in the already published works on Chancellorsville. It was all a mere re-hash, and poorly cooked at that. To rely on the four reasons given by the Committee on the Conduct of the War as a purgation of Hooker from responsibility for our defeat at Chancellorsville, simply deserves no notice. It is all of a piece with the discussion of the Third-Corps fight at Gettysburg on July 2. No one ever doubted that the Third Corps fought, as they always did, like heroes that day. What has been alleged is merely that Sickles did not occupy and protect Little Round Top, as he would have done if he had had the military coup d’oeil.
Now, I desire to compare with Hooker’s recorded words, and the utterances of Fast Day, the actual performance, and see what “loyalty to Hooker,” as voted in Music Hall, means. Chancellorsville bristles with points of criticism, and there are some few points of possible disagreement. Of the latter the principal ones upon which Hooker’s formal apologists rely, are the destruction of the Eleventh Corps through Howard’s alleged carelessness, and the failure of Sedgwick to perform the herculean task assigned to him in coming to Hooker’s support. Allowing, for the moment, that Howard and Sedgwick were entirely at fault, and eliminating these two questions entirely from the issue, let us see what Hooker himself did, bearing in mind that he has officially acknowledged that he knew, substantially, the number of Lee’s army, and bearing also in mind that the following are facts which can be disputed only by denying the truth and accuracy of all the reports, Federal and Confederate, taken as a body; and these happen to dovetail into each other in one so consistent whole, that they leave to the careful student none but entirely insignificant items open to doubt.
From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, Hooker with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First Corps, nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings of Lee’s army of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men respectively, being all the while cognizant of the facts. Had ever a general a better chance to whip his enemy in detail? And yet we were badly beaten in this fight. Now, if loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that his conduct of this campaign was even respectable, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, respectably led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, two to one. Will the soldiers of the ever-faithful army accept this as an explanation of our defeat?
Again: from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker, with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of twenty-seven thousand. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, three to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our defeat?
Again: from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours, against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch (the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteen thousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick. If loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one. Shall we accept this as an explanation of our defeat?
If there is in the world’s military history a parallel to this extraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended to study the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to find such an instance in the course of many years’ reading, and shall be happy to have it pointed out to me. Hooker’s wound cannot be alleged in extenuation. If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command over to Couch, the next in rank. If he did not do this, he was responsible for what followed. And he retained the command himself, only using Couch as his mouthpiece.
I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac was at any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, man for man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson’s in its palmiest days. When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, as here, defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter its force of the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a reason other than Hooker’s alleged lack of heart of his subordinate officers. And this reason is only to be found in Hooker’s inability to handle so many men. All the resolutions in the world, passed under a furore of misstatement and misconception, even by such a noble body of men as Third-Corps veterans, will not re-habilitate Joseph Hooker’s military character during these five days, nor make him other than a morally and intellectually impotent man from May 1 to May 5, 1863. Loyalty to Hooker, so-called, is disloyalty to the grand old army, disloyalty to the seventeen thousand men who fell, disloyalty to every comrade who fought at Chancellorsville. I begrudge no man the desire to blanket facts and smother truth in order to turn a galling defeat into a respectable campaign; I begrudge no man his acceptance of Hooker’s theory that Chancellorsville was not a disaster; I begrudge no one his faith in Hooker as a successful battle-field commander of the Army of the Potomac. But let it be well understood that this faith of necessity implies the fact that the Army of the Potomac was unable or unwilling to fight one-quarter its number of Lee’s troops. I prefer my faith in the stanch, patient army, in its noble rank and file, in its gallant officers, from company to corps; and I refuse to accept Hooker’s insult to his subordinates as any explanation for allowing the Army of the Potomac to “be here defeated without ever being fought.”
The Army of the Potomac was better than its commanders from first to last. It was, beyond speaking, superior to its commander during the fighting days at Chancellorsville. As a corps commander, Joseph Hooker will always be a type and household word. In logistics, even as commander of the Army of the Potomac, he deserves high praise. But when it comes to fighting the army at Chancellorsville, let whoso will keep his loyalty to Hooker, without protest from me. I claim for myself and the bulk of my comrades the right, equally without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to express my loyalty to the rank and file, my loyalty to the officers, and my loyalty to the army as a whole. And I claim, moreover, the right, without protest, sneers, or resolutions, to show that on this field it was the general commanding, and not the army, whose lapses caused defeat. Not that I object to these Fast-Day resolutions. I believe that I can still struggle onward in life, even under the contempt of their authors. But partisanship in matters of history is a boomerang which always flies back to whack its thrower. And Fast Day’s performance was baldly partisan.
I am satisfied to abide the verdict of all soldiers, of all citizens, who ever studied the facts of this campaign. What ever the action of any meeting of old soldiers may be under partial knowledge of facts, under the influence of heated or sectional discussion, or under the whipping-in of a member of Hooker’s staff, I do not believe that with the issue squarely put before them, and the facts plainly stated, any but a very inconsiderable fraction, and that not the most intelligent one, of the men of the Army of the Potomac, will give their suffrage to what has been suddenly discovered to be loyalty due to Gen. Joseph Hooker, as against loyalty to the Army of the Potomac.
The recent course of lectures at the Lowell Institute was intended to be a purely military one. There was no intention of bringing politics or sectional pride into the discussion, and it was thought that the lectures could to-day be delivered without rousing a breath of ancient animosity. If there was any campaign during our civil war which was especially, in a military sense, a glorious one for the rebels, and an ignominious one for us, it was Chancellorsville. It is indeed a pity that the skill of the one side and the errors of the other cannot be once again pointed out, that the true and only possible explanation of Hooker’s one hundred and thirty thousand men being defeated by Lee’s sixty thousand cannot be once again stated, without eliciting from a body of veterans of the old Third Corps a set of condemnatory resolutions. There has been some very heated criticism of the recent lectures, and not a little fault-finding with the lecturers. I presume that none of the gentlemen who participated in the course would feel like denying the inference, so often suggested, that the censors might have done much better than they were able to do. Such censors generally can. These dozen lecturers have all been earnest students of our civil war, as is abundantly testified by the twenty odd volumes on the subject published by them since the reports of operations became available; and they keenly feel that modesty which is always bred of study. Such as they had, they were glad to give the public; nor do they in any wise shrink from generous disagreement or courteous criticism. I submit, however, that some of the carping which has been indulged in is scarcely apt to lead to the correction of errors, or the elucidation of truth. It is passing strange, that, at this late day, one may not criticise the military operations without arousing the evil spirit of the war. Can we not aim at truth, rather than self-gratulation, which will live no longer than we do? Criticism has always been indulged in, always will be. If a Frederick may be dissected by a Lloyd, if a Napoleon may be sat on in judgment by a Lanfrey, may not the merest tyro in the art of war he pardoned for reviewing Hooker? The gallant soldier who helped make history rarely writes history. The same spirit which sent him to the front in 1861 generally keeps him busy to-day with the material interests of the country. Despite the certainly novel fling of Fast Day at one who went into service as a mere boy, it remains a fact that rank, without the devoted study of years and a single eye to truth, will not enable any one to write history. It was proven beyond a peradventure on Fast Day, that the command of a corps, let alone a division, will not of itself breed a historian. Partisanship never will.
Truth will get written some day. I myself prefer to write as an American, forgetting North and South, and to pass down to those who will write better than any of us, as one who tried to speak the truth, whomsoever it struck. It is not I who criticise, who condemn Joseph Hooker: it is the maxims of every master, of every authority on the art of war. Not one of Hooker’s apologists can turn to the history of a master’s achievements, or to a volume of any accepted authority, without finding his pet commander condemned, in every action, and on every page, for the faults of the fighting days at Chancellorsville.
It was assumed on Fast Day that one should criticise only what he saw. I have never understood that Gibbon’s “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire” is any the less good because he did not live in the first few centuries of the Christian era, or that Jomini could write any less well of Frederick than of Napoleon. Service certainly helps a man in his researches or work, but it only helps. The best critic may be one who never served. I think I was the first officer to whom the Secretary of War permitted free use of the rebel archives for study. I have had good opportunities. How I have used them, I leave to others to say. It is easy to capture a meeting of honest-hearted veterans by such lamentable prestidigitation as was exhibited on Fast Day, and to pass any resolutions desired, by appealing to their enthusiasm. I prefer to be judged by the sober after-thought of men who are neither partisans, nor ready to warp facts or make partial statements to sustain their theories.
THEODORE A. DODGE. BOSTON, April 10, 1886.
Transcriber’s Appendix: Transcription notes:
The first edition of this book was published in 1881. The author’s appendix was added in the second edition, in 1886, which is the source for this etext.
The following modifications were applied while transcribing the printed book to e-text:
chapter 4
– table on p 19, fixed typo (“McGown”, should be “McGowan”)
chapter 12
– p 71, para 1, fixed typo (“inititate”)
chapter 18
– p 111, para 1, fixed typo (“Pleasanton”)
chapter 27
– p 180, para 1, fixed “the the”
Limitations imposed by converting to plain ASCII: – The words “manoeuvre”, “manoeuvres” and “manoeuvring” are printed in the book using the “oe” ligature. The term “coup d’oeil” was also printed with the “oe” ligature, “minutiae” was printed using the “ae” ligature, and several other French terms (such as “elan” and “echelon”) were printed with accented vowels. However, this does not seem enough to merit an 8-bit text.
– Italics were printed for various non-English words and phrases, and occasionally for emphasis. For the most part, these were simply converted to plain text. However, I did use underscores to denote two italicized phrases in the author’s appendix, where the use of italics was more significant.
I did not modify:
– The phrases “on each side the road”, “on both sides the road” – The first paragraph of chapter 22 contains the phrase “angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan” I believe “or” is incorrect and should be probably “for” or “of”, but I don’t know which. “or” is printed in both the 1881 and 1886 editions, so I left it as is.