are uneasy about it, as they are so unprovided for the journey. I have, however, hurried on preparations, and will be able to set off to-morrow morning. The circumstances of my being ready sooner than I expected, and a letter from the Governor of Maryland telling that six ships, whom I take to be plundering vessels, were coming up the Potomac, induces me not to wait for your Excellency’s answer. Not that I pretend to defend the towns of Alexandria, Baltimore and Annapolis, at a time, or to stop the depredations of the enemy’s parties in a country where their naval superiority renders it impossible; but because I don’t think any consideration must delay the execution of superior orders, and because, if the corps was not sent to Southward they would with alacrity march back thirty or forty miles more to rejoin the grand army.
Having received no particulars of your Excellency’s journey to Rhode Island, but by the paper, a letter from you to Mr. Lund Washington, and private letters from some friends, I cannot know what change has taken place in your plans, and am not able to account for the inactivity which you foresee for the grand army. Letters from Ministers, letters from my friends, intelligences from other quarters, every thing was combined to flatter me with the hope that our grand and decisive object would be in contemplation. I then was not displeased with the dispositions of the enemy that weakened that place. It is probable that your Excellency’s plans have changed, and you intend to prosecute the war to the Southward.
I had yesterday the pleasure of dining on board the Hermione, and left her under sail to go to Rhode Island, where she will probably be the day after to-morrow. Mr. Delatouche, uncle to captain Latouche, will, it is said, command the squadron of the second division. I was conversing with his nephew, on whom he has an entire confidence on the expedition against New York, and he assured me that his Uncle’s plan would certainly be to take possession of the harbour, and send a force up the North River, which you know is entirely the thing that you wanted M. de Vernay to do.
Mr. Delatouche having confidentially told me that he had a great influence over Mr. Destouches, I observed to him how important it was for the common cause that the French fleet might have the greatest possible activity. We were also conversing of the difficulties we laboured under for transportation, and be told me that the next day after his arrival at Rhode Island, unless such obstacles occurred as he could not foresee; Mr. Destouches would make you an offer of the ship l’Eveille, and the four frigates to carry twelve hundred men to any part of` continent you might think proper. Those ships are too strong to be afraid of frigates, and too fast sailers to be in the least concerned by the fear of a squadron. Thinking that (particularly as Lord Cornwallis has retreated) our march would take us forty days, where desertion and sickness, occasioned by want of shoes and every other necessary, as well as by the heat of the season, would much reduce our numbers, and that these ships, with the addition of the two frigates at Philadelphia, armed _en flute_, would in sailing on the 4th or 5th of May, carry 1500 men to Wilmington, Georgetown, or any place in the rear of Lord Cornwallis or the neighborhood of General Greene, I thought it my duty to encourage this idea, which would bring us to the point of operations sooner than we could arrive by land. It would also give you the time of forming at Morristown or Trenton, a detachment well provided, agreeably to the project you had in contemplation after the return of this corps. The appointment of officers could be made without affecting the delicacy of the regimental officers, nor the honor of those already employed. While we would be operating, Mr. Destouches might keep cruizers off Charleston. These ideas, my dear General, are only thrown out in consequence of the freedom you have often ordered me to take. What Mr. Destouches may do is uncertain, and I did not think myself authorised to express to him the least wish on that head. It was my duty to relate our difficulties to you, and the chances I foresaw to see them relieved in some measure; but unless the bad weather, of which there is now a prospect, makes it impossible, I will be to-morrow at the ferry at the Susquehannah.
You may have known from Mr. de La Luzerne, that two millions and a half had been given to Mr. Franklin, and that Marquis de Castries and Count de Vergennes, were trying to obtain a sum more adequate to our wants. This, however, the Minister of France has requested me not to mention, as it was as yet an uncertainty, and would perhaps give ill-grounded hopes, destructive of the internal efforts we ought to make. I am told that just before the departure of Mr. Dela Peyrouse, some dispatches were sent to Brest; but do not think they contain any thing relating to our operations, as Marquis de Castries writes me that the determination of the Council upon our letters will be sent by the ships who is to convoy the expected vessels.
I am very sorry I have not seen the Aid de Camp who had a verbal message from General Greene. Inclosed I send to your Excellency the letter I have received on the occasion. Perhaps, did he mean to propose an expedition towards Cape-fear or Georgetown, which might be made with the light squadron above mentioned. An additional circumstance is, that l’Eveille will now be commanded by Mr. de Lombard, captain Latouche’s uncle, who is entirely under that Gentleman’s influence.
I write to the board of war to get some shoes and other parts of clothing. I will this morning speak to the commanding officers of battalions on our intended journey; but have not yet said any thing to Colonel Gimat and Major Galvan, because it is possible that new circumstances may engage you to change your dispositions. Going by water, if possible, would level most all difficulties; but if I don’t hear from you, I will always proceed on. I have the honor to be, yours &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Washington’s Letters of 21st of March and 5th and 6th of April. Sparks’ Writ. of Wash. volume 7. pp. 449 and 468, 8469. See also–Sparks’ Writ. of Wash. vol. 8. Appendix No. 1.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1751.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–I received your Excellency’s letter relating to Colonel Gouvion. It would have been very agreeable to me to keep this officer, your orders have been sent to Philadelphia where he is for the present. However distant I may be from the scene, I am happy to find that your Excellency hopes to undertake the grand object we have had in contemplation.
By a letter just received from the board of War, it seems that representations of wants have been made which they have mistaken for objections from me to our journey southward. I have said to some officers that our proximity to the southern states was the reason which had induced your Excellency to send this detachment, but I hope I need not assure you that I never thought of intimating the least idea of alteration to your Excellency’s projects, but such as you would think of making yourself after your own ideas and intelligences. Perhaps my letter to the board of War may appear disrespectful or impolite, but nothing could stop me in an instance where it might be suspected I objected to your plans, or even differed in opinion. You know me too perfectly not to think an explanation useless.
It is confidently reported that the second division is arrived in the capes of Delaware, consisting of nine sail of the line, this was the number mentioned to me by the Marquis de Castries to be in harbour, your Excellency would in that case have a brilliant Campaign to the northward.
With the highest and most affectionate respect Yours &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Wash. of the 11th April. Sparks’ Writ. of Wash. vol. 8, p. 11.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 13th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–Had your Excellency’s answer to my letter of the 8th, been forwarded with an equal celerity that your favor of the 6th, I would have received it before this time, but whatever change my new situation could make in your Excellency’s dispositions, I thought it my duty in the mean while to obey the positive orders I had received, the Troops are now crossing the ferry and will with all possible speed proceed to Richmond.
By a letter received from General Green I find that he is, strongly of opinion that I must go to the southward, his intention is to carry the seat of war into South Carolina, there by preventing a junction between Arnold and Cornwallis, he gives me many excellent reasons to justify the movement and requests me to make to Richmond, and they will, if possible, increase my zeal to execute your Excellency’s orders.
General Green’s opinion is that Lord Cornwallis will fall down towards Wilmington, his own project is to carry the war into South Carolina. Under these circumstances a corps of Light Infantry embarked at Philadelphia on board a light squadron might have been upon the seat of war in a very short passage.
I cannot help fearing, my dear General, that our campaign will take a defensive turn which is far from answering our first plans and expectations. Major McPherson is with me as a volunteer, that officer has most zealously employed himself and has been most dangerously exposed in the discovery of a plot made to furnish the enemy with provisions, he has managed this matter with infinite address, being for two days and one night with six soldiers who, as well as himself, put on the air of British, and, in company with a spy who thought them to be enemy and by a most violent gale of wind, crossed the bay in a small boat, by which means he was made sensible that a trade of flour is carried with the enemy from the western shore of Maryland, and saved a magazine of 800 barrels of continental flour which would otherwise have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In case we proceed southerly perhaps will it be possible for General Green to give Mayor McPherson a command in some detachment; I would be happy if he was recommended to him by your Excellency. My determination being to go on with rapidity, unless I am recalled, your Excellency may easily judge of my movements from the answer I will probably receive in a few hours. Was I to assure your Excellency that this journey is perfectly agreeable to the Troops, I would not use that candor which you have so much right to expect, but their zeal and discipline insure their readiness to obey. I shall do my utmost to prevent desertion, and unless I was recalled, I shall proceed with celerity. But I beg your Excellency to remember that experience has often taught us how much reduced has ever been the number of our troops from the time of their departure to that of their arrival at the Southern army.
With the highest and most affectionate respect,
Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Susquehannah ferry April 14th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL–Your Excellency’s letter of the 11th, has overtaken me at this place, and having given to you an account of every measure I thought proper to take, I will only add that I am still at the ferry where the troops have crossed the river; but the wind blows so high that it has been impossible to take the waggons over, and I am obliged to have others impressed on the southern side of the Susquehannah. Your Excellency mentions the propriety of remaining at the head off Elk until shoes can be collected, but the prospect I have from the board of war are not flattering enough to encourage this measure. On the other side General Green is pressing in his advices, and will soon be so in his orders to me. I cannot obtain any good account of Phillip’s motions, nor oppose the schemes he may have formed, until I am much farther advanced; and dissatisfaction and desertion being two greater evils than any other we have to fear; I am anxious to have rivers, other countries, and every kind of barrier to stop the inclination of the men to return home. Many men have already deserted, many more will I am afraid take the same course, whatever sense of duties, ties of affection, and severity of discipline may operate, shall be employed by me, and I wish we might come near the enemy, which is the only means to put a stop to the spirit of desertion.
Many articles, and indeed every one which compose the apparatus of a soldier, will be wanting for this detachment. But shoes, linen, overalls, hunting shirts, shirts, and ammunition will be the necessary supplies for which I request your Excellency’s most pressing orders to people concerned, and most warm entreaties to the board of war. I wish it was possible to have the men equiped at once, and this would be a great saving of expense.
While I am writing to your Excellency the wind rises more and more, which will much impede our passage for such stores as were to cross over with the waggons, and the guard appointed to stay with them. At such a distance from the enemy, I cannot give your Excellency any account of their movements, but by the last intelligence General Phillips was still at Portsmouth.
Should the French get a naval superiority, an expedition against Portsmouth is very practible. These companies, filled up to their proper number, and some other troops to increase the corps to two thousand, would with a detachment of artillery from Philladelphia, be equal to the attack of that post. 3000 militia can with the greatest ease be collected. In case Duke de Lauzurn’s legion arrives, that corps could come in the fleet; but should the French become superior at sea the British fleet in Chesapeak would be in danger, and in every case, if your Excellency thinks of sending any reinforcement this way, (let it be the Jersey troops or recruits) their coming by water to James or York river may save an immense trouble and expense.
My heart and every faculty of my mind, have been these last years so much concerned in the plan of an expedition against * * * that I am very desirous to hear, by the very first safe opportunity what reasons can have overthrown the project.
Some disputes that have at first happened between the Jersey and New-England troops, make me think that these last must be as much as possible separated from the Pensylvanians.
While I was writing these accounts have been brought to me, that, a great desertion had taken place last night: nine of the Rhode Island company, and the best men they had, who have made many campaigns, and never were suspected, these men say they like better a hundred lashes than a journey to the south-ward. As long as they had an expedition in view they were very well satisfied, but the idea of remaining in the southern states appear to them intolerable, and they are amazingly averse to the people and climate. I shall do my best, but if this disposition lasts I am afraid we will be reduced lower than I dare express. With the highest and most affectionate respect, yours &,c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Washington, of the 21st and 22d April–Sparks’ Writ. of Wash. v. 8., pp. 19, 22.
TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Hanover Court House, April 28th, 1781.
Sir,–Having received intelligence that General Phillips’ army were preparing at Portsmouth, for offensive operations. I left at Baltimore every thing that could impede our march, to follow us under a proper escort, and with about a thousand men, officers included; hastened towards Richmond which I apprehended would be a principal object with the enemy.
Being on our way, I have received successive accounts of their movements. On the 21st, the British troops, commanded by their Generals, Philips and Arnold, landed at City Point on the south side of James River. A thousand militia under Maj. General Caroude Stuben and General Muhlenberg, were posted at Blandford to oppose them, and on the 25th they had an engagement with the enemy; the militia behaved very gallantly, and our loss, it is said, is about twenty killed and wounded. The same day, the enemy whose force it is reported to be near 2500 regular troops, marched into Petersburg. Yesterday they moved to Osburn’s, about thirteen miles from Richmond, and after a skirmish with a corps of militia, destroyed some vessels that had been collected there, but have not yet attempted to cross the river. Baron de Stuben, is at the same side, and has removed to Falling Creek Church.
The Continental detachment will in a few hours arrive at this place, 20 miles from Richmond. The enemy are more than double our force in regular troops and their command of the waters gives them great advantages.
With the highest respect, I have the honor to be yours, &c.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp on Pamunkey River, May 3d, 1781.
Sir,–I had lately the honor to inform you of the enemy’s movements towards Richmond, and the forced marches I was making to its defence. The detachment arrived on the 29th; the British army was thirteen miles distant on the other side of the river. Petersburg, Chesterfield Court House, and part of our vessels had fallen into their hands. Our regular force consisted of 900 men, rank and file; that of the enemy, of 2,300, at the lowest estimate.
The command of the water, and such a superiority of regular troops, gave them possession of our shore. There was no crossing for us, but under a circuit of fifteen miles, and from the number and size of their boats, their passage over the river was six times quicker than ours.
Richmond being their main object. I determined to defend this capital, where a quantity of public stores and tobacco was contained. General Nelson was there, with a corps of militia, and Generals Stuben and Muhlenberg, higher up on the other side. The same evening, we were by summons from General Philips, made accountable for the public stores on board vessels near the town, (which he declared) should certainly fall into his hands. Next morning the enemy moved to Manchester, opposite Richmond, where they burnt the ware-houses. Six hundred men ventured on this side, but were timely recalled, and being charged by a few dragoons of Major Nelson, flew into their boats with precipitation.
Knowing General Phillip’s intention against Richmond, (orders for attack had been already given) I directed Baron de Stuben to join us, and collected our force to receive the enemy, but the same night they retreated to Osburn’s, from thence to the neck of land formed by James River and Appamatox, where they have re-embarked. Col. Pleasant’s and Good’s battallions of militia, were sent on each side of the river and gave annoyance to their troops and boats. The enemy have lost some men killed, prisoners and deserters. Since the British army landed at City Point, (some flour excepted at the Court-house) no public property has been destroyed. Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp near Bottom’s Creek, May 4th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–I request you will receive my affectionate acknowledgements for your kind letters. Every mark of friendship I receive from you adds to my happiness, as I love you with all the sincerity and warmth of my heart, and the sentiment I feel for you goes to the very extent of my affections.
Inclosed I send you, my dear General, two copies of letters to General Greene, which I also sent to Congress for their information. You will also find copies of the strange letters I have received from General Phillips, and the answers which, if he does not behave better, will break off our correspondence.
The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for it Richmond was lost, and Major Galvan, who has exerted himself to the utmost, cannot be with us under two days, as he never could obtain or seize horses for the artillery and ammunition waggons. It is not without trouble I have made this rapid march. General Phillips has expressed to an officer on flag, the astonishment he felt at our celerity, and when on the 30th, as he was going to give the signal to attack, he reconnoitred our position, Mr. Osburn, who was with him, says that he flew into a violent passion and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me.
I am, however, uneasy, my dear General, and do not know what the public will think of our conduct. I cannot say in any official letter that no boats, no waggons, no intelligence, not one spy could be obtained; that if once I had been manoeuvring with Phillips he had every advantage over me; that a defeat would have scattered the militia, lost the few arms we have, and knocked down this handful of Continental troops. Great deal of mischief had been already done. I did not know but what the enemy meant to establish a post. Under these circumstances I thought it better to fight on none but my own grounds and to defeat the main and most valuable object of the enemy. Had I gone on the other side, the enemy would have given me the slip and taken Richmond, leaving nothing to me, but the reputation of a rash unexperienced young man. Our stores could not be removed.
No orders from General Greene have as yet come to me. I cannot conceive the reason of his delay in answering my letters. In the meanwhile, Phillips is my object, and if with a thousand men I can be opposed to three thousand in this State, I think I am useful to General Greene. In a former letter he tells me that his object is to divide the enemy, and having no orders I must be regulated by his opinion.
The enemy are gone down the river. I have detached some militia to Hoods where I mean to make a fort. Colonel Hennis, with another corps of militia, is gone towards Williamsburg. His orders are in case the enemy land there, to annoy them, and in case they mean to establish a post, he is to disturb them until I arrive. This position is 16 miles from Richmond, 42 from Williamsburg, 60 from Fredericksburg. I have sent an officer at Point Comfort, and established a chain of expresses to know if they appear to turn towards Potomac. Should it be the case, Fredericksburg will have my attention, having missed Mr. Hunter’s works at Fredericksburg must be their next object as they are the only support to our operations in the southward. Your first letters, my dear General, will perhaps tell me something more about your coming this way. How happy I should be to see you, I hope I need not express. As you are pleased to give me the choice, I shall frankly tell my wishes. If you co-operate with the French against the place, you know I wish to be at head quarters. If something is co-operated in Virginia, I will find myself very happily situated for the present. In case my detachment remains in this State I wish not to leave it, as I have a separate and active command, though it does not promise great glory; but as you gave me leave to do it, I shall in a few days write to you more particularly on my private concerns. It is not only on account of my own situation that I wish the French fleet may come into the bay. Should they come even without troops, it is ten to one that they will block up Phillips in some rivers, and then I answer he is ruined. Had I but ships, my situation would be the most agreeable in the world. Adieu my dear General, you will make me happy to write me sometimes. With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, yours, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letters of Wash. of 31 May.–See Sparks’ Writ., v. 8., p. 60.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May the 8th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–There is no fighting here unless you have a naval superiority, or an army mounted upon race-horses. Phillips’ plan against Richmond has been defeated; he was going towards Portsmouth, and I thought it should be enough for me to oppose him at some principal points in this State. But now it appears I will have business to transact with two armies, and this is rather too much.
By letters from North Carolina, I find that Lord Cornwallis, who I had been assured had sailed from Charleston, is advancing towards Hallifax. In consequence of letters from the same quarter, General Phillip’s has altered his plans, and returned to a place called Brandon on the south side of James river, where he landed the night before last. Our detachment is under march towards the Hallifax road, his command of the water, enabled him to land where I could not reach him. The brigade at Petersburg is destroyed, and unless he acts with an uncommon degree of folly, he will be at Hallifax before me. Each of these armies is more than the double superior to me. We have no boats, few militia, and less arms. I will try to do for the best, and hope to deserve your approbation.
Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and reinforcements destined to General Green’s army. While I am going to get beaten by both armies or each of them seperately, the Baron remains at Richmond where he hurries the collection of recruits, and every other requisite. I have forbidden every department to give me any thing that maybe thought useful to General Greene, and should a battle be expected (an event which I will try to keep off,) no consideration will prevent our sending to Carolina 800 recruits who, I hope, may be equiped in a fortnight. When General Green becomes equal to offensive operations, this quarter will be relieved. I have written to Wayne, to hasten his march, but unless I am very hard pushed, shall request him to proceed south-ward. The militia have been ordered out, but are slow, unarmed, and not yet used to this business. General Green, from whom I had as yet no letters, was on the 26th, before Camden, but did not think himself equal to the storming of the works. My respects, if you please, to Mr. Washington, and compliments to the family. Most respectfully and affectionately.
Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Welton, north side of James River, May 18th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.–Having been directed by General Greene to take command of the troops in Virginia. I have also received orders from him, that every account from this quarter, be immediately transmitted to Congress, and to your Excellency; in obedience to which I shall have the honor to relate our movements, and those of the combined armies of the enemy. When General Phillips retreated from Richmond, his project was to stop at Williamsburg, there to collect contributions which he had imposed, this induced me to take a position between Pamunkey, and Chikahomany rivers, which equally covered Richmond, and some other interesting parts of the State, and from where I detached General Nelson with some militia towards Williamsburg.
Having got as low down as that place, General Phillips seemed to discover an intention to make a landing, but upon advices received by a vessel from Portsmouth, the enemy weighed anchor, and with all the sail they could crowd, hastened up the river, this intelligence made me apprehensive that the enemy intended to manoeuvre me out of Richmond where I returned immediately, and again collected our small force, intelligence was the same day received that Lord Cornwallis (who I had been assured, to have embarked at Wilmington) was marching through North Carolina, (this was confirmed by the landing of General Phillips at Brandon south side of James River.) Apprehending that both armies would move to meet at a central point, I march towards Petersburg and intended to have established a communication over Appamatox and James river, but on the 9th, General Phillips took possession of Petersburgh; a place where his right flank being covered by James River, his front by Appamatox, on which the bridges had been destroyed in the first part of the invasion, and his left not being attackable but by a long circuit through fords that at this season are very uncertain, I could not (even with an equal force) have got any chance of fighting him, unless I had given up this side of James River, and the country from which reinforcements are expected. It being at the enemy’s choice to force us to an action, which their own position insured them against our enterprizes, I thought it proper to shift this situation, and marched the greater part of our troops to this place about ten miles below Richmond. Letters from General Nash, General Sumner, and General Jones are positive as to the arrival of Colonel Tarleton, and announce that of Lord Cornwallis at Halifax. Having received a request from North Carolina for ammunition, I made a detachment of 500 men under General Muhlenberg to escort 20,000 cartridges over Appamatox, and to divert the enemy’s attention, Colonel Gimat, with his battalion, and 4 field pieces cannonaded their position from this side of the River. I hope our ammunition will arrive safe, as before General Muhlenberg returned he put it in a safe road with proper directions. On the 13th, General Phillips died and the command devolved on General Arnold. General Wayne’s detachment has not yet been heard of, before he arrives, it becomes very dangerous to risk any engagement where (as the British armies being vastly superior to us) we shall certainly be beaten, and by the loss of arms, the dispersion of militia, and the difficulty of a junction with General Wayne, we may lose a less dangerous chance of resistance.
These considerations have induced me to think that with our so very great inferiority, and with the advantage the enemy have by their cavalry and naval superiority, there would be much rashness in fighting them on any but our grounds, and this side of the river, and that an engagement which I fear will be soon necessary; ought, if possible to be deferred till the Pensylvanians arrive, whom I have by several letters requested to hasten to our assistance.
No report has lately come from near Hallifax, though a very active officer has been sent for that purpose; but every intelligence confirms that Lord Cornwallis is hourly expected at Petersburg, it is true there never was such difficulty in getting tolerable intelligence, as there is in this country, and the immense superiority of the enemy’s horses, render it very precarious to hazard our small parties.
Arnold has received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.
I am dear General, your most obedient humble servant, Yours &c.
P.S. Injustice to Major Mitchell and Captain Muir, who were taken at Petersburg, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that they had been sent to that place on public service. I have requested General Lawson to collect and take command of the militia south of Appamatox, local impediments was thrown in the road from Hallifax to Petersburg, and precautions taken to remove the horses from the enemy’s reach. Should it be possible to get arms, some militia might be brought into the field, but General Greene and myself labour under the same disadvantage, the few militia we can with great pains collect arrive unarmed, and we have not a sufficiency of weapons to put into their hands.~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Washington’s Letter of the 31st May.–Sparks’ Writ. of Wash., v. 8., p. 60.
TO COLONEL HAMILTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May 23, 1781.
MY DEAR HAMILON,–I have been long complaining that I had nothing to do, and want of employment was an objection I had to my going to the southward; but for the present, my dear friend, my complaint is quite of an opposite nature, and I have so many arrangements to make, so many difficulties to combat, so many enemies to deal with, that I am much of a General as will make me a historian of misfortunes, and nail my curse upon the ruins of what good soldiers are pleased to call the army in Virginia. There is an age past since I heard from you. I acknowledge that on my part, I have not written so often as I ought to have done, but you will excuse this silence in favor of my very embarrassing circumstances, however remote you may be from your former post of aid- de-camp, to the Commander-in-chief, I am sure you are nevertheless acquainted with every transaction at head quarters. My letters have served to report information, and I shall consequently abstain from repetitions.
Our forced march saved Richmond. Phillips was going down, and thus far I am very happy. Phillips’ return, his landing at Brandon, south side of James and Appamatox rivers. Had Phillips marched to Hallifax I was determined to follow him, and should have risked every thing rather to omit making a diversion in favor of Greene; but that army took possession of Petersburg, and obliged me to stick to the side of the river whence reinforcements are expected. Both armies have formed their junction of between four and five thousand men. We have no Continentals; their infantry is near five to one; their cavalry ten to one. Our militia are not numerous, without arms, and not used to war. Government wants energy, and there is nothing to enforce the laws. General Greene has directed me to take command in this State, and I must tell you by the way, his letter is very polite and affectionate; it then became my duty to arrange the departments, which I found in the greatest confusion and relaxation; nothing can be obtained, and yet expenses are enormous. The Baron and the few new levies we could collect, are ordered to South Carolina. Is it not strange that General Wayne’s detachment cannot be heard of? They are to go to Carolina; but should I have them for a few days, I am at liberty to keep them. This permission I will improve so far as to receive one blow, that being beat, I may at least be beat with some decency. There are accounts that Lord Cornwallis is very strong; others make him very weak. In this country there is no getting good intelligence. I request you will write me if you approve of my conduct. The command of the waters, the superiority in cavalry, and the great disproportion of forces, gave the enemy such advantages that I durst not venture out, and listen to my fondness for enterprise; to speak truth, I was afraid of myself as much as of the enemy. Independence has rendered me the more cautious, as I know my own warmth; but if the Pennsylvanians come, Lord Cornwallis shall pay something for his victory.
I wish a reinforcement of light infantry to recruit the battallions, or a detachment under General Huntington, was sent to me. I wish Lawson or Sheldon were immediately dispatched with some horses. Come here, my dear friend, and command our artillery in Virginia. I want your advices and your exertions. If you grant my request, you will vastly oblige your friend. Yours, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Richmond, May the 24th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.–The junction of Lord Cornwallis with the other army at Petersburg was an event that, from local circumstances, and from their so great superiority, it was impossible to prevent, it took place on the 20th, and having lost every hope to operate, a timely stroke in conjunction with the Pensylvanians, my ideas were confined to defensive measures. I therefore moved up to Richmond, where precautions were taken to remove every valuable property, either public or private.
By an officer that was in Halifax after Lord Cornwallis, I hear he has not left any post at that place, it appears, his sick and wounded remained at Wilmington, and were reimplaced by that garison. Reports concerning the numbers are so different, that I cannot trust anything but my eyes, until such an opportunity offers, this is the order of march, in which it is said his Lordship crossed Roanoke. Col. Tarlton’s legion, Col. Hamilton’s corps, 23d, 71st, 33d, British regiments, 200 tories, an Hessian regiment, the light infantry and guards with six field pieces. I am told General Leslie and Genl. O’Hara are with him, I have received successive and repeated accounts, that a British fleet of transports was arrived at Hampton, they were said to consist of 11 large vessels, and 16 smaller ones, under convoy of three large frigates. Mr. Day D.Q.M. at Williamsburg, writes that on the 22nd, 12 sail of large ship; a sloop, and schooner got underway opposite James Town; those ships full of men, and some horses on board the sloop. We have no accounts of any fleet having sailed from New-York.
Yesterday afternoon, we had a heavy rain, which Colonel Tarlton improved in surprising some militia in Chesterfield County, thirty of whom fell into his hands.
This morning at 9 o’clock the enemy moved from Peteraburg towards City Point, and destroyed the bridge they had lately constructed over Appamatoc. I have just received accounts, that a body of them has landed at Westover. These are said to be the men who came up the river from Hampton, previous to which General Arnold had received a small reinforcement from Portsmouth.
To my great mortification, I have heard this morning, that the Pensylvanians are not so near as I had been, by every account positively assured. General Wayne writes me he will hasten to my support, and I am confident he will not lose time at this critical moment, but before he arrives, it is impossible that 900 continentals and 40 horses, with a body of militia by no means so considerable as they are reported to be, and whom it is so difficult to arm, be with any advantage opposed to such a superiority of forces, such a number of cavalry, to which may be added, their very prejudicial command of the writers.
Our handful of men being the point to which militia may be collected, and the only check, however small it is, that the enemy may have in this state, it ought, I think, to be managed with a great deal of prudence as its preservation is so very important to the fate of operations in Virginia.
With the highest respect. I have the honor to be Yours &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–Inclosed you will find the copy of a letter to General Green. He at first had requested that I would directly write to you, since which his orders have been different, but he directed me to forward you copies of my official accounts. So many letters are lost in their way that I do not care to avoid repetitions.–I heartily wish, my dear general, my conduct may be approved of, particularly by you. My circumstances have been peculiar, and in this state I have sometimes experienced strange disappointments. Two of them, the stores at Charlottesville, and the delay of the Pennsylvania detachment, have given me much uneasiness and may be attended with bad consequences. Your presence, my dear general, would do a great deal, Should these detachments be increased to three or four thousand, and the French army come this way, leaving one of our generals at Rhode Island and two or three about New York and in the Jerseys, you might be very offensive in this quarter, and there could be, a southern army in Carolina. Your presence would do immense good, but I would wish you to have a large force. General Washington, before he personally appears, must be strong enough to hope success. Adieu, my dear general, with the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, Yours,~[1]
P.S. If you persist in the idea to come this way. you may depend upon about 3000 militia in the field, relieved every two months. Your presence will induce them to turn out with great spirit.
Footnote:
1. This letter, and the succeeding one to Gen. Greene, was written while Lafayette was retreating before Lord Cornwallis, and as he was about to cross the Rapidan to form a junction with Wayne. See the answers in Sparks’s _Writ. of Wash_. v. 3. p. 86.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp between Rappahannock and North Anna, June 3rd, 1781,
SIR,–I have done myself the honor to write you many letters, but least some of them should have miscarried, which I much apprehend to have been the case, I shall repeat an account of the late transactions in this state.
The junction of the enemy being made, which for the reasons I have mentioned it was impossible to prevent, I retired towards Richmond and waited for Lord Cornwallis’s movements, his regular force being so vastly superior to mine.–Reinforcements from below having still increased it, and his cavalry being ten to one, I could not think to bring into action a small body of eight or nine hundred men, that preserved the shadow of an army and an inconsiderable number of militia whose defeat was certain and would be attended with a fatal loss of arms.–
Lord Cornwallis had at first a project to cross above Richmond, but desisted from it and landed at Westover, he then proposed to turn our left flank, but before it was executed we moved by the left to the forks of Chickahomony,–the enemy advanced twelve miles and we retreated in the same proportion; they crossed Chickahomony and advanced on the road to Fredericksburg. We marched in a parallel with them, keeping the upper part of the country. Our position at Mattapony church would have much exposed the enemy’s flank on their way to Fredericksburg, but they stopped at Cook’s ford on the North Anna river, where they are for the present.–General Wayne having announced to me his departure on the 23d, I expected before this time to have made a junction. We have moved back some distance and are cautious not to indulge Lord Cornwallis with an action with our present force.–
The intentions of the enemy are not as yet well explained. Fredericksburg appears to be their object, the more so as a greater number of troops are said to be gone down than is necessary for the garrison of Portsmouth.–The public stores have been as well as possible removed, and every part of Hunter’s works that could be taken out of the way.–It is possible they mean to make a stroke towards Charlotteville; this I would not be uneasy for, had my repeated directions been executed, but instead of removing stores from there to Albemarle old Court House, where Baron de Steuben has collected six hundred regulars, and where I ordered the militia south of James River to rendezvous–It appears from a letter I received this evening that state stores have been contrary to my directions collected there, least they should mix with the Continentals, but my former letters were so positive, and my late precautions are so multiplied that. I hope the precious part of the stores will have been removed to a safer place. I had also some stores removed from Orange Court House. Dispatches from the Governor to me have fallen into the enemies’ hands; of which I gave him and the Baron immediate notice.
The report of an insurrection in Hampshire county, and the hurry of Lord Cornwallis to communicate the copy of a Cartel with you where it is settled the prisoners will be sent by such a time to Jamestown, are motives that gave me some suspicions of a project towards the Convention troops. The number of the rebels is said to be 700–Gen. Morgan has marched against them; I think the account is pretty well authenticated tho’ it is not official.–Having luckily opened a letter from the Board of War, to the Governor whereby the Convention troops are ordered to New England, I sent a copy of it to Col. Wood and requested an immediate execution of the order. This motive and the apprehension that I might be interrupted in a junction with Gen. Wayne have induced me particularly to attend to our re-union, an event that was indispensable to give us a possibility to protect some part or other of this state. I was until lately ignorant of your orders, that the new Continentals and militia under Baron de Steuben be united with this part of your army, and the Baron intended shortly to march to the southward.–When united to Gen. Wayne 1 shall be better able to command my own movements and those of the other troops in this state.–Had this expected junction taken place sooner, matters would have been very different.
The enemy must have five hundred men mounted and their Cavalry increases daily. It is impossible in this country to take horses out of their way, and the neglect of the inhabitants, dispersion of houses, and robberies of negroes, (should even the most vigorous measures have been taken by the Civil authority) would have yet put many horses into their hands. Under this cloud of light troops it is difficult to reconnoitre as well as counteract any rapid movements they choose to make. I have the honor to be with great respect, &c.
TO GENERAL GREENE,
(ORIGINAL.)
Allen’s Creek, 22 miles from Richmond, Jane 18th, 1781.
SIR,–The enemy’s position at Cooke’s ford enabled them either to return to James River or to gain our northern communication. The arms and other precious stores arriving from Philadelphia, the importance of a junction with Gen. Wayne, and other strong reasons mentioned in my last, made it my first object to check the further progress of Lord Cornwallis. Some stores at the forks of James River were under the care of the major general, the Baron de Steuben, who had five hundred regulars of the Virginia new levies, and some militia.
Col. Tarlton’s legion having pressed for Charlottesville, where the Assembly were sitting, was disappointed in his purpose by proper information being given them. One hundred and fifty arms, however, and a small quantity of powder fell into the enemy’s hands.
A detachment under Col. Simcoe said to be four hundred dragoons and mounted infantry, proceeded to the point of Fork, of which the Baron de Steuben received notice. Both his men and stores were transported to the south branch when the Baron marched to Etaunton River. Simcoe threw over a few men which destroyed what stores had been left. He hazarded a great deal, but our loss was inconsiderable.
In the meantime the British army was moving to the point of Fork, with intention to strike our magazines at Albermarle old Court House. Our force was not equal to their defence, and a delay of our junction would have answered the views of the enemy. But on the arrival of the Pennsylvanians we made forced marches towards James River, and on our gaining the South Anna we found Lord Cornwallis encamped some miles below the point of Fork. A stolen march through a difficult road gave us a position upon Michunk Creek, between the enemy and our magazines, where, agreeable to appointment, we were joined by a body of riflemen. The next day Lord Cornwallis retired towards Richmond (where he now is) and was followed by our small army.
I have directed General Steuben to return this way and a junction will be formed as soon as his distance permits.
With the highest regard, &c., &c.
P. S. The following is an extract of a letter just now received from James Barron, Commodore, dated Warwick, 9 miles from Hampton, June 17th, 1781,
“At five o’clock this afternoon anchored in the road from sea, 35 sail of the enemies’ vessels; viz: 24 ships, 10 brigs and one schooner, which I take to be the fleet that sailed from hence 13 days ago. Only 4 appear to have troops on board.”
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Mr. Tyter’s plantation, 20 miles from Williamsburg, 27th June, 1781.
SIR,–My letter of the 18th, informed you of the enemy’s retrograde movement to Richmond, where they had made a stop. Our loss at the point of Fork chiefly consisted of old arms out of repair and some cannon, most of which have been since recovered.
On the 18th the British Army moved towards us with design as I apprehend to strike at a detached corps commanded by Gen. Muhlenberg, upon this the light Infantry and Pennsylvanians marched under Gen. Wayne when the enemy retired into town. The day following I was joined by Gen. Steuben’s troops, and on the night of the 20th Richmond was evacuated. Having followed the enemy our light parties fell in with them near New Kent Court House, the army was still at a distance and Lord Cornwallis continued his route towards Williamsburg; his rear and right flank were covered by a large corps commanded by Col. Simcoe. I pushed forward a detachment under Col. Butler, but notwithstanding a fatiguing march the colonel reports that he could not have overtaken them, had not Major McPherson mounted 50 light infantry behind an equal number of dragoons, which coming up with the enemy charged them within six miles of Williamsburg; such of the advance corps as could arrive to their support, composed of riflemen under Major Call and Major Willis began a smart action. Inclosed is the return of our loss. That of the enemy is about 60 killed and 100 wounded, including several officers, a disproportion which the skill of our riflemen easily explains. I am under great obligations to Col. Butler and the officers and men of the detachment for their ardor in the pursuit and their conduct in the action. Gen. Wayne who had marched to the support of Butler, sent down some troops under Major Hamilton. The whole British army came out to save Simcoe, and on the arrival of our army upon this ground returned to Winsburg. The post they occupy at present is strong and under protection of their shipping, but upwards of one hundred miles from the point of Fork.
I had the honor to communicate these movements to the executive of the state that the seat of government might be again re-established in the capital. Lord Cornwallis has received a reinforcement from Portsmouth.
With the greatest respect I have the honor to be.
TO GENERAL GREENE.
(ORIGINAL.)
Ambler’s Plantation, opposite Jamestown, 8 July, 1781.
SIR,–On the 4th inst. the enemy evacuated Williamsburg where some stores fell into our hands, and retired to this place under the cannon of their shipping. Next morning we advanced to Bird’s tavern, and a part of the army took post at Norrel’s mill about nine miles from the British camp.
The 6th I detached an advanced corps under Gen. Wayne with a view of reconnoitering the enemy’s situation. Their light parties being drawn in the pickets which lay close to their encampment were gallantly attacked by some riflemen whose skill was employed to great effect.
Having ascertained that Lord Cornwallis had sent off his baggage under a proper escort and posted his army in an opened field fortified by the shipping, I returned to the detachment which I found more generally engaged. A piece of cannon had been attempted by the van guard under Major Galvan whose conduct deserves high applause.–Upon this the whole British army came out and advanced to the thin wood occupied by General Wayne.–His corps chiefly composed of Pennsylvanians and some light infantry did not exceed eight hundred men with three field pieces. But notwithstanding their numbers, at sight of the British the troops ran to the rencontre. A short skirmish ensued with a close, warm, and well directed firing, but as the enemy’s right and left of course greatly outflanked ours, I sent General Wayne orders to retire half a mile to where Col. Vose’s and Col. Barber’s light infantry battalions had arrived by a rapid move, and where I directed them to form. In this position they remained till some hours in the night. The militia under Gen. Lawson had been advanced, and the continentals were at Norrel’s mill when the enemy retreated during the night to James Island, which they also evacuated, crossing over to the south side of the river. Their ground at this place and the island were successively occupied by General Muhlenberg. Many valuable horses were left on their retreat.
From every account the enemy’s loss has been very great and much pains taken to conceal it. Their light infantry, the brigade of guards and two British regiments formed the first line, the remainder of the army the second; the cavalry were drawn up but did not charge.
By the inclosed return you will see what part of Gen. Wayne’s detachment suffered most. The services rendered by the officers make me happy to think that altho’ many were wounded we lost none. Most of the field officers had their horses killed, and the same accident to every horse of two field pieces made it impossible to move them, unless men had been sacrificed. But it is enough for the glory of Gen. Wayne and the officers and men he commanded to have attacked the whole British army with a reconnoitering party only, close to their encampment, and by this severe skirmish hastened their retreat over the river.–
Col. Bowyer of the riflemen is a prisoner.–
I have the honor to be, &e,
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Mrs. Ruffin’s, August 20th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL–Independent of the answer to your letter of the 15th, I have been very particular in a second letter intrusted to Col. Moriss. But at this moment wish to send you minuted and repeated accounts of every thing that passes in this quarter.
The enemy have evacuated their forts at Troy, Kemp’s Landing, Great Bridge, and Portsmouth. Their vessels with troops and baggage went round to York. Some cannon have been left spiked up at Portsmouth; but I have not yet received proper returns.
I have got some intelligences by the way of this servant I have once mentioned. A very sensible fellow was with him, and from him as well as deserters, I hear that they begin fortifying at York. They are even working by a windmill at which place I understand they will make a fort and a battery for the defence of the river. I have no doubt but that something will be done on the land side. The works at Gloster are finished; they consist of some redoubts across Gloster creek and a battery of 18 pieces beating the river.
The enemy have 60 sails of vessels into York river, the largest a 50 gun ship and two 36 frigates.–About seven other armed vessels, the remainder are transports, some of them still loaded and a part of them very small vessels. It appears they have in that number merchantmen, some of whom are Dutch prizes. The men of war are very thinly manned. On board the other vessels there are almost no sailors.
The British army had been sickly at Portsmouth, the air of York begins to refit them. The whole cavalry have crossed on the Gloster side yesterday evening, a movement of which I gave repeated accounts to the militia there; but the light infantry and main body of the militia are at this place, Gen. Wayne on the road to Westover, and we may form our junction in one day. I keep parties upon the enemy’s lines. The works at Portsmouth are levelling. The moment I can get returns and plans l will send them to your Excellency. The evacuation of a post fortified with much care and great expense will convince the people abroad that the enemy cannot hold two places at once.–The Maryland troops were to have set out on Monday last. There is in this quarter an immense want of clothing of every sort, arms, ammunition, hospital stores, and horse accoutrements. Should a maritime superiority be expected, I would propose to have all those matters carried from Philadelphia to the head of Elk.
The numbers of the British army fit for duty I _at least_ would estimate at 4500, rank and file. Their sailors I cannot judge but by intelligences of the number of vessels. In a word this part affords the greatest number of regulars and the only active army to attack, which having had no place of defence must be less calculated for it than any garrison either at New York or in Carolina.
With the highest respect and most sincere affection, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Holt’s Forge, September the 1st, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.–I am happy to inform your Excellency that Count de Grasse’s fleet is safely arrived in this bay; it consists of 28 ships of the line with several frigates and convoys a considerable body of troops under Marquis de St. Simon.–Previous to their arrival such positions had been taken by our army as to prevent the enemy’s retreating towards Carolina.
In consequence of your Excellency’s orders I had the honor to open a correspondence with the French Generals, and measures have been taken for a junction of our troops.–
Lord Cornwallis is still on York river and is fortifying himself in a strong position.–
With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~[1]
Footnote:
1. See answer of Washington, Sparks’s Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 156.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp Williamsburg, Sept. 8th, 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL.–Your letter of the 2d September is just come to hand. Mine of yesterday mentioned that the ships in York river had gone down. Inclosed is the account of an engagement off the capes. What disposition has been made for the internal protection of the bay, I do not know. James river is still guarded, but we have not as yet received any letter from Count de Grasse relative to his last movements. I hasten to communicate them as your Excellency will probably think it safer to keep the troops at the Head of Elks until Count de Grasse returns. Indeed, unless the greatest part of your force is brought here, a small addition can do but little more than we do effect. Lord Cornwallis will in a little time render himself very respectable.
I ardently wish your whole army may be soon brought down to operate.
We will make it our business to reconnoitre the enemy’s works and give you on your arrival the best description of it that is in our power. I expect the governor this evening and will again urge the necessity of providing what you have recommended.
By a deserter from York I hear that two British frigates followed the French fleet and returned after they had seen them out of the capes. A spy says that two schooners supposed to be French have been seen coming up York river, but we have nothing so certain as to insure your voyage, tho’ it is probable Count de Grasse will soon return.
I beg leave to request, my dear General, in your answer to the Marquis de St. Simon you will express your admiration at this celerity of their landing and your sense of their cheerfulness in submitting to the difficulties of the first moments. Indeed I would be happy something might also be said to Congress on the subject.
Your approbation of my conduct emboldens me to request that Gen. Lincoln will of course take command of the American part of your army; the division I will have under him may be composed of the troops which have gone through the fatigues and dangers of the Virginia campaign; this will be the greatest reward of the services I may have rendered, as I confess I have the strongest attachment to these troops.
With the highest respect I have the honor to be,~[1]
Footnote:
1. See Letter of Washington, Sparks’s Writ. of Wash. v. 8. p. 157. A plan of operations in Virginia at p. 158.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Williamsburg, 10 Sept. 1781.
MY DEAR GENERAL,–Gourion is just arrived, he says you may be on your way. We hasten to send to the commanding naval officer in the bay. Hitherto I had no way to write to you by water, but Count de Grasse being at sea we request the officer he has left to have every precaution taken for the safety of navigation. It is probable they are taken, but I would have been too uneasy had I not added this measure to those that have been probably adopted.
I wrote several letters to you; the surprising speedy landing of the French troops under the Marquis de St. Simon; our junction at Williamsburg; the unremitted ardor of the enemy in fortifying at York; the sailing of Count de Grasse in pursuit of 16 sail of the line, of the British fleet, were the most principal objects. I added we were short of flour, might provide cattle enough. I took the liberty to advise James River as the best to land in, the particular spot referred to a more particular examination, the result of which we shall send tomorrow.
Excuse the haste that I am in, but the idea of your being in a cutter leaves me only the time to add that I am, &c.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp before York, September 30th, 1781.
My Dear General–You have been so often pleased to ask I would give my opinion on any subject that may occur, that I will this day take the liberty to mention a few articles.
I am far from laughing at the idea of the enemy’s making a retreat. It is not very probable, but it is not impossible, indeed they have no other way to escape; and since we cannot get ships at York I would be still more afraid of a retreat by West Point than any thing else. The French hussars remaining here, our dragoons and some infantry might be stationed somewhere near West Point, rather on the north side. I see the service is much done by details, and to use your permission would take the liberty to observe that when the siege is once begun it might be more agreeable to the officers and men to serve as much as possible by whole battalions. Col. Scamel is taken: his absence I had accounted for by his being officer of the day. I am very sorry we lose a valuable officer, but tho’ Col. Scamel’s being officer of the day has been a reason for his going in front, I think it would be well to prevent the officers under the rank of generals or field officers reconnoitering for the safety of their commands from advancing so near the enemy’s lines.
There is a great disproportion between Huntington’s and Hamilton’s battalions. Now that Scamel is taken we might have them made equal and put the eldest of the two Lieutenant Colonels upon the right of the brigade.
I have these past days wished for an opportunity to speak with your Excellency on Count de Grasse’s demand relative to Mr. de Barrass’s fleet. This business being soon done, we may think of Charleston, at least of the harbor or of Savannah. I have long and seriously thought of this matter but would not be in a hurry to mention it until we knew how long this will last. However it might be possible to give Count de Grasse an early hint of it in case you agree with him upon the winterly departure of the whole fleet for the West Indies. One of my reasons to wish troops (tho’ not in great number) to be sent to Glocester county by way of West Point is that for the first days it will embarrass any movement of the enemy up the river or up the country on either side, and when it is in Glocester county it may be thought advantageous by a respectable regular force to prevent the enemy’s increasing their works there and giving us the trouble of a second operation, and in the same time it will keep from York a part of the British forces.
With the highest respect and most sincere affection I have the honor to be, &c.~[1]
Footnote:
1. For a “Plan of the Siege of Yorktown,” see Spark’s Writ. of Wash. v.8. p. 186.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
November 29th, 1781
MY DEAR GENERAL,–Inclosed you will find some numbers, a copy of which I have kept, and which contains some names that may probably occur in our correspondence. I need not tell you, my dear General, that I will be happy in giving you every intelligence in my power and reminding you of the most affectionate friend you can ever have.
The goodness you had to take upon yourself the communicating to the Virginia army the approbation of Congress appears much better to me than my writing to the scattered part of the body I had the honor to command. Give me leave, my dear General, to recall to your memory the peculiar situation of the troops who being already in Virginia were deprived of the month’s pay given to the others. Should it be possible to do something for them it would give me great satisfaction.
I will have the honor to write to you from Boston, my dear General, and would be very sorry to think this is my last letter. Accept however once more the homage of the respect and of the affection that render me for ever–
LAFAYETTE.
* * * * *
APPENDIX I.
A SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781,
TO SERVE AS EXPLANATION TO THE MAP.
After the combat of MM. Destouches and Arbuthnot, the project on Portsmouth was abandoned: the French sailed for Rhode Island; the militia were dismissed, the regular troops proceeded to the north. Arnold was afterwards reinforced by Major-general Phillips, and the conquest of Virginia became the true object of the English during this campaign. The allied army, under the Generals Washington and Rochambeau, proceeded towards New York; that of General Greene attacked the posts which had been left in Carolina, both about five hundred miles from Richmond: Major-general the Marquis de Lafayette was charged with defending Virginia.
_April_ and _May_.–From preparations made at Portsmouth, he conceives that the capital was the proposed aim; a forced march of his corps from Baltimore to Richmond, about two hundred miles; he arrives in the evening of the 29th of April; the enemy had reached Osborn; the small corps of militia assemble in the night at Richmond; the next morning the enemy at Manchester, seeing themselves forestalled, re-embark at Bermuda Hundred, and re-descend James River.
The Americans at Bottom’s Bridge, a detached corps in Williamsburg; General Phillips receives an _aviso_, and re-ascends the river, landing at Brandon; second reinforcement from New York; Lord Cornwallis, who was reported to have embarked at Charlestown, advances through North Carolina.
The Americans at Osborn, to establish a communication on James and Appomattox, are forestalled by the march of Phillips to Petersburg, the 10th, at Wilton; the 18th, canonading and reconnoitring, on Petersburg, which, by assembling on one point, the hostile parties permit a convoy to file off for Carolina; the 20th, at Richmond; junction of Lord Cornwallis with the troops of Petersburg; the great disproportion of the American corps, the impossibility of commanding the navigable rivers, and the necessity of keeping the important side of James River, do not allow any opposition.
Having sent a portion of the troops to Portsmouth, Lieutenant-general Lord Cornwallis selected for himself an army of about five thousand men, three hundred dragoons, and three hundred light horsemen; crosses to Westover. The Americans had only about three thousand men, formed of one thousand two hundred regulars, fifty dragoons, and two thousand militia. All the important forces had evacuated Richmond; our troops at Wintson’s Bridge; a rapid march of the two corps, the enemies to engage an action, the Americans to avoid it, and retain the heights of the country with the communication of Philadelphia, which is equally necessary to our army and to the existence of that of Carolina.
_June_.–The magazines of Fredericksburg are evacuated; the Americans at Mattapony Church; the enemy at Chesterfield Tavern; heavy rains, which will render the Rapid Ann impassable; Lord Cornwallis marches to engage the front; our troops hasten their march, and repair to Racoon Ford, to await General Wayne, with a regular corps of Pennsylvanians.
Despairing of being able to engage in action, or cut off the communication between Wayne and Philadelphia, Lord Cornwallis changes his own purpose,and endeavours to defeat that of the Americans; he suddenly directs his movements against the great magazines of Albemarle Court House; a detachment of dragoons strives to carry off the Assembly of State at Charlottesville, but does not accomplish this end; another detachment bore upon Point-of-Fork, where General Steuben formed six or seven hundred recruits; he evacuated that point, and thought he ought to retire in the direction of Carolina; some objects of slight importance are destroyed. The passage of the Rapid Ann was necessary, to avoid being embarrassed by Lord Cornwallis; the communication with Philadelphia was indispensable. It was impossible to hope, even by fighting, to prevent the destruction of the magazines before the junction with the Pennsylvanians. Lafayette takes, therefore, the resolution of waiting for them, and, as soon as they arrive, regains the enemy with forced marches.
The 12th, the Americans at Boswell’s Tavern; Lord Cornwallis has reached Elk Island. The common road, which it is necessary for him to cross to place himself above the enemy, passes at the head of Bird’s Creek; Lord Cornwallis carries thither, his advance-guard, and expects to fall upon our rear; the Americans repair, during the night, a road but little known, and, concealing their march, take a position at Mechunck Creek, where, according to the orders given, they are joined by six hundred mountaineers. The English general, seeing the magazines covered, retires to Richmond, and is followed by our army.
Various manoeuvres of the two armies; the Americans are rejoined by General Steuben, with his recruits; their force then consists of two thousand regulars, and three thousand two hundred militia. Lord Cornwallis thinks he must evacuate Richmond; the 20th, the Marquis de Lafayette follows him, and retains a posture of defence, seeking to manoeuvre, and avoiding a battle. The enemy retires on Williamsburg, six miles from that town; their rear-guard is attacked in an advantageous manner by our advanced corps under Colonel Butler. Station taken by the Americans at one march from Williamsburg.
_July_.–Various movements, which end by the evacuation of Williamsburg; the enemy at Jamestown. Our army advances upon them; the 6th, a sharp conflict between the hostile army and our advance-guard under General Wayne, in front of Green Spring: two pieces of cannon remain in their hands; but their progress is arrested by a reinforcement of light infantry; the same night they retire upon James Island, afterwards to Cobham, on the other side of James River, and from thence to their works at Portsmouth.
Colonel Tarleton is detached into Amelia County; the generals Morgan and Wayne march to cut him off; he abandons his project, burns his wagons, and retires with precipitation. The enemy remaining in Portsmouth, the American army takes a healthy station upon Malvan Hill, and reposes after all its labour.
_August_.–The Americans refusing to descend in front of Portsmouth, a portion of the English army embarks and proceeds by water to Yorktown and Gloucester. General Lafayette takes a position at the Fork of Pamunkey and Mattapony River, having a detached corps upon both sides of York River. The Pennsylvanians and some new levies receive orders to remain on James River, and think them selves intended for Carolina. An assembly of militia on Moratie or Roanoke River; the fords and roads south of James River destroyed on various pretence; movements to occupy the attention of the enemy. As in the event prepared by Lafayette, the means of escape would remain to the garrison of Portsmouth, Lafayette threatened that point. General O’Hara thinks he ought to nail up thirty pieces of cannon, and join the largest part of the army. The whole was scarcely united, when the Count de Grasse appears at the entrance of Chesapeak Bay. General Wayne crosses the river, and places himself in such a manner as to arrest the enemy’s march, if he should attempt to retreat towards Carolina. The French admiral is waited for at Cape Henry by an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, to report to him the respective situations of the land troops, and ask him to make the necessary movements to cut off all retreat to the enemy. He anchors at Cape Henry, sends three vessels to York River, and fills James River with frigates; the Marquis de Saint Simon, with three thousand men, lands at James Island or Jamestown.
_September_.–The river thus defended, General Wayne receives the order to cross it; the Marquis de Lafayette marches upon Williamsburg, and assembles together, in a good position, the combined troops, to the number of seven thousand three hundred men. He had left one thousand rive hundred militia in the county of Gloucester, and sends to hasten some troops coming from the north. This station, which closes all retreat to Lord Cornwallis, (our advance posts nine miles from York,) is retained from the 4th to the 28th of September. Lord Cornwallis reconnoitres the position of Lafayette, and despairs of forcing it.
The 6th September, the Count de Grasse, quitting the defended rivers, goes out with the remainder of his fleet, pursues Admiral Hood, who had presented himself, beats him, and sinks the _Terror_; he takes the _Iris_ and _Richmond_ frigates; the 13th, he joins, in the bay, the squadron of M. de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, with eight hundred men and the French artillery: the fleet of the Count de Grasse consists, at this period, of thirty eight ships of the line.
Admiral de Grasse and General Saint Simon, commanders of the French under Lafayette, urge him to attack Lord Cornwallis and offer him a reinforcement from the ship garrisons. He prefers acting on more secure grounds, and waiting for the troops from the north. General Washington succeeded in reality, in completely deceiving General Clinton as to his intentions; he was advancing towards Virginia with an American detachment, and the army of the Count de Rochambeau embarked at the head of the Chesapeak; they proceeded upon transports, to Williamsburg. The 28th, they march upon New York, and the combined army commences investing it; the 29th, reconnoitring the place; the 30th, the enemy evacuates the advance posts, and retires into the works of York.
_October_.–The 1st, a new reconnoitre; the 3rd, a skirmish between the legion of the Duke of Lauzun and that of Tarleton, in which the former gained the advantage. That legion and eight hundred men from the ships under M. de Choisy, had joined the militia at Gloucester. The night of the 6th, the trenches were opened; that of the 11th, the second parallel. The night of the 14th, the redoubts of the enemy’s left were taken, sword in hand, the one by the grenadiers and French light horsemen, the other by the light infantrymen of the Americans. The first directed by the Baron de Viomenil, a field-marshal; the 2nd by the Marquis de Lafayette. The morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis asked to capitulate; that same evening the firing ceased. The English Army, reduced to eight thousand men, comprising 900 militia gave themselves as prisoners of war.
* * * * *
APPENDIX II
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Havre, 18th July, 1779.
SIR,–You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As it is not a fixed plan which you require, nor a memorial addressed in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your wishes.
The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our assistance, both by sea and land. The smallest effort made now, would have more effect on the people than a great diversion at a more distant period; but besides the gratitude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed states, a body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent. In short, sir, without entering into tedious details, you know that my opinions on this point have never varied, and my knowledge of this country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to our own country.
Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to take Halifax; but as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we should then receive assistance, and, under pretext of invading Canada, we should endeavour to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the British navy in the new world.
Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to, I will diminish, as much as possible, the necessary number of troops. I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and chasseurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally, abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who can relinquish, for one year, the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect American.
I would ask, then, for four thousand three hundred men, and, as I am not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know that I shall not court the choice of the king. Although I have commanded, with some success, a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my own claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly, and as, setting talents apart, it is on the political conduct of the leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that half the success must depend, I am obliged, reluctantly, to set forth a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some basis.
Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix; troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~[1]
Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing batteries onshore; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d’Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months’ provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen, but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of January;~[2] it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy’s fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are assured that four or five weeks’ preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.
The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be, first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island; secure to ourselves, till spring, a fine island and harbour, and have it in our power to open the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance. Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any one of the states, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should take them by surprise.
A few days before our departure, and not sooner (to prevent the consequences of an indiscretion), three corvettes should be despatched to America, with letters to M. de Luzerne, to congress, and to General Washington. We might write that the king, desiring to serve his allies, and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some vessels to America, and, with them, a body of land forces; and that, if congress is in want of their assistance, they will willingly lend their aid to General Washington, but otherwise they will proceed to the Islands: This form will be perfectly appropriate. On any part, I would write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters to congress, and to General Washington. To the latter I would say, confidentially, that we have almost a _carte blanche_, and unfold my plans, and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be reported at our departure that we are destined as a garrison to one of the Antilles, while the troops of these islands act on the offensive, and that, in the summer, we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in Canada.
The squadron sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem to threaten New York, and we should find, on our arrival, pilots for different destinations, and the necessary signals and counter signs.~[3] If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about during the night, land at Block Island, and lay siege to Newport.
There are some continental troops, who might reach Bristol in a day. There are militia at Tivertown, who might also be mustered. Greenwich having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot. To escape the inconveniences experienced the last year, the naval commander should send, without a moment’s delay, two frigates, to occupy the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and as the enemy usually leave at Conanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If the wind should be favourable, the vessels might return the same night, or the end of the squadron might join them; all these manoeuvres, however, will depend on circumstances. Thus much is certain, that the same wind which brings us to land will enable us to make ourselves masters of the eastern channel, so as to assist the Americans at Bristol and Tivertown, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel; at all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I describe.~[4]
Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the shore that is behind the town offers great facilities for landing; it is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries. There the French troops might easily disembark, and, reaching at day-break the heights which command the town and the enemy’s lines, might seize their outworks and storm all before there, protected, if necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded by these false attacks on both sides of the island, would suppose that the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manoeuvre appears, the more confident we may be of its success.
You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment; the details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only say here, that my thorough knowledge of the island leads me to think that, with the above mentioned number of troops, and a very slender co- operation on the part of America, I might pledge myself to gain possession of the island in a few days.~[5]
As soon as we are in possession of the island, we must write to the state of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national troops. Unless the state should prefer waiting for the opinion of General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries upon Goat Island, Brenton’s Point and Conanicut Island, would render the passage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there, and would never attempt it in an unfavourable season. We should be supported by the country, and although it is said to be difficult to procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and should obtain more resources than the American army itself.
The same letter that announces to congress our success in Rhode Island, of which, as far as calculations may be relied on, there is little doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and inquire whether, our assistance is further needed. Their reply would open to new fields of service, and, with their consent, we would leave the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The bay of Chesapeak would then be free, and that state might bend its whole force against its western frontiers.~[6]
It is impossible to estimate here the posts which the British occupy in America. Georgia and Carolina appear to need our assistance, and the precise operation against Rhode Island must be decided on the spot; but to give a general idea, it is sufficient to say that the months of December and January should be employed at the south. As the English are obliged to station some of their vessels, frigates, merchant ships, or transports, in each of their ports, they would amount in the whole to a considerable loss.
In the month of February we would return to Newport, where we might employ ourselves in interchanges with New York; and the French sailors, exchanged for soldiers, might be sent under a flag of truce to M. d’Orvillers. Political interests might be treated of with congress, and the commander of the detachment go to Philadelphia to make arrangements with the minister plenipotentiary for the next campaign, and to lay some proposals before congress and General Washington. I should propose sending for deputies from the different savage nations, making them presents, endeavouring to gain them over from the side of the English, and to revive in their hearts that ancient love of the French nation which, at some future day, it may be important for us to possess.
It is needless to say here, that if we should wait until the month of October, the season would be too far advanced to think of Rhode Island, but the southern operations would be equally practicable, and their success more certain, as we should take the enemy by surprise.
In that case, instead of proceeding to Newport, we should winter at Boston, where we should be well received, and provided with every accommodation. We could open the campaign when we pleased, and might make preparations beforehand for a great expedition against Rhode Island, procuring, at the same time, from the inhabitants of the ports of the north of Boston, and especially that of Marble Head, all the information they may have acquired about Halifax.
But let us suppose ourselves established at Newport. The campaign opens by the close of April, and the British will be in no haste to quit New York. The fear of leaving himself unprotected on our side will prevent his executing any design against the forts on the North River. It may even be in our power to assist General Washington in making an attack on New York. Count d’Estaing, before his departure, thought that he had discovered the possibility of a passage through the Sound. This question I leave to naval officers; but, without being one myself, I know that Long Island might be captured, the troops driven off, and, whilst General Washington made a diversion on his side, batteries might be erected that would greatly annoy the garrison of New York. At all events, preparations should be made to act against Halifax in the month of June. With the claims which the other expedition would give us, I will pledge myself that we should be assisted in this by the Americans. I could find at Boston, and in the northern parts, trust-worthy persons who could go to Halifax for us, and procure all the necessary information; the town of Marble Head, in particular, would furnish us with excellent pilots. The inhabitants of the north of New Hampshire and Cascobay should be assembled under the command of their general, Stark, who gained the victory at Bennington, ready to march, if circumstances require it, by the route of Annapolis. The country is said to be inhabited by subjects ill affected to British government; ~[7] some of them have entered into a correspondence with the Americans, and have given assurances that they will form a party in our favour.
With regard to ourselves, I suppose that we sail the 1st of June, and that we are accompanied by some continental frigates, and such private vessels as might be collected in Boston. Congress would undoubtedly furnish us with as many troops as we should require, and those very brigades which lately belonged to my division, and whose sole object at present is to keep the enemy at Rhode Island in check, having no longer any employment, would be able to join us without impairing the main army. They would come the more willingly, as the greater part of the regiments belonging to the northern part of New England would be averse to crossing the Hudson River, and would prefer a service more advantageous to their own country.~[8] We should find at Boston cannon and mortars. Others, if necessary, might be sent from Springfield, and the corps of American artillery is tolerably good.
The enemy would suspect our designs the less, as their ideas run wholly upon an invasion of Canada; the movements of the militia in the north would be considered as a plan for uniting with us at Sorel, near the River St. Francis, as we ascended the St. Lawrence: this opinion, which, with a little address, might be strengthened, would awaken apprehensions and excite disturbances at Quebec;~[9] and if a vessel of war should by chance be at Halifax ready for sea, they would probably despatch it to the threatened colony.
I have never seen the town of Halifax, but those persons who, before the war, were in the English service, and had spent most of the time in garrison, inform me that the great point is, to force to the right and left the passage of George’s Island, and that a landing might be effected without difficulty, either on the side towards the eastern battery, in order to seize that battery and Fort Sackville, or, which appears to be a shorter way, on the side towards the town. The northern suburb, where the magazines are, is but slightly defended. The basin, where vessels are repaired, might also be secured. Several officers, worthy of confidence, have assured me, that Halifax is built in the form as of an amphitheatre; that all the houses might be cannonaded by the vessels that had forced the passage, and in that case, the town would compel the garrison to surrender. As the troops might destroy all the works on the shore, and the vessels of war easily carry the batteries on the islands, I am well persuaded, and the accounts of all who have been there convince me still more, that Halifax would be unable to withstand the united power of our forces and those of America.~[10]
The idea of a revolution in Canada is gratifying to all good Frenchmen; and if political considerations condemn it, you will perceive that this is to be done only by suppressing every impulse of feeling. The advantages and disadvantages of this scheme demand a full discussion, into which I will not at present enter. Is it better to leave in the neighbourhood of the Americans an English colony, the constant source of fear and jealousy, or to free our oppressed brethren, recover the fur trade, our intercourse with the Indians, and the profit of our ancient establishments, with out the expenses and losses formerly attending them? Shall we throw into the balance of the new world a fourteenth state, which would be always attached to us, and which, by its situation, would give us a superiority in the troubles that may, at some future day, agitate America? Opinions are very much divided on this topic. I know yours, and my own is not unknown to you; I do not, therefore, dwell on it, and consider it in no other light than as a means of deceiving and embarrassing the enemy. If, however, it should at any time be brought under consideration, it would be necessary to prepare the people beforehand; and the knowledge which I was obliged to obtain when a whole army was about to enter that country has enabled me to form some idea of the means of succeeding there But to return to Nova Scotia: part of the American troops, who will accompany us, and such of the inhabitants as take up arms in our favour, might be left there as a garrison. It would be easy to destroy or take possession of the English establishments on the banks of Newfoundland, and after this movement we should direct our course according to circumstances. Supposing that we could return to Boston or Rhode Island during the month of September, and that New York had not yet been taken, we might still be enabled to assist General Washington. Otherwise St. Augustine, the Bermudas, or some other favourable points of attack, might engage our attention; on the other hand, if we should be ordered home, we might reach France in three weeks or a month from the banks of Newfoundland, and alarm the coasts of Ireland on our way.
If the September plan, which combines all advantages, appears too near at hand, if it were decided even not to send us in October, it would be necessary to delay our departure until the end of January. In this case, as in the former, we should be preceded fifteen days only by corvettes; we should pass the month of April in the south, attack Rhode Island to May, and arrive at Halifax the last of June. But you are aware that the autumn is, on many accounts, the most favourable time for our departure; at all events, you will not accuse me of favouring this opinion from interested motives, as a winter at Boston or Newport is far from equivalent to one spent at Paris.~[11]
These views, in obedience to your request, I have the honour to submit to your judgment; I do not affect to give them the form of a regular plan, but you will weigh the different schemes according to circumstances. I trust that you will receive these remarks with the greater indulgence, as my American papers, those respecting Halifax excepted, are at Paris, and, consequently, almost all my references are made from memory; beside, I did not wish to annoy you with details too long for a letter, and if you are desirous to converse more freely on the subject, the impossibility of leaving the port of Havre, at present, will allow me time to spend three days at Versailles.
I am thoroughly convinced, and I cannot, without violating my conscience, forbear repeating, that it is highly important for us to send a body to America. If the United States should object to it, I think it is our duty to remove their objections, and even to suggest reasons for it. But on this head you will be anticipated, and Dr. Franklin is only waiting a favorable occasion to make the propositions. Even if the operations of the present campaign, with the efforts of Count d’Estaing or some other fortunate accident should have given affairs a favorable turn, there will be a sufficient field for us, and one alone of the, proposed advantages would repay the trouble of sending the detachment.
A very important point, and one on which I feel obliged to lay the greatest stress, is the necessity of perfect and inviolable secrecy. It is unnecessary to trust any person, and even the men who are most actively employed in fitting out the detachment and the vessel need not be informed of the precise intentions of government. At farthest, the secret should be confided to the naval commander, and to the leader of the land forces, and not even to them before the last moment.
It will certainly be said that the French will be coldly received in that country, and regarded with a jealous eye in their army. I cannot deny that the Americans are difficult to be dealt with, especially by the Frenchmen; but if I were intrusted with the business, or if the commander chosen by the king, acts with tolerable judgment, I would pledge my life that all difficulties would be avoided, and that the French troops would be cordially received.
For my own part, you know my sentiments, and you will never doubt that my first interest is to serve my country. I hope, for the sake of the public good, that you will send troops to America. I shall be considered too young, I presume, to take the command, but I shall surely be employed. If, in the arrangement of this plan, any one, to whom my sentiments are less known than to yourself, in proposing for me either the command or some inferior commission, should assign as a reason, that I should thereby be induced to serve my country with more zeal either in council or in action, I took the liberty (putting aside the minister of the king) to request M. de Vergennes to come forward as my friend, and to refuse, in my name, favors bestowed from motives so inconsistent with my character.
I have the honor to be, &c.
LAFAYETTE.
Footnotes:
1. I hear that you have, at Lorient, three vessels of the India company, of forty guns and eight hundred tons. These caracks, if I recollect rightly, are fifty-gun ships, of nine hundred and sixty tons all number of vessels would be sufficient; they might soon be got ready, and their force would diminish the required escort. As for frigates, you will find in readiness, at Lorient, the _Alliance_, the _Pallas_, and others. However, if you are determined to employ the vessels which are fitted out, in the expedition against England, it would be necessary to take ours from St. Malo in preference. (Note from M. de Lafayette.)
2. Virginia and Carolina would be the scene of our operations during the months of December and January, and we should pass the remainder of the winter at Boston. I greatly prefer this project to waiting until the last of January.
3. To deceive the enemy, pilots might be assembled from different parts, under pretence of sending them to the Islands, at the request of the French. This business, as well as the preparations and signals, might be entrusted to a lieutenant-colonel of the royal corps of engineers, an officer of great merit at the head of the American corps of engineers, who, under cover of working to the fortifications of the Delaware, might remain near Sandy Hook.
4. The frigates or vessels necessary to protect the landing, either real or pretended, of the Americans, should anchor in those channels. The enemy would then be obliged either to disperse among the forts, and thereby to weaken their lines, or else to leave the field open to the Americans, who, by a diversion upon the lines, would force the enemy to have them fully manned, and prevent them attending to their rear.
5. It is necessary, however, to consider all the unfortunate contingencies that may occur. If the expedition to Rhode Island should be prevented, or if it should not succeed, or if nothing can be attempted at New York, we ought then to proceed on our expeditions against Virginia, or Georgia, or Carolina, and winter afterwards at Boston, leaving Rhode Island to the next season, as proposed in our plan of sailing in the month of October.
6. If the capture of the Bermudas, or some expedition of the kind, should be considered necessary, the rest of the winter might be employed in carrying it into effect.
7. The last time I was at Boston, I saw there a respectable man, a member of the council in Nova Scotia, who had secretly entered into the service of General Gates, and who assured us of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants.
8. General Gates, who is popular in New England, and perfectly acquainted with Halifax, has often proposed to make an expedition, in concert, against that town, with French and American troops combined.
9. In the present harassed state of the English, I doubt if they will have in port any vessel capable of joining the squadron.
10. I have not made any allowance for the diversion in the north, of which, however, I feel certain, and if the troops should not go to Annapolis, would, at least, compel a part of the British garrison, and such of the inhabitants as adhered to the royal party, to remain in the fort.
11. Fifteen hundred or two thousand select troops thrown into America might aid General Washington, and enable him to act on the offensive, by supplying him with good heads to his columns, and by uniting the French with an American division for combined operations. This plan would be of some use, but it appeared to me that you wished for one offering results of greater importance.