of selecting the constituencies to which the experiment should be applied, and in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to escape the fatal charge of partisan selection.
_Proportional representation and democratic principles._
What hinders the adoption of a complete scheme of proportional representation? Is it not primarily a lack of courage and of trust in the principle of democracy? But does it need a greater courage, a greater belief in the value of the democratic principle than the grant of self-government to the Transvaal and to the Orange River Colony within a few years of the Boer War? The courage and faith in the latter case have been abundantly justified, and were statesmen actuated by a similar courage and belief in democracy to propose a system of proportional representation there would undoubtedly be a public response which would astonish them; for reforms which are obviously based upon justice are quickly and gladly accepted. Democracy cannot be carried to its highest pitch of perfection if the electoral methods by which representative institutions are brought into being are fundamentally defective. “By proportional representation,” said Mr. James Gibb, “if electors were enabled to put more intelligence and conscience into their votes, the nation would be the gainer. The character of the electorate is of paramount importance, one outcome of it being the character of the House of Commons. The electors have not yet had a fair chance of showing what they can do in the making of a House of Commons. The question put to them is in such a form that they can hardly give an intelligible reply. The single-member system seems to imply a belief that the elector’s liberty of choice must be narrow. We have now arrived at a point when another step is due in the evolution of the people’s liberties, when an individual elector should obtain a greater freedom of choice and therefore a more intimate relation to national affairs.[13] Further, the smooth working of democratic institutions requires that no section of the electors should be permanently divorced from the governing body. Such separation begets a feeling of hostility towards the institutions of the country. Thus, Lord Dunraven has referred to Ireland as a country in the government of which some of its best citizens are not allowed to take part. Similarly, many British settlers in the Orange Free State, although resident for several years, never had any representative in the State Assembly. The natural feeling arose that the government of the country was a matter which did not concern them, and they never attended the meetings addressed by the member of the Assembly for the district. It may be true that minorities must suffer, but there is no reason why they should suffer needlessly. Here justice and expediency go hand in hand. It is to the advantage of the country that all should be associated with the representative body which speaks in the name of the whole, whether that body be a town council, a county council, or a House of Commons.
_Constitutional reform._
As pointed out in the opening chapter, the question of electoral reform is intimately associated with the constitutional problem which has occupied Parliament since 1906. This problem contains two factors–the relation between the two Houses of Parliament, and the constitution of the House of Lords. The House of Commons claims greater power in legislation on the ground that it is the expression of the national will. This demand has called forth a movement for reforming the House of Lords in order that it may fulfil more adequately its duties as a Second Chamber. The Unionist leaders have proposed that the peers should delegate their powers to a small number and that the House should be strengthened by the introduction of nominated and elected elements. With regard to the suggestion that a certain number of Lords of Parliament should be nominated by the Crown, all evidence points to the fact that such nominations invariably become party in character. No Government can afford to ignore the claims of the party which supports it, or to miss the opportunity of strengthening its position in one of the Houses of Parliament. The Canadian Senate, which is a nominated body, fails to give satisfaction, and there is a strong demand for its reform. At the conclusion of Sir John Macdonald’s long lease of power the Senate consisted nearly wholly of Conservatives. Now that the Liberal Government has been in office for a good many years, the Senate is nearly wholly Liberal. Obviously, the introduction of a nominated element will not provide a Second Chamber that will command public confidence.
The elected element might be chosen indirectly by the County Councils or by the House of Commons, or the much bolder course of direct popular election, advocated by Sir Edward Grey, might be adopted. Direct election is distinctly preferable to indirect election by bodies created for other purposes. The experience of the United States, France, Sweden, and all other countries where the Upper House is elected by local legislatures, provincial councils, or municipalities, show that elections to the local authorities are fought on questions of national politics. But whether indirect or direct election is determined upon, it is already clear that the only possible method of election is that of proportional representation. The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems has reported that there is much to be said in favour of the transferable vote as a method of election for a Second Chamber, and this verdict has since been endorsed in numerous articles in the press. Thus a writer in the _Quarterly Review_ says that: “If an elected element is thought to be necessary for the popularity and effectiveness of a reformed Upper House, then let a certain number of members be elected in large constituencies by means of proportional representation.”[14] Were the minimum age qualifying for a vote in such elections raised to twenty-five or more there would naturally be provided the conservative tendency to which that House is intended to give expression, and were peers eligible as candidates doubtless such peers as were interested in politics would experience little difficulty in securing election.[15]
The principle of election has been adopted for the Senates of Australia and of South Africa. In the former the majority system with direct election is used; in the latter, a proportional system with indirect election. The difference in the results is most striking. In Australia each of the States is polled as a separate constituency, each elector having three votes. The result of the election of 1910 was as follows:–
AUSTRALIA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910
State. Votes Polled. Labour Non-Labour Seats Obtained. Votes. Votes. Labour. Non-Labour. Victoria 648,889 692,474 3 — New South Wales 736,666 735,566 3 — Queensland 244,292 124,048 3 — South Australia 171,858 148,626 3 — Western Australia 128,452 109,565 3 — Tasmania 92,033 75,115 3 — ——— ——— — — 2,021,090 1,997,029[16] 18 —
It will be seen that the Labour Party polled 2,021,090 votes and obtained 18 seats, whilst their opponents, with a poll of no less than 1,997,029 votes, obtained none. So effectively does the majority system in the form of the block vote blot out minorities. The Hon. W. Pember Reeves, in commenting upon these figures,[17] said that: “Such results give rise to revolutions.”
In South Africa each State is represented by eight Senators chosen by the local Parliaments by means of the single transferable vote. The first elections gave the following result:–
SOUTH AFRICA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910
Seats Obtained. States. Dutch Parties[18] British Parties[18]
Cape Colony South African 6 Progressive 2 Transvaal Het Volk and Progressive and Nationalist 5 Labour 3 Natal Dutch 1 British 7 Orange Free State Orangia Unie 6 Constitutionalist 2 — — Total 18 Total 14
In the one case minorities are completely suppressed; in the other the minority in each State obtains representation.
These two illustrations show that if the House of Lords is to be strengthened by the infusion of an elected element chosen by large constituencies, a true system of election must be adopted. This is the conclusion arrived at by Professor Ramsay Muir[19] after a careful examination of the different methods by which a Second Chamber can be constituted. All suggestions as to the selection of peers by hereditary peers, of peers qualified by service, by nomination, by indirect election, by direct election on a limited franchise, are ruled out and the direct election of a new Second Chamber by the single transferable vote is advocated in order that the new House may contain those elements which fail to secure representation with a system of single-member constituencies. But if, by the adoption of direct popular election and proportional representation, the Upper House were made more truly representative than the Lower, then whatever resolutions were passed defining the relations between the two Houses there is not much doubt that power would tend to pass into the hands of the more representative House. In commenting upon the Royal Commission’s report _The Nation_[20] said: “Perhaps the most pregnant sentence in this whole report is that in which the Commission suggests that proportional representation might be a suitable basis for an elective Senate. We have our liberty of choice, and democracy may find its account in either alternative. We may prefer to retain an imperfectly representative Lower House. But if we place above it a really representative Senate the whole balance of the Constitution might be altered, and the Senate become the more venerable, the more democratic, and in the end, the more powerful Chamber. We may, on the other hand, reform the House of Commons, and render any Senate superfluous. In either event, proportional representation may become the ultimate key to our constitutional problem.”
_Federal Home Rule._
The same question, the method of election, must enter into the consideration of those larger schemes, Federal Home Rule and Imperial Federation, which have been mooted in the discussion of the constitutional relations between the two Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. A writer in _The Times_,[21] whose series of letters attracted considerable attention, said that the “central idea of Federalism appears to be that our present single Imperial Parliament, which does, or makes an attempt at doing, all the complicated work–first of the Empire, and second of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and third of the various countries which together make up the United Kingdom–is no longer adequate to the purpose. The Federalists therefore propose that the Imperial Parliament, while maintaining its supremacy absolutely intact, shall delegate a large part of its functions to a number of subordinate national or provincial Parliaments, who shall manage the domestic affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, or of such other territorial divisions as may be agreed upon. These national or provincial Parliaments will be entirely independent one of another, but all will acknowledge the full and absolute sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament.” Mr. Birrell stated that “Federation beginning here at home, as it is called, is ripening for a speedy decision. Such a Federation once established would be able to find room for our Dominions overseas as and when they wished to come in. We should have then a truly Imperial Parliament, at the door of which any one of our Dominions could come in, and as it were hang up its hat and coat in his Mother’s House and take part in common Imperial proceedings, and in the government of this great Empire.”[22] These are great changes, and without entering too deeply into details of how these new bodies are to be brought into being, it is certain that one of the conditions of their successful working is that they must be fully representative. It is inconceivable that a national council can be set up for Wales, or for Scotland, or for Ireland, without provision for the adequate representation of minorities. Lord Morley, in instituting the new Councils in India, was compelled to make provision for the representation of Muhammedans. Mr. Birrell, in the Irish Council Bill of 1907, proposed that minorities should be represented by members nominated by the Crown. It is impossible to reconcile this reactionary proposal with democratic principles, and there can be no possible reason for its adoption when there is a method of election available which enables minorities to choose their own representatives.
_Imperial federation._
Mr. Birrell’s vision of an Imperial Parliament for the British Empire raises once more the value of a true method of election. An Imperial Parliament will not accomplish its purpose–the consolidation of the Empire–if the basis of representation is such as to give undue emphasis to the separate interests of the constituent States. Further, it would seem desirable that the establishment of such a Parliament should be preceded by the more complete unification of the various States, for in no other Empire are there so many racial divisions, and it is from these that the greatest of political difficulties spring–in Ireland the division between north and south; in the United Kingdom between Ireland and Great Britain; in South Africa between the Dutch and British; in Canada between the French and British. The majority system of election brings out these differences in their acutest form. In Canada in 1910 no representative from the Province of Quebec attended the National Conference of Canadian Conservatives; of the four Provinces forming the South African Union it was in the Orange Free State, where in the local Parliament the minority was almost wholly deprived of representation, that racial differences gave rise to the keenest feeling. Proportional representation has proved itself to have been of the greatest value in bi-racial countries such as Belgium where the representation of political parties no longer coincides with racial divisions. The adoption of proportional representation in the United Kingdom, in Canada, and for all elections in South Africa would complete the consolidation of these various divisions of the Empire, and even where racial difficulties do not exist, as in Australia and New Zealand, the fair representation of all classes of citizens would free questions of Imperial politics from the dangers of exaggerated party majorities.
_Conclusion._
Whether it is a question of improving existing institutions, or the creation of further representative bodies, the method of election is all important. All other departments or human activity show continuous improvement, and the substitution of scientific for rule-of-thumb methods of election is an improvement long overdue. It may even be said that the continued successful working of representative institutions demand such an improvement. The accomplishment of other electoral reforms can be more easily attained by the adoption of a system which allows of the fair representation of all. The reform of the House of Lords, whether by the delegation of the powers of existing peers to a small number, or by the introduction of an elected element, or its establishment on a completely democratic basis, necessitates the adequate representation of minorities. Federal Home Rule is impracticable unless due provision is made for minority representation. But in the contemplation of newer legislative bodies it must not be forgotten that it is of the utmost importance that the prestige of the House of Commons–the mother of parliaments, and, as such, the glory of English-speaking peoples–should be maintained at the highest level. Yet its predominance in the Parliament of the United Kingdom can be permanently secured only if it is made fully and completely representative. The House of Commons must once more renew itself; it must establish itself on sounder foundations. Its privileges and powers have been won by the efforts of past generations. To the present generation falls the opportunity of perfecting its organization and of strengthening its foundations by making it in truth the expression of the national will.
[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation of Liberal members at House of Commons, 20 May 1908.]
[Footnote 2: “This number might be reduced to eleven, if minor variations were grouped.”–Sir Charles Dilke, National Liberal Club, 10 May 1909.]
[Footnote 3: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ 1909, p. 62.]
[Footnote 4: Section 41 of the South Africa Act, 1909, reads thus: “As soon as may be after every quinquennial census the Governor-General-in-Council shall appoint a commission consisting of three Judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa to carry out any redivision which may have become necessary as between the different electoral divisions in each Province, and to provide for the allocation of the number of members to which such Province may have become entitled under the provisions of this Act.”]
[Footnote 5: The Town Clerk of Edinburgh, Dr. Hunter, urges a rearrangement of the Parliamentary Divisions of the city, so as to assimilate them to the municipal wards. “Confusion and unnecessary expense are caused by the present arrangement…. The municipal area of the city is represented in Parliament partly by the four city members, partly by the member for Leith Burghs, and partly by the member for the County of Midlothian. The distinction thus existing between the Municipal and Parliamentary divisions of the city necessitates the annual making up of separate rolls of voters for municipal and for Parliamentary purposes respectively, involving heavy additional expense (amounting to upwards of £1100 per annum), which would be avoided if the areas for both purposes were assimilated.” Assimilation is desirable “not merely in order to save needless expense, but in the interests of candidates and electors as well as of the electoral agencies. In the dual arrangement at present existing the usual organizations for electoral purposes of all kinds have to be duplicated. Not one of the Parliamentary wards correspond with any of the municipal wards.”–_The Scotsman_, 9 August 1910.]
[Footnote 6: “The General Election of January 1910, and the Bearing of the Results on some Problems of Representation.” Paper read before the Royal Statistical Society, 19 April 1910. Mr. Rosenbaum, however, rejects proportional representation on political grounds. These have been considered in the two previous chapters.]
[Footnote 7: “Electoral Statistics.” Paper read before the Manchester Statistical Society, 12 December 1906.]
[Footnote 8: Joseph King, M.P., in evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1909.]
[Footnote 9: This difficulty would disappear with the adoption of Home Rule.]
[Footnote 10: _Real Representation for Ireland_, 1908.]
[Footnote 11: Report of Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, 21 July 1909.–_Representation,_ vol. ii. p. 154.]
[Footnote 12: In reply to a deputation of the Manchester Liberal Federation, 22 May 1909.]
[Footnote 13: _Minutes of Evidence_, Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910 (Cd. 6352), p. 104.]
[Footnote 14: _Cf._ “Two Chambers or One,” _Quarterly Review_, July 1910.]
[Footnote 15: The indirect election of the United States Senate gives so little satisfaction that the House of Representatives on 14 April 1911 approved of the proposed amendment to the Constitution providing for popular election by 296 votes to 6.]
[Footnote 16: Of these, the Fusionists polled 1,830,353 votes.]
[Footnote 17: Address to the London School of Economics, 5 October 1910.]
[Footnote 18: These broad distinctive titles are here given, although the author recognizes that the Nationalist and Unionist parties in South Africa are not exclusively Dutch or British.]
[Footnote 19: _Peers and Bureaucrats_, by Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at Liverpool University.]
[Footnote 20: 21 May 1910.]
[Footnote 21: “Pacificus,” _The Times_, 31 October 1910.]
[Footnote 22: Address to the Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.]
APPENDIX I
THE JAPANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM–THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE
The following memorandum has been written by Mr. Kametaro Hayasbida, the Chief Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives, in reply to a series of questions, the particulars of which are set out in the memorandum.
_Failure of single member system._
The Original Election Law of our country was promulgated in 1889, the same year in which took place the promulgation of the Constitution. Under this law the system of small electoral districts was single-adopted, and each _Fu_ or _Ken_ (administrative district) was divided into several electoral districts each of which constituted a single-member constituency (with the exception of some large districts which, impossible of further division, had two seats allotted with the system of _scrutin de liste_). The system was, however, found in practice to be very unsatisfactory, as it often happened that a minority of the voters, instead of the majority, in certain _Fu_ or _Ken_ obtained the majority of the members returned, and, on the other hand, a party with a majority at the polls could not sometimes, as the result of the grouping of the voters in the small electoral districts, secure any representation at all. Under such circumstances it was utterly impossible for each political party to obtain representation in reasonable proportion to the strength of its voters; or, in other words, the electors of the country at large had never succeeded in being properly represented in their legislative body. As the inadequacy of the system was thus apparently shown I formulated in 1891, by somewhat what modifying Marshal’s cumulative voting system, a system of large electoral districts combined with that of the single vote, and urged for a revision of the Election Law.
_Multi-member constituencies. Single vote adopted 1900._
Since then several elections had taken place; and the defects of the existing law were more strongly pronounced at each successive election. It was, however, not until the year 1898 that the Government at last introduced a Bill for a revision of the law with the view of adopting the system I had the honour of formulating. After heated discussion in three successive sessions, the Bill was passed in 1900 and sanctioned as a law. This is our present Election Law. In the revised system the _Fu, Ken_, and _Shi_ (the administrative districts) constitute at the same time the electoral districts, and a voter in each district has but one vote for one candidate, while several seats (according to the population) are allotted to the district.
The above is a brief historical sketch of our electoral system. I shall now try to answer your questions in order.
_Equitable results._
As to the first question whether our system secures the representation of each party in reasonable proportion to its voting strength, I cannot do better than answer it by pointing out a few instances in the General Election which took place on the 15 May 1908.
TABLE I
THE CITY OF TOKYO (11 seats)
Seats in Seats
Parties. Votes. Proportion Obtained. to votes.
Seiyu-Kwai (Liberals) 6,579 2.71 2 Konsei-honto (Progressives) 2,216 0.91 1 Daido-ha (Conservatives) 2,879 1.18 2 Yuko-Kwai (Radicals) 4,656 1.91 2 Churitsu (Independent) 10,414 4.29 4 —— —– —
Total 26,744 11.00 11
All parties except the Seiyu-kwai and Daido-ha succeeded in obtaining their representatives in reasonable proportion to their respective voting strength. The explanation given for the particular case of the Seiyu-kwai is that the party, unable for some reason or other to limit the number of candidates, had placed five candidates instead of three or four, and caused its own defeat by splitting the votes. I take at random, or rather in the order they come, a few more districts, and the results obtained are as follows:–
TABLE II
TOKYO-FU (5 seats)
Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained to Votes.
Seiyu-kwai 5 12,794 4.02 4 Kensei-honto – – – –
Daido-ha. 1 13,122 .98 1 Churitsu – – – –
—— —- –
Total 6 15,916 5.00 5
TABLE III
THE CITY OF KYOTO (3 seats)
Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained to Votes.
Seiyu-kwai 1 1,284 0.45 – Kensei-honto – – – –
Daido-ha – – – –
Yuko-Kwai – – – –
Churitsu 3 7,304 2.55 3 – —– —- –
Total 4 8,588 3.00 3
TABLE IV
KYOTO-FU (5 seats)
Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. to Votes.
Seiyu-kwai 5 18,928 4.01 4 Kensei-honto — — — —
Daido-ha — — — —
Yuko-kwai — — — — Churitsu 1 4,701 0.99 1
————————————– Total…. 6 23,629 5.00 5
TABLE V
THE CITY OF OSAKA (6 seats)
Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. to Votes.
Seiyu-kwai 5 8,666 3.32 4 Kensei-honto — — — —
Daido-ha — — — —
Yuko-kwai 1 2,612 1.00 1 Churitsu 2 4,368 1.68 1
——————————————— Total…. 8 15,646 6.00 6
TABLE VI
OSAKU-FU (6 seats)
Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. to Votes.
Seiyu-kwai 5 15,137 3.57 5 Kensei-honto — — — —
Daido-ha 1 2,199 0.52 — Yuko-kwai 1 1,304 0.31 —
Churitsu 3 6,786 1.60 1
——————————————— Total…. 10 25,426 6.00 6
Throughout all electoral districts similar results were obtained. The Churitsu (_i.e._ those belonging to no party), considered as a group, had not everywhere been as successful as the other parties, as observe in Tables V. and VI. Each candidate of this group is quite independent of the other, and has no political views or propaganda in common, nor any organization whatever. Therefore, each case is totally different from the other. Although all independent candidates or voters are in these tables grouped as Churitsu, it is not proper to consider them in the same category with the other parties.
Now, judging from the results in the General Election, a few instances of which are given above, I may say that our present system, if not fully satisfactory, tolerably secures the representation of each political party in approximate proportion to its voting capacity.
_The new system and party organization._
As to the first part of your second question, whether, to obtain these results, the system involves a great deal of calculation on the part of political organizations as to the exact number of their supporters, I should say that, as the same system and method of election are uniformly adopted in the city, county, borough and village elections as well as in the elections of the Prefectural Assembly, it is not a very difficult task for all political parties to ascertain from the results of all these elections their relative strength, and to estimate the number of their supporters.
As to the second part of the question, whether it is necessary to issue precise instructions to the electors as to the candidates for whom they should vote, my answer is this: as every political organization through its branch in every _Fu_ and _Ken_ and the sub-branches in the cities, counties, towns and villages, is always in close touch with its constituents, and is constantly explaining its position and propaganda, with the view not only to instruct them but also to extend the sphere of its influence, it is not so difficult as it seems to decide the number of candidates. When it is once decided efforts are made on the part of the organization to distribute the votes among the candidates in such a way that not one of them receives a defeat at the hands of the other party. To attain this object the methods are not very complicated, for every elector has but one vote for one candidate; and, moreover, the stronger candidates, so long as their own position is secured, will endeavour to distribute a portion of their votes among the weaker candidates. This being the case, the member returned with the greatest number of votes may not be the most popular candidate, but the party as a whole is much more likely to succeed in getting representatives in proportion to the strength of its voters.
_The position of independents._
As to the third question, whether the system enables men of independent mind and character to maintain their position in Parliament, I should emphatically state that the revised system is much better than the old in this respect. Under the old system even such a prominent man as Mr. M. Matsuda (the Speaker of the House of Representatives some years ago, and the Minister of Finance in the present Government) suffered several defeats. But under the new system it has never happened that the leader of a party has lost his seat at any election, as he may seek his election at the safest district. To men of independent mind and character the new system offers the greater opportunity to maintain their position in the House, for in the election they may, in spite of the opposition of parties, draw their votes from all parts within a large electoral district. It may be said that the larger electoral district we have, the greater opportunity we afford to independent candidates. For instance, both Mr. Y. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokyo, and Mr. S. Shimada, by being independent candidates, have never lost their seat in Parliament, and in the last General Election were returned for their native prefecture or town with a great number of votes.
This brings me to the end of my answers to your inquiries. In conclusion I may say a few words about the public opinions in our country as to the Election Laws.
_Public opinion and the new system._
Despite the fact that the new system enables the elector of the country to be more reasonably represented in the House, still there are some ambitious politicians urging for their own selfish purpose to restore the old system. But, as almost all prominent members in both Houses are fully cognizant of the relative merits and demerits of the two systems, there is not much chance of our returning to the old system.
APPENDIX II
THE SECOND BALLOT
A Note on the German General Elections of 1903 and 1907.
The German Reichstag, which consists of 397 members, is elected by a system of single-member constituencies. Every member, however, must have obtained a majority of the votes polled, either at a first or second ballot, in the constituency for which he has been returned. The German Official Returns furnish very complete details of the elections, including the figures for the first and second ballots, and the summaries at the end of the Returns disclose a very striking divergence between the proportions of seats obtained and votes polled by the various political parties. These discrepancies have attracted general attention, and have usually been attributed to the great variation in the size of German constituencies. As a matter of fact, the effect of redistribution on the proportionality between seats and votes is not nearly so large as is generally supposed. Apart from the consequences of neglecting the votes of the minority or minorities in each constituency, wherein lies the gravest defect of a single-member system, the second ballot is a disturbing factor of considerable importance. So far from diminishing the disproportion between seats and votes polled by the various parties, the second ballot frequently increases that disproportion. In order to appreciate the respective effects of unequal constituencies and of the second ballots it is necessary to consider these two factors separately. This will be facilitated by making a comparison between the results which would have been obtained without second ballots with the results actually obtained. The following tables, which are based upon the official returns, give the votes polled and the seats obtained by the five principal groups:–
GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1903
Parties. Votes. Results without Results with Second Ballot. Second Ballot. Social Democrats 3,010,771 122 81 (31.7%) (30.7%) (20.4%)
Centre Party 1,875,273 104 100 (19.7%) (26.2%) (25.2%)
National Liberals 1,317,401 32 51 (13.9%) ( 8.1%) (12.8%)
Conservatives 1,281,852 79 75 (13.6%) (19.9%) (18.9%)
Radical Parties 872,653 11 36 ( 9.2%) ( 2.8%) ( 9.1%)
GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1907
Parties. Votes. Results without Results with Second Ballot. Second Ballot. Social Democrats 3,259,029 73 43 (28.9%) (18.4%) (10.8%)
Centre Party 2,179,743 101 105 (19.3%) (26.4%) (26.4%)
National Liberals 1,630,681 47 54 (14.5%) (11.8%) (13.6%)
Conservatives 1,632,072 91 84 (13.6%) (22.9%) (21.2%)
Radical Parties 1,233,933 30 49 (10.9%) ( 7.6%) (12.3%)
_The effect of unequal constituencies on representation_.
The Social Democrats were affected to a greater extent than any other party by both the factors referred to. In 1903 the Socialists polled 31.7 per cent, of the votes, and, at the first ballots, were at the head of the poll in 122, or 30.7 per cent, of the constituencies. In other words, if the system of second ballots had not been in force, the Social Democrats would have obtained very nearly their fair share of representation. If, in addition, there had been a redistribution of seats by which the sizes of constituencies had been equalized, the Social Democrats would have obtained more than their share of representation. The strength of the party lay in the large towns, and if, for example, Berlin had the additional eight seats to which it was entitled nearly all of them would have fallen to the Social Democrats. Again the three divisions of the district of Hamburg returned Social Democrats with overwhelming majorities. Were the representation allotted to Hamburg doubled, as it should be, all six seats might possibly have fallen to the Social Democrats.[1] An equalization of the size of constituencies might have produced in 1903 the phenomenon which has occurred so often in England. The largest party would have secured a number of seats far in excess of that to which it was entitled by reason of its strength. In 1907 the Socialists polled 28.9 of the votes, but only succeeded in reaching the head of the poll at the first ballot in 73, or 18.4 per cent. of the constituencies. A redistribution of seats would have added to their representation in the large towns, and the first ballots would have yielded a result which would have corresponded more fairly with their polling strength.
_The effect of second ballots_.
In both years the system of second ballots has had the effect of reducing very considerably the representation of the Social Democrats. In the year 1903 the Social Democrats won 56 constituencies by absolute majorities, and were engaged in the second ballots in 118 constituencies. In 66 of these constituencies they were at the head of the poll, but succeeded in maintaining this position at the second ballots in 24 only. In the remaining 52 constituencies they were second on the poll, and at the second ballots they were able to win only _one_ of these seats. In these 118 constituencies the Socialists polled 1,170,000 votes at the first ballots, whilst the other parties polled 1,920,000. As a result of the second ballots the Socialists obtained 25 seats and the remaining parties obtained 93 seats.
The figures of the year 1907 tell a similar tale. At the first ballots the Social Democrats were at the head of the poll in 73 constituencies. The second ballots reduced this number to 43. They were engaged in the second ballots in 90 constituencies; they were at the head of the poll in the first ballot in 44 of these constituencies, but kept this position in 11 only; they were second on the poll in the remaining 46 constituencies and won in 3 cases only. In these 90 constituencies the Social Democrats polled at the first ballot 1,185,000 votes, whilst the other parties taken together polled 1,888,000 votes; the Socialists obtained 14 seats, the other parties obtained 76 seats.
In both these elections the second ballots affected very adversely the representation of the largest party. If this party, without the second ballot and with a fair distribution of seats, might have obtained more than its share of representation, then the second ballots would have acted as a corrective, but not necessarily so. There is no reason why the second ballots should not have added to the over-representation already obtained. This will be seen from the figures of the elections in the Kingdom of Saxony. This division of the German Empire is entitled to 23 representatives in the Reichstag. In 1903 the Socialists won 18 of these seats with absolute majorities; they were engaged in the second ballots in the remaining five constituencies; they won four (all those in which they were at the head of the poll at the first ballots) and only lost the one constituency in which they were second on the poll. The Social Democrats, who at the first ballots polled 58.8 per cent, of the votes, thus obtained 22 seats out of 23, and the second ballots in this case only confirmed the overwhelming preponderance which the system of single-member constituencies had conferred upon the larger party.
_Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum_.] It would, indeed, seem that a system of second ballots rather accentuates those great changes in representation which are the normal characteristic of a system of single-member constituencies. In the elections in Saxony in 1907 the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party, obtaining 48.5 per cent. of the votes. They succeeded in obtaining eight seats by absolute majorities and were engaged at the second ballots in eight other constituencies. They lost every one of these constituencies, although at the first ballots they had been at the head of the poll in five of them. The unfavourable swing of the pendulum reduced their representation at the first ballots, and the second ballots merely increased their misfortunes.
Nor would redistribution have lessened the violence of these changes in the constituencies in which second ballots were necessary. Thus, for example, Frankfort-On-Main, with an electorate of 77,164, should return two members instead of one. The constituency was won by the Socialists in the second ballots of 1903, but was lost at the second ballots in 1907. In both years the Socialist candidate was at the head of the poll at the first ballots. Similarly the constituency of Elberfeld-Barmen, with an electorate of 67,241, won by an absolute majority in 1903, was lost by the Socialists at the second ballots in 1907, although their candidate had been at the head of the poll at the first ballot. If these and other constituencies had received additional representatives, the violence of the changes in the composition of the legislative body would in all probability have been increased.
_The second ballot and the representation of minorities_.
A study of the statistics of the German General Elections shows that the representation obtained by the various parties depends very largely upon their supremacy in certain localities. In these districts the minorities have been unrepresented for many years, the second ballots having in no way saved them from practical disfranchisement. Thus the Centre Party is in the ascendant in the Rhenish Provinces. In the district of Cologne, Münster, and Aix-la-Chapelle, the Centre Party monopolizes the representation, returning in 1907 every one of the 15 members to which the districts were entitled. In the adjoining districts of Dusseldorf, Coblentz and Treves they returned 16 out of 24. In Bavaria, the districts of Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Lower Franconia and Schwabia, which are entitled to 23 members, were represented wholly by members of the Centre Party. Taking the kingdom of Bavaria as a whole, the Centre Party obtained 34 seats out of 48, although they polled only 44.7 per cent of the votes at the first ballots. There is therefore reproduced in Germany the conditions which obtain in certain parts of the United Kingdom–the permanent supremacy of one party which monopolizes, or nearly so, the representation of the district.
_Summary_
The system of second ballots has therefore had a considerable influence in creating that divergence between the votes polled and the seats obtained which has characterized German elections. The representation of any one party depends, to a very large degree, upon the attitude taken towards it by other parties. The system in no way acts as a corrective to the anomalies arising from single-member constituencies, and may even accentuate the violent changes associated with them. Moreover, the system does not provide representation for minorities, and therefore does not ensure a fully representative character to popularly elected legislative bodies. It may be mentioned that all the criticisms here directed against the second ballot apply with nearly equal force to the use of the alternative vote (_see_ p. 95), a thinly disguised form of the same principle which appears to be meeting with some acceptance in this country.
[Footnote 1: The minority would, of course, have had a better chance with six divisions. Dr. Ed. Bernstein, to whom the author submitted this memorandum, makes the following comment: “I am not so sure that the equalization of the size of the constituencies would in 1903 have secured to the Social Democratic party a number of seats far in excess of its voting strength. But this is a subordinate consideration. The possibility of an unproportional representation of parties, even if the seats are equally distributed, is undeniably there, and this ought to settle the question.]
APPENDIX III
THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
The principle of proportional representation was first discussed in Sweden in 1867. The new Danish Constitution of that year provided for the use of the transferable vote (Andrae’s scheme) in the election of the Upper House, and Herr S. G. Troil proposed in the Swedish Parliament that the three most important of its committees should be elected by means of the same system. The motion was not carried, and a similar motion, made by Professor H. L. Ryön in 1878, was equally unsuccessful. It was not until 1896 that the next step was taken, when the Government, in view of the increasing demand for a more democratic franchise, proposed a proportional system of election. Nothing came of this proposal immediately, but from this date the agitation for an extension of the franchise gave rise to the demand for the proportional method of election in order to ensure the representation of minorities.
_The former constitution of the two chambers_.]
The story of the struggle for reform will best be understood if prefaced by a statement of the franchise conditions previously existing in Sweden. The Upper, or First, Chamber of the Riksdag, was elected by members of the provincial councils and of the councils of the five largest towns. The other towns sent members to their provincial councils. The members of provincial councils were elected in two stages; the primary electors chose electors of the second degree, who in turn chose the councillors. The primary electors in the country[1] had ten votes for every 100 kroner of rateable income, subject to a limit of 5000 votes. The electors of the second degree had only one vote in the election of councillors, and councillors had only one vote in the election of members of the First Chamber of the Riksdag. Owing to the great advantage conferred upon primary electors possessed of large incomes these electors largely controlled not only the composition of the town and provincial councils, but also the composition of the Upper Chamber. The election of members of the Lower Chamber of Parliament was direct; every person of not less than 800 kroner income was entitled to vote, but no one was entitled to more than one vote.
_The struggle for electoral reform_.
In 1899 M. Branting, the leader of the Socialist Party, proposed the adoption of proportional representation, coupled with universal and equal suffrage for the election of town councils. The main object of this proposal was to place town councils on a more democratic basis, but as the five largest councils elected representatives to the First Chamber the proposal would have had some influence upon the composition of that House. M. Branting’s proposal was rejected, and when revived two years later met a similar fate. In 1902 two Liberals (MM. Hedlund and Carlsson) proposed that provincial councils should be elected by a proportional method on the basis of manhood suffrage, whilst a similar proposition was made in the same year in respect of the elections of the Lower House of Parliament. Both these motions were rejected, but in response to a demand from both Houses for an inquiry a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the problem of electoral reform. The Commission reported in the following year in favour of a list system of proportional representation with official ballot papers, and the Government proposed this system combined with manhood suffrage for the election of members for the Lower Chamber. This proposal was accepted in 1904 in the Upper Chamber, but rejected in the Lower Chamber by five votes. Next year it was again discussed, accepted by the Upper Chamber but rejected in the Lower by a majority of ten. A change of ministry took place, and in 1906 M. Staaff, the Liberal Prime Minister, proposed manhood suffrage with the “majority” system of election. But the Moderate Party insisted upon a proportional system, and the proposals of the Liberal ministry were rejected by the Upper Chamber. M. Alfred Petersson, of Paboda, then proposed manhood suffrage with a proportional system for the Lower Chamber, and a proportional system for the Upper Chamber, which, however, was to be elected as before by the provincial councils. This proposal was rejected by the Lower Chamber but accepted by the Upper Chamber, and M, Staaff resigned. The Moderates, with M. Lindman as Prime Minister, then introduced a Bill incorporating M. Petersson’s proposals with the addition of the direct election of provincial councils and a less plutocratic franchise. This measure, which was adopted by both Houses in 1907, was confirmed after a General Election in 1909.
_The Swedish law of 1909_.
Under this law the proportional system is applied to elections for both Houses of Parliament, all parliamentary committees, town councils and provincial councils. For the Lower Chamber there is manhood suffrage. The Upper Chamber is elected still by the provincial councils and by the town councils of the five largest towns, but the elections of provincial councils are now direct. But, in order to maintain as much continuity as possible in the composition of the Upper Chamber, only one-sixth of the House is renewed every year. The maximum number of votes in the elections of both provincial and town councils is forty. The first election under the new system took place in 1909, when the Stockholm Town Council and several provincial councils were called upon to elect their proportion of members of the Upper House. In March 1910 the first elections to the Stockholm Town Council were held, and in the following May there were elections under the new system for all the provincial councils. In 1911 the first elections to the Lower House of Parliament will take place.
In Sweden, even under the new law, there are no official ballot papers and no nominations of candidates. This arrangement is supposed to preserve to the electors the fullest possible liberty in voting. In practice the party organizations print ballot papers containing the names of the candidates whom they support, and these printed forms are accepted by the returning officers. Every elector, however, is at liberty to strike out any of the names on these papers, to substitute other names, to vary the order in which the names are printed, or to prepare his own ballot paper.[2]
_The Swedish system of proportional representation_.]
The mechanism of the proportional system adopted has had regard to the practice mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The first proposal, that of M. Petersson, of Paboda, was only a crude approximation towards a proportional system. His scheme, in brief, was (1) that the number of votes recorded for each candidate should be ascertained; (2) that the candidate with the highest number of votes should be declared elected; (3) that a further count should then take place, the papers on which the successful candidate’s name appeared being treated as of the value of one-half. The remaining candidates whose names appeared on these papers would be credited with half a vote in respect of each such paper. The non-elected candidates would then be arranged according to the number of votes obtained, the highest being declared elected. As soon as any two names on any ballot paper had been declared successful a fresh count would take place, such papers being treated as of the value of one-third. This process of reducing the value of the paper as soon as a further candidate appearing thereon was elected was to be continued until all the seats were allotted. The principle underlying this distribution of seats is the same as that contained in the d’Hondt rule of the Belgian system. A group of electors which was more than twice as numerous as any other group would obtain two seats before any was allotted to a smaller group. If the group was more than three times as large as any other it would obtain three seats before the smaller group received one, and so on. It was at once recognized that this scheme would tell considerably in favour of well-organized parties–parties whose supporters would accept the ballot papers printed for them without question. An example will make this clear. If, taking an extreme case, in an election for three members 8000 voters placed the names of two candidates, P and Q, on each of their ballot papers, whilst a more loosely organized group of 13,000 voters spread its support over four candidates, T, S, V and W, different sections voting for these candidates independently, the following result might take place:–
P Q . . 8,000 | T . . . 4,000
| S . . . 3,500
| V . . . 3,000
| W . . . 2,500
Candidate P, being the first in order on the 8000 ballot papers of the first group, would be declared elected, and Q, the remaining name on these ballot papers, would be credited with 4000 votes–half the original value of the papers. Q and T, having 4000 votes each, would then be declared elected. Thus one group, with 8000 votes, would carry two seats, and the other, with 13,000 votes, would only obtain one–a result due to a lack of combination.
_The allotment of seats to parties_.
The plan finally adopted is based on M. Petersson’s proposal, but provides, as in the Belgian scheme, for the official recognition of parties. Electors may write at the head of their ballot papers the name or motto of a party. The papers bearing the same name or motto are then grouped together, the numbers in each group ascertained, and the seats available are allotted to these groups in accordance with the d’Hondt rule, irrespective of the number of votes obtained by individual candidates. Thus, in the example given, if electors of the second group had all headed their ballot papers with the same party name or motto the particular way in which they had distributed their votes among the candidates would not have affected the number of seats obtained by the group as a whole. The first group would have obtained one, and the second two seats.
_The selection of the successful candidates_.
The position of the candidates on each list is determined in accordance with the original proposal of M. Petersson. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes is declared elected, the papers on which his name appears are then marked down to the value of one-half, the relative position of the remaining candidates ascertained afresh, and the highest of these declared elected, and so on. This procedure, called the reduction rule, is however subordinate to a further rule (the rule of the order of preference), which is as follows. If more than one-half of the supporters of a party list have placed the same candidate at the head of their ballot papers, the first seat apportioned to the list is allotted to this candidate; if more than two-thirds have placed the same two candidates in the same order at the head of the ballot papers, these two candidates have the first claim to the seats apportioned to the party; if more than three-fourths have placed the same three candidates in the same order at the head of the list, these are given the first, second, and third seats, and so on. The selection of the successful candidates is determined in accordance with this rule so far as possible, but as soon as the application of the rule breaks down the relative claims of the non-elected candidates on the list are determined in accordance with the reduction rule. But if, say, three candidates have been declared elected in accordance with the rule of the order of preference, and it is necessary to choose others by the reduction rule, the papers containing these three names are treated as of the value of one-fourth in determining the relative position of the remaining candidates of the group.
_Free voters and double candidatures._
In order to complete the description of the Swedish system two subsidiary features, which will seldom come into play in actual elections, must be mentioned. Provision is made for those electors who owe no party allegiance, and who therefore do not wish to place any party name or motto at the head of their list. Such voters are called “free voters,” and the votes recorded for their candidates are ascertained. These candidates are placed in a group by themselves, called the free group, but the number of votes recorded for each individual candidate in this group, and not the total number of votes recorded for all the candidates, forms the basis of comparison with the totals of the party lists in the allotment of seats. The second feature provides for the improbable case of two groups of electors or parties having placed the same candidate upon their list. In the event of such candidate being so favourably placed in two lists as to be elected by both parties, then, for the purpose of ascertaining the new value of the papers on which his name appears, each list is debited with half a seat. When, as already explained, one seat has been allotted to a list, the list total is divided by two in accordance with the d’Hondt rule for the purpose of the fresh comparison of totals; but if this candidate has already been elected on another list the total would be divided by one and a half instead of by two. A fresh total would be ascertained for each of the lists containing the candidate’s name.
_An election at Carlskrona._
The author was permitted by the courtesy of the Burgomaster of Carlskrona to watch the election of provincial councillors on 24 May 1910, to represent the city in the Bleking provincial council, and a description of this election will show how the system works in practice. Carlskrona is entitled to nine members. For the purpose of the election the town was divided into two parts, but the polling place in each division was at the town hall. The register was prepared fourteen days before the election, and stated in addition to the name, address, and occupation of the elector, the amount of his (or her) rateable income and the number of votes to which he (or she) was entitled. The conduct of the election was in the hands of the Burgomaster, assisted by the magistrates of the town. As already explained, there were no official ballot papers and no nominations of candidates. Each elector voted for such candidates as he pleased, provided they possessed the necessary qualifications–those of an ordinary elector. Three parties–the Moderate, Liberal, and Labour–contested the election. Each party printed ballot papers containing the names of the candidates adopted by the party organization and with the name of the party at the head of the ballot paper. The ballot paper issued by the Moderate party was in the following form:–
_De Moderata_
_Borgmästaren_–O. Holmdahl.
_Grosshandlaren_–N. P. Nordström.
_Lasarettsläkaren_–R. Lundmark.
_Disponenten_–H. Berggren.
_Kommendören_–G. Lagercrantz.
_Rådmannen_–C. G. Ewerlof.
_Chefsintendenten_–I. Neuendorff.
_Kaptenen, friherre_–F. E. von Otter. _Underofficeren af 2: dra graden_–O. W. Strömberg. _Folkskolläraren_–H. E. Mattsson.
_Byggmästaren_–K. J. A. Johansson. _Handlanden_–Aug. Andrén.
_The Poll._
The ballot papers could be obtained at the committee rooms on, or prior to, the day of election, and also on the day of election from party agents at the doors of the polling stations. Each elector took his ballot paper folded to the Burgomaster, or presiding magistrate, who endorsed the back with the number of votes to which the elector was entitled. The presiding magistrate was assisted by two others who checked the accuracy of the proceedings. The poll opened at 10 A.M., the proceedings were adjourned for lunch at 1 P.M., the poll was again opened during the afternoon and closed about 8 P.M. The counting took place next day when, as comparatively few electors took advantage of their right to vary the order of the names as printed on the ballot papers, the number of votes recorded for each candidate was easily ascertained. Nor did the varying values of the ballot papers present any great difficulty. A calculating machine made the necessary additions both quickly and accurately. In this election only one paper was spoiled,[3] and it was very obvious that the provision of printed ballot papers by the party organizations made the act of voting a very simple one. The votes recorded for the different parties were as follows:–
Moderate . . . . . 20,334
Liberal . . . . . 8,732
Labour . . . . . 3,617
_The allotment of seats to parties.
There were nine seats to be distributed among the three parties. The distribution was carried out in accordance the d’Hondt rule, but the method of applying this rule differed from that employed in Belgium. In Belgium the party totals would have been divided by the numerals 1, 2, 3, &c., and the quotients ranged in order of magnitude, the ninth in order being termed the “electoral quotient.” Each party would have received as many seats as its total contained this quotient. The Swedish method provides for the allotment of one seat at a time, and it does so because of the possibility of the same candidate being elected by more than one party. Save in the rare case mentioned, the arithmetical operations, though differently presented, are identical with those of the Belgian system. Thus, at Carlskrona the first seat was given to the Moderates–that party having received the highest number of votes. Before the next seat was allotted the value of the Moderate total was reduced by one-half, and the new total was then compared with the original totals of the other parties. The totals to be considered in the allotment of the second seat were, therefore, as follows:–
Moderate. . . . . 10,167
Liberal . . . . . 8,732
Labour . . . . . 3,617
The Moderate party being still credited with the highest total received the second seat, and their original total, 20,334, was then divided by three in order to ascertain to whom the third seat should be allotted. The totals at this stage were as follows:–
Moderate . . . . . 6,778
Liberal . . . . . 8,732
Labour . . . . . 3,617
The Liberal total being now the highest, this party received the third seat, and in order to ascertain to whom the fourth seat should be given the Liberal total was reduced in value by one-half, the totals of the other parties remaining as at the previous allotment. The totals for comparison were now:–
Moderate . . . . . 6,778
Liberal . . . . . 4,366
Labour . . . . . 3,617
The Moderate total was again the highest, and the party received the fourth seat. The process of reducing the totals in succession according to the foregoing rule was continued until all the nine seats were allotted. In this election the Moderates obtained six seats, the Liberals two, and Labour one.
_The selection of the successful candidates._
The returning officer had then to determine which candidates on each list should be declared successful. In the Carlskrona election this task was extremely simple, for the large majority of the voters had accepted the ballot papers provided for them by their parties. No less than 19,756 votes out of a total of 20,334 had been received for the Moderate list as printed by the party organization. The totals for each candidate were quickly ascertained. Moreover, it was possible to select all the successful candidates by the rule of the order of preference. More than six-sevenths of the Moderate votes having been recorded for the list as printed, the first six names on the list were declared elected. Of the Liberal votes, 8118 out of a total of 8732 were recorded for the party list as printed, and as this number constituted more than two-thirds of the total, the first two names on the list were declared elected. With regard to the Labour party, 3580 out of a total of 3617 votes had been recorded for the party list, and the first candidate on the list was therefore declared elected.
_The election of suppléants.
In common with all continental systems, supplementary members (suppléants) were chosen for the purpose of taking the place of an elected member who might die or retire before the council had run its course. The method adopted in Sweden is peculiar to itself. In Belgium the same rules serve for the election of the suppléants as for the election of members, and they are called upon to serve in the order in which they stand at the declaration of the poll. In Sweden it is held that each elected member must have a suppléant, or deputy, special to himself. The method of selection may be illustrated from the Carlskrona election. The candidate who was to be regarded as suppléant to Burgomaster Holmdahl (the first on the Moderate list) was chosen as follows: Holmdahl had received 20,334 votes, his name having appeared on every ballot paper of the Moderate party; the votes recorded for the unelected candidates on these papers were ascertained, the result being:–
Neuendorfs . . . . . 20,334
von Otter . . . . . 20,242
Strömberg . . . . . 19,913
Mattsson . . . . . 20,119
Johansson . . . . . 20,237
Andrén . . . . . . 20,170
Neuendorff being the candidate who had received the highest number of votes on these papers, was declared elected as suppléant to Holmdahl. A suppléant for Nordström, the second elected member, was then chosen from among the remaining five non-elected members. Nordström’s votes were 20,235, and the votes recorded for the non-elected members on the same papers were:–
von Otter 20,143
Strömberg 19,913
Mattsson 20,055
Johansson 20,195
Andrén 20,071
Johansson, being highest with 20,195 votes, was declared suppléant to Nordström.
This method of choosing the suppléant seems to be unsatisfactory. The party as such does not determine who shall be called upon to fill a vacancy in its ranks; whether a non-elected member succeeds to a vacancy as a suppléant depends very largely on accident. A good illustration occurred in the selection of a suppléant from the Labour list. The party’s candidates were as follows:–
Kloo.
Karlsson.
Ostergren.
Olsson.
Ek.
Johansson.
Jensen.
Fagerberg.
Pettersson.
The first candidate on the list had been declared elected, and obviously, in the opinion of the party, the next favourite was Karlsson, and had there been a second seat awarded to the list Karlsson would have been declared elected. In determining, however, whether he should be declared elected as a suppléant, his position on the list did not count, and as the party list had been voted for without alteration by most of the Labour voters, five of the non-elected candidates were credited with the same number of votes. The choice of the suppléant was made by lot, and fell in this case upon Johansson, the sixth name on the list. It may be said that there is; considerable dissatisfaction with the method of electing suppléant candidates, and the Stockholm _Dagblad_, in its issue of the 29 May 1910, stated that the choice of suppléant, although there might have been many thousand votes given to every candidate, depended upon so small a difference in the totals received by each that even one ballot paper might determine the result. This is a detail in the system that can easily be remedied, and steps are already being taken to bring the election of suppléants into agreement with the election of ordinary members.
_Comparison with Belgian system._
It will be of interest to compare the Swedish with the Belgian system. It has been shown that the method of allotting seats to different groups is identical in principle in both countries. This method, the d’Hondt rule, favours the largest parties, and this explains why, in the smaller Belgian constituencies, cartels or combinations of parties take place. The Swedish system enables such combined action to take place with greater facility. It enables two parties to make use of the same motto without presenting a common list of candidates. No inter-party negotiations are required, as in Belgium, with reference to the order in which the names of candidates shall appear upon the list. In Sweden each group can put forward its own list of candidates, and so long as the electors make use of the same motto at the head of the ballot paper the combination gains the additional representation which may fall to it as a result of being treated as one party, whilst the share falling to each section is determined by the number of votes recorded for their respective candidates.
The Swedish method of choosing the successful candidates from the various lists differs materially from that used in Belgium. In Sweden the d’Hondt rule is used not only for the allotment of seats to parties, but also in the selection of the successful candidates. In Belgium the use of the d’Hondt rule is restricted to the former purpose, and when once the electoral quotient is ascertained the rule is discarded. The difference in the two methods can be illustrated from the Stockholm municipal election of 1910. In the fifth ward the ballot paper of the Moderate party was as follows:–
Welin.
Norstrom.
Boalt.
Roberg.
Palmgren.
Bohman.
Ringholm.
Herlitz.
——————
Hafstrom.
Svensson.
von Rosen.
Freden.
The line in the ballot paper divides the eight candidates for election as members from those who were standing for election as suppléants only. The votes recorded for the Moderate party numbered 118,483, of which 86,851 were given for the party ticket as printed. The number of votes accepting the party order of the first three candidates was about 93,000. This latter number was more than three-fourths, but less than four-fifths of the total, and therefore only the first three candidates on the ballot paper could be declared elected in accordance with the rule of the order of preference. The remaining four members had to be chosen by the reduction rule; the votes recorded for the five non-elected candidates were ascertained, the papers containing the names of the three elected candidates being treated for this purpose as of the value of one-fourth.
Some of the supporters of the eighth and sixth candidates had struck out the names of the fourth and other candidates. This manoeuvre had the result of placing these two candidates in the order named at the head of the poll at the fourth and fifth counts, and they were accordingly elected. Other candidates had received exclusive support, and it should be pointed out that it is the total amount of exclusive support recorded for all candidates which determines how soon the application of the rule of the order of preference breaks down. As soon as this takes place the election of any one candidate may depend, as in the election of the suppléants, upon the action of a comparatively small number of voters. Thus, some supporters of the fifth candidate, a Miss Palmgren, had struck out the names of all candidates save hers. Those papers which contained her name alone were treated as of full value, and although the votes of these supporters only numbered 1100, or less than 1 per cent. of the whole, they were sufficient to turn the scale in her favour. As, however, 86,851 votes out of a total of 118,453, had been recorded for the list as printed, showing that this proportion of voters preferred the fourth candidate to those that succeeded him, it would certainly seem that the result was not fair to this candidate. In Belgium if seven seats were won by a party which polled 118,453 votes, the electoral quotient would not be more than one-seventh of this total, and the election of the first candidate, instead of absorbing one-half the value of the votes, would consume only one-seventh. The election of the first two candidates would absorb two-sevenths instead of two-thirds, the election of three candidates would consume three-sevenths instead of three-fourths, and the election of four candidates would consume four-sevenths instead of four-fifths. In the Stockholm election more than five-sevenths of the voters had supported the party list as it was printed, and according to the Belgian system the first five candidates would have been declared elected.
_The system and party organization_.
The Swedish rule of selecting successful candidates is defended on the ground that it confers great power upon the electors. These can if necessary more effectively express their disapproval of the list put forward by the party organization, and as it is thought that a large number of voters too readily accept the party lead, a counterpoise is considered desirable. Recent experience in Belgium, however, would tend to show that a greater knowledge of their power has induced more and more electors to make use of the opportunity which that system allows of expressing individual preferences. If we regard a party as consisting of two groups–those that follow the party lead, and those which, whilst supporting the party, desire to assert their own preferences–then as between these two groups the Belgian system is strictly fair. If a party wins seven seats and four-sevenths of the party support the official list, this group would obtain four out of the seven seats; but in Sweden, as has been shown, at least four-fifths must support the official list before the first four candidates can be sure of election. The Swedish system discriminates in favour of the dissentients within a party, and this discrimination may have unexpected effects on party organization. The Belgian method has induced parties to welcome the support of all sections, knowing that such sections will not obtain more than their fair share of influence. In Sweden the tendency may be for party organizers to regard the support of various sections with suspicion, because, whilst these sections will obtain the full advantage of the party vote, their independent action may result in the gain of the section at the expense of the party as a whole. As a result of the Stockholm election referred to, the opinion was expressed by party organizers that it would be necessary to limit the number of candidates on a list to the number which the party knew it could carry. This would be an undesirable outcome of a rule designed to secure greater freedom for the elector, for it would tend to make party discipline more strict and parties exclusive rather than inclusive, as is the case in Belgium. It should, however, be added that in the large majority of the provincial council elections the selection of candidates was made in accordance with the rule of the order of preference. It would, therefore, seem that party organizers, as a rule, took care to present lists of candidates acceptable to the party as a whole.
_The great improvement effected by the Swedish system_.
The new Swedish electoral system, like all proportional systems, constitutes a striking advance upon the previous electoral conditions. The extent of the improvement will, of course, be seen from a comparison of some of its results with those of former years. For example, Stockholm used to be represented in the Lower Chamber by twenty-two members chosen by the “block” system, or _scrutin de liste_. The party in the majority monopolized the representation, and the absurdity of the system was well illustrated by an incident in the election of 1882, which was preceded by a severe struggle between the advocates of free trade and protection. At this election Stockholm returned twenty-two free traders, but as one of the elected members had not paid his taxes, all the voting papers containing his name were declared to be invalid. In consequence the twenty-two free traders were unseated and the twenty-two protectionist candidates were declared elected in their place. An attempt was made to ameliorate the evils of this system by dividing the town into five parliamentary districts, but, although so divided, Stockholm in 1908 returned twenty-one members, all of whom were either Liberals or Socialists, the large minority of Moderates being unrepresented. When the proportional system was applied in March 1910 to the election of the municipal council, each party obtained its fair share of representation in each of the six wards of the city, and the total result shows how large an improvement is effected by the new method:–
Parties. Votes Seats Seats in
Obtained. Obtained. Proportion to Votes.
Moderate 281,743 22 24
Liberal 142,639 12 12
Socialist 160,607 16 14
———————————– 584,989 50 50
In the election of the provincial council of Bleking the result was as follows:–
Parties. Votes Seats Seats in Obtained. Obtained. Proportion
to Votes.
———————— ———————– Moderate 54,465 22 22.4
Liberal 36,595 10 15.1
Socialist 3,617 1 1.5
———————————- 94,677 39 39
The general fairness of these results is all the more remarkable, because in Stockholm there was a very considerable variation in the value of a vote in the different wards, whilst many of the constituencies in the province of Bleking returned only a few members, and these did not give full play to the proportional system. The figures confirm the experience of all other countries, that a proportional system, even when applied to comparatively small constituencies, yields results which approximate very closely to the ideal aimed at, the true representation of the electors.
[Footnote 1: The town councils were elected in one stage; each elector had one vote for every 100 kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 votes. The members of the town council, when electing members of the provincial councils, had only one vote each.]
[Footnote 2: A ballot paper is not declared invalid even if it contains the names of more candidates than there are members to be elected (except at the elections of parliamentary committees). The names in excess are regarded as suppléant candidates (see _Election of Suppléants_) to the number of two in the elections for the Riksdag and the town councils, and to a number equal to the number of members at the election for the provincial councils. Any additional names on a ballot paper are regarded as non-existent.]
[Footnote 3: This paper bore the signature of the elector.]
APPENDIX IV
THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
_The influence of the Belgian system._
The system of proportional representation introduced into Finland by the electoral law of 1906, while it presents little or no difficulty to the voter, is, in its method of counting the votes, perhaps the most complicated of the systems at present in force. It has for its basis the Belgian List system and the d’Hondt rule, but the variations which were introduced with the object of safeguarding the rights of the electors against the possible tyranny of party managers are so important that at the first glance its resemblance to the parent system is not easily recognized. The Belgian model is followed more closely in the method of distributing the seats to the various parties than in the manner in which the successful candidates are chosen from the party lists. In its internal party arrangement the Finnish system shows boldness, originality, and, it must be added, no little complexity of procedure.
_Schedules and “compacts” in place of lists._
Finland is divided into sixteen electoral districts returning from six to twenty-three members, with the one exception of Lapland, which is a single-member constituency. In each constituency any group of not less than fifty electors can put forward a schedule of not more than three candidates, however many may be the total number of members to be elected. Each of these schedules may be headed with the name of a party or some political motto. The persons responsible for these schedules may, and commonly do, combine them in groups known as “compacts,” and it is these compacts, and not the original schedules, which correspond roughly to the party “lists” of the Belgian system, the only limit to this power of combination being that the combined schedules must not contain the names of more candidates than there are vacancies to be filled. But as the names of the same candidates may, and constantly do, occur in many different schedules within a single compact, a first glance at a Finnish polling paper would seem to show in each combination the names of more candidates than there are vacancies. The compact bears the name of the political party to which it belongs. Combination into compacts is, of course, optional, and a certain number of schedules are put forward independently. A vacant corner is reserved on the ballot paper where any elector who is not content with any of the schedules submitted may make his own schedule.
_An election in Nyland_.
The system may be more fully understood from some details of the election of 1907 in the Nyland division. In this division, the largest in Finland, returning twenty-three members, no less than seventy-two schedules were presented, or which all except five were combined into compacts. The five remained isolated. Of the combined schedules seventeen were included in the compact of the Swedish party, but the individual candidates in these seventeen schedules numbered only twenty-three, the legal limit, the same names being repeated in several schedules. The old Finnish compact contained thirteen schedules, the Young Finns seventeen, the Social Democrats eight, the “Christian” compact seven, the “Free Christian” compact three, and the Radicals two.
As already stated, the voter’s task is not difficult. He, or she, simply marks the schedule of his, or her, choice. The voter can also, if he wishes, alter the order of the names in a schedule. The effect of doing this will be apparent in a moment. That the task is simple is conclusively shown by the fact that the percentage of spoilt votes was in the Nyland division only 0.58 per cent. For the whole country the percentage was only 0.93, and this with universal adult suffrage and a poll of 899,347, or 70.7 per cent, of the electorate.
_The returning officer’s task_.
The task of the returning officer is twofold. He has to ascertain (1) the relative positions of candidates within each compact (or independent schedule), and (2) their position relatively to the candidates of other compacts in the final allotment of seats. He proceeds as follows. He first counts the votes on each schedule, reckoning a full vote to the first name, a half vote to the second, and a third of a vote to the third (the effect of an alteration of the order of names in a schedule by the voter is now apparent). Thus if schedule No. 1 (in the specimen ballot paper on page 323), containing the names Schybergson, Neovius, and Soderholm, receives the support of 6000 voters in all, of whom 3000 have placed Schybergson as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 1000 as No. 3, Schybergson will have a total of 3000 + 2000/2 + 1000/3 = 4333. Similarly, if Neovius obtains the support of 2000 as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 2000 as No. 3, his total will be 2000 + 2000/2 + 2000/3 = 3666; Soderholm, the third candidate, would receive 1000 votes as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 3000 as No. 3, and his total would be 1000 + 2000/2 + 3000/3 = 3000. But these individual totals of 4333, 3666, and 3000 are used merely to determine the order of the candidates within the schedule itself, and having performed that function, they are not taken further into account. In the example given (as would usually be the case in practice) the order within the schedule has not been disturbed, and the candidates are credited, the first (Schybergson) with the full number of the voters who supported the schedule–6000; the second (Neovius) with one-half that number–3000; the third (Soderholm) with one-third of that number–2000. These last figures are called “numbers of comparison,” a phrase intended to throw light upon their function. The same process is gone through with all the other schedules in the same compact. The returning officer then adds up all the numbers of comparison which each candidate has obtained in all the schedules within the compact where his name appears, and arranges candidates within the compact in the order of these totals. Thus, in the actual election of 1907, in the Nyland division, Schybergson headed the Swedish party compact with 9192 as the total of his “numbers of comparison,” Soderholm coming next with 6837.
_The allotment of seats_.
When the candidates in each compact have thus been arranged in order (and the votes given in writing by independent voters have also been counted), the returning officer proceeds to the second stage of his duties–the determination of the position of candidates with reference to their competitors in other compacts; and it is on this position that the actual allotment of seats depends. For this purpose he primarily takes into account, not the “numbers of comparison” of individual candidates, but the total number of voters who have supported each compact; he credits this total to the candidate who has the highest “number of comparison” within the compact; credits the next candidate with one-half this total, the third candidate with one-third, and so on, finally arranging the whole of the candidates in order. Thus far this stage of the process is identical in substance with the Belgian method, though the appearance is different. For, obviously, if List (or compact) A, of which the candidates are G, H, I, in that order receives 12,000 votes, while List B, with candidates P, Q, R, receives 10,000, and List C, with candidates X, Y, Z, receives 8000, it is all one whether the returning officer applies the d’Hondt rule and assigns two seats to List A (thus seating G and H), two seats to List B (thus seating P and Q), and one seat to List C (thus seating X), or whether he tabulates the result of the polling thus:
G 12,000 \
P 10,000 |
X 8,000 > Elected.
H 12,000/2 i.e. 6,000 |
Q 10,000/2 i.e. 5,000 /
Y 8,000/2 i.e. 4,000 Not elected, and so on.
But at this point a characteristic feature of the Finnish system comes into play. Candidates’ names may occur in more than one compact, and may be found in isolated schedules, or on the written papers of independent voters as well. Consequently their final order cannot be determined by this simple application of the Belgian method. The returning officer must[1] add to the number of votes credited to a candidate of any one compact such additional votes as he may have obtained either as a member of another compact or from independent voters. Thus, in the Nyland elections, Miss Sohlberg, whose name will be found at the head of Schedule 48 within the Swedish compact, obtained the eleventh place within that compact. The total number of voters supporting this compact was 44,544, and Miss Sohlberg was therefore credited with an eleventh of this total, or 4049 votes. But Miss Sohlberg’s name also occurred in Schedules 62 and 63 in the “Free Christian” compact and Schedule 21 in the “Christian” compact, and as her share of the votes of these compacts she received 153 and 325 respectively. She also received four votes in writing. Thus her final total was 4049 + 153 + 325 + 4, or 4531 in all, and it was this number which determined her position on the poll.
_Successful candidates in the Nyland election._ This explanation will perhaps be more comprehensible if the actual result of the polling in the Nyland division, so far as the first 25 candidates are concerned, is given in a tabular form:–
Final Names of Party. Number of Additional Final Order Candidates. Votes resulting Votes. Total. of from Place of
Poll. Candidates on
Compact.
1 Schybergson Swedish 44,544 2.33 44,546.33 2 Häninan Social Dem. 40,951 6.5 40,957.5 3 Soderholm Swedish 22,272 0.33 22,272.33 4 Sillanpää Social Dem. 20,475.5 8.83 20,484.33 5 Käkikoski Old Finn 20,402 9.33 20,411.33 6 Oljemark Swedish 14,848 — 14,848 7 Sirén Social Dem. 16,650.33 2.33 16,652.66 8 Rosenquist (G.) Swedish 8,908.8 2,932.83[2] 11,841.63 9 Rosenquist (V.) Swedish 11,136 4.33 11,140.33 10 Helle Social Dem. 10,237.75 3 10,240.75 11 Palmén Old Finn 10,201 8.83 10,209.83 12 Pertillä (E.) Social Dem. 8,190.2 4.67 8,194.87 13 Ahlroos Swedish 7,424 1 7,425 14 Pertillä (V.) Social Dem. 6,725.17 1.5 6,726.67 15 Reima Old Finn 6,800.67 5.67 6,806.34 16 Erkko Young Finn 6,521 6.32 6,527.32 17 Ehrnrooth Swedish 6,363.43 75.83 6,439.26 18 Laine (M.) Social Dem. 5,850.14 4 5,854.14 19 Wasastjerna Swedish 5,568 — 5,568 20 Ingman Social Dem. 5,118.88 3.5 5,122.38 21 Laine (O.) Old Finn 5,100.5 — 5,100.5 22 von Alfthan Swedish 4,949.33 — 4,949.33 23 Johansson Social Dem. 4,550.11 1.33 4,551.44 (All the above were elected.)
24 Sohlberg Swedish 4,049.45 482.45[3] 4,531.9 25 Gustaffsson Swedish 4,454.4 4.5 4,458.9 &c. &c.
_Equitable results._
It will to some extent be gathered from the foregoing table that the total number of the supporters of the various compacts or parties in the Nyland division and the number of seats won were as follows:
Seats Seats in
Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion Won. to Votes.
Swedish 44,544 9 8.7
Social Democrat 40,951 9 8.0 Old Finn 20,402 4 4.0
Young Finn 6,521 1 1.3
“Christian” compact 2,932 – .6 “Free Christian” 458 – .1
Radical 168 – –
Isolated schedules 1,356 – .3
Total 117,332 23 23.0
The result is thus in reasonable correspondence with the demands of a strictly proportionate allotment of seats; this statement is also true of the results for the whole of Finland, as the following table will show:–
Seats Seats in
Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion Won. to Votes.
Social Democrat 329,946 80 74.1 Old Finn. 243,573 59 54.7
Young Finn 121,604 26 27.3 Swedish 112,267 24 25.2
Agrarian 51,242 9 11.5
Christian Labourer 13,790 2 3.1 Minor groups 18,568 – 4.1
Total 890,990 200 200.0
An exactly mathematical distribution is, of course, not to be expected from this, any more than from any other method which does not adopt the system of treating a whole country as a single constituency. As to the mechanism of the system it only remains to add that the process of counting was found to be very lengthy. In the Nyland division, where the results were ascertained sooner than in any other case, the elections were held on 15 and 16 March, but the result was not announced until the 2 April. To people accustomed to the greater rapidity of ordinary electoral methods this will seem a serious drawback. Possibly improved arrangements may shorten this long interval between the elections and the announcement of the result.
It would obviously be premature to attempt to estimate the political effects of the Finnish system as compared with other systems of proportional representation.
_Elector’s freedom of choice._
The Finnish system has been in operation since 1907, and the whole political circumstances of Finland have undergone so many striking changes, and so many new factors are at work that to disentangle particular causes and effects is an impossibility. But plainly the Finnish machinery gives a greater freedom to the elector than the Belgian system. The Finnish system in fact encourages the electors to arrange the candidates of a party in the order preferred by the electors themselves, and not in the order dictated by the party managers. There is no “party ticket” for which the elector can vote blindfold. He must choose the schedule that he prefers; he can even rearrange that schedule, or, if he chooses, can make one of his own. No doubt the schedule itself is ready made for him, but it contains three names only, and is not the equivalent of the Belgian “list.” On the other hand, the elector who chooses to vote for a schedule within a compact adds, whether he likes it or not, to the total votes of the compact, and so may help to return not the candidate of his choice, but the candidates preferred by the majority of the party with which he is in sympathy. An illustration of this fact may be taken from the Nyland poll. The old Finnish party were alive to the possibilities of the situation, and combined their lists with great skill so as to attract votes. They placed their favourite candidates in nearly every schedule, but not at the head of the schedule. At the head of the schedule they placed some man of local popularity, usually a peasant proprietor, whose name was not repeated in many, if any, other schedules. Thus the local favourite attracted votes to the schedule, but in the race for the highest numbers of comparison the candidates whose names appeared on few schedules were left behind those whose names appeared on many schedules even in the lower places.
A portion of the official ballot paper showing the compact put forward by the Swedish People’s Party is printed on the opposite page. In one corner of the ballot paper was a blank schedule in the following form.
THE ELECTOR who does not approve of any of the preceding lists should write here the names of his candidates in the order in which he wishes them to be elected.
CANDIDATES
_Name_…………………………………………….
_Profession or Occupation_…………………………..
_Address_………………………………………….
_Name_…………………………………………….
_Profession or Occupation_…………………………..
_Address_………………………………………….
_Name_…………………………………………….
_Profession or Occupation_…………………………..
_Address_………………………………………….
FINLAND GENERAL ELECTION, 1907
Part of Ballot Paper–Nyland Division.
The Voters’ Compact of the Swedish People’s Party.
1
HELSINGFORS.
Experienced Members of the Diet:–
–Schybergson, E. K.
–Neovius, A. W.
–Soderholm, K. G.
33
EAST NYLAND-LOUISA.
Justice and Progress:–
–Rosenquist, G. G.
–Stromberg, J.
–Ehrnrooth, L.
34
MID-NYLAND-NIOKBY.
The Welfare of the Rural Population;– –Topelius, G. L.
–Alfthau, K. von
–Rosenquist, B. T.
35
MID-NYLAND-ESBO.
The Welfare of the Rural Population:– –Wasastjerna, O.
–Schybergson, E.
–Soderholin, K.
36
WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT.
The Welfare ol the Rural Population:– –Nordberg, G.
–Ehrnrooth, L.
–Oljemark, K. T.
37
WEST NYLANB-EKENAS.
The Welfare of the Rural Population. Law and Justice:– –Oljemark, K. T.
–Schybergson, E.
–Soderholm, K.
38
BORGA.
Knowledge and Experience:–
–Runeberg, J. W.
–Bjorkenheim, G.
–Rosenquist, G. G.
39
HELSINGFORS.
Sound Development of the Community;– –Westermarck, Helena.
–Rosenquist, B. T.
–Bjorkenheim, G.
40
HELSINGFORS.
Law and Justice:–
–Sorterholm, K.
–Alfthan, K. von
–Westermarck, Helena,
41
HELSINGFORS.
Legality and Progress:–
–Westermarck, Helena.
–Neovius, A.
–Ehrnrooth, L.
42
HELLSINGFORS.
Swedish Culture:–
–Rosenqnist, B. T.
–Gustafsson, F. prof.
–Soderholm, K.
43
HELSINGFORS.
Friends of Labour and of the People:– –Alfthan, K. von
–Gustafsson, F. prof.
–Gronroos, F.
44
HELSINGFORS.
Experience and Practical Knowledge:– –Runeberg, J. W.
–Schybergson, E.
–Neovius, A.
45
HELSINGFORS.
The Labourers’ Welfare:–
–Ahlroos, F.
–Holmberg, W.
–Ehrnrooth, L.
46
HELSINGFORS.
Commerce and Industry:
–Heimburger, W. F.
–Bjorkenheim, G.
–Schybergson, E.
47
THE SKERRIES OF NYLAND:
Navigation and Fisheries:–
–Hjelt, Th.
–Renter, O.
–Alfthan, K.
48
THE PROVINCE OF NYLAND:
HELSINGFORS.
Temperance, Morality and Popular Education:– –Sohlberg, H.
–Ahlroos, F.
–Rosenquist, G. G.
[Footnote 1: This right of addition is subject to a limit. The reinforcements must not raise a candidate’s total above what he might obtain if the votes given to all compacts or lists, where his name occurs, were divided by the figure which indicates his order within the compact from which he derives his principal strength.]
[Footnote 2: This large reinforcement of votes came from the Christian compact, where this candidate’s name appeared as well as in the Swedish compact.]
[Footnote 3: See reference to Miss Sohlberg in preceding paragraph.]
APPENDIX V
THE STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910
The following tables are taken, with permission, from a paper read on 12 December 1906, by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, M.A., before the Manchester Statistical Society, of which a second and revised edition was published in April 1910 by the Proportional Representation Society.
In these tables the totals for England, Wales, and Monmouth, Scotland and Ireland are shown separately, and the figures for England have been further subdivided according to the ten divisions into which the kingdom is divided by the Registrar General for the purpose of his work.
These ten subdivisions are as follows:
Metropolitan–
London.
South East–
Surrey.
Kent.
Sussex.
Hampshire.
Berkshire.
South Midland–
Middlesex.
Hertfordshire.
Buckinghamshire.
Oxfordshire.
Northamptonshire.
Huntingdonshire.
Bedfordshire.
Cambridgeshire.
East–
Essex.
Suffolk.
Norfolk.
South-West–
Wiltshire.
Dorsetshire.
Devonshire.
Cornwall.
Somersetshire.
West Midland–
Gloucestershire.
Herefordshire.
Shropshire.
Staffordshire.
Worcestershire.
Warwickshire.
North Midland–
Leicestershire.
Rutlandshire.
Lincolnshire.
Nottinghamshire.
Derbyshire.
North-West–
Cheshire.
Lancashire.
Yorkshire–
West Riding.
East Riding (with York).
North Riding.
Northern Division–
Durham.
Northumberland.
Cumberland.
Westmorland.
The first three columns, A, B and C, show the number of members allotted to these several divisions, the number of registered electors, and the number of members to which each division would be entitled if the 670 members of which the House of Commons is composed were divided among the several divisions in proportion to their electorates.
In taking the electorate as the basis of a proportionate redistribution of seats it is not intended to prejudge the question whether population or electorate is the better standard. The electorate has been taken because the figures are available for the very year in which the election takes place, whereas the population is only enumerated once in ten years.
The columns D and E show in two groups the number of members elected for these divisions, Liberal, Labour, and Irish members being gathered together in one column, Conservatives alone occupying the other.
It is one of the disadvantages of our present system of representation that it makes it quite impossible to ascertain the relative strength of the several parties into which the voters are divided. In the great majority of contests there is a Liberal, Labour, or Irish Nationalist candidate on one side, and a Unionist candidate on the other, and there is practically no evidence as to how many of the supporters of either candidate belong to each of the parties concerned. Any estimate of the relative strength of the Liberal and Labour parties or of the Unionist Free Traders, and Tariff Reformers must be largely a matter of guesswork. All that is possible, therefore, is to divide the voters into two groups, as has been done in these tables.
The columns F and G show the total electorate of the constituencies held respectively by the two groups of members shown in columns D and E.
The figures in these two columns are of value in showing the probable result of a scheme of redistribution. The South-Eastern counties may be taken as an example. These are at present represented by 48 members. The Liberals held three constituencies in January 1910 containing an electorate of 31,221 (columns D and F); the Conservatives held 45 constituencies containing an electorate of 604,887 (columns E and G). If a redistribution of seats was made on the basis of equal electorates, the South-Eastern counties would be entitled to 55 members (column C). It may be assumed that in any rearrangement of constituencies the parties would retain their predominance in the areas which they now