Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards the Filipino residents set up a government there. A few days later the Moro datos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers, cut off the head of the Filipino _presidente_, served a few other leading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded to set up a government of their own which was the only government that the place had prior to the arrival of the American troops.
Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place to be stripped and compelled to march before him on the public plaza in a state of nudity.
At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time after the Spaniards left had they desired to do so. On the arrival of the Americans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn it over to them, but his proposition was declined.
He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions under Insurgent rule. It reads as follows:–
“We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during the revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when for seven or eight months there was in existence the so-called Filipino Republic. During that time there was much robbing and killing; the life of a man was worth no more than that of a chicken; men killed one another for personal gain; enemies fought one another with the bolo instead of settling their differences before the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror. There was no justice. Because of this the Moros were opposed to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better class of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control of the local government.” [336]
Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who did not promptly make their escape were murdered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual.
Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinos to govern Moros did not result in complete success.
Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communication with the Sultan of Jolo, authorizing him to establish in all the _rancherias_ of Mindanao and Jolo a government in accordance with a decree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms, and was advised that, “if in this war, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence and with the opposition of our brothers in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country will always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory.” [337] Curiously, the Sultan seems to have remained unmoved by the appeal.
_Masbate_
This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayan population of 29,451. Its people are all Filipinos, and are on the whole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set. There is no reason why it should have been excluded in considering “the human problem in its broader governmental aspect,” whatever that may be, nor can I understand why Blount should have desired to exclude it except that he seems to have been endeavouring to exclude everything possible outside of Luzon, in order to increase the apparent importance of the Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be taken into account in connection with the Visayan Islands, of which it is one.
The islands ordinarily included in the group known as “The Visayas” from the ancient tribal name of the civilized Filipino people who inhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor and numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although their inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak a number of more or less distinct dialects. Only Panay, Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan have non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last named their number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panay and Negros, however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers, as are the representatives of a tribe sometimes called _Monteses_ [338] and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thought it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao.
In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldo was established at various places and different times, without consulting or considering the will of the people. The men who went as his delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authority was not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings which might easily have grown into a war cry.
The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in the following extract from a letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabini discussed the advisability of putting the constitution in force:–
“And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and Iloilo will form a federal Republic and not one in conformity with the centralized Republic provided for by the Constitution.” [339]
The action later taken by Negros shows that there was abundant reason for this fear.
As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was still ignorant as to the real conditions in Negros and Mindanao. [340]
From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, we learn that Aguinaldo and his followers were even then still uninformed as to events in the Visayan Islands. [341] In view of these facts, how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that the Malolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And what shall we say of the following statement, remembering that the Treaty of Paris was signed December 10, 1899?
“When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thousand men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all of the rest of the archipelago with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the army of their country.” [342]
Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by the use of armed emissaries, the Visayan Islands, with the exception of Negros, were brought into the Insurgent fold.
Mabini’s fear that Negros and Iloilo would form a federal republic was not realized, but Negros set up its own government, applied to the local commander of the United States forces for help, endeavoured with almost complete success to keep out Tagalog invaders, and presently settled down contentedly under American rule, facts of which Blount makes no mention. On the contrary, without just cause, he includes this great island, with its 4881 square miles of territory and its 560,776 inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Aguinaldo exercised complete control.
At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition when they planned to land. Negotiations had been entered into with the local Filipino officers, but the latter, under the influence of representatives whom Aguinaldo had sent from Luzon, announced themselves as adherents of his government, and when the American troops finally disembarked fired the town ahead of them. It has been claimed that in doing this they were inspired by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by their own records present a very different picture.
In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says:
“We have received a communication forwarded from Iloilo, from General Martin Delgado and Francisco Soriano, your commissioner. Soriano states that the troops of Diocno have done nothing except commit excesses and steal money during the attack by the Americans upon the town of Iloilo, even going so far as to break their guns by using them as poles to carry the stolen money which they took to Capiz. It is said that these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to fight and do not want Capiz to aid the people of Iloilo, who are the ones who support the entire forces, including the troops of Diocno who went there.” [343]
This same letter contains the following brief reference to conditions in Cebu and Leyte:–
“Also a native priest, Senor Pascual Reyes, has arrived here from Cebu, and says that in Leyte General Lucban is committing many abuses and that Colonel Mojica is only a mere figurehead. In Cebu, he says, things are also in a chaotic condition, because the military chief, Magsilum [Maxilom,–TR.], and the people are not in harmony.”
Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a letter to Aguinaldo from the commissioner whom he put in charge of elections in that island, who on February 19, 1899, writes: [344]–
“Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I left on the 11th for the northern pueblos of this Island to hold the elections for the offices ordered by the Superior Decree of June 18, last.
* * * * *
“The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos I visited later I found that almost all of the residents were in their homes, so that when the elections were held in the town hall, all the principal residents attended, requesting me to inform you that they were disposed to sacrifice even their dearest affections whenever necessary for our sacred cause; they only asked me to inform those who hold the reins of government at the present time in this province, that some steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which had been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains, Majors, Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abusing in the most barefaced manner the positions they claimed to hold, were depriving them of their horses and their carabaos, or cattle. I promised them that I would do this, as I do now, by sending a communication at once to Sres. Flores and Maxilom, who are at the head of the provincial government, impressing upon them the fact that if they continue to grant ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have done, it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province.”
He adds that these men did not remedy the evils complained of. It would be possible to cover in detail all of this and the remaining Insurgent territory, and to show that Judge Blount was quite right in stating that conditions similar to those encountered in Luzon arose there, but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must ask my readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount and myself that such was the case!
Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately arose:–
“The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they would have lived in a conquered country. They were quartered on the towns and the towns had to feed them whether they would or not.
“Peace there was where Aguinaldo’s soldiers had not penetrated, but there does not seem to have been progress. Life went very well in a long siesta in the shady villages under the palm trees, but not only the structure of the State, its very foundations were falling apart. When Aguinaldo’s soldiers came they brought cruelty and license with them. Proud of their victories and confident in themselves they felt that the labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for the purpose of administering to their necessities and their desires. Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him, was forced to entreat it, to appeal to it; he was never strong enough to enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it.”
Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over his inability to maintain a decent state of public order in the territory which he claimed to govern, and in December, 1898, tendered his resignation, giving among other reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of the military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich themselves by improper means, such as accepting bribes, making prisoners a source of gain, and decreasing the allowance of the soldiers. He said that many soldiers had received sums of money as their share of booty, and intimated that officers must have done the same. He made charges against civil as well as military officers and ended by saying that he retained the evidence for presentation when called on. [345]
Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resignation. No wonder that he wished to tender it!
In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount has said:–
“This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under date of November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy Department for its information, with the comment that it ‘in my opinion contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon Island.’ The Admiral’s indorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report.” [346]
He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral believed that the report truthfully set forth the conditions which actually existed in these provinces, and that his indorsement was suppressed. Not only was it true that this report when rendered contained the most complete and reliable information then available in regard to the existing state of the northern part of Luzon Island, but it contained the only first-hand information available. The facts ultimately leaked out and led the admiral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions which arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later said:–
“There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for the first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would.”
I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of these statements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with Dewey’s testimony before the Senate Committee, in which they occur, but he did not mention them.
I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without quoting extracts from a remarkable document written by Isabelo Artacho in October, [347] 1899. It was entitled “Declaration Letter and Proclamation” and was addressed to the Filipino people. While it is probable that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred for Aguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and his rank and standing entitle his statements to consideration:–
“Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said, the faithful interpretation of your wishes and desires.
“Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever you see an insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful wives violated, parents and brothers crying for the murder of a son or of a brother; honest families robbed and in misery; villages burned and plundered for the benefit of a chief or a General; you will see fresh and living signs yet of those horrible crimes perpetrated with the greatest cynicism by those who call themselves your liberators! Liberators because they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hats a piece of red cloth or a triangular figure!
“Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of the village, simply for having implored mercy for a creature arbitrarily inflicted with the _cepo_ [an oblong square piece of heavy wood divided into two parts, with a lock at each end and six or more holes in the middle to confine the feet of prisoners]; there, a dying man, suspended by the feet in a _cepo_, raised from the level of the ground, by another president who has charged him with an unproved crime; there a poor woman falsely charged and driven by petty officers with their bayonets for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop, they being supposed to be, each, Justice itself, ‘_Justicia_,’ and to be obeyed as images of the Gods; there, generals who murder without fear, for an insignificant motive, creatures whose members are being mutilated, or their flesh cut in slices and afterwards roasted and given them to eat; there, officers braining a girl who has refused to accede to their sensual wishes, the lifeless body of the victim, pierced with shots, after having been made use of, is thrown into the river. It is not unusual to witness officers burying people alive in a tomb prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer; it is not unusual to see a _Puisne_-Judge pointing a revolver at a man who is about to give evidence, and threatening to brain him for having dared to ask: ‘Why and to whom am I to declare?’ And finally, on his tottering throne, you will see the Magistrate of the Philippines, so called by his worshippers, with his mephistophelian smile, disposing and directing the execution of a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, or the execution of some other crimes against those who are indifferent or do not care to worship him, such indifference being considered a crime.
“Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention that one recently committed on the person of the renowned and by many called the worthy General, Antonio Luna, which took place just at the entrance of the palace of the Republic Presidency, and also the assassination at Kavite of the ever remembered martyr, Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the ‘Katipunan’ Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution of 1896; against the memory of whom it has been committed, in the proclamation of that falsely called Republic, the criminal and unjust omission to render the smallest manifestation of Filipinos’ feelings towards him, to prevent that same might dislike his murderers!
“Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called democratic Government of the Republic, that grand work of the wise Filipinos; admire with me that beautiful monument erected on a sheet of paper and consecrated to the conquest of reason and labour, especially in connection with human rights and property, the basis for the well-being of social life; but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity when brought to practice and you will again see that the laws were made for the people and not the people for the laws!
“Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think, to wish, to say, anything which does not agree with what the said Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing is attended to, whilst those who have your lives in their hands must be respected.
“Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice taken of family, property, morality and iustice, but confusion and disorder appear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, produced by the ignorance of the subordinate officers, and of the powers that be in the villages and provinces, who are supported by a special committee, or special commissioners empowered to impoverish and to ruin all and with the right of disposing, at their own accord, life, family and individual property without responsibility whatsoever on their part.
* * * * *
“Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern Islands of Jolo, Mindanao, Iloilo, Negros, Cebu and others where now the American flag is hoisted and under whose shadow tranquillity and well-being are experienced, speak for itself.
“Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the whole people of Imus, who were asking protection when the American troops took possession of the town of Bacoor, whilst the insurgent troops there located were hostile.
“Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the war made by the numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malabon, Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Perez Dasmarinias and other towns, before the Worthy Chief Mariano Trias, who ultimately refused, with dignity, the high position of Secretary of War, for which rank he was promoted for reasons which are not worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the non-resistance shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit], Noveleta, and Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, notwithstanding the many intrenchments and troops there located, as well as the identical behaviour observed by other towns of Luzon provinces who are ready to follow when the American troops are in them.
* * * * * * *
“In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people are tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will shake a napkin to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and lightning and troops of dangerous insects; that day in which they will witness the realization of that famous telegraphed dream to the effect that two hours after the commencement of the war the insurgents will take their breakfast in the Palace of ‘Malacanang,’ their tiffin in the Senate House, and their dinner on board the _Olympia_ or in Kavite; that day in which the celebrated _Pequenines_ army, with their invisible Chief-leader, will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls of dust and sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has caused the smallpox to the Americans; that day in which the _Colorum_ army will capture the American fleet with the cords their troops are provided with, in combination with a grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of husks of paddy, by a Nazarene, who will then, by merely touching, convert each husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in which the insurgents, like their leaders, provided with hosts of flour, or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy water, pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging to a miraculous Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or talisman or _amuletos_, will make themselves invulnerable to bullets; also have power to convert into any of the four elements, like those personages of the Philippine legends and comedies,–Ygmidio, Tenoso, Florante, Barnardo, Carpio, etc.
“Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting for the predicted European conflict, which it is said would give them their independence; if not, perhaps, divide the Islands as they are now amongst cousins, brothers, nephews, uncles and godfathers.
“In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary political and social education and the habit of behaving justly towards ourselves and towards our fellow-brothers; when free from all superstition, healthy, strong and vigorous, we find ourselves capable of governing ourselves, without there being the possibility of the preponderance of our passions in the consideration, direction, and administration of the interests of our country, then, and only then, we will be free! we will be independent! [348]
“_Hongkong_, 1st October, 1899.”
Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have detailed are alive to-day, and are powers in their respective communities. Simeon Villa was recently elected a member of the municipal board from the south district of Manila, but fortunately an American governor-general prevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my departure from Manila he was appointed, by Speaker Osmena, a member of a committee on reception for Governor-General Harrison.
The kind of independent “government” these men established is the kind that they would again establish if they had the chance, [349] but among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be those Americans who failed to escape seasonably. I do not mean to say that such a state of affairs would come about immediately, but it would certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner yet “the united Filipino people” would split up on old tribal lines, and fly at each other’s throats.
CHAPTER VIII
Did We Destroy a Republic?
The claim has frequently been made that the United States government destroyed a republic in the Philippine Islands, [350] but some of the critics seem to entertain peculiar ideas as to what a republic is. Blount states [351] that Aguinaldo declined to hear our declaration of independence read “because we would not recognize his right to assert the same truths,” and then apparently forgetting the Insurgent chief’s alleged adherence to the principles of this dacument, he lets the cat out of the bag by saying that “the war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz,” and would himself have been “The Republic.” [352]
He would doubtless have set up just this sort of a government, if not assassinated too soon, but it would hardly have accorded with the principles of the declaration of independence, nor would it have been exactly “a government of the people, by the people, for the people.”
Blount truly says [353] that the educated Filipinos, admittedly very few in number, absolutely control the masses. He adds [354] that _presidentes_ of pueblos are as absolute bosses as is Murphy in Tammany Hall, and that the towns taken collectively constitute the provinces. The first statement is true, and the second, which is tantamount to a declaration that the _presidentes_ control every square foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so far from the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned enough to retain the idea that a republic is “a state in which the sovereign power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them.”
Blount labored under no delusion as to the fitness of the common people to govern. [355]
Not only did the Filipinos themselves understand perfectly well that they had no republic, but there were many of them who were fully aware of the fact that they could establish none. Fernando Acevedo, in writing to General Pio del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said: [356]–
“There could be no republic here, even though the Americans should consent, because, according to the treaties, the Filipinos are not in condition for a republic. Besides this, all Europe will oppose it, and if it should be that they divide our country as though it were a round cake, what would become of us and what would belong to us?”
I will now trace the evolution of the government which Aguinaldo did set up. In doing so I follow Taylor’s argument very closely, drawing on his unpublished Ms., not only for ideas, but in some instances for the words in which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases, and do not mean to unload on him any responsibility for my statements, but do wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him and at the same time to avoid the necessity for the continual use of quotation marks.
Aguinaldo’s methods in establishing his republic are shown by his order [357] that “any person who fights for his country has absolute power to kill any one not friendly to our cause” and the further order [358] prescribing that twelve lashes should be given to a soldier who lost even a single cartridge, while if he continued to waste ammunition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899, workmen who had abandoned their work in the arsenal at Malolos were arrested, returned, given twenty-five lashes each and then ordered to work. [359]
The news that an American expedition was about to sail for the Philippines made him realize that he had not much more than a month in which to place himself in a position in which he would have to be consulted and assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he received from Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an insurrection, not as an ally of the United States, but on his own account. From May 21 to May 24 he issued orders for the uprising against Spain. On May 24 he declared himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation in which he promised to resign his power into the hands of a president and cabinet, to be appointed when a constitutional assembly was convened, which would be as soon as the islands had passed into his control. He further announced that the North American nation had given its disinterested protection in order that the liberty of the Philippines should be gained. [360] On May 25, 1898, the first American troops sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines.
Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough Spanish territory to erect thereon what would appear to the Americans on their arrival to be a government of Luzon, of which he was the head. The Hongkong junta and Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recognition of their government, but they had first to create it. To obtain recognition it was necessary that the American commander on land should be able to report that wherever he or his troops had gone the country was ruled by Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the people were capable of governing themselves.
As the United States is a republic it was natural that the directing group of insurgent leaders should decide upon a republican form of government. That form would appeal to the people of the United States; the first “Christian Asiatic Republic” was a description which would inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of republics. The idea was a wise and subtle one; but Aguinaldo’s republic was merely an elaborate stage-setting, arranged for the contemplation of the people of the United States.
By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had been such that Aguinaldo felt that he could throw down the mask. He would still be glad of American assistance, but he felt himself strong enough to do without it. He saw that “there can now be proclaimed before the Filipino people and the civilized nations its only aspiration, namely, the independence of this country, which proclamation should not be delayed for any ulterior object of this government” [361] and ordered that the independence of the Philippines should be proclaimed at his birthplace, Cavite Viejo, on June 12, 1898. On that date he formally proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pampanga, Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong were about to fall into his hands, the Spanish troops in them being besieged, and about to surrender.
From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo promulgated his decree for the creation and administration of municipalities. [362] In brief, this provided that as soon as the territory of the archipelago, or any portion thereof, had passed from the possession of Spanish forces, the people in the towns who were most conspicuous for their intelligence, social position and upright conduct were to meet and elect a town government. The heads of the towns in every province were to elect a head for the province and his three counsellors. The provincial council, composed of these four officials, with the presidente of the capital of the province, were to see to the execution in that province of the decrees of the central government and to advise and suggest.
This provincial council was to elect representatives for the revolutionary congress, which was to be charged with submitting suggestions to the central government upon interior and exterior affairs, and was to be heard by the government upon serious matters which admitted of delay and discussion.
Before any person elected to office was permitted to discharge his functions, his election was to be approved by the central government. The military commanders, except in time of war, were to have no jurisdiction over the civil authorities. They could, however, demand such supplies as they might need, and these could not be refused. The government was to appoint commissioners to carry these regulations into effect.
On June 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the government of provinces and municipalities [363] as supplemental to the decree of two days before. It went into the details of government, under the following heads: police, justice, taxation and registration of property.
On June 23 he proclaimed the establishment of a revolutionary government, with himself as “president.” In this capacity he had all the powers of the Spanish governor-general, unhampered by any orders from Spain. It is true that the scheme provided for the eventual formation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who drew it up really knew what that word meant. What was provided for in practice was a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship, in which, under the form of election, provision was made for the filling of all offices by men devoted to the group which had seized control.
According to this decree the dictatorial government was in future to be entitled the revolutionary government. Its duty was to struggle for the independence of the Philippines in order to estabish a true republic. The dictator was to be known as the president of the revolutionary government. There were to be four secretaries–one of foreign affairs, commerce and marine; one of war and public works; one of police and interior order, justice, education and hygiene; one of the treasury, agriculture and manufactures. The government could increase the number of secretaries if necessary. They were to assist the president in the despatch of business coming under their departments.
In addition to the president and his secretaries, there was to be a revolutionary congress composed of representatives from the provinces of the Philippine Archipelago, elected as provided by the decree of June 18. In case a province was not able to elect representatives, the government would appoint them for such province. The congress was to discuss and advise, to approve treaties and loans, and to examine and approve the accounts of the secretary of the treasury. If important matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heard concerning them; but if they did not admit of delay, the president of the government was to act at once. Projects of law could be presented by any representative, and by the secretaries of the government.
A permanent committee of congress presided over by the vice-president was to be chosen by that body. This was to serve as a court of appeal in criminal cases and as a court of final jurisdiction in cases arising between the secretaries of the government and provincial officials. The acts of congress were not to go into effect until the president of the government ordered their execution. He was also to have the right of veto.
This was a well-devised plan to secure control for the central group about Aguinaldo. His commissioners, under a form of election in which the electors were carefully selected men, established municipal governments devoted to the cause of the revolution. These were to choose provincial officials and members of the congress. All elections were subject to Aguinaldo’s approval, and every province was under the command of a military representative of his, who could and did call upon the civil authorities for such supplies as he deemed fit. All real power was vested in the central group, and the central group was composed of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private advisers. By this time he had gathered about him men who were trained in the law, some of whom had served the Spanish government in various capacities. They were accustomed to the methods that had previously prevailed under the Spanish regime, and were now ready to draw up constitutions and regulations for the new government. Mabini wrote the three organic decrees. Copies of them were sent to the foreign consuls in Manila, and on July 15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey.
Although the title of “president” was assumed by Aguinaldo, as more likely to be favourably considered in the United States than “dictator,” the tendency of his followers who had not been educated in Europe was to speak of and to regard him not as a president, but as an overlord holding all power in his hands. The people did not feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners in an estate; they considered themselves subject to a ruler who sometimes called himself president, and sometimes dictator. Indeed, there is much to show that if Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans, even the name “republic” would not have been long continued as the title of his government. [364]
Aguinaldo’s claim as to the effectiveness of his government on August 6, 1898, was as follows: [365] “The government of the revolution actually rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Infanta and besieges the capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillity reign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected by the inhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees dated June 18 and 23 last. Moreover, the revolution has about nine thousand prisoners of war who are treated humanely and according to the rules of civilized warfare. We can muster more than thirty thousand men organized as a regular army.”
It may have been that in the majority of these provinces municipal governments, formed in accordance with the provisions of the decree of June 18, had been established; but provincial governments had not been established in all of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any of them, as they were the scene of operations against the Spaniards. There could not well have been nine thousand prisoners in his hands at this time, as that was claimed later when a large additional number of Spaniards had surrendered. As for the thirty thousand men organized as a regular army, there may be a certain difference of opinion as to what constitutes a regular army; the men who saw Aguinaldo’s force then, and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of the opinion that that force was not a regular army. Probably only Manila Province had a provincial government on August 6. Its local presidentes met at Cavite Viejo on August 3 and elected three members of congress from the province, and also the members of the provincial government. The election took place under the supervision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales, whom Aguinaldo had appointed governor of Manila Province on August 1. He remained governor after the election was held. Not until August 17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan assemble under the presidency of the secretary of the interior and proceed to elect two members to congress and the members of the provincial government. Not until August 20 was there an election for the members of the provincial government of Cavite Province. This was held in the town of Cavite. Isaac Fernando Rios, who was afterwards a member of the Filipino junta in Madrid, was chosen a representative of the province; but as he wrote that he was in favour of coming to some agreement with Spain which would permit the development of the Philippines, without abandoning the sovereignty of that country, Aguinaldo promptly disapproved his election [366] and ordered a new one held for the office thus left vacant. On October 2, 1899, Aguinaldo approved the result of a new election held there because four of the five high officials of the province had absented themselves, while one of them had died. Of the men who had so absented themselves one had gone abroad, while the other three had remained in Manila or Cavite under the government of the United States. [367]
The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had arms in their hands. It is not probable that many of them had any conviction concerning the form of government which would be best for the Philippines. There were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a republic. Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the people accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted a president and a republic, without knowing, and probably without caring very much, what it all meant, except that they hoped that taxes would cease with the departure of the friars. A determined and well-organized minority had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous, and leaderless majority.
As soon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents it was divided into territorial zones within which command was exerted by military officers. On July 20, 1898, Cavite had been divided into four zones, and next day Brigadier-General Artemio Ricarte was placed in command of the province and the first zone.
By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six zones, and Nueva Ecija into four zones, with a separate commander for each zone. These men established the government prescribed by Aguinaldo’s decrees of the middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo’s municipal governments had been established in the greater part of the towns of Luzon. These governments were not established by the mass of the people. The mass of the people were not consulted, but they were not in the habit of being consulted in such matters and probably saw no necessity for it in this case. As an evidence of this we have the fact that from the beginning the acts of election were almost always drawn up in Spanish, although by far the greater portion of the people of the archipelago spoke only the native dialects.
The method of establishing these municipal governments employed in Cavite in June, 1898, was continued to the end of Aguinaldo’s rule. It was the same in different places and at different times. Data obtained from reports and documents written in towns far removed from each other follow. They must be considered together in order to obtain an idea of what this method really was.
When the Insurgent movement had progressed sufficiently far, the leaders collected their adherents and obtained recognition as the heads of their provinces or districts. For example, representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled at San Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of General Maximo Hizon agreed to yield him “complete obedience as military governor of the province and representative of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine Islands.” [368] The town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this gathering. Commissioners, in almost every case officers of Aguinaldo’s army, were empowered by him to establish the so-called republican government. They appointed delegates who proceeded to the smaller towns and held elections; but whenever possible the commissioner of Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates were lieutenants of the army. The commissioners selected the electors, for they had all to be “marked out by their good conduct, their wealth, and their social position,” and they had all to be in favour of independence. They then presided at the elections, which were _viva voce_. They apparently selected the people to be elected, and forwarded a record of the proceedings to the central government. The election had to be approved by the dictator or president before the successful candidates could assume the duties of their offices. Later on, the military commanders remote from the seat of government were authorized to approve elections and install the successful candidates, but the records of election had even then to be forwarded to the capital for approval, the action of the commissioner not being final.
The commissioners do not seem to have been able to find many men who had the necessary requisites for electors. In the town of Lipa, Batangas Province, with a population of forty thousand seven hundred forty-three, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosen for whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November 23, 1898, an election was held at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for a presidente to succeed one who had been elected representative in congress. One hundred and sixteen votes were cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand. On October 5, 1898, at Echague, Isabela Province, a presidente was elected for whom fifty-four votes were cast. The population of Echague is fifty-four thousand. On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one hundred and eleven men voted out of a population of sixty-two hundred and forty. On January 29, 1899, the town of Hernani, in Samar, elected its municipal officials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty-four men voted. The town has a population of twenty-five hundred and fifty-five.
The elections, so-called, were not always held without protest. For example, the town of San Jose, Batangas, protested unavailingly to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 P.M., in a storm of rain. Men who had been on friendly terms with the Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. If in spite of the precautions taken men were elected who were disliked by the commissioner or his supporters, the election could be set aside on the ground that the person elected was not an adherent of the revolution.
The elections were often held in a singular manner, as in the following case: [369]–
“On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared before Aguinaldo on Bacoor and announced that they were representatives of the people of the district, who loved liberty. Then in accordance with the directions of the president of the republic under the supervision of the secretary of the interior, they drew lots from a hat to decide how the offices of the head of the district, delegate of police, delegate of the treasury and delegate of justice were to be distributed. The decision having been made in this simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravely approved the election as expressing the will of the people. Perhaps it did, for they seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obey them. On November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an election for local officials in Tondo which since August 13 had been within the American lines.”
On August 23 San Carlos, in Pangasinan Province, a town of twenty-three thousand people, elected its officials under the new form of government. The presidente chosen was a well-known member of the Katipunan, and before the election was held announced his intention of killing any one who was chosen for the position for which he was a candidate. [370] He was accordingly elected. In spite of this grave informality, an informality which formed one ground for a protest on the part of some of the people of the town, Aguinaldo approved the election.
On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the supervision of the military commander in Camarines for the municipal officials of the town of Yriga. [371] The voting was oral, and a secretary wrote down the votes for the two candidates under direction of the commissioner, who finally announced that the candidate whose friend he was had been elected, but without stating how many votes he had received. This newly elected head of the town had the town crier on the following night publish through the streets an address to the people, in which he thanked those who had voted for him and warned those who had not that it would be well for them to beware. The Spanish law known as the Maura Law, which regulated the elections in the municipalities under the Spanish government, provided for a limited electoral body, composed largely of ex-officials of the municipalities. The choosing of an electoral body by the military commander of a district probably did not seem strange to the people. The provincial and municipal officials were established in office by armed men, and they were obeyed because they had been installed by armed men; but it was a form of election to which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object. There were, however, in many cases bitter complaints of the abuses committed by the officers thus “elected.”
This form of government spread with the advance of Aguinaldo’s arms. Municipal elections were held in Tarlac in July, in Ilocos Norte and Tayabas in August, in Benguet and the Batanes Islands in September, 1898, in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samar in January, 1899.
On December 27 Antonio Luna wrote that all the provinces of Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, and Ticao, Romblon, part of Panay, the Batanes, and Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction of the insurgent government. [372]
By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and districts into which Luzon had been divided by the Spanish government had civil governors. [373] These 14 were Tagalog provinces or provinces which the Tagalogs controlled. The other provinces were still under military rule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were dominated by their military commanders. With the manner of holding elections which prevailed, the governors must have been men who were in favour of the military party in force, for otherwise they would not have been elected. [374]
It is not probable that the number of provinces under civil governors much increased. If in Pangasinan Province, where there are many Tagalogs, organizations opposed to the rule of Aguinaldo could cause serious disorders, as was the case, it must have been considered expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tagalogs, who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate the archipelago, that all provinces in which an effective majority of the people were not of that tribe, should be kept under military rule. The municipal governments which had been established in Luzon were in the hands of Aguinaldo’s adherents, or of men who it was hoped would prove loyal to him. They were men of the Spanish-speaking group, which has always dominated the people of the islands. They were probably not as a rule men of means. Many of them, perhaps most of them, had been clerks and employees under the Spanish government, and they saw no reason for changing the methods of town administration which had then been followed. The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, and the regulations for town government, were but little modified from those they found in force. In many ways such changes as were made were for the worse.
Once installed in power, Aguinaldo’s officials were required to exercise over the mass of the people about the same control that had always been exercised over them. The governing group considered that they were perfectly capable of providing for the welfare of the islands, and that it was the duty of the people to obey them without question.
When the insurgent force was increased in preparation for war with the Americans a large number of municipal officials resigned, or attempted to do so. It was not easy for a municipal official under Aguinaldo’s government to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, had to be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the person concerned was unfit to perform the duties of his office. Judging by the record, [375] an epidemic seems to have attacked the municipal officials in January, 1899. It is probable that they saw that war was inevitable and that they did not wish to remain in charge of the towns and be responsible for providing for the necessities of “the liberating army.” In Pangasinan in that month men could not leave their barrios without obtaining the permission of the headman, and in one town men who had attempted to sell their property for the purpose of going to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrested and their conduct investigated. [376]
Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, ordered the congress provided for in his decree of June 23, 1898, to assemble at the capital on September 15,1898, and appointed a number of provisional representatives for provinces and islands not under his control. [377] It has often been claimed that Aguinaldo’s government controlled at this time the whole archipelago, except the bay and city of Manila and the town of Cavite. [378]
Blount quotes the following statement from the report of the First Philippine Commission:–
“While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire island except that city.” [379]
I signed that statement, and signed it in good faith; nevertheless, it is untrue. The Filipino forces never controlled the territory now known as Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga or Apayao, much less that occupied by the Negritos on the east coast of Luzon, but this is not all. There exists among the Insurgent records a very important document, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the call for the first session of the Filipino congress was issued, there were no less than sixty-one provinces and _commandancias_, which the Insurgents, when talking among themselves, did not even claim to control, and twenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to Luzon. [380]
The men who composed this congress were among the ablest natives of the archipelago; but representative institutions mean nothing unless they represent the people; if they do not, they are a conscious lie devised either to deceive the people of the country or foreign nations, and it is not possible for any system founded upon a lie to endure. A real republic must be founded not upon a few brilliant men to compose the governing group but upon a people trained in self-restraint and accustomed to govern by compromise and concession, not by force. To endure it must be based upon a solid foundation of self-control, of self-respect and of respect for the rights of others upon the part of the great majority of the common people. If it is not, the government which follows a period of tumult, confusion and civil war will be a government of the sword. The record the Philippine republic has left behind it contains nothing to confirm the belief that it would have endured, even in name, if the destinies of the islands had been left in the hands of the men who set it up.
The national assembly met on the appointed day in the parish church of Barasoain, Malolos, which had been set aside for the meetings of congress. This body probably had then more elected members than at its subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large number of men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after consultation with his council to represent provinces which they had never even seen.
From a “list of representatives of the provinces and districts, selected by election and appointment by the government up to July 7, 1899, with incomplete list of October 6, 1899” [381] I find that there were 193 members, of whom forty-two were elected and one hundred fifty-one were appointed. This congress was therefore not an elective body. Was it in any sense representative? The following table, showing the distribution of delegates between the several peoples, will enable us to answer this question.
In considering this table it must be remembered that the relationship given between the number of delegates assigned to a given people and the number of individuals composing it is only approximate, as no one of these peoples is strictly limited to the provinces where it predominates.
I have classified the provinces as Tagalog, Visayan, etc., according to census returns showing the people who form a majority of their inhabitants in each case. [382]
People Number Elected Appointed Delegates Delegates
Visayans 3,219,030 0 68 Tagalogs 1,460,695 18 19
Ilocanos 803,942 7 11 Bicols 566,365 4 7
Pangasinans 343,686 2 2 Pampangans 280,984 2 2
Cagayans 159,648 4 6
Zambalans 48,823 1 2
Non-Christians 647,740 4 34 42 151
It will be noted that the Tagalog provinces had eighteen out of a total of forty-two elected delegates. The Visayans, by far the most numerous people in the islands, did not have one. The non-Christian provinces had a very disproportionately large total of delegates, of whom four are put down as elected, but on examination we find that one of these is from Lepanto, the capital of which was an Ilocano town; one is from Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-Ilocano population; one is from Benguet, the capital of which was an Ilocano town, and one from Tiagan, which was an Iloeano settlement. These delegates should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos.
If the individual relationships of the several members are considered, the result is even more striking. Of the thirty-eight delegates assigned to the non-Christian provinces, one only, good old Lino Abaya of Tiagan, was a non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian _comandancias_ were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionate to their population, and in this way the congress was stuffed full of Tagalogs.
Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo’s cabinet, representing the Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild, scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero representing the Moros, Bagobos, Mandayas and Manobos of Davao; of Jose M. Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of Bataan, just across the bay from Manila, representing the wild Moros of Cotabato; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese _mestizo_ Manila business man, representing the Yacan and Samal Moros of Basilan; of my good friend Benito Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission, and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress of the United States, representing the bloody Moros of Jolo! Yet they appear as representatives of these several regions.
Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory had ever set foot in the provinces or _comandancias_ from which they were appointed, or would have been able to so much as name the wild tribe or tribes inhabiting them.
I have been furnished a list, made up with all possible care by competent persons, from which it appears that there were eighty-five delegates actually present at the opening of congress, of whom fifty-nine were Tagalogs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans, and one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. Yet it has been claimed that this was a representative body! It was a Tagalog body, without enough representatives of any other one of the numerous Philippine peoples to be worth mentioning.
With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have had no difficulty in obtaining any legislation he desired.
The committee of congress appointed to draw up a constitution set to work promptly, and by October 16,1898, had proceeded so far with their work that Buencamino was able to write to Aguinaldo that while he had been of the opinion that it would have been best for him to continue as a dictator aided by a committee of able men, yet it would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspend its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact that he did not approve of a constitution. [383]
Apparently early in December the committee submitted their project. In presenting it to congress they said [384] that–
“The work whose results the commission has the honour to present for the consideration of congress has been largely a matter of selection; in executing it not only has the French constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as we have considered those nations as most resembling the Filipino people.”
The most important difference between this project and the actual constitution adopted was that, although the project provided that the Dominican, Recollect, Franciscan and Augustinian friars should be expelled from the country and that their estates should become the property of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religion as that of the state and forbade state contribution to the support of any other, although it permitted the practice in private of any religion not opposed to morality, which did not threaten the safety of the country. The government was authorized to negotiate a concordat with the Pope for the regulation of the relations between church and state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, but it finally failed of adoption, and the constitution as promulgated provided for the freedom and equality of religion and for free and compulsory education which had not been provided for in the original project. The constitution as approved forbade the granting of titles of nobility, decorations or honorary titles by the state to any Filipino. This paragraph did not exist in the original project, which merely forbade any Filipino to accept them without the consent of the government.
Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo’s advisers, did not approve of the constitution. He himself had drawn up a project for a constitution during June, 1898, but it was not accepted by the committee, the greater part of whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. And yet when separation of church and state was finally provided for it did not please Mabini, who, although he was opposed to church control, wrote to Aguinaldo [385] that the constitution as passed by congress was not acceptable and should not be promulgated because the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, as the army had to be in control for the time being, and furthermore it was not expedient to separate church and state, as this separation would alienate many of their adherents. Indeed, there was not much in the constitution which he thought ought to take immediate effect, [386] and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him because he had refused to agree to its promulgation. Existing conditions were such that he believed that all powers should be vested in one person. He warned Aguinaldo that if the constitution were put in force, he would be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo, probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed certain changes in it. [387]
Evidently the provisions of the constitution did not worry Aguinaldo much, as is shown by his reply to the request by some of his officers for information as to what reward those who were first in the attack on Manila should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis, duke, etc. [388]
On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the formation of a new cabinet made up as follows: Apolinario Mabini president and secretary of foreign affairs; Teodoro Sandico, secretary of the interior; Mariano Trias, secretary of the treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary of _fomento_. [389] On January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the president of the council of government. This body met twice a week at Malolos on set days, and at the close of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo a statement of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached for his decision. The president of the republic did not preside at, or take part in, its deliberations.
On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation in which he announced that the United States had obtained possession of the Philippines and that its government would beextended over the islands of the archipelago. Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if not intended to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried into Manila by his emissaries and posted up over the one issued by the American commander. It was a challenge to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo and his advisers hastened their preparations for the coming combat.
The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an order to the heads of all provinces directing the organization of territorial militia to resist the American invasion, and ordering the heads of the towns to hold meetings of the people to protest against the aggression of the United States. They were held in accordance with these orders, and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and published in the official organ of the government as evidence of the feeling of the people. It was, however, not considered necessary in publishing them to mention the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders.
On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo [390] recommending changes in the proposed constitution, which he still liked as little as ever. He was afraid that Negros and Panay would refuse to accept the form of government it prescribed. The worst thing about it was that the Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo’s government; for when they saw the constitution they would know, as it made no mention of them, that the Filipinos wanted independence. Mabini thought that it was possible that the wording of the constitution might have been deliberately planned by members of the congress in favour of annexation to the United States, so that that country would be warned, would become more mistrustful, and would refuse to recognize Aguinaldo’s government. Whatever the president of the council may have thought about the theoretical advisability of a congress to represent the people, he found one much in the way when he had obtained it.
Buencamino advised that the constitution should be approved and promulgated; one argument was that the congress had been consulted in the matter of a national loan, and if it was dissolved, there could be no loan. This was apparently the only matter upon which it had been consulted. [391]
The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified at a session of the congress on January 20, 1899.
On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and ordered that it should be “kept, complied with and executed in all its parts because it is the sovereign will of the Philippine people.” [392] The constitution provided for a government of three cooerdinate powers, executive, legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form of government which would have succeeded in the Philippines was not determined by actual experience. It was never really put in force for war with the United States began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as the expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated natives rather than as the working formula for the actual conduct of the political life of a nation. One proof of this is the fact that not until June 8, 1899, were Aguinaldo’s decrees upon the registration of marriages and upon civil marriage, dated June 20,1898, revoked, and the provisions of the constitution concerning marriage put in effect. [393]
Aguinaldo had approved the constitution; he had informed the foreign consuls and General Otis that it had been promulgated and become the law of the land. It was not promulgated. It had not become the law of the land. It served one important purpose. It passed into the hands of the Americans and showed them the ability and the aspirations of certain individuals of the archipelago, but Mabini and his followers did not believe in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least was emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come for it to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote to Aguinaldo that if it should be promulgated it would be absolutely necessary to give the president the veto power, and replace the elected representatives by others appointed by the government. If this were not done the president would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing that disagreement between the executive government and the congress was the cause of its misfortunes, would start another revolutionary movement to destroy both of them. [394]
As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution was mere paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the capacity of the people to maintain self-government. It expressed only the academic aspirations of the men who drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence from any previous or subsequent experience of the people that it would have worked in practice. It was enacted for the misleading of Americans rather than for the benefit of the Filipinos.
While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, it was in fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the people had no share. Their duty was only to give soldiers for the army and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question the orders they received from the military heads of their provinces.
There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic in the Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which even remotely resembled a republic.
CHAPTER IX
The Conduct of the War
It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.
From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and “severely punished” for a third. [395]
On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.
Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.
The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.
“The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained.” [397]
Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]
Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes cooeperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399] and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.
There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.
The Visayas
Feeling between Tagalog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401] but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.
On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them. [402]
In Luzon General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.” [403]
That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided–
“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”
With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] American soldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]
It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.
I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.
A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.
Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape. [408]
These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions, [409] but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.
In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them. [410] More significant yet, when conditions became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary: [411]–
“_December 22._–It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.
“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.
“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.
* * * * *
“_December 24._–We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Senors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.
“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.” [412]
In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:–
“_February 6._–We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Senor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.” [413]
The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:–
“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore, I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.” [414]
There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.
The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many times more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzon during the entire month.
On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:–
“_Pavia_, April 6th, 1899.
“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:
“_Towns:_ Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zarraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.
* * * * *
“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.
* * * * *
“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.
“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.
“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.
“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.
“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.
“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.
“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.
“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.
“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.
“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.” [415]
Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.
Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure. [416]
We learn from the _Filipino Herald_ for February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan. [417]
But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.
General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date. [418]
And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. [419] Things now went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor. [420] Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence. [421]
The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.
On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pio del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.
Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:–
“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.
Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.” [422]
The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.
Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details. [423]
In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.
It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations, whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:–
“_Manila_, April 19, 1901.
“To the Filipino People:–
“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.
“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force–a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.
“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.
“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.
“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.
“_Emilio Aguinaldo_. [424]
“_Manila_, April 19, 1901.”
This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagalog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:–
“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.” [425]
Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and while serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.
The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:–
“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.” [426]
These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.
The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.
Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.
The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration–not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:–
“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.
“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, including rice, _palay_, [427] chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reestablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’
“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.
“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.
“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to the _mestizo_ ruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of his _barrio_, [428] the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered–it was their pride.
“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.
“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.
“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.
“The insurrection had originated among the Tagalogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagalog provinces.
“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”
General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reestablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.
Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.
The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small. [429] Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715. [430]
The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It means only that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.
Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:
“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.” [431]
Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.
In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.
This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions. [432]
CHAPTER X
Mr. Bryan and Independence
In order to bring home to some of my Democratic and Anti-Imperialist friends the unreliable character of the testimony of even the very high officers of the so-called Philippine Republic, I here quote certain extracts from the Insurgent records, showing the important part played, doubtless unwittingly, by Mr. William Jennings Bryan in Philippine politics during the war. The first of these might properly have been considered in the chapter entitled “Was Independence Promised?” Others are instructive in that they show the use made of false news in bolstering up the Insurgent cause, and might with propriety have been included in the chapter on “The Conduct of the War.” I have thought it best to keep them by themselves. Further comment on them would seem to be superfluous.
“On May 1, 1900 (P.I.R., 516.6), I. de los Santos wrote a long letter in Tagalog and cipher to Aguinaldo, in which he reported upon the progress of what he would have probably called the diplomatic campaign. If this letter is to be believed, the agents in the United States of the junta had been able to form relations which might be of great value to them. Santos said in part:–
“‘Commissioners… Senores Kant (G. Apacible) and Raff (Sixto Lopez) duly carried out your last instructions given at Tarlac. Senor Del Pan, sailing by way of Japan, about the middle of October, and Senor Caney (G. Apacible), sailing by way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto about the middle of February following. But before the arrival of Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (United States) and was able to pry in upon our political friends and enemies. When they met each other they continued the voyage incognito, as Raft had done previously, making themselves known to a very few people; but later on, and according to the instructions carried by Caney, they made themselves known to a greater number of people, and have succeeded in interviewing Bryan who happened to be in New York. Senor Raff said that Bryan feared being present at a conference, lest he might be called a traitor by members of his own party, and also by those of the opposite or “imperialist” party, who are quite proud over the victories they have gained against our people over there. Nevertheless, Raff was able to be present and talk at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political friends introducing him as a friend from the committee (at Hongkong) and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there in order that our sacred rights may be given consideration by them. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the conference, he sent a most trusted person, his right-hand man, Dr. Gardner. The results of the conference between Senor Raff and Dr. Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Mr. Bryan, are as follows:–
“‘1st. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease to defend our sacred rights. 2nd. That we must never mention Bryan’s name in our manifestos and proclamations, lest the opposite party might say he is a traitor. 3rd. That we are in the right; and hence he promised in the name of Bryan that if this Senor Bryan is victorious in the presidential campaign, he will recognize our independence without delay. Your honored self can easily conclude from all the foregoing that Senor Del Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurred with him; and he returned to inform Senor Apacible about the results of the conference. So these two studied over the plan of the policy to be adopted and carried out. I write you what their opinions are, viz.: 1st, that they will reside there, pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aiding the propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set for the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardner said and promised in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay there in order that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he can sign the recognition of our independence; and this should be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory he should forget his promise. 3rd. For carrying out the two propositions just mentioned, they request 2000 pounds sterling, that is $20,000 in silver, to be used for the propaganda, for paying newspapers and for bribing senators–this last clause is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And 4th, that the money must be sent immediately, and that you should be informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos and proclamations.
“‘In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposition, and as I did not have the desired money here, I answered as follows: “Plan approved; for the sake of economy we have decided that one of the two retire, but before doing so make arrangements, establish communications with leaders of Bryan’s party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the relations; he who is to retire will locate himself in Paris near Senor Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will secretly discuss political problems that may arise. So he will watch for the opportune moment of Bryan’s election, in order to go immediately to Hayti and formally arrange the contract with Bryan.” [433]
* * * * *
“‘By the end of 1899, by the time guerrilla warfare was well under way, by the time that any Filipino government, unless an expression of the unfettered will of the nearest bandit who can muster a dozen rifles may be called a government, had ceased to exist, a strong opposition to the policy of the administration had arisen in the United States and a demand for the recognition of the independence of the Philippines. The junta in Hongkong were assured that the Democratic party would come into power in the next elections and that this would mean the success of the patriotic efforts of Aguinaldo and his followers. The news was good and was forthwith spread abroad in “Extracts from our correspondence with America,” “News from our foreign agents,” “News from America,” and “Translations from the foreign press”–circulars and handbills printed on thin paper which were smuggled into the Philippines and passed into the hands of the guerrilla leaders who could read Spanish. They gathered their followers about them and told them that a powerful party had arisen in America which was going to give them all they had ever asked for. They had only to fight on, for success was certain. In America the “Anti-imperialists” were hanging the “Imperialists,” and they should continue to harry the American adherents among the natives of the Philippines.
“‘There are a number of these publications among the papers captured from the insurgents, and the adoption of this method of propaganda seems to have been nearly coincident with Aguinaldo’s orders declaring guerrilla warfare. It does not seem likely that the matter contained in them was supplied by a Filipino, for if it was he assumed a general acquaintance among the people with American politics and American methods which they were far from possessing.
“‘In these publications the Filipinos were assured that the Imperialists were kept in power only by the lavish contributions