Colonial troops were offered about this time, and the Diary contains the entry, February 20th: “The sending of a Colonial force to Suakim. Hartington and Derby had snubbed the Colonists, and were snubbed by the Cabinet in consequence.”] then that of Egyptian Finance, on which Harcourt broached his scheme by which the United Kingdom was to pay the difference caused by a reduction of the rate of interest, to which scheme Chamberlain and I were opposed. We were informed that the Queen “most strongly protested against our binding ourselves to leave Egypt.”‘
Meanwhile the Radicals in the Cabinet considered their concerted action in view of a change of leadership.
‘We settled during the Cabinet that Trevelyan, Chamberlain, and I should meet at my room at the Local Government Board, directly the Cabinet was over, to discuss the terms on which we would join a Hartington administration; and we did so, finding Egypt and my proposed inquiry into the Civil List the only real difficulties. The Civil List could be got over, as it was certain that the Whigs would give in to pressure from us upon this point. But Harcourt had informed us that our Egyptian policy made the formation of a Government impossible, as Hartington would not consent to accept office on our Egyptian policy.’
It was very difficult to come to an agreement about Egypt. Lord Derby had declared that the only alternatives were guaranteed neutrality or annexation. Dilke and Chamberlain stood for the former, considering their duty done if they prevented occupation by any other European Power, and took steps to establish internal order–which meant completing the organization of an Egyptian army. There was a third policy; for Lord Hartington, who repeatedly in public repudiated the idea of annexation, insisted upon the retention of a single control during a prolonged occupation. In this he had the strongest backing from the Queen.
‘Chamberlain at our meeting added a fresh proviso–namely, that Parnell or some other Irishman should be Chief Secretary. I afterwards informed Harcourt of Chamberlain’s views, adding that Chamberlain was willing to avoid all personal questions, although he much wished that John Morley should be in the Cabinet, [Footnote: Sir Charles had noted his own strong wish to this effect in the previous year.] that he wholly rejected Harcourt’s plan for Egypt as being a bribe to buy off the Powers, forced on us by unworthy fears. Chamberlain wished, if his own Egyptian policy was not adopted, to simply evacuate the country.
‘Chamberlain, I was empowered to say, had also mentioned the English land question, and was opposed to allowing Lord Salisbury to come in,’ as this, he said to Sir Charles, ‘would surely be a hopeless confession of weakness, and give him a chance with the new electors.
‘I argued against Chamberlain’s Egyptian policy, not on the merits, but on the chances of our getting our own way.
‘”I doubt our getting our way as to bankruptcy, and am not sure that we ought to put that forward as sole or chief cause for not joining Hartington.” To this Chamberlain replied: “True. But how can we join another Government without any settled policy about Egypt? Harcourt’s alternative is impossible; then what is there? I should refuse to join Hartington unless we can agree as to Egypt policy, and if we do agree, there can in that case be no reason for letting Salisbury in.”‘
Egypt was in Sir Charles’s view the main, but not the only, difficulty. The Government policy of ‘lying down to Germany’ was another. At the same date:
‘January 7th, Chamberlain and I had a conference with regard to Samoa, in which I pointed out that if we quarrelled with France about Egypt she would have all Europe behind her, whereas in our dealings with Germany about Samoa, Zanzibar, and other matters, Germany would stand alone.’ [Footnote: A letter to Lord Hartington from his secretary, Mr. Brett, which is quoted by Mr. Bernard Holland (_Life of Duke of Devonshire_, vol. ii, pp. 38, 39), suggests that the Hartington section had difficulty in reconciling Sir Charles’s attitude on other Imperial matters with his Egyptian policy: “It would indeed be a farce, after all the fuss about the Cameroons and Angra Pequena, to allow Suakim, which is the port of Khartoum, and the Nile to pass into the hands of foreigners.” The answer is, first, that Sir Charles would certainly never have consented to let any port in Egypt or the Soudan pass into the hands of any European Power: his proposal was neutralization of Egypt under international guarantee; and, secondly, that the questions were governed by different conditions, which he set out in conference with Mr. Chamberlain about Samoa.]
January 9th, ‘I had decided that if I resigned, or if I refused to join a Hartington administration, I should mention four subjects–Egypt, Samoa, Zanzibar, and (probably) the Civil List inquiry (if I were not completely satisfied). On the same day I was at work on our draft despatch to Sir Edward Malet as to Zanzibar, which had been settled on the 8th after the Cabinet of the 7th, but which did not go off until the 14th. On January 14th I noted in my Diary, “The Zanzibar despatch went. Seven days’ delay. I know that two days’ delay was caused by the necessity of sending to Osborne and to the Prime Minister, but why seven days?”
‘On January 21st the first matter discussed was that of New Guinea, in which we found ourselves in difficulties caused by absence of jurisdiction over foreigners, and we agreed in consequence to annexation.’
The situation with Germany was undoubtedly grave, but ought not, Sir Charles maintained, to entail the sacrifice of Zanzibar. On February 24th Count Muenster, the German Ambassador, told Mr. Alfred de Rothschild that he expected to be withdrawn, but that New Guinea was the only serious matter in dispute.
‘On Tuesday, February 24th, I breakfasted at Alfred de Rothschild’s house, to meet the German Ambassador, Count Muenster, at the latter’s wish. Alfred de Rothschild did not sit down with us, and we were _tete-a-tete_. Muenster was very free in his remarks about Bismarck. “No one ever contradicts him.” “He sees none but flatterers.” “His life is a period to be got through.”‘
Two March entries are apposite here:
‘On Wednesday, March 4th, Rosebery wrote to me to ask me to dine with him to meet “Herbert Bismarck,” who had suddenly arrived, but I was engaged to the Speaker’s dinner, and had to put off seeing young Bismarck till Thursday, the 5th. He had come over to try to force us to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby. I noted in my Diary: [Footnote: Sir Charles’s Diaries, to portions of which certain biographers had access, are at this point quoted by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice in his _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 430. The passage runs: “Negotiations with Germany on the vexed colonial questions were meanwhile proceeding, more particularly with regard to New Guinea. Sir Julian Pauncefote proposed a plan which it was hoped might satisfy the German Chancellor, and Count Herbert Bismarck reappeared as co-negotiator with Count Muenster in London. Lord Rosebery, who had just joined the Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal, also took part in the negotiations. ‘Herbert Bismarck came over again,’ Sir Charles Dilke noted; ‘if at his former visit he had only tried to get us to dismiss Lord Derby, on this occasion he wanted us to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby.'”] “He puts us in a difficult position as individuals, for how can we say to this personally friendly fellow that we do not think Lord Granville’s speech in the Lords on Friday foolish, or how say that we think that the allusion to old Bismarck’s dislike of Muenster in a recent despatch from Malet ought to have been published.”
‘On Friday, March 6th, I saw Herbert Bismarck again twice…. I having expressed anxiety about Zanzibar, he told me that his father had directed him to say that he “considered Zanzibar as independent as Turkey or Russia.” It is to my mind shameful that, after this, Lord Granville should have begun and Lord Salisbury have rapidly completed arrangements by which the Zanzibar mainland, the whole trade of which was in our hands, was handed over to Germany.’
‘On March 7th we discussed Herbert Bismarck’s views on the Cameroons, on German claims in New Guinea (on this head we settled with him), and on Pondoland.’
While the difficulties with Germany were being discussed, differences as to Egyptian policy and our relations with France continued.
On January 20th, Egypt once more threatened to break up the Government. France had proposed an international Commission of Inquiry into the financial situation.
‘We discussed a French proposal which, as I wrote to the Chancellor, had at least one advantage–namely, “that it re-forms the majority in the Cabinet by uniting two of the three parties–yours and mine.” Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Kimberley, Derby, Harcourt, the Chancellor, Trevelyan, and Dilke, eight in all, supported taking the new French proposals as a basis. Chamberlain was absent ill. Northbrook, Hartington, Childers, to my astonishment, and Carlingford were against us. After the Cabinet Hartington wrote to Mr. Gladstone to say that he “could not accept the decision,” and Northbrook supported him.’ Next day, however, ‘when we turned to Egyptian finance, Trevelyan went over from our side to the other. Mr. Gladstone announced that what we had decided on the previous day was not to prevent our arguing against the French proposed inquiry, and thus Hartington was kept in.’
‘On January 23rd I forwarded to Chamberlain a letter from Sandringham, which showed that the Queen had been alarmed at the possibility that my proposed Civil List inquiry might affect not only new grants, but also the Civil List arrangements made at the beginning of the reign. Chamberlain made a Delphic reply that, on the one hand, inquiry would be a farce if it did not include the existing Civil List, but that on the other hand there could be no intention to make any change in the arrangements with the Queen.’
‘On January 28th, I heard from Sandringham that the Prince of Wales was going to Osborne the next day, and would broach to the Queen his friendliness to the idea of a new settlement of the Civil List. Chamberlain was anxious that no difficulty should be made by us on the occasion of the marriage of Princess Beatrice. He wrote: “_If alone_, I should wait for something or somebody to turn up. Before Prince Edward wants an allowance who knows what may happen? But I am perfectly ready to follow your lead or to lead to your prompting.”‘
All arrangements were being made on the assumption that Lord Hartington would become Prime Minister.
‘I had been left by Mr. Gladstone in a certain doubt as to whether I was to be completely responsible for the Redistribution Bill, or whether Hartington was to share the responsibility. I wrote to Hartington: “Mr. Gladstone sends me everything on Redistribution, and expresses no opinion of his own. Northcote and Salisbury write to me only, and the whole thing is more and more in my hands. If I let things drift, it is clear that I shall practically have sole charge of the Bill, for no one else will know anything about it. I do not shrink from this at all. It is work I like. But, as you will probably be called on to form an Administration immediately after the passing of the Bill, don’t you think it would look well, and that our people and the Press and the country would like it, if you were to take charge of the Bill? If so, I had better have two or three days’ work at it with you.”
‘Hartington had asked me to stay with him at Hardwick to talk it over, but it was only a Saturday to Monday visit from January 10th to 12th, and there were many people in the house, and our whole conversation was but very short; and Hartington continued to show but little desire to work at the detail, and the Bill could only be handled by those who knew its detail.’
Although the Opposition leaders had accepted the compact, it was at this time quite uncertain whether the House of Commons would consent to the Redistribution scheme–affecting as it did the interests of every member. The Fourth Party had not been consulted in the arrangement, and inevitable friction followed.
‘On January 27th I had a correspondence with Northcote in reference to some mischief which had been made by Randolph Churchill. Northcote had been told by the Conservative Chief Whip, “Dilke told Randolph that the Government would have given more grouping if we had pressed for it.” The Conservative party being angry at the absence of grouping of the boroughs, Northcote had taken up the point, but he now wrote: “Whatever Churchill said must have been in the nature of an inference of his own from what had previously passed, from which he had probably gathered that the Government were ready to concede grouping.” But there was a lady in the case who had gossiped about what Northcote had said to her, and he promised to write to the offender.’
‘On January 13th Mr. Gladstone wrote as to the Redistribution Bill: “The difficulty as I see it about communication with Northcote is that he seems to have little weight of influence, and to be afraid or unwilling to assume any responsibility. I have usually found him reasonable in his own views, but obliged to reserve his judgment until after consulting his friends, which consultations I have found always to end badly. On the other hand, it is, of course, necessary to pay him due respect. What may prove to be best under these circumstances is–(1) not to be bound always to consult HIM, (2) to consult him freely on the easier and smaller matters, but (3) in a stiff question, such as the numbers of the House may prove to be, to get at Salisbury if possible, under whose wing Northcote will, I think, mostly be content to walk, (4) Or, if Salisbury cannot be got alone, then Northcote and Salisbury would be far preferable to Northcote alone.”‘
All these difficulties had to be met by Sir Charles. When the Bill actually came before the House, ‘Mr. Gladstone instructed James to assist me in the conduct of it. But practically I had it to myself.’ Lord Hartington had rendered invaluable service in the preliminary negotiations. But for such laborious work of detail as was needed to carry through this Bill, neither temperament nor surroundings had fitted him. His Hardwick home is thus described by Sir Charles in a letter which he wrote to Mrs. Pattison:
‘I am writing in my bedroom, which is–bed and all–that of Mary Queen of Scots, who was the prisoner of Bess of Hardwick. It is a wonderful house, indeed–enormous, and yet completely covered with the tapestry and the pictures of the time…. The casement windows have never been touched since Queen Elizabeth was here, and are enormous. (There is a local proverb which speaks of the hall as “all window and no wall.”) The result is that, in spite of heavy hanging curtains, the candles are blown out if you go near the windows…. The portrait of the first Cavendish–who was usher of Cardinal Wolsey, and who married Bess of Hardwick, the richest lady of the day–is exactly like Hartington, but a vulgar Hartington–fat and greasy–a Hartington who might have kept a public-house.’
Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Sir Charles at Hardwick concerning his host:
‘The true Whig tradition is to keep abreast of the movement which they would willingly restrain, and do nothing to quicken, but it is difficult for a man of Hartington’s temperament to make the sacrifice of pride which these tactics require.’
Mr. Chamberlain’s Ipswich speech had made its mark, and Sir Charles notes ‘the beginning of the terror caused by the unauthorized programme’ in ‘a letter which I received from Lord Salisbury, who was at Florence, as to my draft Report of the Housing Commission.’
‘Lord Salisbury had greatly changed his views since he had sketched out socialistic proposals for me in his own hand. He now complained of that which I had said on “the burning questions of expropriation, betterment, and land tenure,” and thought that Chamberlain’s evidence had affected the report, and that such views “must now be considered in the light of the doctrines as to land he has recently laid down.”‘
That letter, received on January 30th, must have been written two days earlier, and evidently at that moment there were plans of forming an administration which should exclude the Radicals.
‘On January 28th Harcourt told me that he had stopped the Queen deciding to send for Goschen to form a Whig Ministry if we were beaten or if Mr. Gladstone resigned by telling her that Goschen would refuse, or that, if he consented, no one would join him.’
On January 29th, at Birmingham, Mr. Chamberlain made reply to his critics in a speech which added to the Ipswich programme manhood suffrage and payment of members, and which further declared that the sanctity of public property far exceeded that of private property. If land, for instance, had been ‘lost or wasted or stolen,’ some equivalent for it must be found, and some compensation exacted from the wrongdoers. [Footnote: ‘The ransom theory,’ afterwards alluded to (see Chapter XLIV., p. 182).]
These utterances from a member of the Cabinet were not likely to pass unchallenged.
‘On Monday, February 2nd, Chamberlain telegraphed to me that he was coming up on the next day, Tuesday, the 3rd, on purpose to see me on an important matter; and on the morning of the 3rd I received in a secret box the letters about which he was coming. There was one from Mr. Gladstone complaining of the unauthorized programme, and a draft proposed reply, and Chamberlain added: “Take them (Mr. Gladstone’s letters and enclosures from the Whigs) in connection with the _Times_ articles. There is to be a dead set evidently…. There are three possibilities. (1) Mr. Gladstone may wish me to resign. (2) A vote of censure may be proposed in the House of Commons and carried. (3) Mr. Gladstone may defend me, and in so doing may to all intents and purposes censure me in such a way as to entail my resignation. The first would not, I think, do me any harm. The second would do me good. The third would not be pleasant. My object in proposed reply is to make Mr. G. speak more plainly, and to let me know where I stand. I have spoken in the first person because (until I see you) I have no right to assume that you will accept a joint responsibility. But I think you will, and then if we go out or are forced out there will be a devil of a row. I have been speaking to Schnadhorst to-day on the possibility. He says (you must take the opinion for what it is worth) that it would strengthen us in the country…. I assume Trevelyan would go with Mr. G…. I shall want to know what you think of it all, and whether you have any alterations to propose in the reply.”
‘I noted: “I, of course, make common cause. The Whigs want to force him into a row with Mr. G., who, they think, will break him in place of his breaking Hartington after Mr. G. is gone.” I admitted to Chamberlain when we met on February 3rd that there was, as he said, a dead set at him, and that the _Pall Mall_ for a wonder was backing it up. On his first point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone did not wish for his resignation, and knew that I should go too. On the second, I doubted any member being ready to bell the cat; and on the third point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone’s defence of Chamberlain would not be such as to entail his resignation.’
Sir Charles thought, and told Chamberlain, that the object of the Whigs was to force them ‘to war with Mr. G. who is strong, and not with Hartington,’ against whom the Radicals would hold winning cards. ‘We therefore play into their hands by going NOW.’ Meanwhile, he took up a fighting attitude towards the rest of the world.
‘I had written to Mr. Gladstone very strongly backing up Chamberlain’s right to express his individual opinion upon the questions of the future, and pointing out his patience in not repudiating some of Hartington’s remarks, and saying that I could not let him go out alone.’
‘On February 4th I heard from Chamberlain … thanking me for getting Carrington, who represented my Department in the Lords, to make a pro-Chamberlain speech.’
This was the more valuable because the whole Press was against the “unauthorized programme.” At the same time, Sir Charles did not fail to point out that their position was an unsound one, writing first:
‘Our words as to the future are too wide. They would cover my preaching a Republic for two years hence, or your preaching the nationalization of land without compensation for the next Parliament.’
He urged also that the precedent which Mr. Chamberlain sought to establish was two-edged.
February 5th, ‘At night I gave Chamberlain a hint that some day others might turn against him that freedom of speech which he claimed as against Hartington; and he prepared a document which, under the form of standing out for full right of free speech, really yielded the whole point. He covered his retreat with great skill, and the document as corrected by me would be valuable if it could be found. I have no copy, but have memoranda which passed between us, in one of which I begged him to keep the draft with my corrections as representing our joint view, inasmuch as it might be important in the future. Chamberlain notes, in a minute which I have, his acceptance of the general doctrine, with a declaration that the present was an exceptional period; that there was a new departure under the franchise reform, that it was essential to give a general direction to the discussion, that his actual proposals were moderate, and such as only to point to, firstly, a revision of taxation which Mr. Gladstone himself had advocated, details being open, but the principle being to secure equality of sacrifice; secondly, the extension of power of local authorities on lines already conceded in Ireland.’
The two allies were fighting a hard fight at a critical moment. At such times even the closest friends naturally seek to reassure each other, and to a letter from Sir Charles Mr. Chamberlain made this reply, January 11th:
‘The malice and ingenuity of men is so great that I should be afraid they would some day break our friendship if it had not victoriously stood the strain of public life for so many years. I will swear that I will never do anything knowingly to imperil it, and I hope that we are both agreed that if by any chance either of us should think that he has the slightest cause of complaint he will not keep it to himself for a day, but will have a frank explanation. In this case I shall feel safe, for I am certain that any mistake would be immediately repaired by whoever might be in fault.’
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE FALL OF KHARTOUM AND THE PENJDEH INCIDENT
‘On the morning of Thursday, February 5th, 1885, at 3 a.m., Brett went to Lord Granville with the news of the fall of Khartoum. He used to tell how he had been wholly unable to find the old gentleman, and how the servants had ultimately asserted that their master was at Walmer–which he was not. At the same hour the news was sold by a War Office messenger to one of the News Agencies. The resident clerk at the War Office had written to Thompson, of the War Office, in an unsealed envelope, instead of putting the despatch into a box. It did not matter much on this occasion, but it might matter in a great European war. A Cabinet was immediately summoned for the next day. [Footnote: The following correspondence between Mr. Brett (now Viscount Eslier) and Sir Charles throws light on the summoning of the Cabinet:
War Office,
Thursday morning, 3 a.m.
Here is some bad news.
No Ministers in town, except you and Chamberlain!
Have tried Lord G. and Lord Northbrook. No results!
So things must take their chance. There ought to have been a Cabinet to-morrow; but suppose it is not possible.
R.B.
Please return enclosed. Will send you a copy later. Have you any suggestion to make?
You will see that W. proposes to keep this secret. Not possible for long in this Office.
_Sir Charles Dilke to Mr. Brett._
Telegraph to _Mr. G. and Hartington to come up to-day_, and call a Cabinet for to-morrow at 11 a.m. Make Hamilton telegraph to all Ministers at once. I’m prepared to take it on myself if you like, but you can send this to Chamberlain if he agrees.
I agree certainly.–J. C.
Local Government Board,
February 5th, 1885.
It is absurd not to make them come up _to-day_ in face of Wolseley’s “_It is most essential that I shall have the earliest possible decision._”] Only three subjects were discussed: Khartoum, secrecy, and the question of the Italians as against the Turks in the Red Sea.’
On February 7th, ‘The next matter was Wolseley, who had confused us by greatly varying his statements…. Next came a proposal that Gordon should be bought from the Mahdi.’
‘On February 9th Mr. Gladstone mentioned his intention to bring in Rosebery and Lefevre as members of the Cabinet. It was decided that the Italians should be allowed to go to Kassala–a decision which was afterwards reversed. The French views on Egyptian finance were named, the despatch of Indian troops to Suakim again discussed. Wolseley having asked that General Greaves should be sent to Suakim, Childers said that the Queen and Duke of Cambridge had stopped that officer’s promotion because he “belonged to the Ashantee gang” (Wolseley’s friends), and that the Duke had now complained that he did not know him. Chamberlain proposed that we should invite the Canadian Government to send a force to Suakim; and, finally, Childers was allowed to mention finance, which had been the object for which the Cabinet was called.
‘On February 10th I wrote to Chamberlain that Rosebery and Lefevre would help the Cabinet with the public, but would weaken us in the Cabinet.
‘On February 11th there was another Cabinet, five members being absent–namely, the Chancellor, Carlingford, Spencer, Chamberlain, and Trevelyan–owing to the suddenness of the call. It was on the Suakim command, Mr. Gladstone being very obstinate for Greaves, as against Graham with Greaves for Chief of Staff–a compromise. I supported Hartington–I do not know why–and we beat Mr. Gladstone by 5 to 4. Both officers were inferior men, and Graham did but badly. Probably Greaves would have done no better….
‘Mr. Gladstone complained that he and Hartington had received at Carnforth on the 5th a disagreeable telegram _en clair_ from the Queen, and Mr. Gladstone was very anxious to know whether the Tories had found it out, asking anxiously, “What are the station-master’s politics?”
‘February 13th … I was with Harcourt when Rosebery came to be sworn in, so I took the opportunity of making Rosebery help us to make Lord Derby uncomfortable for proposing to refuse the troops offered by the colony of New South Wales.
‘We began to discuss our Soudan policy with some anxiety.
‘Courtney and Morley had insisted in private letters that we should only rescue, and not attack the rebels, and the _Times_ agreed with them–unless we intended to stay in the country and establish a Government. Wolseley’s policy would be represented as one of “smash and retire,” and it was for this reason that Chamberlain pressed negotiations with the Mahdi, as he thought we should be stronger if we could show that the Mahdi had rejected a fair offer. It was on February 13th that Hartington most strongly pressed his proposal for the Suakim railroad, and invited me to be a member of a Cabinet Committee to consider the proposal.’
‘On Monday, February 16th, the first matter discussed was the Russian answer as regards Egyptian finance. The Soudan was put off till the next day, Chamberlain making a strong speech first upon our policy. Hartington asked for five million, to include the cost of his Suakim-Berber railway, and for leave to call out reserves.
‘On February 19th I had an interview with Mr. Gladstone, and found him anxious to be turned out on the vote of censure. Indeed, he was longing for it, in the firm belief that, if turned out, he would come back after the dissolution in November, while, if not turned out, he would be more likely to be beaten.
‘On February 20th the subjects discussed were Egypt (Finance and Suez Canal) and the sending a colonial force to Suakim. Chamberlain had developed to Childers at the same meeting a proposal that Hartington should form a Ministry to carry on the Soudan War, with the loyal support of those of us who went out with Mr. Gladstone.
‘On February 25th, Goschen having asked for assurances as to the Berber railway, Chamberlain wrote to me saying that if Hartington gave them, it might be a sufficient cause for our resignation, as we were not prepared to commit the country to establishing settled government in any part of the Soudan. Chamberlain proposed that we should resign before the division, and that the Government being beaten, there should then be brought about the establishment of what he called the combination or patriotic Government, which meant a Hartington administration. I, on the whole, preferred to go on as we were, so I stopped a box of Hartington’s which was going round the Cabinet, and proposed an alteration of form which prevented Chamberlain going out on these assurances.
‘During the debate I went away to dine, and, not having heard the middle of Harcourt’s speech, asked Chamberlain whether Harcourt had tried to answer any of Goschen’s questions, to which Chamberlain answered, “Not one. He asked questions in turn,” which is a good description of Harcourt’s style. I then wrote on a slip of paper, “Forster is taking notes”; and Chamberlain replied, “Forster– against slavery, against Zebehr, [Footnote: Zebehr was arrested in Cairo on the ground of treasonable correspondence with the Mahdi, and interned at Gibraltar, but later was allowed to return to Cairo. He died in January, 1903.] and of course generally in favour of a crusade,” a note which is also characteristic–of both these men.
‘At four o’clock in the morning of February 28th, when we got our majority of 14, after the first division, Mr. Gladstone, who wanted to go out, said to Childers and myself, “That will do.” This was indeed a Delphic utterance.’
Sir Charles himself spoke, at Mr. Gladstone’s request, at great length in the third day’s debate on February 26th, but it was ‘only a debating speech.’
‘After we had had a sleep, we met in Cabinet on Saturday, February 28th. Lord Granville and Childers now anxious to go. Harcourt, who had at night been against going, was now anxious to go. This was a curious and interesting Cabinet. Lord Granville and Lord Derby, who were at loggerheads both with Bismarck and with their colleagues, were strong that we should resign, and they got some support from Chamberlain, Northbrook, Childers, and Hartington. Lefevre, [Footnote: Lord Eversley, then Mr. Shaw Lefevre, had joined the Cabinet after the news from Khartoum. Lord Rosebery had accepted the Privy Seal. Lord Eversley says that on February 28th opinions were evenly divided, but that one member refused to express an opinion on the ground of his recent admission. See, too, _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 421-422.] who had only just come in, and Trevelyan were strong for staying in, as was Carlingford; but the other members of the Cabinet either wobbled backwards and forwards, or did not care. At last it was decided by the casting vote of Mr. Gladstone, if one may use the phrase when there was no actual voting, that we should try to go on at present so as to carry the Seats Bill ourselves.
‘We then turned to the Berber railway, and decided that it should be a temporary or contractor’s line made only so far as might be necessary for purely military reasons. We then decided that Wolseley should not be allowed to make himself Governor-General of the Soudan.
‘After the Cabinet Chamberlain and I continued our discussion as to his strong wish to resign. I told him that I wanted to finish the Seats Bill, that I thought Lord Salisbury might refuse or make conditions with regard to coming in, that Mr. Gladstone would not lead in opposition, and that we should seem to be driving him into complete retirement, and I asked whether we were justified in running away.’
Meantime the financial business of the year had to go on, and part of it was a demand for increased naval expenditure, to which, as has been seen already, Mr. Gladstone was opposed.
‘The Navy Estimates were first discussed, and then the Army, and a sum asked for for the fortification of coaling-stations was refused, and also a sum asked for for defending the home merchant ports. We all of us were guilty of unwise haste on this occasion, for the demand was right; but the chief blame must fall rather on Childers, Hartington, and the others who had been at the War Office than upon those who sinned in ignorance.’
This decision against naval expenditure was a cause of embarrassment to the Government in the country, for a strong ‘big navy’ campaign followed. The real question at issue in the Cabinet became that of taxation. On March 2nd, and again in April, Sir Charles ‘warned Mr. Gladstone against Childers’s proposed Budget’–the rock on which they finally made shipwreck. ‘Mr. Gladstone replied: “The subject of your note has weighed heavily on my mind, and I shall endeavour to be prepared for our meeting.” I now sent him a memorandum after consultation with Chamberlain.’
What Sir Charles wrote in 1885 is nowadays matter of common argument; it was novel then in the mouth of a practical politician:
‘I stated at length that, as head of the Poor Law department, I ought to have knowledge of the pressure of taxation upon the incomes of the poor. As Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, I had had to hear a great deal of evidence upon the subject of the income of the working classes, and as Chairman of the recent Conference on Industrial Remuneration had had special opportunities of further examining the question. It was my opinion that the position of the agricultural labourers had declined, and that the Whig or Conservative minority on my Commission, represented by Mr. Goschen and Lord Brownlow, admitted this contention of mine as regarded the south of England. The labourers of the south were unable to procure milk, and relied largely on beer as an article of food. Their wages had but slightly increased in the twenty years since 1865, and had decreased considerably since 1879. Food had slightly risen in price, clothes were nominally cheaper, but the same amount of wear for the money was not obtainable, and house rent (where house rent was paid by the labourers) had greatly risen. An enormous proportion of the income of the rich escaped taxation: fifty millions a year of their foreign income at the least. The uncertainty of employment placed the labourer even lower as a partaker in the income of the country than the statisticians placed him. The calculations of employers, upon which the estimates of statisticians were based, were founded upon the higher earnings of the best workers; and when the matter was examined, it was found that variation of wages, loss of time, and failure of work, much lowered the average earnings. The taxation of the working classes rose to a higher percentage than that of the upper and middle classes. Mr. Dudley Baxter, who was a Conservative, had admitted this, and had advocated a reduction in the tobacco duty and the malt tax. Since that time the tobacco duty had been raised, and the duties pressing upon beer had been rather raised than lowered.’
Sir Charles’s insistence upon this matter is all the more notable because foreign complications were rapidly accumulating, and they were of a gravity which might well have seemed to dwarf all questions of the incidence of taxation.
There were not only the difficulties with Germany. There was also the Soudan, where a large body of British troops was engaged, in a country the perils of which England had now to realize.
‘On March 7th there was a Cabinet as to the Suakim-Berber railway. Northbrook and I, soon joined by Harcourt and Chamberlain, were in favour of stopping our impossible campaign. I argued that when we decided to destroy the power of the Mahdi, it was on Wolseley’s telling us that he hoped possibly to take Khartoum at once. For some weeks after that he had intended to take Berber. Then he had told us that he at least could occupy Abu Hamed. Now he was in full retreat, and both his lines of supply–namely, that up the Nile and that from Suakim–seemed equally difficult. The Chancellor wrote on a slip of paper for me: “We seem to be fighting three enemies at once. (1) The Mahdi; (2) certain of our people here; (3) Wolseley.” Nothing was settled, and we passed on to Egyptian finance.’
March 11th, ‘In the evening a despatch was circulated in which Wolseley said: “Please tell Lord Granville that I cannot wait any longer, and I must issue proclamation, and will do so on my own authority if I do not receive answer to this by the 14th. I hope I may be allowed to issue it as Governor-General.”
‘I at once wrote, “I understood that we had _decided_ that he was not to be Governor-General, and that the proclamation should not be issued in the terms proposed”; on which Lord Granville wrote, “Yes. Cabinet to-morrow.–G.”
‘On Thursday, March 12th, the first matter discussed was that of the arrest of Zebehr. Then came Wolseley’s proclamation, which was vetoed. We decided that he should not be allowed to make himself Governor-General of the Soudan.’
It now seemed more than likely that the British Government would have work on its hands which would render the employment of an army in the Soudan very undesirable; for more serious than the Mahdi’s movements on the Nile, more serious than the operations of German Admirals in the Pacific, was the menace of a Russian advance upon Afghanistan.
Arrangements had been made for the demarcation of the Afghan frontier which Sir Charles had persistently urged. A British Commissioner had been appointed in July, 1884, but at the end of the following November Russia was still parleying on questions of detail. These, however, seemed to have been at length resolved; and in January, 1885, the British Commissioner was waiting in the neighbourhood of Herat for the Russian Commissioners to join in the work of fixing the boundaries. But the Russians did not appear; they were, says Sir Charles, ‘intriguing at Penjdeh, and preparing for the blow which later on they struck against the Afghans.’ The Amir evidently felt this, for he renewed the proposal that he should pay a state visit to the Viceroy, and on January 23rd Dilke wrote to Grant Duff that this had been accepted.
February 4th, ‘On this day I received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman at Quetta, in which he thanked me for the assistance that I had given him in the retention of Sibi, Pishin, and the Khojak. “It was greatly due to your support of my representations on the subject that our influence on this frontier is at present all-powerful.”‘
On February 5th, a few hours after the fall of Khartoum was published,
‘there was a meeting of Ministers as to Central Asia. We decided on a reply to Russia drawn up by myself and Kimberley, Lord Granville and Northbrook somewhat dissenting, and Fitzmaurice and Philip Currie taking no part.
‘On February 18th we had a meeting of the Central Asia Committee at the Foreign Office with regard to the Russian advance in the direction of Penjdeh, Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, Kimberley, myself, Fitzmaurice, and Currie. We ordered Sir Peter Lumsden’ (Chief of the Boundary Commission), ‘in the event of a Russian advance on Herat, to throw himself and escort into that city, and to aid the Afghan defence.’
On March 12th, after deciding to limit Lord Wolseley’s schemes in the Soudan, ‘we took a decision that war preparations against Russia should be made in India.’
‘On the 20th we decided that if the Russians continued to advance, 20,000 troops should be concentrated at Quetta. We next gave instructions to Lord Dufferin with regard to what he was to say to the Amir of Afghanistan at the interview which was about to take place between them, and authorized him to renew our guarantee. There was either a regular or irregular Cabinet on March 24th. We decided that if the Russians advanced upon Herat, the advance should be treated as a _casus belli_, and orders to this effect were sent to Dufferin. At the meeting on April 2nd the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, assured the Amir in the presence of his Prime Minister, of Mr. Durand, and of Captain Talbot, “that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by war all over the world.”‘
‘On April 8th, in public durbar, the Amir, without contradiction from Lord Dufferin, said: “The British Government has declared it will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy.”‘
Sir Charles was now discussing by letter with Sir Frederick Roberts the proposals which were preferred by the Defence Committee in India for the defence of the North-West Frontier, with special emphasis on the further question whether there was any point at which England could strike at Russia. [Footnote: See Appendix following on this chapter, pp. 122, 123.]
Early in April sittings of the Housing Commission in Scotland occasioned Dilke’s absence from a Cabinet at which important phases of the Central Asian question were discussed.
April 4th, ‘Chamberlain wrote to me an account of all that passed, pointing out that the Russian answer bade us “give up everything, and they offer us absolutely nothing by way of concession in return. This attitude really leaves us no alternative. I am very uncomfortable about it, because the more I study the matter the more I think that the Russians are right both in form and in substance–i.e., they have the pretexts on their side, and they also have a strong argument in favour of their line, both on the matter of territorial right, and also on the ground that this line is the only one which insures any chance of permanent peace. But we cannot have the pill forced down our throats by Russia without inquiry, or discussion on equal terms…. Harcourt declares that we have ‘closed the door of Peace and opened the door of War.’ The only difference between us is that he is inclined to accept the alternative of the Russian zone which has been already refused, and as to which the present Note says in effect that, though they are ready to go back to this zone, yet it will be of no use, as they are determined in the end to stick to their line.”‘
‘On Thursday, April 9th, there was a Cabinet, which I also missed, and which considered the conflict at Penjdeh.’ [Footnote: On March 20th, General Komarof with a Russian force had attacked and routed an Afghan army in the valley of Penjdeh.]
Every day now had its Cabinet. On April 11th, 13th, and 14th evacuation of the Soudan was discussed, but Lord Hartington, by a threat of resignation, secured repeated postponements.
‘This question was mixed up by some members of the Cabinet with that of Afghanistan, inasmuch as they said that we could not fight Russia in Afghanistan, and go on in the Soudan as well; upon which Mr. Gladstone said of the Soudan, “I am not prepared to go on upon any terms, Russia or no Russia.”
A new trouble was added when the Egyptian Government suppressed the _Bosphore Egyptien_, a local paper published in French, and closed the printing office. Against this the French protested, and in the course of the quarrel actually broke off diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government, which, considering the relations between that Ministry and the protecting force of Great Britain, pushed unfriendliness very far. Ultimately the _Bosphore_ was allowed to appear and to print what it chose, until it died a natural death.
‘On Monday, April 13th, came a proposal from the Russian Ambassador, made through Lefevre and Brett, but which was really from Stead; Brett meaning Stead. Curiously enough, it was a proposal of Chamberlain’s, of which he had previously told us, which had come back to him in this way. Chamberlain consulted me as to whether he should tell Mr. Gladstone that it was his, and I told him that I thought he had better not, as I thought it was more likely to be successful as coming from the Russian Ambassador and Stead than as coming from him. It virtually amounted to the plan of Arbitration which was ultimately adopted, although as a fact the Arbitration never took place.’
‘On Wednesday, 15th, there was an informal Cabinet, at which I was not present, because the Seats Bill was in Committee in the House at the same time. A form of words with regard to the Soudan was agreed upon which united Hartington with the others.’
‘On Thursday, the 16th, Mr. Gladstone misinformed the House of Commons–the inevitable result from time to time of his habit of answering without notice questions upon dangerous subjects. A meeting had taken place between Lord Granville, Kimberley, and Philip Currie on our side, and Staal, the Russian Ambassador, and Lessar, the Russian expert, at which Lord Granville showed that we meant to let Penjdeh go. Lessar paid a newspaper for its support by telling them. Mr. Gladstone was asked, and replied that he knew nothing about the matter, while he suggested that Penjdeh was not to be given up.’
‘On the 18th the Queen agreed to retirement from the Soudan, with reservation of future liberty of action.’ Whatever happened about Penjdeh, it was certain that resistance would be offered to Russia. ‘On this day, Monday, April 20th, there was a Cabinet, at which it was decided to ask for eleven millions in the vote of credit. We then discussed Lumsden’s despatch of explanation as to the Penjdeh incident, which we decided should be published. The vote of credit was really partly for Russia and partly for the Soudan, and a question arose whether it should be proposed as one or as two, and we decided for one. After which we went back again to the Budget, and the minority proposed a penny increase on the income tax as against the increase on beer, after which the Budget was adjourned to April 30th, it being decided then that the vote of credit should be taken first.’
‘On April 20th I received from the Communalist General Cluseret a long letter in which he offered, on the ground of his profound sympathy, his services to England against Russia in the event of war–a document which would have done him little good had it seen the light when he afterwards stood successfully for my electoral division in the Var, at a time when French sympathy for Russia was predominant.
‘On Tuesday, April 21st, after the Cabinet, I had told Mr. Gladstone that I could not agree to the increase of the taxation on beer, and Mr. Gladstone wrote to me twice on that day about the matter. I was not very sure of Harcourt standing by us, and knew that the pressure was great, inasmuch as, in addition to the two letters from Mr. Gladstone, I received one from Edward Hamilton, also dated the 21st, in which he made the strongest appeal to me on personal grounds not to worry Mr. Gladstone by resignations. He said that Mr. Gladstone was overburdened, and that it would take very little to break him down. Edward Hamilton wrote: “It is a peculiarity of his … that, while he can stand the strain of a grave political crisis such as a question involving peace or war, he succumbs to the strain of a personal question…. Mr. Gladstone, I know, feels that any secession, especially of one who has a reputation not confined to this country, would necessarily weaken greatly the Government, and from a national point of view this is of all times a moment when there ought to be a strong Government which can confront Europe and face the varied difficulties. No one would more gladly escape from office than Mr. G. himself; but the more attractive is the prospect of freedom, the less does he dare allow himself to contemplate it.”‘
Mr. Gladstone wrote saying that such a secession at such a time would be serious for the Government, but also, he thought, serious for the seceder, and Sir Charles replied:
Local Government Board,
Whitehall,
April 21st, 1885.
‘I should always let the consideration of what was due to my friends weigh with me as much as any man, I feel sure, and I am also certain that considerations of personal loyalty to yourself are as strong with me now as they are with any member of the Cabinet. I should never let the other class of considerations–i.e., those personal to myself–weigh with me at all. Because I am fond of work I am supposed to be ambitious; but I fancy few politicians are less so, and I do not mind unpopularity, which, after all, generally rights itself in the course of years. I knew that this matter would be a very serious one before I went into it, and I should not have said what I did had I not felt forced to do so.
‘If others go with me, the extent of our unpopularity and consequent loss of future usefulness will depend on our own conduct, and if we do our duty by firmly supporting the Government through its foreign and general difficulties, I do not think that even the party will be ungenerous to us.’
But Sir Charles finally yielded, and drove a bargain.
‘On April 24th I had decided at Chamberlain’s strong wish to yield to Childers as to the beer duty; Childers promising in return to take the Princess Beatrice Committee of Inquiry demand upon himself.
‘May 9th, the Queen now wished for immediate inquiry–that is, in other words, preferred the Parliament she knew to the new Parliament. The Government proposed “next year.” It was agreed that the Government were to guide the Committee whenever it might sit, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be in the Chair.
‘Mr. Gladstone wrote me a letter to ease off my surrender on beer duties, by pointing out the importance of the proposals which were being made to put realty in the same position as personalty as to Death Duties. “This must in all likelihood lead to a very serious struggle with the Tories, for it strikes at the very heart of class-preference, which is the central point of what I call the lower and what is now the prevalent Toryism.”‘
In the great debate of April 27th, in which Mr. Gladstone proposed a vote of credit for eleven millions, of which six and a half were for war preparation in view of the collision between the Afghans and Russians at Penjdeh,
‘Mr. Gladstone made perhaps the most remarkable speech that even he ever delivered, and I have his notes for it with a map I drew for him before he spoke, to show him the position of the various places. [Footnote: On this speech see the _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., p. 184; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 440.] At this time I wrote to Hartington to suggest that if we were forced into war with Russia we should attack the Russians at Vladivostock, and the Intelligence Department wrote a memorandum upon the subject. I also sent round a paper pointing out that we should fight at the greatest advantage from a Pacific base, that the help of China would be of moment, and that Chinese troops drilled and officered by Englishmen would be irresistible; and Northbrook strongly backed me up. Lumsden was sending us most violent telegrams, and while I was preparing for war I was also asking for the recall of Lumsden in favour of Colonel Stewart. Lord Granville wrote: “Lumsden was a bad appointment, and I for a moment wished to recall him. But it would be condemned here as an immense knock-under.” [Footnote: See the _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 441, 442.] I also suggested that the engineers for whom the Amir had asked should be carefully picked, and should have a private Indian allowance for keeping us informed of what passed at Kabul, and Lord Granville conveyed the suggestion by telegraph to Lord Dufferin. (This was afterwards done.)’
Russia unexpectedly withdrew.
‘On May 2nd there was a sudden Cabinet on the Russian acceptance of arbitration, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and Carlingford being absent. Kimberley, the Chancellor, Northbrook, Derby, and I were for immediate acceptance of the offer; Hartington against; Lord Granville for amiably getting out of it; Trevelyan and Lefevre silent; Rosebery late. Mr. Gladstone at first sided with Lord Granville, then came half way to us, and then proposed that we should wait a bit till Condie Stephen reached us. I replied by showing that Condie Stephen was a Jingo, the friend of Drummond Wolff and of Bowles of _Vanity Fair_, and would make things worse. Then Mr. Gladstone came completely to our side. Childers drew up in Cabinet the form for the declaration as to the Select Committee on the Civil List, and I agreed to it. I wrote what had passed to Chamberlain, who was at Birmingham, and he replied on the next day that he trusted that the information about Russia would be immediately communicated to the House, and went on: “But, then, what becomes of the vote of credit and the Budget? It seems cheeky to ask for 6 1/2 millions of Preparations when the matter is practically settled.”
‘On May 7th the Herat boundary was discussed and a line settled, and it was decided that either the German Emperor or the King of Denmark should be named as the Arbitrator about Penjdeh.’ Later, ‘There was a meeting of the Commons Ministers to discuss the situation created by the refusal by Russia of the German Emperor as Arbitrator, the Queen having previously refused the King of Denmark. The Queen had ultimately to yield. But, as I have said, the arbitration, although agreed on, never took place at all.’
The demarcation of frontier for which Sir Charles had so long contended was carried through without any marked incident, largely owing to the skill of Sir J. West Ridgeway, who had succeeded Sir Peter Lumsden.
APPENDIX
The Memoir gives the following account of the proposals made for defence of the North-West Frontier in India in the spring of 1885, and some observations arising from them:
‘The general idea was to hold the northern route by an entrenched position, and, as regards the southern or flank road, to fortify the mountains before Quetta. Roads and railways were to be made for concentration in the direction of Kandahar, and Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards very wisely noted, “It is impossible to threaten Russia’s base, but we should do all in our power to keep it as far away as possible.” Unfortunately, Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards forgot this, and suggested the possibility of advance upon Herat with the view to attack Russia at her Sarakhs base. The suggestions made in 1885 with regard to Kashmir and the Gromul Pass were acted upon in 1890. Sir Donald Stewart, however, went on to recommend a railway extension from Peshawur towards Kabul, and Sir Frederick Roberts, with greater judgment, on succeeding him, vetoed this scheme. Lord Kitchener revived it, but was not allowed to complete his work. Sir Donald Stewart’s committee recommended the tunnel at the Khojak, which was carried out. Roberts reported against it, and he was right.
‘On the whole, when Sir Frederick Roberts sent me his view on the defence proposals, I was struck with the contrast between the completeness of the manner in which a defence scheme for India has been considered, and the incompleteness, to say the least of it, of all strategic plans at home. Sir Charles Macgregor put on record at the same time his view that a mere offensive on the North-West Frontier of India would be folly, if not madness, and that it would be necessary also to undertake offensive operations against Russia. Quite so, according to all rules of war, and if ultimate defeat is to be avoided. Unfortunately, however, it is not easy to attack Russia, and the proposals made by Sir Charles Macgregor would not bear investigation. Sir Frederick Roberts himself afterwards tried his hand at proposals of his own in a Memorandum entitled, “What are Russia’s vulnerable points?” But I do not know that he was more successful, and I fear that his first question, “Has Russia any vulnerable points?” must, if we are looking to permanency, and not to merely temporary measures, be answered in the negative, except as regards Vladivostock–a case I put. After much correspondence with me on this last memorandum, Sir Frederick Roberts quoted me, without naming me, as having, to his regret, informed him that English public opinion would oppose a Turkish alliance, that a Turkish alliance would not be of much use if we could obtain it, and that apart even from these considerations we could not obtain it if we wished.’
The importance which Sir Charles attached to Vladivostock, as the vulnerable point at which Russia could be attacked in time of war, explains his regret when Port Hamilton, which threatened Vladivostock, was abandoned. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 440; and _Europe and the Far East_, by Sir Robert K. Douglas, pp. 190, 248, 249.]
‘May, 1885.–The Port Hamilton matter began about this time. We had seized it, and, as Northbrook and I agreed, “for naval reasons we ought to keep it.” Northbrook also wrote that he was laying a cable from Shanghai to Port Hamilton, which he thought a most important precaution in time of war; but Port Hamilton was afterwards given up because the sailors found it dull–an insufficient reason.’
CHAPTER XL
REDISTRIBUTION: COERCION AND DEVOLUTION
1885
I.
The year 1885 saw the Seats Bill, with its numerous compromises in detail, passed into law, but not without attendant difficulties.
‘On Ash Wednesday, February 18th, I saw Sir Stafford Northcote, and settled with him, in view of the meeting of the House on the next day, the whole course of affairs for the 19th and 20th, under guise of discussing details of the Seats Bill. After we had parted, Northcote wrote to me that on consideration he had come to the conclusion that he must give notice of a vote of censure, but our amicable communication continued on the next day. “On consideration,” with Northcote, always meant “After bullying by Randolph.”‘
In the process of settlement there were constant meetings with Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote together, with Lord John Manners, with Sir Michael Hicks Beach; while on the Conservative scheme for Irish grouping
‘I saw Healy for them, to discover if the thing could be done by general consent; and, although Healy did not oppose right out, the prospect of an agreement on details was far from promising. Healy and I took the opportunity to discuss the Parnell-Chamberlain Irish National Board scheme, of which I had written to Grant Duff on January 23rd, “Chamberlain has a grand scheme for an Irish Board.”‘
March 6th.–‘Healy having told me that he was sure Lord Salisbury had “rigged” the Irish Boundary Commission, and I having written this to Spencer, I received an indignant denial. “If indignation were justified at anything that Healy says, I should indignantly deny his accusation.”‘
‘Between March 11th and 13th the Conservatives had given me a good deal of trouble by trying, under pressure from their friends, to vary the Seats Agreement upon several points…. They then attacked the two-member towns in England, which, it may be remembered, had been insisted on by Mr. Gladstone against my wish; and Northcote wrote: “Lord Salisbury and I never liked that _privilegium_, and wished to have single-member constituencies everywhere”; he tried hard to get me to reopen the question, knowing doubtless that I was with him on the merits. He continued to press the question as late as March 15th, when he wrote: “Our men are getting hard to hold, and, having twice walked through the lobby almost alone, I have no taste for repeating the operation.” Conference with Lord Salisbury followed, and the final stages were reached: from Monday, March 23rd, I had the Seats Bill in Committee four days a week.’
The essential fact in these dealings is that emphasized by Mr. Howel Thomas, Secretary to the Boundary Commission:
‘No political or other pressure would induce Sir Charles–and the strongest pressure was used again and again–even to contemplate a departure from the spirit of the compact. When once an agreement became possible, he would spare no trouble to modify details. But without agreement, however strong the argument for a change, nothing was listened to.’
‘On May 6th I received from Sir John Lambert, the retired Permanent Secretary of the Local Government Board, a most grateful letter about the Privy Councillorship, which had been announced to him by Mr. Gladstone, and which no man ever more greatly deserved as an honour, or by his character more greatly honoured.’ [Footnote: John Lambert’s letter to Sir Charles contained these words: ‘I have had the opportunity of assisting you in a work which has placed you in the very foremost rank of statesmen, and I have formed a friendship which is one of the most gratifying incidents of my declining years.’]
‘On the morning of May 9th I received a letter from Northcote, congratulating me on the manner in which I had conducted the Redistribution Bill “through its difficult stages…. Let me thank you once more for the great consideration, as well as the perfect loyalty, with which you have dealt with the numerous questions, and congratulate you on having brought your ship so well into port.”‘ [Footnote: Upon a table in the larger drawing-room at 76, Sloane Street there stood always a bronze ‘Victory’ sent by Sir George Trevelyan to Sir Charles to celebrate the passing of the Redistribution Bill, with these words:
‘Dear Dilke,–The bronze is a Victory on a globe. The Victory is obvious. The globe below signifies the manner in which your conduct of the Redistribution Bill got the Tory Press under your feet. I am pleased to think that, as a work of art, it may pass muster even before such an artist as the future Lady Dilke…. It is a copy of a Herculaneum bronze…. I cannot help hoping that you will think it not unworthy of the event which it is meant to commemorate.’]
But ‘port’ was not finally reached till after the fall of the Ministry in June.
Work on the Housing Commission was also practically completed. Throughout the year the Report had been under discussion.
On February 16th ‘I told Chamberlain that the Labourers’ Ireland Committee had “advised taking of land under compulsory powers in order to attach it to cottages”–a proposal which was afterwards carried; to which Chamberlain replied: “And your Commission?” and I answered: “We _shall_, I hope, but Lord Salisbury is jibbing since your speeches” (on the unauthorized programme).
‘On March 11th, at the meeting of my Housing Commission, Lord Salisbury proposed what Goschen at once described as “Revolution,” and Broadhurst “Socialism.” He wanted to give public money out of taxes to London. It may have been silly, but it was not either revolutionary or socialistic.’
When it came to the point of acting on the Report, the Tory leader was very far from revolutionary; on June 4th,
‘I was also seeing Lord Salisbury as to the Housing Commission Bills, which he was to introduce into the House of Lords, [Footnote: Sir Charles was to take charge of the measures in the Commons.] He was strongly opposed to putting it into the power of Boards of Guardians “to build out of the rates as many cottages, with half- acres attached, as they like, taking for the purpose any land they please.” In another letter he wrote: “I should provide that– (1) The Local Authority must pass a petition to the Local Government Board to apply the Acts. (2) The Local Government Board must send down and inquire with a long notice. (3) If the Local Government Board inspector reports (i.) that the poorer classes of the parish are not, and are not likely to be, sufficiently housed without the application of the Acts; (ii.) that the Acts can be applied without ultimate loss to the ratepayers, then a vote of the local authorities should be sufficient to apply the Acts. It would be better that a sufficient interval should be passed in these processes to insure that the second vote should be given by a newly elected local authority.”‘
On April 4th to 9th the Housing Commission visited Scotland.
‘On the evening of April 4th I dined with the Lord Provost of Edinburgh. On Easter Day I attended the Kirk with the Lord Provost, hearing a magnificent sermon by Principal Caird, and in the evening dined with the Lord Advocate. On Easter Tuesday I dined with the Convention of Royal Burghs. On Thursday, April 9th, we left Edinburgh for London.’
There remained only the question of inquiring and reporting with regard to Ireland, and here perplexities abounded.
As far back as February 7th at the Cabinet, ‘the third matter discussed was that of the proposed visit of the Prince of Wales to Dublin as a member of my Commission, or, by himself, in advance of the visit of the Commission. It was decided that Parliament could not be asked for his expenses without trouble with the Irish.’
April 9th.–‘I now began discussing with Spencer the conditions on which the Commission was to appear at Dublin, with regard to which there were great difficulties. Gray was on the Commission, but could not be Spencer’s guest in any way, although, on the other hand, he and his friends were willing to receive me in spite of my being a member of the Government. [Footnote: Mr. Dwyer Gray, Nationalist member for Carlow in 1885. In 1886 he represented St. Stephen’s Green, Dublin.] Spencer, in inviting me to stay with him, wrote: “I do not think you will fear the denunciation of _United Ireland_.”
‘On April 17th I entered in my diary, after the meeting of the Royal Commission at which we signed our report: “Pleasures of Ireland. If we stay with Spencer, the Irish witnesses say that they will not appear before the Commission; and if we do not, I am told that the ‘loyalists’ will not appear.” On this day I wrote to Grant Duff: “I may go” (out) “with Chamberlain over Budget [Footnote: Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone on the Budget and the Beer Tax has been given in the previous chapter, pp. 118-120.] or over Irish Coercion.” He replied, and my rejoinder will be found below.’ [Footnote: Sir Charles’s summary of this letter will be found in this chapter (p. 143).]
Trouble had arisen also over Mr. Childers’s wish to increase the duty on sparkling wines. This Sir Charles strongly opposed
‘on the ground that it would upset the French and make them withdraw the most favoured nation treatment which I had won, and the matter was adjourned.’
‘On Saturday, May 16th, there was another Cabinet. Childers proposed to raise the wine duties, to reduce by one-half his proposed increase on spirits, and to limit to one year his increase on beer. We all agreed, against Childers, to postpone any announcement of changes for three weeks, and Childers, thinking that this meant that we had agreed not to take his proposals, said that he would resign.’
April 24th.–‘I had now received Spencer’s consent to my quitting the Viceregal Lodge, when at Dublin at Whitsuntide, for one evening, to attend a party at Gray’s, which was the virtual condition of our not being boycotted by the Nationalists.’
Negotiations between the Irish party and both English parties were at this time in the air, and it will be seen that this visit to Ireland became connected with political issues quite different from its ostensible and non-controversial object.
II.
Early in 1885 anti-Irish feeling, which to some extent had been allayed, was again roused by dynamite outrages. One bomb was exploded in the Tower of London, and two in the precincts of Parliament. The general temper may be judged by an entry of February 7th:
‘I remonstrated with Harcourt as to the restrictions at the House, which he and the Speaker had agreed on, so far as they affected the Press. I said that it was ridiculous to shut out little Lucy, the “Toby” of _Punch_, and Harcourt gravely assured me that Lucy was a man who would willingly bring dynamite into the House himself; after which I had no more to say.’
It was in face of this feeling that Mr. Chamberlain had drafted a scheme giving very large powers of self-government to an Irish popularly elected body.
When Sir Charles was declaring for resignation, he received a communication which made the Irish matter pressing.
‘On April 22nd Cardinal Manning wrote to me that he had some information of importance which he wished for an opportunity of making known to me, and he begged me to come to him on my way to Whitehall on the morrow. I had to see Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote as to the Seats Bill, and it was not until the afternoon that I was able to see the Cardinal. He spoke in the name of Croke and another Roman Catholic Irish Archbishop, and of five Irish Roman Catholic Bishops who had been staying with him, the latter being a deputation of five to Rome who represented “the 14 Bishops.” He said that Croke had become frightened of the extreme Nationalists. The Cardinal declared that the Roman Catholic clergy were ready to pacify Ireland if we would pass Chamberlain’s Local Government Ireland Scheme, with a Central Board such as Chamberlain proposed. The Bishops and clergy would be prepared to denounce, not only separation, but also an Irish Parliament. I had reason to know that Lord Spencer was unfavourable to any negotiation with Cardinal Manning, but on the 24th, having that day again seen Manning, who put the dots on the “i’s” and volunteered that if the Irish Bishops got the elective board for Ireland they would denounce as revolutionary an Irish Parliament, I wrote to Mr. Gladstone stating Manning’s views, and suggesting that Chamberlain should see the Cardinal on the morrow. [Footnote: See the next two pages, where accounts of these interviews and correspondence occur.]
‘I said in my letter to Mr. Gladstone: “I knew that the Pope, in sending for the Bishops to Rome, had acted on Manning’s advice. I also knew that Manning bitterly resented Errington’s visits to Rome. This was all I knew on the subject until to-day, when Manning suddenly proposed to me to bring about peace and good-will in Ireland on the basis of Chamberlain’s Local Government and Central Board Scheme…. Manning has got a pledge from the Roman Catholic Bishops, including even Archbishop Croke … and from Davitt, to denounce separation. He has got from the Bishops, including Croke, a declaration against an Irish Parliament, provided they obtain the Local Government Central Board. I suggested that he should see Chamberlain at once, and learn secretly the details of his proposals. He said nothing of coercion, and I, of course, avoided the subject, as I did not know whether a coercion Bill is to be proposed. I should suggest that Manning be encouraged to let the Pope have Chamberlain’s scheme.”
‘I sent this memorandum to Chamberlain and to Lord Spencer, as well as to Mr. Gladstone, and Chamberlain wrote: “I am quite willing to call on the Cardinal if Mr. Gladstone approves.” Lord Spencer wrote: “The question of Mr. Chamberlain’s seeing the Cardinal with a view of his scheme being made known to the Pope is for Mr. Gladstone’s decision, but I would venture to say that he should not disclose his plan to the Cardinal unless the Cabinet agree to it.” This last memorandum from Lord Spencer is dated the 25th, but on the 24th Chamberlain, Mr. Gladstone having consented, had seen the Cardinal. I also saw the Cardinal again on the 25th, and he told me that in his opinion it was essential that Dr. Walsh should be made Archbishop of Dublin. He also told me that he was going to see Parnell on the Chamberlain scheme. On April 30th the Cardinal saw Parnell, and told him that the Bishops would support Chamberlain in the Local Government of Ireland scheme. Parnell promised that he would support it, and would not obstruct the Crimes Bill. So O’Shea told me, and showed me a paper unsigned, which purported to be, and which, knowing the hand, I believe was, Parnell’s writing, somewhat to this effect. On the 28th a Committee of the Cabinet had been appointed on Chamberlain’s Irish Local Government and Central Council scheme. On May 1st the Cardinal told me of his interview with Parnell, and of a more completely satisfactory interview between himself and Sexton.
‘The scheme was one which proposed the establishment in Ireland of a national elective Council, to which were to be referred matters at present in the hands of some four Boards at Dublin Castle. Mr. Gladstone’s consent to Chamberlain’s interview with the Cardinal had been given in conversation at the House of Commons on the 23rd, and I have a letter from Mr. Gladstone stating this. I had probably, for some reason which I forget, both written and spoken to him after my first interview with Manning on the 22nd, and put the matter again in a letter (possibly to go to Spencer) on the 24th. I have also a letter from Chamberlain on the 24th, saying that his interview with Manning “quite confirms your minute, and the position is hopeful.” With regard to the Cardinal’s insisting upon Walsh, and his anger at Errington’s interference, I had a letter which I sent to Lord Spencer, and which he kept, but returned my minute referring to the Cardinal’s letter, endorsed only “S. 25-4-85.” Chamberlain also wrote on the same day, again stating that his interview with the Cardinal had been highly satisfactory, and adding: “Do not let Mr. Errington meddle with the Archbishopric of Dublin.” On April 26th the Cardinal had again written to me about the Errington business and the See of Dublin, and this second letter on the subject I kept. The only new point in it was that contained in the following phrase: “I have an impression that efforts have been made to represent Dr. Walsh as a Nationalist. He is not more so than I am; and whether that is excessive or obstructive you will judge.”
‘On Tuesday, April 28th, the Cardinal again spoke to me as to the archbishopric, expressing his great vexation as to Spencer’s action through Errington. I sent a minute to Spencer which he returned, writing, with regard to Manning’s moderate opinions: “I wish it may be so. Responsibility does wonders. Maynooth is so bad that the Pope is now discussing it with the Bishops.” Dr. Walsh, Manning’s candidate, was President of Maynooth. I sent Spencer’s minute to Chamberlain, who returned it with a strong minute of his own for Spencer, who again wrote: “H.E. the Cardinal is wrong in his estimate of Dr. Walsh.” On April 30th Manning wrote mentioning a further conversation with Parnell, and adding: “The result is that I strongly advise the prompt introduction of the scheme I have in writing. It cannot be known too soon. But both on general and on particular reasons I hope that neither you nor your friend will dream of the act you spoke of. Government are pledged in their first Queen’s Speech to county government in Ireland. Let them redeem their pledge. All the rest will follow.” The “act,” of course, was resignation.’
‘At the Cabinet Committee of May 1st on Ireland, Carlingford and Harcourt, in Spencer’s interest, violently attacked Chamberlain’s scheme; Hartington less violently; Childers, Lefevre, and Trevelyan supported. Spencer seeming to waver, Harcourt rather turned round, and Mr. Gladstone afterwards told Chamberlain that Carlingford’s opposition did not matter.
‘On May 1st I again saw Manning, who told me of further interviews with Parnell and Sexton. I noted in my diary: “2nd to 6th. The Irish row–Mr. Gladstone between Chamberlain and Spencer: the deep sea and the devil, or the devil and the deep sea–continues.”
‘On May 7th the Cardinal wrote: “How can the _Standard_ have got the Irish scheme? Nothing is secret and nobody is safe. My copy of it is both safe and secret.” On May 8th I wrote to Grant Duff: “Chamberlain and I have a big Irish Local Government scheme on hand, which is backed by the R. C. Bishops–which may either pacify Ireland or break up the Government.” On the 9th, Harcourt having come over, Chamberlain’s scheme received the support of all the Commoners except Hartington, and was opposed by all the peers except Lord Granville. Mr. Gladstone said to me in leaving the room: “Within six years, if it pleases God to spare their lives, they will be repenting in ashes.” At night he wrote to Lord Spencer and to Hartington that he intended to go out upon this question.
‘During Sunday, May 10th, Harcourt tried hard to patch matters up on the basis of “No Home Rule, no coercion, no remedial legislation, no Ireland at all.”‘
On May 13th ‘Cardinal Manning dined with me, and we further discussed the position of Chamberlain’s scheme.’
Then suddenly a new and complicating factor was introduced:
‘On Friday, May 15th, there was another Cabinet, from which Trevelyan was absent through illness. A Land Purchase Ireland Bill was suddenly presented to us, to which I expressed strong opposition, unless it were to be accompanied by “Chamberlain’s Local Government scheme”; and a Coercion Bill was also presented to us, against which Chamberlain, Lefevre, and I, protested. We, however, declared that we would yield as regards some points in the Coercion Bill provided the Land Purchase Bill were dropped or the “Local Government measure” introduced.’ [Footnote: A Land Purchase Bill had been proposed in the end of April, 1884, by Lord Spencer, which after preliminary consideration by a Committee was discussed in Cabinet.
‘I opposed the whole thing. Lord Derby gave five reasons against it, all five unanswerable, and then supported it. Northbrook agreed with me. Childers, supported by a unanimous Cabinet committee, proposed a scheme of Chamberlain’s suggestion for advancing the whole purchase money. Spencer proposed three-fourths. Mr. Gladstone had a scheme of his own which nobody could understand. Spencer insisted on counting heads. Lord Granville, who would, of course, have supported Mr. Gladstone, had gone away. Trevelyan, who had been called in, was not allowed to vote, and the result was that the majority pronounced against Chamberlain’s scheme; Spencer who was for three-fourths, and I against the whole thing, voting together with Carlingford, Northbrook, the Chancellor, Hartington, and Dodson–a scratch lot–against Mr. Gladstone, Childers, Harcourt, Kimberley, Derby, and Chamberlain.’]
‘On Sunday, May 17th, I dined with Edward Levy Lawson, [Footnote: Afterwards the first Lord Burnham.] and met the Prince of Wales and Randolph Churchill; and Randolph told the Prince and myself that which he had previously told the Irish members–namely, that Salisbury had promised to have no coercion; but I noted in my diary that I did not believe this. I was wrong, for Salisbury afterwards said at Newport that his mind had been made up against coercion long before the change of Government. I knew that Randolph had seen Parnell, as I had twice seen them together in Gosset’s room, which only Randolph and I ever used before 5 p m.’
There were now two separate subjects of division leading to resignations in the Cabinet. There were those who would resign unless coercion was renewed, and there was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was resigning because he could not get his way as to the Budget. His resignation was ‘suspended’; but Mr. Gladstone was evidently anxious to be out of it all.
‘On the Sunday Childers informed us that he would go on for three weeks. On Wednesday afternoon, May 20th, Mr. Gladstone spoke to me at the House, and told me that he would go on until the end of the Session, and would then resign, and that Hartington would try to form a Government, although he might fail in getting one that could agree on Irish proposals. Mr. Gladstone said nothing about land purchase, but in the course of the afternoon he suddenly announced publicly the introduction of a Land Purchase Bill, thinking, I believe, that he had Chamberlain’s consent to a Bill limited to one year. I at once wrote him a letter of resignation, and then sent off for Chamberlain, Lefevre, and Trevelyan.
‘Chamberlain’s interview with Mr. Gladstone that had misled the latter had taken place after the Cabinet of Saturday–I think on the morning of Monday, the 18th–and their meeting was on the subject of Childers’s Budget proposals. Chamberlain, writing to me about it, said: “We are likely to want four millions less money. Therefore, says Childers, let us have a new Budget and clap an additional tax of L300,000 on wine.” Chamberlain also wrote to me, after his interview with Mr. Gladstone, on the Monday afternoon, telling me that Randolph Churchill was going to give notice of a Committee to inquire into the state of Ireland, that Churchill thought that we should be out by that time and supporting him, and that he contemplated a separation from his own leaders, and a union, on a Radical Irish policy for “Local Government,” and against coercion, of the two sides from below the gangway. Chamberlain added that, if the Russian matter “were out of the way, Mr. Gladstone would let us go, and I think _we must go_.” This correspondence had left me unaware of any change in Chamberlain’s view, if there was any, about the Land Purchase Bill. As soon as Chamberlain reached the House on the 20th, and heard from me what I had done, he also wrote a letter of resignation; but he was not pleased, and perhaps rightly, at my having taken so strong a step without consulting him on the precise point.
‘In Chamberlain’s letter, which was sent at 6 p.m. on the 20th, he said: “Dear Mr. Gladstone,–I have heard with great surprise that you have this afternoon given notice of the introduction of a Land Purchase Bill for Ireland, unaccompanied by any reference to the large scheme of Local Government, the promise of which for next year was the condition of the assent given by Sir Charles Dilke and myself to the proposal for dealing with Land Purchase during the present Session. I am convinced that a measure of the kind suggested by Lord Spencer will have a distinct tendency to increase the agitation for a separation between the two countries, and at the same time will seriously prejudice the success of any such scheme of Local Government as I have submitted to the Cabinet…. In the circumstances I feel that I have no alternative but to place my resignation in your hands.”
‘On the morning of May 21st Lefevre informed us that he should go with us, and also wrote a letter of resignation, in which he said that he did not agree with us as to Land Purchase, but that as we went he must go, too, on coercion.
‘Mr. Gladstone sent for me on the 21st, and I suggested a way out, in our acceptance of the Land Purchase Bill, with a promise of “the Local Government Scheme” for 1886. Mr. Gladstone fell in with this view, and proposed that at Dublin, for which I was starting on Friday morning, May 22nd, I should try to get Spencer’s consent to the limitation of the new Coercion Bill to a single year, and the promise of the “Local Government Bill” for 1886. On the 21st Mr. Gladstone wrote to me several times, as did also Chamberlain. Mr. Gladstone had written to Chamberlain on the night of the 20th: “I have never been in greater surprise than at the fresh trouble developed this afternoon. I believed myself to be acting entirely within the lines of your and Dilke’s concurrence, and surely I am right in thinking that you could not have supposed that the notice of an intention to bring in a Bill offered the occasion on which to refer to the distinct though allied subject of Local Government. What I understood to be your and Dilke’s procedure was to agree to a Land Purchase Bill with a provision of funds for one year, which would leave the whole measure … dependent on a fresh judgment which might be associated with Local Government as its condition. It seems to me to be a matter which we may perfectly well consider, and hope to arrange, in what terms reference shall be made to Local Government when the Bill is brought in. Will not that be the time to part, if part we must, which I do not believe? I send a copy of this to Dilke, and will only add, to the expression of my surprise, my deep concern.”
‘When I received a letter from Mr. Gladstone, enclosing a copy of his to Chamberlain, I replied (first showing my answer to Lefevre and sending it to Chamberlain) to the effect that the proposal to introduce a Land Purchase Bill had been discussed by and rejected by the Cabinet, that I could not concur in the reversal of its judgment, and that, thinking as I did that a deliberate opinion of the Cabinet had been disregarded without warrant, and having, so thinking, resigned, I should be unable to attend any meeting of the Cabinet if one were summoned. I have a letter from Chamberlain to Mr Gladstone dated 21st, and two later ones from Mr. Gladstone to myself. Chamberlain said:
‘”My Dear Mr. Gladstone,
‘”I fear there has been a serious misapprehension on both sides with respect to a Land Purchase Bill, and I take blame to myself if I did not express myself with sufficient clearness. I certainly never imagined that the promise of introduction would be made without further reference to the Cabinet, or without some definite decision as to Local Government. I doubt very much if it is wise or even right to attempt to cover over the serious differences of principle that have lately disclosed themselves in the Cabinet. I think it is now certain that they will cause a split in the new Parliament, and it seems hardly fair to the constituencies that this should only be admitted after they have discharged their functions, and when they are unable to influence the result.
‘”I am,
‘”Yours sincerely,
‘”J. CHAMBERLAIN.”
‘They _did_ “cause” a split in the new Parliament, but Spencer the Coercionist and Chamberlain the Nationalist had changed places!’
‘I do not know which of Mr. Gladstone’s two letters dated the 21st is the earlier. In the one Mr. Gladstone wrote: “I hope that my note may have shown you that the time for considering your difficulty (if there be one) has not arrived. Please to tell me if this is so, as if it were not I should have to summon the Cabinet this afternoon to report what has happened. The messenger will wait for an answer.– Yours sincerely, W. E. Gladstone.–This is also for Chamberlain.” I replied somewhat curtly that if there were a Cabinet I could not attend. The other letter referred to a conversation which had taken place between Hamilton and Chamberlain, and said that the latter was “willing that his letter should stand as _non avenu_ until after the recess–i.e. (so I understand it), we should, before the Bill is introduced, consider in what terms the subject of Local Government should be referred to when the Bill is introduced. I am not trying to bind you to this understanding, but if you and he will come here at 3.0 we will try to get at the bottom of the matter.” My reply was:
‘”21st May.
‘”I certainly cannot withdraw my resignation unless the incident is explained to the whole of the members of the Cabinet. If you could see your way to circulate a box explaining that we were not consenting parties to the reversal of the opinion of the Cabinet, then I would try to help find some way out. I am, however, hopeless as to the wisdom of doing so. We differ so completely on the questions which will occupy the time of Parliament for the remainder of the Session that I feel that the Cabinet cannot hold together with advantage to the country. Lefevre strongly agrees with this view Northbrook and Hartington, who, with Lefevre, were against Chamberlain and myself on the merits, evidently felt as amazed as we were at the reversal of the decision.”‘
‘At this moment Chamberlain wrote to Mrs. Pattison’ (in India) ‘to say that the times were “most anxious. Mr. Gladstone is certainly going to retire soon, and the influence which has held together discordant elements will be removed with him. Fortunately, we know our own minds, and are not deficient in resolution, but it is not always easy to see clearly the right times and way of giving effect to our decisions. I do not myself believe that the struggle between us and the Whigs can be long postponed. It has nearly come over the question of Ireland, and even now we may be compelled to break off on this vital point. In any case we shall not join another Government nor meet another Parliament without a decision; and if it is against our views, the split will be final and complete, and we shall be out of office until we can lead a purely Radical Administration. We must win in the end, but the contest will be a bitter one, and may lead us farther than we contemplate at present…. I was dining last Saturday with Lord Ripon, who professed to be well pleased … and declared his full adhesion to the new gospel; but the majority of his class and school are getting thoroughly frightened, and will probably quicken and intensify the movement by setting themselves against it, instead of trying to guide and direct it. A good deal depends on Lord Hartington. He is constitutionally contemptuous of, and unsympathetic with, the democratic sentiment of the times.”
‘By our telegrams of May 21st, I saw that on the 20th Sir John Kirk, our man at Zanzibar, had been snubbed by Lord Granville, and I felt that if I went out upon the Irish Question I should be able at least to speak my mind as to the manner in which we had pandered to the Germans on the Zanzibar coast.
‘On May 21st I wrote to Grant Duff: “Mr. G. will resign at the end of the session. I rather doubt Hartington being able to form a Government.”
‘On the morning of Friday, May 22nd, I left for Dublin, and by teatime was at the Viceregal Lodge.’
On the previous day Sir Charles had written:
‘Local Government Board,
‘May 21st, 1885.
‘My Dear Grant Duff,
‘Off to Ireland, where I expect to be Boycotted by both sides [Footnote: It turned out the other way.]–by the Nationalists because I stay with Spencer, and by the Orangemen because we sit at the Mansion House.
‘Yours,
‘Chs. W. D.’
‘As Mr. Gladstone at our last interview had bid me convert Spencer if I could, and virtually promised that he would support our views if Spencer would, I had asked Trevelyan and Harcourt to back me up in letters. Harcourt made delay. Trevelyan wrote on the 23rd: “I am sorry the whole thing is in the newspapers, and see in it another reason for getting it settled. If you and Chamberlain make it a point to have the Bill for a year, I should be glad to see the concession made. The concession on the part of those who take another view would not be greater than was made by those of us who objected to have a Land Bill that was not based upon a new system of Local Government.”
‘Early in the morning of Saturday, the 23rd, before the meeting of my Commission at the City Hall, I had had a long talk with Spencer, and I felt, more strongly than I ever had before, that his position in Dublin was untenable, and that he ought to be allowed to go. On Whit Sunday I attended church with Spencer, and in the afternoon took him for the only walk which he had enjoyed for a long time. We passed the spot where Lord Frederick Cavendish was killed, and accompanied by a single aide-de-camp, but watched at a distance by two policemen in plain clothes, and met at every street corner by two others, walked to the strawberry gardens, and on our return, it being a lovely Sunday when the Wicklow Mountains were at their best and the hawthorn in bloom, met thousands of Dublin people driving out to the strawberry gardens on cars. In the course of the whole long walk but one man lifted his hat to Spencer, who was universally recognized, but assailed by the majority of those we met with shouts of, “Who killed Myles Joyce?” [Footnote: One of several men hanged for the Maamtrasna murders. All the other men sentenced protested that Myles Joyce was innocent, and died protesting it. Strong efforts were made to gain a reprieve for this lad.] while some varied the proceedings by calling “Murderer!” after him. A few days later, when I was driving with Lady Spencer in an open carriage, a well-dressed bicyclist came riding through the cavalry escort, and in a quiet, conversational tone observed to us, “Who killed Myles Joyce?” At his dinner-party on the Sunday evening Spencer told us that a Roman Catholic priest [Footnote: Father Healy, parish priest of Bray, and most famous of modern Irish talkers.] who was present (the Vicar of Bray, I think, but not _the_ Bray) was the only priest in Ireland who would enter his walls, while the Castle was boycotted by every Archbishop and Bishop. On Monday morning, the 25th, Whit Monday, I paid a visit to the Mansion House at the request of the Lord Mayor of Dublin, taking by Spencer’s leave the Viceregal carriages there, where they had in his second viceroyalty not been before, and was received by the Lord Mayor in state, which consisted in much exhibition of the most gorgeous porter (in green and gold) that my eyes had ever beheld. I afterwards went on to see Hamilton, [Footnote: Sir Robert Hamilton, who had succeeded Mr. Bourke as the permanent head of Dublin Castle.] the Under-Secretary. He offered us as a maximum County Boards plus a Central Education Board for Ireland, to administer all the grants with rating powers, and to be called a great experiment to be extended if it answered. In the evening I discussed this with Spencer, who went a little farther, and offered, in addition to County Boards, four elective Central Boards for Ireland, to discharge much the same duties which Chamberlain’s scheme gave to the Central Board; but Spencer obstinately refused to take the plunge of making the four Boards into one Board. It was on this point that we broke off; and he never got farther forward until after the Government had gone out. He has since declared that his conversion to a more advanced Home Rule scheme than that of Chamberlain, which he had refused, was caused by the return of a certain majority of Nationalist members; but he was perfectly aware at this time what that majority would be, and I confess that I have never been able to understand why Hamilton and Spencer should have held out as they did in May against the moderate scheme, and have supported the extreme one as early as July, which I believe to have been the case. Had Spencer yielded at this moment, it is at least possible that the Irish question would have been settled. At all events, there has never been in our time so fair a chance of settlement.
‘On Tuesday, the 26th, I heard from Lefevre, who wrote strongly against the Coercion Bill for Spencer’s benefit, but added in a separate letter that he regarded the notice in the _Birmingham Post_ as indicating that Chamberlain had been talking freely about the dissensions in the Cabinet, and that if this was so he considered it unfortunate, as tending to increase the difficulty of getting any further concessions from Spencer or other members of the Cabinet who favoured coercion.
‘On Tuesday evening the Commission dined with Gray, and met Dr. Walsh, the new Archbishop; but at Dr. Walsh’s wish I had gone to Gray’s house half an hour before dinner to see the Archbishop privately, and to be thanked by him for the part that I had taken in trying to prevent opposition to the choice. In the evening Gray had a party at which both sides were represented, Chief Justice Morris being among those present. Gray’s house, although the Spencers disliked him, was one at which the parties always met as much as is possible at all in Ireland. When Gray came out of gaol after his imprisonment he gave a small dinner, at which were present the Judge who had sentenced him, the gaoler who had had him in custody, and the prosecuting counsel. The most interesting man at Gray’s was Fottrell, the man whose memoirs ought to be interesting, for he had acted as intermediary between the Castle (that is, Hamilton) and Parnell at the time when secret communications were passing between them, although openly they were at war.
‘Dickson, the Ulster Liberal member, [Footnote: M.P. For Dungannon, Tyrone, 1880-1885. He afterwards became a leading Unionist.] was at Gray’s, and he announced that he had at last come over to Chamberlain’s scheme. Now, Hartington was crossing the next day to stay at the Viceregal Lodge, and was to speak at Belfast under Dickson’s auspices, and the announcement of Dickson’s change of front was a startling blow to him and Spencer.
‘On the morning of Wednesday, the 27th, I wrote to Grant Duff: “A pretty pass you Whigs have brought this country to! I really think we Radicals ought to be allowed to try. We certainly could not do it _worse_. ‘Poland’ has been a byword, yet Poland is far less of a weakness to Russia than Ireland to us, and the Russians have now the Polish peasantry with them, if they have the towns and nobles against them. _We_ have _no_ friends in Ireland. All our policy has aimed at conciliating at least Ulster, and now Ulster is fast becoming as Nationalist as Cork. The Liberals carried Belfast freeholders in the late Antrim election to the cry of ‘Down with coercion!’ and ‘No special legislation!’ Hartington comes to-night, and I shall try to arrange some compromise with him and Spencer as to the future–probably an Irish elective education Council.”
‘On the evening of the 27th I had a long conference with Hartington and Spencer, in which I “worked” Dickson much. Before this I had had the third meeting of my Commission, and then a public meeting in connection with the Dublin Ladies’ Central Association, a body dealing with the Housing of the Working Classes. On the morning of May 28th Spencer came into my bedroom before eight o’clock, and told me that Hartington was very ill, suffering from sleeplessness and fever, and that it would be quite impossible for him to make his Belfast speech…. Dickson soon came to the Viceregal Lodge, and earnestly begged me to go to Belfast in Hartington’s place, but under the circumstances I felt that it was impossible that I should do so, although he promised me that a special train should be waiting at the last moment if I would change my mind.
‘I received this day a letter from Cardinal Manning strongly urging that Chamberlain, Lefevre, and I, should stay in. “If you and the like of you leave the Whigs, they will fall back and unite in resisting you. So long as you are in contact with them, they will yield to reason. These are the thoughts of an Old Testament Radical.” But the Old Testament Radical went on to make proposals to me with regard to the Roman Catholic vote in Chelsea which would have astonished the Old Testament prophets.
‘Another letter which I received this day was from O’Shea about Parnell’s opinions on the Coercion Bill, but it is so obscure that I can make nothing of it. It was on a suggestion of Lefevre’s with regard to bringing the Coercion Bill into force only by “proclamation.” It shows, however, if O’Shea is to be believed, that Parnell was willing to accept a coercion measure of some kind, or, at all events, to haggle about its terms, if publicly resisting it as a whole.
‘By the same post I received a letter from Heneage [Footnote: Mr. Edward Heneage, for many years M.P. for Grimsby, and for a short time Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1886. He was afterwards a leading Unionist.] professing to state the general view of the House of Commons, and pronouncing in favour of a liberal policy towards Ireland. “(1) Non-renewal of the Crimes Act. (2) Amendment of the jury laws. (3) Amendment of the purchase clauses. (4) Abolition of the Lord Lieutenancy. (5) Improvement of Local Government.” This I showed to Spencer, with a memorandum of my own in which I said that it was “a curious letter from a Whig.” Spencer wrote on my memorandum in returning the letter: “It is an odd letter…. He wrote to me the other day about the abolition of the Lord Lieutenancy, rather apologizing for bringing it on. I replied deprecating any movement which might not go with action. To denounce an office without at once abolishing it would weaken the hands of him who filled it.”
‘I wrote to Lefevre and Chamberlain that Hartington had come very well, and was very well at dinner, but bored at having to speak. “Walker told him what I told him as to the unwisdom of speaking in favour of coercion in Belfast immediately after the anti-coercion speeches of the Liberals at the Antrim election; and to-day he is ill. I do not know how far the two things are connected; but the papers will _say_ they are.”
‘I lunched with Sir Edward Guinness and sat in the Speaker’s chair of the Irish Parliament; dined with Sir Robert Hamilton at the Yacht Club at Kingstown; slept on board the boat and crossed next day; spent Saturday to Tuesday at Dockett Eddy; and on Tuesday was at the State Concert, where several of us tried to patch up some means of being able to meet in Cabinet on June 5th. On Thursday, June 4th, I had a long talk with Mr. Gladstone, and, on his agreeing to support the Heneage-Lefevre-O’Shea proposal, now supported by Chamberlain, for only bringing the Coercion Bill into force by a proclamation, agreed to attend the Cabinet the next day, but without withdrawing my resignation, which remained “suspended.”
‘I began on the 3rd and ended on the 5th June a letter to Grant Duff in reply to one from him bidding me not break off from the Government on any but a clear and obvious issue. I told him that (1) Radicals in a minority would only ever get their way by often threatening to go, even on secondary points, and that they must not threaten unless they “meant it.” (2) Mr. G. insisted he was “going.” “Therefore we have to count with Hartington. We doubt if we can form part of a Hartington Government, and we can’t do so if we do not … impose our terms by threats…. This is why I have been forcing the pace of late…. Chamberlain is a little timid just now, in view of the elections and the fury of the _Pall Mall_. I could not drive Chamberlain out without his free consent, so I am rather tied. Still, we shall (June 5th) get our own way, I fancy, at to-day’s Cabinet.”
‘On the morning of June 5th my position in attending the Cabinet was weakened, if not made ridiculous, by a letter from Spencer in which he refused the Heneage-Lefevre-O’Shea compromise. But I went all the same, for I was not supposed to know what he had written to Mr. Gladstone. The first matter discussed was the Budget. I opposed the proposed increase of the wine duties from 1s. to 1s. 3d., and from 2s. 6d. to 3s. (all bottled wine to be at the 3s. rate). I carried with me at first all except Mr. Gladstone against Childers, and at last Mr. Gladstone also. Childers then left the room; Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Harcourt, and the Chancellor, one by one, went after him, but he would not come back. The Guards at Alexandria were mentioned, and then Spencer’s letter to Mr. Gladstone against the proclamation clause read, whereon Chamberlain and I protested against coercion as a whole, and no decision upon any point was come to.
‘On June 6th I dined at Harcourt’s Queen’s Birthday dinner, and afterwards attended Lady Granville’s Foreign Office party, but these were expiring festivities.
‘On Monday, June 8th, there was a Cabinet, at which the first matter was Irish Coercion and the proclamation clause. Spencer now offered proclamation by the Viceroy (i.e., not by the Government in London, which was our proposal) for all the Bill except the intimidation part, but refused to have it for the boycotting clause. Trevelyan now joined Chamberlain, Lefevre, and myself, in opposing Spencer; the others supported him, but tried to make him yield. We decided that if he yielded we should ask that a statement to the Cabinet should be promised to precede proclamation.’
On June 8th Mr. Childers moved the second reading of his Budget Bill, which was met by an amendment moved by Sir Michael Hicks Beach, condemning the proposed increase upon beer and spirits without any corresponding increase on wine, and declining to increase the duty on real property until promised changes were made in regard to local taxation.
‘I made a good debating Budget speech, of which Sir John Lambert wrote “In Tea, Domine, spero,” and I replied: “Since the time of Sir Thomas More all these profane ‘good things’ have come from devout Catholics.”‘
Other leading men followed, and Mr. Gladstone summed up by saying that you must tax either alcohol or tea and sugar. But the division went against him: 6 Liberals voted with the Tories, and 76 were absent. The majority against the Government was 12. The end had at length come.
CHAPTER XLI
FALL OF ADMINISTRATION
JUNE TO JULY, 1885
On June 8th, as has been seen, the Government were defeated by a majority of 12.
‘On June 9th there was a further Cabinet. We had been beaten on the Budget, but in the meantime Spencer had yielded, and Mr. Gladstone was very anxious to be able to say that we were all agreed. Therefore we discussed a Coercion Bill in the first place, but the four of us at once refused to agree to Spencer’s concession as sufficient.’ [Footnote: Namely, that the Coercion Bill should only have effect after a special proclamation had been issued. Sir Charles Dilke notes, September 20th, 1891, the receipt of a letter from Mr. Chamberlain, thanking him for extracts from his Memoir of 1884-85 on Irish affairs, and saying that where it dealt with the same points it tallied exactly with his recollections.] ‘It passes my understanding, therefore, how Mr. Gladstone is able to pronounce, as he has done, “unfounded” the statement that the Cabinet was at odds upon the Irish question at the moment of its defeat. Three of us had resigned on it, and our letters were in his pocket. The next matter discussed was resignation, which did not take a minute; and then the question of what Customs dues should be levied….
‘After the Cabinet there was a levee, at which I had some conversation with Lord Salisbury as to the Redistribution Bill in the Lords, and his reply showed that he meant to form a Government.’
‘On June 10th my discussions with Lord Salisbury as to the Redistribution Bill were continued, and it was decided that the Bill was to go forward in spite of the Ministerial crisis, although this was resisted by the Fourth Party in the House of Commons.’
On the previous evening Sir Charles Dilke addressed an audience at the City Liberal Club in a speech of unwonted passion. Confidently anticipating that the Redistribution Bill would go through in spite of any change of Ministry and the resistance of the Fourth Party, he dwelt on the magnitude of the change for which he had so long wrought. But the central point of the speech was a eulogy of Mr Gladstone, which reflected the temper of a scene that had passed in the House of Commons the same day, and he demanded in the name of Liberalism that the battle should be won, ‘not only with his great name, but under his actual leadership.’
This was the declaration of the Radicals against all thought of a Hartington Administration. Referring to the speech, he writes:
‘I was greatly congratulated on this day on a speech which I had made at a house dinner of the City Liberal Club on the 9th. Chamberlain wrote: “Your speech was admirable, and I have heard from one who was present that the effect was electrical. You never did better in your life.” He went on to agree with me in my wish that Herbert Gladstone should be appointed Chief Whip for the Opposition, and then to say that we must be very careful what we did, or “we shall destroy the Tory Government before it has done our work.” I had asked him to sit to Holl for a portrait for me, and he said that