the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were 33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these qualities are associated with a spirit of independence, find, it increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the party to maintain its majority in the particular constituency for which he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election. Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member constituencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by exclusion from the House of Commons.
_Degradation of party strife._
There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against the existing electoral system–it is in no small measure responsible for that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has characterised recent political and municipal contests. This debasement of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debasement of elections is weakening the faith of many in representative institutions. An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy, however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that “the empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,”[4] and cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the electors will succumb to such influences. The votes of this small section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation allotted to any given constituency is awarded to the party which can secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by which the victory is obtained, and if “the exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences” is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly exploit them to the best of his powers.
_The final rally._
Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable illustration of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our electoral system. “The voters,” says he, “who came in were the results of the ‘final rally’ of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the public-house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political opinion would enable us to improve it.” The political “boss” has no such qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally, and every effort must be made to ensure that the party’s poll exceeds that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as “a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government.” But we are not compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible justification is there for making the representation of all the other electors of a constituency depend upon the result of a final rally?
_Bribery and “nursing”_
Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a much more subtle form–“nursing” the constituency–would appear to be on the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the expenses attending a successful candidature. “If the candidate’s means,” says he, “permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals for money), he is said to be engaged in ‘nursing’ the constituency in which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section–is favourably influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given £100 to the funds of the hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given £5, 5_s_., or nothing at all. Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give £20, but waits to see if Mr. B. gives £25, in which case he will raise his intended £20 to £30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes in large and unmistakable characters…. The writer was once consulted by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to represent a London constituency. The path was clear to his selection as a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless he were prepared to spend from £1500 to £2000 a year from that time until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The constituency was one where money _must_ be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the necessities of the existing system.” Some of the practices associated with constituency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation, but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the attentions of a rich patron?
_The organization of victory._
The cumulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of the party leader–separation which is becoming more and more complete. The work of covering hoardings with posters of a repulsive type, the task of preparing election “literature,” must be carried out by men of a different character from those who are responsible for the public direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the mere force of competition is compelling agents, sometimes against their own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of the Municipal Reform campaign in the London County Council election of 1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the political “boss” in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political “boss” has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable factor in successful political organization. At the London County Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Municipal Reform Party dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become possible in England for a political organization such as “Tammany Hall” to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a notice such as that which appeared in the New York _Evening Post:_ “There are a thousand ‘colonizers’ waiting to vote for the Tammany ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your name.”[8] In New York the Citizens’ Unions have at each election to spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the results of a “final rally,” the votes of the least worthy citizens, assiduous “nursing,” or suggestive posters to decide the representation of a constituency.
_Party exclusiveness._
The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in 1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: “The opposition to me is not to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. … We are face to face with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do not want a system of political assassination under which any one who is in the way may be put out of the way.” To realize the dangerous weapon which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it is not necessary to give complete assent to the statement of Lord Hugh Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the secret organization known as “confederates” was reported to have marked down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but it nevertheless constituted a serious attack upon the representative character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House will be deprived of its rightful place in the constitution of this country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of 1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so eager for Tariff Reform at all costs–the “confederates” themselves–would probably have protested most vigorously had the same policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the comment of _The Times_ on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of those who value the representative character of the House of Commons more highly than an immediate party triumph:–
“Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole, and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our institutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that direction.”[9]
This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments, was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government. Mr. Harold Cox, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support. Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member was required to accept in writing the constitution of the party, and this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against the amendment, and commenting on the incident the _Labour Leader_ said: “Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party’s mandate? We invite the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict will be.”
_Mechanical debates._
These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour’s administration were very real and full of life, because argument could and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord Hugh Cecil has said[10]: “The present system unquestionably weakens the House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative character of the House of Commons as now constituted, leave it only the credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives of the whole people. “Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the debate on the Women’s Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. “To think in programmes,” said he, “is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization of the political intellect.” And the nation suffers.
_The disfranchisement of minorities in bi-racial countries_
The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole, and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the disfranchisement of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties. The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchisement. Only one–Barberton–of the twenty-six country constituencies of the Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk, although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest. The disfranchisement of minorities heightened the natural difference which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal–a difference which would have been still more pronounced had not Het Volk succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the Constitutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election _The Friend_, the organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that “if Bloemfontein ventures to vote for the Constitutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards.” On the morrow of the election the same paper declared that “the election results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown itself politically an alien city.” But would Bloemfontein have “shown itself politically an alien city” if the electoral method had been such that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts, had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength?
Had the Constitution of South Africa provided for the representation of minorities in the House of Assembly, as proposed in the original draft signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and the conflicting interests of the constituent States and of town and country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from complete, and the process has been retarded, and is at the present time being retarded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day, and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects, be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered 36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been considerably modified, would not the process of political unification have been made more complete?
The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony. Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects of the disfranchisement of minorities is to be seen in the American Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the report the absence of minority representation “in the States of the South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together and have given them voice in the electoral colleges…. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and to civil war.”
_Defective representation in municipal bodies_.]
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery, the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force both in County Council and in Municipal elections are based on the same false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote the necessary time to the study of London’s problems, for it is generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of different policies.
_Wasteful municipal finance._
Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are fairly represented.
_No continuity in administration_.]
The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7 Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council. Lewisham’s experience is typical of that of several other London boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in municipal affairs lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no security of continuity in the administration of the business of the Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a select committee of the House of Lords, said: “I found, of course, when I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a weakness.”[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years’ hard work before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough, and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing, such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the representative assembly declines.
_The root of the evil._
In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils constitute a complete answer to Lord Morley’s criticism of Mill, that the latter laid undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a false basis, those democratic institutions, on which so many hopes have been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says, concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of their country.
[Footnote 1: _The Manchester Guardian_, 12 February 1909.]
[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May 1906.]
[Footnote 3: _The Times_, 8 January 1906.]
[Footnote 4: _Human Nature in Politics_, pp. 241 _et seq_.]
[Footnote 5: _The Times_, 22 August 1906.]
[Footnote 6: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ pp. 102 _et seq_.]
[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of the “boss.”]
[Footnote 8: _The Manchester Guardian_, 21 April 1908.]
[Footnote 9: _The Times_, 22 January 1909.]
[Footnote 10: Letter read at the annual meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, 24 April 1907.]
[Footnote 11: Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.]
[Footnote 12: Before the Union.]
[Footnote 13: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H. L.)_, 1907 (132).]
CHAPTER IV
THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES
The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority that succeeds by force or fraud in carrying elections. To break off that point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities. Thirty-five years ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no voice in the Government; and it brings men more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and that every voter shall contribute to bring into Parliament a member of his own opinion.”–LORD ACTON
The disfranchisement of minorities, noted in the two previous chapters as the outcome of our electoral methods, attracted considerable attention during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and several legislative proposals were carried with the specific object of remedying the evil. Indeed every electoral reform bill, beginning with that of 1832, has been accompanied with a demand or a suggestion for an improvement in methods of election in order to secure for the House of Commons a fully representative character. For it was clearly realized that without some such improvement neither an extension of the franchise nor a redistribution of seats would necessarily make the House a mirror of the nation. These attempts to secure representation for minorities have, however, often been confounded with the movement in favour of proportional representation–the just representation of all parties–and this confusion of thought may be partly due to the eloquent plea for the representation of minorities advanced by Mill in the chapter in _Representative Government_ devoted to the advocacy of Hare’s scheme of proportional representation. This confusion showed itself in the speech which the Marquis of Ripon contributed to the debate[1] on the second reading of the Municipal Representation Bill, introduced by Lord Courtney of Penwith in 1907, for the purpose of enabling municipalities to adopt a system of proportional representation. “It was a remarkable thing,” Lord Ripon said, “that so far as the experiments had gone they had not succeeded, and that, he thought, should make them cautious when looking into proposals of this kind.” The experiments to which Lord Ripon referred were legislative proposals for the representation of minorities, and it cannot be admitted that these experiments were failures. They did secure the representation of minorities. The machinery provided did not enable them to do more, and an analysis of the results of these experiments will show to what extent they succeeded in their object, and at the same time disclose in what respects these experiments fell short of a true electoral method.
_The Limited Vote_.]
The first of these experiments was known as the Limited Vote–a method of voting which involves the creation of constituencies returning several members but limits the elector in the number of his votes; the elector is only permitted to vote for a number of candidates which is less than the number of members to be elected, whilst he may not give more than one vote to any one candidate. The Limited Vote was first proposed by Mr. Mackworth Praed in Committee on the Reform Bill of 1831, and the proposal was renewed by him in the following year in the Bill which became the great Reform Act of 1832. Up to that time the constituencies of England returned two members apiece, with the exception of the City of London, which returned four, and of five boroughs each returning one member. The Reform Bill provided that a third member should be added to the representation of each of seven counties, and that certain other counties should be divided into two or more constituencies, each returning two members. Mr. Praed proposed to drop this subdivision of counties, although permitting the additional members to be given, and proposed that in constituencies returning three or four members an elector should not be allowed to vote for more than two candidates. The arguments advanced by Mr. Praed are worth quoting. “He was of opinion,” said he, “that it was an error in the original construction of the Representative Assembly of this country to allow any person to have more than one vote, for, by the present system, it was frequently the case that the same persons, constituting perhaps a bare majority of the electors, returned both members…. In the present case, if large counties were not divided each freeholder would have four votes. He wished to restrict them to two, and he thought that this object might be attained even without the division of counties by allowing each freeholder to vote only for two members although four was to be the number returned. Some measure should be taken to make the vote and views of a large minority known in the legislature.”
This form of voting was proposed by Lord Aberdeen’s Government in the Parliamentary Representation Bill of 1854. In this Bill it was proposed to give a third member to 38 counties and divisions of counties (in addition to the seven counties which already possessed that privilege), and also to eight boroughs. Lord John Russell, in introducing the measure, made a powerful plea on behalf of the representation of minorities in each of these constituencies, but the Crimean War rendered further consideration of the Bill impossible. The system was, however, applied to thirteen constituencies by the Representation of the People Act of 1867. It was not provided for in the Bill as submitted by the Government, nor was it supported by the leader of the Opposition. Its introduction was due to the action of Lord Cairns, who, on 30 July 1867, carried in the House of Lords, with the support of Lord Russell and Lord Spencer, the following amendment:–
“At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates.” A further amendment applicable to the City of London, which returned four members, was also carried. The system remained in force until the Redistribution Act of 1885, when three-member constituencies were abolished. “There is nothing,” said Lord Cairns, in the course of a memorable speech, “so irksome to those who form the minority of one of these large constituencies as to find that from the mere force of numbers they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power, that it is in vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs, that the election must always go in one direction, and that they have no political power whatever.”
The following table will show that Lord Cairns’ proposal secured the object which he had in view–the representation of minorities:–
1868. 1874. 1880. Constituency. Actual Probable Actual Probable Actual Probable results results results results results results with without with without with without Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C Berkshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Birmingham 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 Buckinghamshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Cambridgeshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Dorsetshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Glasgow 3 0 3 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 Herefordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 Hertfordshire 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Leeds 2 1 3 0 1 2 3 0 2 1 3 0 Liverpool 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 London (City) 3 1 4 0 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 Manchester 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 Oxfordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 2 0 3
Totals 22 18 19 21 16 24 9 31 20 20 15 25
The actual results show the relative strength of the two great political parties in each constituency; the probable results are based on the hypothesis that if each voter could have given one vote to each of three candidates, each of the parties would have nominated three candidates, and that as the electors would for the most part have voted on party lines, the larger body would have secured all three seats. In Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Dorsetshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire, Liverpool and London, the Liberal minorities each obtained a representative, whilst the Conservative minorities in Herefordshire, Leeds, and Manchester also obtained representatives. There were only two constituencies–Birmingham and Glasgow–where the minority failed to obtain representation, and this was due to the fact that the minorities in these particular constituencies were comparatively small.
A consideration in detail of the election in Birmingham in 1880 will show why the minority sometimes failed to obtain representation, and will, at the same time, direct attention to the defects of the system. The figures of this election were as follows:–
H. Muntz (Liberal) 22,969
John Bright (Liberal) 20,079
Joseph Chamberlain (Liberal) 19,544
62,592
Major F. Burnaby (Con.) 15,735
Hon. A. C. G. Calthorpe (Con.) 14,208
29,943
It will be seen that the Liberals obtained 62,592 votes and the Conservatives 29,943 votes, and that the latter therefore numbered slightly less than a third of the constituency. If the Liberal votes had not been distributed as evenly as they were over their three candidates, it might have resulted that the lowest candidate on the poll, Joseph Chamberlain, would have received less votes than Major Burnaby, who was the highest of the two Conservative candidates. In order to obtain the full advantage of their numerical superiority it was necessary for the Liberal organization to make an extensive canvass of their supporters, to ascertain as accurately as possible their strength, and to issue precise instructions to the voters in each district as to the manner in which they should record their votes. The memorable cry associated with these elections–“Vote as you are told and we’ll carry you through “–was fit accompaniment of these efforts of the Birmingham caucus.[2] But had there been a mistake in the calculations of the Liberal organization, had the polls disclosed a larger number of Conservatives, disaster would have followed the nomination of three Liberal candidates. If for example the votes had been as follows:–
Muintz Liberal)…… 21,000
Bright (Liberal)….. 20,000
Chamberlain (Liberal) 20,000
61,000
Burnaby (Conservative). 22,000
Calthorpe (Conservative). 21,000
43,000
the Conservatives would have returned two members, and the Liberals, although in a majority, would have returned only one. In brief, the party organizers had to be quite sure that their supporters numbered more than 60 per cent. of the electorate, and that these supporters would vote faithfully as ordered before they could recommend the nomination of three candidates. The attempt to obtain all three seats at Leeds, in the General Election of 1874, failed, with the result that the minority got the larger share of the representation. The poll on this occasion was as follows:–
M. Carter (Liberal)….. 15,390
E. Baines (Liberal) …. 11,850
Dr. F. R. Lees (Liberal). 5,945
33,185
W.St.J.Wheelhouse (Con.) 14,864
R. Tenant (Con.) . . …..13,192
28,056
In this election the total Liberal vote amounted to 33,185, and the total Conservative vote amounted to 28,056, but the Conservatives obtained two seats out of three.
The practical working of the Limited Vote has therefore shown that the representation of a minority in a three-member constituency was always secured whenever that minority numbered not less than two-fifths of the electors, and as, in the majority of constituencies, the minority exceeded this proportion the minority was able to return one of the members. The system, however, possesses no elasticity. No party can put forward a complete list of candidates without incurring considerable risk, and even if the party has an ascertained strength of more than three-fifths complete victory is only possible if the members of the party are willing to carry out implicitly the instructions of the party organization. It should be noted, in connexion with this system of voting, that the more limited the vote the greater is the opportunity afforded to the minority to obtain representation. When in a four-member constituency each elector has three votes the minority must number three-sevenths before it can obtain a representative; if, however, each elector is limited to two votes a smaller minority, namely, a minority which exceeds one-third of the electors, can make sure of returning a member.[3]
_The Cumulative Vote_.]
The Cumulative Vote, the second of the experiments referred to by Lord Ripen, although by no means free from serious defects, has also secured the object for which it was designed–the representation of minorities. With this system the member has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and is permitted to distribute them amongst candidates, or to cumulate them among one or more candidates according to his own discretion. It was warmly advocated for the first time under the name of the Cumulative Vote by James Garth Marshall in an open letter entitled “Minorities and Majorities: their Relative Rights,” addressed by him in 1853 to Lord John Russell. But three years earlier, in 1850, it was recommended[4] by the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, and adopted by Earl Grey in the draft Constitution proposed for the Cape of Good Hope. The Legislative Council of Cape Colony continued to be elected under this system until the Council disappeared under the new Constitution of United South Africa. The Cumulative Vote secured the representation of minorities in the Legislative Council of Cape Colony, and a striking testimony to its value, from this point of view, was given by Lord Milner when speaking in the House of Lords on 31 July 1906, on the announcement of the terms of the new Transvaal Constitution:–
“I hope,” said Lord Milner, “that when the time for making the Second Chamber elective comes, this matter may be reconsidered, for it is certainly very remarkable how much more fairly the system of proportional representation works out in the Cape Colony than the system, not of single members there, but of double-member representation. Take only a single instance. In the Cape Colony, take the bulk of the country districts; you have, roughly speaking, about two Boers to every one white man who is not a Boer. On the system which prevails for the Lower House the representation of these districts is exclusively Boer, for one-third of the population is absolutely excluded from any representation whatever. Under the system which prevails in the election to the Upper House, as nearly as possible one-third of the representatives of those districts are British. Inversely, in the case of the Cape Peninsula, where there is an enormously preponderant British population, but still a considerable Dutch population also, you get in the Lower House no single Dutch representative, whereas in the Upper House there are three representatives, one of whom represents the Dutch section. You could not have a more curious illustration of the great difference in fairness between the two principles as applied to the practical conditions of South Africa. And I cannot help hoping that between this time and the time when the Constitution of the projected Upper House comes to be decided, there may be such a development of opinion as will enable and justify the Government of that day adopting the far sounder principle for the elections to the Upper Chamber. It certainly has a great bearing upon that development of better feeling between the two great races of South Africa whom we are all agreed in desiring to see ultimately amalgamated and fused.”
The Cape Assembly was elected by constituencies returning one or more members, and when more than one each voter could give a single vote to as many candidates as there were members to be elected, with the consequence that the majority in every constituency commanded the whole of its representation. The Council was elected by larger areas with the cumulative vote. Lord Milner in his speech refers to the cumulative vote as proportional voting, but it cannot, strictly speaking, be so described. Nevertheless his testimony clearly shows that the cumulative vote secured the representation of minorities–the great need of which has been recognized by all impartial students of South African political conditions.
Mr. Robert Lowe endeavoured to introduce this form of voting into the Electoral Reform Bill of 1867, but failed, and the only practical application of the system within the United Kingdom has been in connexion with School Board elections. It was introduced into the Education Act of 1870 on the motion of a private member, Lord Frederick Cavendish, whose proposition, supported as it was by W.E. Forster, Vice-President of the Council for Education, by W.H. Smith and by Henry Fawcett, was carried without a division. Under this Act London was divided into eleven electoral areas, returning from four to seven members each; whilst the large towns, such as Manchester, Birmingham, and others, each constituted an electoral area itself, electing a Board of some fifteen members. The Education Act for Scotland which followed in the same Parliament embodied the same principle in the-same manner. The figures of any School Board election will show that the object aimed at–the representation of minorities–was undoubtedly achieved. The last election of the School Board for London, that of 1900, will serve for purposes of illustration. The figures are as follows:–
Votes Obtained. Members Returned. Constituency. Mode- Pro- Inde- Mode- Pro- Inde- rate. gressive. pendent. rate. gressive. pendent. City 4,572 2,183 3 1
Chelsea 7,831 5,408 2,144 3 2 Finsbury 7,573 7,239 837 3 3 1 Greenwich 6,706 6,008 3,375 2 1
Hackney 5,438 9,130 1,579 2 3 Lambeth, E 4,370 9,913 1,313 1 3
Lambeth, W. 8,709 14,156 54 2 4 Marylebone 9,450 7,047 536 4 3
Southwark 2,636 3,430 2,328 1 2 1 Tower Hamlets 6,199 7,437 5,495 1 3 1 Westminster 4,829 2,354 3 2
Totals 68,313 74,305 17,661 25 27 3
In each constituency the minority was enabled to obtain some representation, and although in the majority of cases the representation was still confined to the two main parties, yet it was possible for an independent candidate, as in the Tower Hamlets, or a Roman Catholic candidate, as in Southwark, to succeed in their respective candidatures. The Cumulative Vote not only secured the representation of minorities, but in so doing facilitated very considerably the working of the Education Act. Mr. Patrick Cumin, at that time permanent secretary of the Education Department, in giving evidence before a select committee of the House of Commons, stated that “it would not have been possible to carry the Act into effect, and certainly there would have been more friction if the cumulative vote had not been in existence; for instance, he did not believe that the bye-laws could possibly have been carried into effect without co-operation.” The Right Hon. W.E. Forster and Sir Francis Sandford bore similar testimony, and the Royal Commission on the Elementary Education Acts, in the Report issued in 1888, strongly advised the retention of a system of minority representation.
The Cumulative Vote was also adopted by the State of Illinois for the elections to the State House of Representatives. Each constituency returns three members, and the elector may cumulate or divide his votes, giving one vote to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each of two candidates, or three votes to one candidate. “As a result,” says Professor Commons, “both parties have representatives from every part of the State instead of from the strongholds only, and there are no hopeless minorities of the two main parties. Every citizen who has business before the Legislature has some member of his own party to transact that business.” Constituencies returning three members are, however, not sufficiently large to do justice to this method of voting.
The Cumulative Vote, whilst securing representation to the minority, does not necessarily secure the representation of majorities and minorities in their true proportions. As with the Limited Vote, the party organizations, if they desire to make use of their polling strength to the fullest advantage, must make as accurate an estimate as possible of the numbers of their supporters, and must issue explicit directions as to the way in which votes should be recorded. To nominate more candidates than the party can carry may end in disaster. In the first School Board elections in Birmingham the Liberal organization endeavoured to obtain the whole of the representation, and nominated fifteen candidates. The party polled a majority of the votes, but as these votes were distributed over too many candidates, the Liberals succeeded in returning only a minority of representatives. It is not easy to understand how the Birmingham National League came to imagine that, with the Cumulative Vote, they would still be able to elect a Board composed of members entirely of their own side, and Mr. Forster banteringly suggested that the League should obtain the assistance of a well-taught elementary schoolboy who would be able to show them that it was impossible to get the return which they supposed they might obtain. While there was little excuse for the mistake made by the Birmingham National League, it must be remembered that with the Cumulative Vote it is easy to fall into the opposite error of nominating too few candidates. Every School Board election furnishes examples of an excessive concentration of votes upon individual candidates. The Glasgow School Board election of 1909 resulted as follows:–
Elected—-James Barr 81,109
Canon Dyer 58,711
John Shaughnessy 54,310
Charles Byrne 54,236
Rev. James Brisby 51,357
W. Rounsfell Brown 35,739
R. S. Allan 24,017
Rev. J. Fraser Grahame 23,806
Dr. Henry Dyer 23,422
Mrs. Mary Mason 22,929
W. Martin Haddow 21,880
Rev. Robert Pryde 21,692
Miss K. V. Bannatyne 18,864
Mrs. Agnes Hardie 18,794
J. Leiper Gemmil 18,619
Unelected–Rev. J. A. Robertson 18,534 James Welsh 13,951
Dr. Sloan 13,114
S. M. Lipschitz 12,680
Dr. Charles Workman 7,405
James Laidlaw 4,869
Patrick Gallagher 2,478
——-
602,516
It will be seen that the candidate at the head of the list, Mr. Barr, obtained over 81,000 votes, and the highest of the unsuccessful candidates 18,534 votes. The total number of votes polled was 602,516, and one-fifteenth of this number, viz. 40,167, would have been amply sufficient to secure the return of any one candidate. The votes given to Mr. Barr in excess of this number were wasted, and thus, although with the cumulative vote minorities can secure representation, neither majorities nor minorities secure with any degree of certainty representation in their true proportions.
_The Single Vote_.]
Japan, keenly alive to the evils of a defective electoral system, abandoned, after a short trial, the system adopted when the Japanese Constitution was promulgated in 1889. The administrative areas (with some exceptions) were then divided into single-member constituencies, but it was soon found how unsatisfactorily this system works. It would appear from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, Chief Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives–a memorandum which is printed in full in Appendix I.–that in certain of the administrative areas a minority of the voters often obtained a majority of the members elected. It was almost impossible for political parties to obtain representation in proportion to the strength of their supporters. In 1900 a new election law was adopted. The administrative areas, irrespective of size, were made parliamentary constituencies returning a number of members varying from one to twelve according to the population of the area, but the voter in any area was permitted only one vote. He can vote for one candidate and no more. Under this system minorities can and do get a share of representation whenever the area returns two or more members. A secondary advantage of considerable importance was secured by making the administrative areas conterminous with the parliamentary constituencies. Future redistributions of seats would leave the boundaries of these areas untouched; they would merely consist of a re-arrangement of the number of members to be returned by each area.
The new system secured not only the representation of minorities, but also the representation of the chief parties in reasonable proportion to their voting strength. Further, to men of independent mind and character the new system offered a greater opportunity of maintaining their position in the House of Representatives. As will be seen from Mr. Hayashida’s memorandum, both Mr. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokio, and Mr. S. Shimada, have never lost their seats in Parliament, although they have stood as independent candidates. At the General Election of 1908 they were returned for their native prefecture or town with a great number of votes. These are results of no mean value which are certainly not possible with our Parliamentary system of single-member constituencies, or with the block vote as used in the London municipal elections. Yet, in spite of the marked superiority of the Japanese system, it falls short of a true system of representation; it lacks the elasticity and adaptability which should characterize such a system. Like the limited vote and the cumulative vote, the Japanese system of the single vote demands exact calculations on the part of party organizations, which otherwise may fail to secure for their party the maximum number of representatives. The number of candidates nominated must depend upon a careful estimate of probable support, and when the nominations have taken place efforts must be made by the party organizations to allot this support to their candidates in such a way that not one of them is in danger of defeat. Moreover, as the nomination of too large a number of candidates would, as with the limited vote, be disastrous, parties have in some constituencies been unwilling to nominate more than the number of candidates who were successful at the previous election.
_The need of minority representation_.]
It cannot be maintained then, as was suggested by Lord Ripon, that the experiments made for the purpose of securing the representation of minorities have failed. All the methods tried–the limited, the cumulative, and the single vote–have without question accomplished their purpose. They have done even more. The cumulative vote facilitated the smooth working of the Elementary Education Act, the single vote has secured for Japan a House of Representatives which reflects in reasonable proportions the political forces of the country. The problem for the future is not the abandonment of the principle of minority representation, but the adoption of such improvements in voting mechanism as will do justice to majorities and to minorities alike. For the need of minority representation is becoming more and not less urgent. A brief reference to the more important Parliamentary Bills of recent years will show that the most difficult problems which our administrators have had to face in the framing of those Bills have centred round the problem of representation–and that problem will recur with greater frequency in the future. Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, considered it essential that some special provision for the representation of minorities should be embodied in the Irish Administrative Council Bill introduced into the House of Commons in May 1907. But the method proposed–that the Council should consist of eighty-two elected members and twenty-four nominated members–was essentially undemocratic. The nominated members, even if they were representative of the minority, would never have had the same authority or influence as they would have had as members duly elected by the votes of the minority; and even if we admit the special difficulties attending the representation of minorities in Ireland the solution proposed by Mr. Birrell was in every sense of the term unsatisfactory, and obviously of a temporary character. The first step towards the solution of Irish problems will have been taken when due provision has been made by popular election for the representation of minorities.
Lord Morley of Blackburn, in preparing his great scheme of Indian reforms, found himself face to face with the same problem–the representation of minorities. He had, moreover, been advised by the Indian Government that “in most provinces the Muhammadans are in favour of election, and regard nomination as an inferior method of obtaining admission to the Legislative Council.”[5] Lord Morley, willingly or unwillingly, was compelled to brush aside the English electoral methods as inapplicable to India, and to provide for the representation on the proposed Provincial Legislative Councils of Hindus and Muhammadans in proportion to their strength. The method proposed was an arbitrary one, and can be best described by quoting the terms of Lord Morley’s preliminary despatch.
“Let it be supposed that the total population of the Province is twenty millions, of whom fifteen millions are Hindus and five millions Muhammadans, and the number of members to be elected twelve. Then since the Hindus are to Muhammadans as three to one, nine Hindus should be elected to three Muhammadans. In order to obtain these members, divide the Province into three electoral areas, in each of which three Hindus and one Muhammadan are to be returned. Then, in each of these areas, constitute an electoral college, consisting of, let us say, a hundred members. In order to preserve the proportion between the two religions, seventy-five of these should be Hindus and twenty-five Muhammadans. This electoral college should be obtained by calling upon the various electorates … to return to it such candidates as they desired, a definite number being allotted to each electorate. Out of those offering themselves and obtaining votes, the seventy-five Hindus who obtained the majority of votes should be declared members of the College, and the twenty-five Musalmans who obtained the majority should similarly be declared elected. If the Musalmans returned did not provide twenty-five members for the Electoral College, the deficiency would be made good by nomination. Having thus obtained an Electoral College containing seventy-five Hindus and twenty-five Musalmans, that body would be called upon to elect three representatives for the Hindus and one for the Muhammadans; each member of the College would have only one vote, and could vote for only one candidate. In this way it is evident that it would be in the power of each section of the population to return a member in the proportion corresponding to its own proportion to the total population.”[6]
Lord Morley proceeded to explain that “in this manner minorities would be protected against exclusion by majorities, and all large and important sections of the population would have the opportunity of returning members in proportion to their ratio to the total population. Their choice would in that event be exercised in the best possible way, that, namely, of popular election, instead of requiring Government to supply deficiencies by the dubious method of nomination.” The system of nomination, considered by Mr. Birrell as an adequate solution of this problem in Ireland, was summarily rejected, and rightly so, by Lord Morley as being inferior to popular election, inferior even to the arbitrary method proposed by himself. The plan finally adopted by Lord Morley was a modification of the proposal here outlined, and its working, as the working of all arbitrary schemes must, has evoked criticism on the ground that it does not hold the scales even as between the two sections to be represented.
The Select Committee appointed by the House of Lords “to consider the suggestions made from time to time for increasing the efficiency of that House,” was compelled to propose a method of election by which the Liberal minority might retain some representation in that House. In the election of Representative Peers for Scotland the majority method of election is followed, with the result that none but Unionists are chosen. It was obvious that no proposal for the reform of the House of Lords which embodied an electoral method so unjust could possibly be entertained, and therefore this Select Committee, following in this all previous proposals for the reform of the Upper House, reported that the representation of the minority was essential. A new Second Chamber is now advocated both by Liberals and Unionists.
Again, Mr. Asquith’s Government experienced a very distinct rebuff in its attempt to abolish the cumulative vote in the elections of Scottish School Boards without making any alternative provision for the representation of minorities. The Government proposed to substitute the block vote for the cumulative vote. The block vote would have enabled the majority of the electors to have secured the whole of the representation on the Board. The deletion of the Government’s proposal was proposed in the Scottish Grand Committee, but was defeated. A further amendment by Mr. Phipson Beale in favour of the principle of proportional representation was, in spite of the strong opposition of the Secretary for Scotland, defeated only by twenty-two votes to eighteen. The Government finally withdrew their proposal to abolish the cumulative vote, and it has been made abundantly clear that, while the cumulative vote is far from satisfactory, it can only be dispensed with by the introduction of a better and more scientific way of securing the representation of minorities.
In framing the Port of London Bill, Mr. Lloyd George had to make some provision for the representation of the various interests concerned, and so far as possible, in due proportion. It was impossible to entrust the control of the new Port to the largest interest only, and accordingly he proposed that “in prescribing the manner in which votes are to be recorded, the Board of Trade shall have regard to the desirability of votes being so recorded, whether by allowing the voter to record a vote for a number of candidates in order of preference or otherwise, as to secure that so far as possible the several interests concerned shall be adequately represented on the Port Authority.”[7] The reports of the Poor Law Commission also raise in an acute form the problem of minority representation. If the far-reaching suggestions of these reports are to become law, and especially if the powers of County and County Borough Councils are to be still further increased, the constitution of these bodies will have to be closely examined. Are minorities to be excluded altogether from the new authorities; are they to secure representation through the processes of co-option and nomination; or are they to obtain a hearing by a system of election that will provide them with representation in their own right?
While these and other matters are bringing into greater prominence the need of minority representation, a new problem–one with which the Continent has long been familiar–has arisen in connexion with English parliamentary elections. In an increasing number of contests three or more candidates have taken the field, and the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes has been elected although he may have received less than half the votes recorded. A member so chosen obviously represents only a minority of the electors in the constituency for which he has been returned. Such results have come as a shock to those who have hitherto accepted with composure the more glaring anomalies of our electoral system, and so the growing frequency of three-cornered fights will assist those other forces which are making for a complete readjustment of our electoral methods. The new problem is, however, quite distinct from that of minority representation, and is of sufficient importance to warrant consideration in a separate chapter.
[Footnote 1: 30 April 1907.]
[Footnote 2: “One ward voted for A and B, another for A and C, a third for B and C, a fourth for A and B, &c. The voter who had left the selection of the three candidates to the general committee was also to renounce the privilege of selecting from them the two which he preferred. ‘Vote as you are told’ was the pass word.”–Ostrogorski, _Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties_, vol. i. p. 162.]
[Footnote 3: If in a four-member constituency the number of voters is 21,000 and the parties are in the ratio of 12,000 to 9000, the larger party would, if each elector had three votes, have 36,000 votes in all and the smaller party would have 27,000. No candidate of the smaller party could obtain more than 9000 votes, whilst the 36,000 votes of the larger party carefully divided among four candidates would also allow each candidate to receive 9000 votes. If then the larger party had slightly more than 12,000 supporters out of a total of 21,000, the larger party would obtain all four seats, as each of its candidates would, if the votes were carefully distributed, receive more than 9000 votes each.]
[Footnote 4: “If it is desired that the body should not be a representation of a single interest and a single class of opinions, some means must be adopted to guard against its falling entirely into the hands of the dominant party. With this view we would recommend that, in the election of the council, each elector should have as many votes as there might be members to be chosen, and should be entitled to give all these votes to a single candidate, or to distribute them among several. By this arrangement a monopoly of power in the Legislative Council by any one party, or any one district of the Colony, would be prevented, since a minority of the electors, by giving all their votes to a single candidate, would be enabled to secure his return.”–Earl Grey, _The Colonial Policy of the Administration of Lord John Russell_, vol. ii., Appendix, p. 362.]
[Footnote 5: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. 4426), p. 14.]
[Footnote 6: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. 4426), p. 45.]
[Footnote 7: Port of London Act, 1908, Schedule I., Part IV. (1).]
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES
“Le député, au lieu de représenter la majorité des électeurs, devient prisonnier de la minorité qui lui a donné l’appoint nécessaire pour son élection.”
–YVES GUYOT
” … every fool knows that a man represents Not the fellers that sent him, but them on the fence.”
–J. RUSSELL LOWELL
_Three-cornered contests._
It was stated in the first chapter that the rise of the Labour Party as a political force, with an organization wholly independent of those of the older parties, would make a change in our voting system imperative. Both prior and subsequent to the appointment of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems political organizations have shown themselves keenly alive to the necessity of such a change. At the meeting of the General Committee of the National Liberal Federation at Leicester, on 21 February 1908, a resolution in favour of the early adoption of the second ballot was carried unanimously. The Trades Union Congress, at its meeting in September 1908, less eager to pronounce in favour of a reform of such doubtful value, passed a resolution in favour of an authoritative “inquiry into proportional representation, preference or second ballots, so that the most effective means of securing the true representation of the electors may be embodied in the new Reform Bill.” The spokesman of a deputation from the Manchester Liberal Federation, which waited upon Mr. Winston Churchill on 22 May 1909, said: “The point on which we wish to speak to you to-day is the reform of the present system of voting, which we hold to be out of date, archaic, and in great need of reform.” Mr. Churchill’s reply was a significant reinforcement of Mr. Asquith’s previous declaration, that “it was impossible to defend the present rough and ready methods.” “I think,” said Mr. Churchill, “the present system has clearly broken down. The results produced are not fair to any party, nor to any section of the community. In many cases they do not secure majority representation, nor do they secure an intelligent representation of minorities. All they secure is fluke representation, freak representation, capricious representation.” The figures of two bye-elections–those of the Jarrow Division of Durham and the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield–will show how completely Mr. Churchill’s language is justified. The figures are as follows:–
JARROW ELECTION, 4 July 1907
Curran (Labour) 4,698
Rose-Innes (Conservative) 3,930
Hughes (Liberal) 3,474
O’Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,124
___
14,226
ATTERCLIFFE ELECTION, 4 May 1909
Pointer (Labour) . . . . 3,531
King-Farrow (Unionist) . . . 3,380 Lambert (Liberal) . . . . 3,175
Wilson (Ind. Unionist) . . . 2,803 ___
12,889
In the case of Jarrow the successful candidate obtained just less than one-third of the votes polled, and in the case of Attercliffe the member returned represented a little more than a quarter of the electors. The representation which results from elections of this kind is without doubt most capricious and uncertain in character. A House of Commons so built up could have no claim to be representative of the nation, and its composition would be so unstable as seriously to impair its efficiency. Nor can we afford to regard such elections as being a mere temporary feature of our parliamentary system. The General Election of 1906 showed a notable increase in the number of three-cornered fights over previous general elections, and the bye-elections during the four years 1906–1909 were marked by a still further increase. The Report submitted by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party to the Portsmouth Conference in January 1909 foreshadowed a very large addition to the number of Labour candidates. Some thirty-eight candidates, in addition to the then existing Labour members in Parliament, had been formally approved by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party after due election by the Labour organizations to which the candidates belonged, and although constituencies were not found for all of these new candidates, the number of three-cornered contests in the election of Jan. 1910, in which Liberal, Unionist, Labour (or Socialist) took part, was no less than forty-one, and this number would have been greater had not several Liberal candidates withdrawn. Owing to the desire on the part of the Liberal and Labour parties to avoid the risk of losing seats there were in the elections of December 1910 fewer three-cornered fights. But the Labour party, the permanence of which is no longer open to question, will not be content to remain with its present share of representation. It can however gain additional seats only at the expense of the older parties, and although the Liberal party, as in the Mid-Derby bye-election of May 1908, may sometimes yield seats to Labour nominees, it is not to be expected that the Liberal organizations will always be willing to give way. At the Mid-Glamorgan bye-election in May 1910 the local organization, against the advice of the chief Liberal Whip, nominated a Liberal candidate, and succeeded in retaining the seat although it had been “ear-marked” by the Labour Party. In Scotland, where Liberalism is less complaisant than in England, no seat has been surrendered to the Labour Party without a fight, and when a Labour candidature was threatened in December 1910, in the Bridgeton division of Glasgow, the Liberals retaliated by threatening to place a Liberal candidate in the Blackfriars division where Mr. Barnes, the Labour representative was again standing. These facts should dispel any illusion, if such still exist, that the problem of three-cornered fights is a transitory phenomenon which can safely be ignored. The political organizations, with a true instinct, have realized the importance and urgency of this problem, and increasing pressure will doubtless be brought to bear upon the Government to introduce a system of second ballots, or some other electoral method, that will give effect to what Mr. Churchill has described as “the broad democratic principle, that a majority of voters in any electoral unit, acting together, shall be able to return their man.” The advocates of the second ballot and cognate methods of reform seek a solution of this one problem only. They desire to maintain the essential characteristic of the present system–the exclusive representation of the majority in each constituency–and make no attempt to remedy any of the other evils associated with single-member constituencies. But the question at once arises whether the problem of three-cornered contests can be solved by attempts to preserve the distinctive feature of the present system–the representation of the majority only. A little reflection must convince the reader that such a solution deals with the form of the problem rather than with its essence. For the new problem arises from the fact that three parties instead of two are now seeking representation in Parliament, and no remedy can be regarded as effective which does not provide for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all three parties. This the system of second ballots has completely failed to do; indeed its results only reinforce the arguments of previous chapters, that so long as we compel the electors of any one district, whatever their divisions of opinion, to be all represented by one man, their real representation will be impossible. An examination of the effects of the second ballot in those countries in which the system has been tried fully justifies these statements, and fortunately the body of experience now available is so considerable that the conclusions to be drawn therefrom have an authoritative character.
_The second ballot._
The Reports furnished by His Majesty’s representatives abroad show that the second ballot, in one form or another, is, or has been, in force in the majority of continental countries. The forms differ in detail, but reference need only be made to the three chief types. In Germany the two candidates highest at the first poll proceed to a second election. It was this form of the second ballot that was introduced into New Zealand in 1908. In France all candidates in the original election and even fresh candidates may stand at the second election. At this second poll a relative–not an absolute–majority of votes is sufficient to secure the election of a candidate. As a rule only the two candidates highest at the first election take part in the second ballot, and therefore in practice the German and French methods closely approximate to one another. The third type concerns the application of the second ballot to the _scrutin de liste_ or block vote in multi-member constituencies. It was formerly used in the Belgian parliamentary elections, and is still employed in the election for the Belgian Provincial Councils. The candidates who receive the support of an absolute majority of the electors voting at the first ballot are at once declared elected; the candidates next highest on the poll, but only so many as are equal to double the number of vacancies remaining to be filled, take part in a second ballot.
The object of the second ballot–to ensure that every elected candidate should finally have obtained the support of a majority of the electors voting in the constituency for which he has been returned–has, generally speaking, been achieved. But that does not solve the problem of the representation of three parties; a general election based on such a system yields results which are far from satisfactory. The party which is unsuccessful in one constituency may suffer the same fate in the majority of the constituencies, and this is the fatal flaw in all forms of the second ballot. Moreover experience has shown, and it is evident _a priori_, that with this system the representation of any section of political opinion depends not upon the number of its supporters, but very largely upon the attitude taken towards it by other parties. For, at a second ballot, the result is determined by the action of those smaller minorities which were at the bottom of the poll at the first ballot. No party can be certain of securing representation unless in its own strength it can obtain an absolute majority in at least some of the constituencies. The largest party in the State, if its voting strength is evenly distributed, may be at the mercy of hostile combinations at the second ballots, unless it is so large as to command a majority of votes throughout the country, and when three parties have entered the political arena it rarely happens that any one of them is in this favourable position. That being so, the new element of uncertainty associated with the system of second ballots may yield results which are further removed from the true representation of the whole electorate than the results of the first ballots.
_Experience in Germany._
Continental experience has shown that the coalitions at the second ballots are of two types. One party may incur the hostility of all other parties, and if so, the second ballots will tend uniformly to the suppression of that party. The combination of parties whose aims and purposes are to some degree allied may be regarded as legitimate, but the cumulative effect of such combinations over a large area is most unfair to the party adversely affected. No defence at all can be urged in palliation of the evils of certain other coalitions also characteristic of second ballots–the coalitions of extreme and opposed parties which temporarily combine for the purpose of wrecking a third party in the hope of snatching some advantage from the resulting political situation. Sometimes such coalitions are merely the expression of resentment by an advanced party at the action of a party somewhat less advanced than itself. But, whatever the cause, the coalitions at the second ballots do not result in the creation of a fully representative legislative chamber; on the contrary, they tend to take away all sincerity from the parliamentary system. Illustrations of the first type of coalitions abound. The German general elections afford numerous examples, but as a special note on the working of the second ballots in Germany is to be found in Appendix II., it will suffice to quote some of the results of the election of 1907. The Social Democrats were engaged at the second ballots in ninety constituencies. At the first ballots they were at the head of the poll in forty-four of these constituencies, but at the second ballots they only succeeded in retaining that position in eleven. In the forty-six constituencies in which they were second at the poll they were only able to improve their condition in three cases. These figures show how the German Social Democrats suffered from hostile combinations. It was with the utmost difficulty that they obtained representation in constituencies other than those in which at the first elections they were in an absolute majority. No wonder that one of the planks of the platform of the Social Democratic party is proportional representation.
_Austria._
The Social Democrats of Austria suffered in the General Election of 1907 in the same way. Professor Kedlich,[1] in an article entitled “The Working of Universal Suffrage in Austria,” wrote as follows: “The Christian Socialists have ninety-six seats in the new House, the Social Democrats eighty-six … The number of seats won by them weighs still heavier in the balance when we reflect that in many second ballots the majority of the opponents of social democracy joined their forces against them. Not less instructive are the relative numbers of the votes recorded for each of the parties. Over a million votes were given to the Social Democrats as against 531,000 for the Christian Socialists.” Such results destroy the representative character of legislative bodies. The same lesson on a smaller scale is to be gathered from the Italian elections. Speaking of the General Election of 1904, the Rome correspondent of _The Morning Post_ pointed out that, in not a few constituencies, like the second division of Rome, a rally of Clericals at the second ballots enabled the Conservative Monarchists to triumph over the Socialists.
_Belgium._
The combinations of allied parties against a third party, as in the examples already given, may be defended, but the coalitions at second ballots, as has been pointed out, are not always of this character. Should parties, angered and embittered by being deprived of representation, use their power at the second ballots to render a stable Government impossible, then the results are disastrous. Such were the conditions which obtained in Belgium before the abandonment of second ballots. “The system,” says Sir Arthur Hardinge, “answered well enough so long as only two parties contested an election; but the moment the Socialist Party formed a distinct third party, after the establishment of universal suffrage in 1894, it began to act in a manner which produced unsatisfactory results…. The overwhelming victory of the Clerical party in 1894 was largely due to the fact that in every second ballot between Catholics and Socialists the Liberals voted for the former, whilst in every second ballot between Catholics and Liberals, with the single exception of the Thuin Division, the Socialists preferred the Catholics as the creators of universal suffrage and as, in some respects, a more genuinely democratic party, to the Liberals, whom the Labour leaders regarded with peculiar hatred as the apostles of free competition and individualism. In 1896 the Socialists were in their turn the victims, as the Liberals had been in 1894, of the working of the system of second ballots. Liberal electors at these elections voted everywhere at the second ballots for Clerical against Labour candidates, with the result that the Clericals won every one of the eighteen seats for Brussels, although the total number of Clerical electors in a total electorate of 202,000 was only 89,000, as against 40,000 Liberals and 73,000 ultra-Radicals and Labour men. Two years later the Liberals swung round to an alliance with the Socialists against the Clericals, and in several constituencies, owing to the system of second ballots, the Socialists, although actually in a minority, won all the seats with the help of the Liberals, who on the first ballot had voted unsuccessfully for Liberal as against both Catholic and Labour candidates. It was the practical experience of conditions such as these which gradually convinced all the Belgian parties that, given a three-cornered fight in every, or nearly every, constituency, the only way of preventing a minority from turning the scales and excluding from all representation the views of nearly half the electorate was to adopt the system of proportional representation.”[2]
Count Goblet d’Alviella furnishes an excellent example of the working of the second ballots at Verviers in the General Election of 1898, the last parliamentary election in Belgium, at which second ballots were used. In the election for Senators the Socialists spoiled the chances of the Liberals by voting for the Clericals, whilst, in the election for the Chamber, the Liberals, not to be outdone, spoiled the chances of the Socialists by also supporting the Clericals. The Clericals thus obtained all the seats both in the Senate and in the Chamber with the assistance of the Socialists and of the Liberals in turn. The absurdities of the General Election of 1898 were so flagrant that on the day after the election so determined an opponent of proportional representation as _La Chronique_ exclaimed, “Can anything be more absurd than the working of the second ballots in this country? … What becomes of the moral force of an election in which parties are obliged, if they wish to win, to implore the support of electors who yesterday were their enemies? Such support is never obtained without conditions, and these conditions are either promises which it is not intended to keep or a surrender of principles–in either case a proceeding utterly immoral.”[3]
_France_.]
French elections also furnish examples of the use of the second ballots for the purpose of fostering dissension between opponents. At the General Election in 1906 it was stated that the Conservatives in the South of France, despairing of obtaining representation themselves, intended to support the Socialists at the second ballot in the hope of obtaining an advantage by accentuating the difference between the Socialists and the Radicals. M. Jaurès indignantly denied that there was any understanding between the Socialists and the Conservatives, and took advantage of the accusation to write in _L’Humanité_ a powerful plea for proportional representation. “This reform,” he declared, “would make such unnatural alliances impossible. Each party would be induced and, indeed, it would be to each party’s advantage to fight its own battle, for every group would have an opportunity of obtaining its full share of representation. There would no longer be any question of doubtful manoeuvres, of confused issues; Socialism would have its advocates, Radicalism its exponents, Conservatism its leaders, and there would be a magnificent propaganda of principles which would inevitably result in the political education of the electorate. Every movement would be assured of representation in proportion to its real strength in the country; every party, freed from the necessity of entering into alliances which invariably beget suspicion, would be able to formulate quite clearly its essential principles; governmental and administrative corruption would be reduced to a minimum; the real wishes of the people would find expression; and if parties still continued to dispute for power, it would be to enable them to promote the more effectually the measures for which they stood.” In spite, however, of this eloquent disclaimer on the part of M. Jaurès, the Conservatives have at the bye-elections continued their policy of supporting the Socialists. The bye election of Charolles in December 1908 is a case in point. At the first ballot the figures were as follows:–
M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,770 votes M. Duoarouge (Socialist) 4,367 “
M. Magnien (Conservative) 3,968 “
At the second ballot–
M. Ducarouge (Socialist) 6,841 ” Elected M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,339 “
M. Magnien (Conservative) 301 “
It should be explained that the Conservative candidate, although his name still appeared upon the ballot paper, retired before the second election, and it is evident that the votes of many of his supporters were given to the Socialist candidate. In the following April (1909) several further instances occurred. At Uzès a vacancy was caused by the death of a Radical Socialist member who, at the General Election of 1906, had beaten the Duc d’Uzès, a Reactionary, the Socialist candidate on that occasion being at the bottom of the poll. In the bye-election the Socialist was returned at the head of the poll, but so obvious was the fact that the Socialist owed his victory to Conservative support, that he was received in the Chamber by the Radicals with the cry of “M. le duc d’Uzès.” Uzès was typical of other elections and, as the Paris correspondent of _The Morning Post_ remarked, “the successes of the Unified Socialists in the recent series of bye-elections are in part to be attributed to the votes of the Reactionaries, who voted for the Unified candidates as being enemies of the Republic.” This abuse of the purpose of second ballots–an abuse engendered by the failure of the minority to obtain direct representation–destroys the last semblance of sincerity in the representation of a constituency, and must hasten the abolition of the second ballots in France in the same way as combinations of a similar nature rendered imperative the introduction of a more rational system of election in Belgium.
The foregoing facts are sufficient to show that a system of second ballots does not necessarily result in the formation of a legislative chamber fully representative of the electorate. In Germany the largest party has had its representation ruthlessly cut down by the operation of the second ballots. Indeed, were it not for the overwhelming predominance of this party in certain areas it might not have obtained any representation whatever. In Belgium the effect of the second ballots was to deprive the middle party, the Liberals, of their fair share of representation. In 1896, owing to the coalitions of Socialists and Catholics at the polls, the Liberals had only eleven representatives in the popular chamber. All their leaders had been driven from Parliament, their electoral associations had become completely disorganized save in some large towns, and in many constituencies they had ceased to take part in elections. Yet the results of the very first elections (1900) after the establishment of proportional representation, showed that the Liberals were the second largest party in the State, and that it was a party which still responded to the needs and still gave voice to the views of large numbers of citizens.
_The bargainings at the second ballots in France_.]
The system of second ballots not only deprives large sections of the electorate of representation, but the very coalitions which produce this result bring parliamentary institutions into still further disrepute. These coalitions are condemned in unequivocal terms by Continental writers and statesmen of widely differing schools of thought. The scathing language of M. Jaures has already been quoted, and we find his views endorsed by politicians of the type of M. Deschanel, an ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies, who declared that these coalitions entirely falsify the character of the popular verdict. Again, M. Yves Guyot, an ex-Minister, asserts that “the second ballots give rise to detestable bargainings which obliterate all political sense in the electors.” M. Raymond Poincare, a Senator and a former Minister, condemns the system of second ballots in equally forcible language. “It will be of no use,” he says, “to replace one kind of constituency by another if we do not, at the same time, suppress the gamble of the majority system and the jobbery of the second ballots.” These expressions of opinion on the part of individual French politicians could be multiplied, but it will be sufficient to add to them the more formal and official declaration of the Commission du Suffrage Universel, a Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. In the Report issued by this Committee in 1907, it is declared that “the abolition of the second ballots with the bargainings to which they give rise will not be the least of the advantages of the new system [proportional representation].”
_The “Kuh-Handel” in Germany._
It would appear that the German second ballots are also characterized by this same evil of bargaining. Karl Blind, writing in _The Nineteenth Century_, March 1907, stated that “in this last election the oddest combinations have taken place for the ballots in the various parts of the Empire and within different States. There was no uniformity of action as to coming to a compromise between Conservative and Liberal, or Liberal and Social Democrat, or Centre and any other party, as against some supposed common enemy who was to be ousted from his insufficient majority by a subsequent alliance between otherwise discordant groups, or who wanted to have his insufficient majority increased to an absolute one by the addition of the vote of one of the defeated candidates whose friends finally choose the ‘lesser evil’….
“To some extent these necessary, but sometimes rather sordid, transactions are made all the more difficult through the very existence of separate States with ‘Home Rule’ legislatures of their own. Political development has in them gone so far in a centrifugal sense that the nation has been sadly split up and the public mind too much divided into merely local concerns and issues….
“Irrespective of this baneful influence of a so-called ‘Home Rule’ state of things on the life of the nation at large, I must confess that the huckstering at the second ballots does not strike me as an ideal institution. It generally goes, in Germany, under the name of _Kuh-Handel_ (cow-bargain). It often brings out the worst symptoms of intrigue and political immorality…. Those who dabble in the _Kuh-Handel_ either lead their own contingent as allies into an enemy’s camp from spite against another adversary, or they induce their own men to desist from voting at all at a second ballot, so as to give a chance to another candidate, whom they really detest with all their heart, but whom they wish to use as a means of spiting one still more deeply hated.”
_The position of a deputy elected at a second ballot_.]
The separate experiences, therefore, of France, Belgium, and Germany all yield convincing and corroborative testimony to the demoralizing influence on political life which results from the coalitions at the second ballots. Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to one aspect of this influence, its pernicious effect upon the inner working of parliamentary institutions. The deputy who is elected as the result of a coalition of forces at the second ballot finds himself in an extremely difficult and unstable position. Instead of being the representative of the majority of the electors he too often becomes, in the apt phrase of M. Yves Guyot, “the prisoner of the minority,” and, whilst in Parliament, he is being continually reminded of the power of that minority to make or unmake him at the next election. The persistent pressure of that minority explains those contradictory votes in the French Chamber which, to a foreigner, are often incomprehensible. The deputy will usually act in accordance with the opinion of the group to which he belongs and vote accordingly, but at a subsequent sitting he will find it necessary to vote in such a way as will give satisfaction to that minority whose support assured his success at the previous election, and without whose support he cannot hope for re-election when the time comes for a fresh appeal to the country. The pressure which such a minority can exert must often be intolerable, and must, in any case, render it impossible for any deputy either to do justice to himself or to the legislative chamber to which he belongs.[3]
_The alternative vote._
The shortcomings of the system of the second ballot are so pronounced and are so generally recognized that there now exists but little, if any, demand for its introduction into this country, and more attention has therefore been given to the mechanism of the alternative vote as affording a means of securing the object of the second ballot whilst avoiding many of its inconveniences. Under this suggested plan the voter is invited to mark his preferences against the names of the candidates on the voting paper by putting the figure “1” against his first favourite; the figure “2” against the man he next prefers, and so on through as many names as he may choose to mark. At the end of the poll the number of papers in which each candidate’s name is marked “1” is ascertained, and if one of them is found to have secured the first preferences of an absolute majority of all the persons voting, he is declared elected; but if no candidate has obtained such a majority the papers of the candidate who has obtained the least number of first preferences are examined and transferred one by one to the candidate marked “2” upon them. In this transfer, the papers on which only one preference had been marked would be ignored, the preferences, to use the current phrase, being “exhausted.” If, as the result of this transfer, any candidate has secured the support of an absolute majority of the number of effective preferences he is declared duly elected; but if there is still no candidate with an absolute majority the process is repeated by distributing the papers of the candidate who is left with the lowest number of votes, and so on until some candidate has got an absolute majority of effective preferences.
The alternative vote undoubtedly possesses many and valuable advantages as compared with the second ballot. In the first place, its introduction into the English electoral system would keep English voters in touch with Colonial rather than with Continental practice. Preferential voting[4] has been in use in Queensland since 1892; it was adopted in 1907 by the West Australian Parliament, and was proposed in a Bill submitted by Mr. Deakin to the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in 1906. Moreover, the alternative vote enables the election to be completed in a single ballot; and the fortnight that is wasted between the first and second ballots on the Continent would be saved. There has also been claimed for this method of voting this further advantage, that it would prepare the way (perhaps by rendering it inevitable) for the more complete reform–proportional representation.
The principle of the alternative vote is extremely simple. It is embodied in two Bills which were introduced into the House of Commons in 1908 by Mr. John M. Robertson and by Mr. Dundas White; and also in a modified form in a Bill introduced in 1907 by Mr. A.E. Dunn. Its purpose and mechanism is set forth in the memorandum of Mr. Robertson’s Bill as follows:–
“The object is to ensure that in a parliamentary election effect shall be given as far as possible to the wishes of the majority of electors voting. Under the present system when there are more than two candidates for one seat it is possible that the member elected may be chosen by a minority of the voters.
“The Bill proposes to allow electors to indicate on their ballot papers to what candidate they would wish their votes to be transferred if the candidate of their first choice is third or lower on the poll and no candidate has an absolute majority. It thus seeks to accomplish by one operation the effect of a second ballot.”
Mr. Robertson’s Bill, as originally introduced in 1906, was applicable to single-member constituencies only; but the amended form in which the Bill was re-introduced provided for the use of the transferable vote in double-member constituencies as well, but, in doing so, still maintained the essential characteristic of the existing system of voting–that each member returned should have obtained the support of a majority of the electors voting. Mr. Dundas White, however, in applying the alternative vote to double-member constituencies, made a departure from this principle, and proposed to render it possible for a candidate to be returned who had obtained the support of less than one-half but more than one-third of the voters.[5] The effect of Mr. Robertson’s Bill would have been that it would still be possible in double-member constituencies for the party finally victorious to secure both seats; whilst with Mr. Dundas White’s provisions the two largest parties would in all probability have obtained one seat each.[6]
The difference between the two measures is, however, of no great consequence; the number of double-member constituencies is not very large, and their number may be still further reduced in any future scheme of redistribution of seats. It will, therefore, be sufficient to consider what effect the alternative vote would have in single-member areas. Let us take the Jarrow election, in which there were four candidates, and apply to that election the possible working of the alternative vote. The figures for the election may be repeated:–
Curran(Labour) . . . . 4,698
Rose-limes (Unionist). . . 3,930
Hughes (Liberal) . . . . 3,474
O’Hanlon (Nationalist) . . 2,122
The electors would, with the alternative vote, have numbered the candidates on the ballot papers in the order of their choice, and, as none of the candidates had obtained an absolute majority, the votes of the lowest candidate on the poll would be transferred to the second preferences marked by his supporters. If, for purposes of illustration, it is assumed that every one of the 2122 supporters of Mr. O’Hanlon had indicated a second preference, that 1000 had chosen Mr. Curran, 1000 had chosen Mr. Hughes, and 122 had chosen Mr. Rose-Innes, then the following table will show the effect of the transfer:–
Candidate. First Count. Transfer of O’Hanlou’s Votes. Result.
Curran (Labour) 4,698 +1,000 5,698 Rose-Innes (Unionist) 3,930 + 122 4,052 Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +1,000 4,474 O’Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,122 -2,112 —
Total 14,224 — 14,224
Only three candidates now remain for consideration, and their position on the poll as the result of the transfer is as follows:–
Curran . . . . . . 5,698
Hughes . . . . . . 4,474
Rose-Innes . . . . . 4,052
As neither has as yet obtained a majority of the total votes polled, it becomes necessary that the votes given for Mr. Rose-Innes, who is now lowest on the poll, should be transferred in accordance with the next preferences of his supporters. It is conceivable that the larger proportion of these preferences would have been given for the Liberal candidate, Mr. Hughes, rather than for Mr. Curran, and, if so, the final result might easily have been the election of Mr. Hughes as member for Jarrow.
_The alternative or contingent vote in Queensland_.]
Before considering the value of the transferable vote in single-member constituencies as a means of securing a true expression of the national will, it may perhaps be pointed out that the procedure prescribed by the Queensland Act differs from that contained in the English Bills. The regulations of the Queensland Act are as follows:–
“When one member only is to be returned at the election, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates except those two who receive the greatest number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates.
“When two members are to be returned, and there are more than four candidates, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates except those four who receive the greatest number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates.”
It will be seen that the system here prescribed approximates to the German form of the second ballot, according to which only the two candidates highest on the poll may stand again. Were the Queensland form of preferential voting applied to the Jarrow election, both Mr. Hughes and Mr. O’Hanlon would be declared defeated candidates, and only the further preferences recorded by their supporters would be taken into account in determining the relative position of the two highest candidates, Curran and Rose-Innes. The provisions of the West Australian Act of 1907, and of Mr. Deakin’s Bill of 1906, followed the more elastic and undoubtedly superior method embodied in the English proposals.
Sir J.G. Ward, in introducing the Second Ballot Bill into the New Zealand Parliament in 1908, defended the selection of this electoral method on the ground that the system of preferential voting introduced into Queensland had been a partial failure. He stated that the privilege of marking preferences had not been extensively used, and quoted the opinion of Mr. Kidston, a former Queensland Premier, that the marking of preferences should be made compulsory. As explained in the course of the New Zealand debates, part of the alleged failure of the Queensland system was due to the unnecessarily cumbrous nature of the regulations. The Queensland Electoral Acts still retain the old method of voting–that of striking out from the ballot paper the names of such candidates as the elector does not intend to vote for. The confusion produced in the mind of the elector may readily be imagined when he is instructed to strike out the names of candidates for whom he does not intend to vote in the first instance, and then to mark such candidates in the order of his choice. Moreover, the provisions, as detailed above, for giving effect to preferences are so defective that only a proportion of the preferences marked can be taken into account. Even so, preferential voting in Queensland sometimes has a decisive influence upon the result of the election, as the following example, taken from the elections of 1908, will show:–
WOOLLOONGABBA ELECTION
_First Count_.
Votes.
1st Candidate . . . 1,605
2nd ” . . . 1,366
3rd ” . . . 788
—–
Total . . . 3,759
The votes recorded for the third candidate were then distributed according to the preferences marked, which were as follows:–
1st Candidate . . . 15
2nd ,, . . . 379
No preferences . . . 394
—
788
The result of the distribution brought the second candidate to the top of the poll, the final figures being as follows:–
2nd Candidate . . . 1,745
1st ,, . . . 1,620
_West Australia_
Where the more simple and straightforward instructions have been adopted, as in West Australia, it has been found that a larger percentage of the electors make use of the privilege of marking preferences. Here are the figures for the constituency of Claremont in the elections of 1908:–
_First Count._
Foulkes . . . . 1,427
Briggs . . . . 825
Stuart . . . . 630
—–
Total . . . 2,888
When the votes recorded for the candidate lowest on the poll were distributed it was found that nearly 75 per cent, of his papers were marked with additional preferences. The numbers were as follows:–
Briggs . . . . . 297
Foulkes . . . . 174
No preferences . . . 165
—
Total . . . 636
The final figures were as follows:–
Foulkes . . . . 1,601
Briggs . . . . 1,122
These figures doubtless show that even in West Australia, when the transferable vote is applied to single-member constituencies, a considerable number of the electors will not indicate a preference for any candidate other than for that of their own party, but similar abstentions occur at the second ballots in France, where it is found that a considerable percentage of the electors usually refrain from going to the poll on the second occasion. The Labour Party in Queensland has sometimes issued instructions to its supporters to abstain from marking preferences for the purpose of keeping the party solid and absolutely separate from other parties. Such action necessarily increases the percentage of abstentions. Nor can any remedy for action of this kind be found in making the marking of preferences compulsory. Even in Belgium, where “compulsory voting” is in force, the compulsion only extends to an enforced attendance at the polling place. The act of voting is not compulsory, for a blank unmarked ballot paper may be dropped into the voting urn. The compulsory marking of preferences when the elector has none may still further vitiate the results of elections in a most undesirable way, whilst abstention from preference marking merely deprives those abstaining of a privilege which they might exercise if they chose. It is quite conceivable that an elector after voting for the candidate of his choice may be indifferent to the fate of the remaining candidates and, if so, an enforced expression of opinion on his part would not be of any real value, and should not be counted in determining the result of an election.
_Mr. Deakin’s failure to carry the alternative vote._
Does then the alternative, or contingent vote, as used in West Australia, solve the problem of three-cornered fights–the problem of