WASHINGTON, _February 7, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit to the Senate, for its advice with regard to ratification, a convention for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice in certain cases between the United States and His Majesty the King of Hanover, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments at London on the 18th of January last. An extract from a dispatch of Mr. Buchanan to the Secretary of State relative to the convention is also herewith communicated.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 7, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate to Congress herewith a letter and accompanying papers from the Secretary of the Interior, of the 5th instant, on the subject of the colonization of the Indians in the State of California, and recommend that the appropriation therein asked for may be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 7, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate to Congress the accompanying letter from the Secretary of the Interior, with its inclosure, on the subject of a treaty between the United States and the Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior, and recommend that the appropriation therein asked for may be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 9, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I communicate to the Senate herewith a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, and also one from the Secretary of the Interior, with accompanying papers, containing information called for by the resolution adopted by the Senate on the 30th ultimo, respecting the advance of public moneys to the marshal of the United States for the western district of Arkansas.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 9, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I herewith communicate to the Senate, for its constitutional action thereon, the articles of convention and agreement between the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes of Indians made on the 4th day of November, 1854, at Doaksville, near Fort Towson, Choctaw Nation.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 12, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
The resolution of the Senate of the 11th of December last, requesting a copy of the official correspondence relative to the late difficulties between the consul of France at San Francisco and the authorities of the United States in California, has been under consideration, and it was hoped that the negotiations on the subject might have been brought to a close, so as to have obviated any objection to a compliance with the resolution at this session of Congress. Those negotiations, however, are still pending, but I entertain a confident expectation that the affair will be definitely and satisfactorily adjusted prior to the next session.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 14, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, upon the subject of the admission of the United States consuls into the ports of the Dutch colonies.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 14, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit to the Senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the United States and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, relative to the rights of neutrals during war.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 17, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate herewith a letter[41] of the Secretary of the Interior and accompanying paper, for the consideration of Congress.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 41: Recommending an appropriation to supply a deficit in the amount held on Indian account, caused by the failure of Selden, Withers & Co., with whom it was deposited.]
WASHINGTON, _February 19, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit herewith, for the constitutional action of the Senate, a treaty made on the 15th day of November, 1854, by Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the Rogue River Indians in Oregon Territory.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 19, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit herewith, for the constitutional action of the Senate, a treaty made by Isaac I. Stevens, governor and superintendent of Indian affairs in Washington Territory, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs, headmen, and delegates of the Nesqually, Puyallup, Steilacoom, Squawksin, S’Homamish, Ste’h-chass, F’peeksin, Squi-aitl, and Sa-heh-wamish tribes and bands of Indians occupying the lands lying around the head of Pugets Sound and the adjacent inlets in Washington Territory.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 19, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit herewith, for the constitutional action of the Senate, two treaties, one made on the 18th day of November, 1854, by Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the Quil-si-eton and Na-hel-ta bands of the Chasta tribe of Indians, the Cow-non-ti-co, Sa-cher-i-ton, and Na-al-ye bands of Scotans, and the Grave Creek band of Umpqua Indians in Oregon Territory; the other, made on the 29th of November, 1854, by Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and headmen of the confederated bands of the Umpqua tribe of Indians and the Calaponas, residing in Umpqua Valley, Oregon Territory.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 21, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate to Congress a communication of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying paper, and recommend that the appropriation[42] therein asked for be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 42: For extending and improving the culvert running from the United States Capitol Grounds down the center of South Capitol street toward the canal.]
WASHINGTON, _February 22, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 21st instant, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, inclosing a copy of the letter[43] addressed to the Department of State on the 17th November, 1852, by Mr. Joaquin J. de Osma, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Republic of Peru.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 43: Proposing a settlement of the Lobos Islands controversy.]
WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate to Congress herewith a communication of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, with accompanying estimates, and recommend that the appropriation[44] therein asked for be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 44: To fulfill treaty stipulations with the Wyandotte Indians.]
WASHINGTON, _February 24, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 22d instant, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, together with the copy of a communication from Francis W. Rice,[45] therein referred to.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 45: Late United States consul at Acapulco, relative to outrages committed upon him by authorities of Mexico.]
WASHINGTON, _February 26, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I transmit herewith a report of the Secretary of the Navy, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 20th instant, requesting the President “to communicate to the Senate a copy of the order issued by the Navy Department to the officer in command of the Home Squadron in pursuance of which the United States sloop of war _Albany_ was ordered on her last cruise to Carthagena and Aspinwall, etc.; also of the orders given by such officer to Commander Gerry to proceed upon such cruise, and also of any reports or letters from the captain of the _Albany_ on the necessity of repairs to said vessel.”
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 27, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit to Congress herewith a communication of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, and recommend that the appropriation[46] therein asked for be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 46: For surveying public lands in the northern part of Minnesota Territory acquired from the Chippewa Indians.]
WASHINGTON, _February 27, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate herewith, for the consideration of Congress, a letter of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, and accompanying paper, recommending certain appropriations[47] on account of the Indian service.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 47: For running the boundary line between the Chickasaw and Choctaw nations of Indians and for negotiations with the Menominee Indians.]
WASHINGTON, _February 27, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I communicate to the Senate herewith, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made in this city on the 22d instant between the United States and the Mississippi, the Pillager, and the Lake Winnibigoshish bands of Chippewa Indians.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 28, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
For eminent services in the late war with Mexico, I nominate Major-General Winfield Scott, of the Army of the United States, to be lieutenant-general by brevet in the same, to take rank as such from March 29, 1847, the day on which the United States forces under his command captured Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulua.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _February 28, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I communicate to the Senate herewith, for its constitutional action thereon, a treaty made and concluded in this city on the 27th day of February, 1855, between George W. Manypenny, commissioner on the part of the United States, and the chiefs and delegates of the Winnebago tribe of Indians.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _March 1, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I communicate to Congress herewith a copy of an act of the legislature of the State of Texas, approved the 11th of February, 1854, making partial provision for running and marking the boundary line between the said State and the territories of the United States from the point where the said line leaves the Red River to its intersection with the Rio Grande, and appropriating $10,000 toward carrying the same into effect, when the United States shall have made provision by the enactment of a law for the appointment of the necessary officers to join in the execution of said survey.
It will be perceived from the accompanying papers that the early demarcation of said boundary line is urgently desired on the part of Texas, and, acquiescing in the importance thereof, I recommend that provision be made by law for the appointment of officers to act in conjunction with those to be appointed by the State of Texas, and that the sum of $10,000 at least be appropriated for the payment of their salaries and necessary incidental expenses.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _March 2, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I communicate to the Senate herewith, for its constitutional action thereon, the articles of a treaty negotiated on the 4th of January, 1855, between Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs in Oregon, and the chiefs of certain confederated tribes of Indians residing in the Willamette Valley of Oregon.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, _March 2, 1855_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I herewith submit a report of the Secretary of War, containing all the information that can now be furnished in reply to the resolution of the Senate of the 28th ultimo, requesting “a statement of the number of muskets, rifles, and other arms and equipments delivered to the State arsenals, respectively, the number remaining on hand, and the number sold and accounted for; also, the date and amount of such sales.”
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _March 2, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit to Congress herewith a communication of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, with accompanying papers,[48] and recommend that the appropriations therein asked for be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 48: Estimates of appropriations necessary for carrying out the bounty-land law.]
WASHINGTON, _March 2, 1855_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit to Congress herewith a communication of this date from the Secretary of the Interior, with its inclosure,[49] and recommend that the appropriations therein asked for be made.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 49: Additional estimate of appropriations necessary for pay of Indian agents.]
WASHINGTON, _March 3, 1855_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
I transmit herewith to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents,[50] in answer to their resolutions of the 30th of January and 23d February last.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
[Footnote 50: Correspondence relative to the causes disturbing the friendly relations between Spain and the United States and instructions to United States diplomatic agents relative to the same; correspondence relative to Cuba, etc.]
VETO MESSAGES.
WASHINGTON, _February 17, 1855_.
_To the House of Representatives_:
I have received and carefully considered the bill entitled “An act to provide for the ascertainment of claims of American citizens for spoliations committed by the French prior to the 31st of July, 1801,” and in the discharge of a duty imperatively enjoined on me by the Constitution I return the same with my objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originated.
In the organization of the Government of the United States the legislative and executive functions were separated and placed in distinct hands. Although the President is required from time to time to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, his participation in the formal business of legislation is limited to the single duty, in a certain contingency, of demanding for a bill a particular form of vote prescribed by the Constitution before it can become a law. He is not invested with power to defeat legislation by an absolute veto, but only to restrain it, and is charged with the duty, in case he disapproves a measure, of invoking a second and a more deliberate and solemn consideration of it on the part of Congress. It is not incumbent on the President to sign a bill as a matter of course, and thus merely to authenticate the action of Congress, for he must exercise intelligent judgment or be faithless to the trust reposed in him. If he approve a bill, he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated for such further action as the Constitution demands, which is its enactment, if at all, not by a bare numerical majority, as in the first instance, but by a constitutional majority of two-thirds of both Houses.
While the Constitution thus confers on the legislative bodies the complete power of legislation in all cases, it proceeds, in the spirit of justice, to provide for the protection of the responsibility of the President. It does not compel him to affix the signature of approval to any bill unless it actually have his approbation; for while it requires him to sign if he approve, it, in my judgment, imposes upon him the duty of withholding his signature if he do not approve. In the execution of his official duty in this respect he is not to perform a mere mechanical part, but is to decide and act according to conscientious convictions of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the proposed law. In a matter as to which he is doubtful in his own mind he may well defer to the majority of the two Houses. Individual members of the respective Houses, owing to the nature, variety, and amount of business pending, must necessarily rely for their guidance in many, perhaps most, cases, when the matters involved are not of popular interest, upon the investigation of appropriate committees, or, it may be, that of a single member, whose attention has been particularly directed to the subject. For similar reasons, but even to a greater extent, from the number and variety of subjects daily urged upon his attention, the President naturally relies much upon the investigation had and the results arrived at by the two Houses, and hence those results, in large classes of cases, constitute the basis upon which his approval rests. The President’s responsibility is to the whole people of the United States, as that of a Senator is to the people of a particular State, that of a Representative to the people of a State or district; and it may be safely assumed that he will not resort to the clearly defined and limited power of arresting legislation and calling for reconsideration of any measure except in obedience to requirements of duty. When, however, he entertains a decisive and fixed conclusion, not merely of the unconstitutionality, but of the impropriety, or injustice in other respects, of any measure, if he declare that he approves it he is false to his oath, and he deliberately disregards his constitutional obligations.
I cheerfully recognize the weight of authority which attaches to the action of a majority of the two Houses. But in this case, as in some others, the framers of our Constitution, for wise considerations of public good, provided that nothing less than a two-thirds vote of one or both of the Houses of Congress shall become effective to bind the coordinate departments of the Government, the people, and the several States. If there be anything of seeming invidiousness in the official right thus conferred on the President, it is in appearance only, for the same right of approving or disapproving a bill, according to each one’s own judgment, is conferred on every member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
It is apparent, therefore, that the circumstances must be extraordinary which would induce the President to withhold approval from a bill involving no violation of the Constitution. The amount of the claims proposed to be discharged by the bill before me, the nature of the transactions in which those claims are alleged to have originated, the length of time during which they have occupied the attention of Congress and the country, present such an exigency. Their history renders it impossible that a President who has participated to any considerable degree in public affairs could have failed to form respecting them a decided opinion upon what he would deem satisfactory grounds. Nevertheless, instead of resting on former opinions, it has seemed to me proper to review and more carefully examine the whole subject, so as satisfactorily to determine the nature and extent of my obligations in the premises.
I feel called upon at the threshold to notice an assertion, often repeated, that the refusal of the United States to satisfy these claims in the manner provided by the present bill rests as a stain on the justice of our country. If it be so, the imputation on the public honor is aggravated by the consideration that the claims are coeval with the present century, and it has been a persistent wrong during that whole period of time. The allegation is that private property has been taken for public use without just compensation, in violation of express provision of the Constitution, and that reparation has been withheld and justice denied until the injured parties have for the most part descended to the grave. But it is not to be forgotten or overlooked that those who represented the people in different capacities at the time when the alleged obligations were incurred, and to whom the charge of injustice attaches in the first instance, have also passed away and borne with them the special information which controlled their decision and, it may be well presumed, constituted the justification of their acts.
If, however, the charge in question be well founded, although its admission would inscribe on our history a page which we might desire most of all to obliterate, and although, if true, it must painfully disturb our confidence in the justice and the high sense of moral and political responsibility of those whose memories we have been taught to cherish with so much reverence and respect, still we have only one course of action left to us, and that is to make the most prompt and ample reparation in our power and consign the wrong as far as may be to forgetfulness.
But no such heavy sentence of condemnation should be lightly passed upon the sagacious and patriotic men who participated in the transactions out of which these claims are supposed to have arisen, and who, from their ample means of knowledge of the general subject in its minute details and from their official position, are peculiarly responsible for whatever there is of wrong or injustice in the decisions of the Government.
Their justification consists in that which constitutes the objection to the present bill, namely, the absence of any indebtedness on the part of the United States. The charge of denial of justice in this case, and consequent stain upon our national character, has not yet been indorsed by the American people. But if it were otherwise, this bill, so far from relieving the past, would only stamp on the present a more deep and indelible stigma. It admits the justice of the claims, concedes that payment has been wrongfully withheld for fifty years, and then proposes not to pay them, but to compound with the public creditors by providing that, whether the claims shall be presented or not, whether the sum appropriated shall pay much or little of what shall be found due, the law itself shall constitute a perpetual bar to all future demands. This is not, in my judgment, the way to atone for wrongs if they exist, nor to meet subsisting obligations.
If new facts, not known or not accessible during the Administration of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, or Mr. Monroe, had since been brought to light, or new sources of information discovered, this would greatly relieve the subject of embarrassment. But nothing of this nature has occurred.
That those eminent statesmen had the best means of arriving at a correct conclusion no one will deny. That they never recognized the alleged obligation on the part of the Government is shown by the history of their respective Administrations. Indeed, it stands not as a matter of controlling authority, but as a fact of history, that these claims have never since our existence as a nation been deemed by any President worthy of recommendation to Congress.
Claims to payment can rest only on the plea of indebtedness on the part of the Government. This requires that it should be shown that the United States have incurred liability to the claimants, either by such acts as deprived them of their property or by having actually taken it for public use without making just compensation for it.
The first branch of the proposition–that on which an equitable claim to be indemnified by the United States for losses sustained might rest–requires at least a cursory examination of the history of the transactions on which the claims depend. The first link which in the chain of events arrests attention is the treaties of alliance and of amity and commerce between the United States and France negotiated in 1778. By those treaties peculiar privileges were secured to the armed vessels of each of the contracting parties in the ports of the other, the freedom of trade was greatly enlarged, and mutual obligations were incurred by each to guarantee to the other their territorial possessions in America.
In 1792-93, when war broke out between France and Great Britain, the former claimed privileges in American ports which our Government did not admit as deducible from the treaties of 1778, and which it was held were in conflict with obligations to the other belligerent powers. The liberal principle of one of the treaties referred to–that free ships make free goods, and that subsistence and supplies were not contraband of war unless destined to a blockaded port–was found, in a commercial view, to operate disadvantageously to France as compared with her enemy, Great Britain, the latter asserting, under the law of nations, the right to capture as contraband supplies when bound for an enemy’s port.
Induced mainly, it is believed, by these considerations, the Government of France decreed on the 9th of May, 1793, the first year of the war, that “the French people are no longer permitted to fulfill toward the neutral powers in general the vows they have so often manifested, and which they constantly make for the full and entire liberty of commerce and navigation,” and, as a counter measure to the course of Great Britain, authorized the seizure of neutral vessels bound to an enemy’s port in like manner as that was done by her great maritime rival. This decree was made to act retrospectively, and to continue until the enemies of France should desist from depredations on the neutral vessels bound to the ports of France. Then followed the embargo, by which our vessels were detained in Bordeaux; the seizure of British goods on board of our ships, and of the property of American citizens under the pretense that it belonged to English subjects, and the imprisonment of American citizens captured on the high seas.
Against these infractions of existing treaties and violations of our rights as a neutral power we complained and remonstrated. For the property of our injured citizens we demanded that due compensation should be made, and from 1793 to 1797 used every means, ordinary and extraordinary, to obtain redress by negotiation. In the last-mentioned year these efforts were met by a refusal to receive a minister sent by our Government with special instructions to represent the amicable disposition of the Government and people of the United States and their desire to remove jealousies and to restore confidence by showing that the complaints against them were groundless. Failing in this, another attempt to adjust all differences between the two Republics was made in the form of an extraordinary mission, composed of three distinguished citizens, but the refusal to receive was offensively repeated, and thus terminated this last effort to preserve peace and restore kind relations with our early friend and ally, to whom a debt of gratitude was due which the American people have never been willing to depreciate or to forget. Years of negotiation had not only failed to secure indemnity for our citizens and exemption from further depredation, but these long-continued efforts had brought upon the Government the suspension of diplomatic intercourse with France and such indignities as to induce President Adams, in his message of May 16, 1797, to Congress, convened in special session, to present it as the particular matter for their consideration and to speak of it in terms of the highest indignation. Thenceforward the action of our Government assumed a character which clearly indicates that hope was no longer entertained from the amicable feeling or justice of the Government of France, and hence the subsequent measures were those of force.
On the 28th of May, 1798, an act was passed for the employment of the Navy of the United States against “armed vessels of the Republic of France,” and authorized their capture if “found hovering on the coast of the United States for the purpose of committing depredations on the vessels belonging to the citizens thereof;” on the 18th of June, 1798, an act was passed prohibiting commercial intercourse with France under the penalty of the forfeiture of the vessels so employed; on the 25th of June, the same year, an act to arm the merchant marine to oppose searches, capture aggressors, and recapture American vessels taken by the French; on the 28th of June, same year, an act for the condemnation and sale of French vessels captured by authority of the act of 28th of May preceding; on the 27th of July, same year, an act abrogating the treaties and the convention which had been concluded between the United States and France, and declaring “that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the Government or citizens of the United States;” on the 9th of the same month an act was passed which enlarged the limits of the hostilities then existing by authorizing our public vessels to capture armed vessels of France wherever found upon the high seas, and conferred power on the President to issue commissions to private armed vessels to engage in like service.
These acts, though short of a declaration of war, which would put ail the citizens of each country in hostility with those of the other, were, nevertheless, actual war, partial in its application, maritime in its character, but which required the expenditure of much of our public treasure and much of the blood of our patriotic citizens, who, in vessels but little suited to the purposes of war, went forth to battle on the high seas for the rights and security of their fellow-citizens and to repel indignities offered to the national honor.
It is not, then, because of any failure to use all available means, diplomatic and military, to obtain reparation that liability for private claims can have been incurred by the United States, and if there is any pretense for such liability it must flow from the action, not from the neglect, of the United States. The first complaint on the part of France was against the proclamation of President Washington of April 22, 1793. At that early period in the war which involved Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, the United Netherlands, and Great Britain on the one part and France on the other, the great and wise man who was the Chief Executive, as he was and had been the guardian of our then infant Republic, proclaimed that “the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers.” This attitude of neutrality, it was pretended, was in disregard of the obligations of alliance between the United States and France. And this, together with the often-renewed complaint that the stipulations of the treaties of 1778 had not been observed and executed by the United States, formed the pretext for the series of outrages upon our Government and its citizens which finally drove us to seek redress and safety by an appeal to force. The treaties of 1778, so long the subject of French complaints, are now understood to be the foundation upon which are laid these claims of indemnity from the United States for spoliations committed by the French prior to 1800. The act of our Government which abrogated not only the treaties of 1778, but also the subsequent consular convention of 1788, has already been referred to, and it may be well here to inquire what the course of France was in relation thereto. By the decrees of 9th of May, 1793, 7th of July, 1796, and 2d of March, 1797, the stipulations which were then and subsequently most important to the United States were rendered wholly inoperative. The highly injurious effects which these decrees are known to have produced show how vital were the provisions of treaty which they violated, and make manifest the incontrovertible right of the United States to declare, as the consequence of these acts of the other contracting party, the treaties at an end.
The next step in this inquiry is whether the act declaring the treaties null and void was ever repealed, or whether by any other means the treaties were ever revived so as to be either the subject or the source of national obligation. The war which has been described was terminated by the treaty of Paris of 1800, and to that instrument it is necessary to turn to find how much of preexisting obligations between the two Governments outlived the hostilities in which they had been engaged. By the second article of the treaty of 1800 it was declared that the ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to agree respecting the treaties of alliance, amity, and commerce of 1778 and the convention of 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time; and until they shall have agreed upon these points the said treaties and convention shall have no operation.
When the treaty was submitted to the Senate of the United States, the second article was disagreed to and the treaty amended by striking it out and inserting a provision that the convention then made should continue in force eight years from the date of ratification, which convention, thus amended, was accepted by the First Consul of France, with the addition of a note explanatory of his construction of the convention, to the effect that by the retrenchment of the second article the two States renounce the respective pretensions which were the object of the said article.
It will be perceived by the language of the second article, as originally framed by the negotiators, that they had found themselves unable to adjust the controversies on which years of diplomacy and of hostilities had been expended, and that they were at last compelled to postpone the discussion of those questions to that most indefinite period, a “convenient time.” All, then, of these subjects which was revived by the convention was the right to renew, when it should be convenient to the parties, a discussion which had already exhausted negotiation, involved the two countries in a maritime war, and on which the parties had approached no nearer to concurrence than they were when the controversy began.
The obligations of the treaties of 1778 and the convention of 1788 were mutual, and estimated to be equal. But however onerous they may have been to the United States, they had been abrogated, and were not revived by the convention of 1800, but expressly spoken of as suspended until an event which could only occur by the pleasure of the United States. It seems clear, then, that the United States were relieved of no obligation to France by the retrenchment of the second article of the convention, and if thereby France was relieved of any valid claims against her the United States received no consideration in return, and that if private property was taken by the United States from their own citizens it was not for public use. But it is here proper to inquire whether the United States did relieve France from valid claims against her on the part of citizens of the United States, and did thus deprive them of their property.
The complaints and counter complaints of the two Governments had been that treaties were violated and that both public and individual rights and interests had been sacrificed. The correspondence of our ministers engaged in negotiations, both before and after the convention of 1800, sufficiently proves how hopeless was the effort to obtain full indemnity from France for injuries inflicted on our commerce from 1793 to 1800, unless it should be by an account in which the rival pretensions of the two Governments should each be acknowledged and the balance struck between them.
It is supposable, and may be inferred from the contemporaneous history as probable, that had the United States agreed in 1800 to revive the treaties of 1778 and 1788 with the construction which France had placed upon them, that the latter Government would, on the other hand, have agreed to make indemnity for those spoliations which were committed under the pretext that the United States were faithless to the obligations of the alliance between the two countries.
Hence the conclusion that the United States did not sacrifice private rights or property to get rid of public obligations, but only refused to reassume public obligations for the purpose of obtaining the recognition of the claims of American citizens on the part of France.
All those claims which the French Government was willing to admit were carefully provided for elsewhere in the convention, and the declaration of the First Consul, which was appended in his additional note, had no other application than to the claims which had been mutually made by the Governments, but on which they had never approximated to an adjustment. In confirmation of the fact that our Government did not intend to cease from the prosecution of the just claims of our citizens against France, reference is here made to the annual message of President Jefferson of December 8, 1801, which opens with expressions of his gratification at the restoration of peace among sister nations; and, after speaking of the assurances received from all nations with whom we had principal relations and of the confidence thus inspired that our peace with them would not have been disturbed if they had continued at war with each other, he proceeds to say:
But a cessation of irregularities which had affected the commerce of neutral nations, and of the irritations and injuries produced by them, can not but add to this confidence, and strengthens at the same time the hope that wrongs committed on unoffending friends under a pressure of circumstances will now be reviewed with candor, and will be considered as founding just claims of retribution for the past and new assurance for the future.
The zeal and diligence with which the claims of our citizens against France were prosecuted appear in the diplomatic correspondence of the three years next succeeding the convention of 1800, and the effect of these efforts is made manifest in the convention of 1803, in which provision was made for payment of a class of cases the consideration of which France had at all previous periods refused to entertain, and which are of that very class which it has been often assumed were released by striking out the second article of the convention of 1800. This is shown by reference to the preamble and to the fourth and fifth articles of the convention of 1803, by which were admitted among the debts due by France to citizens of the United States the amounts chargeable for “prizes made at sea in which the appeal has been properly lodged within the time mentioned in the said convention of the 30th of September, 1800;” and this class was further defined to be only “captures of which the council of prizes shall have ordered restitution, it being well understood that the claimant can not have recourse to the United States otherwise than he might have had to the French Republic, and only in case of the insufficiency of the captors.”
If, as was affirmed on all hands, the convention of 1803 was intended to close all questions between the Governments of France and the United States, and 20,000,000 francs were set apart as a sum which might exceed, but could not fall short of, the debts due by France to the citizens of the United States, how are we to reconcile the claim now presented with the estimates made by those who were of the time and immediately connected with the events, and whose intelligence and integrity have in no small degree contributed to the character and prosperity of the country in which we live? Is it rational to assume that the claimants who now present themselves for indemnity by the United States represent debts which would have been admitted and paid by France but for the intervention of the United States? And is it possible to escape from the effect of the voluminous evidence tending to establish the fact that France resisted all these claims; that it was only after long and skillful negotiation that the agents of the United States obtained the recognition of such of the claims as were provided for in the conventions of 1800 and 1803? And is it not conclusive against any pretensions of possible success on the part of the claimants, if left unaided to make their applications to France, that the only debts due to American citizens which have been paid by France are those which were assumed by the United States as part of the consideration in the purchase of Louisiana?
There is little which is creditable either to the judgment or patriotism of those of our fellow-citizens who at this day arraign the justice, the fidelity, or love of country of the men who founded the Republic in representing them as having bartered away the property of individuals to escape from public obligations, and then to have withheld from them just compensation. It has been gratifying to me in tracing the history of these claims to find that ample evidence exists to refute an accusation which would impeach the purity, the justice, and the magnanimity of the illustrious men who guided and controlled the early destinies of the Republic.
I pass from this review of the history of the subject, and, omitting many substantial objections to these claims, proceed to examine somewhat more closely the only grounds upon which they can by possibility be maintained.
Before entering on this it may be proper to state distinctly certain propositions which it is admitted on all hands are essential to prove the obligations of the Government.
First. That at the date of the treaty of September 30, 1800, these claims were valid and subsisting as against France.
Second. That they were released or extinguished by the United States in that treaty and by the manner of its ratification.
Third. That they were so released or extinguished for a consideration valuable to the Government, but in which the claimants had no more interest than any other citizens.
The convention between the French Republic and the United States of America signed at Paris on the 30th day of September, 1800, purports in the preamble to be founded on the equal desire of the First Consul (Napoleon Bonaparte) and the President of the United States to terminate the differences which have arisen between the two States. It declares, in the first place, that there shall be firm, inviolable, and universal peace and a true and sincere friendship between the French Republic and the United States. Next it proceeds, in the second, third, fourth, and fifth articles, to make provision in sundry respects, having reference to past differences and the transition from the state of war between the two countries to that of general and permanent peace. Finally, in the residue of the twenty-seventh article, it stipulates anew the conditions of amity and intercourse, commercial and political, thereafter to exist, and, of course, to be substituted in place of the previous conditions of the treaties of alliance and of commerce and the consular convention, which are thus tacitly but unequivocally recognized as no longer in force, but in effect abrogated, either by the state of war or by the political action of the two Republics.
Except in so far as the whole convention goes to establish the fact that the previous treaties were admitted on both sides to be at an end, none of the articles are directly material to the present question save the following:
ART. II. The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to agree at present respecting the treaty of alliance of 6th February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the convention of 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time; and until they may have agreed upon these points the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows:
* * * * *
ART. V. The debts contracted by one of the two nations with individuals of the other, or by the individuals of one with the individuals of the other, shall be paid, or the payment may be prosecuted, in the same manner as if there had been no misunderstanding between the two States. But this clause shall not extend to indemnities claimed on account of captures or confiscations.
On this convention being submitted to the Senate of the United States, they consented and advised to its ratification with the following proviso:
_Provided_, That the second article be expunged, and that the following article be added or inserted: It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years from the time of the exchange of ratifications.
The spirit and purpose of this change are apparent and unmistakable. The convention as signed by the respective plenipotentiaries did not adjust all the points of controversy. Both nations, however, desired the restoration of peace. Accordingly, as to those matters in the relations of the two countries concerning which they could agree, they did agree for the time being; and as to the rest, concerning which they could not agree, they suspended and postponed further negotiation.
They abandoned no pretensions, they relinquished no right on either side, but simply adjourned the question until “a convenient time.” Meanwhile, and until the arrival of such convenient time, the relations of the two countries were to be regulated by the stipulations of the convention.
Of course the convention was on its face a temporary and provisional one, but in the worst possible form of prospective termination. It was to cease at a convenient time. But how should that convenient time be ascertained? It is plain that such a stipulation, while professedly not disposing of the present controversy, had within itself the germ of a fresh one, for the two Governments might at any moment fall into dispute on the question whether that convenient time had or had not arrived. The Senate of the United States anticipated and prevented this question by the only possible expedient; that is, the designation of a precise date. This being done, the remaining parts of the second article became superfluous and useless, for as all the provisions of the convention would expire in eight years, it would necessarily follow that negotiations must be renewed within that period, more especially as the operation of the amendment which covered the whole convention was that even the stipulation of peace in the first article became temporary and expired in eight years, whereas that article, and that article alone, was permanent according to the original tenor of the convention.
The convention thus amended, being submitted to the First Consul, was ratified by him, his act of acceptance being accompanied with the following declaratory note:
The Government of the United States having added in its ratification that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, and having omitted the second article, the Government of the French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention with the addition importing that the convention shall be in force for the space of eight years and with the retrenchment of the second article: _Provided_, That by this retrenchment the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article.
The convention, as thus ratified by the First Consul, having been again submitted to the Senate of the United States, that body resolved that “they considered the convention as fully ratified,” and returned the same to the President for promulgation, and it was accordingly promulgated in the usual form by President Jefferson.
Now it is clear that in simply resolving that “they considered the convention as fully ratified” the Senate did in fact abstain from any express declaration of dissent or assent to the construction put by the First Consul on the retrenchment of the second article. If any inference beyond this can be drawn from their resolution, it is that they regarded the proviso annexed by the First Consul to his declaration of acceptance as foreign to the subject, as nugatory, or as without consequence or effect. Notwithstanding this proviso, they considered the ratification as full. If the new proviso made any change in the previous import of the convention, then it was not full; and in considering it a full ratification they in substance deny that the proviso did in any respect change the tenor of the convention.
By the second article, as it originally stood, neither Republic had relinquished its existing rights or pretensions, either as to other previous treaties or the indemnities mutually due or claimed, but only deferred the consideration of them to a convenient time. By the amendment of the Senate of the United States that convenient time, instead of being left indefinite, was fixed at eight years; but no right or pretension of either party was surrendered or abandoned.
If the Senate erred in assuming that the proviso added by the First Consul did not affect the question, then the transaction would amount to nothing more than to have raised a new question, to be disposed of on resuming the negotiations, namely, the question whether the proviso of the First Consul did or not modify or impair the effect of the convention as it had been ratified by the Senate.
That such, and such only, was the true meaning and effect of the transaction; that it was not, and was not intended to be, a relinquishment by the United States of any existing claim on France, and especially that it was not an abandonment of any claims of individual citizens, nor the set off of these against any conceded national obligations to France, is shown by the fact that President Jefferson did at once resume and prosecute to successful conclusion negotiations to obtain from France indemnification for the claims of citizens of the United States existing at the date of that convention; for on the 30th of April, 1803, three treaties were concluded at Paris between the United States of America and the French Republic, one of which embraced the cession of Louisiana; another stipulated for the payment of 60,000,000 francs by the United States to France; and a third provided that, for the satisfaction of sums due by France to citizens of the United States at the conclusion of the convention of September 30, 1800, and in express compliance with the second and fifth articles thereof, a further sum of 20,000,000 francs should be appropriated and paid by the United States. In the preamble to the first of these treaties, which ceded Louisiana, it is set forth that–
The President of the United States of America and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, desiring to remove all source of misunderstanding relative to objects of discussion mentioned in the second and fifth articles of the convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, an 9 (30th September, 1800), relative to the rights claimed by the United States in virtue of the treaty concluded at Madrid the 27th of October, 1795, between His Catholic Majesty and the said United States, and willing to strengthen the union and friendship which at the time of the said convention was happily reestablished between the two nations, have respectively named their plenipotentiaries, … who … have agreed to the following articles.
Here is the most distinct and categorical declaration of the two Governments that the matters of claim in the second article of the convention of 1800 had not been ceded away, relinquished, or set off, but they were still subsisting subjects of demand against France. The same declaration appears in equally emphatic language in the third of these treaties, bearing the same date, the preamble of which recites that–
The President of the United States of America and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, having by a treaty of this date terminated all difficulties relative to Louisiana and established on a solid foundation the friendship which unites the two nations, and being desirous, in compliance with the second and fifth articles of the convention of the 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic (30th September, 1800), to secure the payment of the sums due by France to the citizens of the United States, have appointed plenipotentiaries–
who agreed to the following among other articles:
ART. I. The debts due by France to citizens of the United States, contracted before the 8th of Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic (30th September, 1800), shall be paid according to the following regulations, with interest at 6 per cent, to commence from the periods when the accounts and vouchers were presented to the French Government.
ART. II. The debts provided for by the preceding article are those whose result is comprised in the conjectural note annexed to the present convention, and which, with the interest, can not exceed the sum of 20,000,000 francs. The claims comprised in the said note which fall within the exceptions of the following articles shall not be admitted to the benefit of this provision.
* * * * *
ART. IV. It is expressly agreed that the preceding articles shall comprehend no debts but such as are due to citizens of the United States who have been and are yet creditors of France for supplies, for embargoes, and prizes made at sea in which the appeal has been properly lodged within the time mentioned in the said convention, 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year (30th September, 1800).
ART. V. The preceding articles shall apply only, first, to captures of which the council of prizes shall have ordered restitution, it being well understood that the claimant can not have recourse to the United States otherwise than he might have had to the Government of the French Republic, and only in case of insufficiency of the captors; second, the debts mentioned in the said fifth article of the convention, contracted before the 8th Vendemiaire, an 9 (30th September, 1800), the payment of which has been heretofore claimed of the actual Government of France and for which the creditors have a right to the protection of the United States; the said fifth article does not comprehend prizes whose condemnation has been or shall be confirmed. It is the express intention of the contracting parties not to extend the benefit of the present convention to reclamations of American citizens who shall have established houses of commerce in France, England, or other countries than the United States, in partnership with foreigners, and who by that reason and the nature of their commerce ought to be regarded as domiciliated in the places where such houses exist. All agreements and bargains concerning merchandise which shall not be the property of American citizens are equally excepted from the benefit of the said convention, saving, however, to such persons their claims in like manner as if this treaty had not been made.
* * * * *
ART. XII. In case of claims for debts contracted by the Government of France with citizens of the United States since the 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year (30th September, 1800), not being comprised in this convention, may be pursued, and the payment demanded in the same manner as if it had not been made.
Other articles of the treaty provide for the appointment of agents to liquidate the claims intended to be secured, and for the payment of them as allowed at the Treasury of the United States. The following is the concluding clause of the tenth article:
The rejection of any claim shall have no other effect than to exempt the United States from the payment of it, the French Government reserving to itself the right to decide definitively on such claim so far as it concerns itself.
Now, from the provisions of the treaties thus collated the following deductions undeniably follow, namely:
First. Neither the second article of the convention of 1800, as it originally stood, nor the retrenchment of that article, nor the proviso in the ratification by the First Consul, nor the action of the Senate of the United States thereon, was regarded by either France or the United States as the renouncement of any claims of American citizens against France.
Second. On the contrary, in the treaties of 1803 the two Governments took up the question precisely where it was left on the day of the signature of that of 1800, without suggestion on the part of France that the claims of our citizens were excluded by the retrenchment of the second article or the note of the First Consul, and proceeded to make ample provision for such as France could be induced to admit were justly due, and they were accordingly discharged in full, with interest, by the United States in the stead and behalf of France.
Third. The United States, not having admitted in the convention of 1800 that they were under any obligations to France by reason of the abrogation of the treaties of 1778 and 1788, persevered in this view of the question by the tenor of the treaties of 1803, and therefore had no such national obligation to discharge, and did not, either in purpose or in fact, at any time undertake to discharge themselves from any such obligation at the expense and with the property of individual citizens of the United States.
Fourth. By the treaties of 1803 the United States obtained from France the acknowledgment and payment, as part of the indemnity for the cession of Louisiana, of claims of citizens of the United States for spoliations, so far as France would admit her liability in the premises; but even then the United States did not relinquish any claim of American citizens not provided for by those treaties; so far from it, to the honor of France be it remembered, she expressly reserved to herself the right to reconsider any rejected claims of citizens of the United States.
Fifth. As to claims of citizens of the United States against France, which had been the subject of controversy between the two countries prior to the signature of the convention of 1800, and the further consideration of which was reserved for a more convenient time by the second article of that convention, for these claims, and these only, provision was made in the treaties of 1803, all other claims being expressly excluded by them from their scope and purview.
It is not to be overlooked, though not necessary to the conclusion, that by the convention between France and the United States of the 4th of July, 1831, complete provision was made for the liquidation, discharge, and payment on both sides of all claims of citizens of either against the other for unlawful seizures, captures, sequestrations, or destructions of the vessels, cargoes, or other property, without any limitation of time, so as in terms to run back to the date of the last preceding settlement, at least to that of 1803, if not to the commencement of our national relations with France.
This review of the successive treaties between France and the United States has brought my mind to the undoubting conviction that while the United States have in the most ample and the completest manner discharged their duty toward such of their citizens as may have been at any time aggrieved by acts of the French Government, so also France has honorably discharged herself of all obligations in the premises toward the United States. To concede what this bill assumes would be to impute undeserved reproach both to France and to the United States.
I am, of course, aware that the bill proposes only to provide indemnification for such valid claims of citizens of the United States against France as shall not have been stipulated for and embraced in any of the treaties enumerated. But in excluding all such claims it excludes all, in fact, for which, during the negotiations, France could be persuaded to agree that she was in any wise liable to the United States or our citizens. What remains? And for what is five millions appropriated? In view of what has been said there would seem to be no ground on which to raise a liability of the United States, unless it be the assumption that the United States are to be considered the insurer and the guarantor of all claims, of whatever nature, which any individual citizen may have against a foreign nation.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
WASHINGTON, _March 3_, [_1855_.]
_To the House of Representatives_:
I return herewith to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, the bill entitled “An act making appropriations for the transportation of the United States mail, by ocean steamers and otherwise, during the fiscal years ending the 30th of June, 1855, and the 30th of June, 1856,” with a brief statement of the reasons which prevent its receiving my approval. The bill provides, among other things, that–
The following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the year ending the 30th of June, 1856:
For transportation of the mails from New York to Liverpool and back, $858,000; and that the proviso contained in the first section of the act entitled “An act to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the service of the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1852,” approved the 21st of July, 1852, be, and the same is hereby, repealed: _Provided_, That Edward K. Collins and his associates shall proceed with all due diligence to build another steamship, in accordance with the terms of their contract, and have the same ready for the mail service in two years from and after the passage of this act; and if the said steamship is not ready within the time above mentioned, by reason of any neglect or want of diligence on their part, then the said Edward K. Collins and his associates shall carry the United States mails between New York and Liverpool from the expiration of the said two years, every fortnight, free of any charge to the Government, until the new steamship shall have commenced the said mail service.
The original contract was predicated upon the proposition of E.K. Collins of March 6, 1846, made with abundant means of knowledge as to the advantages and disadvantages of the terms which he then submitted for the acceptance of the Government. The proposition was in the following terms:
WASHINGTON, _March 6, 1846_.
E.K. Collins and his associates propose to carry the United States mail between New York and Liverpool twice each month during eight months of the year and once a month during the other four months for the sum of $385,000 per annum, payable quarterly. For this purpose they will agree to build five steamships of not less than 2,000 tons measurement and of 1,000 horsepower each, which vessels shall be built for great speed and sufficiently strong for war purposes.
Four of said vessels to be ready for service in eighteen months from the signing of the contract. The fifth vessel to be built as early as possibly practicable, and when not employed in the mail service to be subject to the orders of the Government for carrying dispatches, for which service a fair compensation is to be paid. Contract to be for the term of ten years. It is also proposed to secure to the United States the privilege of purchasing said steamships whenever they may be required for public purposes, at a fair valuation, to be ascertained by appraisers appointed by the United States and by the owners.
EDWARD K. COLLINS.
The act of March 3, 1847, provides–
That from and immediately after the passage of this act it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Navy to accept, on the part of the Government of the United States, the proposals of E.K. Collins and his associates, of the city of New York, submitted to the Postmaster-General, and dated at Washington, March 6, 1846, for the transportation of the United States mail between New York and Liverpool, and to contract with the said E.K. Collins and his associates for the faithful fulfillment of the stipulations therein contained, and in accordance with the provisions of this act.
And under this proposition and enactment the original contract was made.
According to the terms of that contract the parties were to receive from the United States for twenty round trips each year the sum of $19,250 the trip, or $385,000 per annum; and they were to construct and provide five ships of a stipulated size and quality for the performance of this or other service for the Government.
Of the ships contracted for, only four have been furnished–the _Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic_, and _Baltic_–and the present bill proposes to dispense entirely with the original condition of a fifth ship, by only requiring the construction of one, which would but supply the place of the _Arctic_, recently lost by peril of the sea. Certain minor conditions involving expense to the contractors, among which was one for the accommodation and subsistence of a certain number of passed midshipmen on each vessel, had previously been dispensed with on the part of the United States.
By act of Congress of July 21, 1852, the amount of compensation to the contractors was increased from $19,250 to $33,000 a trip and the number of trips from twenty to twenty-six each year, making the whole compensation $858,000 per annum. During the period of time from the commencement of the service of these contractors, on the 27th of April, 1850, to the end of the last fiscal year, June 30, 1854, the sum paid to them by the United States amounted to $2,620,906, without reckoning public money advanced on loan to aid them in the construction of the ships; while the whole amount of postages derived to the Department has been only $734,056, showing an excess of expenditure above receipts of $1,886,440 to the charge of the Government. In the meantime, in addition to the payments from the Treasury, the parties have been in the enjoyment of large receipts from the transportation of passengers and merchandise, the profits of which are in addition to the amount allowed by the United States.
It does not appear that the liberal conditions heretofore enjoyed by the parties were less than a proper compensation for the service to be performed, including whatever there may have been of hazard in a new undertaking, nor that any hardship can be justly alleged calling for relief on the part of the Government.
On the other hand, the construction of five ships of great speed, and sufficiently strong for war purposes, and the services of passed midshipmen on board of them, so as thus to augment the contingent force and the actual efficiency of the Navy, were among the inducements of the Government to enter into the contract.
The act of July 21, 1852, provides “that it shall be in the power of Congress at any time after the 31st day of December, 1854, to terminate the arrangement for the additional allowance herein provided for upon giving six months’ notice;” and it will be seen that, with the exception of the six additional trips required by the act of July 21, 1852, there has been no departure from the original engagement but to relieve the contractors from obligation, and yet by the act last named the compensation was increased from $385,000 to $858,000, with no other protection to the public interests provided than the right which Congress reserved to itself to terminate the contract, so far as this increased compensation was concerned, after six months’ notice. This last provision, certainly a primary consideration for the more generous action of the Government, the present bill proposes to repeal, so as to leave Congress no power to terminate the new arrangement.
To this repeal the objections are, in my mind, insuperable, because in terms it deprives the United States of all future discretion as to the increased service and compensation, whatever changes may occur in the art of navigation, its expenses, or the policy and political condition of the country. The gravity of this objection is enhanced by other considerations. While the contractors are to be paid a compensation nearly double the rate of the original contract, they are exempted from several of its conditions, which has the effect of adding still more to that rate; while the further advantage is conceded to them of placing their new privileges beyond the control even of Congress.
It will be regarded as a less serious objection than that already stated, but one which should not be overlooked, that the privileges bestowed upon the contractors are without corresponding advantages to the Government, which receives no sufficient pecuniary or other return for the immense outlay involved, which could obtain the same service of other parties at less cost, and which, if the bill becomes a law, will pay them a large amount of public money without adequate consideration; that is, will in effect confer a gratuity whilst nominally making provision for the transportation of the mails of the United States.
To provide for making a donation of such magnitude and to give to the arrangement the character of permanence which this bill proposes would be to deprive commercial enterprise of the benefits of free competition and to establish a monopoly in violation of the soundest principles of public policy and of doubtful compatibility with the Constitution.
I am, of course, not unmindful of the fact that the bill comprises various other appropriations which are more or less important to the public interests, for which reason my objections to it are communicated at the first meeting of the House following its presentation to me, in the hope that by amendment to bills now pending or otherwise suitable provision for all the objects in question may be made before the adjournment of Congress.
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
PROCLAMATIONS.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas by an act of the Congress of the United States approved the 5th day of August, 1854, entitled “An act to carry into effect a treaty between the United States and Great Britain signed on the 5th day of June, 1854,” it is provided that whenever the President of the United States shall receive satisfactory evidence that the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and the Provincial Parliaments of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edwards Island have passed laws on their part to give full effect to the provisions of the said treaty, he is authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that he has such evidence; and
Whereas satisfactory information has been received by me that the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and the Provincial Parliaments of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edwards Island have passed laws on their part to give full effect to the provisions of the treaty aforesaid:
Now, therefore, I, Franklin Pierce, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that from this date the following articles, being the growth and produce of the said Provinces of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edwards Island, to wit: Grain, flour, and breadstuffs of all kinds; animals of all kinds; fresh, smoked, and salted meats; cotton wool, seeds and vegetables, undried fruits, dried fruits, fish of all kinds, products of fish and all other creatures living in the water, poultry, eggs; hides, furs, skins, or tails, undressed; stone or marble in its crude or unwrought state, slate, butter, cheese, tallow, lard, horns, manures, ores of metals of all kinds, coal, pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes; timber and lumber of all kinds, round, hewed, and sawed, unmanufactured in whole or in part; firewood; plants, shrubs, and trees; pelts, wool, fish oil, rice, broom corn, and bark; gypsum, ground or unground; hewn or wrought or unwrought burr or grind stones; dyestuffs; flax, hemp, and tow, unmanufactured; unmanufactured tobacco, rags–shall be introduced into the United States free of duty so long as the said treaty shall remain in force, subject, however, to be suspended in relation to the trade with Canada on the condition mentioned in the fourth article of the said treaty, and that all the other provisions of the said treaty shall go into effect and be observed on the part of the United States.
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the 16th day of March, A.D. 1855, and of the Independence of the United States the seventy-ninth.
[SEAL.]
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
By the President:
W.L. MARCY,
_Secretary of State_.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas the act of Congress of the 28th of September, 1850, entitled “An act to create additional collection districts in the State of California and to change the existing district therein, and to modify the existing collection districts in the United States,” extends to merchandise warehoused under bond the privilege of being exported to the British North American Provinces adjoining the United States in the manner prescribed in the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1845, which designates certain frontier ports through which merchandise may be exported, and further provides “that such other ports situated on the frontiers of the United States adjoining the British North American Provinces as may hereafter be found expedient may have extended to them the like privileges on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury and proclamation duly made by the President of the United States specially designating the ports to which the aforesaid privileges are to be extended:”
Now, therefore, I, Franklin Pierce, President of the United States of America, in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury, do hereby declare and proclaim that the ports of Rouses Point, Cape Vincent, Suspension Bridge, and Dunkirk, in the State of New York; Swanton, Alburg, and Island Pond, in the State of Vermont; Toledo, in the State of Ohio; Chicago, in the State of Illinois; Milwaukee, in the State of Wisconsin; Michilimackinac, in the State of Michigan; Eastport, in the State of Maine; and Pembina, in the Territory of Minnesota, are and shall be entitled to all the privileges in regard to the exportation of merchandise in bond to the British North American Provinces adjoining the United States which are extended to the ports enumerated in the seventh section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1845, aforesaid, from and after the date of this proclamation.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this 2d day of July, A.D. 1855, and of the Independence of the United States of America the seventy-ninth.
[SEAL]
FRANKLIN PIERCE.
By the President:
W.L. MARCY,
_Secretary of State_.
THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE.
WASHINGTON, _December 31, 1855_.
_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives_:
The Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall assemble annually on the first Monday of December, and it has been usual for the President to make no communication of a public character to the Senate and House of Representatives until advised of their readiness to receive it. I have deferred to this usage until the close of the first month of the session, but my convictions of duty will not permit me longer to postpone the discharge of the obligation enjoined by the Constitution upon the President “to give to the Congress information of the state of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”
It is matter of congratulation that the Republic is tranquilly advancing in a career of prosperity and peace.
Whilst relations of amity continue to exist between the United States and all foreign powers, with some of them grave questions are depending which may require the consideration of Congress.
Of such questions, the most important is that which has arisen out of the negotiations with Great Britain in reference to Central America.
By the convention concluded between the two Governments on the 19th of April, 1850, both parties covenanted that “neither will ever” “occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America.”
It was the undoubted understanding of the United States in making this treaty that all the present States of the former Republic of Central America and the entire territory of each would thenceforth enjoy complete independence, and that both contracting parties engaged equally and to the same extent, for the present and for the future, that if either then had any claim of right in Central America such claim and all occupation or authority under it were unreservedly relinquished by the stipulations of the convention, and that no dominion was thereafter to be exercised or assumed in any part of Central America by Great Britain or the United States.
This Government consented to restrictions in regard to a region of country wherein we had specific and peculiar interests only upon the conviction that the like restrictions were in the same sense obligatory on Great Britain. But for this understanding of the force and effect of the convention it would never have been concluded by us.
So clear was this understanding on the part of the United States that in correspondence contemporaneous with the ratification of the convention it was distinctly expressed that the mutual covenants of nonoccupation were not intended to apply to the British establishment at the Balize. This qualification is to be ascribed to the fact that, in virtue of successive treaties with previous sovereigns of the country, Great Britain had obtained a concession of the right to cut mahogany or dye-woods at the Balize, but with positive exclusion of all domain or sovereignty; and thus it confirms the natural construction and understood import of the treaty as to all the rest of the region to which the stipulations applied.
It, however, became apparent at an early day after entering upon the discharge of my present functions that Great Britain still continued in the exercise or assertion of large authority in all that part of Central America commonly called the Mosquito Coast, and covering the entire length of the State of Nicaragua and a part of Costa Rica; that she regarded the Balize as her absolute domain and was gradually extending its limits at the expense of the State of Honduras, and that she had formally colonized a considerable insular group known as the Bay Islands, and belonging of right to that State.
All these acts or pretensions of Great Britain, being contrary to the rights of the States of Central America and to the manifest tenor of her stipulations with the United States as understood by this Government, have been made the subject of negotiation through the American minister in London. I transmit herewith the instructions to him on the subject and the correspondence between him and the British secretary for foreign affairs, by which you will perceive that the two Governments differ widely and irreconcilably as to the construction of the convention and its effect on their respective relations to Central America.
Great Britain so construes the convention as to maintain unchanged all her previous pretensions over the Mosquito Coast and in different parts of Central America. These pretensions as to the Mosquito Coast are founded on the assumption of political relation between Great Britain and the remnant of a tribe of Indians on that coast, entered into at a time when the whole country was a colonial possession of Spain. It can not be successfully controverted that by the public law of Europe and America no possible act of such Indians or their predecessors could confer on Great Britain any political rights.
Great Britain does not allege the assent of Spain as the origin of her claims on the Mosquito Coast. She has, on the contrary, by repeated and successive treaties renounced and relinquished all pretensions of her own and recognized the full and sovereign rights of Spain in the most unequivocal terms. Yet these pretensions, so without solid foundation in the beginning and thus repeatedly abjured, were at a recent period revived by Great Britain against the Central American States, the legitimate successors to all the ancient jurisdiction of Spain in that region. They were first applied only to a defined part of the coast of Nicaragua, afterwards to the whole of its Atlantic coast, and lastly to a part of the coast of Costa Rica, and they are now reasserted to this extent notwithstanding engagements to the United States.
On the eastern coast of Nicaragua and Costa Rica the interference of Great Britain, though exerted at one time in the form of military occupation of the port of San Juan del Norte, then in the peaceful possession of the appropriate authorities of the Central American States, is now presented by her as the rightful exercise of a protectorship over the Mosquito tribe of Indians.
But the establishment at the Balize, now reaching far beyond its treaty limits into the State of Honduras, and that of the Bay Islands, appertaining of right to the same State, are as distinctly colonial governments as those of Jamaica or Canada, and therefore contrary to the very letter, as well as the spirit, of the convention with the United States as it was at the time of ratification and now is understood by this Government.
The interpretation which the British Government thus, in assertion and act, persists in ascribing to the convention entirely changes its character. While it holds us to all our obligations, it in a great measure releases Great Britain from those which constituted the consideration of this Government for entering into the convention. It is impossible, in my judgment, for the United States to acquiesce in such a construction of the respective relations of the two Governments to Central America.
To a renewed call by this Government upon Great Britain to abide by and carry into effect the stipulations of the convention according to its obvious import by withdrawing from the possession or colonization of portions of the Central American States of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, the British Government has at length replied, affirming that the operation of the treaty is prospective only and did not require Great Britain to abandon or contract any possessions held by her in Central America at the date of its conclusion.
This reply substitutes a partial issue in the place of the general one presented by the United States. The British Government passes over the question of the rights of Great Britain, real or supposed, in Central America, and assumes that she had such rights at the date of the treaty and that those rights comprehended the protectorship of the Mosquito Indians, the extended jurisdiction and limits of the Balize, and the colony of the Bay Islands, and thereupon proceeds by implication to infer that if the stipulations of the treaty be merely future in effect Great Britain may still continue to hold the contested portions of Central America. The United States can not admit either the inference or the premises. We steadily deny that at the date of the treaty Great Britain had any possessions there other than the limited and peculiar establishment at the Balize, and maintain that if she had any they were surrendered by the convention.
This Government, recognizing the obligations of the treaty, has, of course, desired to see it executed in good faith by both parties, and in the discussion, therefore, has not looked to rights which we might assert independently of the treaty in consideration of our geographical position and of other circumstances which create for us relations to the Central American States different from those of any government of Europe.
The British Government, in its last communication, although well knowing the views of the United States, still declares that it sees no reason why a conciliatory spirit may not enable the two Governments to overcome all obstacles to a satisfactory adjustment of the subject.
Assured of the correctness of the construction of the treaty constantly adhered to by this Government and resolved to insist on the rights of the United States, yet actuated also by the same desire which is avowed by the British Government, to remove all causes of serious misunderstanding between two nations associated by so many ties of interest and kindred, it has appeared to me proper not to consider an amicable solution of the controversy hopeless.
There is, however, reason to apprehend that with Great Britain in the actual occupation of the disputed territories, and the treaty therefore practically null so far as regards our rights, this international difficulty can not long remain undetermined without involving in serious danger the friendly relations which it is the interest as well as the duty of both countries to cherish and preserve. It will afford me sincere gratification if future efforts shall result in the success anticipated heretofore with more confidence than the aspect of the case permits me now to entertain.
One other subject of discussion between the United States and Great Britain has grown out of the attempt, which the exigencies of the war in which she is engaged with Russia induced her to make, to draw recruits from the United States.
It is the traditional and settled policy of the United States to maintain impartial neutrality during the wars which from time to time occur among the great powers of the world. Performing all the duties of neutrality toward the respective belligerent states, we may reasonably expect them not to interfere with our lawful enjoyment of its benefits. Notwithstanding the existence of such hostilities, our citizens retained the individual right to continue all their accustomed pursuits, by land or by sea, at home or abroad, subject only to such restrictions in this relation as the laws of war, the usage of nations, or special treaties may impose; and it is our sovereign right that our territory and jurisdiction shall not be invaded by either of the belligerent parties for the transit of their armies, the operations of their fleets, the levy of troops for their service, the fitting out of cruisers by or against either, or any other act or incident of war. And these undeniable rights of neutrality, individual and national, the United States will under no circumstances surrender.
In pursuance of this policy, the laws of the United States do not forbid their citizens to sell to either of the belligerent powers articles contraband of war or take munitions of war or soldiers on board their private ships for transportation; and although in so doing the individual citizen exposes his property or person to some of the hazards of war, his acts do not involve any breach of national neutrality nor of themselves implicate the Government. Thus, during the progress of the present war in Europe, our citizens have, without national responsibility therefor, sold gunpowder and arms to all buyers, regardless of the destination of those articles. Our merchantmen have been, and still continue to be, largely employed by Great Britain and by France in transporting troops, provisions, and munitions of war to the principal seat of military operations and in bringing home their sick and wounded soldiers; but such use of our mercantile marine is not interdicted either by the international or by our municipal law, and therefore does not compromit our neutral relations with Russia.
But our municipal law, in accordance with the law of nations, peremptorily forbids not only foreigners, but our own citizens, to fit out within the United States a vessel to commit hostilities against any state with which the United States are at peace, or to increase the force of any foreign armed vessel intended for such hostilities against a friendly state.
Whatever concern may have been felt by either of the belligerent powers lest private armed cruisers or other vessels in the service of one might be fitted out in the ports of this country to depredate on the property of the other, all such fears have proved to be utterly groundless. Our citizens have been withheld from any such act or purpose by good faith and by respect for the law.
While the laws of the Union are thus peremptory in their prohibition of the equipment or armament of belligerent cruisers in our ports, they provide not less absolutely that no person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered, in the service of any foreign state, either as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer. And these enactments are also in strict conformity with the law of nations, which declares that no state has the right to raise troops for land or sea service in another state without its consent, and that, whether forbidden by the municipal law or not, the very attempt to do it without such consent is an attack on the national sovereignty.
Such being the public rights and the municipal law of the United States, no solicitude on the subject was entertained by this Government when, a year since, the British Parliament passed an act to provide for the enlistment of foreigners in the military service of Great Britain. Nothing on the face of the act or in its public history indicated that the British Government proposed to attempt recruitment in the United States, nor did it ever give intimation of such intention to this Government. It was matter of surprise, therefore, to find subsequently that the engagement of persons within the United States to proceed to Halifax, in the British Province of Nova Scotia, and there enlist in the service of Great Britain, was going on extensively, with little or no disguise. Ordinary legal steps were immediately taken to arrest and punish parties concerned, and so put an end to acts infringing the municipal law and derogatory to our sovereignty. Meanwhile suitable representations on the subject were addressed to the British Government.
Thereupon it became known, by the admission of the British Government itself, that the attempt to draw recruits from this country originated with it, or at least had its approval and sanction; but it also appeared that the public agents engaged in it had “stringent instructions” not to violate the municipal law of the United States.
It is difficult to understand how it should have been supposed that troops could be raised here by Great Britain without violation of the municipal law. The unmistakable object of the law was to prevent every such act which if performed must be either in violation of the law or in studied evasion of it, and in either alternative the act done would be alike injurious to the sovereignty of the United States.
In the meantime the matter acquired additional importance by the recruitments in the United States not being discontinued, and the disclosure of the fact that they were prosecuted upon a systematic plan devised by official authority; that recruiting rendezvous had been opened in our principal cities and depots for the reception of recruits established on our frontier, and the whole business conducted under the supervision and by the regular cooperation of British officers, civil and military, some in the North American Provinces and some in the United States. The complicity of those officers in an undertaking which could only be accomplished by defying our laws, throwing suspicion over our attitude of neutrality, and disregarding our territorial rights is conclusively proved by the evidence elicited on the trial of such of their agents as have been apprehended and convicted. Some of the officers thus implicated are of high official position, and many of them beyond our jurisdiction, so that legal proceedings could not reach the source of the mischief.
These considerations, and the fact that the cause of complaint was not a mere casual occurrence, but a deliberate design, entered upon with full knowledge of our laws and national policy and conducted by responsible public functionaries, impelled me to present the case to the British Government, in order to secure not only a cessation of the wrong, but its reparation. The subject is still under discussion, the result of which will be communicated to you in due time.
I repeat the recommendation submitted to the last Congress, that provision be made for the appointment of a commissioner, in connection with Great Britain, to survey and establish the boundary line which divides the Territory of Washington from the contiguous British possessions. By reason of the extent and importance of the country in dispute, there has been imminent danger of collision between the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States, including their respective authorities, in that quarter. The prospect of a speedy arrangement has contributed hitherto to induce on both sides forbearance to assert by force what each claims as a right. Continuance of delay on the part of the two Governments to act in the matter will increase the dangers and difficulties of the controversy.
Misunderstanding exists as to the extent, character, and value of the possessory rights of the Hudsons Bay Company and the property of the Pugets Sound Agricultural Company reserved in our treaty with Great Britain relative to the Territory of Oregon. I have reason to believe that a cession of the rights of both companies to the United States, which would be the readiest means of terminating all questions, can be obtained on reasonable terms, and with a view to this end I present the subject to the attention of Congress.
The colony of Newfoundland, having enacted the laws required by the treaty of the 5th of June, 1854, is now placed on the same footing in respect to commercial intercourse with the United States as the other British North American Provinces.
The commission which that treaty contemplated, for determining the rights of fishery in rivers and mouths of rivers on the coasts of the United States and the British North American Provinces, has been organized, and has commenced its labors, to complete which there are needed further appropriations for the service of another season.
In pursuance of the authority conferred by a resolution of the Senate of the United States passed on the 3d of March last, notice was given to Denmark on the 14th day of April of the intention of this Government to avail itself of the stipulation of the subsisting convention of friendship, commerce, and navigation between that Kingdom and the United States whereby either party might after ten years terminate the same at the expiration of one year from the date of notice for that purpose.
The considerations which led me to call the attention of Congress to that convention and induced the Senate to adopt the resolution referred to still continue in full force. The convention contains an article which, although it does not directly engage the United States to submit to the imposition of tolls on the vessels and cargoes of Americans passing into or from the Baltic Sea during the continuance of the treaty, yet may by possibility be construed as implying such submission. The exaction of those tolls not being justified by any principle of international law, it became the right and duty of the United States to relieve themselves from the implication of engagement on the subject, so as to be perfectly free to act in the premises in such way as their public interests and honor shall demand.
I remain of the opinion that the United States ought not to submit to the payment of the Sound dues, not so much because of their amount, which is a secondary matter, but because it is in effect the recognition of the right of Denmark to treat one of the great maritime highways of nations as a close sea, and prevent the navigation of it as a privilege, for which tribute may be imposed upon those who have occasion to use it.
This Government on a former occasion, not unlike the present, signalized its determination to maintain the freedom of the seas and of the great natural channels of navigation. The Barbary States had for a long time coerced the payment of tribute from all nations whose ships frequented the Mediterranean. To the last demand of such payment made by them the United States, although suffering less by their depredations than many other nations, returned the explicit answer that we preferred war to tribute, and thus opened the way to the relief of the commerce of the world from an ignominious tax, so long submitted to by the more powerful nations of Europe.
If the manner of payment of the Sound dues differ from that of the tribute formerly conceded to the Barbary States, still their exaction by Denmark has no better foundation in right. Each was in its origin nothing but a tax on a common natural right, extorted by those who were at that time able to obstruct the free and secure enjoyment of it, but who no longer possess that power.
Denmark, while resisting our assertion of the freedom of the Baltic Sound and Belts, has indicated a readiness to make some new arrangement on the subject, and has invited the governments interested, including the United States, to be represented in a convention to assemble for the purpose of receiving and considering a proposition which she intends to submit for the capitalization of the Sound dues and the distribution of the sum to be paid as commutation among the governments according to the respective proportions of their maritime commerce to and from the Baltic. I have declined, in behalf of the United States, to accept this invitation, for the most cogent reasons. One is that Denmark does not offer to submit to the convention the question of her right to levy the Sound dues. The second is that if the convention were allowed to take cognizance of that particular question, still it would not be competent to deal with the great international principle involved, which affects the right in other cases of navigation and commercial freedom, as well as that of access to the Baltic. Above all, by the express terms of the proposition it is contemplated that the consideration of the Sound dues shall be commingled with and made subordinate to a matter wholly extraneous–the balance of power among the Governments of Europe.
While, however, rejecting this proposition and insisting on the right of free transit into and from the Baltic, I have expressed to Denmark a willingness on the part of the United States to share liberally with other powers in compensating her for any advantages which commerce shall hereafter derive from expenditures made by her for the improvement and safety of the navigation of the Sound or Belts.
I lay before you herewith sundry documents on the subject, in which my views are more fully disclosed. Should no satisfactory arrangement be soon concluded, I shall again call your attention to the subject, with recommendation of such measures as may appear to be required in order to assert and secure the rights of the United States, so far as they are affected by the pretensions of Denmark.
I announce with much gratification that since the adjournment of the last Congress the question then existing between this Government and that of France respecting the French consul at San Francisco has been satisfactorily determined, and that the relations of the two Governments continue to be of the most friendly nature.
A question, also, which has been pending for several years between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, growing out of the sequestration by public authorities of that country of property belonging to the present American consul at Athens, and which had been the subject of very earnest discussion heretofore, has recently been settled to the satisfaction of the party interested and of both Governments.
With Spain peaceful relations are still maintained, and some progress has been made in securing the redress of wrongs complained of by this Government. Spain has not only disavowed and disapproved the conduct of the officers who illegally seized and detained the steamer _Black Warrior_ at Havana, but has also paid the sum claimed as indemnity for the loss thereby inflicted on citizens of the United States.
In consequence of a destructive hurricane which visited Cuba in 1844, the supreme authority of that island issued a decree permitting the importation for the period of six months of certain building materials and provisions free of duty, but revoked it when about half the period only had elapsed, to the injury of citizens of the United States who had proceeded to act on the faith of that decree. The Spanish Government refused indemnification to the parties aggrieved until recently, when it was assented to, payment being promised to be made so soon as the amount due can be ascertained.
Satisfaction claimed for the arrest and search of the steamer _El Dorado_ has not yet been accorded, but there is reason to believe that it will be; and that case, with others, continues to be urged on the attention of the Spanish Government. I do not abandon the hope of concluding with Spain some general arrangement which, if it do not wholly prevent the recurrence of difficulties in Cuba, will render them less frequent, and, whenever they shall occur, facilitate their more speedy settlement.
The interposition of this Government has been invoked by many of its citizens on account of injuries done to their persons and property for which the Mexican Republic is responsible. The unhappy situation of that country for some time past has not allowed its Government to give due consideration to claims of private reparation, and has appeared to