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the effect that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning.” Johnson then coolly adds: “His prediction proved true.” Yet with these facts staring them in the face, McCook and Johnson made no other efforts to strengthen the right of the line, and Johnson, on the arrival of his reserve brigade later, posted it in the woods a mile and a half from his front “near his headquarters.” General Kirk was mortally wounded in the attack on his command, but lived long enough after the battle to make a report of the part taken in the engagement by his brigade. He states in his report, that he suggested to Johnson to send his reserve brigade to support the main lines, and that Johnson declined to do so.

The location of Johnson’s headquarters, and Johnson being there, makes him responsible for the capture of Willich, and the breaking up of that brigade. Willich had been on the line for an hour before daylight with his brigade under arms, and from what he heard of the movements of the enemy to his front, he was satisfied that a change should be made in the position of his division, and started to Johnson’s headquarters to communicate with him. Before he could return to his troops, the enemy was upon them, and drove them from the position they held, without their making a stand. Being without either division or brigade commander, they drifted to the rear. Willich had a horse shot under him, and was captured without giving an order, before he reached his command.

When the artillery was posted in line of battle on the 30th, roads were cut through the cedars to allow the batteries to reach the front line. The heavy loss of guns, reported by Rosecrans, was occasioned by these batteries being unable to reach the roads through the cedar thickets in the retreat, and in many instances guns were abandoned in the woods, through which it was impossible to haul them.

Bragg alleges in his official report that our troops were surprised, and cites the fact that his men passed through the camps where breakfast was being prepared. He was right as to this fact, but wrong about his deduction. Willich’s brigade was the only one that was not through the morning meal, and this was by reason of his troops being under arms for nearly two hours prior to this time, after which Willich gave them orders to prepare their meal. Kirk’s brigade had been under arms since five o’clock in the morning, ready for action an hour before the battle commenced, and in Post’s brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before the first dawn of light. The front of all these brigades was covered with heavy picket lines well thrown out. General Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o’clock in the morning, “great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front, with movements of troops to their left,” and from four o’clock in the morning until seven, Sheridan’s troops were standing under arms, and the cannoneeers were at their places.

It is difficult to determine which to admire more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning, were reformed under the eye of the commanding general, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannon mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day. One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand sturdy resistance of the rocky coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces. In each of these, the two armies displayed their distinctive feature to the best. Under Thomas, the Centre of the army evinced, in a marked degree, the staying qualities of that commander, which afterward were shown so conspicuously at Chickamauga.

Chapter IX.

In Murfreesboro.

During the first six months of 1863, the military operations of the Army of the Cumberland were of a minor character. The exhaustion attending the severe fighting of the last week of the previous year, kept that army in camp for some time to restore the losses of arms and material, to reclothe the army, to recruit the strength of the troops, to forward the needed supplies, and to build the necessary works to fortify Murfreesboro as a new base. The rebuilding of the Muldraughs Hills’ trestleworks, and the heavy repairs elsewhere needed on the railroad north of Nashville, together with having the road from Nashville to Murfreesboro placed in proper order, all required time and were necessary to be done, to supply the wants of the army in the immediate present. But the future was what demanded the greatest thought and most careful planning. The problem that gave Buell the greatest trouble to solve–the protection of his lines of communication and supplies–was now forced upon Rosecrans. The enemy with more than one-half of his cavalry force absent during the battle of Stone’s River, under Morgan in Kentucky and Forrest in West Tennessee, outnumbered that arm of the service of the Army of the Cumberland during the battle almost two to one. These troopers were nearly all old veterans, accustomed to the severest hardships of service, and it was wonderful the rapidity with which they got over ground and the amount of fatigue they could undergo. To afford perfect protection to his line supplying the army from its base at Louisville, as against these raiding bands, if infantry was to be employed, Rosecrans’s entire force was needed, posted by brigades at the vulnerable points. To make an advance and thus lengthen his lines, simply increased the present difficulties. Without making the necessary preparation to protect his line of supplies, Rosecrans would hamper his forward movement and retard and cripple his advance when commenced. The only proper force to meet the enemy’s troopers was cavalry. In the early days of the Army of the Ohio, under Buell, a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to chase and fight cavalry with infantry, and in every instance the effort was crowned with failure, the only result being the discomfort and complete exhaustion of the marching troops.

The repair of the most complete wrecking the Louisville road ever suffered, demanded Rosecrans’s attention the first thing after the Battle of Stone’s River. When the army left Nashville, on the advance to meet Bragg, the supplies in that city were very limited. With the disabling of the road it was impossible at that time to forward sufficient supplies to meet the wants of the command, and for the first few weeks while the army remained at Murfreesboro the troops were on half rations, and many of the articles constituting the “ration” entirely dispensed with, leaving but three or four on the list. The surrounding country for miles was scoured for forage and provisions. Everything of that kind was gathered in by raiding parties, not leaving sufficient for the actual necessities of the inhabitants. To such an extent did this go, that to the officers with means to purchase such provisions as were to be had, potatoes and onions became luxuries. The whole army was threatened with scurvy.

The number and extent of these raids, and the damage sustained by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad during the year from July 1, 1862, is concisely set forth in the report of the superintendent of that road. His report shows that during this time “the road has been operated for its entire length only seven months and twelve days;” “all the bridges and trestleworks on the main stem and branches, with the exception of the bridge over Barren River and four small bridges, were destroyed and rebuilt during the year. Some of the structures were destroyed twice and some three times. In addition to this, most of the water stations, several depôts, and a large number of cars were burnt, a number of engines badly damaged, and a tunnel in Tennessee nearly filled up for a distance of eight hundred feet.”

By reason of this condition of things, Rosecrans determined to increase the cavalry arm of his army, so that he could meet the ten or twelve thousand cavalry of the enemy in their detached raids on more of an equal footing. From the commencement of operations in Tennessee under Buell, the enemy’s cavalry had been steadily increasing in numbers and in efficiency, until at this time it was a greater problem how to meet this arm of the enemy’s force than his infantry. Rosecrans made repeated urgent applications to the department at Washington for additional cavalry; for horses and improved arms for those already under his command. He detailed infantry to be mounted and armed as cavalry, organizing a brigade of “mounted infantry” under Colonel John T. Wilder.

On Bragg’s retreating from Murfreesboro, he took position with a portion of his army and established his headquarters at Shelbyville. He then ordered part of his command to move to Tullahoma, and there intrench, throwing up extensive earthworks and fortifications. Later, he placed his troops in winter quarters. In addition to the cavalry that had formerly been under Bragg, Van Dorn in February reported to him with his command of three brigades of cavalry, about five thousand effective troops. Bragg placed Van Dorn and Wheeler to protect the front and flanks of his army, assigning the former to the left, with his headquarters at Columbia, and directing the latter to take position on the right, constituted each command a corps. To Wheeler’s command he assigned Morgan’s, Wharton’s, and Martin’s divisions. Forrest’s command was assigned to Van Dorn. Some important events took place during the first six months of 1863, that had a bearing on the fortunes of the Army of the Cumberland.

On January 9th, in recognition of the services of that army, by General Order No. 9 of the War Department, that command was reorganized, and the Centre, Right, and Left were constituted corps d’armee, with the designation of Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Corps, under the same commanders, who were thus advanced to this higher command. During this month, Steedman, in command of Fry’s old division, was ordered from Gallatin to the front, and posted at Triune and La Vergne. Reynold’s division was ordered from Gallatin to Murfreesboro. A slight change was also made in the boundaries of the Department. On the 25th, by order of the War Department, the commands of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were transferred from the department under Grant, to that under Rosecrans, and later Fort Heiman. To Rosecrans was then committed the care and control of the Cumberland River, his second and secondary line of communication and supplies connecting his two principal depots.

On January 26th, Bragg ordered Wheeler on an expedition to capture Fort Donelson. Wheeler directed Forrest to move his brigade with four guns on the river road, via the Cumberland Iron Works, to the vicinity of Dover, which was the real position occupied and fortified by Federal forces, and not the old site of Fort Donelson, while Wheeler with Wharton’s command of some twenty-five hundred men moved on a road to the left. Rosecrans, hearing from his scouts that this movement was contemplated, ordered Davis in command of his division and two brigades of cavalry under Minty, to march by the Versailles road, and take Wheeler in the rear. Steedman was directed to watch Wheeler’s movements by way of Triune. Davis despatched Minty to move with his cavalry around by way of Unionville and Rover, while he moved with the infantry direct to Eaglesville. At Rover, Minty captured a regiment of some three hundred and fifty men. Davis and Steedman’s forces united at Franklin, the latter marching by way of Nolinsville. Wheeler, advancing rapidly, passed between the troops in pursuit, and, on February 3d, his entire force attacked the post at Dover, occupied by Colonel Harding with the Eighty-third Illinois, some six hundred men in the command. The rebels opened fire at once, and made vigorous assault in force upon Harding’s position. His little command repulsed the enemy with heavy loss. Again they advanced, making a more determined assault than before, but again they were driven back with still greater loss. In this last repulse Harding ordered his men to charge beyond his works, which they did with great gallantry, capturing forty-two of the rebels. Wheeler then withdrew with a total loss of one hundred and fifty killed, four hundred wounded, and one hundred and fifty captured. Colonel Harding lost sixteen killed, sixty wounded, and fifty captured. Efforts were made to cut off the retreat of Wheeler’s force by Davis’s command, re-enforced by five hundred cavalry, which went as far west as Kinderhook and Bon Aqua Springs, but Wheeler took the road through Centreville, where he crossed Duck River.

In the latter part of the engagement at Dover, Harding was aided by the fire from six gunboats which were acting as convoys for a fleet of transports conveying reinforcements to Rosecrans’s command, consisting of eighteen regiments of infantry, with four batteries of artillery that had been serving in Kentucky under the command of General Gordon Granger. The troops forming this column were under the immediate command of Crook, Baird, and Gilbert. After the danger at Dover had passed, the fleet steamed up to Nashville, and there the troops disembarked. During February Crook was sent with his command to take post at Carthage, on the Cumberland River, and watch the movements of the enemy from there to Rome, and Gilbert was ordered to proceed with his brigade to Franklin.

On March 4th, Gilbert at Franklin ordered Colonel Coburn, with five regiments of infantry, four detachments of cavalry under Colonel Jordan, and Aleshire’s battery, the whole command nearly three thousand strong, to proceed south from Franklin with a wagon-trail of one hundred wagons, ostensibly on a foraging expedition, but also to reconnoitre the enemy’s front toward Columbia. Coburn’s command some twelve miles south of Franklin, was to meet a force moving from Murfreesboro toward Columbia, and these commands were to co-operate and determine the position of the enemy. Unknown to Gilbert, Van Dorn, on assuming command in Columbia, in February, determined to establish outposts and picket-lines within sight of Franklin and Triune, and to move his headquarters north of Duck River to Spring Hill. Jordan’s cavalry struck the enemy only three miles from town, formed in line of battle. Opening with artillery, Jordan advanced, and, after a sharp conflict, the enemy retreated to Spring Hill. That night Coburn notified Gilbert that he was confronted by a largely superior force, and suggested that he fall back. Gilbert, however, ordered him to advance. Proceeding next morning, the column met the enemy drawn up in line of battle a short distance from Thompson’s Station. Forrest’s command occupied the extreme right, with a battery of artillery on the left of this, and some paces retired was Armstrong’s brigade. On the left of his command and in line with it was the Texan brigade under Whitfield, with two guns on each side of the Columbia turnpike, making a force of 10,000 men under Van Dorn. It was about half-past nine o’clock in the morning when Coburn struck these troops in line. He immediately deployed his infantry across the pike and to the right, and ordered his command to advance. The enemy’s battery posted at the pike opening fire, Coburn’s troops charged it handsomely, his entire command moving in line of battle down the pike. When within one hundred and fifty yards, Armstrong’s and Whitfield’s brigades sprang forward and opened a destructive fire. Coburn’s troops held their lines for over half an hour under heavy fire, replying with the same, when he ordered his command to fall back. Finding this large force in his front, he directed Jordan with his cavalry to cover his retreat. Van Dorn now advanced his line, pressed forward his right and left to surround Coburn and capture the entire force. Jordan formed two detachments, dismounted behind a stone fence to check the advance of Forrest and enable the artillery to escape. Forrest made two sustained attempts to dislodge these detachments from their position, but he was repulsed each time; on a third attempt they were surrounded and captured. The regiment in charge of the train with the artillery and cavalry now moved off rapidly on the pike to Franklin, and Coburn, being surrounded by the rebels in overwhelming numbers, and finding his ammunition exhausted, surrendered. His loss was 40 killed, and 150 wounded, and 2,200 prisoners, including his wounded. The enemy’s loss was 35 killed and 140 wounded. The rebels lost heavily in officers, several of the most valued of Forrest’s falling in the repulses of his command.

The surrender of Coburn weakened the forces at Franklin, and revealed the enemy in such strong force on the immediate front, that Gordon Granger at once ordered Baird to proceed by rail to Franklin, and moving his own headquarters there, assumed the command in person.

On the 7th, Sheridan’s division was ordered to the front to reconnoitre the enemy’s position. He reached Franklin, and the force at that place was further increased by the arrival of a brigade from Nashville. On the 9th, Minty’s brigade of cavalry also reported, and on the day following, Granger with his troops advanced from there upon Van Dorn’s encampment at Spring Hill. In support of Granger’s movement on Van Dorn, Rosecrans ordered Davis to move with his division from Salem to Eaglesville, with R. S. Granger’s brigade in supporting distance, posted at Versailles. Gordon Granger drove Van Dorn from Spring Hill, and the next day compelled his entire command to retire south of Rutherford’s Creek. On account of the high water the pursuit was not continued further.

During March the rebel cavalry under Morgan met with one of the most decisive repulses yet experienced by that command. On the 18th of March Colonel Hall with his command, the second brigade of Reynolds’s division, was sent from Murfreesboro after Morgan. Starting northeast from that place he advanced beyond Statesville, when hearing that Morgan was advancing on him he retired toward Milton, posted his command on some high ground near that place and awaited the attack. Morgan endeavored first to turn the right and then the left of Hall’s command, but in each of these attempts he was driven off with heavy loss. He then dismounted the main portion of his command and ordered an attack to be made on the front. A vigorous assault was at once made with a heavy force, but this was also repulsed, Morgan losing a large number of men. After an engagement lasting some four hours, in which Hall’s brigade fought with the utmost determination, Morgan’s command, being repulsed at all points and in every assault, withdrew from the field with a loss of some ninety-five killed, three hundred and fifty wounded, and twenty prisoners.

Early in April, Morgan’s troopers were defeated with great loss. On the 2d of April Stanley advanced with his cavalry to Liberty, where Morgan met them with his entire command. The two forces encamped within two miles of each other. On the morning of the 3d, Stanley advanced, intending to engage Morgan’s command at once, but found that he had retreated to what he regarded as a very strong position at Snow Hill. Morgan, however, had left a strong force at Liberty to watch Stanley’s movements. As Stanley advanced, he struck this force and quickly drove upon it with part of his command, sending a portion around to the right, which turned the enemy’s left flank. Pressing Morgan’s command from both positions, it soon gave way at all points, and was in full retreat. Morgan’s officers tried to rally their men, but the latter were thoroughly demoralized and had no fight in them. The teamsters became panic-stricken and added to the general rout. It was two weeks before Morgan succeeded in getting his men together again.

Early in April, Rosecrans ordered Colonel Streight to the command of a brigade he had organized for the purpose of making a raid on the lines of communication of the rebels, and to move through the country south and southeast, destroying as he went all property of use to them. Streight’s command started from Nashville, partially mounted, going by way of Clarksville to Fort Henry, at which place he took steamer from Eastport, Miss. En route to Fort Henry his command secured as many animals as they could, but only four-fifths of the men were mounted, and they poorly. The animals were nearly all mules, and very few of them were fit for the service required. It was expected that the command would capture enough good animals to carry the expedition successfully through, but this was not realized. Leaving Eastport on the 21st, he passed through Tuscumbia three days later, and reached Moulton on the 26th. From here on the 28th he pressed forward through Day’s Gap on Sand Mountain, in the direction of Blountsville. In the gap their rear guard was overtaken and attacked on the 30th by the enemy’s cavalry under Forrest, who had pressed forward, riding night and day. Selecting the best mounted of his men, he pushed at once to Streight’s camp. Here coming upon the rear of Streight’s force as it was leaving camp, Forrest opened with artillery firing. Dismounting his men, Streight formed his command on the crest of a hill on each side of the road and awaited the enemy’s attack. As Forrest advanced, Streight ordered a charge to be made which drove the enemy at all points, capturing their two pieces of artillery. Forrest lost in killed and wounded seventy-five men, a large percentage of whom were killed. Streight’s loss was twenty-one killed and wounded. A good many of horses were captured from the enemy, on which Streight mounted a number of his men. On the same afternoon the enemy attacked again, but was driven back with considerable loss, after a severe engagement lasting from three o’clock until dark. On May 1st, the Federal forces reached Blountsville at noon. Here all the wagons save one were burned, and the ammunition placed on pack mules, after distributing to the men all that they could carry. At three o’clock Streight started again, and skirmishing commenced at once on their rear. Pressing on, the command marched until twelve o’clock that night. Resuming their march in the morning, the rear skirmished all the forenoon of the 2d with the rebels. Arriving at Gadsden, Streight remained long enough to destroy a large quantity of provisions in store there for the enemy. It was expected at this place that a small steamer would be found, upon which a detachment of men could be sent to capture Rome. In this Streight was disappointed. From this point Streight’s animals became much exhausted, and the men were falling to the rear and getting captured. To prevent this the command had to go much slower. Forrest coming up about one o’clock on the 2d, attacked the command while the horses were being fed at Blount’s farm. Here Colonel Hathaway fell, shot through the breast. Again the rebels were repulsed, but they constantly pressed upon the rear of Streight’s command, keeping up a brisk skirmish fire. The enemy were kept in check at Blount’s farm until after dark. In the meantime the main command had crossed the Coosa. Here the river was so high that the ammunition was damaged by being wet. From this place Streight sent a detachment to burn the Round Mountain iron works, one of the principal manufactories of munitions of war in the South. It was burned to the ground and all the machinery destroyed. On arriving at the other branch of the Coosa a bridge was found, and, as soon as the command had crossed, it was destroyed. On the morning of the 3d, as the men were preparing their breakfast, the enemy again attacked. Shortly afterward Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of the entire command. This was at first refused, but on consultation with his officers, and considering the damaged condition of his ammunition and the complete exhaustion of his command, Streight, after making a personal inspection of Forrest’s artillery, finally yielded, and the entire force of 1,466 officers and men was surrendered.

On April 20th, Thomas sent J. J. Reynolds with three brigades of infantry and Minty’s brigades of cavalry, together with Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry, to proceed to McMinnville, capture what force was there, destroy the railroad from Manchester to McMinnville, and co-operate with a force to move from Carthage against Morgan. Reynolds made a successful raid on the railroad and nearly destroyed it; burned all the bridges, trestle-work, cars, and locomotives on the road, also the depôt in McMinnville, and several cotton mills. A large amount of supplies was captured, some one hundred animals picked up. The command from Carthage failed to aid in the expedition, and Morgan’s command in the main effected their escape.

Colonel Lewis D. Watkins on the 27th made a gallant charge on the Texas Legion, encamped close to Van Dorn’s main command near Spring Hill. Dashing in upon the enemy early in the morning, he was among them before they could rally for defence, capturing one hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, over three hundred animals, and their camp equipage without the loss of a man.

It was during the six months waiting at Murfreesboro that the unfortunate controversy arose between Rosecrans and the authorities at Washington, represented by General Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief, and Mr. Secretary Stanton of the War Department. The Army of the Cumberland, during the period of the active movements of that command, congratulated itself that the field of operations was so far removed from Washington City, that it did not come under the influence of the authority that seemed to paralyze every effort of the commands immediately around the seat of war at the East. But in this they were mistaken. The future student of the history of the war, in the light of the full official records, will wonder most at the fact that, under the orders from Washington, the commanders in the field were at all able to finally crush the rebellion. It was only when the armies at the East were placed under a general who was practically untrammeled in the exercise of his power, and who conducted his campaigns upon military principles, and not as the result of orders from Washington that the beginning of the end of the rebellion in the East began to dawn. In Tennessee we have seen how Halleck gave Buell orders and then attached such conditions to them as to render their proper execution absolutely impossible. There was nothing to prevent Buell from occupying Chattanooga in June, 1862, as he was directed, while Bragg with his command was in Northern Mississippi, except the utterly useless condition attached to his orders, that he should repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he moved east. Buell urged, in forcible terms, the foolishness and even impropriety of this delay, but Halleck, who knew much of the theory of war as learned from books, and in a general way wished to apply these principles to the practical movements of troops, overruled Buell. The latter knew that the enemy in his front always resolutely refused to be bound in his operations by such rules in conducting campaigns. The result of Halleck’s wisdom soon became manifest when Bragg started for Kentucky, after the waste of Buell’s time in repairing this railroad, which, when completed, was at once turned over to the enemy in good condition for immediate use against our own forces. On Buell fell the force of the blow that some one had to bear for this failure to take advantage of a patent opportunity. Buell’s obedience to Halleck’s orders rendered Bragg’s advance into Kentucky possible, while Buell’s failure to bring Bragg to a decisive action in Kentucky, and his refusal to follow Bragg into the mountains of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, was deemed sufficient cause by Halleck to issue the order removing him from his command. If Halleck’s order to Buell to repair this railroad had never been issued, Bragg’s campaign in Kentucky would never have been made. Halleck’s removal of Buell was the direct result of the latter’s obedience to orders received from the former. On Rosecrans assuming command, almost the first order he received from Halleck was one directing him to advance into East Tennessee after Bragg. With a full knowledge of the military situation obtained from Buell, Rosecrans proceeded at once to protect the line established by Buell, and await the advance of Bragg in the vicinity of Nashville. The battle of Stone’s River was for the time sufficient to prove, even to Halleck, that Buell and Rosecrans were correct, and Rosecrans was allowed for the time to attend to his command without being interfered with. During the encampment at Murfreesboro, the first object of Rosecrans was to properly mount and equip his cavalry. In this he received at first faint encouragement, which soon ceased altogether.

On March 1st Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, wrote a letter, sending a copy to Rosecrans and Grant, offering the position of the then vacant major-generalship in the regular army, to the general in the field who should first achieve an important and decisive victory. Grant very quietly folded up the letter, put it by for future reference, and proceeded with the plans of his campaign, saying nothing. To Rosecrans’s open, impulsive, and honorable nature, engaged with all his powers in furthering the interests of the Government and the general welfare of his command, this letter was an insult, and he treated it accordingly. On March 6th he prepared his reply, and forwarded it to Washington. In this letter he informs the General-in-Chief that, “as an officer and as a citizen,” he felt “degraded at such an auctioneering of honors,” and then adds: “Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for his country? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to chances? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve most.”

The effect of this letter was to widen the breach between the authorities at Washington and Rosecrans. Halleck’s letter and Rosecrans’s reply were both characteristic of the men. Halleck, fresh from the results of a large law practice in California–principally devoted to the establishment of the validity of land grants in favor of his clients, in the success of which large contingent fees were gained–saw nothing improper in such an offer to an officer of sufficient ability and standing to be in command of one of the armies of the United States. With Rosecrans, all the honest, generous impulses of a high-principled, honorable gentleman, who had imperiled his life on many a battlefield, fighting solely from a sense of duty to his country, led to the expression of his contempt for the author of such an offer. The mistake that Halleck made was in thinking that what would prove a tempting offer to a man like himself, would be so to Rosecrans. No one will attempt to maintain the wisdom of Rosecrans’s course as a matter of policy, however much they may sympathize with and admire the spirit of his letter. It was an impolitic letter, and one that aided in drawing the ill-will and resentment of Halleck and Stanton upon him in full force later.

From this time forward, all the requests of Rosecrans for the improvement of the efficiency of his army were treated with great coolness, and in many instances it was only after the greatest importunity that he was able to secure the least attention to his recommendations for the increased usefulness of his command. His repeated applications for more cavalry, and that they be armed with revolving rifles, were treated with little attention. In the meantime nearly every communication from Washington intimated that he was unnecessarily delaying his advance upon Bragg in his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. Grant, on his Vicksburg campaign, became very anxious for the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, to engage Bragg and prevent reinforcements being sent from him to Pemberton or Johnston, operating on his front and rear; and urged Rosecrans to move, and wrote to Halleck, requesting him to direct an advance of the Army of the Cumberland on Bragg’s position. Rosecrans regarded it for the best interest of the country for his army to remain constantly threatening Bragg, in order to hold the entire army of the latter in his immediate front, and also in the event of the defeat of Grant, and a concentration of the enemy on Rosecrans’s position, that he should be close to his base, his army being then the reserve. If an advance succeeded in driving Bragg from Tullahoma, a greater danger than his remaining inactive on our front might ensue. To Bragg, the occupancy of Middle Tennessee was of sufficient importance to justify him in remaining inactive with his entire command, waiting for the advance of Rosecrans some six months. If driven from Tennessee, his troops were ready to unite with the command in Mississippi and defeat Grant’s movements. If Bragg could be held in Tennessee after until after Grant’s success was assured, then, by waiting at Murfreesboro with his army quiet, Rosecrans could render better service than by moving on the enemy. This was a matter of military judgment, on one side espoused by Rosecrans and all his corps and division commanders, who were on the ground, and on the other by Halleck, Stanton, and Grant; and this question served to increase the feeling against Rosecrans in those quarters. Bragg also considered that his presence on the front of the Federal army would prevent any troops from it being sent to aid Grant. And thus the year wore away until early summer. Still another consideration with Rosecrans, was the character of the soil in Tennessee from a short distance south of Murfreesboro to the foot of the Cumberland Mountains. This was a light sandy loam, that in winter and spring, during the rains of those seasons, became like quicksand, allowing the artillery and wagon to sink almost to the hub, and rendering the rapid movement of a large army absolutely impossible.

During the early part of June, Rosecrans commenced placing his troops in position, preparatory to a general advance. He ordered the brigade that had been encamped at Gallatin, under General Ward, to Lavergne, and despatched Gordon Granger to take post at Triune, moving his command from Franklin up to that place. Crook was ordered from Carthage to report to Murfreesboro, and on his arrival, was placed in Reynolds’s division. Rosecrans organized a reserve corps, consisting of three divisions designated as First, Second, and Third, under Baird, J. D. Morgan, and R. S. Granger, respectively, and he assigned Gordon Granger to the command of this corps.

Early in June, Garfield, then Chief-of-Staff of the General commanding, urged Rosecrans to make an advance movement, both as a military and political measure with reference to the sentiment of the North. General Rosecrans had matured his plans for an advance, but decided to refer the question to his general officers in command of corps and divisions. The matter being submitted to them, the universal sentiment of these officers was that the movement should be further delayed. However, on the 23rd of June, Rosecrans having made all necessary arrangements for his command, according to his plans, and learning of the favorable prospects at Vicksburg, and of the movement of the force under Burnside into East Tennessee to take and hold Knoxville, issued the necessary orders for the advance of his army on that of the enemy.

Chapter X.

The Advance on Tullahoma.

At the time of the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, Polk’s corps of Bragg’s army occupied the main position at Shelbyville, strongly intrenched behind heavy works thrown up during the six months of waiting. These added to the natural strength of the position, and extended from Horse Mountain on the east, to Duck River on the west, and were covered by a line of abattis. The town was noted for the strong Union sentiment of its inhabitants, of which fact the rebels took full advantage to the loss and distress of the people. It is situated about twenty-five miles south of Murfreesboro, and some twenty miles North of Tullahoma, on a branch railroad from the main Nashville line, starting west from Wartrace. Bragg’s right was posted at Wartrace, with Hardee’s corps occupying the passes at Liberty, Hoover, and Bellbuckle Gaps. These gaps were all held by strong forces of the enemy, supported by the main command. Polk had an advance in Guy’s Gap with his entire command in supporting distance. Bragg’s extreme right was protected by cavalry with headquarters at McMinnville, while his cavalry on the left, under Forrest, had headquarters at Columbia, threatening Franklin.

At this time the main base of supplies of the enemy was at Chattanooga, to which the entire country south of Duck River had been made tributary. From Duck River, south, the country is rough, with rocky ranges of hills, which divide the “barrens” from the fertile parts of Middle Tennessee. These “barrens” constitute a high rolling plateau of ground between the ranges of hills at Duck River and the Cumberland Mountains. It is here that the soil during a rainy season offers the greatest obstacle to active campaigning. Situated on the “barrens,” at the junction of the McMinnville branch with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, was Tullahoma, a small straggling village, where Bragg had established his main depot and made a large intrenched camp. The defiles of Duck River, a deep, narrow stream with but few fords or bridges, covered its front, with a rough rocky range of hills immediately south of the river. The principal roads as they passed through these hills bore southwardly toward the line of the enemy’s communications and Tullahoma. The Manchester pike passed through Hoover’s Gap and reached the “barrens” by ascending a long, difficult cañon called Matt’s Hollow. The Wartrace road passed through Liberty Gap, and from there it ran into the road along the railroad through Bellbuckle Gap. The direct road to Shelbyville goes through Guy’s Gap.

Rosecrans was satisfied from the information he had received that Bragg intended to fight in his intrenchments at Shelbyville, in the event of the army advancing in that direction. The “effective total present,” as reported by Bragg as the strength of his army on June 20, 1863, at Shelbyville, was 43,089, of all arms. If he were attacked at Shelbyville and beaten, he would then be in good position to retreat to his strong intrenchments at Tullahoma, and on his retreat could so retard Rosecrans’s advance through the narrow winding roads leading up to the “barrens,” as to fully protect his own line of retreat and inflict severe loss on the advancing force without exposing his own troops. Rosecrans’s plan of campaign was to render useless Bragg’s intrenchments by turning his right, and then if possible secure his line of retreat by moving on the railroad bridge at Elk River. Bragg by this means would either be forced to accept battle on ground chose by Rosecrans, or be compelled to beat a retreat on a disadvantageous line, neither as direct nor by as good roads as he would have from Shelbyville and Tullahoma due south. To carry out this plan it was necessary to impress Bragg with the idea that our advance would be in force on Shelbyville, and, if possible, to keep up this impression until the main body of our army reached Manchester. The success of this would keep Bragg’s attention on the movement on his front at Shelbyville, and enable our army to pass through the dangerous defile of Hoover’s Gap, a narrow passage-way three miles long, between two hills, and so on through Matt’s Hollow, an equally dangerous defile, being a gorge two miles long with hardly room anywhere for wagons to pass each other. These passes were only eight miles from Hardee’s headquarters and sixteen from Shelbyville.

The plan then of Rosecrans in the advance on Tullahoma, was to make a feint with Granger’s corps and the main portion of the cavalry, on Polk’s command in his strong position at Shelbyville, and to mass the three main corps on Bragg’s right at Wartrace. The army being all ready for the opening campaign, on the 23d of June General R. B. Mitchell with his command–the First Cavalry Division–commenced the advance from Triune on the Eaglesville and Shelbyville pike, in the feint on Polk’s command, made a furious attack on Bragg’s cavalry and drove in his infantry guards on their main force, pressing the whole line on that front. Granger with the three divisions of his corps and Brannan’s division of Thomas’s corps, on that day moved with three days’ rations from Triune to Salem.

On the same day, Palmer’s division and a brigade of cavalry marched to the vicinity of Bradyville, for the purpose of seizing with his advance the head of the defile leading over an obscure road by Lumley’s Station to Manchester, and so up to the “barrens.” All the other troops were supplied with twelve days’ rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, with six days’ pork and bacon, and six days’ meat on hoof, and were held in readiness to move southward. These movements being made, the next day the entire army pressed forward on the advance.

In the evening of the 23d, the corps commanders met at army headquarters. The plan of the campaign was fully explained to them, and each one received in writing his orders as to his part in the movement.

“Major-General McCook’s corps to advance on the Shelbyville road, turn to the left, move two divisions by Millersburg, and advancing on the Wartrace road seize and hold Liberty Gap. The third division to advance on Fosterville and cover the crossing of General Granger’s command from the Middleton road, and then move by Christiana to join the rest of the corps.

“General Granger to advance on the Middleton road, threatening that place, and cover the passing of General Brannan’s division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was to pass by Christiana and bivouac with the rear division of the Twentieth Corps.

“The Fourteenth Corps, Major-General Thomas, to advance on the Manchester pike, seize and hold with its advance, if practicable, Hoover’s Gap, and bivouac so as to command and cover that and the Millersburg road, so that McCook and himself could be within supporting distances of each other.

“Major-General Crittenden to leave Van Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Army Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville with the other two, and await orders.”

One brigade of cavalry under Turchin was sent with Crittenden to establish a lookout toward McMinnville. All the remaining cavalry under Stanley was to meet Mitchell as he came in from Versailles and at once attack the rebel cavalry at Middleton.

These movements were all promptly executed in the midst of heavy drenching rains, as it only could rain in the mountains and hills of Tennessee, whenever the Army of the Cumberland made a forward movement. The ground was so softened on all the dirt roads as to render them next to impassable.

The Twentieth Corps, consisting of Johnson’s, Davis’s, and Sheridan’s divisions, started on the Shelbyville pike, and by different cross roads moved to the left to Millersburg, where Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions encamped for the night. Johnson’s division was advanced up to Liberty Gap, with the Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel Harrison, thrown forward to skirmish. Harrison developed the enemy in front of the Gap. Willich’s brigade was moved forward, and drove the skirmishers in the rebel front back upon their main line, placed on the crest of the hills, on each side of the entrance to the gap. Here the enemy was too strongly posted to attack his front. Another brigade under Colonel John F. Miller, who had been transferred from Negley’s division to Johnson’s, was then brought forward. These two brigades were at once deployed in line, making a front of such length as to envelop both flanks of the enemy’s line, and advancing, these brigades gallantly drove the rebels through the defile, a distance of two miles. After clearing the gap, the troops returned to the north end of it and there bivouacked. On the following day, late in the afternoon, an attack was made on Willich’s and Miller’s brigades, to drive them out of the north end of the gap. Johnson’s failure to hold the southern entrance enabled the enemy again to enter it, and to secure it entirely they made this attack. The engagement opened with a heavy fire on the centre of the command, the enemy attacking in force. They were handsomely repulsed. Renewing the attack, Hardee then endeavored to secure positions on the hills to the right and left, so as to command Johnson’s flanks with his fire, but each movement was met by Johnson’s troops, supported by Carlin’s brigade of Davis’s division, and every attack was repulsed. Beaten at every point, late in the evening the enemy withdrew entirely, taking position at Bellbuckle. The fighting at Liberty Gap was the most severe of the campaign, and in this attack Johnson’s command, including Carlin’s brigade, lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded. The enemy’s loss was still greater. It was in repelling one of the attacks on the left that Colonel Miller fell severely wounded with a minie ball through his left eye while leading his brigade.

On the 24th, General Thomas moved direct on the Manchester pike from Murfreesboro, Reynold’s division in advance, starting at 4 o’clock in the morning, under orders, if possible, to seize and hold Hoover’s Gap. At 7 A.M., Rousseau’s division followed in support of Reynold’s division, which encountered the mounted videttes of the enemy a few miles beyond our picket station, forced them upon their reserve, and then resolutely pressing on drove the entire force on the run, through Hoover’s Gap and beyond McBride’s Creek. Wilder, finding the enemy about to attack him with two brigades from the division of Fairfield, occupied a strong position on the hills at the southern entrance of the gap. Reynolds at once moved his two infantry brigades forward and occupied the gap in the rear of Wilder’s command, prepared to resist the enemy on the front. Wilder’s brigade was immediately attacked by the enemy’s force. Reynolds supported him at once with his other brigades, which were posted on the ridge of woods on the extreme right to prevent the enemy turning our right flank, then heavily engaged by a superior force. With these reinforcements the enemy was driven back out of the woods, and three regiments were posted on the right, making that position secure. Major Coolidge, commanding the brigade of regulars of Rousseau’s division, was ordered to reinforce Reynolds, and every preparation was made for an attack on the following morning. The other brigades of Rousseau’s command, with Negley’s division, occupied the gap in the rear of Reynolds during the night. Early on the morning of the 25th, Scribner was ordered with his brigade to the front, in support of the batteries and to form a picket line on the extreme left.

On the 24th, Crittenden, with Wood’s and Palmer’s divisions, marched to Bradyville, leaving Van Cleve’s division to garrison Murfreesboro. Granger, with his three divisions and Brannan’s, advanced from Salem to Christiana. Turchin’s division of cavalry under Stanley moved on the Woodbury pike to Cripple Creek, and thence through Salem. During the day Mitchell advanced from Rover through Versailles to Middleton, where he had a sharp engagement with the enemy’s cavalry.

The plans of the enemy not being yet fully developed, and in view of the uncertainty that existed whether he would fall on McCook’s front, or mass on Thomas near Fairfield, Rosecrans issued the following orders for the 25th:

“Major-General Crittenden to advance to Lannon’s Stand, six miles east of Beech Grove, and open communications with General Thomas.

“General Thomas to attack the rebels on the flank of his advance position at the forks of the road, and drive the rebels toward Fairfield.

“General McCook to feign and advance, as if in force, on the Wartrace road by the Liberty Gap passes.

“General Stanley, with his cavalry, to occupy their attention at Forsterville, and General Granger to support him with his infantry at Christiana.”

In the event that Thomas succeeded in his attack and drove the enemy toward Wartrace, he was then to cover that road with a division, and taking the remainder of his troops was to move rapidly on Manchester. McCook was then to move in and take Thomas’s place at Beech Grove, holding Liberty Gap with a division, and was finally to withdraw that and follow Thomas with his entire command to Manchester.

The same day that Crittenden’s command marched to Holly Springs, Brannan’s division reached the main command of Thomas, and went into camp with Rousseau at Hoover’s Mills. Reynolds had a slight skirmish with the enemy on his front. On the night of the 25th, Rousseau was ordered up with his division to take position immediately in the rear of Reynolds, preparatory to an attack on the enemy’s position at Beech Grove the next morning. Minty’s brigade of cavalry pressed forward at all points and drove the enemy to Guy’s Gap. Long took position at Lumley’s Station. The remainder of Turchin’s division moved in the advance with General Crittenden.

The incessant rains that had fallen since the opening of the campaign delayed the advance, by preventing Brannan joining the Fourteenth Corps as soon as was expected. During the night of the 25th it rained so continuously that it was almost impossible for the troops to move, but by extraordinary exertions the divisions were all in position by 10.30 A. M. At 4 o’clock in the morning Brannan’s division moved up to take part in the attack. At 8 A. M. Negley’s division took position to support the attack of the other divisions. If the enemy’s position at Beech Grove was carried, then Rousseau and Brannon were to push on to Manchester that night if possible. At 10.30 A.M. the advance was ordered. Moving forward on the rebels in force on the heights north of Garrison Creek, our army drove them steadily and rapidly toward Fairfield, Rousseau and Brannan operating on their left flank from the hills north of the Fairfield road, while Reynolds advanced against their front and right. The enemy had prepared for an obstinate resistance, and attempted to enfilade Thomas’s troops from the high ground on his right. This was effectually prevented by a gallant charge of Walker’s brigade and the regulars under Major Coolidge, who drove the enemy from this position. Thomas pushed forward his troops, driving the rebels in the direction of Fairfield, who covered their retreat with two batteries of artillery, occupying positions behind strong lines of skirmishers flanked by heavy cavalry force. The rebels thus retired to Fairfield, near to which place our pickets were advanced. Reynold’s division and the baggage moved forward during the night toward Manchester. Late in the afternoon Wilander’s brigade seized Matt’s Hollow, and thus secured that passage. Thomas placed his divisions in line of battle extending from the Fairfield road to within five miles of Manchester. McCook remained in camp at Liberty Gap during the day, while Granger rested at Christiana. Crittenden’s command pressed forward as rapidly as possible on toward Manchester, struggling over almost impassable roads.

Rosecrans’s headquarters, on the 27th, reached Manchester. The advanced position secured by Thomas’s command rendered the concentration of the whole army on the enemy’s left, through Hoover’s Gap, at this time an easy matter. With this done, Bragg would either be forced to fight in resisting the further advance of the army under Rosecrans, or abandon Middle Tennessee altogether. Early on the morning of the 27th, Reynolds’s advance brigade–Wilder’s mounted infantry–took possession of Manchester, capturing forty prisoners, a guard at the railroad depot, and taking the town completely by surprise. Reynolds’s entire division reached Manchester during the morning. General Thomas then moved Rousseau’s and Brannan’s divisions in pursuit of the enemy, driving him as far as Fairfield, and ascertained at that place that the rebels had retreated entirely. These two divisions then turned into the Fairfield and Manchester road, Brannan’s reaching the latter place at 10 P.M. and Rousseau’s at midnight. Negley’s division had, during the day, been moving in support of these two divisions toward the Fairfield road, by way of Noale Fork, and arrived at Manchester at 8 P.M. Thomas’s corps being now together, it was manifest that the enemy must leave his intrenchment at Shelbyville, and that our army must be prepared to meet him at Tullahoma, only twelve miles distant. Rosecrans gave the necessary orders at once to the other corps commanders to close up their columns on Manchester, and be prepared for the contest.

On the extreme right our cavalry, on the 27th, did brilliant work. Supported by the reserve corps under Granger, Stanley advanced from Christiana to Guy’s Gap, where the advance of the rebel army under Wheeler, with Martin’s and a portion of Wharton’s divisions, was encountered. Charging down on them with Minty’s brigade, closely followed by Mitchell’s division, Stanley routed and drove them out of the gap into their intrenchments just north of Shelbyville. Here they again made a stand. Dashing ahead, Minty encountered them in their works, and drove them in disorder from their intrenchments into Shelbyville. While Minty was pushing them on the front, Mitchell came up, turned their right, cutting off their direct line of retreat, and both forces united in driving them beyond the town, completely defeated. Wheeler lost all his artillery and some five hundred prisoners. A large number of the rebels were driven into Duck River and drowned while attempting to cross. The flight was so hurried that Wheeler himself only escaped by swimming the river. This successful movement established the fact that Bragg had abandoned his strong line of defence at Shelbyville, and the question now to be answered was whether he would accept battle at Tullahoma, or retire with his entire command across the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River, fighting as he fell back.

While the concentration of his command at Manchester was being effected, Rosecrans determined to break the line of railroad in the rear of Bragg’s army, if possible. On the morning of the 28th Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry, started at reveillé by way of Hillsboro, to burn Elk River bridge, and to destroy the railroad between Dechard and Cowan. John Beatty, with his brigade of infantry marched to Hillsboro for the purpose of covering and supporting Wilder’s movement. The latter reached Elk River and crossed his command, floating his mountain howitzers on a raft made of an old saw-mill. He then moved on to Dechard, where, after a slight skirmish with a detachment of the enemy, he destroyed the depot full of commissary goods, the water tanks, the railroad bridge over the Winchester road, and tore up some three hundred yards of the railroad. Earlier in the day Wilder sent part of his command, under Colonel Munroe, to destroy the railroad bridge over Elk River. Withers’s division of Bragg’s army reached this point only a few moments ahead of Munroe, and prevented the burning of the bridge. Finding that the enemy was in pursuit of him at all points, Wilder next moved to Tantalon and Anderson with detachments of his command, but was compelled to retire, as these points were strongly guarded by heavy forces of the enemy’s infantry. Crossing the mountains that night on his return over the Tracy City road, and so on to Pelham, the troops slept at the foot of the mountains, and started the next morning just in time to escape Forrest, who was in pursuit with ten regiments of cavalry. Wilder reached Manchester at 1 P.M. of the 30th.

Sheridan’s division of McCook’s corps reached Manchester on the 29th. The command–troops and animals–suffered severely on their march over the heavy roads. Crittenden’s command, which had been on the road since the 26th, reached Manchester also on the 29th, after marching with all speed, badly worn, by reason of the terrible rains and fearful roads. The condition of the latter may be inferred from the fact that it required four days of incessant labor for Crittenden to advance the distance of twenty-one miles. The concentration of the entire army being effected, orders were given for the final movement on the 30th, as follows:

“The Fourteenth Corps to occupy the centre at Concord Church and Bobo Cross Roads, with a division in reserve.

“The Twentieth Corps to take the right on Crumpton’s Creek, two divisions in echelon retired, one in reserve.

“The Twenty-first Corps to come up on the left near Hall’s Chapel, one division in front and one in reserve.”

The rain had rendered the roads over which this movement was to be made as soft and spongy as a swamp, into which the wagons cut to the hubs, and even horses could only pass over with the greatest exertion. The troops on the 30th were compelled to drag along the artillery through the mud into position. While the orders for the movements of the troops were being executed on the 30th, Thomas sent Steedman’s brigade of Brannan’s division, and two regiments of Negley’s division on separate roads to reconnoitre the enemy’s position, and Sheridan sent Bradley’s brigade of his own division on another road, for the same purpose. These reconnoissances all returned, and reported having found the enemy in force within a mile or two of Tullahoma, on all roads except the one leading to Estill Springs. Scouts coming in confirmed this, adding that it was the general belief that Bragg would not leave his intrenchments at Tullahoma without a fight.

On the same day Rosecrans ordered his topographical engineers to ascertain the nature of the ground, in order to determine the practicability of moving by columns in mass in line of battle from the position in front, to gain the rear of the rebel position. Their report being favorable, all arrangements were completed, and the second division of Crittenden’s corps was moved into position.

On July 1st, Thomas, hearing from a citizen that the enemy were evacuating Tullahoma, ordered Steedman with his brigade, supported by two regiments of Reynolds’s division on the left, to advance cautiously and ascertain if the report was true. Pushing forward his advance, Steedman, meeting with no opposition, entered the place at noon, capturing a few prisoners. Rosecrans being at once notified of this, immediately ordered Rousseau’s and Negley’s divisions in pursuit. Pressing forward with all possible haste by Spring Creek, these divisions overtook the rear guard of the enemy late in the afternoon at Bethpage Bridge, two miles above the railroad crossing, where, after a sharp skirmish, in which a good many of our men were wounded, the rebels were driven steadily back, until darkness prevented further pursuit. The enemy, occupying the heights south of the river, commanded the bridge with their artillery, which they had placed behind epaulements.

On the 2d, the ammunition was brought forward, and McCook, with Sheridan’s and Davis’s divisions, was ordered in pursuit on the roads west of the railroad. Sheridan, on arriving at Rock Creek Ford, found Elk River so swollen with the heavy rains of the past week as to be barely fordable for cavalry. On the south bank of the river the enemy had posted a force of cavalry to resist the crossing. Sheridan opened fire at once on them, drove them away, and occupied the ford. During the night the enemy burned the bridge on the line of advance of Thomas, who found equal difficulty in crossing. Here the river was very deep, and he ordered Rousseau’s, Brannan’s, and Reynolds’s divisions up the river to Jones’s Ford. Hambright’s brigade was thrown across the river, and the other troops went into camp on the north bank. Hambright captured several rebel prisoners, who told him that Bragg’s army was in full retreat by way of Pelham and Cowan, across the Cumberland Mountains. Turchin, with a small brigade of cavalry, moved forward from Hillsboro on the Dechard road. On reaching the fords of Elk River at Morris Ferry he found the rebel cavalry strongly posted. He attacked them at once, re-enforced by Mitchell’s command, and forced a passage of the river after a sharp fight. Night closed the pursuit.

On the 3d, Sheridan succeeded in crossing Elk River, supported by Davis’s division, and pursued the enemy to Cowan, where he learned that Bragg had crossed the mountains with part of his artillery and infantry by the University and Sweden’s Cove, sending Hardee’s corps into Sequatchie Valley, and covering his retreat with his cavalry. Thomas crossed Rousseau’s and Brannan’s divisions at Jones’s Ford and ordered them to take position on the Winchester and Hillsboro road. He directed Negley and Reynolds to cross their divisions at the ford on the Winchester and Manchester pike. On the 4th, Rousseau was ordered to march to the Dechard and Pelham roads, and to take up position at Brackenfield’s Point toward the University. Reynolds encamped at Penningtown, and Brannan’s division at Taite’s. The cavalry sent from Sheridan’s position, and by Stanley from the main column, developed the fact that the enemy was entirely across the mountains, and the troops were now ordered into camp to await supplies from the depot at Murfreesboro.

Bragg’s army reached Chattanooga the first week in July. Here he established his headquarters with Polk’s corps retained in and around town for the purposes of observation, with the exception of Anderson’s brigade of Withers’s division, which was ordered to Bridgeport, at the crossing of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad over the Tennessee River. Hardee’s corps was distributed along the line of the Knoxville Railroad, with Tyner’s Station as the centre. At Chattanooga Bragg at once commenced fortifying his position, which work he steadily prosecuted for some weeks, awaiting the development of Rosecrans’s plans. He also threw up defensive works at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far north as Blyth’s Ferry. Forrest was sent to Kingston, on the north bank of the Tennessee River, with orders to picket the approaches to the river from Sequatchie Valley, as well as the various crossings of the river, and to maintain a watchful observation of Burnside’s movements in East Tennessee.

The Tullahoma campaign, with the exception of the one immediately following, which placed the Army of the Cumberland across the Tennessee and terminated in the battle of Chickamauga, was the most brilliant of the great strategic campaigns carried to a successful issue by General Rosecrans. The movements of the army occupied nine days, during which time the enemy was driven from two strongly fortified positions, with a loss in prisoners captured of 1,634, eleven pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores and supplies. The result of this campaign gave to Rosecrans possession of Middle Tennessee, and placed the armies back in the relative positions occupied by them prior to Bragg’s advance into Kentucky, a little less than one year previous. The campaign was conducted throughout, in one of the most extraordinary series of rain-storms ever known in Tennessee at that season of the year. This, with the resistance interposed by Bragg at our advance at Hoover’s Gap, retarded operations thirty-six hours, and in front of Manchester a detention of sixty hours occurred. These delays and the storms prevented us getting possession of Bragg’s communication and forcing him to a very disastrous battle. General Rosecrans in his official report of this campaign says: “These results were far more successful than were anticipated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements.”

Bragg made no official report of the Tullahoma campaign, but in a statement to General J. E. Johnston of his operations at that time, he says that he offered battle behind his works at Shelbyville to Rosecrans, which was refused; that the latter passed to his, Bragg’s, right on two occasions, threatening his rear. He being not able to cope with the Federal army retreated to the Tennessee. Bragg adds: “The Tennessee will be taken as our line.”

During these nine days of active campaigning the Army of the Cumberland, numbering less than sixty thousand effective men, with a loss of 560 killed, wounded, and missing, compelled the army under Bragg, numbering something less than forty-five thousand effective men, to retreat a greater distance and out of far stronger positions than the united armies under Sherman were able to compel the same army with but slight additional strength under General Joe Johnston, to fall back, in four months of active field campaigning, with a very much larger relative loss. The proportion of the forces of the opposing armies during the Tullahoma campaign was far nearer equal than that on to Atlanta, while the natural and military obstacles to be overcome were largely the greater in the Tullahoma campaign. To Bragg the forward movement of the Federal army in full strength was a surprise, but to find that army so far in his rear and so near to cutting his line of communications was a much greater surprise. These might not have been guarded against, but nothing displayed the marked superiority of Rosecrans over his opponent, as a great strategist, so much as the grand success of the final movement of the campaign, from Manchester south. The general who–as even the rebels, in their worship of their leader General Lee, admitted–was able in Western Virginia to completely outgeneral Lee, on the Tullahoma campaign again demonstrated his ability as the greatest strategic general of the war.

Brilliant campaigns, however, without battles, do not accomplish the destruction of an army. A campaign like that of Tullahoma always means a battle at some other point. This was true after the Atlanta campaign, where Sherman got the glory and Thomas did the fighting. This was equally true as to the Tullahoma, and the fact that these two armies were yet somewhere to meet and engage in deadly strife, was apparent to the commanders of both armies. Where and when that meeting was to be was the problem that engaged the minds of both these commanders. In the Tullahoma campaign the elements were on the side of Bragg’s army, both in preventing the rapid movements of the Federal army, and in furnishing a perfect barrier to a successful pursuit when the retreat was under way, by the high water in the swollen streams, the bridges over which Bragg destroyed as he fell back.

The concluding line of Bragg’s letter to Johnston, that “The Tennessee will be taken as our line,” demonstrated that, to his mind at least, his Kentucky movement of the year before did not meet with the success he anticipated. Here now he was waiting his opportunity to contest his last foothold on the State of Tennessee at the far corner in Chattanooga. With Rosecrans, his army required after these days of hard campaigning a rest to repair the wear and tear of the heavy marching, and the resupplying of his entire command. The railroads in his rear required his attention first. These were placed in order up to his army, and the repairs on the road to the front were then to be pushed to the Tennessee River. In three weeks time these were completed, and on the 25th, the first supply train was pushed through to the Tennessee River. Then Rosecrans established his new depot of supplies at Stevenson, Alabama, and hastened, as rapidly as he could, the accumulation of supplies at that point.

Chapter XI.

The Movement to Chickamauga.

The withdrawal of the army under Bragg to Chattanooga again made that point the objective of a campaign. But several things had to be taken into consideration before this was entered into. Burnside had been ordered from Cincinnati to East Tennessee through Kentucky, and it was necessary to know the force and position of his command. If Knoxville and Cumberland Gap were under his control, then it would be reasonably safe to follow out a plan of operations looking to flank Bragg’s left by a movement across the Tennessee over the ranges of mountains of Northern Georgia. But to do this, part of the force under Grant, now inactive after Vicksburg, should be ordered up at least as far east as the Tennessee, to protect the line of supplies and prevent any movement of the enemy to the rear on that flank of Rosecrans’s army. Another weighty consideration was that of forage for the animals of the command. By the middle of August, corn in the valleys of Southern Tennessee and Northern Alabama would be ripe, and subject to the wants of the army. It was General Rosecrans’s plan to wait until these movements could be accomplished and until the corn had ripened, and knowing the difficulties in the way at the best, of his successfully accomplishing his plans for the campaign, he wished at least to have that best in his favor.

In making his final preparations for his operations against Chattanooga, General Rosecrans considered two plans. One was to appear on the front of Chattanooga and attempt a direct attack on the town and reduce it by a lengthy siege. The other was to flank Bragg out of Chattanooga, as he had been compelled by the movement on the Tullahoma campaign to abandon his strongholds one by one.

The first plan could hardly be entertained, as Bragg was at his base, with but short lines to all important points under control of the rebel government, and at a place where in a very short time heavy reinforcements could be sent him, while Rosecrans in front of Chattanooga would be in a rough, sterile country, far away from his base of supplies, with a long wagon-haul over rocky mountain ranges from his nearest depôt. To attempt the movement on the left, or through Sequatchie Valley, would concentrate Bragg’s entire army at the contemplated point of crossing the Tennessee. This plan Bragg was prepared for, and was resting, quietly awaiting the movements of our army carrying it into effect. But it was not the purpose of Rosecrans to meet this expectation of his opponent. The genius of Rosecrans contemplated one of the most brilliant military movements of the war to obtain possession of this great stronghold of Nature, the gateway to East Tennessee and Northern Georgia, Chattanooga. At that time this place was of the utmost importance to each of the contending forces, and the highest prize in a military point of view that the Army of the Cumberland ever contended for.

To properly understand the magnitude and importance of the campaign that Rosecrans was now entering on, it is necessary that the topography of the country should be considered. The position of our army after the Tullahoma campaign was on the northwester base of the Cumberland range, in camp occupying McMinnville, Tullahoma, Dechard, and Winchester, with Chattanooga south of east. Immediately in front was the first great barrier in the advance movement–the Cumberland Mountains–a lofty range of rocks dividing the waters flowing into the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. The range rises far to the north and extends to the southwest into Alabama. North of Chattanooga the mountains are much bolder, more difficult to cross, with almost sheer declivities on each of the sides.

Beyond the main range, in the direct road to Chattanooga, running south, flows the Sequatchie River through the valley of that name, formed by another range jutting off slightly to the east from the main range, and between it and the Tennessee River. This spur is known by the name of Walling’s Ridge [NOTE from Brett and Bob: This is probably what is now known as Walden’s Ridge which was named after a Mr. Walling or Wallen as subsequently described. This Ridge was quite sparsely populated with an estimate of 11 families at the time of the civil war, so it’s history is not exactly well documented. Subsequent references use Walling’s Ridge to be consistent with the original text.], after an early settler and Indian hunter. It abuts close on the Tennessee in precipitous rocky bluffs.

South of the Tennessee, and separated from the mountain ranges north by this river, are the two ranges known as Sand and Lookout Mountains. The northern extremity of the former is called Raccoon Mountain. Here the river cuts its channel as a great chasm through these mountain ranges, so sharply defined that the masses abut directly upon the water in heavy palisades of rock.

The tops of all these mountain ranges are of poor soil but generally with considerable timber; rough, with but few roads, and these almost impassable for wagons and nearly destitute of water. The western slope of Sand Mountain reaches nearly to the Tennessee River. Between this latter range and Lookout Mountain is Lookout Valley with the creek of that name flowing through it into the Tennessee a short distance below Chattanooga. This valley is also known as Wills Valley, and at that time was traversed by a railroad branching from the Nashville road at Wauhatchie, terminating at Trenton.

Beyond this was Lookout range, 2,400 feet above the sea, with almost perpendicular sides, heavily wooded and with little water, abutting abruptly on the Tennessee, some two miles south of the town, with only three practical wagon roads over it–one close to the river, one at Johnson’s Crook, and the third at Winston’s Gap, twenty-six and forty-two miles respectively south of Chattanooga.

To the east of Lookout Mountain is Chattanooga Valley with the town at the head of it and the creek of that name flowing through, with Dry Creek as a branch emptying its waters into the Tennessee just south of the town. Beyond this to the east is Missionary Ridge, and parallel to it and just beyond is Chickamauga Valley, with the creek of that name running through it emptying into the river above Chattanooga, formed by East, Middle, and West Chickamauga Creeks, uniting with Pea Vine Creek between the latter two as a tributary. Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks have a common source in McLemore’s Cove, which is formed by Pigeon Mountain on the east, jutting to the north as a spur of Lookout Mountain, with the latter on the west, Missionary ridge running out as it enters this cove. The wagon road from Chattanooga to Rome, known as the La Fayette road, crosses Missionary Ridge into Chickamauga Valley at Rossville and proceeds thence nearly due south, crossing Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon Mills, thence to the east of Pigeon Mountain, passing through La Fayette some twenty-two miles south of Chattanooga; it then continues on to Summerville, within twenty-five miles of Rome, and so on to the latter place.

Beyond these ranges is Taylor’s ridge, with a number of lesser ranges between it and the Atlanta Railroad, running through Dalton. Both Pigeon Mountain and Taylor’s Ridge are very rough mountain ranges, with but few roads, and these only through gaps. At Dalton is the junction of the East Tennessee with the Atlanta Railroad, in the valley of the head waters of the Coosa River, which valley is here some ten miles wide and is the great natural passage-way into East Tennessee from the south.

To follow Bragg to Chattanooga and to cross the Tennessee above that place involved moving the army either to the north of the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or by Therman and Walling’s Ridge, some sixty-five to seventy miles through a country poorly supplied with water, with no forage, and by narrow and difficult wagon roads. This route would take Rosecrans further away from his base of supplies and line of communication than that south of the river. It was over this northern route that Bragg anticipated the onward movement of the Army of the Cumberland. This would enable him to make a protracted defence of the town and retard the advance for weeks, if not months. But Rosecrans’s plan of the campaign contemplated a much more hazardous movement and a far speedier one for the possession of Chattanooga. To accomplish this, however, it was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains with subsistence, ammunition, a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; then to cross his army over the Tennessee River, after that over Sand or Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley, and from there to cross Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges–Missionary Ridge–if he went directly to Chattanooga, or to cross Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor’s Ridge, if he struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. This involved the carrying by his army of ammunition for two great battles and twenty-five days’ subsistence.

As soon as the repairs were made on the main line to Stevenson, Rosecrans ordered Sheridan’s division to make an advance movement with two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson. Van Cleve had been ordered up with his divisions from Murfreesboro and was posted at McMinnville. On August 8th, stores being accumulated at the front, orders were issued to corps commanders to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for the general advance.

The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on August 16th, and the troops were ordered to move as follows:

“Crittenden’s corps in three columns to move through the Sequatchie Valley. Minty’s cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, and after covering the left flank of Van Cleve to proceed to Pikesville.

“Thomas to move Reynolds and Brannan from University by way of Battle Creek, where they were to take post, concealed near its mouth. Negley and Baird to go by way of Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek between Anderson and Stevenson.

“McCook to move Johnson by Salem and Larkin’s Ford to Bellefont. Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson. The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.”

These orders were complied with, and the movements completed by the evening of August 20th. Crittenden sent Hazen’s brigade on a reconnoissance to Harrison’s Landing, where he found the enemy throwing up works. On the next day Hazen took post at Poe’s cross-roads. Wilder was sent to reconnoitre from Harrison’s Landing to Chattanooga. On reaching Chattanooga, he was supported by Wagner’s brigade, and both commands opened fire on the next day, shelling the town from across the river. This bombardment of the place caused it to be evacuated by the rebel troops, to points beyond range outside, and the withdrawal by Bragg of his stores to points of convenience on the railroad to the rear. Bragg then ordered Anderson’s brigade to withdraw from Bridgeport.

The feint under Crittenden was so well timed that Bragg concentrated his immediate command at and above Chattanooga, leaving the crossing of the river by the main portion of our army later, unobstructed. Rosecrans had posted his army so that demonstrations were made simultaneously from Whitesburg to Blythe’s Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, and Bragg did not know just where to look for his real advance, but definitely concluded that it would NOT be made anywhere in the vicinity of Bridgeport. On the 26th, five days after the surprise at Chattanooga, Burnside’s advance into East Tennessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the vicinity of Knoxville. Bragg then ordered Buckner to evacuate Knoxville, and occupy Loudon. The demonstration at Blythe’s Ferry on the Tennessee, opposite the mouth of the Hiawasse, caused Bragg to order him to retire to Charleston, and soon thereafter to Chattanooga. On the 30th, information was given General Thomas that Johnston, with 15,000 men from Mississippi, had re-enforced Bragg.

Under cover of the apparent activity of the left of our army in front of and above Chattanooga, Rosecrans effected safely the crossing of the first great barrier to the objective point, and reached the banks of the Tennessee opposite the enemy, concealing as far as he could the movements of his troops, and the position of his pontoons and trains. He then had the river reconnoitered, that the best points might be selected and the means at once provided for the crossing. As soon as the crossings had been determined on, the proper dispositions were made to begin the movement.

The Tennessee River, at the various points where our army was to cross, is very wide; and, swollen by recent rains, was quite high for that season of the year. The troops crossed the river at four points. As there were not enough pontoons for two bridges, Sheridan had commenced trestlework for part of one at Bridgeport. Reynolds advanced to Shellmound, seizing the place. Here he captured a number of boats, and with these and other material picked up, he was enabled to cross at that point, while Brannan crossed his division from the mouth of Battle Creek on rafts. The main crossing of McCook’s corps was at Caperton’s Ferry, about forty miles below Chattanooga, where the pontoon bridge was laid by Davis’s division, after driving a detachment of rebel cavalry from the opposite side.

The movement across the river was commenced on August 29th, and completed on September 4th. Baird, in command of a division of Thomas’s corps, crossed the river at Bridgeport after the repairs were completed to the bridge. Negley’s division crossed at Caperton’s Ferry. The four divisions of Thomas’s corps with great difficulty crossed Sand Mountain, and concentrated near Trenton in Will’s Valley, east of Sand Mountain. On September 6th Negley’s division, being in the advance, reached Johnson’s Crook where Beatty’s brigade was sent at once up the mountain to seize Steven’s Gap. Before proceeding far he met the enemy’s pickets, and, night coming on, he went into camp just west of the gap. The Eighteenth Ohio went a short distance on the road to the top of Lookout Mountain, met the enemy’s pickets and withdrew. The next day, Baird’s division supporting Negley, the latter with two brigades, moved forward, and with his advance gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. The entire of Negley’s division reached this point on the 9th, at the head of Johnson’s Crook, and with one brigade held the pass while another was sent a short distance north on the mountain to seize Cooper’s Gap, with a regiment in the advance to occupy and hold the entrance on the east. Another regiment was sent forward to hold Stevens’s Gap, which was found heavily obstructed with fallen timber. Negley still being in the advance, moved the day following across Missionary Ridge, and took up a position in McLemore’s Cove on the road through Dug Gap. Here he found the enemy’s cavalry drawn up in line, and learned from citizens that the rebels were in strong force concentrated in his front in Dug Gap, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Baird’s division was in supporting distance of Negley.

Early in the morning of the 9th Reynolds sent the Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry) to make a reconnoissance along the top of Lookout Mountain, to discover the enemy’s movements and to determine the rumors in regard to the evacuation of Chattanooga. At 11 A.M. the regiment entered the town as the rear of the enemy’s column was leaving the place. The next day the four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were in supporting distance of each other, with Negley still in front of Dug Gap, the enemy holding the east entrance with a heavy force, and the Gap full of obstructions. Negley discovered early on the following day that his situation was critical, and that he was in danger of losing his train. He determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens’s Gap, which movement he proceeded to execute, and succeeded in the face of the enemy by his energy and skill, with the prompt co-operation of Baird, in securing his position in front of the gap without the loss of a single wagon. The next day the location of Bragg’s army at La Fayette with Johnston’s reinforcements was fully determined, and Thomas’s corps now awaited the movements of the other troops with reference to the concentration of the army.

In the meantime Davis’s and Johnson’s divisions of McCook’s corps, crossing the river at Caperton’s Ferry, moved over Sand Mountain into Will’s Valley, and thence–Davis being in the advance–moved into and seized Winston’s Gap, some twenty-five miles from Caperton’s Ferry, and about forty-two from Chattanooga. Sheridan’s division crossed the river at the railroad bridge, moved through Trenton, and on the 6th encamped twelve miles from Winston’s Gap. McCook sent several detachments on the 8th and 9th to different points, reconnoitering the enemy. One went to Alpine and two into Broomtown Valley, but nothing was discovered of Bragg’s whereabouts. On the evening of the 9th Rosecrans sent orders to McCook, stating that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and were retreating southward, and directing him to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and to attack on his flank. The day following McCook reached Alpine, where he discovered the situation. The enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga, the exact location as yet unknown. McCook learned that he could not communicate with Thomas, as his couriers could not pass through the valley, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, and that his corps was entirely isolated at Alpine. That, had he gone to Summerville, he would have been exposed to an attack from the entire rebel army, which his reconnoissance later determined was concentrated in force near La Fayette. On the following day McCook remained in camp waiting for Thomas to move up on him. He, however, sent his wagon-train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain. On the 12th McCook waited in camp for reports from the cavalry as to the position and movements of the enemy.

Crittenden’s corps had during the time moved down the Sequatchie Valley, in readiness for an active campaign. He then crossed the river at Bridgeport, Shell Mound, and Battle Creek, and on September 4th his entire corps was across the river. He was ordered to move up the valley of Running Water Creek and Whiteside, leaving one division on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and to push forward as near as possible to Chattanooga, threatening the enemy in that direction. At 6 A.M. on the 9th Crittenden was informed by a despatch from Rosecrans that Chattanooga had been abandoned by the enemy, and that he was to push forward at once with five day’s rations and make a vigorous pursuit. During the morning Crittenden with Wood’s division occupied the town, and Wood was placed in command. Palmer’s and Van Cleve’s were turned off south after they passed the spur of Lookout Mountain, and encamped at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga. In the afternoon of the same day Crittenden was ordered to leave a brigade at Chattanooga, and with the balance of his command to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor, the line of march to be through Ringgold and on to Dalton. The next day Crittenden left Wagner–who had crossed the river from the front of the town during the night–in command, and ordered forward Palmer’s, Van Cleve’s, and the two brigades of Wood’s division in pursuit, marching on the Rossville and Riggold road. During the afternoon Palmer reported the enemy’s cavalry strong on his front, that he had only been able to march six miles, had encamped at Chickamauga Creek, and that his advance had been checked by a charge of the rebel cavalry. That night Crittenden received several reports from his front that the enemy was in force near La Fayette, and threatening to retake Chattanooga.

During the 11th, Wood, with his two brigades, was on a reconnoissance at Gordon’s Mills, and Crittenden was ordered to occupy Ringgold and report. These movements determined to Rosecrans’s satisfaction the position of the enemy in force in the vicinity of La Fayette. He immediately ordered Crittenden to close his entire command upon Wood, crossing as quickly as possible to the Rossville and La Fayette road, to some point near Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Early on the morning of the 12th, Wilder was ordered back to Ringgold and directed to follow on the line of march of the infantry, covering the left flank. Crittenden succeeded during the day in effecting a concentration of his command at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, which point Wilder’s brigade reached after a severe skirmish during the day near Leet’s tanyard, where he lost thirty men killed and wounded. With the knowledge that Bragg was concentrating his forces awaiting reinforcements behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, and that his own army was scattered a distance of thirty miles from flank to flank–from Lee and Gordon’s Mills to Alpine–Rosecrans felt that it was a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of his army in the shortest possible space of time.

During these movements of the army under Rosecrans, what was Bragg doing? On August 20th, the movement of our army over the Cumberland Mountains was reported to Bragg, and he then knew that he might look for an immediate advance. The movement of our army across the Tennessee was also reported to Bragg by his scouts, but was regarded by him as incredible. These reports were soon after confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton and had advanced up the Will’s Valley Railroad as far as Wauhatchie, within seven miles of Chattanooga, as a covering force under which Rosecrans’s columns of infantry were advancing. Our army was now as near the line of communication of the rebel army, as the latter was to the line to Nashville, and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg commence operations to the north. Bringing his cavalry forward at once, Bragg soon ascertained that the general movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between the armies. He then determined to meet our army as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains. To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divisions, and he felt that his force would not permit this and make a successful attack also. Bragg put his army in motion on September 7th and 8th, and took up position from Lee and Gordon’s Mills to La Fayette, on the road running south from Chattanooga, with the front to the east side of Lookout Mountain, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek, establishing his headquarters at the former place.

The positions of our detached corps was fully known to Bragg on the 8th. Learning of Negley’s movement of the 9th into McLemore’s cove, Bragg rightly interpreted it to mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force, under the idea that he was in full retreat. With his own force concentrated in front of the centre, Bragg at once saw how Rosecrans had exposed the corps of his army to be attacked and defeated in detail, and that evening he gave order to Hindman to prepare his division to move against Negley, and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne’s division, join Hindman, and immediately move upon Negley. On receipt of these orders, Hill replied that his part of the movement was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both gaps–Dug and Catlett’s–had been closed by felling timber which would require twenty-four hours to remove. Hindman having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles, was now in position, some three miles from Negley in the cove. Bragg not wishing to lose so favorable an opportunity of striking his opponent’s force, ordered Buckner with his command to move from Anderson and join Hindman in the cove, which he did during the afternoon of the 10th. After these commands had united, the commanders held a consultation and determined that a change in the plan of operations should be made. Bragg having removed his headquarters to La Fayette, “so as to secure more prompt and decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy’s centre,” now directed Polk to send his remaining division to support Hindman during the operations in the cove. Despatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change of plans, Hindman and Cleburne waited his return. Bragg refused to make any change, and sent a verbal order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction. Bragg at the same time sent written orders by courier to Hindman, notifying him of the movements of our forces, that Polk had been directed to cover his rear, and ordered him to attack and force his way through Negley to La Fayette at the earliest hour in the morning, and adds “Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.” Walker’s reserve corps was also ordered to move promptly, join Cleburne’s division at Dug Gap and unite in the attack. All obstructions were removed from Dug and Catlett’s Gaps, and Breckenridge’s division of Hill’s corps was kept in position south of La Fayette to check any movement of our troops from that direction, thus putting 30,000 troops in position to crush Negley and Baird. Bragg shortly after daylight joined Cleburne, where they waited nearly all day for Hindman’s guns to open–when Cleburne was to attack–on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird’s divisions. After waiting long past noon in great anxiety for Hindman’s attack, about the middle of the afternoon his first gun was heard. Cleburne at once pressed forward and discovered that Negley had fallen back to Steven’s Gap.

Bragg, finding his attempt against Thomas’s corps a failure, then determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden’s divided corps, approaching from Chattanooga, by withdrawing the troops engaged in the movement on Thomas’s command to La Fayette, and directing Polk’s and Walker’s corps to move immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Bragg knew Crittenden’s corps was divided, but supposed only one division had been sent to Ringgold. At six o’clock on the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote again to Polk, notifying him of Crittenden’s position of the 11th, and stated: “This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler’s cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.” Later in the evening two additional orders were issued to Polk, urging him to attack promptly at “day-dawn,” on the 13th; that our army was concentrating, and that it should be quick and decided.” At eleven o’clock that night Polk sent a dispatch stating that he had taken a strong position for defense and asked that he be heavily re-enforced. Bragg sent him an immediate order not to defer his attack, as his command was numerically superior to the opposing force, and told him that to secure success, prompt and rapid movements on his part were necessary. Early on the morning of the 13th, Bragg, at the head of Buckner’s command, went to the front, and found no advance had been made by Polk as ordered, and that Crittenden had united his forces and recrossed the Chickamauga.

Again the attempt to strike our army in detail had failed, and now Bragg gave orders to his commanders to concentrate along the east bank of Chickamauga in position for battle, and as soon as his reinforcements under Longstreet from Virginia were up to attack with the entire command. Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry on the extreme left, was ordered to engage the attention of Thomas in McLemore’s Cove, covering the main movement of the rebel army; Forrest with his own and Pegram’s divisions of cavalry covered the right and front. Bragg ordered B. R. Johnson’s brigade from Ringgold, where he had been stationed protecting the railroad, to take position near Reed’s bridge on the extreme right of his line. Walker’s corps was then formed on Johnson’s left, opposite Alexander’s Bridge. Buckner’s corps was formed on the left of Walker, near Ledford’s Ford. Polk’s corps was placed in line opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mills on Buckner’s left, with Hill on the extreme left. Two brigades that had just arrived from Mississippi were placed under Johnson on the right, making his command a division of three brigades strong. To this division in the earlier movements three brigades of Longstreet’s corps from Virginia were temporarily attached. On the 18th, Hood reporting, was placed in command of this column on the right.

The rebel army on the 17th were in position, and that evening Bragg issued his orders for his forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at six o’clock on the morning of the 18th. Bragg’s plan of battle for the 18th was for the column under Johnson–later under Hood–to cross in force at Reed’s Bridge, rapidly turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Walker’s corps next on the left, crossing at Alexandria Bridge, was to unite in the movement, pressing our army vigorously on flank and rear, in the same direction. Buckner, crossing at Ledford’s Ford, was to join in the movement to the left, pressing our army back up the stream from Polk’s front. The latter to push forward to the front at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and if not able to cross there, to bear to the right and cross at Dalton’s Ford or Alexander’s Bridge, and unite in the attack wherever he could find an opposing force. Hill, to cover the left flank of the rebel army from an advance by our forces in the cove, to ascertain by pressing his cavalry to the front if we were reinforcing our corps at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and if so to attack on the flank. This plan contemplated the destruction of the left of our army, the seizing of the La Fayette road, and, if possible, occupying and holding the roads in Chattanooga Valley, cutting off all access from Chattanooga. These movements were not executed as rapidly as was contemplated by Bragg, owing to the resistance made by our cavalry and Wilder’s mounted infantry, and the difficulties arising from bad and narrow roads. Johnson was repeatedly urged to commence the movement on the right, but he delayed his advance until late in the afternoon, when Hood arrived and effected the crossing. Walker moved up to Alexander’s Bridge, at which point Wilder hotly contested his crossing, and finally broke up the bridge. Walker moved down the creek to Byron’s Ford, where he crossed and joined Hood on the right during the night. On Walker’s crossing, Wilder was compelled to fall back.

The concentration of our army continued on the 13th, Thomas held his position of the 12th, with Negley’s, Baird’s, and Brannan’s divisions remaining in camp, waiting the arrival of McCook, who had been ordered to close up to the left. Reynolds’s division was concentrated on the road from Cooper’s or Frick’s Gap to Catlett’s Gap, and the next day moved forward and took position at Pond Spring, with his two infantry brigades, and was joined here by Wilder. Reynolds sent Turchin to make a reconnoissance with the Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, to the mouth of Catlett’s Gap, driving the rebel cavalry pickets from Chickamauga Creek to the gap, where he found the enemy posted with strong reserves. Brannan on the same day reconnoitered the position of the enemy toward Dug Gap, sending a brigade to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee’s Mills, one mile to the right and south of Reynolds, at Pond Spring. Turchin made another reconnoissance on the 16th toward Catlett’s Gap, and found the enemy strongly posted there with infantry and artillery. The next day Thomas moved his entire corps and closed upon Crittenden’s right along Chickamauga Creek, and was joined at night by McCook on his right. The four divisions of Thomas’s command on the afternoon of the 18h moved to the left to Crawfish Springs. Here Rosecrans, anticipating the movement of Bragg to secure the road to Chattanooga, and recognizing the importance of holding it, ordered Thomas with his corps to march on the cross-road leading by the Widow Glenn’s to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and take position on that road near Kelly’s farm, connecting with Crittenden’s corps on his right at Gordon’s Mills. During the entire night of the 18th the troops of Thomas’s corps were moving to the left, and at daylight on the 19th the head of the column reached Kelly’s farm; Baird’s division in the advance, taking position at the forks of the road, facing toward Reed’s and Alexander’s Bridges over the Chickamauga. Wilder had been driven across the State road to the heights east of Widow Glenn’s house the evening before, by the advance in force of the enemy over these bridges, and Baird’s right rested close to Wilder’s brigade. Baird’s division was closely followed by Brannan, who was placed in position on the left of Baird, on the two roads leading to the bridges.

Orders were received by McCook at midnight on the 13th, directing two divisions of his corps to move to Thomas’s support, and that he send his train back under guard of his remaining division. McCook moved his command, by way of Valley Head, up the mountain at Alpine on the night of the 13th, and down on the 14th into Lookout Valley, except one brigade from each division forming his train guard under command of Lytle, encamped at Little River in the mountains. Sheridan’s marched down Lookout Valley to Johnson’s Crook, while Johnson’s and Davis’s divisions were sent from Valley head on the direct road to Stevens’s Gap. General Lytle was ordered to make a reconnoissance with two brigades toward Dougherty’s Gap at the head of McLemore’s Cove, and on the night of the 18th General Lytle joining the corps with two of his brigades, McCook’s command was closed up on the Fourteenth Corps, except Post’s brigade of Davis’s division, ordered by General Rosecrans to hold Stevens’s Gap at all hazards.

Crittenden on the 13th, under orders from headquarters, posted Wood’s division in a strong position at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, under orders to resist any advance of the enemy to last, and in case of extremity, if Granger was not in position to support, then to fall back to some point where he could guard the road to Chattanooga and the one around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold both roads, as long as he had a man under him. The next day Crittenden moved the two remaining divisions of his corps to a position on the southern spur of Missionary Ridge, his right communicating with Thomas, where he was to remain, covering the road in Chattanooga Valley. Finding no movement of the enemy on his front, on the 15th Crittenden was ordered to return with his command and take position near Crawfish Spring, with Van Cleve on the left and Palmer on the right. During the day Minty with the cavalry made an extended reconnoissance on the front, finding the enemy in force at all points. Wood, holding position on Chickamauga Creek, at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, on the morning of the 18th reported the enemy advancing with strong line of skirmishers on his left and asked for supports. Van Cleve was placed on Wood’s left and Palmer then took Van Cleve’s position on Wood’s right. Wilder in the afternoon reported Minty’s cavalry driven back after being re-enforced with two of his regiments; that the enemy was flanking him and that he would fall back on Wood. Palmer later in the day was placed on the left of Van Cleve’s new position on the line of Chickamauga Creek, his last brigade reaching its position at four o’clock on the morning of the 19th; Wood holding his position on the creek at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, which at this point runs between steep rocky bluffs in an eastwardly course, with the road to Chattanooga via Rossville crossing it at right angles; Van Cleve on his left and Palmer on the left of Van Cleve; the general course of the line being northeasterly along the Chickamauga and Rossville road.

Chapter XII.

The Battle of Chickamauga.

Colonel Dan. McCook, of Granger’s reserve corps, who had been posted on the road leading to Reed’s Bridge, on the evening of the 18th, made a reconnoissance to Chickamauga Creek as far as Reed’s Bridge, which he burned. On the 19th, meeting Thomas, he reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was on the west side of the creek, and as the bridge was destroyed a prompt movement in that direction might succeed in capturing the entire force. Thomas ordered Brannan to post a brigade on the road to Alexander’s Bridge as support to Baird, and with his other brigades to reconnoitre the road to Reed’s Bridge in search of this brigade of the enemy. Brannan moved at nine o’clock A.M., and Baird, under orders from Thomas, threw forward his right wing so as to get into line with Brannan. Baird was also ordered to keep a sharp outlook on his right flank and watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter. Shortly after these movements a part of Palmer’s division reported to Thomas and was placed in position on the right of Baird. Rosecrans, when he sent Thomas to the left–the critical point–told him that he was to hold the road to Rossville, and if hard pressed, that he should be re-enforced with the entire army.

Under Bragg’s orders, Walker’s corps on the 18th crossed the west side of Chickamauga a little below Alexander’s Bridge and then moved up the stream opposite this point. Bushrod Johnson’s command the same day crossed at Reed’s bridge, and then marched up the stream some three miles and took position on the morning of the 19th. Walker resumed his movement to his left up the stream, under the impression that our centre was still at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, Bragg’s plan being to mass Walker’s and Johnson’s commands and attack our left flank. The advance movement of Brannan’s division, Croxton’s brigade in front, about ten o’clock encountered the enemy, being the cavalry under Forrest with Wilson’s and Ector’s brigades of infantry, and drove them nearly half a mile, when it met with obstinate resistance. This reconnoissance of Brannan in pursuit of the brigade reported by Dan. McCook developed the relative position of the opposing contending forces, which up to this time was unknown to the respective commanders of each. It gave to Bragg the knowledge that his right was greatly overlapped by Thomas on our left, and that his flank was in danger of being turned. It compelled him at once to halt Walker’s command on its march, and to direct it to retrace its steps and reinforce Forrest, now engaged with Croxton, whose movement brought on the battle of Chickamauga before Bragg had his troops in the position ordered.

Thomas then ordered Baird’s division forward to Croxton’s support. Moving at once with two brigades on the front, with Starkweather’s in reserve, Baird and Croxton drove the enemy steadily for some distance with great loss, capturing many prisoners. Croxton’s brigade having exhausted its ammunition in the severe fighting of over an hour, was then moved to the rear, and Brannan’s and Baird’s divisions with united forces drove the enemy from their immediate front. Here the line was halted and readjusted. Baird learning from his prisoners that the rebel army was in heavy force on his immediate front, gathering for an attack in mass, drew back his right wing and waited the assault of Bragg’s right on his line, which was made in heavy force by Walker, who had reached his new position. Before Baird had completed the reforming of his line, Walker’s corps, in overwhelming numbers was upon him, assaulting Scribner’s and King’s brigades, and driving them back in disorder.

McCook, early on the morning of the 19th, had taken position with his corps at Crawfish Spring, and was now beyond the extreme left of the rebel army, massing his troops at this point and waiting for orders. At a little after ten o’clock in the morning he was directed to take command of the right and the cavalry on that flank. This included Negley’s division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was watching the fords of Chickamauga near Crawfish Spring, one brigade of his command being then engaged with the enemy. The same order directed McCook to send Johnson’s divisions to the left to report to Thomas, and following this came another one from Rosecrans directing McCook to send Davis’s division also to Thomas. On Baird being driven back, General Thomas ordered Johnson’s and Reynolds’s division of his own corps–both of whom had opportunely arrived by this time–immediately to advance and drive the enemy back. Johnson arriving first was ordered at once to advance his left, connecting with Baird’s right, Palmer was immediately placed on Johnson’s right and Reynolds still to the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as the line was thus formed the troops advanced, attacking Walker’s corps on the flank with great vigor, driving it in confusion back to its first position, while Brannan’s division, fighting them on the front, drove back the head of the column and retook the artillery which had been captured from Baird when he was driven back. Bragg then ordered up Cheatham’s division, which had been in reserve, reinforcing Walker. With these two commands united, the rebels pressed forward with loud yells, determined on the destruction of our left. As these two commands advanced, a gap was made in their lines, into which Bragg threw Stewart’s division. As they encountered our line, these troops moved forward. Striking Johnson first, they drove him from his position in disorder, then Palmer was compelled to retire, when Van Cleve coming to his support was also beaten back. Reynolds then in turn was overpowered and the rebels seemed to be sweeping every thing before them as at Stone’s River. By this time Davis had reported with his division, and moving at once to the front checked the rebel advance, when Wood coming up to his assistance, our lines were reformed, and Cheatham’s, Stewart’s, and Walker’s troops were driven in rapid retreat back to their original line. Sheridan, under orders, had left Lytle’s brigade to hold Lee and Gordon’s Mills on our extreme right, and moved to our left in support of the new line near Wood’s and Davis’s divisions. He reached the position opportunely and aided in driving back the rebels, Bradley’s brigade recapturing the Eighth Indiana battery previously taken by the enemy. A large number of prisoners were captured belonging to Longstreet’s corps.

Bragg, finding that his plan of battle was discovered by his opponent, and that the latter intended to dispute to the end for the possession of the Rossville and Chattanooga road, ordered Polk to cross the creek with his remaining division at the nearest ford and to assume command in person on their right. Hill with his corps was also ordered to move across the Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon’s Mills and to join the line on the right.

The rebels made another desperate assault at about half past two o’clock on our right. Hood’s corps, with Bushrod Johnson’s division from the enemy’s centre, moved forward in heavy masses, assaulting furiously Reynolds’s and Van Cleve’s divisions. Here they met with fearful loss from the heavy infantry and artillery fire, portions of six batteries opening with canister on their advancing columns, but still on they came. Soon the roar of battle was heard approaching near to the Widow Glenn’s house, where Rosecrans’s headquarters were. Our right centre now was pierced and the enemy was on the La Fayette road. Negley, from the right under McCook, was immediately ordered up with his division, Brannan from Thomas’s left joining him. These two divisions were at once sent in to the fight. Moving rapidly forward to the attack, with cheer on cheer, they hurled back Hood and Johnson, steadily driving them until darkness ended the combat, our troops re-occupying their old positions.

Thomas, wishing to reform his lines–which had become greatly extended in driving the rebels–and concentrate them on more commanding ground in the rear preparatory to the engagement to be renewed on the morrow, selected a new position for Baird’s and Johnson’s divisions, the former on the extreme left. These positions were designated to them and were occupied at once. Palmer and Reynolds were ordered into position in line on the right of Johnson, with Brannan to the rear and right of Reynolds as reserve. While these movements were being made, Cleburne with his fresh division of Hill’s corps, who had been ordered to the extreme right by Bragg, under orders to attack immediately, advancing in full force, supported by Cheatham, assaulted Johnson first and then Baird with tremendous force. The onset was so determined that some confusion in the line resulted, but in a few minutes our troops rallied and the enemy was repulsed in fine style. This conflict lasted for some time after dark with heavy losses on both sides, the heavy firing lighting up the struggle. At this point our artillery was again used with good effect. Wilder’s brigade had occupied a position during the day on the La Fayette road about a mile north of Lee and Gordon’s Mills, with Minty close by. The latter was now ordered to report to Granger at Rossville, to hold in check the enemy’s cavalry operating on their right. Granger, with his reserves protected the roads to the rear toward Rossville and covered our left flank.

With night the fighting ceased, and the troops, worn out after the marching of the night before–moving from the right to the extreme left–and the heavy fighting of the day, slept on their arms, awaiting the heavier conflict of the morrow. Though weary, the troops were in most excellent spirits, and confident of final victory. It was known throughout the army that we had been fighting during the day largely superior forces. That Bragg had been heavily re-enforced from Mississippi and East Tennessee, and by Longstreet’s command from Virginia, and that the enemy was fighting most desperately. Bragg’s great aim had been to conceal his main attack on our left by the feint on the centre, and supposed that our centre on the morning of the 19th was still at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Presuming this to be the case, Bragg had massed heavily on our left, intending to repeat his movement made on our right at Murfreesboro. His plan contemplated the breaking of our left, sweeping it before him in broken masses, crushing our centre, and destroying our right, and then occupying the road to Chattanooga in force he would have the Federal army completely in his power. The movement made by Croxton compelled Bragg to open the battle in heavy force on the left, before his troops had secured the positions assigned them, and then, to his surprise, he found that during the night our left had been greatly prolonged, and that Rosecrans was in force, occupying a position far to the north of what he had been led to expect. During the night Bragg ordered up by forced marches all reinforcements arriving by railroad. Three brigades of fresh troops reached the enemy during the night, and were placed in line early in the morning of the 20th. These, with the troops ordered late the day before from the east bank of the Chickamauga, gave Bragg a large number of fresh troops, which he placed in line of battle on the 20th. During the night Bragg summoned his generals to meet him at his camp fire, and there gave them orders for the following day. He divided his entire force into two commands, to which he assigned his senior Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet and Polk. The former–who had reported during the night–to the left, composed of six divisions where his own troops were stationed, and the latter continuing in his command of five divisions on the right. Bragg’s plan of battle for the 20th was for Polk to assault in force, with Breckinridge’s division on his extreme right at day-dawn, when the attack was to be taken up rapidly in succession by the divisions to his left. The left wing was to await the movement on the right, and when the attack was made there to take it up promptly. When the entire line became engaged it was to move forward vigorously and persistently throughout its entire length, the whole army wheeling on Longstreet’s left as a pivot, but constantly pressing our left to get possession of the road to Chattanooga.

The battle of the 19th was a series of brilliant charges and counter-charges, in favor of first one side and then the other. During the day our troops, at times broken and driven by the enemy, always promptly rallied and drove the rebels in disorder to their