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The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, v6 by Abraham Lincoln

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THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Volume Six

CONSTITUTIONAL EDITION

WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

1862-1863

RECOMMENDATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 14, 1862.

TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The third section of the "Act further to promote the efficiency of
the Navy," approved 21st of December, 1861, provides:

"That the President of the United States by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall have the authority to detail from the
retired list of the navy for the command of squadrons and single
ships such officers as he may believe that the good of the service
requires to be thus placed in command; and such officers may, if upon
the recommendation of the President of the United States they shall
receive a vote of thanks of Congress for their services and gallantry
in action against an enemy, be restored to the active list, and not
otherwise."

In conformity with this law, Captain David G. Farragut was nominated
to the Senate for continuance as the flag-officer in command of the
squadron which recently rendered such important service to the Union
by his successful operations on the lower Mississippi and capture of
New Orleans.

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully
correspond with the intention of the law or be more pregnant with
happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain D.
G. Farragut receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and
gallantry displayed in the capture since 21st December, 1861, of
Forts Jackson and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the
destruction of various rebel gunboats, rams, etc............

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I submit herewith a list of naval officers who commanded vessels
engaged in the recent brilliant operations of the squadron commanded
by Flag-officer Farragut which led to the capture of Forts Jackson
and St. Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of rebel
gunboats, rams, etc., in April 1862. For their services and
gallantry on those occasions I cordially recommend that they should,
by name, receive a vote of thanks of Congress:

LIST:
Captain Theodorus Bailey.
Captain Henry W. Morris.
Captain Thomas T. Craven.
Commander Henry H. Bell.
Commander Samuel Phillips Lee.
Commander Samuel Swartwout.
Commander Melancton Smith.
Commander Charles Stewart Boggs
Commander John De Camp
Commander James Alden.
Commander David D. Porter.
Commander Richard Wainwright.
Commander William B. Renshaw.
Lieutenant Commanding Abram D. Harrell.
Lieutenant Commanding Edward Donaldson.
Lieutenant Commanding George H. Preble.
Lieutenant Commanding Edward T. Nichols.
Lieutenant Commanding Jonathan M. Wainwright.
Lieutenant Commanding John Guest.
Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. B. Caldwell.
Lieutenant Commanding Napoleon B. Harrison.
Lieutenant Commanding Albert N. Smith.
Lieutenant Commanding Pierce Crosby.
Lieutenant Commanding George M. Ransom.
Lieutenant Commanding Watson Smith.
Lieutenant Commanding John H. Russell.
Lieutenant Commanding Walter W. Queen.
Lieutenant Commanding K. Randolph Breese.
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Seliin E. Woolworth.
Acting Lieutenant Commanding Charles H. Baldwin.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 14, 1862

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, May 15, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Cumberland, Virginia:

Your long despatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more
fully soon. Will say now that all your despatches to the Secretary
of War have been promptly shown to me. Have done and shall do all I
could and can to sustain you. Hoped that the opening of James River
and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to
Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am
still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between
Richmond and here.

A. LINCOLN.

SPEECH TO THE 12TH INDIANA REGIMENT,
MAY [15?] 1862

SOLDIERS, OF THE TWELFTH INDIANA REGIMENT: It
has not been customary heretofore, nor will it be hereafter, for me
to say something to every regiment passing in review. It occurs too
frequently for me to have speeches ready on all occasions. As you
have paid such a mark of respect to the chief magistrate, it appears
that I should say a word or two in reply. Your colonel has thought
fit, on his own account and in your name, to say that you are
satisfied with the manner in which I have performed my part in the
difficulties which have surrounded the nation. For your kind
expressions I am extremely grateful, but on the other hand I assure
you that the nation is more indebted to you, and such as you, than to
me. It is upon the brave hearts and strong arms of the people of the
country that our reliance has been placed in support of free
government and free institutions.

For the part which you and the brave army of which you are a part
have, under Providence, performed in this great struggle, I tender
more thanks especially to this regiment, which has been the subject
of good report. The thanks of the nation will follow you, and may
God's blessing rest upon you now and forever. I hope that upon your
return to your homes you will find your friends and loved ones well
and happy. I bid you farewell.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL:

What is the strength of your force now actually with you?

A. LINCOLN.

MEMORANDUM OF PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS OF ABOVE DATE TO
GENERAL McDOWELL, AND GENERAL MEIGS'S INDORSEMENT THEREON.

May 17, 1862.
You will retain the separate command of the forces taken with you;
but while co-operating with General McClellan you will obey his
orders, except that you are to judge, and are not to allow your force
to be disposed otherwise than so as to give the greatest protection
to this capital which may be possible from that distance.

[Indorsement.]
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The President having shown this to me, I suggested that it is
dangerous to direct a subordinate not to obey the orders of his
superior in any case, and that to give instructions to General
McClellan to this same end and furnish General McDowell with a copy
thereof would effect the object desired by the President. He desired
me to say that the sketch of instructions to General McClellan
herewith he thought made this addition unnecessary.

Respectfully,
M. C. M.

INDORSEMENT RELATING TO GENERAL DAVID HUNTER'S
ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION,

MAY 17, 1862

No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility
without consulting me.

A. LINCOLN.

FROM SECRETARY STANTON TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1862.

GENERAL:
Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been
received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it
is believed that, even if this were prudent, it would require more
time to effect a junction between your army and that of the
Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land
march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack
upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been
ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is
ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from
all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in
communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-
operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by
extending your right-wing to the north of Richmond.

It is believed that this communication can be safely established
either north or south of the Pamunkey River.

In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the
enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming
force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five
and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The
specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any
danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to co-
operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting
this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no
order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of
position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each
other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for
efficient cooperation. When General McDowell is in position on your
right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will
instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that
route.

The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the
Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves
forward.

By order of the President:
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond.

PROCLAMATION REVOKING
GENERAL HUNTER'S ORDER
OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION, MAY 19, 1862.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

A Proclamation

Whereas there appears in the public prints what purports to be a
proclamation of Major general Hunter, in the words and figures
following, to wit:

(General Orders No. 11)
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HILTON HEAD, PORT ROYAL, S. C.,
May 9, 1862.

"The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising
the military department of the South, having deliberately declared
themselves no longer under the protection of the United States of
America, and having taken up arms against the said United States, it
became a military necessity to declare martial law. This was
accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial
law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The persons in
these three States: Georgia Florida, and South Carolina--heretofore
held as slaves are therefore declared forever free.
"By command of Major-General D. Hunter:
"(Official.)ED. W. SMITH,
"Acting Assistant Adjutant-General."

And whereas the same is producing some excitement and
misunderstanding: therefore,

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and
declare that the Government of the United States, had no knowledge,
information, or belief of an intention on the part of General Hunter
to issue such a proclamation; nor has it yet any authentic
information that the document is genuine. And further, that neither
General Hunter nor any other commander or person has been authorized
by the Government of the United States to make a proclamation
declaring the slaves of any State free; and that the supposed
proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether
void so far as respects such a declaration.

I further make known that whether it be competent for me, as
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of any
State or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shall
have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the
government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which under
my responsibility I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel
justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field.

These are totally different questions from those of police
regulations in armies and camps.

On the sixth day of March last, by special message, I recommended to
Congress the adoption of a joint resolution, to be substantially as
follows:

Resolved, That the United States ought to co-operate with any State
which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State
pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to
compensate for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by
such change of system.

The resolution in the language above quoted was adopted by large
majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic,
definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people
most immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of
those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue--I beseech you
to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind
to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged
consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and
partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common
object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee.
The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven,
not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much
good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the
providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast
future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day of May, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of
the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. E. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I have just been waited on by a large committee who present a
petition signed by twenty-three senators and eighty-four
representatives asking me to restore General Hamilton to his
division. I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be understood
as rebuking you. Please answer at once.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, May 22, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just
such control of General McDowell and his forces as you therein
indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get
aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless
his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him
will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can
reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he would not
reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's
single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. LINCOLN,
President United States.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1862. 4 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN:

In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been
compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The
enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are
trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General
McDowell's in their rear.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 24, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's
command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday
morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for
other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a
probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two Companies cavalry,
putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson now opposing General
McDowell's advance have as their line of supply and retreat the road
to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you
could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies
from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of
the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the
army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of
nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will
secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now
have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are
building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say
they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to
move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as
you indicated in your long despatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL RUFUS SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May, 24 1862. 2 P.M.

GENERAL SAXTON:

Geary reports Jackson with 20,000 moving from Ashby's Gap by the
Little River turnpike, through Aldie, toward Centreville. This he
says is reliable. He is also informed of large forces south of him.
We know a force of some 15,000 broke up Saturday night from in front
of Fredericksburg and went we know not where. Please inform us, if
possible, what has become of the force which pursued Banks yesterday;
also any other information you have.

A. LINCOLN

TELEGRAM TO COLONEL D. S. MILES.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 1.30 P.M.

COLONEL MILES, Harper's Ferry, Virginia

Could you not send scouts from Winchester who would tell whether
enemy are north of Banks, moving on Winchester? What is the latest
you have?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Franklin:

You are authorized to purchase the 400 horses, or take them wherever
or however you can get them. The exposed condition of General Banks
makes his immediate relief a point of paramount importance. You are
therefore directed by the President to move against Jackson at
Harrisonburg and operate against the enemy in such way as to relieve
Banks. This movement must be made immediately. You will acknowledge
the receipt of this order, and specify the hour it is received by
you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862. 7.15 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Franklin, Virginia:

Many thanks for the promptness with which you have answered that you
will execute the order. Much--perhaps all--depends upon the celerity
with which you can execute it. Put the utmost speed into it. Do not
lose a minute.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, near Corinth, Mississippi:

Several despatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from
Governor Morton asking reinforcements for you have been received. I
beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame
where I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond
to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to
his own. Under this pressure We thinned the line on the upper
Potomac, until yesterday it was broken with heavy loss to us, and
General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet
extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this
breach, and have them not at hand. My dear General, I feel justified
to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and
men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 24, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Fredricksburg:

General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin
on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy
Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for
the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at
once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance of the line
of the Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the
forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General
Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation,
interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force which
you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The
information thus far received here makes it probable that if the
enemy operate actively against General Banks, you will not be able to
count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release
him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with
Ewell eight miles from Winchester.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., May 24, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL I. McDOWELL:

I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my order. The
change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any
one. Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your
movement.

A. LINCOLN

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. W. GEARY.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862 1.45 P.M.

GENERAL GEARY, White Plains:

Please give us your best present impression as to the number of the
enemy's forces north of Strasburg and Front Royal. Are the forces
still moving north through the gap at Front Royal and between you and
there?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862. 2 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks
before him--precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also
threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, from
both north and south--in precisely what force we cannot tell. I
think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not
be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of
Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack
Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington.
Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN, President.

ORDER TAKING MILITARY POSSESSION OF RAILROADS.
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

Ordered: By virtue of the authority vested by act of Congress, the
President takes military possession of all the railroads in the
United States from and after this date until further order, and
directs that the respective railroad companies, their officers and
servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation
of such troops and munitions of war as may be ordered by the military
authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

By order of the Secretary of War.
M. C. MEIGS

TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY CHASE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

SECRETARY CHASE, Fredericksburg, Virginia:

It now appears that Banks got safely into Winchester last night, and
is this morning retreating on Harper's Ferry. This justifies the
inference that he is pressed by numbers superior to his own. I think
it not improbable that Ewell, Jackson, and Johnson are pouring
through the gap they made day before yesterday at Front Royal, making
a dash northward. It will be a very valuable and very honorable
service for General McDowell to cut them off. I hope he will put all
possible energy and speed into the effort.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

If Banks reaches Martinsburg, is he any the better for it? Will not
the enemy cut him from thence to Harper's Ferry? Have you sent
anything to meet him and assist him at Martinsburg? This is an
inquiry, not an order.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862. 6.30 P.M.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

One good six-gun battery, complete in its men and appointments, is
now on its way to you from Baltimore. Eleven other guns, of
different sorts, are on their way to you from here. Hope they will
all reach you before morning. As you have but 2500 men at Harper's
Ferry, where are the rest which were in that vicinity and which we
have sent forward? Have any of them been cut off?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

I fear you have mistaken me. I did not mean to question the
correctness of your conduct; on the contrary! I approve what you have
done. As the 2500 reported by you seemed small to me, I feared some
had got to Banks and been cut off with him. Please tell me the exact
number you now have in hand.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
[Sent in cipher.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., May 25,1862. 8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about
6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for
McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered
at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell
upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front
Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the
24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks, on the road to
Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester
yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two
forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward
Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on
the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near
Front Royal, With 10,000, following up and supporting, as I
understand, the forces now pursuing Banks, also that another force of
10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped
here, as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them
crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about
20,000 of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front
Royal, and General Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to
Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's
rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's
Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at
Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here
and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their
places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States.
We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which
arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our
situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly
helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness
to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's
force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with
the force you have.

A. LINCOLN.

HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY OF REBELLION

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

MAY 16, 1862

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims
at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was
clandestinely prepared during the Winter of 1860 and 1861, and
assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional
government at Montgomery, in Alabama on the 18th day of February,
1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the
flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and the capture of Fort
Sumter, Which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation.
Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were
obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege.
The mails in every direction were stopped and the lines of telegraph
cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had
been called out by the government for the defense of Washington were
prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined
treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no
adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress
had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It
became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing
means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should
let the government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself
of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of
insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its
blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the
departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the
office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their
unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should
proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, and
especially the California treasure ships then on their way to this
coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to
purchase or charter and arm as quickly as possible five steamships
for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the
navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase or charter and arm an equal
number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York
to purchase or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander
Gillis to purchase or charter and arm and put to sea two other
vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Dupont, with a
view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I
directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid
and efficient services, in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D.
Morgan, the Governor of New York, or in his absence George D. Morgan,
William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were
by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to
act for his department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the
forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense.

The several departments of the government at that time contained so
large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible
to provide safely through official agents only for the performance of
the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their
ability, loyalty, and patriotism.

The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by
private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard
cities, inland across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the
northern lakes. I believe by these and other similar measures taken
in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the
government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of
the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial
persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such
misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary
proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.

I recall these transactions now because my attention has been
directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of
Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these
words:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War by investing
Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money
and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction,
without requiring from him any guaranty for the faithful performance
of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were
available, and by involving the government in a vast number of
contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business
pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the
purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly
injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the
House."

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in
justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to
rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is
unanimously entertained by the heads of department who participated
in the proceedings which the House of Representatives have censured.
It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that although he fully approved the
proceedings they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that
not only the President, but all the other heads of departments, were
at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or
fault was committed in the premises.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. 12.40

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and
baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably
safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862. 1 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Falmouth, Virginia:

Despatches from Geary just received have been sent you. Should not
the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at
Fredericksburg, move this way--to Manassas Junction or Alexandria?
As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these
questions.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Can you not cut the Alula Creek railroad? Also, what impression have
you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of
Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

May 27.1862. 9.58 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to
march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1862.

GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston:

The President directs that the militia be relieved, and the
enlistments made for three years, or during the war. This, I think,
will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest
intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his
whole command with small loss.

Concentrations of our force have been made, which it is hoped will
capture the enemy.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT,

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield

The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders,
unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of
Rodney, in which case you will move upon him. Acknowledge the
receipt of this order, and the hour it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General McClellan at 6.30 P.M. yesterday telegraphed that Fitz-John
Porter's division had fought and driven 13,000 of the enemy, under
General Branch, from Hanover Court-House, and was driving them from a
stand they had made on the railroad at the time the messenger left.
Two hours later he telegraphed that Stoneman had captured an engine
and six cars on the Virginia Central, which he at once sent to
communicate with Porter. Nothing further from McClellan.

If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover
Court-House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg
should not push through and join him.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

What of F.J. Porter's expedition? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON. May 28, 1862. 4 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this
side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue
Ridge looking for them.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 5.40 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are
still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of
legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Fremont as much,
and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I
suppose you know Fremont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going
into Harrisonburg.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 28, 1862. 8.40 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a
total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and
Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all
the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to
see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from
Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from
Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That
the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot
be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry informs
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewells, forced his
advance from Charlestown today. General King telegraphs us from
Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000
left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am
painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you,
and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard
to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT, Moorefield:

The order to remain at Moorefield was based on the supposition that
it would find you there.

Upon subsequent information that the enemy were still operating in
the vicinity of Winchester and Martinsburg, you were directed to move
against the enemy.

The President now again directs you to move against the enemy without
delay. Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and the time
received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 10 A.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY, McClellan's Headquarters:

Yours just received. I think it cannot be certainly known whether
the force which fought General Porter is the same which recently
confronted McDowell. Another item of evidence bearing on it is that
General Branch commanded against Porter, while it was General
Anderson who was in front of McDowell. He and McDowell were in
correspondence about prisoners.
A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
May 29, 1862. 10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly
whether any considerable force of the enemy--Jackson or any one else
--is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected
development into your calculations.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Williamsport, Maryland:

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near
Front Royal at twelve (noon) tomorrow. General Fremont will be at or
near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow
and harass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for
General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

General McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and
probably will, be at Front Royal by twelve (noon) to-morrow. His
force, when up, will be about 20,000. Please have your force at
Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that
point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by the same time. Your
despatch No.30 received and satisfactory.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General Fremont's force should, and probably will, be at or near
Strasburg by twelve (noon) tomorrow. Try to have your force, or the
advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 1.20 P.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY:

Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our
forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on
the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the
country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I somewhat apprehend that Fremont's force, in its present condition,
may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the
enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your
column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force
reaching Front Royal will amount to.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10.15 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,
Williamsport, Maryland, via Harper's Ferry:

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and
Winchester, Or any or all of them, he may come in collision with
Fremont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at
Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Fremont if possible;
the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning
of my despatch yesterday.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 12.40.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown:

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Fremont has
nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part
of it. I have a despatch from Fremont this morning, not telling me
where he is; but he says:
"Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously
at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet."

The high figures erroneous, of course. Do you know where Longstreet
is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 2.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

Yours, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 P.M.
Saturday, has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he
directed to act in view of it. You must be up to the time you
promised, if possible.

Corinth was evacuated last night, and is occupied by our troops to-
day; the enemy gone south to Okolotia, on the railroad to Mobile.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON CITY, May 30, 1862.9.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown, Va.:

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry:
"The rebels are in line of battle in front of our lines. They have
nine pieces of artillery, and in position, and cavalry. I shelled
the woods in which they were, and they in return threw a large number
of shells into the lines and tents from which I moved last night to
take up a stronger position. I expect a great deal from the battery
on the mountain, having three 9 inch Dahlgren bearing directly on the
enemy's approaches. The enemy appeared this morning and then
retired, with the intention of drawing us on. I shall act on the
defensive, as my position is a strong one. In a skirmish which took
place this afternoon I lost one horse, The enemy lost two men killed
and seven wounded.

"R. SAXTON, Brigadier General."

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General
Fremont.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 10.20 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front
Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of
Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of
Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within
it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry
at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields,
with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A.M. yesterday,
with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the
enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and
stores, and saved the bridge.

General Fremont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at
or near Strasburg at 5 P.M. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport,
with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed
to co-operate. Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an
additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having
entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true.
Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON

TO GENERAL G. A. McCALL, WASHINGTON, May 31, 1562.

GENERAL McCALL:

The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to
justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your
position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., June 1, 1862. 9.30.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the
attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any
only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General
Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and
sending General Dix to Port Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry.
We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy
so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication.
Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. 6.15 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Front Royal, Virginia:

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or flank Jackson. Please
tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time
this reaches you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your despatch of to-day to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the
good news it brings.

Have you anything from Memphis or other parts of the Mississippi
River? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, Tennessee:

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel
prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseeans? If you do, please tell
us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
[Cipher.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch about Chattanooga and Dalton was duly received and sent
to General Halleck. I have just received the following answer from
him:

We have Fort Pillow, Randolph, and Memphis.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all
of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think
it probable that you include some combination of the force near
Cumberland Gap under General Morgan.

Do you?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Winchester:

We are arranging a general plan for the valley of the Shenandoah, and
in accordance with this you will move your main force to the
Shenandoah at or opposite Front Royal as soon as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no farther. Get your force
well in hand and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement
of the enemy either back toward Strasburg or toward Franklin, and
await further orders, which will soon be sent you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[Cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, 'Tennessee:

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like
number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove
the proposition.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Accounts, which we do not credit, represent that Jackson is largely
reinforced and turning upon you. Get your forces well in hand and
keep us well and frequently advised; and if you find yourself really
pressed by a superior force of the enemy, fall back cautiously toward
or to Winchester, and we will have in due time Banks in position to
sustain you. Do not fall back upon Harrisonburg unless upon
tolerably clear necessity. We understand Jackson is on the other
side of the Shenandoah from you, and hence cannot in any event press
you into any necessity of a precipitate withdrawal.

A. LINCOLN.

P.S.--Yours, preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, is just
received. On this point use your discretion, remembering that our
object is to give such protection as you can to western Virginia.
Many thanks to yourself, officers, and men for the gallant battle of
last Sunday.
A. L.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

June 13, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: I herewith transmit a memorial addressed and
presented to me in behalf of the State of New York in favor of
enlarging the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canal. While I have not
given nor have leisure to give the subject a careful examination, its
great importance is obvious and unquestionable. The large amount of
valuable statistical information which is collated and presented in
the memorial will greatly facilitate the mature consideration of the
subject, which I respectfully ask for it at your hands.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON; June 13. 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

We cannot afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's
engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. You
fought Jackson alone and worsted him. He can have no substantial
reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely
you and Banks in supporting distance are capable of keeping him from
returning to Winchester. But if Sigel be sent forward to you, and
McDowell (as he must) be put to other work, Jackson will break
through at Front Royal again. He is already on the right side of the
Shenandoah to do it, and on the wrong side of it to attack you. The
orders already sent you and Banks place you and him in the proper
positions for the work assigned you. Jackson cannot move his whole
force on either of you before the other can learn of it and go to his
assistance. He cannot divide his force, sending part against each of
you, because he will be too weak for either. Please do as I directed
in the order of the 8th and my despatch of yesterday, the 12th, and
neither you nor Banks will be overwhelmed by Jackson. By proper
scout lookouts, and beacons of smoke by day and fires by night you
can always have timely notice of the enemy's's approach. I know not
as to you, but by some this has been too much neglected.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 15, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

MY DEAR SIR:--Your letter of the 12th by Colonel Zagonyi is just
received. In answer to the principal part of it, I repeat the
substance of an order of the 8th and one or two telegraphic
despatches sent you since.

We have no definite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are
compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we
have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you
some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you
alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he
is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he cannot have
been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only
have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond
than Richmond is to come to him. Neither is very likely. I think
Jackson's game--his assigned work--now is to magnify the accounts of
his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms
keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as
his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond
three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to
allow this. Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to
halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the
objects being to guard against Jackson's returning by the same route
to the upper Potomac over which you have just driven him out, and at
the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia.

Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead,
if, on full consideration, you think best. I do not believe Jackson
will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and
if he comes upon you in superior force, you have but to notify us,
fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time. But while
we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we
cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave
no force on the Front Royal line--the very line upon which he
prosecuted his late raid. The true policy is to place one of you on
one line and the other on the other in such positions that you can
unite once you actually find Jackson moving upon it. And this is
precisely what we are doing. This protects that part of our
frontier, so to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance
of McClellan. I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it
deranged. While you have only asked for Sigel, I have spoken only of
Banks, and this because Sigel's force is now the principal part of
Bank's force.

About transferring General Schenck's commands, the purchase of
supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers, mentioned in
your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War to-morrow.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Mount Jackson, Virginia:

Your despatch of yesterday, reminding me of a supposed understanding
that I would furnish you a corps of 35,000 men, and asking of me the
"fulfilment of this understanding," is received. I am ready to come
to a fair settlement of accounts with you on the fulfilment of
understandings.

Early in March last, when I assigned you to the command of the
Mountain Department, I did tell you I would give you all the force I
could, and that I hoped to make it reach 35,000. You at the same
time told me that within a reasonable time you would seize the
railroad at or east of Knoxville, Tenn., if you could. There was
then in the department a force supposed to be 25,000, the exact
number as well known to you as to me. After looking about two or
three days, you called and distinctly told me that if I would add the
Blenker division to the force already in the department, you would
undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 10,000, and at the
expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan I took it from
his army and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled. I
have given you all I could, and I have given you very nearly, if not
quite, 35,000.

Now for yours. On the 23d of May, largely over two months afterward,
you were at Franklin, Va., not within 300 miles of Knoxville, nor
within 80 miles of any part of the railroad east of it, and not
moving forward, but telegraphing here that you could not move for
lack of everything. Now, do not misunderstand me. I do not say you
have not done all you could. I presume you met unexpected
difficulties; and I beg you to believe that as surely as you have
done your best, so have I. I have not the power now to fill up your
Corps to 35,000. I am not demanding of you to do the work of 35,000.
I am only asking of you to stand cautiously on the defensive, get
your force in order, and give such protection as you can to the
valley of the Shenandoah and to western Virginia.

Have you received the orders, and will you act upon them?

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL C. SCHURZ.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCHURZ, Mount Jackson, Virginia:

Your long letter is received. The information you give is valuable.
You say it is fortunate that Fremont did not intercept Jackson; that
Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If
this is so, how happened it that Fremont fairly fought and routed him
on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and rout him false
and fabricated? Both General Fremont and you speak of Jackson having
beaten Shields. By our accounts he did not beat Shields. He had no
engagement with Shields. He did meet and drive back with disaster
about 2000 of Shields's advance till they were met by an additional
brigade of Shields's, when Jackson himself turned and retreated.
Shields himself and more than half his force were not nearer than
twenty miles to any of it.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

It would be of both interest and value to us here to know how the
expedition toward East Tennessee is progressing, if in your judgment
you can give us the information with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 18, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been reinforced
by about 10,000 from Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from
General King at Fredericksburg, saying a Frenchman, just arrived from
Richmond by way of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing through
the latter place to join Jackson.

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal
force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what
day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you
think you can inform me with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, JUNE 19, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of last night just received, and for which I thank you.

If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves
one of two things: either they are very strong at Richmond, or do not
mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to
Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and
your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

In regard to the contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and
Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire
and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, June 20, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel
corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced
from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance
for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it
was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case
stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs
and do so if possible.

In regard to a contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and
Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire
and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 21 1862 6 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Your despatch of yesterday (2 P. M.) was received this morning. If
it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army
under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as
to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole
country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather
it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better
chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not
under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it
with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by
telegraph or by letter, because of the chances of its reaching the
enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave
your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Middletown:

I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the
enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point.

All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at two o'clock
to-day.

A. LINCOLN.

TREATY WITH MEXICO

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

On the 7th day of December, 1861, I submitted to the Senate the
project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico which had
been proposed to me by Mr. Corwin, our minister to Mexico, and
respectfully requested the advice of the Senate thereupon.

On the 25th day of February last a resolution was adopted by the
Senate to the effect:

"that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the
United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of
the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European
powers."

This resolution having been duly communicated to me, notice thereof
was immediately given by the Secretary of State to Mr. Corwin, and he
was informed that he was to consider his instructions upon the
subject referred to modified by this resolution and would govern his
course accordingly. That despatch failed to reach Mr. Corwin, by
reason of the disturbed condition of Mexico, until a very recent
date, Mr. Corwin being without instructions, or thus practically left
without instructions, to negotiate further with Mexico.

In view of the very important events Occurring there, he has thought
that the interests of the United States would be promoted by the
conclusion of two treaties which should provide for a loan to that
republic. He has therefore signed such treaties, and they having
been duly ratified by the Government of Mexico, he has transmitted
them to me for my consideration. The action of the Senate is of
course conclusive against an acceptance of the treaties On my part.
I have, nevertheless, thought it just to our excellent minister in
Mexico and respectful to the Government of that republic to lay the
treaties before the Senate, together with the correspondence which
has occurred in relation to them. In performing this duty I have
only to add that the importance of the subject thus submitted to the
Senate, can not be over estimated, and I shall cheerfully receive and
consider with the highest respect any further advice the Senate may
think proper to give upon the subject.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

VETO OF A CURRENCY BILL

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, JUNE 23, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

The bill which has passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, entitled "An act to repeal that part of an act of Congress
which prohibits the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination
than five dollars in the District of Columbia," has received my
attentive consideration, and I now return it to the Senate, in which
it originated, with the following objections:

1. The bill proposes to repeal the existing legislation prohibiting
the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five
dollars within the District of Columbia, without permitting the
issuing of such bills by banks not now legally authorized to issue
them. In my judgment, it will be found impracticable, in the
present condition of the currency, to make such a discrimination.
The banks have generally suspended specie payments, and a legal
sanction given to the circulation of the irredeemable notes of one
class of them will almost certainly be so extended, in practical
operation, as to include those of all classes, whether authorized or
unauthorized. If this view be correct, the currency of the District,
should this act become a law, will certainly and greatly deteriorate,
to the serious injury of honest trade and honest labor.

2. This bill seems to contemplate no end which cannot be otherwise
more certainly and beneficially attained. During the existing war it
is peculiarly the duty of the National Government to secure to the
people a sound circulating medium. This duty has been, under
existing circumstances, satisfactorily performed, in part at least,
by authorizing the issue of United States notes, receivable for all
government dues except customs, and made a legal tender for all
debts, public and private, except interest on public debt. The
object of the bill submitted to me--namely, that of providing a small
note currency during the present suspension--can be fully
accomplished by authorizing the issue, as part of any new emission of
United States notes made necessary by the circumstances of the
country, of notes of a similar character, but of less denomination
than five dollars. Such an issue would answer all the beneficial
purposes of the bill, would save a considerable amount to the
treasury in interest, would greatly facilitate payments to soldiers
and other creditors of small sums, and would furnish; to the people a
currency as safe as their own government.

Entertaining these objections to the bill, I feel myself constrained
to withhold from it my approval and return it for the further
consideration and action of Congress.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN

SPEECH AT JERSEY CITY, JUNE 24, 1862.

When birds and animals are looked at through a fog, they are seen to
disadvantage, and so it might be with you if I were to attempt to
tell you why I went to see General Scott. I can only say that my
visit to West Point did not have the importance which has been
attached to it; but it concerned matters that you understand quite as
well as if I were to tell you all about them. Now, I can only remark
that it had nothing whatever to do with making or unmaking any
general in the country. The Secretary of War, you know, holds a
pretty tight rein on the press, so that they shall not tell more than
they ought to; and I 'm afraid that if I blab too much, he might draw
a tight rein on me.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending
with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your
point, are very gratifying.

The later one of 6.15 P.M., suggesting the probability of your being
overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the
responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I
can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can
with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to
assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and
shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I
possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better
towards York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of
the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

ORDER CONSTITUTING THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 26, 1862.

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