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The Entire Writings of Lincoln by Abraham Lincoln

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M. C. MEIGS

TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY CHASE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

SECRETARY CHASE, Fredericksburg, Virginia:

It now appears that Banks got safely into Winchester last night, and
is this morning retreating on Harper's Ferry. This justifies the
inference that he is pressed by numbers superior to his own. I think
it not improbable that Ewell, Jackson, and Johnson are pouring
through the gap they made day before yesterday at Front Royal, making
a dash northward. It will be a very valuable and very honorable
service for General McDowell to cut them off. I hope he will put all
possible energy and speed into the effort.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

If Banks reaches Martinsburg, is he any the better for it? Will not
the enemy cut him from thence to Harper's Ferry? Have you sent
anything to meet him and assist him at Martinsburg? This is an
inquiry, not an order.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862. 6.30 P.M.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

One good six-gun battery, complete in its men and appointments, is
now on its way to you from Baltimore. Eleven other guns, of
different sorts, are on their way to you from here. Hope they will
all reach you before morning. As you have but 2500 men at Harper's
Ferry, where are the rest which were in that vicinity and which we
have sent forward? Have any of them been cut off?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL R. SAXTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1862.

GENERAL SAXTON, Harper's Ferry:

I fear you have mistaken me. I did not mean to question the
correctness of your conduct; on the contrary1 I approve what you have
done. As the 2500 reported by you seemed small to me, I feared some
had got to Banks and been cut off with him. Please tell me the exact
number you now have in hand.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
[Sent in cipher.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., May 25,1862. 8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about
6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for
McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered
at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7000 to 10,000 fell
upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front
Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the
24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks, on the road to
Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester
yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two
forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward
Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on
the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near
Front Royal, With 10,000, following up and supporting, as I
understand, the forces now pursuing Banks, also that another force of
10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped
here, as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them
crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about
20,000 of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front
Royal, and General Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to
Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's
rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's
Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at
Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here
and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their
places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States.
We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which
arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our
situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly
helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness
to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's
force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with
the force you have.

A. LINCOLN.

HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY OF REBELLION

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

MAY 16, 1862

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims
at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was
clandestinely prepared during the Winter of 1860 and 1861, and
assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional
government at Montgomery, in Alabama on the 18th day of February,
1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the
flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and the capture of Fort
Sumter, Which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation.
Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were
obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege.
The mails in every direction were stopped and the lines of telegraph
cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had
been called out by the government for the defense of Washington were
prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined
treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no
adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress
had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It
became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing
means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should
let the government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself
of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of
insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its
blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the
departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the
office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their
unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should
proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, and
especially the California treasure ships then on their way to this
coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to
purchase or charter and arm as quickly as possible five steamships
for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the
navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase or charter and arm an equal
number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York
to purchase or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander
Gillis to purchase or charter and arm and put to sea two other
vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Dupont, with a
view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I
directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid
and efficient services, in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D.
Morgan, the Governor of New York, or in his absence George D. Morgan,
William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were
by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to
act for his department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the
forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense.

The several departments of the government at that time contained so
large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible
to provide safely through official agents only for the performance of
the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their
ability, loyalty, and patriotism.

The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by
private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard
cities, inland across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the
northern lakes. I believe by these and other similar measures taken
in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the
government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of
the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial
persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such
misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary
proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.

I recall these transactions now because my attention has been
directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of
Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these
words:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War by investing
Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money
and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction,
without requiring from him any guaranty for the faithful performance
of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were
available, and by involving the government in a vast number of
contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business
pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the
purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly
injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the
House."

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in
justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to
rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is
unanimously entertained by the heads of department who participated
in the proceedings which the House of Representatives have censured.
It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that although he fully approved the
proceedings they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that
not only the President, but all the other heads of departments, were
at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or
fault was committed in the premises.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. 12.40

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and
baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably
safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862. 1 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Falmouth, Virginia:

Despatches from Geary just received have been sent you. Should not
the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at
Fredericksburg, move this way--to Manassas Junction or Alexandria?
As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these
questions.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Can you not cut the Alula Creek railroad? Also, what impression have
you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of
Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

May 27.1862. 9.58 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to
march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1862.

GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston:

The President directs that the militia be relieved, and the
enlistments made for three years, or during the war. This, I think,
will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest
intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his
whole command with small loss.

Concentrations of our force have been made, which it is hoped will
capture the enemy.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT,

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield

The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders,
unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of
Rodney, in which case you will move upon him. Acknowledge the
receipt of this order, and the hour it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General McClellan at 6.30 P.M. yesterday telegraphed that Fitz-John
Porter's division had fought and driven 13,000 of the enemy, under
General Branch, from Hanover Court-House, and was driving them from a
stand they had made on the railroad at the time the messenger left.
Two hours later he telegraphed that Stoneman had captured an engine
and six cars on the Virginia Central, which he at once sent to
communicate with Porter. Nothing further from McClellan.

If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover
Court-House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg
should not push through and join him.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

What of F.J. Porter's expedition? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON. May 28, 1862. 4 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this
side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue
Ridge looking for them.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 5.40 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are
still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of
legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Fremont as much,
and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I
suppose you know Fremont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going
into Harrisonburg.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 28, 1862. 8.40 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a
total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and
Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all
the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to
see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from
Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from
Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That
the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot
be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry informs
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewells, forced his
advance from Charlestown today. General King telegraphs us from
Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000
left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am
painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you,
and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard
to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT, Moorefield:

The order to remain at Moorefield was based on the supposition that
it would find you there.

Upon subsequent information that the enemy were still operating in
the vicinity of Winchester and Martinsburg, you were directed to move
against the enemy.

The President now again directs you to move against the enemy without
delay. Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and the time
received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 10 A.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY, McClellan's Headquarters:

Yours just received. I think it cannot be certainly known whether
the force which fought General Porter is the same which recently
confronted McDowell. Another item of evidence bearing on it is that
General Branch commanded against Porter, while it was General
Anderson who was in front of McDowell. He and McDowell were in
correspondence about prisoners.
A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
May 29, 1862. 10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly
whether any considerable force of the enemy--Jackson or any one else
--is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected
development into your calculations.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Williamsport, Maryland:

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near
Front Royal at twelve (noon) tomorrow. General Fremont will be at or
near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow
and harass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for
General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

General McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and
probably will, be at Front Royal by twelve (noon) to-morrow. His
force, when up, will be about 20,000. Please have your force at
Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that
point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by the same time. Your
despatch No.30 received and satisfactory.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General Fremont's force should, and probably will, be at or near
Strasburg by twelve (noon) tomorrow. Try to have your force, or the
advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 1.20 P.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY:

Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our
forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on
the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the
country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I somewhat apprehend that Fremont's force, in its present condition,
may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the
enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your
column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force
reaching Front Royal will amount to.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10.15 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,
Williamsport, Maryland, via Harper's Ferry:

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and
Winchester, Or any or all of them, he may come in collision with
Fremont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at
Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Fremont if possible;
the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning
of my despatch yesterday.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 12.40.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown:

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Fremont has
nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part
of it. I have a despatch from Fremont this morning, not telling me
where he is; but he says:
"Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously
at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet."

The high figures erroneous, of course. Do you know where Longstreet
is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGT0N, May 30, 1862. 2.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

Yours, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 P.M.
Saturday, has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he
directed to act in view of it. You must be up to the time you
promised, if possible.

Corinth was evacuated last night, and is occupied by our troops to-
day; the enemy gone south to Okolotia, on the railroad to Mobile.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON CITY, May 30, 1862.9.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown, Va.:

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry:
"The rebels are in line of battle in front of our lines. They have
nine pieces of artillery, and in position, and cavalry. I shelled
the woods in which they were, and they in return threw a large number
of shells into the lines and tents from which I moved last night to
take up a stronger position. I expect a great deal from the battery
on the mountain, having three 9 inch Dahlgren bearing directly on the
enemy's approaches. The enemy appeared this morning and then
retired, with the intention of drawing us on. I shall act on the
defensive, as my position is a strong one. In a skirmish which took
place this afternoon I lost one horse, The enemy lost two men killed
and seven wounded.
"R. SAXTON, Brigadier General."

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General
Fremont.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 10.20 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front
Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of
Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of
Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within
it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry
at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields,
with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A.M. yesterday,
with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the
enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and
stores, and saved the bridge.

General Fremont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at
or near Strasburg at 5 P.M. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport,
with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed
to co-operate. Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an
additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having
entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true.
Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON

TO GENERAL G. A. McCALL.,WASHINGTON, May 31, 1562.

GENERAL McCALL:

The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to
justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your
position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., June 1, 1862. 9.30.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the
attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any
only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General
Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and
sending General Dix to Port Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry.
We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy
so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication.
Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN, President.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. 6.15 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Front Royal, Virginia:

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or flank Jackson. Please
tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time
this reaches you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your despatch of to-day to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the
good news it brings.

Have you anything from Memphis or other parts of the Mississippi
River? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, Tennessee:

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel
prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseeans? If you do, please tell
us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
[Cipher.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch about Chattanooga and Dalton was duly received and sent
to General Halleck. I have just received the following answer from
him:

We have Fort Pillow, Randolph, and Memphis.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all
of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think
it probable that you include some combination of the force near
Cumberland Gap under General Morgan.

Do you?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Winchester:

We are arranging a general plan for the valley of the Shenandoah, and
in accordance with this you will move your main force to the
Shenandoah at or opposite Front Royal as soon as possible.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no farther. Get your force
well in hand and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement
of the enemy either back toward Strasburg or toward Franklin, and
await further orders, which will soon be sent you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[Cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, 'Tennessee:

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like
number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove
the proposition.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Accounts, which we do not credit, represent that Jackson is largely
reinforced and turning upon you. Get your forces well in hand and
keep us well and frequently advised; and if you find yourself really
pressed by a superior force of the enemy, fall back cautiously toward
or to Winchester, and we will have in due time Banks in position to
sustain you. Do not fall back upon Harrisonburg unless upon
tolerably clear necessity. We understand Jackson is on the other
side of the Shenandoah from you, and hence cannot in any event press
you into any necessity of a precipitate withdrawal.

A. LINCOLN.

P.S.--Yours, preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, is just
received. On this point use your discretion, remembering that our
object is to give such protection as you can to western Virginia.
Many thanks to yourself, officers, and men for the gallant battle of
last Sunday.
A. L.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

June 13, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: I herewith transmit a memorial addressed and
presented to me in behalf of the State of New York in favor of
enlarging the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canal. While I have not
given nor have leisure to give the subject a careful examination, its
great importance is obvious and unquestionable. The large amount of
valuable statistical information which is collated and presented in
the memorial will greatly facilitate the mature consideration of the
subject, which I respectfully ask for it at your hands.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON; June 13. 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

We cannot afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's
engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. You
fought Jackson alone and worsted him. He can have no substantial
reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely
you and Banks in supporting distance are capable of keeping him from
returning to Winchester. But if Sigel be sent forward to you, and
McDowell (as he must) be put to other work, Jackson will break
through at Front Royal again. He is already on the right side of the
Shenandoah to do it, and on the wrong side of it to attack you. The
orders already sent you and Banks place you and him in the proper
positions for the work assigned you. Jackson cannot move his whole
force on either of you before the other can learn of it and go to his
assistance. He cannot divide his force, sending part against each of
you, because he will be too weak for either. Please do as I directed
in the order of the 8th and my despatch of yesterday, the 12th, and
neither you nor Banks will be overwhelmed by Jackson. By proper
scout lookouts, and beacons of smoke by day and fires by night you
can always have timely notice of the enemy's's approach. I know not
as to you, but by some this has been too much neglected.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 15, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

MY DEAR SIR:--Your letter of the 12th by Colonel Zagonyi is just
received. In answer to the principal part of it, I repeat the
substance of an order of the 8th and one or two telegraphic
despatches sent you since.

We have no definite power of sending reinforcements; so that we are
compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we
have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you
some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you
alone beat Jackson last Sunday, I argue that you are stronger than he
is to-day, unless he has been reinforced; and that he cannot have
been materially reinforced, because such reinforcement could only
have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond
than Richmond is to come to him. Neither is very likely. I think
Jackson's game--his assigned work--now is to magnify the accounts of
his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms
keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as
his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond
three or four times as much as if he were there. Our game is not to
allow this. Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to
halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the
objects being to guard against Jackson's returning by the same route
to the upper Potomac over which you have just driven him out, and at
the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia.

Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead,
if, on full consideration, you think best. I do not believe Jackson
will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and
if he comes upon you in superior force, you have but to notify us,
fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time. But while
we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we
cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave
no force on the Front Royal line--the very line upon which he
prosecuted his late raid. The true policy is to place one of you on
one line and the other on the other in such positions that you can
unite once you actually find Jackson moving upon it. And this is
precisely what we are doing. This protects that part of our
frontier, so to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance
of McClellan. I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it
deranged. While you have only asked for Sigel, I have spoken only of
Banks, and this because Sigel's force is now the principal part of
Bank's force.

About transferring General Schenck's commands, the purchase of
supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers, mentioned in
your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War to-morrow.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Mount Jackson, Virginia:

Your despatch of yesterday, reminding me of a supposed understanding
that I would furnish you a corps of 35,000 men, and asking of me the
"fulfilment of this understanding," is received. I am ready to come
to a fair settlement of accounts with you on the fulfilment of
understandings.

Early in March last, when I assigned you to the command of the
Mountain Department, I did tell you I would give you all the force I
could, and that I hoped to make it reach 35,000. You at the same
time told me that within a reasonable time you would seize the
railroad at or east of Knoxville, Tenn., if you could. There was
then in the department a force supposed to be 25,000, the exact
number as well known to you as to me. After looking about two or
three days, you called and distinctly told me that if I would add the
Blenker division to the force already in the department, you would
undertake the job. The Blenker division contained 10,000, and at the
expense of great dissatisfaction to General McClellan I took it from
his army and gave it to you. My promise was literally fulfilled. I
have given you all I could, and I have given you very nearly, if not
quite, 35,000.

Now for yours. On the 23d of May, largely over two months afterward,
you were at Franklin, Va., not within 300 miles of Knoxville, nor
within 80 miles of any part of the railroad east of it, and not
moving forward, but telegraphing here that you could not move for
lack of everything. Now, do not misunderstand me. I do not say you
have not done all you could. I presume you met unexpected
difficulties; and I beg you to believe that as surely as you have
done your best, so have I. I have not the power now to fill up your
Corps to 35,000. I am not demanding of you to do the work of 35,000.
I am only asking of you to stand cautiously on the defensive, get
your force in order, and give such protection as you can to the
valley of the Shenandoah and to western Virginia.

Have you received the orders, and will you act upon them?

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL C. SCHURZ.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1862

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCHURZ, Mount Jackson, Virginia:

Your long letter is received. The information you give is valuable.
You say it is fortunate that Fremont did not intercept Jackson; that
Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If
this is so, how happened it that Fremont fairly fought and routed him
on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and rout him false
and fabricated? Both General Fremont and you speak of Jackson having
beaten Shields. By our accounts he did not beat Shields. He had no
engagement with Shields. He did meet and drive back with disaster
about 2000 of Shields's advance till they were met by an additional
brigade of Shields's, when Jackson himself turned and retreated.
Shields himself and more than half his force were not nearer than
twenty miles to any of it.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

It would be of both interest and value to us here to know how the
expedition toward East Tennessee is progressing, if in your judgment
you can give us the information with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., June 18, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been reinforced
by about 10,000 from Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from
General King at Fredericksburg, saying a Frenchman, just arrived from
Richmond by way of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing through
the latter place to join Jackson.

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal
force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what
day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you
think you can inform me with safety.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, JUNE 19, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Yours of last night just received, and for which I thank you.

If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves
one of two things: either they are very strong at Richmond, or do not
mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to
Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and
your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

In regard to the contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and
Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire
and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, June 20, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel
corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced
from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance
for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it
was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case
stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs
and do so if possible.

In regard to a contemplated execution of Captains Spriggs and
Triplett the government has no information whatever, but will inquire
and advise you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 21 1862 6 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Your despatch of yesterday (2 P. M.) was received this morning. If
it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army
under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as
to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole
country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather
it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better
chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not
under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it
with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by
telegraph or by letter, because of the chances of its reaching the
enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave
your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 22, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Middletown:

I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the
enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point.

All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at two o'clock
to-day.

A. LINCOLN.

TREATY WITH MEXICO

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

On the 7th day of December, 1861, I submitted to the Senate the
project of a treaty between the United States and Mexico which had
been proposed to me by Mr. Corwin, our minister to Mexico, and
respectfully requested the advice of the Senate thereupon.

On the 25th day of February last a resolution was adopted by the
Senate to the effect

"that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the
United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of
the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European
powers."

This resolution having been duly communicated to me, notice thereof
was immediately given by the Secretary of State to Mr. Corwin, and he
was informed that he was to consider his instructions upon the
subject referred to modified by this resolution and would govern his
course accordingly. That despatch failed to reach Mr. Corwin, by
reason of the disturbed condition of Mexico, until a very recent
date, Mr. Corwin being without instructions, or thus practically left
without instructions, to negotiate further with Mexico.

In view of the very important events Occurring there, he has thought
that the interests of the United States would be promoted by the
conclusion of two treaties which should provide for a loan to that
republic. He has therefore signed such treaties, and they having
been duly ratified by the Government of Mexico, he has transmitted
them to me for my consideration. The action of the Senate is of
course conclusive against an acceptance of the treaties On my part.
I have, nevertheless, thought it just to our excellent minister in
Mexico and respectful to the Government of that republic to lay the
treaties before the Senate, together with the correspondence which
has occurred in relation to them. In performing this duty I have
only to add that the importance of the subject thus submitted to the
Senate, can not be over estimated, and I shall cheerfully receive and
consider with the highest respect any further advice the Senate may
think proper to give upon the subject.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

VETO OF A CURRENCY BILL

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, JUNE 23, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

The bill which has passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, entitled "An act to repeal that part of an act of Congress
which prohibits the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination
than five dollars in the District of Columbia," has received my
attentive consideration, and I now return it to the Senate, in which
it originated, with the following objections:

1. The bill proposes to repeal the existing legislation prohibiting
the circulation of bank-notes of a less denomination than five
dollars within the District of Columbia, without permitting the
issuing of such bills by banks not now legally authorized to issue
them. In my judgment, it will be found impracticable, in the
present condition of the currency, to make such a discrimination.
The banks have generally suspended specie payments, and a legal
sanction given to the circulation of the irredeemable notes of one
class of them will almost certainly be so extended, in practical
operation, as to include those of all classes, whether authorized or
unauthorized. If this view be correct, the currency of the District,
should this act become a law, will certainly and greatly deteriorate,
to the serious injury of honest trade and honest labor.

2. This bill seems to contemplate no end which cannot be otherwise
more certainly and beneficially attained. During the existing war it
is peculiarly the duty of the National Government to secure to the
people a sound circulating medium. This duty has been, under
existing circumstances, satisfactorily performed, in part at least,
by authorizing the issue of United States notes, receivable for all
government dues except customs, and made a legal tender for all
debts, public and private, except interest on public debt. The
object of the bill submitted to me--namely, that of providing a small
note currency during the present suspension--can be fully
accomplished by authorizing the issue, as part of any new emission of
United States notes made necessary by the circumstances of the
country, of notes of a similar character, but of less denomination
than five dollars. Such an issue would answer all the beneficial
purposes of the bill, would save a considerable amount to the
treasury in interest, would greatly facilitate payments to soldiers
and other creditors of small sums, and would furnish; to the people a
currency as safe as their own government.

Entertaining these objections to the bill, I feel myself constrained
to withhold from it my approval and return it for the further
consideration and action of Congress.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN

SPEECH AT JERSEY CITY, JUNE 24, 1862.

When birds and animals are looked at through a fog, they are seen to
disadvantage, and so it might be with you if I were to attempt to
tell you why I went to see General Scott. I can only say that my
visit to West Point did not have the importance which has been
attached to it; but it concerned matters that you understand quite as
well as if I were to tell you all about them. Now, I can only remark
that it had nothing whatever to do with making or unmaking any
general in the country. The Secretary of War, you know, holds a
pretty tight rein on the press, so that they shall not tell more than
they ought to; and I 'm afraid that if I blab too much, he might draw
a tight rein on me.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending
with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your
point, are very gratifying.

The later one of 6.15 P.M., suggesting the probability of your being
overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the
responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I
can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can
with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to
assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and
shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I
possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better
towards York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of
the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

ORDER CONSTITUTING THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 26, 1862.

Ordered:
1st. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell,
including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at
Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the
Army of Virginia.

2d. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to
Major-General John Pope, as commanding general. The troops of the
Mountain Department, heretofore under command of General Fremont,
shall constitute the First Army Corps, under the command of General
Fremont; the troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under General
Banks, shall constitute the Second Army Corps, and be commanded by
him; the troops under the command of General McDowell, except those
within the fortifications and city of Washington, shall form the
Third Army Corps, and be under his command.

3d. The Army of Virginia shall operate in such manner as, while
protecting western Virginia and the national capital from danger or
insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the
rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the
direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to
relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.

4th. When the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia shall be
in position to communicate and directly co-operate at or before
Richmond, the chief command, while so operating together, shall be
governed, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of War.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:

The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it
absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you
immediately to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the
nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to
Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of
Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force
the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you
to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against
Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the
forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to
your own judgment.

The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative
by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond
yesterday, the full extent of which is not yet known.

You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day
and hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so
that we may take measures to aid in river and railroad
transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to
General McClellan.

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:

We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in
large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We
are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs
that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to
the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own
position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he
had cavalry enough.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as
we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next
day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed
reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did
not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and
your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a
drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not
being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy
concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been
upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week
ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come
in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor
the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present
condition and aspect of things.

A. LINCOLN

TO SECRETARY SEWARD.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

MY DEAR SIR:--My view of the present condition of the war is about as
follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the
Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in
Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon
will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all
the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know
of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large
part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let
us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc.
What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the
Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A
reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for
its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new
troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan
directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any
other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I
expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or
am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake
me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force
were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so
hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the
new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because
such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28,1862.

GENERAL DIX:

Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every
nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way
you can. Report to me.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28, 1862.

FLAG-OFFICER GOLDS BOROUGH, Fort Monroe:

Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is
driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with
gunboats at or near that place. McClellan's main force is between
the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate
with him and support him there.

A. LINCOLN

To GOVERNOR MORTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
June 28, 1862.

GOVERNOR O. P. MORTON, Indianapolis, Ind:

Your despatch of to-day is just received. I have no recollection of
either John R. Cravens or Cyrus M. Allen having been named to me for
appointment under the tax law. The latter particularly has been my
friend, and I am sorry to learn that he is not yours. No appointment
has been or will be made by me for the purpose of stabbing you.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862.6 P.M.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Astor House, New York:

Not much more than when you left. Fulton of Baltimore American is
now with us. He left White House at 11 A.M. yesterday. He
conversed fully with a paymaster who was with Porter's force during
the fight of Friday and fell back to nearer McClellan's quarters just
a little sooner than Porter did, seeing the whole of it; stayed on
the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night, and left for White
House at 5 A.M. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order
under protection of the guns arranged for the purpose, under orders
and not from necessity; and with all other of our forces, except what
was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in pontoons over
the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy firing on
the Richmond side, begun at 5 and ceased at 7 A.M. Saturday. On the
whole, I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time.
What has happened since we still know not, as we have no
communication with General McClellan. A despatch from Colonel
Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at
Richmond to-day, and will be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing
upon what Colonel Ingalls founds his opinion. Confirmed about saving
all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to White
House from the field, and the number of wounded reaching there up to
11 A.M. Saturday was not large.

A. LINCOLN.

To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two
points that may be satisfactory for you to know.

First. All the sick and wounded were safely removed

Second. A despatch from Burnside shows that he is from White House;
not a man left behind in condition to afford efficient support, and
is probably doing so.

Third. The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the
conviction that the movement was made by General McClellan to
concentrate on Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of
which we have any information.

Fourth. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night, between twelve and one
o'clock, General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that
the result of the movement was satisfactory to him.

Fifth. From these and the facts stated by the President, my
inference is that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond
within two days.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

[Unfortunately McClellan did not do any of the things he was ordered,
and that it was very likely possible to do. It is still some
mystery what he was doing all these days other than hiding in the
woods and staying out of communication so he would not receive any
more uncomfortable orders. This was another place where the North
was close to wining the war and did not. D.W.]

TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862.

HON. WM. H. SEWARD, New York:

We are yet without communication with General McClellan, and this
absence of news is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to
which we are posted he effected everything in such exact accordance
with his plan, contingently announced to us before the battle began,
that we feel justified to hope that he has not failed since. He had
a severe engagement in getting the part of his army on this side of
the Chickahominy over to the other side, in which the enemy lost
certainly as much as we did. We are not dissatisfied with this, only
that the loss of enemies does not compensate for the loss of friends.
The enemy cannot come below White House; certainly is not there now,
and probably has abandoned the whole line. Dix's pickets are at New
Kent Court-House.

A. LINCOLN.

CALL FOR TROOPS.

NEW YORK, June 30, 1862.

TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE SEVERAL STATES:

The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the national
forces has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and
about Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible
delay; in fact, there will soon be no formidable insurgent force
except at Richmond. With so large an army there, the enemy can
threaten us on the Potomac and elsewhere. Until we have
re-established the national authority, all these places must be held,
and we must keep a respectable force in front of WASHINGTON. But
this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness and
casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the
struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with
energy and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our
military condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by
proclamation, I have deemed it best to address you in this form. To
accomplish the object stated we require without delay 150,000 men,
including those recently called for by the Secretary of War. Thus
reinforced our gallant army will be enabled to realize the hopes and
expectations of the government and the people.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:

Is it not probable that the enemy has abandoned the line between
White House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to
maintain it, and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better
move up and see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at
once be opened to White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be
up still.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WAR DEPARTMENT, JUNE 30, 1862. 3 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition
must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and
the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important
movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the
capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the
movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here
if you cannot do it without breaking up the operations against that
point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and
artillery are strong enough. The first reports from Richmond were
more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not
on our side, it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole
force on the line of the James River, and is supported there by our
gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and
hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered so promptly. Let
me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as
to provide immediately for transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 30, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but
please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important
to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the
expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or
east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as
the taking and holding of Richmond.

A. LINCOLN.

CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS, JULY 1, 1862.

June 28, 1861.

The undersigned, governors of States of the Union, impressed with the
belief that the citizens of the States which they respectively
represent are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent
successes of the Federal arms may be followed up by measures which
must insure the speedy restoration of the Union, and believing that,
in view of the present state of the important military movements now
in progress, and the reduced condition of our effective forces in the
field, resulting from the usual and unavoidable casualties in the
service, the time has arrived for prompt and vigorous measures to be
adopted by the people in support of the great interests committed to
your charge, respectfully request, if it meets with your entire
approval, that you at once call upon the several States for such
number of men as may be required to fill up all military
organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore
organized such additional number of men as may, in your judgment, be
necessary to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military
positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily
crush the rebellion that still exists in several of the Southern
States, thus practically restoring to the civilized world our great
and good government. All believe that the decisive moment is near at
hand, and to that end the people of the United States are desirous to
aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that you may deem
needful to sustain our government.

ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR., Governor of Maine.
H. S. BERRY, Governor of New Hampshire.
FREDERICK HOLBROOK, Governor of Vermont.
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, Governor of Connecticut.
E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.
CHARLES S. OLDEN, Governor of New Jersey.
A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.
A. W. BRADFORD, Governor of Maryland.
F. H. PIERPOINT, Governor of Virginia.
AUSTIN BLAIR, Governor of Michigan.
J. B. TEMPLE, President Military Board of Kentucky.
ANDREW JOHNSON, Governor of Tennessee.
H. R. GAMBLE, Governor of Missouri.
O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.
DAVID TODD, Governor of Ohio.
ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Governor of Minnesota.
RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois.
EDWARD SALOMON, Governor of Wisconsin.

THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
July 1, 1862

GENTLEMEN:--Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to
me in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the
twenty-eighth day of June, I have decided to call into the service an
additional force of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the
troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would
be ______ . I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as
to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and
satisfactory conclusion. An order fixing the quotas of the
respective States will be issued by the War Department to-morrow.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN
REBELLIOUS STATES, JULY 1, 1862.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:

A Proclamation.

Whereas in and by the second section of an act of Congress passed on
the 7th day of June, A. D. 1862, entitled "An act for the collection
of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within the United
States, and for other purposes," it is made the duty of the President
to declare, on or before the first day of July then next following,
by his proclamation, in what States and parts of States insurrection
exists:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the
States of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana,
Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and the
State of Virginia except the following counties-Hancock, Brooke,
Ohio, Marshall, Wetzel, Marion, Monongalia, Preston, Taylor,
Pleasants, Tyler, Ritchie, Doddridge, Harrison, Wood, Jackson, Wirt,
Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Barbour, Tucker, Lewis, Braxton, Upsbur,
Randolph, Mason, Putnam, Kanawha, Clay, Nicholas, Cabell, Wayne,
Boone, Logan, Wyoming, Webster, Fayette, and Raleigh-are now in
insurrection and rebellion, and by reason thereof the civil authority
of the United States is obstructed so that the provisions of the "Act
to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay the interest on the
public debt, and for other purposes," approved August 5, 1861, can
not be peaceably executed; and that the taxes legally chargeable upon
real estate under the act last aforesaid lying within the States and
parts of States as aforesaid, together with a penalty of 50 per
centum of said taxes, shall be a lien upon the tracts or lots of the
same, severally charged, till paid.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed..............

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:
F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of State.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1862.

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the
United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his
eminent services in Organizing the flotilla on the western Waters,
and for his gallantry at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number
Ten, and at various other places, whilst in command of the naval
forces, embracing a period of nearly ten months.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, D. C. July 1, 1862

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, JULY 1,1862. 3.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we
had a million of men, We could not get them to you in time. We have
not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the
enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair.
Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events,
even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough
in the country, and will bring it out.

A. LINCOLN.

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., July 2, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is
having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment.
When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor
under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing
your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of
WASHINGTON, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included
in and about WASHINGTON 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have
not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Fremont's in
the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all
in WASHINGTON, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000.
With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of
your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of
sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is
simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you
have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can,
please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like
manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are
not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try
just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will
strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The
governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I
accept.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself
received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad
for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your
judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or
will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga
expedition.

Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation
without endangering the Service in your department.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an
act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of
the volunteer service," without my approval.

My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same
title passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned
for the express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the
same, as I am informed.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS.
(Private and Confidential.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.

GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the
half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000
additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the
war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new
men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same
month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and
new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you
will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this.
The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is
thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.

Yours truly,

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