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The Winning of the West, Volume Four by Theodore Roosevelt

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This volume covers the period which opened with the checkered but
finally successful war waged by the United States Government against the
Northwestern Indians, and closed with the acquisition and exploration of
the vast region that lay beyond the Mississippi. It was during this
period that the West rose to real power in the Union. The boundaries of
the old West were at last made certain, and the new West, the Far West,
the country between the Mississippi and the Pacific, was added to the
national domain. The steady stream of incoming settlers broadened and
deepened year by year; Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio became states,
Louisiana, Indiana, and Mississippi territories. The population in the
newly settled regions increased with a rapidity hitherto unexampled; and
this rapidity, alike in growth of population and in territorial
expansion, gave the West full weight in the national councils.

The victorious campaigns of Wayne in the north, and the innumerable
obscure forays and reprisals of the Tennesseeans and Georgians in the
south, so cowed the Indians, that they all, north and south alike, made
peace; the first peace the border had known for fifty years. At the same
time the treaties of Jay and Pinckney gave us in fact the boundaries
which the peace of 1783 had only given us in name. The execution of
these treaties put an end in the north to the intrigues of the British,
who had stirred the Indians to hostility against the Americans; and in
the south to the far more treacherous intrigues of the Spaniards, who
showed astounding duplicity, and whose intrigues extended not only to
the Indians but also to the baser separatist leaders among the
Westerners themselves.

The cession of Louisiana followed. Its true history is to be found, not
in the doings of the diplomats who determined merely the terms upon
which it was made, but in the western growth of the people of the United
States from 1769 to 1803, which made it inevitable. The men who settled
and peopled the western wilderness were the men who won Louisiana; for
it was surrendered by France merely because it was impossible to hold it
against the American advance. Jefferson, through his agents at Paris,
asked only for New Orleans; but Napoleon thrust upon him the great West,
because Napoleon saw, what the American statesmen and diplomats did not
see, but what the Westerners felt; for he saw that no European power
could hold the country beyond the Mississippi when the Americans had
made good their foothold upon the hither bank.

It remained to explore the unknown land; and this task fell, not to mere
wild hunters, such as those who had first penetrated the wooded
wilderness beyond the Alleghanies, but to officers of the regular army,
who obeyed the orders of the National Government. Lewis, Clark, and Pike
were the pioneers in the exploration of the vast territory the United
States had just gained.

The names of the Indian fighters, the treaty-makers, the wilderness
wanderers, who took the lead in winning and exploring the West, are
memorable. More memorable still are the lives and deeds of the settler
folk for whom they fought and toiled; for the feats of the leaders were
rendered possible only by the lusty and vigorous growth of the young
commonwealths built up by the throng of westward-pushing pioneers. The
raw, strenuous, eager social life of these early dwellers on the western
waters must be studied before it is possible to understand the
conditions that determined the continual westward extension of the
frontier. Tennessee, during the years immediately preceding her
admission to statehood, is especially well worth study, both as a
typical frontier community, and because of the opportunity afforded to
examine in detail the causes and course of the Indian wars.

In this volume I have made use of the material to which reference was
made in the first; beside the American State Papers, I have drawn on the
Canadian Archives, the Draper Collection, including especially the
papers from the Spanish archives, the Robertson MSS., and the Clay MSS.
for hitherto unused matter. I have derived much assistance from the
various studies and monographs on special phases of Western history; I
refer to each in its proper place. I regret that Mr. Stephen B. Weeks'
valuable study of the Martin family did not appear in time for me to use
it while writing about the little state of Franklin, in my third volume.



_May_, 1896.












[Illustration: Map Showing the First Explorations of the Great West.
Based on a map by G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London.]




The Westward March of the Backwoodsman.

The backwoods folk, the stark hunters and tree-fellers, and the war-worn
regulars who fought beside them in the forest, pushed ever westward the
frontier of the Republic. Year after year each group of rough settlers
and rough soldiers wrought its part in the great epic of wilderness

The people that for one or more generations finds its allotted task in
the conquest of a continent, has before it the possibility of splendid
victory, and the certainty of incredible toil, suffering, and hardship.
The opportunity is great indeed; but the chance of disaster is even
greater. Success is for a mighty race, in its vigorous and masterful
prime. It is an opportunity such as is offered to an army by a struggle
against a powerful foe; only by great effort can defeat be avoided, but
triumph means lasting honor and renown.

As it is in the battle, so it is in the infinitely greater contests
where the fields of fight are continents, and the ages form the measure
of time. In actual life the victors win in spite of brutal blunders and
repeated checks.

The Grimness and Harshness of Frontier Life.

Watched nearby, while the fight stamps to and fro, the doers and the
deeds stand out naked and ugly. We see all too clearly the blood and
sweat, the craft and dunning and blind luck, the raw cruelty and
stupidity, the shortcomings of heart and hand, the mad abuse of victory.
Strands of meanness and cowardice are everywhere shot through the warp
of lofty and generous daring. There are failures bitter and shameful
side by side with feats of triumphant prowess. Of those who venture in
the contest some achieve success; others strive feebly and fail ignobly.

Only a Mighty Race Fit for the Trial.

If a race is weak, if it is lacking in the physical and moral traits
which go to the makeup of a conquering people, it cannot succeed. For
three hundred years the Portuguese possessed footholds in South Africa;
but they left to the English and Dutch the task of building free
communities able to hold in fact as well as in name the country south of
the Zambesi. Temperate South America is as fertile and healthy for the
white man as temperate North America, and is so much less in extent as
to offer a far simpler problem of conquest and settlement; yet the
Spaniard, who came to the Plata two centuries before the American
backwoodsman reached the Mississippi, scarcely made as much progress in
a decade as his northern rival did in a year.

The task must be given the race just at the time when it is ready for
the undertaking. The whole future of the world would have been changed
had the period of trans-oceanic expansion among the nations of Europe
begun at a time when the Scandinavians or Germans were foremost in
sea-trade and sea-war; if it had begun when the fleets of the Norsemen
at the threatened all coasts, or when the Hanseatic league was in its

No race can Succeed Save at the Right Moment.

But in the actual event the days of Scandinavian supremacy at sea
resulted in no spread of the Scandinavian tongue or culture; and the
temporary maritime prosperity of the North German cities bore no
permanent fruit of conquest for the German people. The only nations that
profited by the expansion beyond the seas, and that built up in alien
continents vast commonwealths with the law, the language, the creed, and
the culture, no less than the blood, of the parent stocks, were those
that during the centuries of expansion, possessed power on the
ocean,--Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and, above all, England.

Interest of the Race and the Individual Opposed.

Even a strong race, in its prime, and given the task at the right
moment, usually fails to perform it; for at the moment the immense
importance of the opportunity is hardly ever understood, while the
selfish interests of the individual and the generation are opposed to
the interest of the race as a whole. Only the most far-seeing and
high-minded statesmen can grasp the real weight, from the
race-standpoint, of the possibilities which to the men of their day seem
so trivial. The conquest and settlement rarely take place save under
seldom-occurring conditions which happen to bring about identity of
interest between the individual and the race. Dutch seamen knew the
coasts of Australia and New Zealand generations before they were settled
by the English, and had the people of Holland willed to take possession
of them, the Dutch would now be one of the leading races of mankind; but
they preferred the immediate gains to be derived from the ownership of
the trade with the Spice Islands; and so for the unimportant
over-lordship of a few patches of tropical soil, they bartered the
chance of building a giant Dutch Republic in the South Seas. Had the
Swedish successors of Gustavus Adolphus devoted their energies to
colonization in America, instead of squabbling with Slavs and Germans
for one or two wretched Baltic provinces, they could undoubtedly have
built up in the new world a Sweden tenfold greater than that in the old.
If France had sent to her possessions in America as many colonists as
she sent soldiers to war for petty townships in Germany and Italy, the
French would now be masters of half the territory north of the Rio
Grande. England alone, because of a combination of causes, was able to
use aright the chances given her for the conquest and settlement of the
world's waste spaces; and in consequence the English-speaking peoples
now have before them a future more important than that of all the
continental European peoples combined.

Each Race Indifferent to its Own Future.

It is natural that most nations should be thus blind to the
possibilities of the future. Few indeed are the men who can look a score
of years into the future, and fewer still those who will make great
sacrifices for the real, not the fancied, good of their children's
children; but in questions of race supremacy the look-ahead should be
for centuries rather than decades, and the self-sacrifice of the
individual must be for the good not of the next generation but perchance
of the fourth or fifth in line of descent. The Frenchman and the
Hollander of the seventeenth century could not even dimly see the
possibilities that loomed vast and vague in the colonization of America
and Australia; they did not have, and it was hardly possible that they
should have, the remotest idea that it would be well for them to
surrender, one the glory gained by his German conquests, the other the
riches reaped from his East Indian trade, in order that three hundred
years later huge unknown continents should be filled with French and
Dutch commonwealths. No nation, taken as a whole, can ever see so far
into the future; no nation, even if it could see such a future, would
ever sacrifice so much to win it. Hitherto each race in turn has
expanded only because the interests of a certain number of individuals
of many succeeding generations have made them active and vigorous agents
in the work of expansion.

This Indifference as Marked in New as in Old Communities.

This indifference on the part of individuals to the growth of the race
is often nearly as marked in new as in old communities, although the
very existence of these new communities depends upon that growth. It is
strange to see now the new settlers in the new land tend to turn their
faces, not towards the world before them, but towards the world they
have left behind. Many of them, perhaps most, wish rather to take parts
in the struggles of the old civilized powers, than to do their share in
laying the obscure but gigantic foundations of the empires of the
future. The New Englander who was not personally interested in the lands
beyond the Alleghanies often felt indifferent or hostile to the growth
of the trans-montane America; and in their turn these over-mountain men,
these Kentuckians and Tennesseans, were concerned to obtain a port at
the mouth of the Mississippi rather than the right to move westward to
the Pacific. There were more men in the new communities than in the old
who saw, however imperfectly, the grandeur of the opportunity and of the
race-destiny: but there were always very many who did their share in
working out their destiny grudgingly and under protest.

The Race Grows because its Interests Happen to be Identical with
those of the Individual.

The race as a whole, in its old homes and its new, learns the lesson
with such difficulty that it can scarcely be said to be learnt at all
until success or interests failure has done away with the need of
learning it. But in the case of our own people it has fortunately
happened that the concurrence of the interests of the individual and of
the whole organism has been normal throughout most of its history.

The United States and Great Britain in 1791.

The attitude of the United States and Great Britain, as they faced one
another in the western wilderness at the beginning of the year 1791, is
but another illustration of the truth of this fact. The British held the
lake posts, and more or less actively supported the Indians in their
efforts to bar the Americans from the Northwest. Nominally, they held
the posts because the Americans had themselves left unfulfilled some of
the conditions of the treaty of peace; but this was felt not to be the
real reason, and the Americans loudly protested that their conduct was
due to sheer hatred of the young Republic. The explanation was simpler.
The British had no far-reaching design to prevent the spread and growth
of the English-speaking people on the American continent. They cared
nothing, one way or the other, for that spread and growth, and it is
unlikely that they wasted a moment's thought on the ultimate future of
the race. All that they desired was to preserve the very valuable
fur-trade of the region round the Great Lakes for their own benefit.
They were acting from the motives of self-interest that usually control
nations; and it never entered their heads to balance against these
immediate interests the future of a nation many of whose members were to
them mere foreigners.

Reluctance of the Americans to Enter into War with the Indians.

The majority of the Americans, on their side, were exceedingly loth to
enter into aggressive war with the Indians: but were reluctantly forced
into the contest by the necessity of supporting the backwoodsmen. The
frontier was pushed westward, not because the leading statesmen of
America, or the bulk of the American people, foresaw the continental
greatness of this country or strove for such greatness; but because the
bordermen of the West, and the adventurous land-speculators of the East,
were personally interested in acquiring new territory, and because,
against their will, the governmental representatives of the nation were
finally forced to make the interests of the Westerners their own. The
people of the seaboard, the leaders of opinion in the coast towns and
old-settled districts, were inclined to look eastward, rather than
westward. They were interested in the quarrels of the old-world nations;
they were immediately concerned in the rights of the fisheries they
jealously shared with England, or the trade they sought to secure with
Spain. They did not covet the Indian lands. They had never heard of the
Rocky Mountains--nobody had as yet,--they cared as little for the
Missouri as for the Congo, and they thought of the Pacific Slope as a
savage country, only to be reached by an ocean voyage longer than the
voyage to India. They believed that they were entitled, under the
treaty, to the country between the Alleghanies and the Great Lakes; but
they were quite content to see the Indians remain in actual occupancy,
and they had no desire to spend men and money in driving them out.
Nevertheless, they were even less disposed to proceed to extremities
against their own people, who in very fact were driving out the Indians;
and this was the only alternative, for in the end they had to side with
one or the other set of combatants.

The governmental authorities of the newly created Republic shared these
feelings. They felt no hunger for the Indian lands; they felt no desire
to stretch their boundaries and thereby add to their already heavy
burdens and responsibilities. They wished to do strict justice to the
Indians; the treaties they held with them were carried on with
scrupulous fairness and were honorably lived up to by the United States

The Government Especially Averse to War.

They strove to keep peace, and made many efforts to persuade the
frontiersmen to observe the Indian boundary lines, and not to intrude on
the territory in dispute; and they were quite unable to foresee the
rapidity of the nation's westward growth. Like the people of the eastern
seaboard, the men high in governmental authority were apt to look upon
the frontiersmen with feelings dangerously akin to dislike and
suspicion. Nor were these feelings wholly unjustifiable. The men who
settle in a new country, and begin subduing the wilderness, plunge back
into the very conditions from which the race has raised itself by the
slow toil of ages.

Inevitable Shortcomings of the Frontiersmen.

The conditions cannot but tell upon them. Inevitably, and for more than
one lifetime--perhaps for several generations--they tend to retrograde,
instead of advancing. They drop away from the standard which highly
civilized nations have reached. As with harsh and dangerous labor they
bring the new land up towards the level of the old, they themselves
partly revert to their ancestral conditions; they sink back towards the
state of their ages-dead barbarian forefathers. Few observers can see
beyond this temporary retrogression into the future for which it is a
preparation. There is small cause for wonder in the fact that so many of
the leaders of Eastern thought looked with coldness upon the effort of
the Westerners to push north of the Ohio.

The Westerners Solved the Problem.

Yet it was these Western frontiersmen who were the real and vital
factors in the solution of the problems which so annoyed the British
Monarchy and the American Republic. They eagerly craved the Indian
lands; they would not be denied entrance to the thinly-peopled territory
wherein they intended to make homes for themselves and their children.
Rough, masterful, lawless, they were neither daunted by the prowess of
the red warriors whose wrath they braved, nor awed by the displeasure of
the Government whose solemn engagements they violated. The enormous
extent of the frontier dividing the white settler from the savage, and
the tangled inaccessibility of the country in which it everywhere lay,
rendered it as difficult for the national authorities to control the
frontiersmen as it was to chastise the Indians.

Why the East backed the West.

If the separation of interests between the thickly settled East and the
sparsely settled West had been complete it may be that the East would
have refused outright to support the West, in which case the advance
would have been very slow and halting. But the separation was not
complete. The frontiersmen were numerically important in some of the
States, as in Virginia, Georgia, and even Pennsylvania and New York; and
under a democratic system of government this meant that these States
were more or less responsive to their demands. It was greatly to the
interest of the frontiersmen that their demands should be gratified,
while other citizens had no very concrete concern in the matter one way
or the other. In addition to this, and even more important, was the fact
that there were large classes of the population everywhere who felt much
sense of identity with the frontiersmen, and sympathized with them. The
fathers or grandfathers of these peoples had themselves been
frontiersmen, and they were still under the influences of the traditions
which told of a constant march westward through the vast forests, and a
no less constant warfare with a hostile savagery. Moreover, in many of
the communities there were people whose kinsmen or friends had gone to
the border; and the welfare of these adventurers was a matter of more or
less interest to those who had stayed behind. Finally, and most
important of all, though the nation might be lukewarm originally, and
might wish to prevent the settlers from trespassing on the Indian lands
or entering into an Indian war, yet when the war had become of real
moment and when victory was doubtful, the national power was sure to be
used in favor of the hard-pressed pioneers.

The Government Ultimately supports the Frontiersmen.

At first the authorities at the national capital would blame the whites,
and try to temporize and make new treaties, or even threaten to drive
back the settlers with a strong hand; but when the ravages of the
Indians had become serious, when the bloody details were sent to homes
in every part of the Union by letter after letter from the border, when
the little newspapers began to publish accounts of the worst atrocities,
when the county lieutenants of the frontier counties were clamoring for
help, when the Congressmen from the frontier districts were appealing to
Congress, and the governors of the States whose frontiers were molested
were appealing to the President--then the feeling of race and national
kinship rose, and the Government no longer hesitated to support in every
way the hard-pressed wilderness vanguard of the American people.

The Situation in 1791.

The situation had reached this point by the year 1791. For seven years
the Federal authorities had been vainly endeavoring to make some final
settlement of the question by entering into treaties with the
Northwestern and Southwestern tribes. In the earlier treaties the
delegates from the Continental Congress asserted that the United States
were invested with the fee of all the land claimed by the Indians. In
the later treaties the Indian proprietorship of the lands was conceded.
[Footnote: American State Papers, Vol. IV., Indian Affairs, I., p. 13.
Letter of H. Knox, June 15, 1789. This is the lettering on the back of
the volume, and for convenience it will be used in referring to it.]
This concession at the time seemed important to the whites; but the
Indians probably never understood that there had been any change of
attitude; nor did it make any practical difference, for, whatever the
theory might be, the lands had eventually to be won, partly by whipping
the savages in fight, partly by making it better worth their while to
remain at peace than to go to war.

Knox and the Treaties.

The Federal officials under whose authority these treaties were made had
no idea of the complexity of the problem. In 1789 the Secretary of War,
the New Englander Knox, solemnly reported to the President that, if the
treaties were only observed and the Indians conciliated, they would
become attached to the United States, and the expense of managing them,
for the next half-century, would be only some fifteen thousand dollars a
year. [Footnote: American State Papers, Vol. IV., Indian Affairs, I., p.
13.] He probably represented, not unfairly, the ordinary Eastern view of
the matter. He had not the slightest idea of the rate at which the
settlements were increasing, though he expected that tracts of Indian
territory would from time to time be acquired. He made no allowance for
a growth so rapid that within the half-century six or eight populous
States were to stand within the Indian-owned wilderness of his day. He
utterly failed to grasp the central features of the situation, which
were that the settlers needed the land, and were bound to have it,
within a few years; and that the Indians would not give it up, under no
matter what treaty, without an appeal to arms.

Treaties with the Southern Indians.

In the South the United States Commissioners, in endeavoring to conclude
treaties with the Creeks and Cherokees, had been continually hampered by
the attitude of Georgia and the Franklin frontiersmen. The Franklin men
made war and peace with the Cherokees just as they chose, and utterly
refused to be bound by the treaties concluded on behalf of the United
States. Georgia played the same part with regard to the Creeks. The
Georgian authorities paid no heed whatever to the desires of Congress,
and negotiated on their own account a series of treaties with the Creeks
at Augusta, Galphinton, and Shoulder-bone, in 1783, 1785, and 1786. But
these treaties amounted to nothing, for nobody could tell exactly which
towns or tribes owned a given tract of land, or what individuals were
competent to speak for the Indians as a whole; the Creeks and Cherokees
went through the form of surrendering the same territory on the Oconee.
[Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 15. Letter of Knox, July 6,
1789.] The Georgians knew that the Indians with whom they treated had no
power to surrender the lands; but all they wished was some shadowy color
of title, that might serve as an excuse for their seizing the coveted
territory. On the other hand the Creeks, loudly though they declaimed
against the methods of the Georgian treaty-makers, themselves
shamelessly disregarded the solemn engagements which their authorized
representatives made with the United States. Moreover their murderous
forays on the Georgian settlers were often as unprovoked as were the
aggressions of the brutal Georgia borderers.

Mutual Wrongs of the Creeks and the Borderers.

The Creeks were prompt to seize every advantage given by the
impossibility of defining the rights of the various component parts of
their loosely knit confederacy. They claimed or disclaimed
responsibility as best suited their plans for the moment. When at
Galphinton two of the Creek towns signed away a large tract of
territory, McGillivray, the famous half-breed, and the other chiefs,
loudly protested that the land belonged to the whole confederacy, and
that the separate towns could do nothing save by consent of all. But in
May, 1787, a party of Creeks from the upper towns made an unprovoked
foray into Georgia, killed two settlers, and carried off a negro and
fourteen horses; the militia who followed them attacked the first
Indians they fell in with, who happened to be from the lower towns, and
killed twelve; whereupon the same chiefs disavowed all responsibility
for the deeds of the Upper Town warriors, and demanded the immediate
surrender of the militia who had killed the Lower Town people--to the
huge indignation of the Governor of Georgia. [Footnote: American State
Papers, Vol. IV., 31, 32, 33. Letter of Governor Matthews, August 4,
1787, etc.]

Difficulties of the Federal Treaty-Makers.

The United States Commissioners were angered by the lawless greed with
which the Georgians grasped at the Indian lands; and they soon found
that though the Georgians were always ready to clamor for help from the
United States against the Indians, in the event of hostilities, they
were equally prompt to defy the United States authorities if the latter
strove to obtain justice for the Indians, or if the treaties concluded
by the Federal and the State authorities seemed likely to conflict.
[Footnote: _Do_., p. 49. Letter of Benjamin Hawkins and Andrew Pickens,
December 30, 1785.] The Commissioners were at first much impressed by
the letters sent them by McGillivray, and the "talks" they received
through the Scotch, French, and English half-breed interpreters
[Footnote: _Do_., _e.g._, the letter of Galphin and Douzeazeaux, June
14, 1787.] from the outlandishly-named Muscogee chiefs--the Hallowing
King of the War Towns, the Fat King of the White or Peace Towns, the
White Bird King, the Mad Dog King, and many more. But they soon found
that the Creeks were quite as much to blame as the Georgians, and were
playing fast and loose with the United States, promising to enter into
treaties, and then refusing to attend; their flagrant and unprovoked
breaches of faith causing intense anger and mortification to the
Commissioners, whose patient efforts to serve them were so ill rewarded.
[Footnote: American State Papers, Vol. IV., p. 74, September 26, 1789.]
Moreover, to offset the Indian complaints of lands taken from them under
fraudulent treaties, the Georgians submitted lists [Footnote: _Do_., p.
77, October 5, 1789.] of hundreds of whites and blacks killed, wounded,
or captured, and of thousands of horses, horned cattle, and hogs
butchered or driven off by Indian war parties. The puzzled Commissioners
having at first been inclined to place the blame of the failure of peace
negotiations on the Georgians, next shifted the responsibility to
McGillivray, reporting that the Creeks were strongly in favor of peace.
The event proved that they were in error; for after McGillivray and his
fellow chiefs had come to New York, in the summer of 1790, and concluded
a solemn treaty of peace, the Indians whom they nominally represented
refused to be bound by it in any way, and continued without a change
their war of rapine and murder.

The Indians as Much to Blame as the Whites.

In truth the red men were as little disposed as the white to accept a
peace on any terms that were possible. The Secretary of War, who knew
nothing of Indians by actual contact, wrote that it would be indeed
pleasing "to a philosophic mind to reflect that, instead of
exterminating a part of the human race by our modes of population ... we
had imparted our knowledge of cultivation and the arts to the
aboriginals of the country," thus preserving and civilizing them
[Footnote: American State Papers, Vol. IV., pp. 53, 57, 60, 77, 79, 81,
etc.]; and the public men who represented districts remote from the
frontier shared these views of large, though vague, beneficence. But
neither the white frontiersmen nor their red antagonists possessed
"philosophic minds." They represented two stages of progress, ages
apart; and it would have needed many centuries to bring the lower to the
level of the higher. Both sides recognized the fact that their interests
were incompatible; and that the question of their clashing rights had to
be settled by the strong hand.

The Trouble Most Serious in the North.

In the Northwest matters culminated sooner than in the Southwest. The
Georgians, and the settlers along the Tennessee and Cumberland, were
harassed rather than seriously menaced by the Creek war parties; but in
the north the more dangerous Indians of the Miami, the Wabash, and the
Lakes gathered in bodies so large as fairly to deserve the name of
armies. Moreover, the pressure of the white advance was far heavier in
the north. The pioneers who settled in the Ohio basin were many times as
numerous as those who settled on the lands west of the Oconee and north
of the Cumberland, and were fed from States much more populous. The
advance was stronger, the resistance more desperate; naturally the open
break occurred where the strain was most intense.

There was fierce border warfare in the south. In the north there were
regular campaigns carried on, and pitched battles fought, between
Federal armies as large as those commanded by Washington at Trenton or
Greene at Eutaw Springs, and bodies of Indian warriors more numerous
than had ever yet appeared on any single field.

The United States Government Driven to War.

The newly created Government of the United States was very reluctant to
make formal war on the northwestern Indians. Not only were President
Washington and the National Congress honorably desirous of peace, but
they were hampered for funds, and dreaded any extra expense.
Nevertheless they were forced into war. Throughout the years 1789 and
1790 an increasing volume of appeals for help came from the frontier
countries. The governor of the Northwestern Territory, the
brigadier-general of the troops on the Ohio, the members of the Kentucky
Convention, and all the county lieutenants of Kentucky, the lieutenants
of the frontier counties of Virginia proper, the representatives from
the counties, the field officers of the different districts, the General
Assembly of Virginia, all sent bitter complaints and long catalogues of
injuries to the President, the Secretary of War, and the two Houses of
Congress; complaints which were redoubled after Harmar's failure. With
heavy hearts the national authorities prepared for war. [Footnote:
American State Papers, IV., pp. 83, 94, 109, and III.]

Raid on the Marietta Settlements.

Their decision was justified by the redoubled fury of the Indian raids
during the early part of 1791. Among others the settlements near
Marietta were attacked, a day or two after the new year began, in bitter
winter weather. A dozen persons, including a woman and two children,
were killed, and five men were taken prisoners. The New England
settlers, though brave and hardy, were unused to Indian warfare. They
were taken completely by surprise, and made no effective resistance; the
only Indian hurt was wounded with a hatchet by the wife of a frontier
hunter in the employ of the company. [Footnote: "The American Pioneer,"
II., 110. American State Papers, IV., 122.] There were some twenty-five
Indians in the attacking party; they were Wyandots and Delawares, who
had been mixing on friendly terms with the settlers throughout the
preceding summer, and so knew how best to deliver the assault. The
settlers had not only treated these Indians with much kindness, but had
never wronged any of the red race; and had been lulled into a foolish
feeling of security by the apparent good-will of the treacherous foes.
The assault was made in the twilight, on the 2nd of January, the Indians
crossing the frozen Muskingum and stealthily approaching a block-house
and two or three cabins. The inmates were frying meat for supper, and
did not suspect harm, offering food to the Indians; but the latter, once
they were within doors, dropped the garb of friendliness, and shot or
tomahawked all save a couple of men who escaped and the five who were
made prisoners. The captives were all taken to the Miami, or Detroit,
and as usual were treated with much kindness and humanity by the British
officers and traders with whom they came in contact. McKee, the British
Indian agent, who was always ready to incite the savages to war against
the Americans as a nation, but who was quite as ready to treat them
kindly as individuals, ransomed one prisoner; the latter went to his
Massachusetts home to raise the amount of his ransom, and returned to
Detroit to refund it to his generous rescuer. Another prisoner was
ransomed by a Detroit trader, and worked out his ransom in Detroit
itself. Yet another was redeemed from captivity by the famous Iroquois
chief Brant, who was ever a terrible and implacable foe, but a
great-hearted and kindly victor. The fourth prisoner died; while the
Indians took so great a liking to the fifth that they would not let him
go, but adopted him into the tribe, made him dress as they did, and, in
a spirit of pure friendliness, pierced his ears and nose. After Wayne's
treaty he was released, and returned to Marietta to work at his trade as
a stone mason, his bored nose and slit ears serving as mementos of his

Cincinnati Also Suffers.

The squalid little town of Cincinnati also suffered from the Indian war
parties in the spring of this year, [Footnote: "American Pioneer," II.,
149.] several of the townsmen being killed by the savages, who grew so
bold that they lurked through the streets at nights, and lay in ambush
in the gardens where the garrison of Fort Washington raised their
vegetables. One of the Indian attacks, made upon a little palisaded
"station" which had been founded by a man named Dunlop, some seventeen
miles from Cincinnati, was noteworthy because of an act of not uncommon
cruelty by the Indians. In the station there were some regulars. Aided
by the settlers they beat back their foes; whereupon the enraged savages
brought one of their prisoners within ear-shot of the walls and tortured
him to death. The torture began at midnight, and the screams of the
wretched victim were heard until daylight. [Footnote: McBride, I., 88.]

Difficulties Discriminating between Hostile and Friendly

Until this year the war was not general. One of the most bewildering
problems to be solved by the Federal officers on the Ohio was to find
out which tribes were friendly and which hostile. Many of the inveterate
enemies of the Americans were as forward in professions of friendship as
the peaceful Indians, were just as apt to be found at the treaties, or
lounging about the settlements; and this widespread treachery and deceit
made the task of the army officers puzzling to a degree. As for the
frontiersmen, who had no means whatever of telling a hostile from a
friendly tribe, they followed their usual custom and lumped all the
Indians, good and bad, together; for which they could hardly be blamed.
Even St. Clair, who had small sympathy with the backwoodsmen,
acknowledged [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 58.] that they could
not and ought not to submit patiently to the cruelties and depredations
of the savages; "they are in the habit of retaliation, perhaps without
attending precisely to the nations from which the injuries are
received," said he. A long course of such aggressions and retaliations
resulted, by the year 1791, in all the Northwestern Indians going on the
war-path. The hostile tribes had murdered and plundered the
frontiersmen; the vengeance of the latter, as often as not, had fallen
on friendly tribes; and these justly angered friendly tribes usually
signalized their taking the red hatchet by some act of treacherous
hostility directed against the settlers who had not molested them.

Treachery of the Friendly Delawares.

In the late winter of 1791 the hitherto friendly Delawares who hunted or
traded along the western frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia proper
took this manner of showing that they had joined the open foes of the
Americans. A big band of warriors spread up and down the Alleghany for
about forty miles, and on the 9th of February attacked all the outlying
settlements. The Indians who delivered this attack had long been on
intimate terms with the Alleghany settlers, who were accustomed to see
them in and about their houses; and as the savages acted with seeming
friendship to the last moment, they were able to take the settlers
completely unawares, so that no effective resistance was made. [Footnote:
"American Pioneer," I., 44; Narrative of John Brickell.] Some settlers
were killed and some captured. Among the captives was a lad named John
Brickell, who, though at first maltreated, and forced to run the
gauntlet, was afterwards adopted into the tribe, and was not released
until after Wayne's victory. After his adoption, he was treated with the
utmost kindness, and conceived a great liking for his captors, admiring
their many good qualities, especially their courage and their kindness
to their children. Long afterwards he wrote down his experiences, which
possess a certain value as giving, from the Indian standpoint, an
account of some of the incidents of the forest warfare of the day.

Utter Untrustworthiness of the Indians.

The warriors who had engaged in this raid on their former friends, the
settlers along the Alleghany. retreated two or three days' journey into
the wilderness to an appointed place, where they found their families.
One of the Girtys was with the Indians. No sooner had the last of the
warriors come in, with their scalps and prisoners, including the boy
Brickell, than ten of their number deliberately started back to
Pittsburgh, to pass themselves as friendly Indians, and trade. In a
fortnight they returned laden with goods of various kinds, including
whiskey. Some of the inhabitants, sore from disaster, suspected that
these Indians were only masquerading as friendly, and prepared to attack
them; but one of the citizens warned them of their danger and they
escaped. Their effrontery was as remarkable as their treachery and
duplicity. They had suddenly attacked and massacred settlers by whom
they had never been harmed, and with whom they preserved an appearance
of entire friendship up to the very moment of the assault. Then, their
hands red with the blood of their murdered friends, they came boldly
into Pittsburgh, among the near neighbors of these same murdered men,
and stayed there several days to trade, pretending to be peaceful allies
of the whites. With savages so treacherous and so ferocious it was a
mere impossibility for the borderers to distinguish the hostile from the
friendly, as they hit out blindly to revenge the blows that fell upon
them from unknown hands. Brutal though the frontiersmen often were, they
never employed the systematic and deliberate bad faith which was a
favorite weapon with even the best of the red tribes.

The Federal Authorities Misjudge the Settlers.

The people who were out of reach of the Indian tomahawk, and especially
the Federal officers, were often unduly severe in judging the borderers
for their deeds of retaliation, Brickell's narrative shows that the
parties of seemingly friendly Indians who came in to trade were
sometimes--and indeed in this year 1791 it was probable they were
generally--composed of Indians who were engaged in active hostilities
against the settlers, and who were always watching for a chance to
murder and plunder. On March 9th, a month after the Delawares had begun
their attacks, the grim backwoods captain Brady, with some of his
Virginian rangers, fell on a party of them who had come to a block-house
to trade, and killed four. The Indians asserted that they were friendly,
and both the Federal Secretary of War and the Governor of Pennsylvania
denounced the deed, and threatened the offenders; but the frontiersmen
stood by them. [Footnote: State Department MSS., Washington Papers, Ex.
C., p. 11, etc. Presly Neville to Richard Butler, March 19, 1791; Isaac
Craig to Secretary of War, March 16, 1791; Secretary of War to
President, March 31, 1791.] Soon afterwards a delegation of chiefs from
the Seneca tribe of the Iroquois arrived at Fort Pitt, and sent a
message to the President, complaining of the murder of these alleged
friendly Indians. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 145, Cornplanter
and others to the President, March 17, 1791.] On the very day these
Seneca chiefs started on their journey home another Delaware war party
killed nine settlers, men, women, and children, within twenty miles of
Fort Pitt; which so enraged the people of the neighborhood that the
lives of the Senecas were jeopardized. The United States authorities were
particularly anxious to keep at peace with the Six Nations, and made
repeated efforts to treat with them; but the Six Nations stood sullenly
aloof, afraid to enter openly into the struggle, and yet reluctant to
make a firm peace or cede any of their lands. [Footnote: State Department
MSS., Washington Papers, Knox to the President, April 10, 1791; American
State Papers, IV., pp. 139-170, 225-233, 477-482, etc.]

Intimate Relations of the British and Indians.

The intimate relations between the Indians and the British at the Lake
Posts continued to perplex and anger the Americans. While the frontiers
were being mercilessly ravaged, the same Indians who were committing the
ravages met in council with the British agent, Alexander McKee, at the
Miami Rapids; the council being held in this neighborhood for the
special benefit of the very towns which were most hostile to the
Americans, and which had been partially destroyed by Harmar the
preceding fall. The Indian war was at its height, and the murderous
forays never ceased throughout the spring and summer. McKee came to
Miami in April, and was forced to wait nearly three months, because of
the absence of the Indian war parties, before the principal chiefs and
headmen gathered to meet him. At last, on July 1st, they were all
assembled; not only the Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawas,
Pottawatamies and others who had openly taken the hatchet against the
Americans, but also representatives of the Six Nations, and tribes of
savages from lands so remote that they carried no guns, but warred with
bows, spears, and tomahawks, and were clad in buffalo-robes instead of
blankets. McKee in his speech to them did not incite them to war. On the
contrary, he advised them, in guarded language, to make peace with the
United States; but only upon terms consistent with their "honor and
interest." He assured them that, whatever they did, he wished to know
what they desired; and that the sole purpose of the British was to
promote the welfare of the confederated Indians. Such very cautious
advice was not of a kind to promote peace; and the goods furnished the
savages at the council included not only cattle, corn, and tobacco, but
also quantities of powder and balls. [Footnote: Canadian Archives,
McKee's speech to the Indians, July 1, 1971; and Francis Lafontaine's
account of sundries to Indians.]

The Fur Trade the Prime Object of the British.

The chief interest of the British was to preserve the fur trade for
their merchants, and it was mainly for this reason that they clung so
tenaciously to the Lake Posts. For their purposes it was essential that
the Indians should remain lords of the soil. They preferred to see the
savages at peace with the Americans, provided that in this way they
could keep their lands; but, whether through peace or war, they wished
the lands to remain Indian, and the Americans to be barred from them.
While they did not at the moment advise war, their advice to make peace
was so faintly uttered, and so hedged round with conditions as to be of
no weight; and they furnished the Indians not only with provisions but
with munitions of war. While McKee, and other British officers, were at
the Miami Rapids, holding councils with the Indians, and issuing to them
goods and weapons, bands of braves were continually returning from
forays against the American frontier, bringing in scalps and prisoners;
and the wilder subjects of the British King, like the Girtys, and some
of the French from Detroit, went off with the war parties on their
forays. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 196. Narrative of Thomas
Rhea, July 2, 1791. This narrative was distrusted; but it is fully borne
out by McKee's letter, and the narrative of Brickell. He saw Brickell,
whom he calls "Brittle," at the Miami.] The authorities at the capital
of the new Republic were deceived by the warmth with which the British
insisted that they were striving to bring about a peace; but the
frontiersmen were not deceived, and they were right in their belief that
the British were really the mainstay and support of the Indians in their

The Americans Draw the Sword.

Peace could only be won by the unsheathed sword. Even the National
Government was reluctantly driven to this view. As all the Northwestern
tribes were banded in open war, it was useless to let the conflict
remain a succession of raids and counter-raids. Only a severe stroke,
delivered by a formidable army, could cow the tribes. It was hopeless to
try to deliver such a crippling blow with militia alone, and it was very
difficult for the infant government to find enough money or men to equip
an army composed exclusively of regulars. Accordingly preparations were
made for a campaign with a mixed force of regulars, special levies, and
militia; and St. Clair, already Governor of the Northwestern Territory,
was put in command of the army as Major-General.

Rangers and Scouts are Raised.

Before the army was ready the Federal Government was obliged to take
other measures for the defence of the border. Small bodies of rangers
were raised from among the frontier militia, being paid at the usual
rate for soldiers in the army, a net sum of about two dollars a month
while in service. In addition, on the repeated and urgent request of the
frontiersmen, a few of the most active hunters and best woodsmen, men
like Brady, were enlisted as scouts, being paid six or eight times the
ordinary rate. These men, because of their skill in woodcraft and their
thorough knowledge of Indian fighting, were beyond comparison more
valuable than ordinary militia or regulars, and were prized very highly
by the frontiersmen. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 107, Jan. 5,

Raid of Scott.

Besides thus organizing the local militia for defense, the President
authorized the Kentuckians to undertake two offensive expeditions
against the Wabash Indians so as to prevent them from giving aid to the
Miami tribes, whom St. Clair was to attack. Both expeditions were
carried on by bands of mounted volunteers, such as had followed Clark on
his various raids. The first was commanded by Brigadier-General Charles
Scott; Colonel John Hardin led his advance guard, and Wilkinson was
second in command. Towards the end of May, Scott crossed the Ohio, at
the head of eight hundred horse-riflemen, and marched rapidly and
secretly towards the Wabash towns. A mounted Indian discovered the
advance of the Americans and gave the alarm; and so most of the Indians
escaped just as the Kentucky riders fell on the town. But little
resistance was offered by the surprised and outnumbered savages. Only
five Americans were wounded, while of the Indians thirty-two were slain,
as they fought or fled, and forty-one prisoners, chiefly women and
children, were brought in, either by Scott himself or by his detachments
under Hardin and Wilkinson. Several towns were destroyed, and the
crowing corn cut down. There were not a few French living in the town,
in well-finished log-houses, which were burned with the wigwams.
[Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 131, Scott's Report, June 28,

Raid of Wilkinson.

The second expedition was under the command of Wilkinson, and consisted
of over five hundred men. He marched in August, and repeated Scott's
feats, again burning down two or three of the towns, and destroying the
goods and the crops. He lost three or four men killed or wounded, but
killed ten Indians and captured some thirty. [Footnote: _Do_.,
Wilkinson's Letter, August 24, 1791.] In both expeditions the volunteers
behaved well and committed no barbarous act, except that in the
confusion of the actual onslaught two or three non-combatants were
slain. The Wabash Indians were cowed and disheartened by their
punishment, and in consequence gave no aid to the Miami tribes; but
beyond this the raids accomplished nothing, and brought no nearer the
wished-for time of peace.

St. Clair's Difficulty in Organizing his Campaign.

Meanwhile St. Clair was striving vainly to hasten the preparations for
his own far more formidable task. There was much delay in forwarding him
the men and the provisions and munitions. Congress hesitated and
debated; the Secretary of War, hampered by a newly created office and
insufficient means, did not show to advantage in organizing the
campaign, and was slow in carrying out his plans; while there was
positive dereliction of duty on the part of the quartermaster, and the
contractors proved both corrupt and inefficient. The army was often on
short commons, lacking alike food for the men and fodder for the horses;
the powder was poor, the axes useless, the tents and clothing nearly
worthless; while the delays were so extraordinary that the troops did
not make the final move from Fort Washington until mid-September.
[Footnote: St. Clair Papers, II., 286, Report of Special Committee of
Congress, March 27, 1792.]

Wretched Condition of St. Clair's Army.

St. Clair himself was broken in health; he was a sick, weak, elderly
man, high minded, and zealous to do his duty, but totally unfit for the
terrible responsibilities of such an expedition against such foes. The
troops were of wretched stuff. There were two small regiments of regular
infantry, the rest of the army being composed of six months' levies and
of militia ordered out for this particular campaign. The pay was
contemptible. Each private was given three dollars a month, from which
ninety cents was deducted, leaving a net payment of two dollars and ten
cents a month. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 118, Report of
Secy. of War, January 22, 1791.] Sergeants netted three dollars and
sixty cents; while the lieutenants received twenty-two, the captains
thirty, and the colonels sixty dollars. The mean parsimony of the nation
in paying such low wages to men about to be sent on duties at once very
arduous and very dangerous met its fit and natural reward. Men of good
bodily powers, and in the prime of life, and especially men able to do
the rough work of frontier farmers, could not be hired to fight Indians
in unknown forests for two dollars a month. Most of the recruits were
from the streets and prisons of the seaboard cities. They were hurried
into a campaign against peculiarly formidable foes before they had
acquired the rudiments of a soldier's training, and, of course, they
never even understood what woodcraft meant. [Footnote: Denny's Journal,
374.] The officers were men of courage, as in the end most of them
showed by dying bravely on the field of battle; but they were utterly
untrained themselves, and had no time in which to train their men. Under
such conditions it did not need keen vision to foretell disaster. Harmar
had learned a bitter lesson the preceding year; he knew well what
Indians could do, and what raw troops could not; and he insisted with
emphasis that the only possible outcome to St. Clair's expedition was

The Troops Gather at Fort Washington.

As the raw troops straggled to Pittsburgh they were shipped down the
Ohio to Fort Washington; and St. Clair made the headquarters of his army
at a new fort some twenty-five miles northward, which he christened Fort
Hamilton. During September the army slowly assembled; two small
regiments of regulars, two of six months' levies, a number of Kentucky
militia, a few cavalry, and a couple of small batteries of light guns.
After wearisome delays, due mainly to the utter inefficiency of the
quartermaster and contractor, the start for the Indian towns was made on
October the 4th.

The Army Begins its March.

The army trudged slowly through the deep woods and across the wet
prairies, cutting out its own road, and making but five or six miles a
day. It was in a wilderness which abounded with game; both deer and bear
frequently ran into the very camps; and venison was a common food.
[Footnote: Bradley MSS. The journal and letters of Captain Daniel
Bradley; shown me by the courtesy of his descendants, Mr. Daniel B.
Bradley of Southport, Conn., and Mr. Arthur W. Bradley of Cincinnati,
Ohio.] On October 13th a halt was made to build another little fort,
christened in honor of Jefferson. There were further delays, caused by
the wretched management of the commissariat department, and the march
was not resumed until the 24th, the numerous sick being left in Fort
Jefferson. Then the army once more stumbled northward through the
wilderness. The regulars, though mostly raw recruits, had been reduced
to some kind of discipline; but the six months' levies were almost worse
than the militia. [Footnote: Denny, October 29, 1791, etc.] Owing to the
long delays, and to the fact that they had been enlisted at various
times, their terms of service were expiring day by day; and they wished
to go home, and tried to, while the militia deserted in squads and
bands. Those that remained were very disorderly. Two who attempted to
desert were hung; and another, who shot a comrade, was hung also; but
even this severity in punishment failed to stop the demoralization.

St. Clair a Broken-down Man and His Subordinates

With such soldiers there would have been grave risk of disaster under
any commander; but St. Clair's leadership made the risk a certainty.
There was Indian sign, old and new, all through woods; and the scouts
and stragglers occasionally interchanged shots with small parties of
braves, and now and then lost a man, killed or captured. It was,
therefore, certain that the savages knew every movement of the army,
which, as it slowly neared the Miami towns, was putting itself within
easy striking range of the most formidable Indian confederacy in the
Northwest. The density of the forest was such that only the utmost
watchfulness could prevent the foe from approaching within arm's length
unperceived. It behooved St. Clair to be on his guard, and he had been
warned by Washington, who had never forgotten the scenes of Braddock's
defeat, of the danger of a surprise. But St. Clair was broken down by
the worry and by continued sickness; time and again it was doubtful
whether he could so much as stay with the army. The second in command,
Major-General Richard Butler, was also sick most of the time; and, like
St. Clair, he possessed none of the qualities of leadership save
courage. The whole burden fell on the Adjutant-General, Colonel Winthrop
Sargent, an old Revolutionary officer; without him the expedition would
probably have failed in ignominy even before the Indians were reached,
and he showed not only cool courage but ability of a good order; yet in
the actual arrangements for battle he was, of course, unable to remedy
the blunders of his superiors.

His Shortcomings.

St. Clair should have covered his front and flanks for miles around with
scouting parties; but he rarely sent any out, and, thanks to letting the
management of those that did go devolve on his subordinates, and to not
having their reports made to him in person, he derived no benefit from
what they saw. He had twenty Chickasaws with him; but he sent these off
on an extended trip, lost touch of them entirely, and never saw them
again until after the battle. He did not seem to realize that he was
himself in danger of attack. When some fifty miles or so from the Miami
towns, on the last day of October, sixty of the militia deserted; and he
actually sent back after them one of his two regular regiments, thus
weakening by one half the only trustworthy portion of his force.
[Footnote: Bradley MSS. In his journal Captain Bradley expresses his
astonishment at seeing the regiment and his inability to understand the
object in sending it back. Captain Bradley was not over-pleased with his
life at the fort; as one of the minor ills he mentions in one of his
letters to Ebenezer Banks: "Please deliver the enclosed letter to my
wife. Not a drop of cider have I drinked this twelve month."]

The Last Camp.

On November 3d the doomed army, now reduced to a total of about fourteen
hundred men, camped on the eastern fork of the Wabash, high up, where it
was but twenty yards wide. There was snow on the ground and the little
pools were skimmed with ice. The camp was on a narrow rise of ground,
where the troops were cramped together, the artillery and most of the
horse in the middle. On both flanks, and along most of the rear, the
ground was low and wet. All around, the wintry woods lay in frozen
silence. In front the militia were thrown across the creek, and nearly a
quarter of a mile beyond the rest of the troops. [Footnote: St. Clair's
Letter to the Secretary of War, Nov. 9, 1791.] Parties of Indians were
seen during the afternoon, and they skulked around the lines at night,
so that the sentinels frequently fired at them; yet neither St. Clair
nor Butler took any adequate measures to ward off the impending blow. It
is improbable that, as things actually were at this time, they could
have won a victory over their terrible foes; but they might have avoided
overwhelming disaster.

The Indians Surprise the Camp at Dawn.

On November 4th the men were under arms, as usual, by dawn, St. Clair
intending to throw up entrenchments and then make a forced march in
light order against the Indian towns. But he was forestalled. Soon after
sunrise, just as the men were dismissed from parade, a sudden assault
was made upon the militia, who lay unprotected beyond the creek. The
unexpectedness and fury of the onset, the heavy firing, and the
appalling whoops and yells of the throngs of painted savages threw the
militia into disorder. After a few moments' resistance they broke and
fled in wild panic to the camp of the regulars, among whom they drove in
a frightened herd, spreading dismay and confusion.

The drums beat, and the troops sprang to arms, as soon as they heard the
heavy firing at the front; and their volleys for a moment checked the
onrush of the plumed woodland warriors. But the check availed nothing.
The braves filed off to one side and the other, completely surrounded
the camp, killed or drove in the guards and pickets, and then advanced
close to the main lines. [Footnote: Denny, November 4th; also p. 221.]

Desperate Fighting Follows.

A furious battle followed. After the first onset the Indians fought in
silence, no sound coming from them save the incessant rattle of their
fire, as they crept from log to log, from tree to tree, ever closer and
closer. The soldiers stood in close order, in the open; their musketry
and artillery fire made a tremendous noise, but did little damage to a
foe they could hardly see. Now and then, through the hanging smoke,
terrible figures flitted, painted black and red, the feathers of the
hawk and eagle braided in their long scalp-locks; but save for these
glimpses, the soldiers knew the presence of their sombre enemy only from
the fearful rapidity with which their comrades fell dead and wounded in
the ranks. They never even knew the numbers or leaders of the Indians.
At the time it was supposed that they outnumbered the whites; but it is
probable that the reverse was the case, and it may even be that they
were not more than half as numerous. It is said that the chief who led
them, both in council and battle, was Little Turtle, the Miami. At any
rate, there were present all the chiefs and picked warriors of the
Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Miamis, and all the most reckless and
adventurous young braves from among the Iroquois and the Indians of the
Upper Lakes, as well as many of the ferocious whites and half-breeds who
dwelt in the Indian villages.

Fury and Skill of the Indians.

The Indians fought with the utmost boldness and ferocity, and with the
utmost skill and caution. Under cover of the smoke of the heavy but
harmless fire from the army they came up so close that they shot the
troops down as hunters slaughter a herd of standing buffalo. Watching
their chance, they charged again and again with the tomahawk, gliding
into close quarters while their bewildered foes were still blindly
firing into the smoke-shrouded woods. The men saw no enemy as they stood
in the ranks to load and shoot; in a moment, without warning, dark faces
frowned through the haze, the war-axes gleamed, and on the frozen ground
the weapons clattered as the soldiers fell. As the comrades of the
fallen sprang forward to avenge them, the lithe warriors vanished as
rapidly as they had appeared; and once more the soldiers saw before them
only the dim forest and the shifting smoke wreaths, with vague half
glimpses of the hidden foe, while the steady singing of the Indian
bullets never ceased, and on every hand the bravest and steadiest fell
one by one.

The Troops at First Fight Resolutely.
Bravery of the Officers in Command.

At first the army as a whole fought firmly; indeed there was no choice,
for it was ringed by a wall of flame. The officers behaved very well,
cheering and encouraging their men; but they were the special targets of
the Indians, and fell rapidly. St. Clair and Butler by their cool
fearlessness in the hour of extreme peril made some amends for their
shortcomings as commanders. They walked up and down the lines from flank
to flank, passing and repassing one another; for the two lines of battle
were facing outward, and each general was busy trying to keep his wing
from falling back. St. Clair's clothes were pierced by eight bullets,
but he was himself untouched. He wore a blanket coat with a hood; he had
a long queue, and his thick gray hair flowed from under his
three-cornered hat; a lock of his hair was carried off by a bullet.
[Footnote: McBride's "Pioneer Biography," I., 165. Narrative of Thomas
Irwin, a packer, who was in the fight. There are of course discrepancies
between the various accounts; in the confusion of such a battle even the
most honest eye-witnesses could not see all things alike.] Several times
he headed the charges, sword in hand. General Butler had his arm broken
early in the fight, but he continued to walk to and fro along the line,
his coat off and the wounded arm in a sling. Another bullet struck him
in the side, inflicting a mortal wound; and he was carried to the middle
of the camp, where he sat propped up by knapsacks. Men and horses were
falling around him at every moment. St. Clair sent an aide, Lieutenant
Ebenezer Denny, to ask how he was; he displayed no anxiety, and answered
that he felt well. While speaking, a young cadet, who stood nearby, was
hit on the kneecap by a spent ball, and at the shock cried aloud;
whereat the General laughed so that his wounded side shook. The aide
left him; and there is no further certain record of his fate except that
he was slain; but it is said that in one of the Indian rushes a warrior
bounded towards him and sunk the tomahawk in his brain before any one
could interfere.

The Indians Capture the Artillery.
Charges and Counter-Charges.

Instead of being awed by the bellowing artillery, the Indians made the
gunners a special object of attack. Man after man was picked off, until
every officer was killed but one, who was wounded; and most of the
privates also were slain or disabled. The artillery was thus almost
silenced, and the Indians, emboldened by success, swarmed forward and
seized the guns, while at the same time a part of the left wing of the
army began to shrink back. But the Indians were now on comparatively
open ground, where the regulars could see them and get at them; and
under St. Clair's own leadership the troops rushed fiercely at the
savages, with fixed bayonets, and drove them back to cover. By this time
the confusion and disorder were great; while from every hollow and grass
patch, from behind every stump and tree and fallen log, the Indians
continued their fire. Again and again the officers led forward the
troops in bayonet charges; and at first the men followed them with a
will. Each charge seemed for a moment to be successful, the Indians
rising in swarms and running in headlong flight from the bayonets. In
one of the earliest, in which Colonel Darke led his battalion, the
Indians were driven several hundred yards, across the branch of the
Wabash; but when the Colonel halted and rallied his men, he found that
the savages had closed in behind him, and he had to fight his way back,
while the foe he had been driving at once turned and harassed his rear.
He was himself wounded, and lost most of his command. On re-entering
camp he found the Indians again in possession of the artillery and
baggage, from which they were again driven; they had already scalped the
slain who lay about the guns. Major Thomas Butler had his thigh broken
by a bullet; but he continued on horseback, in command of his battalion,
until the end of the fight, and led his men in one of the momentarily
successful bayonet charges. The only regular regiment present lost every
officer, killed or wounded. The commander of the Kentucky militia,
Colonel Oldham, was killed early in the action, while trying to rally
his men and damning them for cowards.

Inferiority of the Troops to the Indians.

The charging troops could accomplish nothing permanent. The men were too
clumsy and ill-trained in forest warfare to overtake their fleet,
half-naked antagonists. The latter never received the shock; but though
they fled they were nothing daunted, for they turned the instant the
battalion did, and followed firing. They skipped out of reach of the
bayonets, and came back as they pleased; and they were only visible when
raised by a charge.

Feats of Some of the Packhorsemen.

Among the packhorsemen were some who were accustomed to the use of the
rifle and to life in the woods; and these fought well. One, named
Benjamin Van Cleve, kept a journal, in which he described what he saw of
the fight. [Footnote: "American Pioneer," II., 150; Van Cleve's
memoranda.] He had no gun, but five minutes after the firing began he
saw a soldier near him with his arm swinging useless; and he borrowed
the wounded man's musket and cartridges. The smoke had settled to within
three feet of the ground, so he knelt, covering himself behind a tree,
and only fired when he saw an Indian's head, or noticed one running from
cover to cover. He fired away all his ammunition, and the bands of his
musket flew off; he picked up another just as two levy officers ordered
a charge, and followed the charging party at a run. By this time the
battalions were broken, and only some thirty men followed the officers.
The Indians fled before the bayonets until they reached a ravine filled
with down timber; whereupon they halted behind the impenetrable tangle
of fallen logs. The soldiers also halted, and were speedily swept away
by the fire of the Indians, whom they could not reach; but Van Cleve,
showing his skill as a woodsman, covered himself behind a small tree,
and gave back shot for shot until all his ammunition was gone. Before
this happened his less skilful companions had been slain or driven off,
and he ran at full speed back to camp. Here he found that the artillery
had been taken and re-taken again and again. Stricken men lay in heaps
everywhere, and the charging troops were once more driving the Indians
across the creek in front of the camp. Van Cleve noticed that the dead
officers and soldiers who were lying about the guns had all been scalped
and that "the Indians had not been in a hurry, for their hair was all
skinned off." Another of the packers who took part in the fight, one
Thomas Irwin, was struck with the spectacle offered by the slaughtered
artillerymen, and with grewsome homeliness compared the reeking heads to
pumpkins in a December cornfield.

The Soldiers Lose Heart.
Panic Seizes the Army.

As the officers fell the soldiers, who at first stood up bravely enough,
gradually grew disheartened. No words can paint the hopelessness and
horror such a struggle as that in which they were engaged. They were
hemmed in by foes who showed no mercy and whose blows they could in no
way return. If they charged they could not overtake the Indians; and the
instant the charge stopped the Indians came back. If they stood they
were shot down by an unseen enemy; and there was no stronghold, no
refuge to which to flee. The Indian attack was relentless, and could
neither be avoided, parried, nor met by counter assault. For two hours
or so the troops kept up a slowly lessening resistance; but by degrees
their hearts failed. The wounded had been brought towards the middle of
the lines, where the baggage and tents were, and an ever growing
proportion of unwounded men joined them. In vain the officers tried, by
encouragement, by jeers, by blows, to drive them back to the fight. They
were unnerved. As in all cases where large bodies of men are put in
imminent peril of death, whether by shipwreck, plague, fire, or
violence, numbers were swayed by a mad panic of utterly selfish fear,
and others became numbed and callous, or snatched at any animal
gratification during their last moments. Many soldiers crowded round the
fires and stood stunned and confounded by the awful calamity; many broke
into the officers' marquees and sought for drink, or devoured the food
which the rightful owners had left when the drums beat to arms.

St. Clair Resolves on Retreat.

There was but one thing to do. If possible the remnant of the army must
be saved, and it could only be saved by instant flight, even at the cost
of abandoning the wounded. The broad road by which the army had advanced
was the only line of retreat. The artillery had already been spiked and
abandoned. Most of the horses had been killed, but a few were still
left, and on one of these St. Clair mounted. He gathered together those
fragments of the different battalions which contained the few men who
still kept heart and head, and ordered them to charge and regain the
road from which the savages had cut them off. Repeated orders were
necessary before some of the men could be roused from their stupor
sufficiently to follow the charging party; and they were only induced to
move when told that it was to retreat.

The Troops Break through the Indian Ring.

Colonel Darke and a few officers placed themselves at the head of the
column, the coolest and boldest men drew up behind them, and they fell
on the Indians with such fury as to force them back well beyond the
road. This made an opening through which, said Van Cleve the packer, the
rest of the troops "pressed like a drove of bullocks." The Indians were
surprised by the vigor of the charge, and puzzled as to its object. They
opened out on both sides and half the men had gone through before they
fired more than a chance shot or two. They then fell on the rear, and
began a hot pursuit. St. Clair sent his aide, Denny, to the front to try
to keep order, but neither he nor anyone else could check the flight.
Major Clark tried to rally his battalion to cover the retreat, but he
was killed and the effort abandoned.

Wild Rout of the Army.

There never was a wilder rout. As soon as the men began to run, and
realized that in flight there lay some hope of safety, they broke into a
stampede which soon became uncontrollable. Horses, soldiers, and the few
camp followers and women who had accompanied the army were all mixed
together. Neither command nor example had the slightest weight; the men
were abandoned to the terrible selfishness of utter fear. They threw
away their weapons as they ran. They thought of nothing but escape, and
fled in a huddle, the stronger and the few who had horses trampling
their way to the front through the old, the weak, and the wounded; while
behind them raged the Indian tomahawk. Fortunately the attraction of
plundering the camp was so overpowering that the savages only followed
the army about four miles; otherwise hardly a man would have escaped.

Story of Van Cleve the Packer.

St. Clair was himself in much danger, for he tried to stay behind and
stem the torrent of fugitives; but he failed, being swept forward by the
crowd, and when he attempted to ride to the front to rally them, he
failed again, for his horse could not be pricked out of a walk. The
packer, Van Cleve, in his journal, gives a picture of the flight. He was
himself one of the few who lost neither courage nor generosity in the

Among his fellow packers were his uncle and a young man named Bonham,
who was his close and dear friend. The uncle was shot in the wrist, the
ball lodging near his shoulder; but he escaped. Bonham, just before the
retreat began, was shot through both hips, so that he could not walk.
Young Van Cleve got him a horse, on which he was with difficulty
mounted; then, as the flight began, Bonham bade Van Cleve look to his
safety, as he was on foot, and the two separated. Bonham rode until the
pursuit had almost ceased; then, weak and crippled, he was thrown off
his horse and slain. Meanwhile Van Cleve ran steadily on foot. By the
time he had gone two miles most of the mounted men had passed him. A
boy, on the point of falling from exhaustion, now begged his help; and
the kind-hearted backwoodsman seized the lad and pulled him along nearly
two miles farther, when he himself became so worn-out that he nearly
fell. There were still two horses in the rear, one carrying three men,
and one two; and behind the latter Van Cleve, summoning his strength,
threw the boy, who escaped. Nor did Van Cleve's pity for his fellows
cease with this; for he stopped to tie his handkerchief around the knee
of a wounded man. His violent exertions gave him a cramp in both thighs,
so that he could barely walk; and in consequence the strong and active
passed him until he was within a hundred yards of the rear, where the
Indians were tomahawking the old and wounded men. So close were they
that for a moment his heart sunk in despair; but he threw off his shoes,
the touch of the cold ground seemed to revive him, and he again began to
trot forward. He got around a bend in the road, passing half a dozen
other fugitives; and long afterwards he told how well he remembered
thinking that it would be some time before they would all be massacred
and his own turn came. However, at this point the pursuit ceased, and a
few miles farther on he had gained the middle of the flying troops, and
like them came to a walk. He fell in with a queer group, consisting of
the sole remaining officer of the artillery, an infantry corporal, and a
woman called Red-headed Nance. Both of the latter were crying, the
corporal for the loss of his wife, the woman for the loss of her child.
The worn-out officer hung on the corporal's arm, while Van Cleve
"carried his fusee and accoutrements and led Nance; and in this sociable
way arrived at Fort Jefferson a little after sunset."

The Remnant of the Army Reaches Cincinnati.
Exultation of the Victors.

Before reaching Fort Jefferson the wretched army encountered the regular
regiment which had been so unfortunately detached a couple of days
before the battle. The most severely wounded were left in the fort;
[Footnote: Bradley MSS. The addition of two hundred sick and wounded
brought the garrison to such short commons that they had to slaughter
the pack-horses for food.] and then the flight was renewed, until the
disorganized and half-armed rabble reached Fort Washington, and the mean
log huts of Cincinnati. Six hundred and thirty men had been killed and
over two hundred and eighty wounded; less than five hundred, only about
a third of the whole number engaged in the battle, remained unhurt. But
one or two were taken prisoners, for the Indians butchered everybody,
wounded or unwounded, who fell into their hands. There is no record of
the torture of any of the captives, but there was one singular instance
of cannibalism. The savage Chippewas from the far-off north devoured one
of the slain soldiers, probably in a spirit of ferocious bravado; the
other tribes expressed horror at the deed. [Footnote: Brickell's
Narrative.] The Indians were rich with the spoil. They got horses, tents,
guns, axes, powder, clothing, and blankets--in short everything their
hearts prized. Their loss was comparatively slight; it may not have been
one twentieth that of the whites. They did not at the moment follow up
their victory, each band going off with its own share of the booty. But
the triumph was so overwhelming, and the reward so great, that the war
spirit received a great impetus in all the tribes. The bands of warriors
that marched against the frontier were more numerous, more formidable,
and bolder than ever.

In the following January Wilkinson with a hundred and fifty mounted
volunteers marched to the battle-field to bury the slain. The weather
was bitterly cold, snow lay deep on the ground, and some of the
volunteers were frost bitten. [Footnote: McBride's "Pioneer Biography,"
John Reily's narrative. This expedition, in which not a single hostile
Indian was encountered, has been transmuted by Withers and one or two
other border historians into a purely fictitious expedition of revenge
in which hundreds of Indians were slain on the field of St. Clair's

Kentucky Volunteers Visit the Battle-field and Bury the Dead.

Four miles from the scene of the battle, where the pursuit had ended,
they began to find the bodies on the road, and close alongside, in
the woods, whither some of the hunted creatures had turned at the last,
to snatch one more moment of life. Many had been dragged from under the
snow and devoured by wolves. The others lay where they had fallen,
showing as mounds through the smooth white mantle that covered them. On
the battle-field itself the slain lay thick, scalped, and stripped of
all their clothing which the conquerors deemed worth taking. The bodies,
blackened by frost and exposure, could not be identified; and they were
buried in a shallow trench in the frozen ground. The volunteers then
marched home.

News of the Disaster is Sent to Washington.

When the remnant of the defeated army reached the banks of the Ohio, St.
Clair sent his aide, Denny, to carry the news to Philadelphia, at that
time the national capital. The river was swollen, there were incessant
snowstorms, and ice formed heavily, so that it took twenty days of toil
and cold before Denny reached Wheeling and got horses. For ten days more
he rode over the bad winter roads, reaching Philadelphia with the evil
tidings on the evening of December 19th. It was thus six weeks after the
defeat of the army before the news was brought to the anxious Federal

The young officer called first on the Secretary of War; but as soon as
the Secretary realized the importance of the information he had it
conveyed to the President. Washington was at dinner, with some guests,
and was called from the table to listen to the tidings of ill fortune.
He returned with unmoved face, and at the dinner, and at the reception
which followed, he behaved with his usual stately courtesy to those whom
he was entertaining, not so much as hinting at what he had heard.

Washington's Wrath.

But when the last guest had gone, his pent-up wrath broke forth in one
of those fits of volcanic fury which sometimes shattered his iron
outward calm. Walking up and down the room he burst out in wild regret
for the rout and disaster, and bitter invective against St. Clair,
reciting how, in that very room, he had wished the unfortunate commander
success and honor and had bidden him above all things beware of a
surprise. [Footnote: Tobias Lear, Washington's Private Secretary as
quoted by both Custis and Rush. The report of an eyewitness. See also
Lodge's "Washington," p. 94. Denny, in his journal, merely mentions that
he went at once to the Secretary of War's office on the evening of the
19th, and does not speak of seeing Washington until the following
morning. On the strength of this omission one or two of St. Clair's
apologists have striven to represent the whole account of Washington's
wrath as apocryphal; but the attempt is puerile; the relation comes from
an eyewitness who had no possible motive to distort the facts. The
Secretary of War, Knox, was certain to inform Washington of the disaster
the very evening he heard of it; and whether he sent Denny, or another
messenger, or went himself is unimportant. Lear might very well have
been mistaken as to the messenger who brought the news; but he could not
have been mistaken about Washington's speech.] "He went off with that
last solemn warning thrown into his ears," spoke Washington, as he
strode to and fro, "and yet to suffer that army to be cut to pieces,
hacked, butchered, tomahawked, by a surprise, the very thing I guarded
him against! O God, O God, he's worse than a murderer! How can he answer
it to his country!" Then, calming himself by a mighty effort: "General
St. Clair shall have justice ... he shall have full justice." And St.
Clair did receive full justice, and mercy too, from both Washington and
Congress. For the sake of his courage and honorable character they held
him guiltless of the disaster for which his lack of capacity as a
general was so largely accountable.

The Blame for the Disaster.

Washington and his administration were not free from blame. It was
foolish to attempt the campaign the Northwestern Indians with men who
had only been trained for six months, and who were enlisted at the
absurd price of two dollars a month. Moreover, there were needless
delays in forwarding the troops to Fort Washington; and the commissary
department was badly managed. Washington was not directly responsible
for any of these shortcomings; he very wisely left to the Secretary of
War, Knox, the immediate control of the whole matter, seeking to avoid
all interference with him, so that there might be no clashing or
conflict of authority [Footnote: State Dep. MSS., Washington Papers. War
Dept. Ex. C., Washington to Knox, April 1, 1791.]; but he was of course
ultimately responsible for the little evil, no less than for the great
good, done by his administration.

Incompetence of St. Clair.

The chief blunder was the selection of St. Clair. As a commander he
erred in many ways. He did not, or could not, train his troops; and he
had no business to challenge a death fight with raw levies. It was
unpardonable of him to send back one of his two regular regiments, the
only trustworthy portion of his force, on the eve of the battle. He
should never have posted the militia, his poorest troops, in the most
exposed situation. Above all he should have seen that the patrols and
pickets were so numerous, and performed their duty so faithfully, as to
preclude the possibility of surprise. With the kind of army furnished
him he could hardly have won a victory under any circumstances; but the
overwhelming nature of the defeat was mainly due to his incompetence.



Demoralization Caused by St. Clair's Defeat.

The United States Government was almost as much demoralized by St.
Clair's defeat as was St. Clair's own army. The loosely-knit nation was
very poor, and very loath to undertake any work which involved sustained
effort and pecuniary sacrifice; while each section was jealous of every
other and was unwilling to embark in any enterprise unlikely to inure to
its own immediate benefit. There was little national glory or reputation
to be won by even a successful Indian war; while another defeat might
prove a serious disaster to a government which was as yet far from firm
in its seat. The Eastern people were lukewarm about a war in which they
had no direct interest; and the foolish frontiersmen, instead of backing
up the administration, railed at it and persistently supported the party
which desired so to limit the powers and energies of the National
Government as to produce mere paralysis. Under such conditions the
national administration, instead of at once redoubling its efforts to
ensure success by shock of arms, was driven to the ignoble necessity of
yet again striving for a hopeless peace.

Reluctance of the Government to Carry on the War.

It would be impossible to paint in too vivid colors the extreme
reluctance of the Government to enter into, or to carry on, war with the
Indians. It was only after every other shift had been vainly tried that
resort was had to the edge of the sword. The United States would gladly
have made a stable peace on honorable terms, and strove with weary
patience to bring about a friendly understanding. But all such efforts
were rendered abortive partly by the treachery and truculence of the
savages, who could only be cowed by a thorough beating, and partly by
the desire of the settlers for lands which the red men claimed as their
hunting grounds.

Peace Envoys Sent to the Tries.

In pursuance of their timidly futile policy of friendliness, the
representatives of the National Government, in the spring of 1792, sent
peace envoys, with a flag of truce, to the hostile tribes. The
unfortunate ambassadors thus chosen for sacrifice were Colonel John
Hardin, the gallant but ill-starred leader of Kentucky horse, who had so
often and with such various success encountered the Indians on the field
of battle; and a Federal officer, Major Alexander Trueman. In June they
started towards the hostile towns, with one or two companions, and soon
fell in with some Indians, who on being shown the white flag, and
informed of the object of their visit, received them with every
appearance of good will. But this was merely a mask. A few hours later
the treacherous savages suddenly fell upon and slew the messengers of
peace. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 238, 239, etc.; also
Marshall.] It was never learned whether the deed was the mere wanton
outrage of some blood-thirsty young braves, or the result of orders
given by one of the Indian councils. At any rate, the Indians never
punished the treachery; and when the chiefs wrote to Washington they
mentioned with cool indifference that "you sent us at different times
different speeches, the bearers whereof our foolish young men killed on
their way" [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Indian affairs, M. 2, p. 224.
The Michigan and Wisconsin historical societies have performed a great
service by publishing so many of these papers.]; not even expressing
regret for the occurrence.

Treachery of the Savages.

The truculent violence and bad faith of the savages merited severe
chastisement; but the United States Government was long-suffering and of
the forbearing to a degree. There was no attempt to avenge the murder of
the flag-of-truce men. On the contrary, renewed efforts were made to
secure a peace by treaty. In the fall of 1792 Rufus Putnam, on behalf of
the United States, succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Wabash and
Illinois tribes, [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 338.] which at
least served to keep many of their young braves out of actual
hostilities. In the following spring three commissioners--Benjamin
Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering, all men of note,--were
sent to persuade the Miami tribes and their allies to agree to a peace.
In his letter of instructions the Secretary of War impressed upon them
the desire of the people of the United States for peace in terms that
were almost humiliating, and even directed them if necessary to cede
some of the lands already granted by the Indians at previous treaties.

Peace Commissioners Go to Niagara.
Failure of the Negotiations.

In May, 1793, the Commissioners went to Niagara, where they held
meetings with various Iroquois chiefs and exchanged friendly letters
with the British officers of the posts, who assured them that they would
help in the effort to conclude a peace. Captain Brant, the Iroquois
chief, acted as spokesman for a deputation of the hostile Indians from
the Miami, where a great council was being held, at which not only the
Northwestern tribes, but the Five Nations, were in attendance. The
commissioners then sailed to the Detroit River, having first sent home a
strong remonstrance against the activity displayed by the new commander
on the Ohio, Wayne, whose vigorous measures, they said, had angered the
Indians and were considered by the British "unfair and unwarrantable."
This was a preposterous complaint; throughout our history, whether in
dealing with Indians or with other foes, our Peace Commissioners have
invariably shown to disadvantage when compared with the military
commandants, for whom they always betray such jealously. Wayne's conduct
was eminently proper; and it is difficult to understand the mental
attitude of the commissioners who criticised it because the British
considered it "unwarrantable." However, a few weeks later they learned
to take a more just view of Wayne, and to thank him for the care with
which he had kept the peace while they were vainly trying to treat; for
at the Detroit they found they could do nothing. Brant and the Iroquois
urged the Northwestern tribes not to yield any point, and promised them
help, telling the British agent, McKee, evidently to his satisfaction,
"we came here not only to assist with our advice, but other ways, ... we
came here with arms in our hands"; and they insisted that the country
belonged to the confederated tribes in common, and so could not be
surrendered save by all. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Brant to McKee, Aug. 4,
1793.] Brant was the inveterate foe of the Americans, and the pensioner
of the British; and his advice to the tribes was sound, and was adopted
by them--though he misled them by his never-fulfilled promise of
support. They refused to consider any proposition which did not
acknowledge the Ohio as the boundary between them and the United States;
and so, towards the end of August, the commissioners returned to report
their failure. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 340-360.] The
final solution of the problem was thus left to the sword of Wayne.

Attitude of the British Becomes Progressively More Hostile.

The attitude of the British gradually changed from passive to active
hostility. In 1792 and 1793 they still wished the Indians to make peace
with the Americans, provided always there were no such concessions made
to the latter as would endanger the British control of the fur trade.
But by the beginning of 1794 the relations between Great Britain and the
United States had become so strained that open war was threatened; for
the advisers of the King, relying on the weakness of the young Federal
Republic, had begun to adopt that tone of brutal insolence, which
reflected well the general attitude of the British people towards the
Americans, and which finally brought on the second war between the two

Lord Dorchester's Speech.

The British officials in Canada were quick to reflect the tone of the
home government, and, as always in such cases, the more zealous and
belligerent went a little farther than they were authorized. On February
10th Lord Dorchester, Governor of Canada, in an address of welcome to
some of the chiefs from the tribes of the north and west said, speaking
of the boundary: "Children, since my return I find no appearance of a
line remains; and from the manner in which the people of the United
States push on and act and talk... I shall not be surprised if we are at
war with them in the course of the present year; and if so a line must
then be drawn by the warriors... we have acted in the most peaceable
manner and borne the language and conduct of the people of the United
States with patience; but I believe our patience is almost exhausted."
[Footnote: Rives' "Life and Times of James Madison," III., 418. A
verified copy of the speech from the archives of the London foreign
office. The authenticity of the speech was admitted at the time by the
British Minister; yet, extraordinary to say, not only British, but
American historians, have spoken of it as spurious.] Of course such a
speech, delivered to such an audience, was more than a mere incitement
to war; it was a direct appeal to arms. Nor did the encouragement given
the Indians end with words; for in April, Simcoe, the Lieutenant
Governor, himself built a fort at the Miami Rapids, in the very heart of
the hostile tribes, and garrisoned it with British regulars, infantry
and artillery; which, wrote one of the British officials to another, had
"put all the Indians here in great spirits" [Footnote: Canadian
Archives, Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, Detroit, April 16, 1794.] to
resist the Americans.

The British and Spaniards Join in Intriguing with the Indians.

The same official further reported that the Spaniards also were exciting
the Indians to war, and were in communication with Simcoe, their
messengers coming to him at his post on the Miami. At this time the
Spanish Governor, Carondelet, was alarmed over Clark's threatened
invasion of Louisiana on behalf of the French Republic. He wrote to
Simcoe asking for English help in the event of such invasion. Simcoe, in
return, wrote expressing his good will, and enclosing a copy of
Dorchester's speech to the Northern Indians; which, Carondelet reported
to the Court of Spain, showed that the English were following the same
system adopted by the Spaniards in reference to the Indians, whom they
were employing with great success against the Americans. [Footnote:
Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, letter of Carondelet, July 9,1794.]
Moreover, the Spaniards, besides communicating with the British, sent
messages to the Indians at the Miami, urging them to attack the
Americans, and promising help; [Footnote: Canadian Archives, letter of
McKee, May 7, 1794.] a promise which they never fulfilled, save that in
a covert way they furnished the savages with arms and munitions of war.

Effect of Dorchester's Speech.
The Indians Greatly Encouraged.

The Canadians themselves were excited and alarmed by Dorchester's
speech, [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Joseph Chew to Thomas Aston
Coffin, Montreal, February 27, 1794.] copies of which were distributed
broadcast; for the general feeling was that it meant that war was about
to be declared between Great Britain and the United States. The Indians
took the same view, as to what the speech meant; but to them it gave
unmixed pleasure and encouragement. The British officials circulated it
everywhere among the tribes, reading it aloud to the gathered chiefs and
fighting men. "His Excellency Governor Simcoe has just now left my house
on his way to Detroit with Lord Dorchester's speech to the Seven
Nations," wrote Brant the Iroquois chief to the Secretary of Indian
Affairs for Canada, "and I have every reason to believe when it is
delivered that matters will take an immediate change to the Westward, as
it will undoubtedly give those Nations high spirits and enable them by a
perfect union to check General Wayne." [Footnote: Canadian Archives,
Brant to Chew, April 21, 1794.] In April, Lieutenant Colonel John
Butler, of the British army, addressed a great council of chiefs near
Buffalo, beginning, "I have now a speech to deliver to you from your
father Lord Dorchester, which is of the utmost consequence, therefore
desire you will pay strict attention to it." [Footnote: Canadian
Archives, Butler to Chew, April 27, 1794.] He then delivered the speech,
to the delight of the Indians, and continued: "You have heard the great
talk of our going to war with the United States, and by the speech of
your Father just now delivered to you, you cannot help seeing there is a
great prospect of it, I have therefore to recommend you to be all
unanimous as one man, and to call in all your people that may be
scattered about the Territories of the United States." McKee, the
British Indian agent among the Northwestern tribes who were at war with
the Americans, reported with joy the rapid growth of warlike spirit
among the savages in consequence of Dorchester's speech, and of the
building of the British fort on the Miami. He wrote, "The face of the
Indian affairs in this country, I have the greatest satisfaction in
informing you, seems considerably altered for the better. His Excellency
Lord Dorchester's speech and the arrival here of speeches from the
Spaniards induce me to believe that a very extensive union of the Indian
Nations will be the immediate consequence. The Lieutenant Governor has
ordered a strong detachment of the 24th Regt. to take post a mile & a
half below this place, this step has given great spirits to the Indians
and impressed them with a hope of our ultimately acting with them and
affording a security for their families, should the enemy penetrate to
their villages." [Footnote: Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, May 8,

The British Furnish Them with Arms and Munitions.

Nor did the British confine their encouragement to words. The Canadian
authorities forwarded to the Miami tribes, through the agent McKee,
quantities of guns, rifles, and gunlocks, besides vermillion paint and
tobacco. [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Chew to Coffin, June 23, 1794.]
McKee was careful to get from the home authorities the best firearms he
could, explaining that his red proteges preferred the long to the short
rifles, and considered the common trade guns makeshifts, to be used only
until they could get better ones.

British Agents Greet the Scalping Parties.

The Indians made good use of the weapons thus furnished them by the
"neutral" British. A party of Delawares and Shawnees, after a successful
skirmish with the Americans, brought to McKee six of the scalps they had
taken; and part of the speech of presentation at the solemn council
where they were received by McKee, ran: "We had two actions with [some
of Wayne's troops who were guarding convoys] in which a great many of
our enemies were killed. Part of their flesh we have brought here with
us to convince our friend of the truth of their being now in great force
on their march against us; therefore, Father, [addressing McKee] we
desire you to be strong and bid your children make haste to our
assistance as was promised by them." The speaker, a Delaware chief,
afterwards handed the six scalps to a Huron chief, that he might
distribute them among the tribes. McKee sent to the home authorities a
full account of this council, where he had assisted at the reception and
distribution of the scalps the savages had taken from the soldiers of a
nation with which the British still pretended to be at peace; and a few
days later he reported that the Lake Indians were at last gathering, and
that when the fighting men of the various tribes joined forces, as he
had reason to believe they shortly would, the British posts would be
tolerably secure from any attacks by Wayne. [Footnote: Canadian
Archives, McKee's letters May 25 and May 30, 1794.]

Indians Serve the British as Police.

The Indians served the British, not only as a barrier, against the
Americans, but as a police for their own soldiers, to prevent their
deserting. An Englishman who visited the Lake Posts at this time
recorded with a good deal of horror the fate that befell one of a party
of deserters from the British garrison at Detroit. The commander, on
discovering that they had gone, ordered the Indians to bring them back
dead or alive. When overtaken one resisted, and was killed and scalped.
The Indians brought in his scalp and hung it outside the fort, where it
was suffered to remain, that the ominous sight might strike terror to
other discontented soldiers. [Footnote: Draper MSS. From Parliament
Library in Canada, MS. "Canadian Letters," descriptive of a tour in
Canada in 1792-93.]

Anger of the Americans over Dorchester's Speech.

The publication of Lord Dorchester's speech caused angry excitement in
the United States. Many thought it spurious; but Washington, then
President, with his usual clear-sightedness, at once recognized that it
was genuine, and accepted it as proof of Great Britain's hostile feeling
towards his country. Through the Secretary of State he wrote to the
British Minister, calling him to sharp account, not only for
Dorchester's speech but for the act of building a fort on the Miami, and
for the double-dealing of his government, which protested friendship,
with smooth duplicity, while their agents urged the savages to war. "At
the very moment when the British Ministry were forwarding assurances of
good will, does Lord Dorchester foster and encourage in the Indians
hostile dispositions towards the United States," ran the letter, "but
this speech only forebodes hostility; the intelligence which has been
received this morning is, if true, hostility itself...governor Simcoe
has gone to the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, followed by three
companies of a British regiment, in order to build a fort there." The
British Minister, Hammond, in his answer said he was "willing to admit
the authenticity of the speech," and even the building of the fort; but
sought to excuse both by recrimination, asserting that the Americans had
themselves in various ways shown hostility to Great Britain. [Footnote:
Wait's State Papers and Publick Documents, I., 449, 451. Letters of
Randolph, May 20, 1794, and Hammond, May 22, 1794.] In spite of this
explicit admission, however, the British statesmen generally, both in
the House of Lords and the House of Commons, disavowed the speech,
though in guarded terms; [Footnote: Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations,
I., Randolph to Jay, Aug. 18, 1794.] and many Americans were actually
convinced by their denials.

Severity of the Indian Ravages.
Raids and Counter-raids.

Throughout this period, whatever the negotiators might say or do, the
ravages of the Indian war parties never ceased. In the spring following
St. Clair's defeat the frontiers of Pennsylvania suffered as severely as
those of Virginia, from bands of savages who were seeking for scalps,
prisoners, and horses. Boats were way-laid and attacked as they
descended the Ohio; and the remote settlements were mercilessly
scourged. The spies or scouts, the trained Indian fighters, were out all
the while, watching for the war bands; and when they discovered one, a
strong party of rangers or militia was immediately gathered to assail
it, if it could be overtaken. Every variety of good and bad fortune
attended these expeditions. Thus, in August, 1792, the spies discovered
an Indian party in the lower settlements of Kentucky. Thirty militia
gathered, followed the trail, and overtook the marauders at Rolling
Fork, killing four, while the others scattered; of the whites one was
killed and two wounded. About the same time Kenton found a strong Indian
camp which he attacked at dawn, killing three warriors; but when they
turned out in force, and one of his own scouts was killed, he promptly
drew back out of danger. Neither the Indians nor the wild white Indian
fighters made any point of honor about retreating. They wished to do as
much damage as possible to their foes, and if the fight seemed doubtful
they at once withdrew to await a more favorable opportunity. As for the
individual adventures, their name was legion. All the old annalists, all
the old frontiersmen who in after life recorded their memories of the
Indian wars, tell with interminable repetition stories, grewsome in
their blood-thirstiness, and as monotonous in theme as they are varied
in detail:--how such and such a settler was captured by two Indians,
and, watching his chance, fell on his captors when they sat down to
dinner and slew them "with a squaw-axe"; how another man was
treacherously attacked by two Indians who had pretended to be peaceful
traders, and how, though wounded, he killed them both; how two or three
cabins were surprised by the savages and all the inhabitants slain; or
how a flotilla of flatboats was taken and destroyed while moored to the
bank of the Ohio; and so on without end. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Major
McCully to Captain Biddle, Pittsburgh, May 5, 1792; B. Netherland to
Evan Shelby, July 5, 1793, etc., etc. Also Kentucky _Gazette_, Sept. I,
1792; Charleston _Gazette_, July 22, 1791, etc.]

The Frontiersmen Wish War.

The United States authorities vainly sought peace; while the British
instigated the tribes to war, and the savages themselves never thought
of ceasing their hostilities. The frontiersmen also wished war, and
regarded the British and Indians with an equal hatred. They knew that
the presence of the British in the Lake Posts meant Indian war; they
knew that the Indians would war on them, whether they behaved well or
ill, until the tribes suffered some signal overthrow; and they coveted
the Indian lands with a desire as simple as it was brutal. Nor were land
hunger and revenge the only motives that stirred them to aggression;
meaner feelings were mixed with the greed for untilled prairie and
unfelled forest, and the fierce longing for blood. Throughout our
history as a nation, as long as we had a frontier, there was always a
class of frontiersmen for whom an Indian war meant the chance to acquire
wealth at the expense of the Government: and on the Ohio in 1792 and '93
there were plenty of men who, in the event of a campaign, hoped to make
profit out of the goods, horses, and cattle they supplied the soldiers.
One of Madison's Kentucky friends wrote him with rather startling
frankness that the welfare of the new State hinged on the advent of an
army to assail the Indians, first, because of the defence it would give
the settlers, and, secondly, because it would be the chief means for
introducing into the country a sufficient quantity of money for
circulation. [Footnote: State Dep. MSS., Madison Papers, Hubbard Taylor
to Madison, Jan. 3, 1792.] Madison himself evidently saw nothing out of
the way in this twofold motive of the frontiersmen for wishing the
presence of an army. In all the border communities there was a lack of
circulating medium, and an earnest desire to obtain more by any

Like many other frontiersmen, Madison's correspondent indulged almost
equally in complaints of the Indian ravages, and in denunciations of the
regular army which alone could put an end to them and of the national
party which sustained the army. [Footnote: _Do._, Taylor to Madison,
April 16, 1792; May 8 and 17, 1792; May 23, 1793, etc.]

Wayne Appointed to Command Western Army.

Major General Anthony Wayne, a Pennsylvanian, had been chosen to succeed
St. Clair in the command of the army; and on him devolved the task of
wresting victory from the formidable forest tribes, fighting as the
latter were in the almost impenetrable wilderness of their own country.
The tribes were aided by the support covertly, and often openly, yielded
them by the British. They had even more effective allies in the
suspicion with which the backwoodsmen regarded the regular army, and
the supine indifference of the people at large, which forced the
administration to try every means to obtain peace before adopting the
only manly and honorable course, a vigorous war.

Wayne's Character and History.

Of all men, Wayne was the best fitted for the work. In the Revolutionary
War no other general, American, British, or French, won such a
reputation for hard fighting, and for daring energy and dogged courage.
He felt very keenly that delight in the actual shock of battle which the
most famous fighting generals have possessed. He gloried in the
excitement and danger, and shone at his best when the stress was sorest;
and because of his magnificent courage his soldiers had affectionately
christened him "Mad Anthony." But his head was as cool as his heart was
stout. He was taught in a rough school; for the early campaigns in which
he took part were waged against the gallant generals and splendid
soldiery of the British King. By experience he had grown to add caution
to his dauntless energy. Once, after the battle of Brandywine, when he
had pushed close to the enemy, with his usual fearless self-confidence,
he was surprised in a night attack by the equally daring British general
Grey, and his brigade was severely punished with the bayonet. It was a
lesson he never forgot; it did not in any way abate his self-reliance or
his fiery ardor, but it taught him the necessity of forethought, of
thorough preparation, and of ceaseless watchfulness. A few days later he
led the assault at Germantown, driving the Hessians before him with the
bayonet. This was always his favorite weapon; he had the utmost faith in
coming to close quarters, and he trained his soldiers to trust the
steel. At Monmouth he turned the fortunes of the day by his stubborn and
successful resistance to the repeated bayonet charges of the Guards and
Grenadiers. His greatest stroke was the storming of Stony Point, where
in person he led the midnight rush of his troops over the walls of the
British fort. He fought with his usual hardihood against Cornwallis; and
at the close of the Revolutionary War he made a successful campaign
against the Creeks in Georgia. During this campaign the Creeks one night
tried to surprise his camp, and attacked with resolute ferocity, putting
to flight some of the troops; but Wayne rallied them and sword in hand
he led them against the savages, who were overthrown and driven from the
field. In one of the charges he cut down an Indian chief; and the dying
man, as he fell, killed Wayne's horse with a pistol shot.

Wayne Reorganizes the Army

As soon as Wayne reached the Ohio, in June, 1792, he set about
reorganizing the army. He had as a nucleus the remnant of St. Clair's
beaten forces; and to this were speedily added hundreds of recruits
enlisted under new legislation by Congress, and shipped to him as fast
as the recruiting officers could send them. The men were of precisely
the same general character as those who had failed so dismally under St.
Clair, and it was even more difficult to turn them into good soldiers,
for the repeated disasters, crowned by the final crushing horror, had
unnerved them and made them feel that their task was hopeless, and that
they were foredoomed to defeat. [Footnote: Bradley MSS. Letters and
Journal of Captain Daniel Bradley; see entry of May 7, 1793, etc.] The
mortality among the officers had been great, and the new officers,
though full of zeal, needed careful training. Among the men desertions
were very common; and on the occasion of a sudden alarm Wayne found that
many of his sentries left their posts and fled. [Footnote: "Major
General Anthony Wayne," by Charles J. Stille, p. 323.] Only rigorous and
long continued discipline and exercise under a commander both stern and
capable, could turn such men into soldiers fit for the work Wayne had
before him. He saw this at once, and realized that a premature movement
meant nothing but another defeat; and he began by careful and patient
labor to turn his horde of raw recruits into a compact and efficient
army, which he might use with his customary energy and decision. When he
took command of the army--or "Legion," as he preferred to call it--the
one stipulation he made was that the campaign should not begin until his
ranks were full and his men thoroughly disciplined.

He Makes a Winter Camp on the Ohio.

Towards the end of the summer of '92 he established his camp on the Ohio
about twenty-seven miles below Pittsburgh. He drilled both officers and
men with unwearied patience, and gradually the officers became able to
do the drilling themselves, while the men acquired the soldierly
self-confidence of veterans. As the new recruits came in they found
themselves with an army which was rapidly learning how to manoeuvre with
precision, to obey orders unhesitatingly, and to look forward eagerly to
a battle with the foe. Throughout the winter Wayne kept at work, and by
the spring he had under him twenty-five hundred regular soldiers who
were already worthy to be trusted in a campaign. He never relaxed his
efforts to improve them; though a man of weaker stuff might well have
been discouraged by the timid and hesitating policy of the National
Government. The Secretary of War, in writing to him, laid stress chiefly
on the fact that the American people desired at every hazard to avert an
Indian war, and that on no account should offensive operations be
undertaken against the tribes. Such orders tied Wayne's hands, for
offensive operations offered the only means of ending the war; but he
patiently bided his time, and made ready his army against the day when
his superiors should allow him to use the weapon he had tempered.

In Spring He Shifts His Camp to Near Cincinnati.
His Second Winter Camp at Greeneville.

In May, '93, he brought his army down the Ohio to Fort Washington, and
near it established a camp which he christened Hobson's Choice. Here he
was forced to wait the results of the fruitless negotiations carried on
by the United States Peace Commissioners, and it was not until about the

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