Full Text Archive logoFull Text Archive — Free Classic E-books

The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Complete by William T. Sherman

Part 9 out of 19

Adobe PDF icon
Download this document as a .pdf
File size: 2.2 MB
What's this? light bulb idea Many people prefer to read off-line or to print out text and read from the real printed page. Others want to carry documents around with them on their mobile phones and read while they are on the move. We have created .pdf files of all out documents to accommodate all these groups of people. We recommend that you download .pdfs onto your mobile phone when it is connected to a WiFi connection for reading off-line.

night closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant came
up to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and at
Graysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found
the corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us that
General Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hear
his guns near Ringgold.

As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possibly
accommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the
general plan, viz., to break up all communication between Bragg and

We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest
that we should interpose a proper force between these two armies.
I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and
thence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or the
Council-Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroad
which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most
successfully and fully accomplished that day. The division of
General Jeff. C. Davis was moved close up to Ringgold, to assist
General Hooker if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps was held at
Grayeville, for any thing that might turn up. About noon I had a
message from General Hooker, saying he had had a pretty hard fight
at the mountain-pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come
forward to turn the position. He was not aware at the time that
Howard, by moving through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already
turned it. So I rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found the
enemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already out
of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the waters
flow to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee.

I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations as
to breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line,
as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed back
to Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and leisurely
back to Chattanooga.

On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and
effectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold and
Graysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to
Graysville, consented that, instead of returning direct to
Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons and
impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the
Hiawasaee River.

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved
from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's
Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps by
way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here
another good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road. On the
30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so
rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste, leaving the bridge but
partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on
the north bank of the Hiawassee.

This was to have been the limit of our operations. Officers and
men had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather was
bitter cold. I had already reached the town of Charleston, when
General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at
Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from
Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside was
completely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d of
December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville,
by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; but
he feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time,
and ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the relief
of Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside. Seven days before,
we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two
days' rations, without a change of clothing--stripped for the
fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to
the private included.

Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by the
road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that
twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the
mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that they
needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough--
and it had to be done. General Howard that night repaired and
planked the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed over
the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposed
rightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee,
and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sent
me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and
complete, and that he must push for Kingston, near which we would
make a junction. But by the time I reached Athens I had better
studied the geography, and sent him orders, which found him at
Decatur, that Kingston was out of our way; that he should send his
boat to Kingston, but with his command strike across to
Philadelphia, and report to me there. I had but a small force of
cavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt of General Grant's
orders, scouting over about Benton and Columbus. I left my aide,
Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate with this cavalry and
hurry it forward. It overtook me in the night at Athens.

On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon,
twenty-six miles distant. About 11 a.m., the cavalry passed to the
head of the column, was ordered to push to London, and, if
possible, to save a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by a
brigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry
moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the
brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks,
and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry
dash, so that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry
got up. The enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying the
pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the
Tennessee River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and other
material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge
was gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust to General
Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that General
Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the
time remained.

Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of
December, I sent my aide (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel Long,
commanding the brigade of cavalry at London, to explain to him how
all-important it was that notice of our approach should reach
General Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to select
the best materials of his command, to start at once, ford the
Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life
and horse-flesh. Major Audenried was ordered to go along. The
distance to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roads
villainous. Before day they were off, and at daylight the
Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the Little
Tennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river as
being very shallow; but it was found too deep for fording, and the
water was freezing cold--width two hundred and forty yards, depth
from two to five feet; horses could ford, but artillery and men
could not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson (who
accompanied me) undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am under
many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sent
Captain Jenny back from Graysville to survey our field of battle.
We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and
spades. General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and partly
with square trestles (made of the houses of the late town of
Morgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th troops
and animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the 5th the
Fifteenth Corps (General Blair's) was over, and Generals-Granger's
and Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracing
was imperfect for, want of spikes, and the bridge broke, causing
delay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Marysville
road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on
a parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house
where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing me a few
words from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel Long had
arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well with
him there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were
symptoms of his speedy departure.

I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem
for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the
work. As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved
forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a
pretty good ford for his horses and wagons at Davis's, seven miles
below Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons
left by General Vaughn at London, on which to pass his men. He
marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th all the
heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major Van
Buren (of General Burnside's staff), who announced that Longstreet
had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and
Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry
was on his heels; and that the general desired to see me in person
as soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops to
halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which
were ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Granger
to report in person to General Burnside for orders. His was the
force originally designed to reenforce General Burnside, and it was
eminently proper that it should join in the stern-chase after

On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into
Knoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later
in the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a
wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection
of ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they were
nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named "Sanders,"
where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had
assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful and
quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim
all round about that hilly barrier.

The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had done, and
what he proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General
Granger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I had
brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition
to the line of the Hiawasaee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might take
advantage of our absence to resume the offensive. I asked him to
reduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it as
part of my report:

KNOXVILLE, December 7, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding, etc.

GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty
thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief
during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach
served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not
deem, for the present, any other portion of your command but the
corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section;
and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately
with him in order to relieve us (thereby rendering the position of
General Thomas less secure), I deem it advisable that all the
troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should
return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front
of Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank
you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General commanding.

Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out of
Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in,
I put in motion my own command to return. General Howard was
ordered to move, via Davis's Ford and Sweetwater, to Athena, with a
guard forward at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which
the enemy had retaken after our passage up. General Jeff. C.
Davis moved to Columbus, on the Hiawaesee, via Madisonville, and
the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains,
to cover movement of cavalry across the mountains into Georgia, to
overtake a wagon-train which had dodged us on our way up, and had
escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from General
Howard that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General Ewing's
division to Athena, and went in person to Tellico with General
Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th all our troops were in
position, and we held the rich country between the Little Tennessee
and the Hiawasaee. The cavalry, under Colonel Long, passed the
mountain at Tellico, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond
Murphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his farther pursuit of the
wagon-train useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico. I then
ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to
Charleston, to which point I had previously ordered the corps of
General Howard.

On the 14th of December all of my command in the field lay along
the Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual
state of affairs, I received orders to leave, on the line of the
Hiawassee, all the cavalry, and come to Chattanooga with the rest
of my command. I left the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel
Long, reenforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel
Heath)--the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army
Corps--at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches,
by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I received
in person from General Grant orders to transfer back to their
appropriate commands the corps of General Howard and the division
commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth
Army Corps to its new field of operations.

It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since
our departure from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the present
moment. I have been unable to receive from subordinate commanders
the usual full, detailed reports of events, and have therefore been
compelled to make up this report from my own personal memory; but,
as soon as possible, subordinate reports will be received and duly

In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the men of my command
for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men
have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp.
For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind,
they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted,
without a murmur. Without a moment's rest after a march of over
four hundred miles, without sleep for three successive nights, we
crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of
Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned
more than a hundred and twenty miles north and compelled Longstreet
to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the
whole country. It is hard to realize the importance of these
events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which
pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot
speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity; but as
I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better body
of soldiers in America than it. I wish all to feel a just pride in
its real honors.

To General Howard and his command, to General Jeff. C. Davis and
his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of
commanders and fidelity of commands. The brigade of Colonel
Bushbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to
come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, in
connection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage
almost amounting to rashness. Following the enemy almost to the
tunnel-gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them
Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian
gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits of the
soldier. General Davis handled his division with artistic skill,
more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's
rear-guard, near Graysville, at nightfall. I must award to this
division the credit of the best order during our movement through
East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to
the right and left gave some reason for disordered ranks:

Inasmuch as exception may be taken to my explanation of the
temporary confusion, during the battle of Chattanooga, of the two
brigades of General Matthias and Colonel Raum, I will here state
that I saw the whole; and attach no blame to any one. Accidents
will happen in battle, as elsewhere; and at the point where they so
manfully went to relieve the pressure on other parts of our
assaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously to an enemy
vastly superior in force, and favored by the shape of the ground.
Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would have
shown their mettle, which has been tried more than once before and
stood the test of fire. They reformed their ranks, and were ready
to support General Ewing's division in a very few minutes; and the
circumstance would have hardly called for notice on my part, had
not others reported what was seen from Chattanooga, a distance of
nearly five miles, from where could only be seen the troops in the
open field in which this affair occurred.

I now subjoin the best report of casualties I am able to compile
from the records thus far received:

Killed; Wounded; and Missing............... 1949

No report from General Davis's division, but loss is small.

Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: Colonels
Putnam, Ninety-third Illinois; O'Meara, Ninetieth Illinois; and
Torrence, Thirtieth Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel-Taft, of the Eleventh
Corps; and Major Bushnell, Thirteenth Illinois.

Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, Corse, and
Matthias; Colonel Raum; Colonel Waugelin, Twelfth Missouri;
Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois; Major P. I.
Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois; and Major Nathan McAlla, Tenth Iowa.

Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa.

My report is already so long, that I must forbear mentioning acts
of individual merit. These will be recorded in the reports of
division commanders, which I will cheerfully indorse; but I must
say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments, who have so
long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases,
should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so
much usefulness and credit to the public service, viz.: Colonel J.
R. Cockerell, Seventieth, Ohio; Colonel J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth
Illinois; Colonel C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel J. A.
Williamson, Fourth Iowa; Colonel G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Illinois;
Colonel J. I. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana.

My personal staff, as usual, have served their country with
fidelity, and credit to themselves, throughout these events, and
have received my personal thanks.

Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of the
battle-field of Chattanooga fought over by the troops under my
command, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenney, engineer on my
staff. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

[General Order No. 68.]

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1884

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-General
W. T. Sherman and others.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of
Congress and of the people of the United States are due, and that
the same are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman,
commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and the
officers and soldiers who served under him, for their gallant and
arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the
Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of
Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of
our arms in that glorious victory.

Approved February 19, 1864.
By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 19th of December I was at Bridgeport, and gave all the
orders necessary for the distribution of the four divisions of the
Fifteenth Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and
the part of the Sixteenth Corps; commanded by General Dodge, along
the railroad from Decatur to Nashville, to make the needed repairs,
and to be in readiness for the campaign of the succeeding year; and
on the 21st I went up to Nashville, to confer with General Grant
and conclude the arrangements for the winter. At that time General
Grant was under the impression that the next campaign would be up
the valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia; and as
it was likely to be the last and most important campaign of the
war, it became necessary to set free as many of the old troops
serving along the Mississippi River as possible. This was the real
object and purpose of the Meridian campaign, and of Banks's
expedition up Red River to Shreveport during that winter.




The winter of 1863-'64 opened very cold and severe; and it was
manifest after the battle of Chattanooga, November 25, 1863, and
the raising of the siege of Knoxville, December 5th, that military
operations in that quarter must in a measure cease, or be limited
to Burnside's force beyond Knoxville. On the 21st of December
General Grant had removed his headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee,
leaving General George H. Thomas at Chattanooga, in command of the
Department of the Cumberland, and of the army round about that
place; and I was at Bridgeport, with orders to distribute my troops
along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, Alabama, and from
Decatur up toward Nashville.

General G. M. Dodge, who was in command of the detachment of the
Sixteenth Corps, numbering about eight thousand men, had not
participated with us in the battle of Chattanooga, but had remained
at and near Pulaski, Tennessee, engaged in repairing that railroad,
as auxiliary to the main line which led from Nashville to
Stevenson, and Chattanooga. General John A. Logan had succeeded to
the command of the Fifteenth Corps, by regular appointment of the
President of the United States, and had relieved General Frank P.
Blair, who had been temporarily in command of that corps during the
Chattanooga and Knoxville movement.

At that time I was in command of the Department of the Tennessee,
which embraced substantially the territory on the east bank of the
Mississippi River, from Natchez up to the Ohio River, and thence
along the Tennessee River as high as Decatur and Bellefonte,
Alabama. General McPherson was at Vicksburg and General Hurlbut at
Memphis, and from them I had the regular reports of affairs in that
quarter of my command. The rebels still maintained a considerable
force of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi,
threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us so
delicate and important a matter. Satisfied that I could check this
by one or two quick moves inland, and thereby set free a
considerable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up to
Nashville and represented the case to General Grant, who consented
that I might go down the Mississippi River, where the bulk of my
command lay, and strike a blow on the east of the river, while
General Banks from New Orleans should in like manner strike another
to the west; thus preventing any further molestation of the boats
navigating the main river, and thereby widening the gap in the
Southern Confederacy.

After having given all the necessary orders for the distribution,
during the winter months, of that part of my command which was in
Southern and Middle Tennessee, I went to Cincinnati and Lancaster,
Ohio, to spend Christmas with my family; and on my return I took
Minnie with me down to a convent at Reading, near Cincinnati, where
I left her, and took the cars for Cairo, Illinois, which I reached
January 3d, a very cold and bitter day. The ice was forming fast,
and there was great danger that the Mississippi River, would become
closed to navigation. Admiral Porter, who was at Cairo, gave me a
small gunboat (the Juliet), with which I went up to Paducah, to
inspect that place, garrisoned by a small force; commanded by
Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois, who had been with me and
was severely wounded at Shiloh. Returning to Cairo, we started
down the Mississippi River, which was full of floating ice. With
the utmost difficulty we made our way through it, for hours
floating in the midst of immense cakes, that chafed and ground our
boat so that at times we were in danger of sinking. But about the
10th of January we reached Memphis, where I found General Hurlbut,
and explained to him my purpose to collect from his garrisons and
those of McPherson about twenty thousand men, with which in
February to march out from Vicksburg as far as Meridian, break up
the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and also the one leading from Vicksburg
to Selma, Alabama. I instructed him to select two good divisions,
and to be ready with them to go along. At Memphis I found
Brigadier-General W. Sooy Smith, with a force of about twentyfive
hundred cavalry, which he had by General Grant's orders brought
across from Middle Tennessee, to assist in our general purpose, as
well as to punish the rebel General Forrest, who had been most
active in harassing our garrisons in West Tennessee and
Mississippi. After staying a couple of days at Memphis, we
continued on in the gunboat Silver Cloud to Vicksburg, where I
found General McPherson, and, giving him similar orders, instructed
him to send out spies to ascertain and bring back timely
information of the strength and location of the enemy. The winter
continued so severe that the river at Vicksburg was full of
floating ice, but in the Silver Cloud we breasted it manfully, and
got back to Memphis by the 20th. A chief part of the enterprise
was to destroy the rebel cavalry commanded by General Forrest, who
were a constant threat to our railway communications in Middle
Tennessee, and I committed this task to Brigadier-General W. Sooy
Smith. General Hurlbut had in his command about seven thousand
five hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, to
Corinth, Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregate
cavalry force of about seven thousand "effective," out of these and
the twenty-five hundred which General Smith had brought with him
from Middle Tennessee. With this force General Smith was ordered
to move from Memphis straight for Meridian, Mississippi, and to
start by February 1st. I explained to him personally the nature of
Forrest as a man, and of his peculiar force; told him that in his
route he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked with a
vehemence for which he must be prepared, and that, after he had
repelled the first attack, he must in turn assume the most
determined offensive, overwhelm him and utterly destroy his whole
force. I knew that Forrest could not have more than four thousand
cavalry, and my own movement would give employment to every other
man of the rebel army not immediately present with him, so that he
(General Smith) might safely act on the hypothesis I have stated.

Having completed all these preparations in Memphis, being satisfied
that the cavalry force would be ready to start by the 1st of
February, and having seen General Hurlbut with his two divisions
embark in steamers for Vicksburg, I also reembarked for the same
destination on the 27th of January.

On the 1st of February we rendezvoused in Vicksburg, where I found
a spy who had been sent out two weeks before, had been to Meridian,
and brought back correct information of the state of facts in the
interior of Mississippi. Lieutenant-General (Bishop) Polk was in
chief command, with headquarters at Meridian, and had two divisions
of infantry, one of which (General Loring's) was posted at Canton,
Mississippi, the other (General French's) at Brandon. He had also
two divisions of cavalry--Armstrong's, composed of the three
brigades of Ross, Stark, and Wirt Adams, which were scattered from
the neighborhood of Yazoo City to Jackson and below; and Forrest's,
which was united, toward Memphis, with headquarters at Como.
General Polk seemed to have no suspicion of our intentions to
disturb his serenity.

Accordingly, on the morning of February 3d, we started in two
columns, each of two divisions, preceded by a light force of
cavalry, commanded by Colonel E. F. Winslow. General McPheraon
commanded the right column, and General Hurlbut the left. The
former crossed the Big Black at the railroad-bridge, and the latter
seven miles above, at Messinger's. We were lightly equipped as to
wagons, and marched without deployment straight for Meridian,
distant one hundred and fifty miles. We struck the rebel cavalry
beyond the Big Black, and pushed them pell-mell into and beyond
Jackson during the 6th. The next day we reached Brandon, and on
the 9th Morton, where we perceived signs of an infantry
concentration, but the enemy did not give us battle, and retreated
before us. The rebel cavalry were all around us, so we kept our
columns compact and offered few or no chances for their dashes. As
far as Morton we had occupied two roads, but there we were forced
into one. Toward evening of the 12th, Hurlbut's column passed
through Decatur, with orders to go into camp four miles beyond at a
creek. McPherson's head of column was some four miles behind, and
I personally detached one of Hurlbut's regiments to guard the
cross-roads at Decatur till the head of McPherson's column should
come in sight. Intending to spend the night in Decatur, I went to
a double log-house, and arranged with the lady for some supper. We
unsaddled our horses, tied them to the fence inside the yard, and,
being tired, I lay down on a bed and fell asleep. Presently I
heard shouts and hallooing, and then heard pistol-shots close to
the house. My aide, Major Audenried, called me and said we were
attacked by rebel cavalry, who were all around us. I jumped up and
inquired where was the regiment of infantry I had myself posted at
the cross-roads. He said a few moments before it had marched past
the house, following the road by which General Hurlbut had gone,
and I told him to run, overtake it, and bring it back. Meantime, I
went out into the back-yard, saw wagons passing at a run down the
road, and horsemen dashing about in a cloud of dust, firing their
pistols, their shots reaching the house in which we were.
Gathering the few orderlies and clerks that were about, I was
preparing to get into a corn-crib at the back side of the lot,
wherein to defend ourselves, when I saw Audenried coming back with
the regiment, on a run, deploying forward as they came. This
regiment soon cleared the place and drove the rebel cavalry back
toward the south, whence they had come.

It transpired that the colonel of this infantry regiment, whose
name I do not recall, had seen some officers of McPherson's staff
(among them Inspector-General Strong) coming up the road at a
gallop, raising a cloud of duet; supposing them to be the head of
McPherson's column, and being anxious to get into camp before dark,
he had called in his pickets and started down the road, leaving me
perfectly exposed. Some straggling wagons, escorted by a New
Jersey regiment, were passing at the time, and composed the rear of
Hurlbut's train. The rebel cavalry, seeing the road clear of
troops, and these wagons passing, struck them in flank, shot down
the mules of three or four wagons, broke the column, and began a
general skirmish. The escort defended their wagons as well as they
could, and thus diverted their attention; otherwise I would surely
have been captured. In a short time the head of McPherson's column
came up, went into camp, and we spent the night in Decatur.

The next day we pushed on, and on the 14th entered Meridian, the
enemy retreating before us toward Demopolis, Alabama. We at once
set to work to destroy an arsenal, immense storehouses, and the
railroad in every direction. We staid in Meridian five days,
expecting every hour to hear of General Sooy Smith, but could get
no tidings of him whatever. A large force of infantry was kept at
work all the time in breaking up the Mobile & Ohio Railroad south
and north; also the Jackson & Selma Railroad, east and west. I was
determined to damage these roads so that they could not be used
again for hostile purposes during the rest of the war. I never had
the remotest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given out
that idea to the people of the country, so as to deceive the enemy
and to divert their attention. Many persons still insist that,
because we did not go to Mobile on this occasion, I had failed; but
in the following letter to General Banks, of January 31st, written
from Vicksburg before starting for Meridian, it will be seen
clearly that I indicated my intention to keep up the delusion of an
attack on Mobile by land, whereas I promised him to be back to
Vicksburg by the 1st of March, so as to cooperate with him in his
contemplated attack on Shreveport:

VICKSBURG, January 31, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, New

GENERAL: I received yesterday, at the hands of Captain Durham,
aide-de-camp, your letter of the 25th inst., and hasten to reply.
Captain Durham has gone to the mouth of White River, en route for
Little Rock, and the other officers who accompanied him have gone
up to Cairo, as I understand, to charter twenty-five steamboats for
the Red River trip. The Mississippi River, though low for the
season, is free of ice and in good boating order; but I understand
that Red River is still low. I had a man in from Alexandria
yesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that place
impassable save by the smallest boats. My inland expedition is now
moving, and I will be off for Jackson and Meridian to-morrow. The
only fear I have is in the weather. All the other combinations are
good. I want to keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile and
the Alabama River, and therefore would be obliged if you would keep
up an irritating foraging or other expedition in that direction.

My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me in
embarking for Red River, though I am very anxious to move in that
direction. The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, I
sent a communication to Admiral Porter, and dispatched to General
Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to
cooperate with you against Shreveport; and I will have his answer
in time, for you cannot do any thing till Red River has twelve feet
of water on the rapids at Alexandria. That will be from March to
June. I have lived on Red River, and know somewhat of the phases
of that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be made
rapidly, with simultaneous movements from Little Rock on
Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of
gunboats and transports directly up Red River. Admiral Porter will
be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1st. I think Steele
could move with ten thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. I
could take about ten thousand, and you could, I suppose, have the
same. Your movement from Opelousas, simultaneous with mine up the
river, would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy (near
Marksville), and the whole combined force could appear at
Shreveport about a day appointed beforehand.

I doubt if the enemy will risk a siege at Shreveport, although I am
informed they are fortifying the place, and placing many heavy guns
in position. It would be better for us that they should stand
there, as we might make large and important captures. But I do not
believe the enemy will fight a force of thirty thousand men, acting
in concert with gunboats.

I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and
hope, before you have made your final dispositions, that I will
have the necessary permission. Half the Army of the Tennessee is
near the Tennessee River, beyond Huntsville, Alabama, awaiting the
completion of the railroad, and, by present orders, I will be
compelled to hasten there to command it in person, unless meantime
General Grant modifies the plan. I have now in this department
only the force left to hold the river and the posts, and I am
seriously embarrassed by the promises made the veteran volunteers
for furlough. I think, by March 1st, I can put afloat for
Shreveport ten thousand men, provided I succeed in my present
movement in cleaning out the State of Mississippi, and in breaking
up the railroads about Meridian.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, commanding.

The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roads
inland, so to paralyze the rebel forces that we could take from the
defense of the Mississippi River the equivalent of a corps of
twenty thousand men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign; and
this was actually done. At the same time, I wanted to destroy
General Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry, was
constantly threatening Memphis and the river above, as well as our
routes of supply in Middle Tennessee. In this we failed utterly,
because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, which
were clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instructions
to him of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to
him at the same time. Instead of starting at the date ordered,
February 1st, he did not leave Memphis till the 11th, waiting for
Warings brigade that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky; and
then, when he did start, he allowed General Forrest to head him off
and to defeat him with an inferior force, near West Point, below
Okalona, on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad.

We waited at Meridian till the 20th to hear from General Smith, but
hearing nothing whatever, and having utterly destroyed the
railroads in and around that junction, I ordered General McPherson
to move back slowly toward Canton. With Winslow's cavalry, and
Hurlbut's infantry, I turned north to Marion, and thence to a place
called "Union," whence I dispatched the cavalry farther north to
Philadelphia and Louisville, to feel as it were for General Smith,
and then turned all the infantry columna toward Canton,
Mississippi. On the 26th we all reached Canton, but we had not
heard a word of General Smith, nor was it until some time after (at
Vicksburg) that I learned the whole truth of General Smith's
movement and of his failure. Of course I did not and could not
approve of his conduct, and I know that he yet chafes under the
censure. I had set so much store on his part of the project that I
was disappointed, and so reported officially to General Grant.
General Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though I
still regard him as a most accomplished gentleman and a skillful
engineer. Since the close of the war he has appealed to me to
relieve him of that censure, but I could not do it, because it
would falsify history.

Having assembled all my troops in and about Canton, on the 27th of
February I left them under the command of the senior major-general,
Hurlbut, with orders to remain till about the 3d of March, and then
to come into Vicksburg leisurely; and, escorted by Winslow's
cavalry, I rode into Vicksburg on the last day of February. There
I found letters from General Grant, at Nashville, and General
Banks, at New Orleans, concerning his (General Banks's) projected
movement up Red River. I was authorized by the former to
contribute aid to General Banks for a limited time; but General
Grant insisted on my returning in person to my own command about
Huntsville, Alabama, as soon as possible, to prepare for the spring

About this time we were much embarrassed by a general order of the
War Department, promising a thirty-days furlough to all soldiers
who would "veteranize"--viz., reenlist for the rest of the war.
This was a judicious and wise measure, because it doubtless secured
the services of a very large portion of the men who had almost
completed a three-years enlistment, and were therefore veteran
soldiers in feeling and in habit. But to furlough so many of our
men at that instant of time was like disbanding an army in the very
midst of battle.

In order to come to a perfect understanding with General Banks, I
took the steamer Diana and ran down to New Orleans to see him.
Among the many letters which I found in Vicksburg on my return from
Meridian was one from Captain D. F. Boyd, of Louisiana, written
from the jail in Natchez, telling me that he was a prisoner of war
in our hands; had been captured in Louisiana by some of our scouts;
and he bespoke my friendly assistance. Boyd was Professor of
Ancient Languages at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning during my
administration, in 1859-'60; was an accomplished scholar, of
moderate views in politics, but, being a Virginian, was drawn, like
all others of his kind, into the vortex of the rebellion by the
events of 1861, which broke up colleges and every thing at the
South. Natchez, at this time, was in my command, and was held by a
strong division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson. In
the Diana we stopped at Natchez, and I made a hasty inspection of
the place. I sent for Boyd, who was in good health, but quite
dirty, and begged me to take him out of prison, and to effect his
exchange. I receipted for him; took him along with me to New
Orleans; offered him money, which he declined; allowed him to go
free in the city; and obtained from General Banks a promise to
effect his exchange, which was afterward done. Boyd is now my
legitimate successor in Louisiana, viz., President of the Louisiana
University, which is the present title of what had been the
Seminary of Learning. After the war was over, Boyd went back to
Alexandria, reorganized the old institution, which I visited in
1866 but the building was burnt down by an accident or by an
incendiary about 1868, and the institution was then removed to
Baton Rouge, where it now is, under its new title of the University
of Louisiana.

We reached New Orleans on the 2d of March. I found General Banks,
with his wife and daughter, living in a good house, and he
explained to me fully the position and strength of his troops, and
his plans of action for the approaching campaign. I dined with
him, and, rough as I was--just out of the woods--attended, that
night, a very pleasant party at the house of a lady, whose name I
cannot recall, but who is now the wife of Captain Arnold, Fifth
United States Artillery. At this party were also Mr. and Mrs.
Frank Howe. I found New Orleans much changed since I had been
familiar with it in 1853 and in 1860-'61. It was full of officers
and soldiers. Among the former were General T. W. Sherman, who had
lost a leg at Port Hudson, and General Charles P: Stone, whom I
knew so well in California, and who is now in the Egyptian service
as chief of staff. The bulk of General Banks's army was about
Opelousas, under command of General Franklin, ready to move on
Alexandria. General Banks seemed to be all ready, but intended to
delay his departure a few days to assist in the inauguration of a
civil government for Louisiana, under Governor Hahn. In Lafayette
Square I saw the arrangements of scaffolding for the fireworks and
benches for the audience. General Banks urged me to remain over
the 4th of March, to participate in the ceremonies, which he
explained would include the performance of the "Anvil Chorus" by
all the bands of his army, and during the performance the
church-bells were to be rung, and cannons were to be fired by
electricity. I regarded all such ceremonies as out of place at a
time when it seemed to me every hour and every minute were due to
the war. General Banks's movement, however, contemplated my
sending a force of ten thousand men in boats up Red River from
Vicksburg, and that a junction should occur at Alexandria by March
17th. I therefore had no time to wait for the grand pageant of the
4th of March, but took my departure from New Orleans in the Diana
the evening of March 3d.

On the next day, March 4th, I wrote to General Banks a letter,
which was extremely minute in conveying to him how far I felt
authorized to go under my orders from General Grant. At that time
General Grant commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi,
embracing my own Department of the Tennessee and that of General
Steele in Arkansas, but not that of General Banks in Louisiana.
General Banks was acting on his own powers, or under the
instructions of General Halleck in Washington, and our, assistance
to him was designed as a loan of ten thousand men for a period of
thirty days. The instructions of March 6th to General A. J. Smith,
who commanded this detachment, were full and explicit on this
point. The Diana reached Vicksburg on the 6th, where I found that
the expeditionary army had come in from Canton. One division of
five thousand men was made up out of Hurlbut's command, and placed
under Brigadier-General T. Kilby Smith; and a similar division was
made out of McPherson's and Hurlbut's troops, and placed under
Brigadier-General Joseph A. Mower; the whole commanded by
Brigadier-General A. J. Smith. General Hurlbut, with the rest of
his command, returned to Memphis, and General McPherson remained at
Vicksburg. General A. J. Smith's command was in due season
embarked, and proceeded to Red River, which it ascended, convoyed
by Admiral Porter's fleet. General Mower's division was landed
near the outlet of the Atchafalaya, marched up by land and captured
the fort below Alexandria known as Fort De Russy, and the whole
fleet then proceeded up to Alexandria, reaching it on the day
appointed, viz., March 17th, where it waited for the arrival of
General Banks, who, however, did not come till some days after.
These two divisions participated in the whole of General Banks's
unfortunate Red River expedition, and were delayed so long up Red
River, and subsequently on the Mississippi, that they did not share
with their comrades the successes and glories of the Atlanta
campaign, for which I had designed them; and, indeed, they, did not
join our army till just in time to assist General George H. Thomas
to defeat General Hood before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th of
December, 1864.

General Grant's letter of instructions, which was brought me by
General Butterfield, who had followed me to New Orleans, enjoined
on me, after concluding with General Banks the details for his Red
River expedition, to make all necessary arrangements for
furloughing the men entitled to that privilege, and to hurry back
to the army at Huntsville, Alabama. I accordingly gave the
necessary orders to General McPherson, at Vicksburg, and continued
up the river toward Memphis. On our way we met Captain Badeau, of
General Grant's staff, bearing the following letter, of March 4th,
which I answered on the 10th, and sent the answer by General
Butterfield, who had accompanied me up from New Orleans. Copies of
both were also sent to General McPherson, at Vicksburg:



DEAR SHERMAN: The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in
the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate
for the place.

I now receive orders to report at Washington immediately, in
person, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood of
confirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order, but
I shall say very distinctly on my arrival there that I shall accept
no appointment which will require me to make that city my
headquarters. This, however, is not what I started out to write

While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least
gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how
much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the
harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it
has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions
under me.

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a
greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers;
but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as
the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I
have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been
of assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has
been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you
cannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter
would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also.
I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in the
morning, I do not know that I will find time just now. Your

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


NEAR MEMPHIS, March 10, 1864

General GRANT.

DEAR GENERAL: I have your more than kind and characteristic letter
of the 4th, and will send a copy of it to General McPherson at

You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us
so large a share of the merits which have led to your high
advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever
professed to you, and will permit me to continue as heretofore to
manifest it on all proper occasions.

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a
position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as
heretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you
will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the
homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large
share for securing to them and their descendants a government of
law and stability.

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At
Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at
Donelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was not
near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to
influence you.

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the
terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at
every point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which I
have followed ever since.

I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great
prototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest, as a
man should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is the
simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can
liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his

This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when
you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle
without hesitation, as at Chattanooga--no doubts, no reserve; and I
tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew
wherever I was that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight
place you would come--if alive.

My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand
strategy, and of books of science and history; but I confess your
common-sense seems to have supplied all this.

Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck is
better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and
policy. Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi
Valley; let us make it dead-sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slope
and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of
a tree live or die with the main trunk! We have done much; still
much remains to be done. Time and time's influences are all with
us; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences
work. Even in the seceded States your word now would go further
than a President's proclamation, or an act of Congress.

For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington!
I foretold to General Halleck, before he left Corinth, the
inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West.
Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when
our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and
Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic. Your sincere


We reached Memphis on the 13th, where I remained some days, but on
the 14th of March received from General Grant a dispatch to hurry
to Nashville in person by the 17th, if possible. Disposing of all
matters then pending, I took a steamboat to Cairo, the cars thence
to Louisville and Nashville, reaching that place on the 17th of
March, 1864.

I found General Grant there. He had been to Washington and back,
and was ordered to return East to command all the armies of the
United States, and personally the Army of the Potomac. I was to
succeed him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi,
embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee, and
Arkansas. General Grant was of course very busy in winding up all
matters of business, in transferring his command to me, and in
preparing for what was manifest would be the great and closing
campaign of our civil war. Mrs. Grant and some of their children
were with him, and occupied a large house in Nashville, which was
used as an office, dwelling, and every thing combined.

On the 18th of March I had issued orders assuming command of the
Military Division of the Mississippi, and was seated in the office,
when the general came in and said they were about to present him a
sword, inviting me to come and see the ceremony. I went back into
what was the dining-room of the house; on the table lay a rose-wood
box, containing a sword, sash, spurs, etc., and round about the
table were grouped Mrs. Grant, Nelly, and one or two of the boys.
I was introduced to a large, corpulent gentleman, as the mayor, and
another citizen, who had come down from Galena to make this
presentation of a sword to their fellow-townsman. I think that
Rawlins, Bowers, Badeau, and one or more of General Grant's
personal staff, were present. The mayor rose and in the most
dignified way read a finished speech to General Grant, who stood,
as usual, very awkwardly; and the mayor closed his speech by
handing him the resolutions of the City Council engrossed on
parchment, with a broad ribbon and large seal attached. After the
mayor had fulfilled his office so well, General Grant said: "Mr.
Mayor, as I knew that this ceremony was to occur, and as I am not
used to speaking, I have written something in reply." He then
began to fumble in his pockets, first his breast-coat pocket, then
his pants, vest; etc., and after considerable delay he pulled out a
crumpled piece of common yellow cartridge-paper, which he handed to
the mayor. His whole manner was awkward in the extreme, yet
perfectly characteristic, and in strong contrast with the elegant
parchment and speech of the mayor. When read, however, the
substance of his answer was most excellent, short, concise, and, if
it had been delivered by word of mouth, would have been all that
the occasion required.

I could not help laughing at a scene so characteristic of the man
who then stood prominent before the country; and to whom all had
turned as the only one qualified to guide the nation in a war that
had become painfully critical. With copies of the few letters
referred to, and which seem necessary to illustrate the
subject-matter, I close this chapter:


Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, New

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant
yesterday at New Orleans, but was unable to answer, except
verbally, and I now reduce it to writing.

I will arrive at Vicksburg the 6th instant, and I expect to meet
there my command from Canton, out of which I will select two
divisions of about ten thousand men, embark them under a good
commander, and order him:

1st. To rendezvous at the mouth of Red River, and, in concert with
Admiral Porter (if he agree), to strike Harrisonburg a hard blow.

2d. To return to Red River and ascend it, aiming to reach
Alexandria on the 17th of March, to report to you.

3d. That, as this command is designed to operate by water, it will
not be encumbered with much land transportation, say two wagons to
a regiment, but with an ample supply of stores, including mortars
and heavy rifled guns, to be used against fortified places.

4th. That I have calculated, and so reported to General Grant,
that this detachment of his forces in no event is to go beyond
Shreveport, and that you will spare them the moment you can, trying
to get them back to the Mississippi River in thirty days from the
time they actually enter Red River.

The year is wearing away fast, and I would like to carry to General
Grant at Huntsville, Alabama, every man of his military division,
as early in April as possible, for I am sure we ought to move from
the base of the Tennessee River to the south before the season is
too far advanced, say as early as April 15th next.

I feel certain of your complete success, provided you make the
concentration in time, to assure which I will see in person to the
embarkation and dispatch of my quota, and I will write to General
Steele, conveying to him my personal and professional opinion that
the present opportunity is the most perfect one that will ever
offer itself to him to clean out his enemies in Arkansas.

Wishing you all honor and success, I am, with respect, your friend
and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

VICKSBURG, March 6, 1864

Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH, commanding Expedition up Red River,
Vicksburg, Mississippi.

GENERAL: By an order this day issued, you are to command a strong,
well-appointed detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, sent to
reinforce a movement up Red River, but more especially against the
fortified position at Shreveport.

You will embark your command as soon as possible, little encumbered
with wagons or wheeled vehicles, but well supplied with fuel,
provisions, and ammunition. Take with you the twelve mortars, with
their ammunition, and all the thirty-pound Parrotts the ordnance-
officer will supply. Proceed to the mouth of Red River and confer
with Admiral Porter. Consult with him, and in all the expedition
rely on him implicitly, as he is the approved friend of the Army of
the Tennessee, and has been associated with us from the beginning.
I have undertaken with General Banks that you will be at
Alexandria, Louisiana, on or before the 17th day of March; and you
will, if time allows, cooperate with the navy in destroying
Harrisonburg, up Black River; but as I passed Red River yesterday I
saw Admiral Porter, and he told me he had already sent an
expedition to Harrisonburg, so that I suppose that part of the plan
will be accomplished before you reach Red River; but, in any event,
be careful to reach Alexandria about the 17th of March.

General Banks will start by land from Franklin, in the Teche
country, either the 6th or 7th, and will march via Opelousas to
Alexandria. You will meet him there, report to him, and act under
his orders. My understanding with him is that his forces will move
by land, via Natchitoches, to Shreveport, while the gunboat-fleet
is to ascend the river with your transports in company. Red River
is very low for the season, and I doubt if any of the boats can
pass the falls or rapids at Alexandria. What General Banks
proposes to do in that event I do not know; but my own judgment is
that Shreveport ought not to be attacked until the gunboats can
reach it. Not that a force marching by land cannot do it alone,
but it would be bad economy in war to invest the place with an army
so far from heavy guns, mortars, ammunition, and provisions, which
can alone reach Shreveport by water. Still, I do not know about
General Banks's plans in that event; and whatever they may be, your
duty will be to conform, in the most hearty manner.

My understanding with General Banks is that he will not need the
cooperation of your force beyond thirty days from the date you
reach Red River. As soon as he has taken Shreveport, or as soon as
be can spare you, return to Vicksburg with all dispatch, gather up
your detachments, wagons, tents, transportation, and all property
pertaining to so much of the command as belongs to the Sixteenth
Army Corps, and conduct it to Memphis, where orders will await you.
My present belief is your division, entire, will be needed with the
Army of the Tennessee, about Huntsville or Bridgeport. Still, I
will leave orders with General, Hurlbut, at Memphis, for you on
your return.

I believe if water will enable the gunboats to cross the rapids at
Alexandria, you will be able to make a quick, strong, and effective
blow at our enemy in the West, thus widening the belt of our
territory, and making the breach between the Confederate Government
and its outlying trans-Mississippi Department more perfect.

It is understood that General Steele makes a simultaneous move from
Little Rock, on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with a force of about
ten thousand men. Banks will have seventeen thousand, and you ten
thousand. If these can act concentrically and simultaneously, you
will make short work of it, and then General Banks will have enough
force to hold as much of the Red River country as he deems wise,
leaving you to bring to General Grant's main army the seven
thousand five hundred men of the Sixteenth Corps now with you.
Having faith in your sound judgment and experience, I confide this
important and delicate command to you, with certainty that you will
harmonize perfectly with Admiral Porter and General Banks, with
whom you are to act, and thereby insure success.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

MEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

Major General McPHERSON, commanding, etc, Vicksburg, Mississippi

DEAR GENERAL: I wrote you at length on the 11th, by a special
bearer of dispatches, and now make special orders to cover the
movements therein indicated. It was my purpose to await your
answer, but I am summoned by General Grant to be in Nashville on
the 17th, and it will keep me moving night and day to get there by
that date. I must rely on you, for you understand that we must
reenforce the great army at the centre (Chattanooga) as much as
possible, at the same time not risking the safety of any point on
the Mississippi which is fortified and armed with heavy guns. I
want you to push matters as rapidly as possible, and to do all you
can to put two handsome divisions of your own corps at Cairo, ready
to embark up the Tennessee River by the 20th or 30th of April at
the very furthest. I wish it could be done quicker; but the
promise of those thirty-days furloughs in the States of enlistment,
though politic, is very unmilitary. It deprives us of our ability
to calculate as to time; but do the best you can. Hurlbut can do
nothing till A. J. Smith returns from Red River. I will then order
him to occupy Grenada temporarily, and to try and get those
locomotives that we need here. I may also order him with cavalry
and infantry to march toward Tuscaloosa, at the same time that we
move from the Tennessee River about Chattanooga.

I don't know as yet the grand strategy of the next campaign, but on
arrival at Nashville I will soon catch the main points, and will
advise you of them..

Steal a furlough and run to Baltimore incog.; but get back in time
to take part in the next grand move.

Write me fully and frequently of your progress. I have ordered the
quartermaster to send down as many boats as he can get, to
facilitate your movements. Mules, wagons, etc., can come up
afterward by transient boats. I am truly your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

[Special Field Order No. 28.]

MEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

1. Major-General McPherson will organize two good divisions of his
corps (Seventeenth) of about five thousand men, each embracing in
part the reenlisted veterans of his corps whose furloughs will
expire in April, which he will command in person, and will
rendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, and report by telegraph and letter
to the general commanding at department headquarters, wherever they
may be. These divisions will be provided with new arms and
accoutrements, and land transportation (wagons and mules) out of
the supplies now at Vicksburg, which will be conveyed to Cairo by
or before April 15th.

4. During the absence of General McPherson from the district of
Vicksburg, Major-General Hurlbut will exercise command over all the
troops in the Department of the Tennessee from Cairo to Natchez,
inclusive, and will receive special instructions from department

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.



Report of Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan.

January 8, 1868.

Major J. H. HAMMOND, Chief of Staff:

SIR: On the 1st instant, while pressed by many arduous duties, I
was requested to report to the commanding general the operations of
my division during the affair of the 27th, the action of the 28th,
and the battle of the 29th ult.

I had not received the report of subordinate commanders, nor had I
time to review the report I have the honor to submit.

Herewith I have the honor to forward these reports, connected with
which I will submit a few remarks.

Brigadier-General Blair speaks of having discovered, while on his
retreat from the enemy's works, a broad and easy road running from
the left of my position to the enemy's lines. The road is neither
broad nor easy, and was advanced over by De Courcey when leading
his brigade to the charge. The road General Blair speaks of is the
one running from Lake's Landing and intersecting with the Vicksburg
road on the Chickasaw Bluffs. Its existence was known to me on the
28th ult., but it was left open intentionally by the enemy, and was
commanded by a direct and cross fire from batteries and rifle-pits.
The withdrawal of his brigade from the assault by Colonel De
Courcey was justified by the failure of the corps of A. J. Smith,
and the command of Colonel Lindsey, to advance simultaneously to
the assault. Both had the same difficulties to encounter--
impassable bayous. The enemy's line of battle was concave, and De
Courcey advanced against his centre--hence he sustained a
concentric fire, and the withdrawal of Steele from the front of the
enemy's right on the 28th ult. enabled the enemy on the following
day to concentrate his right upon his centre.

I regret to find, from the report of Brigadier-General Thayer, some
one regiment skulked; this I did not observe, nor is it mentioned
by General Blair, though his were the troops which occupied that
portion of the field. As far as my observation extended, the
troops bore themselves nobly; but the Sixteenth Ohio Infantry was
peerless on the field, as it had ever been in camp or on the march.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kershner, commanding, was wounded and taken
prisoner. He is an officer of rare merit, and deserves to command
a brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Dieter, commanding the Fifty-eighth
Ohio, was killed within the enemy's works; and Lieutenant-Colonel
Monroe, Twenty-second Kentucky, was struck down at the head of his

I again express my profound acknowledgments to Brigadier-Generals
Blair and Thayer, and Colonels De Conrcey, Lindsey, and Sheldon,
brigade commanders. Also to Major M. C. Garber, assistant
quartermaster; Captain S. S. Lyon, acting topographical engineer;
Lieutenant Burdick, acting ordnance officer; Lieutenant Hutchins,
acting chief of staff; Lieutenants H. G. Fisher and Smith, of
Signal Corps; Lieutenant E. D. Saunders, my acting assistant
adjutant-general; and Lieutenants English and Montgomery, acting
aides-de-camp, for the efficient services rendered me.

Nor can I close this report without speaking in terms of high
praise of the meritorious and gallant services of Captains Foster
and Lamphier. Their batteries silenced several of the enemy's
works, and throughout the operations rendered good service. My
sincere acknowledgments are also due to Captain Griffith,
commanding First Iowa Battery, and Captain Hoffman, commanding
Fourth Ohio Battery.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. MORGAN, Brigadier-General Volunteers.

CINCINNATI, February 8, 1876.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Regarding the attack at Chickasaw Bayou, my record
shows the position of Steele on the left; Morgan to his right;
Morgan L. Smith to his right, and A. J. Smith on the extreme right;
the latter not expected to accomplish much more than a diversion,
the result to come from the three other divisions, Morgan having
the best opportunity. Saturday night they were in position; you
were at Lake's plantation, right and rear of Morgan.

The attack for lodgment on the hills was ordered for Sunday
morning, December 28th. I was sent to A. J. Smith before daylight,
and returned to you soon after. You were with Morgan. You had
fully explained to him the importance of his success, and that he
should be present with the attacking column, which was to be a part
of his division, supported by the remainder, and by Blair's brigade
of Steele's division cooperating. The attack was to be
simultaneous, by the four divisions, on a signal.

Morgan's answer to you was that, when the signal was given, he
would lead his attack, and with his life he would be on the bluffs
in fifteen minutes. He seemed of positive knowledge, and as sure of
success. You then retired to a central point, to be in easy
communication with Steele and Morgan L. Smith. The attack was
made, and developed, in the case of Steele, M. L. Smith, and A. J.
Smith, that to cross the bayou was impossible, if opposed by any
force, and in each they were by a strong one. Morgan's attacking
force succeeded in getting across the causeway and marsh, but he
did not go with it, nor support it with more men, and a large
number were captured from Blair's brigade after gaining the enemy's
last line of works covering the bayou. At the time everybody
blamed and criticised Morgan with the failure. You felt from the
advance of his attack it must be successful, and, as it pushed
forward, you sent me to urge on M. L. Smith, as Morgan was over,
and he, Smith, must aid by persistent attack, and give Morgan as
good a chance as could be to make his lodgment....

I am, etc., L. M. DAYTON
Late Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati, Ohio
General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri


" . . . . The expedition was wonderfully well provided with
provisions, transportation, and munitions, and even axes, picks,
and shovels, so much in use later in the war, evidenced the
forethought that governed this force. The boats, from their open
lower deck construction, proved admirable for transports, but their
tinder-box construction made fire-traps of them, requiring
unremitting vigilance. These points were well understood, and the
readiness with which the troops adapted themselves to circumstances
was a constant source of wonder and congratulations.

"The fleet collected at Friar's Point for final orders, and there
the order of sailing was laid down with great minuteness, and
private instructions issued to commanders of divisions, all of whom
had personal interviews with the commanding general, and received
personal explanations on pretty much every point involved. Our
headquarters boat, the Forest Queen, was not very comfortable, nor
well provided, but General Sherman submitted cheerfully, on the
grounds of duty, and thought Conway a fine fellow. I was only able
to concede that he was a good steamboat captain....

"Our camp appointments were Spartan in the extreme, and in their
simplicity would have met the demands of any demagogue in the land.
The nights were cold and damp, and General Sherman uncomfortably
active in his preparations, so that the assistant adjutant-general
had no very luxurious post just then. We were surrounded with
sloughs. The ground was wet, and the water, although in winter,
was very unwholesome. Many of our men, to this day, have reminders
of the Yazoo in ague, fevers, and diseases of the bowels. Cavalry
was useless. One battalion of Illinois cavalry was strongly
suspected of camping in the timber, until time passed enough to
justify the suspicion of having been somewhere. Really the
strength of Vicksburg was in being out of reach of attack....

"My orders were to learn and report what was going on on the right,
particularly to try and form an idea of the enemy's force in front
of M. L. Smith's division, and at the sand-bar. Leaving my horse
close in the rear of the Sixth Missouri, when the fire became too
heavy for riding, I succeeded, by taking frequent cover, in
reaching unhurt the verge of the bayou among the drift-logs.
There, by concert of action with Lieutenant-Colonel Blood, of the
Sixth Missouri, his regiment, and the Thirteenth Regular Infantry,
kept up a heavy fire on everything that showed along the levee and
earthworks in front. The enemy were behind the embankment, not
over one hundred and fifty yards across the bayou. Several
officers, including Colonel Blood, Colonel Kilby Smith, and myself,
managed, by getting on the piles of drift, to see over the levee
through the cleared fields beyond, even to the foot of the bluff.
The chips and twigs flew around lively enough, but we staid up long
enough to make sure that the enemy had as many men behind the levee
as could get cover. We saw, also, a line of rifle-pits in the
rear, commanding the rear of the levee, and still beyond, winding
along the foot of the bluff, a road worn by long use deep into the
side-hill, and with the side next us strengthened with a good
earthwork, affording a covered line of communication in the rear.
The fire of our men was so well maintained that we were able to see
all these things, say a minute or more. Some of those who ventured
were wounded, but those mentioned and myself escaped unhurt. I
advised that men enough to hold the position, once across--say
three hundred--should make a rush (protected as our lookout had
been by a heavy fire) across the sand-bar, and get a footing under
the other bank of the bayou, as the nucleus of an attacking force,
if General Sherman decided to attack there, or to make a strong
diversion if the attack was made at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in
front of Morgan. General A. J. Smith, commanding First and Second
Divisions, approved of this. While returning to General Sherman, I
passed along the Second and part of the Third Division. On the
left of the Second I found a new Illinois regiment, high up in
numbers, working its way into position. The colonel, a brave but
inexperienced officer, was trying to lead his men according to the
popular pictorial idea, viz., riding in advance waving his sword.
I was leading my horse, and taking advantage of such cover as I
could find on my course, but this man acted so bravely that I tried
to save him. He did not accept my expostulations with very good
grace, but was not rough about it. While I was begging him to
dismount, he waved his sword and advanced. In a second he was
shot, through the chest, and dropped from his horse, plucky to the
last. He died, I was told, within the hour. Many of the regiments
were new and inexperienced, but as a rule behaved well. The fire
along the bayou was severe, but not very fatal, on account of the
cover. I was constantly asked what news from Grant, for from the
moment of our arrival in the Yazoo we were in expectation of either
hearing his guns in the rear, or of having communication with him.
This encouraged the men greatly, but the long waiting was
disappointing, as the enemy was evidently in large force in the
plenty of works, and a very strong position. Careful estimates and
available information placed their force at fifteen to twenty
thousand men. I returned to headquarters about the middle of the
afternoon, and made my report to the general. We were busy till
after midnight, and again early in the morning of the 29th, in
preparing orders for the attack. These were unusually minute in
detail. It seemed as though no contingency was left unprovided
for. Urgent orders and cautions as to rations and ammunition were
given. Drawings of the line of attack, orders for supports, all
and everything was foreseen and given in writing, with personal
explanations to commanders of divisions, brigades, and even
commanders of regiments. Indeed, the commanding general, always
careful as to detail, left nothing to chance, and with experienced
and ordinate officers we would have succeeded, for the troops were
good. The general plan involved a feint on our left toward
Haines's Bluff, by the navy, under Admiral Porter, with whom we
were in constant communication, while between him and General
Sherman perfect harmony existed. On the right a demonstration by
A. J. Smith was to be made. The Second Division (Stuart's) was to
cross the sand-bar, and the Third (General Morgan's) was to cross
on a small bridge over the dough at the head of Chickasaw Bayou,
and, supported by Steele, was to push straight for the Bluff at the
nearest spur where there was a battery in position, and to effect
a lodgment there and in the earthworks. General Sherman gave his
orders in person to Morgan and Steele. I understood Morgan to
promise that he would lead his division in person, and he seemed to
expect an easy victory, and expressed himself freely to that
effect. The aides were sent out, until I was left alone with the
general and a couple of orderlies. He located himself in a
position easy of access, and the most convenient afforded to the
point of attack. He directed me to see what I could, and report if
I met anything that he should know. I galloped as fast as possible
to the right, and found part of the Sixth Missouri pushing over the
sand-bar covered by the Thirteenth Regulars with a heavy fire. We
supposed, if once across, they could get up the bank and turn the
levee against the enemy, and left with that impression. Being in
heavy timber, I was not quite sure of my way back to the general,
his location being new, and therefore pushed full gallop for
Morgan's front, catching a good many stray shots from the
sharpshooters behind the levee, as I was compelled to keep in sight
of the bayou to hold direction. Something over half-way along
Morgan's division front, the commander of a Kentucky regiment
hailed me and said he must have support, as he was threatened by a
masked battery, and the enemy was in force in his front, and might
cross any moment. I answered, rather shortly, 'How the devil do
you know there is a masked battery? If you can't get over, how can
the rebels get at you?' He insisted on the battery, and danger. I
finally told him the bayou was utterly impassable there, but, if he
insisted the enemy could cross, I would insist on an advance on our
side at that point. Hurrying on to make up lost time, I soon
reached Morgan. He was making encouraging speeches in a general
way, but stopped to ask me questions as to Steele's rank, date of
commission, etc. I was very much disturbed at this, fearing want
of harmony, and rode on to Steele, whom I found cursing Morgan so
fiercely that I could not exactly make out the source of the
trouble, or reason why; but saw want of concert clearly enough. I
hastened back to General Sherman, and endeavored to impress my
ideas on him and my fears; but, while he admitted the facts, he
could not be made to believe that any jealousy or personal quarrel
could lead to a failure to support each other, and a neglect of
duty. The signal for attack had already been given, and the
artillery had opened, when I left him again for Morgan's front. I
found Morgan where I left him, and the troops advancing. I had
understood that he was to lead his division, and asked about it,
but, getting no satisfaction, pushed for the front, crossing the
slough at the little bridge at the head of the bayou. I found the
willows cut off eighteen inches or two feet long, with sharp points
above the mud, making it slow and difficult to pass, save at the
bridge. I overtook the rear of the advance about two or three
hundred feet up the gentle slope, and was astonished to find how
small a force was making the attack. I was also surprised to find
that they were Steele's men instead of Morgan's. I also saw
several regiments across the bayou, but not advancing; they were
near the levee. A heavy artillery and infantry fire was going on
all this time. While making my way along the column, from which
there were very few falling back, a shell burst near me, and the
concussion confused me at the time and left me with a headache for
several months. When I got my wits about me again I found a good
many coming back, but the main part of the force was compact and
keeping up the fight. I did not get closer to the woods than about
five hundred feet, and found that a large number had penetrated
into the enemy's works. When our men fell back, very few ran, but
came slowly and sullenly, far more angry than frightened. I found
General Frank Blair on foot, and with him Colonel Sea, of Southwest
Missouri, and learned that Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward
Governor of Missouri, was captured with many of his men. They both
insisted there on the spot, with those around us, that if all the
men ordered up had gone up, or even all that crossed the bayou had
moved forward, we could have readily established ourselves in the
enemy's works. I was firmly of the same opinion at the time on the
ground; and, an entrance effected, we could have brought the whole
force on dry ground, and had a base of operations against
Vicksburg--though probably, in view of later events, we would have
had to stand a siege from Pemberton's army. After explanations
with Blair, I rode to where the men were, who had crossed the
bayou, but had not advanced with the others. I found them to be De
Courcey's brigade; of Morgan's division, which General Sherman
supposed to be in advance. In fact, it was the intended support
that made the attack. A correspondence and controversy followed
between General Blair and Colonel De Courcey, most of which I have,
but nothing came of it. On reaching the bayou, I found that
Thayer's brigade, of Steele's division, had in some way lost its
direction and filed off to the right. Remembering the masked
battery, I suspected that had something to do with the matter, and,
on following it up, I learned that the Kentucky colonel before
mentioned had appealed for aid against the masked battery and
invisible force of rebels, and that a regiment had been ordered to
him. This regiment, filing off into the timber, had been followed
by Thayer's brigade, supposing it to be advancing to the front, and
thus left a single brigade to attack a superior force of the enemy
in an intrenched and naturally strong position. By the time the
mistake could be rectified, it was too late. Our loss was from one
hundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and about eleven hundred
prisoners and wounded. During the afternoon I went with a flag of
truce, with reference to burying the dead. I saw between eighty
and one hundred of our men dead, all stripped. There were others
closer into the enemy's works than I was allowed to go. On going
later to where the Sixth Missouri crossed, I found that they were
under the bank, and had dug in with their hands and bayonets, or
anything in reach, to protect themselves from a vertical fire from
the enemy overhead, who had a heavy force there. With great
difficulty they were withdrawn at night. Next day arrangements
were made to attempt a lodgment below Haines's Bluff: This was to
be done by Steele's command, while the rest of the force attacked
again where we had already tried. During the day locomotives
whistled, and a great noise and fuss went on in our front, and we
supposed that Grant was driving in Pemberton, and expected firing
any moment up the Yazoo or in the rear of Vicksburg. Not hearing
this, we concluded that Pemberton was throwing his forces into
Vicksburg. A heavy fog prevented Steele from making his movement.
Rain began to fall, and our location was not good to be in after a
heavy rain, or with the river rising. During the night (I think)
of January, 1, 1863, our troops were embarked, material and
provisions having been loaded during the day. A short time before
daylight of the 2d, I went by order of the general commanding, to
our picket lines and carefully examined the enemy's lines, wherever
a camp-fire indicated their presence. They were not very vigilant,
and I once got close enough to hear them talk, but could understand
nothing. Early in the morning I came in with the rear-guard, the
enemy advancing his pickets and main guards only, and making no
effort at all to press us. Once I couldn't resist the temptation
to fire into a squad that came bolder than the rest, and the two
shots were good ones. We received a volley in return that did come
very close among us, but hurt none of my party. Very soon after
our rear-guard was aboard, General Sherman learned from Admiral
Porter that McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo. He
went, taking me and one other staff-officer, to see McClernand, and
found that, under an order from the President, he had taken command
of the Army of the Mississippi. He and his staff, of whom I only
remember two-Colonels Scates and Braham, assistant adjutant-general
and aide-de-camp--seemed to think they had a big thing, and, so far
as I could judge, they had just that. All hands thought the
country expected them to cut their way to the Gulf; and to us, who
had just come out of the swamp, the cutting didn't seem such an
easy job as to the new-comers. Making due allowance for the
elevation they seemed to feel in view of their job, everything
passed off pleasantly, and we learned that General Grant's
communications had been cut at Holly Springs by the capture of
Murphy and his force (at Holly Springs), and that he was either in
Memphis by that time or would soon be. So that, everything
considered, it was about as well that we did not get our forces on
the bluff's of Walnut Hill."

The above statement was sent to General Sherman in a letter dated
"Chicago, February 5,1876," and signed "John H. Hammond." Hammond
was General Sherman's assistant adjutant-general at the Chickasaw
J. E. TOURTELOTTE, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.

On 29th December, 1862, at Chickasaw Bayou, I was in command of the
Thirty-first Missouri Volunteer Infantry, First Brigade, First
Division, Fifteenth Army Corps (Blair's brigade). Colonel Wyman,
of the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, having been killed,
I was the senior colonel of the brigade. General Blair rode up to
where my regiment lay, and said to me:

"We are to make a charge here; we will charge in two lines; your
regiment will be in the first line, and the Twenty-ninth
(Cavender's) will support you. Form here in the timber, and move
out across the bayou on a double-quick, and go right on to the top
of the heights in your front." He then told me to await a signal.
I then attempted to make a reconnaissance of the ground over which
we would have to charge, and rode out to the open ground in my
front, and saw that there was water and soft mud in the bayou, and
was fired upon by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, and turned and
went back into the woods where my command lay. Soon after that
General Blair came near me, and I told him there was water and mud
in the bayou, and I doubted if we could get across. He answered me
that General Morgan told him there was no water nor mud to hinder
us. I remarked that I had seen it myself, and General Morgan, or
any one else, could see it if he would risk being shot at pretty
lively. I then told General Blair that it was certain destruction
to us if we passed over the abatis upon the open ground where there
had once been a corn-field; that we could never reach the base of
the hill. He turned to me and said, "Can't you take your regiment
up there?" I told him, "Yes, I can take my regiment anywhere,
because the men do not know any better than to go," but remarked
that old soldiers could not be got to go up there. General Blair
then said, "Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; you
will have the glory of leading the assault." He then went on to
say that General Morgan's division would support us, and they were
heroes of many battles, and pointed to the Fifty-eighth Ohio, then
forming in the rear of the Thirteenth Illinois on my right, and
said: "See these men? They are a part of Morgan's division, and are
heroes of many battles." I laughingly said that they might be
heroes, but the regiment did not number as many as one of my
companies. He again assured me we would be supported by Morgan's
division, and all I had to do was to keep right on and "keep going
till you get into Vicksburg." I took my position in advance of my
regiment and awaited the signal. When we heard it, we raised a
shout, and started at a double-quick, the Thirteenth Illinois on my
right. I saw no troops on my left. When we emerged from the
woods, the enemy opened upon us; crossing the bayou under fire, and
many of the men sinking in the mud and water, our line was very
much disordered, but we pretty well restored it before reaching the
abatis. Here we were greatly disordered, but somewhat restored the
line on reaching the plateau or corn-field. The Twenty-ninth
Missouri came on, gallantly supporting us. The Thirteenth Illinois
came out upon the corn-field, and the Fifty-eighth Ohio followed
close upon it. There was firing to my left, and as I afterward
learned was from the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's brigade (and I believe
of Steele's division). I was struck and fell, and my regiment went
back in great disorder. The fire was terrific. I saw beyond the
Thirteenth Illinois, to my right, a disordered line, and learned
afterward it was the Sixteenth Ohio. When I was taken from the
field by the enemy and taken into Vicksburg, I found among the
wounded and prisoners men and officers of the Sixteenth and
Fifty-eighth Ohio, and of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first
Missouri, and Thirteenth Illinois. After I was exchanged and
joined my command, General Blair laughingly remarked to me that I
had literally obeyed his order and gone "straight on to Vicksburg."
He lamented the cutting to pieces of our force on that day. We
talked the whole matter over at his headquarters during the siege
of Vicksburg. He said that if the charge had been made along our
whole line with the same vigor of attack made by his brigade, and
if we had been supported as Morgan promised to do, we might have
succeeded. I dissented from the opinion that we could even then
have succeeded. I asked him what excuse Morgan gave for failing to
support us, and he said that Colonel or General De Courcey was in
some manner to blame for that, but he said Morgan was mistaken as
to the nature of the ground and generally as to the feasibility of
the whole thing, and was responsible for the failure to afford us
the support he had promised; that he and General Sherman and all of
them were misled by the statements and opinions of Morgan as to the
situation in our front, and Morgan was, on his part, deceived by
the reports of his scouts about other matters as well as the matter
of the water in the bayou.



Extracts from Admiral Porter's Journal.

Sherman and I had made arrangements to capture Arkansas Post.

On the 31st of December, while preparing to go out of the Yazoo, an
army officer called to see me, and said that he belonged to General
McClernand's staff, and that the general was at the mouth of the
Yazoo River, and desired to see me at once. I sent word to the
general that if he wished to see me he could have an opportunity by
calling on board my flag-ship.

A few moments after I had heard the news of McClernand'a arrival, I
saw Sherman pulling about in a boat, and hailed him, informing him
that McClernand was at the mouth of the Yazoo. Sherman then came
on board, and, in consequence of this unexpected news, determined
to postpone the movement out of the Yazoo River, and let McClernand
take that upon himself.

General McClernand took my hint and came on board the flag-ship,
but I soon discovered that any admiral, Grant, Sherman, or all the
generals in the army, were nobody in his estimation. Sherman had
been at McClernand's headquarters to see him and state the
condition of affairs, and he then suggested to the latter the plan
of going to Arkansas Post.

I had a number of fine maps hanging up in my cabin, and when
McClernand came on board he examined them all with the eye of a
connoisseur. He then stated to me as a new thing the plan he
proposed!!! of going to Arkansas Post and stirring up our troops,
which had been "demoralized by the late defeat" (Sherman was
present, looking daggers at him). I answered, "Yes, General
Sherman and myself have already arranged for going to Arkansas
Post." Sherman then made some remark about the disposition of the
troops in the coming expedition, when McClernand gave him rather a
curt answer. McClernand then remarked, "If you will let me have
three gunboats, I will go and take the place." Now General
McClernand had about as much idea of what a gunboat was, or could
do, as the man in the moon. He did not know, the difference
between an ironclad and a "tin-clad." He had heard that gunboats
had taken Fort Henry, and that was all be knew about them. I said
to him: "I'll tell you what I will do, General McClernand. If
General Sherman goes in command of the troops, I will go myself in
command of a proper force, and will insure the capture of the
post." McClernand winced under this, and Sherman quietly walked
off into the after-cabin. He beckoned me to come there, while
McClernand was apparently deeply engaged in studying out a chart,
making believe he was interested, in order to conceal his temper.
Sherman said to me: "Admiral, how could you make such a remark to
McClernand? He hates me already, and you have made him an enemy
for life."

"I don't care," said I; "he shall not treat you rudely in my cabin,
and I was glad of the opportunity of letting him know my
sentiments." By this time, General McClernand having bottled up
his wrath, or cooled down, I went in to him and we discussed the
matter. He consented that Sherman should go in command of the
troops, and the interview ended pleasantly enough.

The above extracts from Admiral Porter's journal were sent by the
admiral to General Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Washington,
May 29, 1875," and signed "David D. Porter."


After leaving the Yazoo, the Army of the Mississippi rendezvous was
at Milliken's Bend. During the night of January 4th or 5th,
General McClernand came on board the Forest Queen, and with General
Sherman went to the Black Hawk flag-boat. There an interview took
place, during which the expedition to Arkansas Post took shape.
General Sherman having asked leave to take the post, and Admiral
Porter having decided to go along, McClernand thought best to go
with his entire army, although the enemy were supposed to have only
about four or five thousand men, and the fort was little more than
a large earthwork commanding the river.

General Sherman's command was then entitled the Second Corps, Army
of the Mississippi, and was comprised of the First Division,
Blair's, Hovey's, and Thayer's brigades, commanded by Steele; and
the Second Division, commanded by David Stuart, with Colonels Giles
A. and Kilby Smith commanding brigades.

Our fleet was convoyed by three ironclads and several other
gunboats. The weather was bitterly cold for that latitude; we were
four days getting into the Arkansas River, which we entered by the
White River cut-off; and my recollection is, that our passing the
mouth of the main river deceived the enemy as to our destination.
The entrance through the cut-off was feasible by reason of high
water, and I think made our appearance a surprise to the force at
the post. We disembarked on the morning of the 10th of January.
Stuart's division first encountered the enemy behind an earthwork
about four miles from the fort, running across the solid ground
from the river to a swamp. General Sherman in person took Steele's
division, and followed a road leading to the rear of the earthwork
just mentioned. We had got fairly under way when the rebels fell
back to the fort, and McClernand, coming up, ordered us to fall
back, and march up the river. It seemed to me then, and afterward,
that it would have been better to have marched straight to the rear
of the fort, as we started to do. We soon overtook Stuart and
closed in, General Sherman on the right, Morgan's force on the
left, reaching to the river, where the gunboats were, while Sherman
reached from the road which connected the post with the back
country, toward where the earthworks reached the river above the
fort, and threatened their communications with Little Rock. The
night was cold and cloudy, with some snow. There were a good many
abandoned huts to our rear, but our forces in position lay on the
frozen ground, sheltered as best they could, among the bushes and
timber. We were so close that they could have reached us any time
during the night with light artillery. The gun-boats threw heavy
shells into the fort and behind the earthworks all night, keeping
the enemy awake and anxious. The heavy boom of the artillery was
followed by the squeak, squeak of Admiral Porter's little tug, as
he moved around making his arrangements for the morrow. The sounds
were ridiculous by comparison. General Sherman and staff lay on
the roots of an old oak-tree, that kept them partly clear of mud.
The cold was sharp, my right boot being frozen solid in a puddle in
the morning. About half-past two or three o'clock, General
Sherman, with another and myself, crept in as close as possible and
reconnoitred the position. The general managed to creep in much
closer than the rest of us--in fact, so close as to cause us
anxiety. The enemy worked hard all night on their abatis and
intrenchments, and in the morning we found a ditch and parapet
running clear across the point on which the post was situated.
This point was cut by a road from the back country, across which
was a heavy earthwork and a battery. This road was at the
extremity of our left. General McClernand kept his head-quarters
on his boat, the Tigress. He came up in the morning to a place in
the woods in our rear. One of his staff, a cavalry-officer,
climbed a tree to report movements; but from that point there was
very little to be seen. Between ten and eleven o'clock the fire
opened from the fleet, and we opened along the whole line from
infantry and field-guns. Our men soon worked in close enough to
keep down the fire of the enemy to a very marked degree.

After reporting to General Sherman, and while explaining the
position of the fleet, the smoke-stacks and flags appeared above
the fort. What firing was going on in our immediate front ceased.
A good many rebels were in plain sight, running away from the fort
and scattering. While we were still surprised, the cry was raised
that a white flag was hung out. I did not see it, but in a few
minutes saw others along the line, and just as the general started
for the fort I saw the flag not far from the white house, near the
parapet. Orders were given to cease firing. Captain Dayton was
sent to the fort where the first flag was raised. Some shots were
fired and some men hurt after this. The first rebel officer we
encountered was Colonel or General Garland, commanding brigade, who
was ordered to put his men in line and stack arms, which was done.
I was directed to pass along the line to the right, and cause the
prisoners to stack arms and form our men in line, just outside the
work. This I did till I reached Deshler's brigade, on our extreme
right, or nearly so, and who was opposed to the right of Steele's
force. Steele's men had rushed up to the very foot of the parapet,
and some were on it, though they did not fire. The commander of
the enemy (Deshler) refused to obey my orders to stack arms, and
asked a good many questions as to "how it happened;" said he was
not whipped, but held us in check, etc. I told him there were
eight or nine thousand men right there, that a shot from me, or a
call, would bring down on him, and that we had entire possession of
the place. After sending two officers from the nearest troops to
explain the condition to Steele, and to warn every officer they met
to pass the word for everybody to be on the sharp lookout, I
arranged with Deshler to keep quiet until I could bring his own
commander, or orders from him. Returning to General Sherman, I
found a party of young rebel officers, including Robert Johnston's
son (rebel Senate) and Captain Wolf, quartermaster, of New Orleans,
who declined to surrender except to gentlemen. Some German
Missouri soldiers didn't relish the distinction, and were about
clubbing them over the head, when I interfered and received their
surrender. Hurrying back to the general, I reported the dangerous
condition of things. He and General Churchill, commanding officer
of the enemy, started for Deshler's brigade; meeting Garland, a
quarrel and some recrimination followed between him and Churchill,
as to where the fault of the surrender belonged, which was rather
promptly silenced by General Sherman, who hurried to the scene of
trouble. There, after some ill-natured talk, Deshler ordered his
men to lay down their arms. I rode into the fort, and found the
parapet badly torn up by the fire from the fleet. On going to the
embrasure where I had seen the gun while on the river-bank talking
to Captain Shirk, the piece was found split back about eighteen
inches, and the lower half of the muzzle dropped out. A battered
but unexploded shell lying with the piece explained that it must
have struck the gun in the muzzle, almost squarely. On passing
along the inside I saw from the torn condition of the earthworks
how tremendous our fire was, and how the fire of the enemy was kept
down. The fire of the navy had partly torn down the side of the
fort next the river. A good many sailors were in the fort.
General A. J. Smith, Admiral Porter, and General Burbridge were
there--all in high spirits, but in some contention as to who got in
first. Toward dark, or nearly so, an Arkansas regiment came in as
reenforcements, but surrendered without any trouble. About the
same time General Sherman received orders to put General A. J.
Smith in charge of the fort, and stay outside with his men. As his
troops were nearly all inside, and had four-fifths of the prisoners
in charge, these orders were not very clear, and the general left
for headquarters to find out what was meant. I went on collecting
arms, and as our men were scattering a good deal and were greatly
excited, I took the precaution to pass along the line and march the
prisoners far enough from the stacked arms to be out of temptation.
I was especially urged to this by hearing several rebel officers
speak of their guns being still loaded. It was dark before all the
prisoners were collected and under guard, including the regiment
that arrived after the fight. I am confident that all the
prisoners were under guard by General Sherman's troops.

Everything being secure, the staff-officers, all of whom had been
busily engaged, scattered to compare notes and enjoy the victory.
I found my way onboard the Tigress, where every one was greatly
excited, and in high feather regarding our victory, the biggest
thing since Donelson. I also obtained some food and small comforts
for a few rebel officers, including young Johnston, Wolfe, and the
Colonel Deshler already mentioned. Then hunted up General Sherman,
whom I found sitting on a cracker-boa in the white house already
mentioned, near where the white flag first appeared. Garland was
with him, and slept with him that night, while the rest of us laid
around wherever we could. It was a gloomy, bloody house, and
suggestive of war. Garland was blamed by the other Confederate
officers for the white flag, and remained with us for safety. Next
day was very cold. We worked hard at the lists of prisoners--
nearly five thousand in number--all of whom were sent to St. Louis,
in charge of our inspector-general, Major Sanger. Our loss was
less than one hundred. The enemy, although behind intrenchments,
lost more than double what we did. Their wounded were much worse
hurt than ours, who were mostly hit around the head and arms.

The losses were nearly all in General Sherman's wing of the army.
The loss in the fleet amounted to little, but their service was
very valuable, and deserved great credit, though they received
little. There was a good deal of sympathy between our part of the
forces and the fleet people, and I then thought, and still think,
if we had been on the left next the river, that in connection with
the tremendous fire from the navy, we could have carried the work
in an hour after we opened on it. Their missiles traversed the
whole fortification, clear through to the hospitals at the upper
end, and I stood five minutes in rifle-range of the fort next the
river--not hit, and but seldom shot at, and no one hit near me.

On the 18th we embarked, in a snow-storm; collected at Napoleon,
which seemed to be washing away; and steamed to Milliken's Bend,
were we arrived on January 21st, and soon after went to Young's
plantation, near Vicksburg.

The above statement from General Hammond was received by General
Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Chicago, February 5, 1876" and
signed "John H. Hammond," who was adjutant-general to General
Sherman during the winter of 1862-'83.


CINCINNATI, February 3, 1876

MY DEAR GENERAL: At Arkansas Post the troops debarked from steamer
January 9th, from one o'clock to dark, in the vicinity of Notrib's
farm, and on the 10th moved out to get position; Steele to the
right, crossing the low ground to the north, to get a higher
ground, avoid crowding the moving columns, and gain the left (our
right) and rear of the "post," and the river-bank above the post.
Stuart took the river-road the movement commencing at 11 o'clock
a.m.. After crossing the low ground covered with water, you were
called back with Steele, as Stuart had driven out the enemy's
rifle-trench pickets, this giving more and feasible room for
moving. Stuart was pushed forward, and by dark he and Steele were
well up to their expected positions. Before daylight on the 11th
you directed me to accompany you for a personal inspection of the
ground to your front, which we made on foot, going so far forward
that we could easily hear the enemy at work and moving about.
Discovering the open fields, you at once directed Steele to move to
the right and front, and pushed Stuart out so as to fully command
them and the field-work of the enemy extending from the fort, to
prevent farther strengthening, as it was evident these works were
the product of a recent thought. Stuart and Steele were prompt in
taking position, but Morgan's command (not under your control) did
not seem to work up, or keep in junction with you. At ten o'clock
you sent me to McClernand to ascertain why the delay of attack. He
attributed it to Admiral Porter, which was really unjust. The
attack began at 1 p.m., by Admiral Porter, and the sound of his
first gun had not died till your men were engaged--Wood's,
Barrett's, and the Parrott batteries and infantry. It was lively
for a time, and Stuart pushed clear up to the enemy's rifle-
trenches, and forced them to keep sheltered. Hammond was mostly
with Steele; Sanger sent to McClernand, and McCoy, myself, and John
Taylor were with you and Stuart. At about half-past three I got
your permission to go to Giles Smith's skirmish-line, and, thinking
I saw evidence of the enemy weakening, I hurried back to you and
reported my observations. I was so confident that a demand for it
would bring a surrender, that I asked permission to make it, and,
as you granted me, but refused to let another member of your staff,
at his request, go with me, I rode directly down the road with only
an orderly. Colonel Garland, commanding a brigade, was the first
officer I saw, to whom, for you, I made the demand. All firing
ceased at once, or in a few moments. I sent the orderly back to
you, and you rode forward. It was then four o'clock.

During the attack, nobody seemed to think McClernand had any clear
idea of what or how it was to be done. During the day he gave you
no directions, nor came where you were; he was well to the rear,

Book of the day: