‘In consequence of the position taken up by the Cabinet, I proceeded to draft a Local Government Bill.’ [Footnote: The measure was a large one, but he notes in his Memoir that ‘it was a less complete and comprehensive measure than that prepared by me for Chamberlain in 1886.’]
Thus, immediately on his entry into the Cabinet Sir Charles found himself entrusted with the task of framing the chief measure for the succeeding Session. When the outlines had been sketched in, he wrote:
‘Before I started for my Easter holiday I went through the draft of the Local Government Bill. Drawing great Bills is heart-breaking work, for one always feels that they will never be introduced or seen, so considerable are the chances against any given Bill going forward. All the great labour that we had given to the London Bill was wasted, and this forms a reason why the Foreign Office is pleasanter than other offices, as no work is wasted there.’
The decision to postpone extension of the franchise, though it eased the situation, did not solve all difficulties. Mr. Chamberlain urged a Tenant Rights Bill for England, which, he said to Sir Charles, “would be a great stroke of business. Without it” they would “lose the farmers for a certainty.” Sir Charles concurred, and an Agricultural Holdings Bill was amongst the measures carried in that Session. It did not go far in the direction of tenant right, and therefore created no controversy with the Whigs. But with regard to Ireland, Mr. Chamberlain ‘was strongly in favour of an Irish Local Government Bill’ (which had been promised in a previous Queen’s Speech). The Prime Minister was of Mr. Chamberlain’s view. On February 3rd to 5th, when Dilke was staying with the Duke of Albany at Claremont (and ‘admiring Clive’s Durbar carpet, for which the house was built’), the Duke ‘talked over Mr. Gladstone’s strong desire for an Irish Local Government Bill.’ That desire was, indeed, no secret, for Mr. Gladstone, still in his expansive mood of Cannes, gave an interview to M. Clemenceau, in which he expressed his hope to “make the humblest Irishman feel that he is a self governing agency, and that the Government is to be carried on by him and for him.”
At the Cabinet of February 9th
‘we looked forward to what the schoolboys call “a jolly blow up,” when Mr. Gladstone should return. The letter from Mr. Gladstone, which was read, was so steady in its terms that I passed a paper to Chamberlain, saying: “He is quite as obstinate as you are.”
‘On February 12th I … found Harcourt perfectly furious at Mr. Gladstone’s conversations as reported in the _Daily News_. I wrote to Chamberlain to tell him, and he replied: u It is lovely. And his conversation with Clemenceau will send Hartington into hysterics re Irish Local Government.’
Sir Charles’s first Cabinet Council was on Tuesday, February 6th, 1883.
‘This was the Queen’s Speech Cabinet, and my notes show that I wrote a good deal of the speech, especially the part which concerned the Bills. I was much surprised at the form of the circular calling the Cabinet: “A Meeting of Her Majesty’s servants will be held,” etc…. We were thirteen on this day, and spent a portion of our valuable time in wondering which of us would be gone before the year was out. Mr. Gladstone still stated in his letters that he would retire at Easter, or at the latest in August, and it was generally thought that he meant August.’
A series of Cabinets followed in which the Prime Minister continued to make himself felt, though absent, and Sir Charles wrote in his Diary:
“Talk of two Kings of Brentford! This Cabinet has to serve two despotic monarchs–one a Tory one, at Osborne, and one a Radical one, at Cannes.”
It shows the temper of the moment that Sir Charles should have described the second monarch as ‘Radical.’ But Ireland was then the central subject of contention, and concerning Ireland Mr. Gladstone was with the Radicals, Dilke and Chamberlain, and against those who wanted to revenge upon the whole Irish nation, the plots of the “Invincibles,” then being exposed by the evidence of James Carey, the Phoenix Park assassin, who had been accepted as an informer.
‘On Sunday, February 18th, I dined with the Prince and Princess of Wales at Marlborough House, where were present Prince Edward of Saxe- Weimar, Hartington, the Duchess of Manchester, Lord and Lady Hamilton (afterwards Duke and Duchess of Abercorn), Lord and Lady Granville, Lady Lonsdale (afterwards Lady de Grey), Lord Rowton, H. Bismarck, Leighton, Alfred de Rothschild, and Sir Joseph Crowe. Lord Granville and I sat in a corner and talked Danube Conference. Lord Granville told me, when we returned to other matters, that Harcourt was in a dangerous frame of mind, and might at any moment burst out publicly about the necessity of governing Ireland by the sword. He was also threatening resignation on account of Mr. Gladstone’s views about the Metropolitan Police.’
‘On February 19th there was an informal Cabinet in Mr. Gladstone’s room, which was now temporarily mine…. Harcourt fought against Lord Granville, Kimberley, Northbrook, Carlingford, and Childers, in favour of his violent views about the Irish. At last Carlingford, although an Irish landlord, cried out: “Your language is that of the lowest Tory.” Harcourt then said: “In the course of this very debate I shall say that there must be no more Irish legislation, and no more conciliation, and that Ireland can only be governed by the sword.” “If you say that,” replied Carlingford, “it will not be as representing the Government, for none of your colleagues agree with you.” It was only temper, and Harcourt said nothing of the kind, but made an excellent speech.’ [Footnote: Sir Charles Dilke’s view of the Irish movement is expressed in a letter of March 7th, 1883: “I don’t think that the movement in Ireland is to be traced to the same causes as that on the Continent. The Irish movement is Nationalist. It is patriotic–not cosmopolitan, and is as detached from French Anarchism and German or American Socialism as is the Polish Nationalist movement.”]
‘On March 1st I heard that when the Irish Government, through the Home Office, had applied to the Foreign Office to ask the Americans for P. J. Sheridan, the Home Office had said that they feared it was useless to apply to the United States except on a charge of murder. On this hint the Irish Government at once charged Sheridan with murder. Harcourt told me that their promptitude reminded him of a story which he had heard from Kinglake, who was once applied to by a friend as to the circumstances which would be sufficient to legalize a “nuncupative [Footnote: “Nuncupative” is a legal term for an oral as distinguished from a written will.] death-bed will.” Kinglake wrote a figurative account of an imaginary case in much detail, and by the next post received a solemn affidavit from the man setting out Kinglake’s own exact series of incidents as having actually occurred.’
Prosecutions and sentences had no more effect than such things generally have in face of a suppressed revolution and on the night of March 15th, 1883, a dynamite explosion took place at the Local Government Board. Sir Charles, however, did not take a very serious view of it:
‘The dynamiters chose a quiet corner, and they chose an hour when nobody was about, which showed that the object was not to hurt anybody, but only to get money from the United States. At the same time they picked their office most unfortunately, for the Local Government Board is the only office where people worked late at night, and two out of my four leading men were still in their rooms, although they had come at ten in the morning and the explosion did not take place till nine at night.’
Mr. Gladstone had returned at the beginning of this month, and on March 5th Sir Charles saw him for the first time in Cabinet, ‘singularly quiet, hardly saying anything at all.’ He did, however, say that Mr. Bradlaugh was “a stone round their necks,” ‘which in a Parliamentary sense he was.’ Despite one of Mr. Gladstone’s greatest speeches, Government were again beaten when they proposed to let him affirm.
In this spring there was an agitation to create a Secretaryship of State for Scotland, and Lord Rosebery was looked upon as designate for the office. Sir Charles did not think the change necessary, but was strongly for having Lord Rosebery in the Cabinet, and wrote to Sir M. Grant Duff, Governor of Madras:
“It would be natural to give Rosebery the Privy Seal, and let him keep the Scotch work; but nothing will induce Mr. G. to look upon him as anything but a nice promising baby, and he will not hear of letting him into the Cabinet.” ‘Nothing,’ he adds, ‘was settled on this occasion.’
“A smaller Bill than those which I have mentioned, but one in which I was interested, was my Municipal Corporations (unreformed) Bill, which had passed the House of Lords, but failed to pass the Commons. [Footnote: Previous reference to Sir Charles’s persistent fight for this Bill is to be found in Chapter XIII.] Rosebery thought that this time it should be introduced into the Commons… because, although the Lords were pledged to it by having passed it,” this pledge must not be strained too hard by constantly waving the red flag of uncomfortable reform before the hereditary bull. “Harcourt having agreed with me that the Bill should be introduced into the Lords, and having also agreed with Rosebery that it should be introduced in the Commons, Rosebery again wrote: ‘I am afraid if you go on bringing this measure before the peers they will begin to smell out suspicious matter in it.”‘
On April 21st ‘Rosebery again promised me to introduce a Bill,’ and the Bill became law in 1884.
After his brother’s death on March 12th Sir Charles Dilke, in his reply to a very kind letter from the Prince of Wales in the name of himself and the Princess, mentioned Lord Rosebery and the Scotch agitation. The Prince wrote back:
“I quite agree. If Rosebery was not to be President of the Council, he ought at least to be Privy Seal. It seems very hard, as he has every claim, especially after the Midlothian election.”
Several matters relating to the Queen and Royal Family appear at this time in the Memoir. At the Cabinet of March 5th
‘a letter from the Queen was read as to her strong wish to have an Indian bodyguard, consisting of twenty noncommissioned officers of the native cavalry. I did not say a word, and Chamberlain not much, but all the others strongly attacked the scheme, which they ended by rejecting. Lord Derby said that the Empress title had been forced on the former Conservative Cabinet, of which he had been a member, in the same way. It was pointed out that if India consented to pay the men, and they only carried side-arms, they might be treated as pages or servants, not soldiers, and need not be voted at all as “men” in the Army Estimates.’
‘A day or two later Villiers, our military attach. in Paris, reported the existence of a military plot, said to have been got up by General Billot, the Minister of War: the plan being that fifteen commanders of corps were to turn out Grevy and put in the due d’Aumale. The story was probably a lie.’
‘On March 18th there was to have been a “forgiving party” at Windsor, for Lord Derby was commanded as well as I. The Harcourts were to have gone, but the Queen sent in the morning to say she had slipped down, and must put off her Sunday dinner.’
‘At this time peace was restored between Randolph Churchill and the Royal Family. The reconciliation was marked by Lady Randolph attending the Drawing-Room held on March 13th at the Queen’s special wish.’
‘At the Marlborough House dinner on May 27th, the Prince spoke to me about the allowance for his sons as they came of age, and told me that he thought the money might be given to him as head of the family. My own view is very much the same, but I would give it all to the Crown, and let the King for the time being distribute it so that we should not deal with any other members of the family.’
‘At Claremont I found, from the conversation of the Duke of Albany and of his secretary, that if the Duke of Cambridge resigned speedily, as then seemed probable, the Duke of Connaught had no chance of obtaining the place; but it was hoped at Court that the Commander-in-Chief would hold his position for five or six years, and then might be succeeded by the Duke of Connaught.’
Later Sir Charles mentions the Duke of Albany’s conversation with him as to Canada, of which he wished to be Governor, but the Queen opposed the project, and Lord Lansdowne was eventually sent out.
Returning to the Easter recess:
‘The Government programme now began to be revised in the light of men’s declared intentions.’
‘On Wednesday, March 21st, I crossed to Paris, and went to Toulon. I must have been back in London on Thursday, March 29th, on which day I had a long interview with Mr. Gladstone on things in general. He had told Harcourt that he would hardly budge about the London police. His last word was that they should be retained by the Home Office for a period distinctly temporary, and to be named in the Bill. I gathered from Mr. Gladstone’s talk that all idea of retirement had gone out of his mind.’
There was a Cabinet on April 7th, and ‘London Government was again postponed, but, owing to the fierce conflict between Harcourt and Mr. Gladstone, was looked upon as dead.’
Mr. Gladstone, in his anger, told Sir Charles that “Harcourt, through laziness, wanted to get out of the Government of London Bill.” But the truth was, says the Memoir, ‘that he could think of nothing but the dynamite conspiracy.’ A Bill to meet this was being rushed through Parliament, with an almost grotesque haste, that was as grotesquely baffled in the end.
‘On April 9th the Queen sat up half the night at Harcourt’s wish in order to be ready to sign the Explosives Bill at once, but Mr. Palmer of the Crown Office (the gentleman who signs “Palmer” as though he were a peer) could not be found; and the other man, Zwingler, was in bed at Turnham Green, and to Harcourt’s rage the thing could not be done. On the 16th Harcourt told the Chancellor that in the discussion of the Crown Office vote he should move the omission of the item for his nephew’s pay.’ [Footnote: Mr. Ralph Charlton Palmer was Lord Selborne’s second cousin, and secretary to Lord Selborne in the Lord Chancellor’s Office. He was afterwards a Commissioner in Lunacy.]
The London Government Bill was not yet given up for lost. On April 11th Sir Charles Dilke wrote to Mr. Gladstone to deprecate its withdrawal, and the Prime Minister replied, agreeing that “withdrawal … would be a serious mischief, and a blow to the Government.”
‘On April 14th there was a Cabinet, at which Mr. Gladstone announced that Harcourt had written to him refusing to go on with the Government of London Bill after the second reading of the measure, and proposing that I should conduct it through Committee.’
‘At the Cabinet of this day (April 21st) Mr. Gladstone said that he wanted the bearing of the Agricultural Holdings Bill on Scotland explained to him. “I wish Argyll were here,” said he. “I wish to God he was,” said Hartington, who had been fighting alone against the Bill, deserted even by the Chancellor and by Lord Derby. Indeed, all my lords were very Radical to-day except Hartington, who was simply ferocious, being at bay. He told us that Lord Derby was a mere owner of Liverpool ground rents, who knew nothing about land.’
‘On Thursday, May 24th, there was a meeting at the Home Office of nine members of the Cabinet as to the Government of London Bill, and I wrote after it to Chamberlain: “Victory! Hartington alone dissenting, everybody was for going on with everything, and sitting in the autumn.” And Chamberlain replied: “At last! But why the devil was it not decided before?”‘
At a full Cabinet a few days later ‘the police difficulty finally slew the London Bill.’ This seemed to Sir Charles a very serious matter, and he thought of resigning. Mr. Chamberlain, however, was against this, though agreeing that he should resign in the autumn ‘unless Mr. Gladstone would promise to put franchise first next year.’
So it was left. But presently Mr. Chamberlain himself became the cause of very grave dissensions. On June 13th, 1883, a great assembly was held at Birmingham to celebrate the twenty-fifth year of Mr. Bright’s membership for the borough, and Mr. Chamberlain in speaking observed that representatives of royalty were not present, neither were they missed. [Footnote: On Monday, June 11th, 1883, there was a “monster procession and fete constituting the popular prelude to the more serious business of the Bright celebration at Birmingham” that week. On June 13th Mr. Chamberlain said: “Twice in a short interval we have read how vast multitudes of human beings have gathered together to acclaim and welcome the ruler of the people. In Russia, in the ancient capital of that mighty Empire, the descendant of a long line of ancient Princes, accompanied by a countless host of soldiers, escorted by all the dignitaries of the State, and by the representatives of foreign Powers, was received with every demonstration of joy by the vast population which was gathered together to witness his triumphal entry. I have been told that more than a million sterling of public money was expended on these ceremonies and festivities…. Your demonstration on Monday lacked nearly all the elements which constituted the great pageant of the Russian Coronation. Pomp and circumstance were wanting; no public money was expended; no military display accompanied Mr. Bright. The brilliant uniforms, the crowds of high officials, the representatives of Royalty, were absent, and nobody missed them; for yours was essentially a demonstration of the people and by the people, in honour of the man whom the people delighted to honour, and the hero of that demonstration had no offices to bestow–no ribands, or rank, or Court titles, to confer. He was only the plain citizen–one of ourselves….” (the Times, June 14th, 1883).] He added that the country was in his opinion more Radical than the majority of the House of Commons, but not more Radical than the Government; that the country was in favour of Disestablishment, and that three things were wanted: First, “a suffrage from which no man who is not disqualified by crime or the recipient of relief shall be excluded “; secondly, equal electoral districts; and, thirdly, payment of members.
‘On June 25th Mr. Gladstone had sent for me about a recent speech by Chamberlain at Birmingham.
‘The Queen had been angry at his “They toil not, neither do they spin,” but was still more angry about this recent speech, at which Mr. Gladstone was also himself offended. [Footnote: “This speech is open to exception from three points of view, I think–first in relation to Bright, secondly in relation to the Cabinet, thirdly and most especially in relation to the Crown, to which the speech did not indicate the consciousness of his holding any special relation,” wrote Mr. Gladstone to Sir Henry Ponsonby (Morley’s Life of Gladstone, vol. iii., p. 112).] I pointed out that Hartington had committed his colleagues on a practical question when he spoke as to Irish Local Government last January, and Mr. Gladstone had committed them when he talked on Ireland and on London government to Ribot and Clemenceau at Cannes. Mr. Gladstone defended himself, but threw over Hartington, who had “behaved worse than Chamberlain.” I went to see Chamberlain about it, and found him very stiff, but tried to get him to say something about it at the Cobden Club, where he was to preside on Saturday, the 30th. On the next day he promised that he would do this, but when he came to read me the words that he intended to use I came to the conclusion that, although they would make his own position very clear, they would only make matters worse as far as Mr. Gladstone and the Queen were concerned.’
Dilke’s mediation was ultimately successful, and ‘on July 2nd Mr. Gladstone, in a letter to Chamberlain, accepted his explanations with regard to his speech.’ In the House of Commons, charge of the Corrupt Practices Bill had been entrusted to the President of the Local Government Board–a very unusual arrangement–and it meant sitting late many nights, once till 5.30 a.m., after which ‘I had to get up as usual for my fencing people.’
‘On July 25th there was another Cabinet, before which I had “circulated” to my colleagues my local government scheme. Many members of the Cabinet objected to it as too complete, and on my communicating their views to the draftsman, Sir Henry Thring, he wrote:
‘”I believe that the great superiority of your plan of local government over any other I have seen consists in its extent. I believe that you will find that your scheme, though apparently far more extreme than any scheme yet proposed, will practically not make a greater alteration in existing arrangements than a far less comprehensive scheme would make. It is, as far as I can judge, impossible to make a partial plan for local government: such a plan disturbs everything and settles nothing…. Your plan, when carried into effect, will disturb most things, no doubt, but will at the same time settle everything.”‘
At a Cabinet held in the recess on October 25th
‘Mr. Gladstone made a speech about the next Session which virtually meant franchise first, and the rest nowhere. After this I locked up my now useless Local Government Bill, of which the principal draft had been dated August 24th. One of its most important parts had been the consolidation of rates and declaration of the liability of owners for half the rates. It had then gone on to establish district councils, and then the County Councils. There was, however, to be some slight resuscitation of the Bill a little later.’
Two minor concerns which interested Sir Charles exceedingly were under prolonged discussion this year. The first was the proposed purchase of the Ashburnham and Stowe collections. Sir Charles ‘voted all through against the purchase of the Ashburnham manuscripts, being certain that we were being imposed upon.’ He noted
‘the experts always want to buy, and always say that the thing is invaluable and a chance which will never happen again. No one can care for the National Gallery more than I do; I know the pictures very well, for I go there almost every week.’
He thought, however, that some wholesale purchases for public collections had been all but worthless, with perhaps one admirable thing in a mass of rubbish.
Secondly, there arose in May a discussion over the Duke of Wellington’s statue, which Leighton and the Prince of Wales wanted to remove from Hyde Park Corner, but which Sir Charles cherished as an old friend. It was one of the matters on which he and Mr. Gladstone were united by a common conservatism:
‘The ridiculous question of the Duke of Wellington’s statue had come up again at the Cabinet of August 9th, and the numbers were taken three times over by Mr. Gladstone, who was in favour of the old statue and against all removals, in which view I steadily supported him, the Cabinet being against us, and Mr. Gladstone constantly trying to get his own way against the majority. It was the only subject upon which, while I was a member of it, I ever knew the Cabinet take a show of hands.’
In the last Cabinet of the Session they ‘once more informally divided about the Wellington statue’; and he recorded the fact that he ‘still hoped to save it.’ Yet in the end he failed; and ‘now,’ he notes pathetically, ‘I should have to go to Aldershot to see it if I wished to do so.’
CHAPTER XXXII
FOREIGN AND COLONIAL AFFAIRS
OCTOBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883
Sir Charles Dilke’s transference to the Local Government Board scarcely lessened his contact with the more important branches of the Foreign Office work, while his entry into the Cabinet greatly increased the range of his consultative authority.
The Triple Alliance was a fact, but only guessed as yet. It is not till the middle of 1883 that Sir Charles writes:
‘On June 4th, 1883, I heard the particulars of the alliance of the Central Powers, signed at Vienna between Germany and Austria in October, 1879, and ratified at Berlin on October 18th of that year, to which Italy had afterwards adhered.’ [Footnote: Sir Charles knew that Prince Bismarck had tried first for an English alliance, and wrote on August 17th, 1882, to Sir M. Grant Duff: “N. Rothschild told me that the late Government had twice declined an offensive and defensive alliance offered by Germany.” See also _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 211.]
An extension was contemplated which would have put France between two fires. Later, in the autumn of 1883,
‘a private letter from Morier to Lord Granville showed that Bismarck had sent the Crown Prince of Germany to Spain to induce Spain to join the “peace league”‘ (Triple Alliance), ‘and had failed.’
On November 22nd, 1883,
‘At the Cabinet I saw a telegram from Lord Dufferin, No. 86, received late on the previous night, in which the Sultan asked our advice as to offers of alliance in the event of immediate general war, which had probably been made him by both sides. We replied to it after the Cabinet (No. 68): “We cannot enter into hypothetical engagements or make arrangements in contemplation of war between friendly Powers now at peace. The Sultan must be aware that Germany is the most powerful military nation on the Continent, and that she has no ambitious views against Turkey. Strongly advise the Sultan not to enter into entangling engagements.” This whole story of the Sultan’s was probably a lie, to get us to say whether we would defend his Armenian frontier, but, curiously enough, Dufferin seemed to believe it.’
‘On May 24th, 1883, I informed the Ministers assembled of two interesting matters of foreign affairs. The one was Bismarck’s denunciation to us of a league among the small Christian States of the Balkan Peninsula for provoking popular votes in Turkey in favour of annexation of various provinces to one or other of the partners. The other was an offer by the Grand Sherif of Mecca to turn the Turks out of Arabia, and place it under British protection.’
The gravest danger to the world’s peace lay in the fact that to the ordinary Englishman Russia was still the natural enemy, and that France, smarting under the rebuff she had experienced in Egypt, was assuming a more unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain.
In South Africa the state of things established after Majuba was revealing itself as one of constant friction, and border wars between the Boers and African tribes claiming British protection led to ceaseless controversy.
‘On the 10th (March, ’83) there was another Cabinet. A Transvaal debate was coming on on Thursday the 15th, and in view of this Chamberlain asked for support of his opinion that an expedition should be sent out to save Montsioa. He was supported only by Hartington and myself, but he afterwards managed to commit us to it, and to force his view upon Mr. Gladstone. He passed a paper to me when he found we could not win at the Cabinet: “How far would the difficulty be met by supplying arms to Mankowane and (query) to Montsioa, and permitting volunteers to go to their assistance?” I replied, “I don’t think it would stand House of Commons discussion.” To this he answered, “Perhaps not. But the first is what Mankowane himself asks for, and if we gave him what he wants that course ought to be defensible.” I wrote, “Yes, I was thinking more of Montsioa.”‘ [Footnote: Mankowane and Montsioa were independent native chiefs of Bechuanaland, for whose protection the Aborigines’ Protection Society was appealing to the British Government.]
‘March 16th, 1883, Mr. Gladstone asked me to speak in the event of the Transvaal debate coming on again, and I refused, as I did not agree in the policy pursued. Chamberlain said he would speak in my place, and did so.
‘May 26th or 27th. We decided at the Cabinet to keep Basutoland.
‘June 13th. As to South Africa, the Colonial Office told us that they hoped to induce the Cape to take Bechuanaland. A little later on the whole of their efforts were directed in the opposite direction– namely, to induce the Cape to let us keep Bechuanaland separate from the Cape. It was announced that Reay had accepted the Transvaal Mission.
‘June 23rd. We decided that Reay was not to go out, because the Transvaal people preferred to come to us.
‘November 30th. We talked of the Transvaal, which looked bad.’
The Transvaal deputation is mentioned immediately after this as having arrived.
There are also allusions to South African affairs having been raised at other Cabinets in this year, but no details given.
Late in 1883, Sir Charles says, ‘I was pressing for the restoration of Cetewayo, and Lord Derby insisted that he had brought all his troubles on himself.’
At this time Russia had subdued the Turcomans and made herself paramount in the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. It was only a matter of months before Russian troops would be on the ill-defined frontiers of Afghanistan. Great Britain was bound to the Amir of Afghanistan by an engagement to assist him against external attack, provided that he complied with British advice as to his foreign relations. Not only was a collision predicted between Russia and the Amir, whose territory Great Britain had thus guaranteed, but it was known where the struggle would be.
‘It was also about this time’ (February, 1883) ‘that the Russian Government took up my suggestion as to the delimitation of the boundary of Afghanistan. But, as Currie wrote, “the object of the Russian Foreign Office may only be to keep the British Government quiet, while they are settling the boundary question with Persia and annexing … Merv, with a view to a fresh departure in the direction of Herat as soon as that process is accomplished.”‘
‘We already foresaw that the struggle would be over Penjdeh. A memorandum of 1882, by Major Napier, [Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. C. Napier, C.I.E., son of the first Lord Napier of Magdala, and twin brother of the second Lord Napier.] had told us that “below Penjdeh the Afghans would not appear to have ever extended their authority.” Mr. Currie, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Currie, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.] as he then was, prophesied that the line proposed by the Russians would strike the Murghab near Penjdeh.’
This was a situation well fitted to arouse Sir Charles, who wrote to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice: “I’m as great a jingo in Central Asia as I am a scuttler in South Africa.” His policy was not that of the India Office. He advocated delimitation of the Afghan frontiers, and in October, 1882, the Amir had asked for this. [Footnote: ‘On October 17th, 1882, the Amir had proposed to Lord Ripon that delimitation of his frontiers which I was pressing at the time, but which had been refused by Lord Ripon. Lord Granville and Fitzmaurice had come round to my view. Northbrook strongly resisted, and wanted his famous treaty.’] ‘The Government of India insisted at this time upon the proposal to Russia of a treaty with regard to Afghanistan.’ Sir Charles thought that British interests in India would be better served by strengthening Afghanistan, by ascertaining exactly what the Amir’s rights were, and by making him feel that he would be protected in them. To-day, when Afghanistan is one of the self-equipping Asiatic military powers, and admittedly an awkward enemy to tackle, the situation seems plain enough; but in those days Abdurrahman, new on the throne, was still a ‘King with opposition.’
‘On April 20th, 1883, there was a meeting at the Foreign Office as to Central Asia between Lord Granville, Hartington, Kimberley, Northbrook, Edmond Fitzmaurice, and myself. The Amir was in a friendly humour, and I felt that the evacuation of Kandahar had been better than a dozen victories.’
The evacuation of Kandahar had been Lord Ripon’s work, but Lord Ripon was now inclining to compromise the unity of the Native State which he had then laboured to establish. He was disposed to keep the Amir at arm’s length, and wished to decline a visit of ceremony which Abdurrahman proposed. All the Committee at the Foreign Office were against this, except Lord Northbrook, who ‘did not believe in Abdurrahman’s strength, and believed that he would soon be turned out of Herat by his own Governor.’
‘On June 7th it was settled that the Amir should have twelve lakhs of rupees a year.’ But Sir Charles had not yet carried his point as to preventing a treaty with Russia, and
‘Philip Currie and Fitzmaurice both wrote to me in favour of the India Office view, while Condie Stephen [Footnote: Sir Alexander Condie Stephen, K.C.M.G., was in 1882-83 despatched from the Legation at Teheran on a mission to Khorassan, the north-east province of Persia] returned from Central Asia with the same view in favour of a treaty…. But Currie put a postscript to his long letter, in which he departed altogether from the treaty position, and took up my own view as to delimitation: “In view of our engagement to defend Afghanistan from foreign aggression, we ought surely to know the limits of the territory we have guaranteed.”
‘I finally said that I had no objection to a treaty which would merely recapitulate facts and set out the Afghan frontier. This was my last word, and, Lord Granville agreeing with me, we went on with delimitation as against treaty…. It was not until June 8th, 1888, that the Emperor of Russia recognized the arrangement and the frontier marked by the boundary pillars.’
For Sir Charles’s policy it was necessary to propitiate the ruler of Afghanistan, and in July, 1883, it was reported that the Amir had applied to the British Government for a new set of teeth. The application had really been for a European dentist. When Lord Ripon persisted in refusing Abdurrahman’s proffered visit, Sir Charles tried to get civil expressions of regret from the Government, and, failing in this, wrote in despair to Lord Kimberley: “I hope to goodness he has got his teeth.”
It was not, however, till 1885 that the tension with Russia became really acute.
In France, Gambetta’s death had been followed by a Ministerial crisis, and in the disturbances which resulted M. Duclerc fell in February, 1883, and after a time of confusion M. Ferry became, for a second time, Prime Minister, having M. Challemel-Lacour, no lover of England, for his Foreign Secretary.
“In order to distract the country’s attention from internal dissensions and the Eastern frontier,” [Footnote: _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 313.] M. Ferry developed that “Colonial policy” of which Sir Charles said, in 1887, that
“it greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and disorganizes her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of mobilization of the reserves.” [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, p. 101.]
Germany also was embarking on a “Colonial policy” disapproved of by Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI., p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,
‘de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in stopping our carrying through our treaty.’
Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles’s reference to this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:
‘In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883, Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty- making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: “In all other countries having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted. We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it was good for the country, I feel sure.”‘
In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee ‘by its delays and hesitations lost us the Cameroons,’ where two native Kings had asked to be taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in regard to Zanzibar.
‘As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, “Are you going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?” a note which applied to an offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become his heirs–an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and which I was in favour of accepting.’
‘The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, assigned as the chief reason for not accepting this trust “the fear lest it should infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862.” … It may be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement. In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my suggestion pointed out at this time that “to the north of the Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long? without a European rival; where the political future of the country is of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the slave trade.” The Government, however, delayed too long, and we afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.’ (Heligoland).
Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides. Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883, officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling that something must be done.
‘On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described him as one ‘who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a new kind of slavery in Fiji.’] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the 13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and almost lost the whole of it.’
‘As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the British Government would undoubtedly “excite a violent outbreak of public feeling in the Australian colonies.” Lord Derby was a party to this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.’
The Colonial Secretary’s general attitude upon these matters may be illustrated from a correspondence which passed between him and Sir Charles in the autumn of this year. Replying to criticisms concerning the Australian Colonies, Lord Derby
‘somewhat sneeringly observed that in order to keep out foreign convicts “it is not necessary that they should annex every island within a thousand miles of their coast. They cannot have at once the protection of British connection and the pleasures of a wholly independent foreign policy.”‘
On this Sir Charles comments:
‘Lord Derby had lost all credit with the Conservative party about the time of his resignation of the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs in the Conservative Administration. But he had retained considerable weight with Liberals. During his tenure of the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in Mr. Gladstone’s Administration, he lost his credit with the Liberals as well, and his influence reached a position of decline which makes it difficult even to remember the enormous weight he had possessed in the earliest part of his political career. For many years Lord Derby was the ideal spokesman of the middle man not fiercely attached to either party. Going over this diary in 1900, it is a curious reflection that the immense weight gained by Sir Edward Grey in the period between 1890 and 1900 was similar to that which Lord Derby had enjoyed at the earlier period. Each of them in his time appeared to express, though far from old, the lifelong judgment of a Nestor. Each of them extorted from the hearer or reader the feeling: “What this man says is unanswerable. It is the dispassionate utterance of one who knows everything, and has thought it out in the simplest but the most convincing form.” Lord Derby could sum up a discussion better, probably, than anyone has ever done, unless it is Sir Edward Grey. Sir Edward Grey’s summing up of a discussion on a difficult problem, such as that presented by the Chinese question, 1897-1900, was better than was to be expected from anyone else, unless it had been the Lord Stanley of, say, thirty-five years before.’
On May 27th
‘I dined at Marlborough House at a dinner to meet a little tin soldier cousin in white epaulettes, who was over from Germany … and (the German Ambassador) Count Munster told me that the French had hoisted their flag on a reef, as he said, within cannon-shot of Jersey, as to the British or neutral nature of which there had long been a dispute between the two Governments.’ [Footnote: The Memoir has a note upon this episode of the Ecrehous Books, which led to the publication of Parliamentary papers in June of that year:
‘The rocks were not within three miles of the coast of Jersey at low- water mark, and this was the limit of the reservation of the Jersey oyster fishery, and it was upon this fact that the French went. It afterwards appeared that the French flag never had been hoisted on the rocks, but only on a boat which came thither for the purpose of fishing, so that the whole matter was somewhat of a storm in a teacup. It raised, however, another question. The Convention of 1839, which defined the limits of the oyster fishery between Jersey and France, also defined the limits of the exclusive French rights of fishery on all other parts of the coast of the British islands; and some day an Irish Parliament may find interest in Sir Edward Hertslet’s “Memorandum as to the French right of fishery upon the coast of Ireland, printed for the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1883.”‘]
‘On May 28th there was a Levee, at which d’Aunay, of the French Embassy, told me that the act of the fishermen at Ecrehous was disavowed by France. “But,” he added, “there is perhaps some Challemel in it,” an admission which rather weakened the other statement, and it again struck me that it was a pity we had been so rude to Challemel when he was Ambassador.’
Relations with France were going from bad to worse. Not only were they strained by the breach of 1882 over Egypt, but French colonizing aspirations had created trouble in Madagascar. The understanding between the two Great Powers that an “identic attitude” in regard to the Hova people was to be maintained was broken down by France, which under various pretexts intervened by force in Madagascar, claiming a protectorate over certain narrow strips of territory on the north-west coast. This claim was denounced by Lord Granville. Yet ‘on October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville’s, at which I met Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook.’ This meeting of the heads of the military and foreign services discussed the affairs of the Congo, and also Madagascar; ‘it was decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of the French. ‘At this time the growing tension was disagreeably felt, and Sir Charles learnt a month later that the Cabinet of November 28th, 1882, ‘had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France.’
At this time an Embassy from Madagascar was in Paris to protest against the oppressive policy pursued. An ultimatum was presented which left the envoys no option but to depart, and they came with their bitter complaint to London, where Sir Charles Dilke very warmly espoused their cause:
‘At this moment, December 1st, 1882, I was having difficulties with Lord Granville about Madagascar, as I was seeing much of the Malagasy envoys, and was very friendly to them; whereas Lord Granville was frightened of the French. A deputation came to us, got up by Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, and introduced by Forster; it suggested American arbitration, and Lord Granville threw much cold water upon the scheme.’
A few days later he adds:
‘I was still at this moment fighting for my Malagasy friends. Not only did Lord Granville snub me, but Courtney wrote from the Treasury: “I hope you will get rid of these people as soon as possible. Even the Baby Jenkins sees the absurdity of the anti-French feeling.” But whatever “Ginx’s Baby” might do, I could not see the absurdity of the anti-French feeling with regard to Madagascar, for the French were wantonly interfering with an interesting civilized black people in whose country they had not even trade, for All the trade was in American, British, or German hands.
‘On December 15th, 1882, there was a fresh trouble, for Lord Granville was furious at a speech by Lord Derby, and, indeed, I never knew him so cross about anything at all. The difficulty was once more Madagascar. Lord Granville _meant_ to do nothing about Madagascar, but he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play, by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad the cards were.’
The Malagasys were unique in that since 1869 they had become definitely a Christian State, and a State Christianized by English missionaries, and this fact was impressively brought home to Sir Charles by a scene which he afterwards (in 1886) thus described in a public lecture:
“At Westminster Abbey there came in to the Morning Service the whole of the members of the Madagascar Embassy, which had just come to London from France. The two Malagasy Ambassadors were at the head of the party. They sat very silently through the service, which the senior Ambassador did not understand at all, and which the second Ambassador only partly understood, until a hymn which had been given out was sung, when, recognizing the familiar tune, the two Ambassadors and the whole of their secretaries struck boldly in with the Malagasy words. There could be no better instant proof, to anyone who saw the scene, of their familiarity with the missionary teaching of England and America, and of the extent to which, though separated from us by language, they look upon themselves as members of the Christian Church.”
In 1882-83 Sir Charles failed to interest his colleagues in the matter, till on August 22nd, 1883, just before Parliament was prorogued, the Cabinet had to discuss ‘what was known as the Tamatave incident, which nearly brought England and France to war over matters growing out of the French operations in Madagascar.’
The town of Tamatave had been bombarded and occupied by the French in June. The matter was aggravated by the treatment of the British Consul and of a British missionary, and difficulties were made as to adequate apology and indemnity.
‘In the course of September I had frequent interviews with Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office with regard to Madagascar…. Lord Granville wrote to me, about the middle of October, that (the French Ambassador) Waddington “professed to have a solution of the Tamatave” difficulty, and on the 22nd a Cabinet was called with regard to the Tamatave difficulty, Egypt, and South Africa. The French despatch from Challemel to Waddington was most unsatisfactory.’
Another Cabinet having been summoned for October 25th, Harcourt wrote: “I have heard nothing about its cause or object, but conjecture that it is Granville’s Cabinet for France…. It is ominous Northbrook (First Lord of the Admiralty) being a principal assistant. I am myself for being _stiff_ with France.”
‘The Cabinet was upon the two points of Tamatave and withdrawal from Egypt, but, in the absurd way in which Cabinets behave when summoned upon important questions, we spent most of our time in discussing a scheme of Lefevre’s for widening Parliament Street; Mr. Gladstone wishing to widen King Street and to make a fork. A Committee was appointed on the matter, to consist of Harcourt, Childers, Lefevre, Northbrook, and myself. Hartington came late as usual, and on his arrival our Tamatave despatch was discussed.’
The complete destruction of the native State and dynasty did not come at this time, and French “protection” of Madagascar was only recognized by Lord Salisbury’s Government in 1890. But the encroachments of France led in this year to further friction, arising from their conflict for the possession of Tonquin. On November 17th the Cabinet discussed ‘the protection of British subjects in China in view of a French attack on the Chinese Empire, and decided to concert measures with Germany and the United States.’ On the 19th they proposed to France mediation in the Chinese difficulty, ‘with the full expectation that it would be refused.’
‘On December 7th there was a paragraph in the _Times_ in large type intended to reassure the French, by stating that our interference in China to protect our own subjects was not combined with Germany in particular. The paragraph, although it may have been wanted, was untrue. We _had_ combined our action with the Germans, and then found it was resented by the French.’
So dissension grew at a pace which enabled Bismarck to turn his attention from European politics, and, in one of his many meetings with Count Herbert, Sir Charles reports that about the second week in November
‘I had a conversation with H. Bismarck about his father. He said that the Prince had turned as yellow as a guinea, and could not now work more than an hour at a time, and that the only thing on which he troubled himself was his workman’s insurance scheme.’
CHAPTER XXXIII
EGYPT AFTER TEL-EL-KEBIR
SEPTEMBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883
‘On September 19th, 1882, at noon we had a conference at the War Office with regard to the future of Egypt, at which were present Lord Granville, Childers, Sir Auckland Colvin, and myself, and which was followed afterwards by a further conference, when there were admitted to us Pauncefote for the Foreign Office and Sir Louis Mallet for the India Office, Admiral Sir Cooper Key for the Admiralty, Sir F. Thompson, Permanent Under-Secretary for War, and Generals Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Henry Norman for the War Office. In preparation for the conference I had stirred up Lord Granville as to the volunteering of Indian Moslem troops for the Khedive’s guard. But Lord Granville in his reply to me was more concerned with abusing my handwriting in choice language than with answering my questions. Hartington, however, had telegraphed to India for me on the 17th to ask the opinion of the Indian Government on the point. Harcourt, writing from Balmoral on the 19th, said: “If you have any ideas on the settlement of Egypt, I wish you would let me have them. I confess I am myself _in nubibus_, and I do not find that my betters are much more enlightened. I am constantly asked here what we are going to propose, and I do not know what to say. I have written to Mr. G. and to Lord G. to ask for light, but I should like to have your own personal views as to what is practicable. I think we must cut the cord between Egypt and Turkey, but one cannot conceal from oneself that the consequences will be serious, and may lead to far-reaching complications. The one good thing is that Bismarck is honestly friendly, and I believe will support us in whatever we propose. Austria seems to be almost as nasty as Russia, and France naturally jealous. I suppose Bismarck can and will keep Austria in order. Please write me a real letter on these knotty points.”
‘Our Egyptian conference decided upon free navigation of the Canal, or, in other words, that ships of war were to pass at all times; on increased influence for England on the Directorate of the Canal; and on the destruction of the Egyptian fortresses. Childers promised to prepare a scheme for taking over the Egyptian railroads. A paper by us was printed for the use of the Cabinet on October 20th, in which we stated our views about the Canal, and incidentally our decision against a British protectorate of Egypt. The arrangement proposed by us was pretty much that afterwards agreed upon by the Powers.’
Before this paper was issued Sir Charles had seen Emile Ollivier, who, as a legal adviser of the Khedive, ‘had great knowledge of the affairs of the Suez Canal’:
‘I possess the draft of a full memorandum of Ollivier’s conversation which I sent to Lord Granville, and which represented his private protests to Lesseps and his argument to the Khedive. Ollivier, who was more English than French in the matter, accepted the position that by the Khedival decree of August 14th England had been substituted for the Khedive in all measures for the re-establishment of order in Egypt, and that it was under this decree that we occupied the ends of the Canal as the delegates of the Khedive; therefore there was no violation of the neutrality, and when the Canal Company on August 19th set up as a new Great Power, and addressed to the Khedive a diplomatic note, their arguments became nonsensical, inasmuch as they virtually argued that the Khedive himself had violated his own neutrality by an internal act. Moreover, the neutrality of the Canal had never been declared at all. The word “neutral” was indeed found in the original concession, but it evidently meant that the Company was not to give to one Power an advantage not given to others as regards trade and passage. Lesseps had set up the Canal as a new Great Power, whereas it was only an Egyptian Limited Company.
‘Even, however, if the Canal had been neutral, Ollivier would have argued against the Company that the suppression of an internal rebellion in the Khedive’s name, at his request, was not war or violation of neutrality. It was the duty of the Khedive to suppress rebellion, and the duty of the Canal as an Egyptian Company to aid, and not to impede, as it had impeded, the lawful action of the Egyptian ruler through his representatives. It had not been contended by the Porte, as the overlord of the Khedive, that the Khedive had not power to delegate authority to England to suppress Arabi’s rebellion. The Porte had delegated to France power to suppress the rebellion in Syria in 1860 in its name. Lesseps seemed to think that it was within the power of the Khedive to delegate to him sovereignty over the Canal, and not in his power to delegate to anybody else the suppression of a rebellion.’
A casual reference at this point recalls the fact that the Khedive’s dethroned predecessor was still moving about the world and capable of causing trouble. Sir Charles went abroad for his autumn vacation:
‘In Paris’ (in the middle of October) ‘I found a letter from Lord Granville as to a visit which the ex-Khedive Ismail proposed to pay to London. Lord Granville said that the Government could not object to his “coming to this country. But at this moment his arrival would be misunderstood, and any civilities, which in other circumstances they would be desirous to show to His Highness, would lead to misconstruction.”‘ [Footnote: ‘In November, 1883, the ex-Khedive had come to London, and when asked to see him, at his wish, I at first refused, but as, after he clearly understood that I knew him to be a rascal, he wished to see me “all the same,” I saw him privately at Lady Marian Alford’s house in Kensington; but he had little to say, and seemed very stupid.’ ]
‘I was at this time in correspondence with my friend d’Estournelles, [Footnote: Baron d’Estournelles de Constant.] who was Acting Resident at Tunis, as to the capitulations. In the course of his letter d’Estournelles expressed his bitter regret that France had not gone to Egypt with us.’
When Sir Charles came back to London from France on October 20th, the Cabinet was still vacillating as to its Egyptian policy:
‘I had found on my return that nothing had been done towards setting up such an Egyptian Army as could take the place of our own, although Sir Charles Wilson, Colonel Valentine Baker, Baring, [Footnote: Major Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer, was then Financial Member of Council in India. Sir Charles Wilson (Colonel Wilson) must not be confounded with Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. Colonel Valentine Baker was head of the Egyptian Gendarmerie.] and others, had written memoranda upon the subject. Baring, in the course of his memorandum, strongly defended the honesty, humanity, and conscience of the Khedive, and opposed annexation and protectorate. On the whole, Baring’s memorandum was a better one than that of his relative Lord Northbrook, or that of Lord Dufferin, which afterwards attracted much attention. Chamberlain and I discussed on Saturday, October 21st, a letter to me from Labouchere, in which the latter seemed to take a different view from that recorded above. Labouchere said that the dissatisfaction with the Egyptian policy was growing, that we seemed to be administering Egypt mainly for the good of the bondholders. He was a bondholder, so it could not be said that he was personally prejudiced against such a policy. But he was sure that it would not go down.
‘He went on to recommend the policy which I was in fact maintaining– namely, that we should warn off other Powers, hand Egypt over to the Egyptians, but, establishing our own influence over the Canal, remain masters of the position so far as we needed to do so. Chamberlain wrote on Labouchere’s letter: “I am convinced the war was submitted to rather than approved by Radicals, and, unless we can snub the bondholders in our reorganization scheme, we may suffer for it. I have written a long paper upon the subject, and sent it to Mr. G. I have arranged for a copy to be sent you.”‘
A further Cabinet held on Saturday, October 21st, “decided” (so Sir Charles noted in his Diary at the moment) “to be very civil to the French –too civil by half, I think. They rejected a complicated scheme of Lord Granville’s, and substituted a single English (not to be so expressed) controller (not to be so called).”
At this moment the autumn Session was approaching, in which the thorny subject of reforming Parliamentary procedure must be disposed of, and the Cabinet were preoccupied with this till 6 p.m. on October 23rd. They
‘scamped their work on the draft despatch to Lord Lyons as to what he was to tell the French as to Egypt, and so made a wretched job of it. At night I pointed this out to Lord Granville, and told him that the despatch was slipslop, and on the next day, October 24th, I managed to get a good many changes made–one by telegraph, and the others by an amending despatch.’
‘Chamberlain’s view of Lord Granville’s proposals was that they were childishly insincere. Europe would not be deceived into believing them to be anything more than a proposal to restore the old system in its entirety, with an English nominee as controller in place of the dual control. Nothing, Chamberlain thought, was being done to develop Egyptian interests or promote Egyptian liberties.
‘Chamberlain was absent from some of the Cabinets at this moment, detained at Birmingham by the gout, but his memorandum was sent round the Cabinet. He was, however, in London on October 24th to assist me in somewhat improving the despatch. His memoranda show the strong view he held that, in spite of the almost unanimous approval of the Press, the war had not been popular, but had only been accepted on the authority of Mr. Gladstone as a disagreeable necessity; and that dissatisfaction existed upon several points, but above all with regard to the civil reorganization of the country. “There is great anxiety lest after all the bondholders should be the only persons who have profited by the war, and lest the phrases which have been used concerning the extension of Egyptian liberties should prove to have no practical meaning.” Chamberlain thought that our first duty was to our principles and our supporters rather than towards other Powers, and that, if the other Powers insisted upon financial control, we should at least put forward as our own the legitimate aspirations of Egyptian national sentiment. Chamberlain refused to believe that an Egyptian Chamber would repudiate the debt, inasmuch as such a course of action would at once render them liable to interference by the Great Powers.’
‘On October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville’s, at which I met Lords Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook’ (representing India, the Colonies, and the Admiralty). ‘I noted with regard to Egypt:
‘”Chamber of Notables: decided to do nothing, at which I am furious. What do four peers know about popular feeling?”‘
In view of the temper of the House of Commons, Sir Charles Dilke warned Lord Granville by letter of the danger that the Fourth Party might carry “the mass of the Tories” with Liberals on a cry for the “liberties of the Egyptian people.” Considerable delay was occasioned by negotiations as to whether Arabi and his associates should or should not be represented by European counsel at their trial, and in the interval rumours were set afloat as to ill usage of them in prison.
‘I had had in the course of this week a good deal of trouble in the House of Commons, caused by a sensational telegram in the _Daily News_, and a letter from a Swiss Arabist in the _Times_ containing most ridiculous lies as to the treatment of political prisoners in Egypt, but believed by our supporters, who were backed up by the Fourth Party.’
These attacks involved the British Agent-General in Egypt, and Sir Edward Malet felt the situation cruelly. He telegraphed home begging to be relieved from the sole responsibility.
‘On Sunday, October 29th, 1882, Lord Granville, with the gout, got the French refusal of our proposals, and the bad news from the Soudan’ (where the Mahdi was laying siege to El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan). ‘He called a Cabinet, but only five Ministers were in town, so it was decided that it was not to be called a Cabinet.’
‘On Tuesday, October 31st, the Queen, who had at first approved of the idea of Dufferin being sent to Egypt to supersede Malet, had now been turned against him by Wolseley, who was staying with her, and, not having seen the telegrams of the 27th, because we had made them into private telegrams and kept them back, told us that she thought that to send Dufferin was bad treatment of Malet. We had therefore to send her Malet’s telegrams in order to persuade her that it was necessary that Dufferin should go.’
‘On Monday, November 6th, there was held at the House of Commons, by Lord Granville’s wish, a meeting at which were present, besides Lord Granville and myself, Hartington, Childers, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and Dodson. We met to consider a further violent refusal by France of all our proposals. Chamberlain and Harcourt were strong in the one sense, and Hartington in the other, while Childers and Dodson sat meek like mice. Hartington was fiercely for the old control, Harcourt and Chamberlain against all control, and no one except Lord Granville in favour of the proposals which were actually made, and Lord Granville a man who constitutionally would always prefer a compromise to a clear course. None of them knew what to do. I noted that I wished they would not first agree upon some foolish course, and then call me in when it had been taken beyond all possibility of alteration. When I was talking to Brett afterwards, he said of his chief, Hartington, that it was somewhat a pity that, being so violent as he always was in Cabinet, he should frequently forget what his opinions were on particular questions, as, for example, closure and county franchise.’
‘Brett also told me that the Queen, to whom, he said, Lord Granville had had to “crawl” for having sent Lord Dufferin to Egypt, was now still more furious with him because the instructions to Dufferin had been sent off on Friday, the 3rd, without her having seen them.
‘Having trouble in the House with regard to the legal points connected with the trial of Arabi, I had at the time frequent meetings with Lord Selborne, who drew draft answers to the questions in the House of Commons, which were ingenious, but hardly suited to the Commons atmosphere.
‘On the 8th there was a Cabinet at which Mr. Gladstone only attended for a minute, merely to prevent his name being omitted from the list. He was ostentatiously devoting himself to procedure only, and taking no part with regard to Egypt.
‘On Friday, the 10th, Count Munster called on me to tell me that Prince Bismarck objected to any plan for a temporary dealing with Egyptian finance, as he feared panic towards the end of the term fixed; but the Ambassador said that the Chancellor attached no importance to any form of control.
‘On Monday, November 13th, I had a formal conference at the House of Lords with the Chancellor, the Attorney-General, and Pauncefote, on the whole of the legal questions connected with the trial of Arabi and our position in Egypt; and I cannot but think that Lord Selborne in all those many letters to me about the subject, which I have retained, showed himself given rather to legal quibbles than to a broad view of the questions raised. At three o’clock there was a Cabinet to consider whether a day should be given to Bourke for the discussion of a motion, but the Cabinet went on to decide to accept a suggestion by Childers and Chamberlain that the sending of a Turkish envoy to Egypt was to involve the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Six members, however, stopped after Mr. Gladstone, Chamberlain, and Childers had gone away, and toned down the phrase to be made use of to Musurus Pasha.
‘On Tuesday, November 14th, we had a Suez Canal conference at Lord Granville’s at noon, and in the afternoon a Congo deputation. Between the two we discussed at Lord Granville’s house (Kimberley, Northbrook, Carlingford, and Childers being present with Lord Granville and myself) the question of the employment of Baker Pasha in Egypt as Chief of the Staff…. Coming back to the Suez Canal question, Childers, who wished us to obtain preponderance, made a characteristic observation, saying: “_I would do it boldly_ by making the Khedive say–” It struck me that some people had an odd idea of boldness.
‘On November 15th we had a further meeting on the Canal question at Mr. Gladstone’s room at the House…. When all had come, there were present Childers, Hartington, Northbrook, Kimberley, Carlingford, Lord Granville, and myself. I found that Count Munster had not told Lord Granville that which he had told me on November 10th. It was decided to send my notes, based on my conversations with Ollivier, to Dufferin. With regard to Arabi’s trial, it was decided that Dufferin should be told to consider the case against him, and to decide that there was no proof of common crime, after which, by arrangement between us and the Khedive, we were to put him away safely in Ascension, Barbados, Bermuda, Ceylon; or any other island than St. Helena, which would be ridiculous. Mr. Gladstone had written us a letter proposing that we should make the Sultan banish Arabi, but we did not much like the idea of his coming to England and stumping the country between Wilfrid Lawson and Wilfrid Blunt. Childers asked leave to arrest any Turkish envoy who might be sent to Cairo, but the matter was left open.’
On November 16th the Cabinet again ‘discussed the fate of Arabi, and decided to let him run riot anywhere; but the decision was afterwards reversed.’
On November 21st
‘there was sent off to Lord Dufferin a personal telegram to say that Baker was to be sent to fight in the Soudan, and that another Englishman must be chosen for his post, that Arabi was to be interned on some island on parole.
‘I received letters at this time from Lord Dufferin on his arrival at Cairo, asking me to keep him informed of my views on the Egyptian situation.
‘On December 4th there was a Cabinet which decided to send Arabi to Ceylon, but after a consultation with Lord Ripon, whose advice was not to be followed if it was hostile; and on the next day Lord Ripon protested, as had been foreseen.
‘Evelyn Wood, who was to command the Egyptian Army, asked the Cabinet for such large figures as to startle them.’
‘I heard from Dufferin also in December from Cairo, in reply to Chamberlain’s memorandum. He thought that Egyptian Members of Parliament would many of them be tools in the hands of the Sultan or of foreign Powers, but added that he would sooner run any risk than wholly abandon representative institutions. “But I think we should make a mistake if we forced upon this country premature arrangements which we dare not apply to India, where the strength of our own position and other circumstances afford not only better guarantees for success, but the power of retreating if the experiment should prove a failure.”
‘In a further letter Lord Dufferin confirmed a story which I had heard as to Halim having bribed Arabi and the other Egyptian Colonels, but most of the money stuck to the hands of the agent who was employed.’
“Two days after I had left the Foreign Office, Hartington wrote to me to ask whether his soldiers might pay military honours to the holy carpet on its return from Mecca–an amusing example of the kind of question with which British Ministers are sometimes called on to deal.”
After Dilke’s promotion to the Cabinet,
‘On Thursday, February 15th, 1883, Parliament met, and I was very hard worked, and on February 17th had heavy business in the House with regard to Egypt, as revealed in the division of the previous night, in which we only had a majority of thirty-five, although I had been permitted distinctly to announce our intention to withdraw our troops, and not to stay permanently in the country. This, after all, was a mere expansion of the promise given to the Powers by Lord Granville in his circular despatch of January 3rd, in which he said that we were desirous of withdrawing British force as soon as the state of the country would permit.
‘In the meantime the Soudan was in a disturbed condition. On January 1st, 1883, we had heard from Cairo: “Second false prophet appeared, hung by first;” or, as the despatch by post expanding the telegram put it, “A second Mahdi has lately appeared, but was hung by order of the first.” The Mahdi, however, was making progress. The Foreign Office were inclined to adopt some responsibility for the Egyptian attempt to defeat the Mahdi, and reconquer the Soudan; but I invariably insisted on striking out all such words from their despatches, and, so far as I know, no dangerous language was allowed to pass. In consequence of my observations a despatch was sent by Lord Granville to our consulate in Egypt, pointing out that telegrams had been received from General Hicks in relation to his military operations in the Soudan, and that Lord Granville understood that these were messages intended for General Baker, and only addressed to the consulate because Hicks found it convenient to make use of the cipher which had been entrusted to Colonel Stewart, who was acting as our Consul at Khartoum; but we repeated that “H. M. G. are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or actions of General Hicks.” At this time the Turkish Government were supplying the Mahdi with money and officers in the hope that the troubles in the Soudan would afford them an excuse for sending troops to “assist the Khedive.” As we continued to get telegrams from Hicks Pasha, Sir Edward Malet informed the Egyptian Government by letter that we must repeat that we had no responsibility for the operations in the Soudan. We foresaw the failure of the Hicks expedition, and should perhaps have done better had we more distinctly told the Egyptian Government that they must stop it and give up the Soudan, holding Khartoum only; but to say this is to be wise after the event. What we did was to “offer no advice, but” point out that the Egyptian Government should make up their minds what their policy was to be, and carefully consider whether they could afford the cost of putting down the Mahdi. In other words, we discouraged the expedition without forbidding it. I fear, however, that Malet, against our wish, was a party to the sending of reinforcements “to follow up successes already obtained”; for after his conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister he added: “This view seems reasonable.”‘
‘On May 4th; 1883, I noted in my Diary, in reference to a matter which I have named, that Colonel Hicks’s telegram to Malet, about which both Hicks and Malet would be reproved, the British Government having nothing to do with the expedition, was to request that communications should be made to General Baker which were, in fact, intended for Sir Evelyn Wood. This showed how completely it had been settled in advance that Baker should command the Egyptian Army, for Hicks in the Soudan fully believed that Baker was in command.’
Expressions of opinion in England had, however, prevented this appointment.
Another entry indicates that French opinion was beginning to accept the British position in Egypt as a _fait accompli_:
‘On May 2nd, 1883, d’Aunay, the French Secretary, told me that Waddington was coming as Ambassador, and intended to ask for Syria for the French as a compensation for our position in Egypt.’….
During the summer there was much negotiation concerning the Suez Canal, and the proposal to cut a rival waterway.
‘On July 4th there was a meeting of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Childers, Chamberlain, and myself, as to the Suez Canal, and we decided to ask Lesseps to come over and meet us. Childers had a scheme with regard to the Canal, to which only Chamberlain and I in the Cabinet were opposed.
‘On July 19th there was another Cabinet. Chamberlain and I tried to get them to drop Childers’s Canal scheme, but they would not. The Cabinet was adjourned to the 23rd, and on Monday, the 23rd, they dropped it.’
In the end, however, M. de Lesseps won. An entry of November 22nd follows up the question of widening the Canal:
‘Another matter which was active at this moment was that of the position of Lesseps, with whom we had now made peace, and to whom we had given our permission for the widening of the first Canal. We supported him against the Turkish Government, who wanted to screw money out of him for their assent, and got the opinion of the law officers of the Crown to show that no Turkish assent was needed. On a former occasion we had contended that his privileges must be construed strictly, as he was a monopolist. On this occasion the law officers took a more liberal view. The fact is that the questions referred to the law officers for opinions by the Foreign Office have very often much more connection with policy than with law, and their opinions are elastic. There never were such law officers as James and Herschell. They did their work with extraordinary promptitude and decision, and with the highest possible skill. They never differed, and they always gave us exactly what we wanted in the best form. Comparing their opinions with those of law officers of other days, which I often at the Foreign Office had to read, I should call James and Herschell unsurpassed and unsurpassable for such a purpose. Lord Selborne, who was, I suppose, a much greater lawyer, was nothing like so good for matters of this kind, for he always tried to find a legal basis for his view, which made it unintelligible to laymen.’
‘On August 7th I had to set to work hard to read up all the Egyptian papers in order to support Fitzmaurice on the 9th. In the course of this speech I announced our intention from November, 1883, to allow Sir Evelyn Wood to maintain order in Cairo with his Egyptian forces, we withdrawing the British forces to Alexandria. There was a Cabinet on the 8th, at which, after a good deal of fighting, it had been decided, against Hartington, to allow me to make the statement with regard to Egypt which I made upon the 9th.’
By August 22nd Lord Hartington had ‘come round so fast that he told us he would be able to evacuate Cairo even before our meeting in October.’ On August 31st Sir Charles Dilke ‘received Sir Evelyn Wood, who was anxious to assure me that he was perfectly able to hold Egypt with his Egyptians.’
The report did not wholly convince Sir Charles, and he expressed some of his doubts to Lord Granville, with whom Sir Evelyn Wood had been staying at Walmer.
‘Lord Granville wrote: “His conversation gives one more the notion of activity, energy, and conscientiousness, than of great ability. I presume you were not able to slip in a question, but, on the other hand, if you had succeeded he would not have heard it. He is in favour of the complete evacuation of Cairo…. He has full confidence in that half of the Egyptian Army which is officered by English officers. He has only a negative confidence in the other half. Evelyn Baring will find a private letter on his arrival, and a despatch by this mail, instructing him to send us a full report. Till we get this we had better not go beyond the declarations which have already been publicly made.” Baring had just (September, ’83) reached Cairo as Consul- General.’
Government policy shaped itself on the assumption that Sir Evelyn Wood was right. On October 25th
‘we formally decided to leave Cairo and concentrate a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men at Alexandria. This was no new decision, but was taken on this occasion in order that the Queen should be informed, which had not previously been done.’
Ten days after this date the Egyptian Army of the Soudan, under General Hicks, was destroyed by the Mahdi in Kordofan. The news only reached Cairo on November 22nd, and the question was now raised as to what should become of the upper valley of the Nile.
‘On December 12th there was a meeting at the War Office about the Soudan, Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, Carlingford, and myself, being present, with Wolseley in the next room, and the Duke of Cambridge in the next but one. We again told the Egyptians that they had better leave the Soudan and defend Egypt at Wady Halfa, and that we would help them to defend Egypt proper. Wolseley was at one time called in, as was Colonel Stewart, the last man who had left Khartoum. Lord Granville told Hartington, who was starting for Windsor, what to tell the Queen, and I noted that “the old stagers, like Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, waste a great deal of their time on concocting stories for the Queen, who is much too clever to be taken in by them, and always ends by finding out exactly what they are doing. It is certainly a case where honesty would be a better policy.”
‘I cannot but think that Malet was largely responsible for the state of things in Egypt (Lord Granville being so far responsible that I had much difficulty in getting him to interfere against Malet), and that we had interfered somewhat late…. Malet left before the army commanded by Hicks was surrounded, and it was on Baring that the blow fell. But Baring was always strongly opposed to the attempt of the Egyptians to reconquer the Soudan, and, moreover, thought that they were quite unfit to govern it. Immediately after the bad news about Hicks first came, Baring told us that Khartoum must fall, and recommended us to tell the Egyptian Government, which we did, that under no circumstances must they expect the assistance of British or Indian troops in the Soudan. We even stopped their sending Wood’s army to the Soudan, and we told Baring not to encourage retired British officers to volunteer, and told him to recommend the evacuation of the Soudan. On December 3rd Baring sent us a most able report upon the whole situation, and he and General Stephenson commanding the British troops, Sir Evelyn Wood commanding the Egyptian Army, and General Baker, were all of opinion that it was impossible to hold Khartoum, and that the Egyptians must be made to fall back on Wady Halfa. On the other hand, the Egyptian Government could not make up their minds to leave Khartoum. Malet up to the last days of his stay in Egypt was rendering himself, in fact, responsible for the Hicks expedition and for the Soudan policy of the Egyptians, and there is one fatal despatch of his in existence in which he relates how he interfered, at the wish of Hicks, to suggest a change of Egyptian Governor. He was privately censured for this, but he was publicly approved for his whole course, and therefore we were in a sense responsible, although we expressly repudiated this responsibility in our despatches to him, and forced the Egyptian Government to acknowledge that they thoroughly understood our repudiation. The only thing that could have been done more than was done would have been to have publicly censured Malet, and Lord Granville should have had the courage to do this.
‘In September I had succeeded in getting Edgar Vincent appointed to the Egyptian Cabinet as the English financier, virtually Prime Minister; but, able as he was, it was a long time before he felt his feet, and could take the government into his own hands.’ [Footnote: When on August 15th Mr. (afterwards Sir) Edgar Vincent dined in Sloane Street with Edward Hamilton, Mr. Gladstone’s private secretary, and some other people, Sir Charles noted that he ‘was once more struck with the extraordinary strength displayed by Vincent for a man of twenty-four.’]
‘Two additional points concerning Egypt which should be mentioned here are, in the first place, Lord Granville’s mistake in creating a place with Egyptian pay, at Lord Spencer’s wish, for Clifford Lloyd, who had made Ireland too hot to hold him; and, in the second place, the violent protests of the Anti-Slavery Society, backed up by ours in December, as to the employment of Zebehr Pasha. We should undoubtedly have been censured by the House of Commons had we allowed any important place to have been given to Zebehr Pasha, but it was difficult to prevent it when it was wished both by the Egyptians and by Baring–given the fact that we had washed our hands of their Soudan policy.
‘What we should have done, if I may be allowed to be wise after the event, was to have distinctly ordered the Egyptians to abandon Khartoum and to fall back to Wady Halfa. At the end of the year Baring forwarded to us a memorandum from the Egyptian Government. They pointed out that the Khedive was forbidden by Turkey to cede territory; that we were asking them to abandon enormous provinces, with Berber and Dongola, and great tribes who had remained loyal. They thought that if they fell back Egypt would have to continually resist the attacks of great numbers of fanatics, and that the Bedouin themselves would rise. They were wrong, but they put their case so well that they converted Baring; and he told us that he doubted if any native Ministers could be found willing to carry out the policy of retirement, and he thought that it would be necessary to appoint English Ministers if we decided to force it on them.
‘In the last lines of Baring’s despatch of December 22nd there occur words which afterwards became of great importance: “If the abandonment policy is carried out … it will be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum, with full powers to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements he can for the future government of the country.” It was on those words that we acted in sending for Gordon, and asking him whether he would go to the Soudan for this purpose, which he agreed to do, and when we sent him there was no question of his going for any other purpose than this.’
END OF VOL. I