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The Hispanic Nations of the New World by William R. Shepherd

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amount of the compensation proved acceptable. Instead, Colombia
urged that the whole matter be referred to the judgment of the
tribunal at The Hague.

Alluding to the use made of the liberties won in the struggle for
emancipation from Spain by the native land of Miranda, Bolivar,
and Sucre, on the part of the country which had been in the
vanguard of the fight for freedom from a foreign yoke, a writer
of Venezuela once declared that it had not elected legally a
single President; had not put democratic ideas or institutions
into practice; had lived wholly under dictatorships; had
neglected public instruction; and had set up a large number of
oppressive commercial monopolies, including the navigation of
rivers, the coastwise trade, the pearl fisheries, and the sale of
tobacco, salt, sugar, liquor, matches, explosives, butter,
grease, cement, shoes, meat, and flour. Exaggerated as the
indictment is and applicable also, though in less degree, to some
of the other backward countries of Hispanic America, it contains
unfortunately a large measure of truth. Indeed, so far as
Venezuela itself is concerned, this critic might have added that
every time a "restorer," "regenerator," or "liberator" succumbed
there, the old craze for federalism again broke out and menaced
the nation with piecemeal destruction. Obedient, furthermore, to
the whims of a presidential despot, Venezuela perpetrated more
outrages on foreigners and created more international friction
after 1899 than any other land in Spanish America had ever done.

While the formidable Guzman Blanco was still alive, the various
Presidents acted cautiously. No sooner had he passed away than
disorder broke out afresh. Since a new dictator thought he needed
a longer term of office and divers other administrative
advantages, a constitution incorporating them was framed and
published in the due and customary manner. This had hardly gone
into operation when, in 1895, a contest arose with Great Britain
about the boundaries between Venezuela and British Guiana. Under
pressure from the United States, however, the matter was referred
to arbitration, and Venezuela came out substantially the loser.

In 1899 there appeared on the scene a personage compared with
whom Zelaya was the merest novice in the art of making trouble.
This was Cipriano Castro, the greatest international nuisance of
the early twentieth century. A rude, arrogant, fearless,
energetic, capricious mountaineer and cattleman, he regarded
foreigners no less than his own countryfolk, it would seem, as
objects for his particular scorn, displeasure, exploitation, or
amusement, as the case might be. He was greatly angered by the
way in which foreigners in dispute with local officials avoided a
resort to Venezuelan courts and--still worse--rejected their
decisions and appealed instead to their diplomatic
representatives for protection. He declared such a procedure to
be an affront to the national dignity. Yet foreigners were
usually correct in arming that judges appointed by an arbitrary
President were little more than figureheads, incapable of
dispensing justice, even were they so inclined.

Jealous not only of his personal prestige but of what he
imagined, or pretended to imagine, were the rights of a small
nation, Castro tried throughout to portray the situation in such
a light as to induce the other Hispanic republics also to view
foreign interference as a dire peril to their own independence
and sovereignty; and he further endeavored to involve the United
States in a struggle with European powers as a means possibly of
testing the efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine or of laying bare
before the world the evil nature of American imperialistic

By the year 1901, in which Venezuela adopted another
constitution, the revolutionary disturbances had materially
diminished the revenues from the customs. Furthermore Castro's
regulations exacting military service of all males between
fourteen and sixty years of age had filled the prisons to
overflowing. Many foreigners who had suffered in consequence
resorted to measures of self-defense--among them representatives
of certain American and British asphalt companies which were
working concessions granted by Castro's predecessors. Though
familiar with what commonly happens to those who handle pitch,
they had not scrupled to aid some of Castro's enemies. Castro
forthwith imposed on them enormous fines which amounted
practically to a confiscation of their rights.

While the United States and Great Britain were expostulating over
this behavior of the despot, France broke off diplomatic
relations with Venezuela because of Castro's refusal either to
pay or to submit to arbitration certain claims which had
originated in previous revolutions. Germany, aggrieved in similar
fashion, contemplated a seizure of the customs until its demands
for redress were satisfied. And then came Italy with like causes
of complaint. As if these complications were not sufficient,
Venezuela came to blows with Colombia.

As the foreign pressure on Castro steadily increased, Luis Maria
Drago, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, formulated in
1902 the doctrine with which his name has been associated. It
stated in substance that force should never be employed between
nations for the collection of contractual debts. Encouraged by
this apparent token of support from a sister republic, Castro
defied his array of foreign adversaries more vigorously than
ever, declaring that he might find it needful to invade the
United States, by way of New Orleans, to teach it the lesson it
deserved! But when he attempted, in the following year, to close
the ports of Venezuela as a means of bringing his native
antagonists to terms, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy seized
his warships, blockaded the coast, and bombarded some of his
forts. Thereupon the United States interposed with a suggestion
that the dispute be laid before the Hague Tribunal. Although
Castro yielded, he did not fail to have a clause inserted in a
new "constitution" requiring foreigners who might wish to enter
the republic to show certificates of good character from the
Governments of their respective countries.

These incidents gave much food for thought to Castro as well as
to his soberer compatriots. The European powers had displayed an
apparent willingness to have the United States, if it chose to do
so, assume the role of a New World policeman and financial
guarantor. Were it to assume these duties, backward republics in
the Caribbean and its vicinity were likely to have their affairs,
internal as well as external, supervised by the big nation in
order to ward off European intervention. At this moment, indeed,
the United States was intervening in Panama. The prospect aroused
in many Hispanic countries the fear of a "Yankee peril" greater
even than that emanating from Europe. Instead of being a kindly
and disinterested protector of small neighbors, the "Colossus of
the North" appeared rather to resemble a political and commercial
ogre bent upon swallowing them to satisfy "manifest destiny."

Having succeeded in putting around his head an aureole of local
popularity, Castro in 1905 picked a new set of partially
justified quarrels with the United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy, Colombia, and even with the Netherlands, arising out of
the depredations of revolutionists; but an armed menace from the
United States induced him to desist from his plans. He contented
himself accordingly with issuing a decree of amnesty for all
political offenders except the leaders. When "reelected," he
carried his magnanimity so far as to resign awhile in favor of
the Vice President, stating that, if his retirement were to bring
peace and concord, he would make it permanent. But as he saw to
it that his temporary withdrawal should not have this happy
result, he came back again to his firmer position a few months

Venting his wrath upon the Netherlands because its minister had
reported to his Government an outbreak of cholera at La Guaira,
the chief seaport of Venezuela, the dictator laid an embargo on
Dutch commerce, seized its ships, and denounced the Dutch for
their alleged failure to check filibustering from their islands
off the coast. When the minister protested, Castro expelled him.
Thereupon the Netherlands instituted a blockade of the Venezuelan
ports. What might have happened if Castro had remained much
longer in charge, may be guessed. Toward the close of 1908,
however, he departed for Europe to undergo a course of medical
treatment. Hardly had he left Venezuelan shores when Juan Vicente
Gomez, the able, astute, and vigorous Vice President, managed to
secure his own election to the presidency and an immediate
recognition from foreign states. Under his direction all of the
international tangles of Venezuela were straightened out.

In 1914 the country adopted its eleventh constitution and thereby
lengthened the presidential term to seven years, shortened that
of members of the lower house of the Congress to four, determined
definitely the number of States in the union, altered the
apportionment of their congressional representation, and enlarged
the powers of the federal Government--or, rather, those of its
executive branch! In 1914 Gomez resigned office in favor of the
Vice President, and secured an appointment instead as commander
in chief of the army. This procedure was promptly denounced as a
trick to evade the constitutional prohibition of two consecutive
terms. A year later he was unanimously elected President, though
he never formally took the oath of office.

Whatever may be thought of the political ways and means of this
new Guzmin Blanco to maintain himself as a power behind or on the
presidential throne, Gomez gave Venezuela an administration of a
sort very different from that of his immediate predecessor. He
suppressed various government monopolies, removed other obstacles
to the material advancement of the country, and reduced the
national debt. He did much also to improve the sanitary
conditions at La Guaira, and he promoted education, especially
the teaching of foreign languages.

Gomez nevertheless had to keep a watchful eye on the partisans of
Castro, who broke out in revolt whenever they had an opportunity.
The United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Cuba, and Colombia eyed the movements of the ex-dictator
nervously, as European powers long ago were wont to do in the
case of a certain Man of Destiny, and barred him out of both
their possessions and Venezuela itself. International patience,
never Job-like, had been too sorely vexed to permit his return.
Nevertheless, after the manner of the ancient persecutor of the
Biblical martyr, Castro did not refrain from going to and fro in
the earth. In fact he still "walketh about" seeking to recover
his hold upon Venezuela!


When, in 1910, like several of its sister republics, Mexico
celebrated the centennial anniversary of its independence, the
era of peace and progress inaugurated by Porfirio Diaz seemed
likely to last indefinitely, for he was entering upon his eighth
term as President. Brilliant as his career had been, however, and
greatly as Mexico had prospered under his rigid rule, a sullen
discontent had been brewing. The country that had had but one
continuous President in twenty-six years was destined to have
some fourteen chief magistrates in less than a quarter of that
time, and to surpass all its previous records for rapidity in
presidential succession, by having one executive who is said to
have held office for precisely fifty-six minutes!

It has often been asserted that the reason for the downfall of
Diaz and the lapse of Mexico into the unhappy conditions of a
half century earlier was that he had grown too old to keep a firm
grip on the situation. It has also been declared that his
insistence upon reelection and upon the elevation of his own
personal candidate to the vice presidency, as a successor in case
of his retirement, occasioned his overthrow. The truth of the
matter is that these circumstances were only incidental to his
downfall; the real causes of revolution lay deeprooted in the
history of these twenty-six years. The most significant feature
of the revolt was its civilian character. A widespread public
opinion had been created; a national consciousness had been
awakened which was intolerant of abuses and determined upon their
removal at any cost; and this public opinion and national
consciousness were products of general education, which had
brought to the fore a number of intelligent men eager to
participate in public affairs and yet barred out because of their
unwillingness to support the existing regime.

Some one has remarked, and rightly, that Diaz in his zeal for the
material advancement of Mexico, mistook the tangible wealth of
the country for its welfare. Desirable and even necessary as that
material progress was, it produced only a one-sided prosperity.
Diaz was singularly deaf to the just complaints of the people of
the laboring classes, who, as manufacturing and other industrial
enterprises developed, were resolved to better their conditions.
In the country at large the discontent was still stronger.
Throughout many of the rural districts general advancement had
been retarded because of the holding of huge areas of fertile
land by a comparatively few rich families, who did little to
improve it and were content with small returns from the labor of
throngs of unskilled native cultivators. Wretchedly paid and
housed, and toiling long hours, the workers lived like the serfs
of medieval days or as their own ancestors did in colonial times.
Ignorant, poverty-stricken, liable at any moment to be
dispossessed of the tiny patch of ground on which they raised a
few hills of corn or beans, most of them were naturally a simple,
peaceful folk who, in spite of their misfortunes, might have gone
on indefinitely with their drudgery in a hopeless apathetic
fashion, unless their latent savage instincts happened to be
aroused by drink and the prospect of plunder. On the other hand,
the intelligent among them, knowing that in some of the northern
States of the republic wages were higher and treatment fairer,
felt a sense of wrong which, like that of the laboring class in
the towns, was all the more dangerous because it was not allowed
to find expression.

Diaz thought that what Mexico required above everything else was
the development of industrial efficiency and financial strength,
assured by a maintenance of absolute order. Though disposed to do
justice in individual cases, he would tolerate no class movements
of any kind. Labor unions, strikes, and other efforts at
lightening the burden of the workers he regarded as seditious and
deserving of severe punishment. In order to attract capital from
abroad as the best means of exploiting the vast resources of the
country, he was willing to go to any length, it would seem, in
guaranteeing protection. Small wonder, therefore, that the people
who shared in none of the immediate advantages from that source
should have muttered that Mexico was the "mother of foreigners
and the stepmother of Mexicans." And, since so much of the
capital came from the United States, the antiforeign sentiment
singled Americans out for its particular dislike.

If Diaz appeared unable to appreciate the significance of the
educational and industrial awakening, he was no less oblivious of
the political outcome. He knew, of course, that the Mexican
constitution made impossible demands upon the political capacity
of the people. He was himself mainly of Indian blood and he
believed that he understood the temperament and limitations of
most Mexicans. Knowing how tenaciously they clung to political
notions, he believed that it was safer and wiser to forego, at
least for a time, real popular government and to concentrate
power in the hands of a strong man who could maintain order.

Accordingly, backed by his political adherents, known as
cientificos (doctrinaires), some of whom had acquired a sinister
ascendancy over him, and also by the Church, the landed
proprietors, and the foreign capitalists, Diaz centered the
entire administration more and more in himself. Elections became
mere farces. Not only the federal officials themselves but the
state governors, the members of the state legislatures, and all
others in authority during the later years of his rule owed their
selection primarily to him and held their positions only if
personally loyal to him. Confident of his support and certain
that protests against misgovernment would be regarded by the
President as seditious, many of them abused their power at will.
Notable among them were the local officials, called jefes
politicos, whose control of the police force enabled them to
indulge in practices of intimidation and extortion which
ultimately became unendurable.

Though symptoms of popular wrath against the Diaz regime, or
diazpotism as the Mexicans termed it, were apparent as early as
1908, it was not until January, 1911, that the actual revolution
came. It was headed by Francisco I. Madero, a member of a wealthy
and distinguished family of landed proprietors in one of the
northern States. What the revolutionists demanded in substance
was the retirement of the President, Vice President, and Cabinet;
a return to the principle of no reelection to the chief
magistracy; a guarantee of fair elections at all times; the
choice of capable, honest, and impartial judges, jefes politicos,
and other officials; and, in particular, a series of agrarian and
industrial reforms which would break up the great estates, create
peasant proprietorships, and better the conditions of the working
classes. Disposed at first to treat the insurrection lightly,
Diaz soon found that he had underestimated its strength. Grants
of some of the demands and promises of reform were met with a
dogged insistence upon his own resignation. Then, as the
rebellion spread to the southward, the masterful old man realized
that his thirty-one years of rule were at an end. On the 25th of
May, therefore, he gave up his power and sailed for Europe.

Madero was chosen President five months later, but the revolution
soon passed beyond his control. He was a sincere idealist, if not
something of a visionary, actuated by humane and kindly
sentiments, but he lacked resoluteness and the art of managing
men. He was too prolific, also, of promises which he must have
known he could not keep. Yielding to family influence, he let his
followers get out of hand. Ambitious chieftains and groups of
Radicals blocked and thwarted him at every turn. When he could
find no means of carrying out his program without wholesale
confiscation and the disruption of business interests, he was
accused of abandoning his duty. One officer after another
deserted him and turned rebel. Brigandage and insurrection swept
over the country and threatened to involve it in ugly
complications with the United States and European powers. At
length, in February, 1913, came the blow that put an end to all
of Madero's efforts and aspirations. A military uprising in the
city of Mexico made him prisoner, forced him to resign, and set
up a provisional government under the dictatorship of Victoriano
Huerta, one of his chief lieutenants. Two weeks later both Madero
and the Vice President were assassinated while on their way
supposedly to a place of safety.

Huerta was a rough soldier of Indian origin, possessed of unusual
force of character and strength of will, ruthless, cunning, and
in bearing alternately dignified and vulgar. A cientifico in
political faith, he was disposed to restore the Diaz regime, so
far as an application of shrewdness and force could make it
possible. But from the outset he found an obstacle confronting
him that he could not surmount. Though acknowledged by European
countries and by many of the Hispanic republics, he could not win
recognition from the United States, either as provisional
President or as a candidate for regular election to the office.
Whether personally responsible for the murder of Madero or not,
he was not regarded by the American Government as entitled to
recognition, on the ground that he was not the choice of the
Mexican people. In its refusal to recognize an administration set
up merely by brute force, the United States was upheld by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba. The elimination of Huerta
became the chief feature for a while of its Mexican policy.

Meanwhile the followers of Madero and the pronounced Radicals had
found a new northern leader in the person of Venustiano Carranza.
They called themselves Constitutionalists, as indicative of their
purpose to reestablish the constitution and to choose a successor
to Madero in a constitutional manner. What they really desired
was those radical changes along social, industrial, and political
lines, which Madero had championed in theory. They sought to
introduce a species of socialistic regime that would provide the
Mexicans with an opportunity for self-regeneration. While Diaz
had believed in economic progress supported by the great landed
proprietors, the moral influence of the Church, and the
application of foreign capital, the Constitutionalists,
personified in Carranza, were convinced that these agencies, if
left free and undisturbed to work their will, would ruin Mexico.
Though not exactly antiforeign in their attitude, they wished to
curb the power of the foreigner; they would accept his aid
whenever desirable for the economic development of the country,
but they would not submit to his virtual control of public
affairs. In any case they would tolerate no interference by the
United States. Compromise with the Huerta regime, therefore, was
impossible. Huerta, the "strong man" of the Diaz type, must go.
On this point, at least, the Constitutionalists were in thorough
agreement with the United States.

A variety of international complications ensued. Both Huertistas
and Carranzistas perpetrated outrages on foreigners, which evoked
sharp protests and threats from the United States and European
powers. While careful not to recognize his opponents officially,
the American Government resorted to all kinds of means to oust
the dictator. An embargo was laid on the export of arms and
munitions; all efforts to procure financial help from abroad were
balked. The power of Huerta was waning perceptibly and that of
the Constitutionalists was increasing when an incident that
occurred in April, 1914, at Tampico brought matters to a climax.
A number of American sailors who had gone ashore to obtain
supplies were arrested and temporarily detained. The United
States demanded that the American flag be saluted as reparation
for the insult. Upon the refusal of Huerta to comply, the United
States sent a naval expedition to occupy Vera Cruz.

Both Carranza and Huerta regarded this move as equivalent to an
act of war. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile then offered their
mediation. But the conference arranged for this purpose at
Niagara Falls, Canada, had before it a task altogether impossible
of accomplishment. Though Carranza was willing to have the
Constitutionalists represented, if the discussion related solely
to the immediate issue between the United States and Huerta, he
declined to extend the scope of the conference so as to admit the
right of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs
of Mexico. The conference accomplished nothing so far as the
immediate issue was concerned. The dictator did not make
reparation for the "affronts and indignities" he had committed;
but his day was over. The advance of the Constitutionalists
southward compelled him in July to abandon the capital and leave
the country. Four months later the American forces were withdrawn
from Vera Cruz. The "A B C" Conference, however barren it was of
direct results, helped to allay suspicions of the United States
in Hispanic America and brought appreciably nearer a "concert of
the western world."

While far from exercising full control throughout Mexico, the
"first chief" of the Constitutionalists was easily the dominant
figure in the situation. At home a ranchman, in public affairs a
statesman of considerable ability, knowing how to insist and yet
how to temporize, Carranza carried on a struggle, both in arms
and in diplomacy, which singled him out as a remarkable
character. Shrewdly aware of the advantageous circumstances
afforded him by the war in Europe, he turned them to account with
a degree of skill that blocked every attempt at defeat or
compromise. No matter how serious the opposition to him in Mexico
itself, how menacing the attitude of the United States, or how
persuasive the conciliatory disposition of Hispanic American
nations, he clung stubbornly and tenaciously to his program.

Even after Huerta had been eliminated, Carranza's position was
not assured, for Francisco, or "Pancho," Villa, a chieftain whose
personal qualities resembled those of the fallen dictator, was
equally determined to eliminate him. For a brief moment, indeed,
peace reigned. Under an alleged agreement between them, a
convention of Constitutionalist officers was to choose a
provisional President, who should be ineligible as a candidate
for the permanent presidency at the regular elections. When
Carranza assumed both of these positions, Villa declared his act
a violation of their understanding and insisted upon his
retirement. Inasmuch as the convention was dominated by Villa,
the "first chief" decided to ignore its election of a provisional

The struggle between the Conventionalists headed by Villa and the
Constitutionalists under Carranza plunged Mexico into worse
discord and misery than ever. Indeed it became a sort of
three-cornered contest. The third party was Emiliano Zapata, an
Indian bandit, nominally a supporter of Villa but actually
favorable to neither of the rivals. Operating near the capital,
he plundered Conventionalists and Constitutionalists with equal
impartiality, and as a diversion occasionally occupied the city
itself. These circumstances gave force to the saying that Mexico
was a "land where peace breaks out once in a while!"

Early in 1915 Carranza proceeded to issue a number of radical
decrees that exasperated foreigners almost beyond endurance.
Rather than resort to extreme measures again, however, the United
States invoked the cooperation of the Hispanic republics and
proposed a conference to devise some solution of the Mexican
problem. To give the proposed conference a wider representation,
it invited not only the "A B C" powers, but Bolivia, Uruguay, and
Guatemala to participate. Meeting at Washington in August, the
mediators encountered the same difficulty which had confronted
their predecessors at Niagara Falls. Though the other chieftains
assented, Carranza, now certain of success, declined to heed any
proposal of conciliation. Characterizing efforts of the kind as
an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sister
nation, he warned the Hispanic republics against setting up so
dangerous a precedent. In reply Argentina stated that the
conference obeyed a "lofty inspiration of Pan-American
solidarity, and, instead of finding any cause for alarm, the
Mexican people should see in it a proof of their friendly
consideration that her fate evokes in us, and calls forth our
good wishes for her pacification and development." However, as
the only apparent escape from more watchful waiting or from armed
intervention on the part of the United States, in October the
seven Governments decided to accept the facts as they stood, and
accordingly recognized Carranza as the de facto ruler of Mexico.

Enraged at this favor shown to his rival, Villa determined
deliberately to provoke American intervention by a murderous raid
on a town in New Mexico in March, 1916. When the United States
dispatched an expedition to avenge the outrage, Carranza
protested energetically against its violation of Mexican
territory and demanded its withdrawal. Several clashes, in fact,
occurred between American soldiers and Carranzistas. Neither the
expedition itself, however, nor diplomatic efforts to find some
method of cooperation which would prevent constant trouble along
the frontier served any useful purpose, since Villa apparently
could not be captured and Carranza refused to yield to diplomatic
persuasion. Carranza then proposed that a joint commission be
appointed to settle these vexed questions. Even this device
proved wholly unsatisfactory. The Mexicans would not concede the
right of the United States to send an armed expedition into their
country at any time, and the Americans refused to accept
limitations on the kind of troops that they might employ or on
the zone of their operations. In January, 1917, the joint
commission was dissolved and the American soldiers were
withdrawn. Again the "first chief" had won!

On the 5th of February a convention assembled at Queretaro
promulgated a constitution embodying substantially all of the
radical program that Carranza had anticipated in his decrees.
Besides providing for an elaborate improvement in the condition
of the laboring classes and for such a division of great estates
as might satisfy their particular needs, the new constitution
imposed drastic restrictions upon foreigners and religious
bodies. Under its terms, foreigners could not acquire industrial
concessions unless they waived their treaty rights and consented
to regard themselves for the purpose as Mexican citizens. In all
such cases preference was to be shown Mexicans over foreigners.
Ecclesiastical corporations were forbidden to own real property.
No primary school and no charitable institution could be
conducted by any religious mission or denomination, and religious
publications must refrain from commenting on public affairs. The
presidential term was reduced from six years to four; reelection
was prohibited; and the office of Vice President was abolished.

When, on the 1st of May, Venustiano Carranza was chosen
President, Mexico had its first constitutional executive in four
years. After a cruel and obstinately intolerant struggle that had
occasioned indescribable suffering from disease and starvation,
as well as the usual slaughter and destruction incident to war,
the country began to enjoy once more a measure of peace.
Financial exhaustion, however, had to be overcome before
recuperation was possible. Industrial progress had become almost
paralyzed; vast quantities of depreciated paper money had to be
withdrawn from circulation; and an enormous array of claims for
the loss of foreign life and property had rolled up.


The course of events in certain of the republics in and around
the Caribbean Sea warned the Hispanic nations that independence
was a relative condition and that it might vary in direct ratio
with nearness to the United States. After 1906 this powerful
northern neighbor showed an unmistakable tendency to extend its
influence in various ways. Here fiscal and police control was
established; there official recognition was withheld from a
President who had secured office by unconstitutional methods.
Nonrecognition promised to be an effective way of maintaining a
regime of law and order, as the United States understood those
terms. Assurances from the United States of the full political
equality of all republics, big or little, in the western
hemisphere did not always carry conviction to Spanish American
ears. The smaller countries in and around the Caribbean Sea, at
least, seemed likely to become virtually American protectorates.

Like their Hispanic neighbor on the north, the little republics
of Central America were also scenes of political disturbance.
None of them except Panama escaped revolutionary uprisings,
though the loss of life and property was insignificant. On the
other hand, in these early years of the century the five
countries north of Panama made substantial progress toward
federation. As a South American writer has expressed it, their
previous efforts in that direction "amid sumptuous festivals,
banquets and other solemn public acts" at which they "intoned in
lyric accents daily hymns for the imperishable reunion of the
isthmian republics," had been as illusory as they were frequent.
Despite the mediation of the United States and Mexico in 1906,
while the latter was still ruled by Diaz, the struggle in which
Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Salvador had been engaged was
soon renewed between the first two belligerents. Since diplomatic
interposition no longer availed, American marines were landed in
Nicaragua, and the bumptious Zelaya was induced to have his
country meet its neighbors in a conference at Washington. Under
the auspices of the United States and Mexico, in December, 1907,
representatives of the five republics signed a series of
conventions providing for peace and cooperation. An arbitral
court of justice, to be erected in Costa Rica and composed of one
judge from each nation, was to decide all matters of dispute
which could not be adjusted through ordinary diplomatic means.
Here, also, an institute for the training of Central American
teachers was to be established. Annual conferences were to
discuss, and an office in Guatemala was to record, measures
designed to secure uniformity in financial, commercial,
industrial, sanitary, and educational regulations. Honduras, the
storm center of weakness, was to be neutralized. None of the
States was thereafter to recognize in any of them a government
which had been set up in an illegal fashion. A "Constitutional
Act of Central American Fraternity," moreover, was adopted on
behalf of peace, harmony, and progress. Toward a realization of
the several objects of the conference, the Presidents of the five
republics were to invite their colleagues of the United States
and Mexico, whenever needful, to appoint representatives, to
"lend their good offices in a purely friendly way."

Though most of these agencies were promptly put into operation,
the results were not altogether satisfactory. Some discords, to
be sure, were removed by treaties settling boundary questions and
providing for reciprocal trade advantages; but it is doubtful
whether the arrangements devised at Washington would have worked
at all if the United States had not kept the little countries
under a certain amount of observation. What the Central Americans
apparently preferred was to be left alone, some of them to mind
their own business, others to mind their neighbor's affairs.

Of all the Central American countries Honduras was, perhaps, the
one most afflicted with pecuniary misfortunes. In 1909 its
foreign debt, along with arrears of interest unpaid for
thirty-seven years, was estimated at upwards of $110,000,000. Of
this amount a large part consisted of loans obtained from foreign
capitalists, at more or less extortionate rates, for the
construction of a short railway, of which less than half had been
built. That revolutions should be rather chronic in a land where
so much money could be squandered and where the temperaments of
Presidents and ex-Presidents were so bellicose, was natural
enough. When the United States could not induce the warring
rivals to abide by fair elections, it sent a force of marines to
overawe them and gave warning that further disturbances would not
be allowed.

In Nicaragua the conditions were similar. Here Zelaya, restive
under the limitations set by the conference at Washington,
yearned to become the "strong man" of Central America, who would
teach the Yankees to stop their meddling. But his downfall was
imminent. In 1909, as the result of his execution of two American
soldiers of fortune who had taken part in a recent insurrection,
the United States resolved to tolerate Zelaya no longer. Openly
recognizing the insurgents, it forced the dictator out of the
country. Three years later, when a President-elect started to
assume office before the legally appointed time, a force of
American marines at the capital convinced him that such a
procedure was undesirable. The "corrupt and barbarous" conditions
prevailing in Zelaya's time, he was informed, could not be
tolerated. The United States, in fact, notified all parties in
Nicaragua that, under the terms of the Washington conventions, it
had a "moral mandate to exert its influence for the preservation
of the general peace of Central America." Since those agreements
had vested no one with authority to enforce them, such an
interpretation of their language, aimed apparently at all
disturbances, foreign as well as domestic, was rather elastic! At
all events, after 1912, when a new constitution was adopted, the
country became relatively quiet and somewhat progressive.
Whenever a political flurry did take place, American marines were
employed to preserve the peace. Many citizens, therefore,
declined to vote, on the ground that the moral and material
support thus furnished by the great nation to the northward
rendered it futile for them to assume political responsibilities.

Meanwhile negotiations began which were ultimately to make
Nicaragua a fiscal protectorate of the United States. American
officials were chosen to act as financial advisers and collectors
of customs, and favorable arrangements were concluded with
American bankers regarding the monetary situation; but it was not
until 1916 that a treaty covering this situation was ratified.
According to its provisions, in return for a stipulated sum to be
expended under American direction, Nicaragua was to grant to the
United States the exclusive privilege of constructing a canal
through the territory of the republic and to lease to it the Corn
Islands and a part of Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific coast, for use
as naval stations. The prospect of American intervention alarmed
the neighboring republics. Asserting that the treaty infringed
upon their respective boundaries, Costa Rica, and Salvador
brought suit against Nicaragua before the Central American Court.
With the exception of the Nicaraguan representative, the judges
upheld the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant had no
right to make any such concessions without previous consultation
with Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras, since all three alike
were affected by them. The Court observed, however, that it could
not declare the treaty void because the United States, one of the
parties concerned, was not subject to its jurisdiction. Nicaragua
declined to accept the decision; and the United States, the
country responsible for the existence of the Court and presumably
interested in helping to enforce its judgment, allowed it to go
out of existence in 1918 on the expiration of its ten-year term.

The economic situation of Costa Rica brought about a state of
affairs wholly unusual in Central American politics. The
President, Alfredo Gonzalez, wished to reform the system of
taxation so that a fairer share of the public burdens should fall
on the great landholders who, like most of their brethren in the
Hispanic countries, were practically exempt. This project,
coupled with the fact that certain American citizens seeking an
oil concession had undermined the power of the President by
wholesale bribery, induced the Minister of War, in 1917, to start
a revolt against him. Rather than shed the blood of his fellow
citizens for mere personal advantages, Gonzalez sustained the
good reputation of Costa Rica for freedom from civil commotions
by quietly leaving the country and going to the United States to
present his case. In consequence, the American Government
declined to recognize the de facto ruler.

Police and fiscal supervision by the United States has
characterized the recent history of Panama. Not only has a
proposed increase in the customs duties been disallowed, but more
than once the unrest attending presidential elections has
required the calming presence of American officials. As a means
of forestalling outbreaks, particularly in view of the
cosmopolitan population resident on the Isthmus, the republic
enacted a law in 1914 which forbade foreigners to mix in local
politics and authorized the expulsion of naturalized citizens who
attacked the Government through the press or otherwise. With the
approval of the United States, Panama entered into an agreement
with American financiers providing for the creation of a national
bank, one-fourth of the directors of which should be named by the
Government of the republic.

The second period of American rule in Cuba lasted till 1909.
Control of the Government was then formally transferred to Jose
Miguel Gomez, the President who had been chosen by the Liberals
at the elections held in the previous year; but the United States
did not cease to watch over its chief Caribbean ward. A bitter
controversy soon developed in the Cuban Congress over measures to
forbid the further purchase of land by aliens, and to insure that
a certain percentage of the public offices should be held by
colored citizens. Though both projects were defeated, they
revealed a strong antiforeign sentiment and much dissatisfaction
on the part of the negro population. It was clear also that
Gomez, intended to oust all conservatives from office, for an
obedient Congress passed a bill suspending the civil service

The partisanship of Gomez, and his supporters, together with the
constant interference of military veterans in political affairs,
provoked numerous outbreaks, which led the United States, in
1912, to warn Cuba that it might again be compelled to intervene.
Eventually, when a negro insurrection in the eastern part of the
island menaced the safety of foreigners, American marines were
landed. Another instance of intervention was the objection by the
United States to an employers' liability law that would have
given a monopoly of the insurance business to a Cuban company to
the detriment of American firms.

After the election of Mario Menocal, the Conservative candidate,
to the presidency in 1912, another occasion for intervention
presented itself. An amnesty bill, originally drafted for the
purpose of freeing the colored insurgents and other offenders,
was amended so as to empower the retiring President to grant
pardon before trial to persons whom his successor wished to
prosecute for wholesale corruption in financial transactions.
Before the bill passed, however, notice was sent from Washington
that, since the American Government had the authority to
supervise the finances of the republic, Gomez would better veto
the bill, and this he accordingly did.

A sharp struggle arose when it became known that Menocal would be
a candidate for reelection. The Liberal majority in the Congress
passed a bill requiring that a President who sought to succeed
himself should resign two months before the elections. When
Menocal vetoed this measure, his opponents demanded that the
United States supervise the elections. As the result of the
elections was doubtful, Gomez and his followers resorted in 1917
to the usual insurrection; whereupon the American Government
warned the rebels that it would not recognize their claims if
they won by force. Active aid from that quarter, as well as the
capture of the insurgent leader, caused the movement to collapse
after the electoral college had decided in favor of Menocal.

In the Dominican Republic disturbances were frequent,
notwithstanding the fact that American officials were in charge
of the customhouses and by their presence were expected to exert
a quieting influence. Even the adoption, in 1908, of a new
constitution which provided for the prolongation of the
presidential term to six years and for the abolition of the
office of Vice President--two stabilizing devices quite common in
Hispanic countries where personal ambition is prone to be a
source of political trouble--did not help much to restore order.
The assassination of the President and the persistence of
age-long quarrels with Haiti over boundaries made matters worse.
Thereupon, in 1913, the United States served formal notice on the
rebellious parties that it would not only refuse to recognize any
Government set up by force but would withhold any share in the
receipts from the customs. As this procedure did not prevent a
revolutionary leader from demanding half a million dollars as a
financial sedative for his political nerves and from creating
more trouble when the President failed to dispense it, the heavy
hand of an American naval force administered another kind of
specific, until commissioners from Porto Rico could arrive to
superintend the selection of a new chief magistrate.
Notwithstanding the protest of the Dominican Government, the
"fairest and freest" elections ever known in the country were
held under the direction of those officials--as a "body of
friendly observers"!

However amicable this arrangement seemed, it did not smother the
flames of discord. In 1916, when an American naval commander
suggested that a rebellious Minister of War leave the capital, he
agreed to do so if the "fairest and freest" of chosen Presidents
would resign. Even after both of them had complied with the
suggestions, the individuals who assumed their respective offices
were soon at loggerheads. Accordingly the United States placed
the republic under military rule, until a President could be
elected who might be able to retain his post without too much
"friendly observation" from Washington, and a Minister of War
could be appointed who would refrain from making war on the
President! Then the organization of a new party to combat the
previous inordinate display of personalities in politics created
some hope that the republic would accomplish its own redemption.

Only because of its relation to the wars of emancipation and to
the Dominican Republic, need the negro state of Haiti, occupying
the western part of the Caribbean island, be mentioned in
connection with the story of the Hispanic nations. Suffice it to
say that the fact that their color was different and that they
spoke a variant of French instead of Spanish did not prevent the
inhabitants of this state from offering a far worse spectacle of
political and financial demoralization than did their neighbors
to the eastward. Perpetual commotions and repeated interventions
by American and European naval forces on behalf of the foreign
residents, eventually made it imperative for the United States to
take direct charge of the republic. In 1916, by a convention
which placed the finances under American control, created a
native constabulary under American officers, and imposed a number
of other restraints, the United States converted Haiti into what
is practically a protectorate.


While the Hispanic republics were entering upon the second
century of their independent life, the idea of a certain
community of interests between themselves and the United States
began to assume a fairly definite form. Though emphasized by
American statesmen and publicists in particular, the new point of
view was not generally understood or appreciated by the people of
either this country or its fellow nations to the southward. It
seemed, nevertheless, to promise an effective cooperation in
spirit and action between them and came therefore to be called

This sentiment of inter-American solidarity sprang from several
sources. The periodical conferences of the United States and its
sister republics gave occasion for an interchange of official
courtesies and expressions of good feeling. Doubtless, also, the
presence of delegates from the Hispanic countries at the
international gatherings at The Hague served to acquaint the
world at large with the stability, strength, wealth, and culture
of their respective lands. Individual Americans took an active
interest in their fellows of Hispanic stock and found their
interest reciprocated. Motives of business or pleasure and a
desire to obtain personal knowledge about one another led to
visits and countervisits that became steadily more frequent.
Societies were created to encourage the friendship and
acquaintance thus formed. Scientific congresses were held and
institutes were founded in which both the United States and
Hispanic America were represented. Books, articles, and newspaper
accounts about one another's countries were published in
increasing volume. Educational institutions devoted a constantly
growing attention to inter-American affairs. Individuals and
commissions were dispatched by the Hispanic nations and the
United States to study one another's conditions and to confer
about matters of mutual concern. Secretaries of State, Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, and other distinguished personages
interchanged visits. Above all, the common dangers and
responsibilities falling upon the Americas at large as a
consequence of the European war seemed likely to bring the
several nations into a harmony of feeling and relationship to
which they had never before attained.

Pan-Americanism, however, was destined to remain largely a
generous ideal. The action of the United States in extending its
direct influence over the small republics in and around the
Caribbean aroused the suspicion and alarm of Hispanic Americans,
who still feared imperialistic designs on the part of that
country now more than ever the Colossus of the North. "The art of
oratory among the Yankees," declared a South American critic, "is
lavish with a fraternal idealism; but strong wills enforce their
imperialistic ambitions." Impassioned speakers and writers
adjured the ghost of Hispanic confederation to rise and confront
the new northern peril. They even advocated an appeal to Great
Britain, Germany, or Japan, and they urged closer economic,
social, and intellectual relations with the countries of Europe.

It was while the United States was thus widening the sphere of
its influence in the Caribbean that the "A B C"
powers--Argentina, Brazil, and Chile--reached an understanding
which was in a sense a measure of self-defense. For some years
cordial relations had existed among these three nations which had
grown so remarkably in strength and prestige. It was felt that by
united action they might set up in the New World the European
principle of a balance of power, assume the leadership in
Hispanic America, and serve in some degree as a counterpoise to
the United States. Nevertheless they were disposed to cooperate
with their northern neighbor in the peaceable adjustment of
conflicts in which other Hispanic countries were concerned,
provided that the mediation carried on by such a "concert of the
western world" did not include actual intervention in the
internal affairs of the countries involved.

With this attitude of the public mind, it is not strange that the
Hispanic republics at large should have been inclined to look
with scant favor upon proposals made by the United States, in
1916, to render the spirit of Pan-Americanism more precise in its
operation. The proposals in substance were these: that all the
nations of America "mutually agree to guarantee the territorial
integrity" of one another; to "maintain a republican form of
government"; to prohibit the "exportation of arms to any but the
legally constituted governments"; and to adopt laws of neutrality
which would make it "impossible to filibustering expeditions to
threaten or carry on revolutions in neighboring republics." These
proposals appear to have received no formal approval beyond what
is signified by the diplomatic expression "in principle."
Considering the disparity in strength, wealth, and prestige
between the northern country and its southern fellows,
suggestions of the sort could be made practicable only by letting
the United States do whatever it might think needful to
accomplish the objects which it sought. Obviously the Hispanic
nations, singly or collectively, would hardly venture to take any
such action within the borders of the United States itself, if,
for example, it failed to maintain what, in their opinion, was "a
republican form of government." A full acceptance of the plan
accordingly would have amounted to a recognition of American
overlordship, and this they were naturally not disposed to admit.

The common perils and duties confronting the Americas as a result
of the Great War, however, made close cooperation between the
Hispanic republics and the United States up to a certain point
indispensable. Toward that transatlantic struggle the attitude of
all the nations of the New World at the outset was substantially
the same. Though strongly sympathetic on the whole with the
"Allies" and notably with France, the southern countries
nevertheless declared their neutrality. More than that, they
tried to convert neutrality into a Pan-American policy, instead
of regarding it as an official attitude to be adopted by the
republics separately. Thus when the conflict overseas began to
injure the rights of neutrals, Argentina and other nations urged
that the countries of the New World jointly agree to declare that
direct maritime commerce between American lands should be
considered as "inter-American coastwise trade," and that the
merchant ships engaged in it, whatever the flag under which they
sailed, should be looked upon as neutral. Though the South
American countries failed to enlist the support of their northern
neighbor in this bold departure from international precedent,
they found some compensation for their disappointment in the
closer commercial and financial relations which they established
with the United States.

Because of the dependence of the Hispanic nations, and especially
those of the southern group, on the intimacy of their economic
ties with the belligerents overseas, they suffered from the
ravages of the struggle more perhaps than other lands outside of
Europe. Negotiations for prospective loans were dropped.
Industries were suspended, work on public improvements was
checked, and commerce brought almost to a standstill. As the
revenues fell off and ready money became scarce, drastic measures
had to be devised to meet the financial strain. For the
protection of credit, bank holidays were declared, stock
exchanges were closed, moratoria were set up in nearly all the
countries, taxes and duties were increased, radical reductions in
expenditure were undertaken, and in a few cases large quantities
of paper money were issued.

With the European market thus wholly or partially cut off, the
Hispanic republics were forced to supply the consequent shortage
with manufactured articles and other goods from the United States
and to send thither their raw materials in exchange. To their
northern neighbor they had to turn also for pecuniary aid. A
Pan-American financial conference was held at Washington in 1915,
and an international high commission was appointed to carry its
recommendations into effect. Gradually most of the Hispanic
countries came to show a favorable trade balance. Then, as the
war drew into its fourth year, several of them even began to
enjoy great prosperity. That Pan-Americanism had not meant much
more than cooperation for economic ends seemed evident when, on
April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Instead
of following spontaneously in the wake of their great northern
neighbor, the Hispanic republics were divided by conflicting
currents of opinion and hesitated as to their proper course of
procedure. While a majority of them expressed approval of what
the United States had done, and while Uruguay for its part
asserted that "no American country, which in defense of its own
rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other
continents, would be treated as a belligerent," Mexico veered
almost to the other extreme by proposing that the republics of
America agree to lay an embargo on the shipment of munitions to
the warring powers.

As a matter of fact, only seven out of the nineteen Hispanic
nations saw fit to imitate the example set by their northern
neighbor and to declare war on Germany. These were Cuba--in view
of its "duty toward the United States," Panama, Guatemala,
Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Since the Dominican
Republic at the time was under American military control, it was
not in a position to choose its course. Four countries Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay--broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany. The other seven republics--Mexico, Salvador, Colombia,
Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay--continued their formal
neutrality. In spite of a disclosure made by the United States of
insulting and threatening utterances on the part of the German
charge d'affaires in Argentina, which led to popular outbreaks at
the capital and induced the national Congress to declare in favor
of a severance of diplomatic relations with that functionary's
Government, the President of the republic stood firm in his
resolution to maintain neutrality. If Pan-Americanism had ever
involved the idea of political cooperation among the nations of
the New World, it broke down just when it might have served the
greatest of purposes. Even the "A B C" combination itself had
apparently been shattered.

A century and more had now passed since the Spanish and
Portuguese peoples of the New World had achieved their
independence. Eighteen political children of various sizes and
stages of advancement, or backwardness, were born of Spain in
America, and one acknowledged the maternity of Portugal. Big
Brazil has always maintained the happiest relations with the
little mother in Europe, who still watches with pride the growth
of her strapping youngster. Between Spain and her descendants,
however, animosity endured for many years after they had thrown
off the parental yoke. Yet of late, much has been done on both
sides to render the relationship cordial. The graceful act of
Spain in sending the much-beloved Infanta Isabel to represent her
in Argentina and Chile at the celebration of the centennial
anniversary of their cry for independence, and to wish them
Godspeed on their onward journey, was typical of the yearning of
the mother country for her children overseas, despite the lapse
of years and political ties. So, too, her ablest men of intellect
have striven nobly and with marked success to revive among them a
sense of filial affection and gratitude for all that Spain
contributed to mold the mind and heart of her kindred in distant
lands. On their part, the Hispanic Americans have come to a
clearer consciousness of the fact that on the continents of the
New World there are two distinct types of civilization, with all
that each connotes of differences in race, psychology, tradition,
language, and custom--their own, and that represented by the
United States. Appreciative though the southern countries are of
their northern neighbor, they cling nevertheless to their
heritage from Spain and Portugal in whatever seems conducive to
the maintenance of their own ideals of life and thought.

For anything like a detailed study of the history of the Hispanic
nations of America, obviously one must consult works written in
Spanish and Portuguese. There are many important books, also, in
French and German; but, with few exceptions, the recommendations
for the general reader will be limited to accounts in English.

A very useful outline and guide to recent literature on the
subject is W. W. Pierson, Jr., "A Syllabus of Latin-American
History" (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1917). A brief
introduction to the history and present aspects of Hispanic
American civilization is W. R. Shepherd, "Latin America" (New
York, 1914). The best general accounts of the Spanish and
Portuguese colonial systems will be found in Charles de Lannoy
and Herman van der Linden, "Histoire de L'Expansion Coloniale des
Peuples Europeens: Portugal et Espagne" (Brussels and Paris,
1907), and Kurt Simon, "Spanien and Portugal als See and
Kolonialmdchte" (Hamburg, 1913). For the Spanish colonial regime
alone, E. G. Bourne, "Spain in America" (New York, 1904) is
excellent. The situation in southern South America toward the
close of Spanish rule is well described in Bernard Moses, "South
America on the Eve of Emancipation" (New York, 1908). Among
contemporary accounts of that period, Alexander von Humboldt and
Aime Bonpland, "Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial
Regions of America", 3 vols. (London, 1881); Alexander von
Humboldt, "Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain", 4 vols.
(London,1811-1822); and F. R. J. de Pons, "Travels in South
America", 2 vols. (London, 1807), are authoritative, even if not
always easy to read.

On the wars of independence, see the scholarly treatise by W. S.
Robertson, "Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as Told in the
Lives of their Liberators" (New York, 1918); Bartolome Mitre,
"The Emancipation of South America" (London, 1893)--a condensed
translation of the author's "Historia de San Martin", and wholly
favorable to that patriot; and F. L. Petre, "Simon Bolivar"
(London, 1910)--impartial at the expense of the imagination.
Among the numerous contemporary accounts, the following will be
found serviceable: W. D. Robinson, "Memoirs of the Mexican
Revolution" (Philadelphia, 1890); J. R. Poinsett, "Notes on
Mexico" (London, 1825); H. M. Brackenridge, "Voyage to South
America, 2 vols. (London, 1820); W. B. Stevenson, "Historical and
Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' Residence in South
America", 3 vols. (London, 1895); J. Miller, "Memoirs of General
Miller in the Service of the Republic of Peru", 2 vols. (London,
1828); H. L. V. Ducoudray Holstein, "Memoirs of Simon Bolivar", 2
vols. (London, 1830), and John Armitage, "History of Brazil", 2
vols. (London, 1836).

The best books on the history of the republics as a whole since
the attainment of independence, and written from an Hispanic
American viewpoint, are F. Garcia Calderon, "Latin America, its
Rise and Progress" (New York, 1913), and M. de Oliveira Lima,
"The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and
Anglo-Saxon America" (Stanford University, California, 1914). The
countries of Central America are dealt with by W. H. Koebel,
"Central America" (New York, 1917), and of South America by T. C.
Dawson, "The South American Republics", 2 vols. (New York,
1903-1904), and C. E. Akers, "History of South America" (London,
1912), though in a manner that often confuses rather than

Among the histories and descriptions of individual countries,
arranged in alphabetical order, the following are probably the
most useful to the general reader: W. A. Hirst, "Argentina" (New
York, 1910); Paul Walle, "Bolivia" (New York, 1914); Pierre
Denis, "Brazil" (New York, 1911); G. F. S. Elliot, "Chile" (New
York, 1907); P. J. Eder, "Colombia" (New York, 1913); J. B.
Calvo, "The Republic of Costa Rica" (Chicago, 1890); A. G.
Robinson, "Cuba, Old and New" (New York, 1915); Otto Schoenrich,
"Santo Domingo" (New York, 1918); C. R. Enock, "Ecuador" (New
York, 1914); C. R. Enock, "Mexico" (New York, 1909); W. H.
Koebel, "Paraguay" (New York, 1917); C. R. Enock, "Peru" (New
York, 1910); W. H. Koebel, "Uruguay" (New York, 1911), and L. V.
Dalton, "Venezuela" (New York, 1912). Of these, the books by
Robinson and Eder, on Cuba and Colombia, respectively, are the
most readable and reliable.

For additional bibliographical references see "South America" and
the articles on individual countries in "The Encyclopaedia
Britannica", 11th edition, and in Marrion Wilcox and G. E. Rines,
"Encyclopedia of Latin America" (New York, 1917).

Of contemporary or later works descriptive of the life and times
of eminent characters in the history of the Hispanic American
republics since 1830, a few may be taken as representative.
Rosas: J. A. King, "Twenty-four Years in the Argentine Republic"
(London, 1846), and Woodbine Parish, "Buenos Ayres and the
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata" (London, 1850). Francia: J. R.
Rengger, "Reign of Dr. Joseph Gaspard Roderick [!] de Francia in
Paraguay" (London, 1827); J. P. and W. P. Robertson, "Letters on
South America", 3 vols. (London, 1843), and E. L. White, "El
Supremo", a novel (New York, 1916). Santa Anna: Waddy Thompson,
"Recollections of Mexico" (New York, 1846), and F. E. Ingles,
Calderon de la Barca, "Life in Mexico" (London, 1859.). Juarez:
U. R. Burke, "Life of Benito Juarez" (London, 1894). Solano
Lopez: T. J. Hutchinson, "Parana; with Incidents of the
Paraguayan War and South American Recollections" (London, 1868);
George Thompson, "The War in Paraguay" (London, 1869); R. F.
Burton, "Letters from the Battle-fields of Paraguay" (London,
1870), and C. A. Washburn, "The History of Paraguay", 2 vols.
(Boston, 1871). Pedro II: J. C. Fletcher and D. P. Kidder,
"Brazil and the Brazilians" (Boston, 1879), and Frank Bennett,
"Forty Years in Brazil "(London, 1914). Garcia Moreno: Frederick
Hassaurek, "Four Years among Spanish Americans "(New York, 1867).
Guzman Blanco: C. D. Dance, "Recollections of Four Years in
Venezuela" (London, 1876). Diaz: James Creelman, "Diaz, Master of
Mexico" (New York, 1911). Balmaceda: M. H. Hervey, "Dark Days in
Chile" (London, 1891-1890. Carranza: L. Gutierrez de Lara and
Edgcumb Pinchon, "The Mexican People: their Struggle for Freedom"
(New York, 1914).

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