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The Head Hunters of Northern Luzon by Cornelis De Witt Willcox

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of control of wild tribes to Christianized Filipinos.--Comparison of
our course with that of the Japanese in Formosa.

The question now presents itself: What is to become of these
highlanders of Northern Luzon? And if the answer to be given is
here applied only to them, let it be distinctly understood that
logically the question may be put in respect of all the wild people
of the Philippines. Of these there are over one million in a total
population of perhaps eight millions. At once it appears that
any conclusions we may draw, any speculations we may cherish, in
respect of the Archipelago, as being inhabited by a Christian people
unjustly deprived of liberty by us, must be subject to a very large
and important correction. Limiting our inquiry to Luzon alone, let it
be recollected that of its 4,000,000 population nearly four hundred
thousand, or one-tenth, are highlanders, and that these highlanders,
in all probability, arrived in the Islands at an earlier date than
their Christianized cousins of the lowlands. Let us recollect further
that these people are ethnologically not savages at all; not only
are they workers in steel and wood, weavers of cloth, but hydraulic
agriculturists of the very highest merit. On the side of moral
qualities they invite our approving attention: they speak the truth,
they look one straight in the eye, they are hospitable, courageous,
and uncomplaining; their women are on a footing of equality, more
or less, with the men, and are respected by them. Where they have
had an opportunity, they have shown an aptitude to learn of no mean
quality. Physically they are the best people of the Archipelago, and
under this head would be remarkable anywhere else in the world. Now,
the Spaniards, with a few exceptions, made no systematic, continuous
attempt to civilize these peoples; or, if they did, no measurable
results have come down to our own day, even Villaverde's efforts,
genuine as they were, having left almost no trace. So far from having
done anything for the hillmen, the record of the Spanish at the
very few points garrisoned by them is one of injustice and robbery,
and worse. That of the Filipinos, [45] in imitation of their Spanish
masters, is no better. At any rate, when we took over the Archipelago
in 1898, a vast area of Luzon was held by a people who looked, and
justly, so far as their experience had gone, upon the white man and
his Filipino understudy as an enemy. The difficulty of guiding and
controlling these people undoubtedly had been (and still is) great,
and partly accounts for the state of affairs we encountered when
we first entered the country, but it was necessarily no greater
for our predecessors in the Islands than it has been for us. Now,
where they failed, we, it may be said without fear of contradiction,
are succeeding, and it is but the simplest act of justice to say that
the credit for our success belongs to the Secretary of the Interior of
the Philippine Islands, Mr. Dean C. Worcester. He would be the last
man on earth to say that his success is complete; on the contrary,
he would assert that a very great quantity of work yet remains to be
done, and that what he has done so far is but the beginning. But it is
nevertheless a successful beginning, and successful because it rests
on the solid foundation of honesty and fair dealing, and is inspired
by interest in and sympathy for a vast body of people universally
hated and feared by the Filipino, and until lately neglected and
misunderstood by almost everybody else.

The physical difficulty alone of reaching these various peoples was
not only very great, but mere presence in their country involved
great risk of one's life. Again, the absence of even the rudest
form of tribal organization made the way hard. Take the Ifugaos, for
example, about 120,000 in number, all speaking essentially the same
language, inhabiting the same country, and having the same origins
and traditions. Yet this large body was and is yet broken up into
separate _rancherias_, or settlements, each formerly hostile to all
the others, this hostility being so great that merely to walk into
a neighboring _rancheria_ in plain sight, not more than two miles
off across the valley, was a sure way to commit suicide. And what is
true of the Ifugaos is true of all the others. Could any other field
have been more unpromising, have offered more difficulties? There
were those thousands of savages shut up in their all but inaccessible
mountains. Why not leave them there, to take one another's heads when
occasion offered? They raised nothing but rice and sweet potatoes,
anyway, and not enough of those to keep from going hungry. Why
concern one's self about them, when there was already so much to be
done elsewhere?

To Mr. Worcester's everlasting honor, be it said, he took no
such view. On the contrary, he went to work, and that after a
simple fashion, but then, all great things are simple! The first
thing was to see the people himself; and then came the beginning
of the solution, to push practicable roads and trails through the
country. Once these established, communication and interchange
would follow, and the way would be cleared for the betterment of
relations and the removal of misunderstandings. Today an American may
ride through the country alone, unarmed and unmolested; [46] twenty
years ago a Spaniard trying the same thing would have lost his head
within the first five miles. And this difference is fundamentally
due to the fact, already mentioned, of the honesty of our relations
with these simple mountaineers. We have their confidence and their
esteem and their respect, and this in spite of the necessity under
which our authorities have constantly labored of punishing them when
necessary and of insisting upon law and order wherever our jurisdiction
prevails. The lesson has been hard to learn, but it has been driven
home. The truth of the matter is, that a great missionary work has
been begun; missionary not in the limited sense of forcing upon the
understanding of a yet circumscribed people a religion unintelligible
to them, but in the sense of teaching peace and harmony, respect for
order, obedience to law, regard for the rights of others.

A beginning accordingly has been made, but what is to be the end? We
should not stay for an answer, could we but feel sure that but one
answer were possible. But we can not feel sure on this head; the people
of the Islands, whether civilized or uncivilized, have not yet gone
far enough to proceed alone. To drop the work now, nay, to lessen
it, would merely be inviting a return to former evil conditions. No
greater disaster could befall these highlanders to-day than a change
entailing a diminution of the interest and sympathy felt for them at
the seat of government. It is best to be plain about this matter:
the Filipinos of the lowlands dislike the highlander as much as
they fear and dread him. They apparently can not bear the idea that
but three or four hundred years ago they too were barbarians; [47]
for this reason the consideration of the highlander is distasteful
and offensive to them. The appropriations of the Philippine Assembly
for the necessary administration of the Mountain Province are none
too great; they would cease entirely could the Assembly have its own
way in the matter. The system of communications, so well begun and
already so productive of happy results, would come to an end. To turn
the destiny of the highlander over to the lowlander is, figuratively
speaking, simply to write his sentence of death; to condemn as fair a
land as the sun shines on to renewed barbarism. We are shut up to this
conclusion, not by theoretical considerations, but by experience. The
matter is worth examining a little closely, covering, as it does,
not only the hill tribes, but non-Christians everywhere else.

Certain persons have demanded from time to time that the control
of non-Christian tribes shall be turned over to the Filipinos. Now,
pointing out in passing that the Filipinos and the non-Christians are
distinct peoples, fully as distinct as the Dutch and the Germans,
and that the Filipinos have no just claim to the ownership of the
territory occupied by the wild men, let us ask ourselves if the
Filipinos are able and fit to control the non-Christian tribes. [48]

Consider for a moment the facts set out in the
following extracts:

"With rare exceptions, the Filipinos are profoundly ignorant of the
wild men and their ways. They seem to have failed to grasp the fact
that the non-Christians, who have been contemptuously referred to in
the Filipino press as a 'few thousand savages asking only to be let
alone,' number approximately a million and constitute a full eighth
of the population of the Archipelago."

"The average hillman hates the Filipinos on account of the abuses which
his people have suffered at their hands, and despises them because of
their inferior physical development and their comparatively peaceful
disposition, while the average Filipino who has ever come in close
contact with wild men despises them on account of their low social
development, and, in the case of the more warlike tribes, fears them
because of their past record for taking sudden and bloody vengeance
for real or fancied wrongs."

"It is impossible to avoid plain speaking if this question is to
be intelligently discussed; and the hard fact is, that wherever
the Filipinos have come in close contact with the non-Christian
inhabitants, the latter have almost invariably suffered at their
hands grave wrongs, which the more warlike tribes, at least, have been
quick to avenge. Thus a wall of prejudice and hatred has been built up
between the Filipinos and the non-Christian tribes. It is a noteworthy
fact that hostile feeling toward the Filipinos is strong even among
people like the Tinguians who, barring their religious beliefs,
are in many ways as highly civilized as are their Ilocano neighbors,"

"The success of American rule over the non-Christian tribes of the
Philippines is chiefly due to the friendly feeling which has been
brought about."

"The wild man has now learned for the first time that he has rights
entitled to a respect other than that which he can enforce with
his lance and his head-axe. He has found justice in the courts. His
property and his life have been made safe, and the American governor,
who punishes him sternly when he kills, is his friend and protector
so long as he behaves himself."

"Finally, it should be clearly borne in mind that the Filipinos have
been given an excellent opportunity to demonstrate practically their
interest in the non-Christians, and their ability wisely to direct the
affairs of primitive peoples. While the inhabitants of the Mountain
Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Agusan, and the Moro Province are not now
subject to control by them, and the inhabitants of Mindoro and Palawan
are subject to their control only through the Philippine Legislature,
there are non-Christian inhabitants in the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela [and eighteen others].

"At the outset, these governors and provincial boards [_i.e._, of
the provinces just mentioned] exercised over their non-Christian
constitutents precisely the same control they had over Filipinos. To
the best of my knowledge and belief, not one single important
measure looking to the betterment of the condition of these
non-Christian inhabitants was ever inaugurated by a Filipino during
this period. Indeed, the fact that no expense would be voluntarily
incurred for them became so evident as to render necessary the passage,
on December 16, 1905, of an act setting aside a portion of the public
revenues for the exclusive benefit of the non-Christians.

"After Apayao was established as a sub-province of Cagayan and the
duty of providing funds for the maintenance of its government was
explicitly imposed upon the provincial board of that province, the
governor stated to me that, in his opinion, it would be useless to
make the necessary expenditure, and that, in his opinion, it would be
better to kill all the savages in Apayao! As they number some 52,000,
this method of settling their affairs would have been open to practical
difficulties, apart from any humanitarian consideration!"

"Contrast with this record of inaction and lack of interest the record
of the special Government provinces [49] and the Moro Province,
where dwell really formidable tribes, which have until recently
engaged in piracy, head-hunting, and murder. Here very extensive
lines of communication have been opened up by the building of roads
and trails and the clearing of rivers. A good state of public order
has been established. Head-hunting, slavery, and piracy are now very
rare. The liquor traffic has been almost completely suppressed. Life
and property have been rendered comparatively safe, and in much
of the territory entirely so. In many instances, the wild men are
being successfully used to police their own country. Agriculture
is being developed. Unspeakably filthy towns have been made clean
and sanitary. The people are learning to abandon human sacrifices
and animal sacrifices and to come to the doctor when injured or
ill. Numerous schools have been established and are in successful
operation. The old sharply drawn tribal lines are disappearing. Bontoc
Igorots, Ifugaos, and Kalingas now visit each other's territory. At
the same time that all of this has been accomplished, the good-will
of the people themselves has been secured. They are outspoken
in their appreciation of what has been done for them and in their
expression of the wish that American rule should continue. They would
be horror-stricken at the thought of being turned over to Filipino
control," [50]

"So far as concerns the warlike tribes, the work for their advancement
thus far accomplished would promptly be lost; for they would instantly
offer armed resistance to Filipino control, and the old haphazard
intermittent warfare, profitless and worse than profitless for both
peoples, would be resumed."

"I say, in all kindness, but with deep conviction, that there is
no reason for believing that Filipino control of the more pacific
non-Christian tribes would not promptly result in the re-establishment
of the old system of oppression which Americans have found it necessary
to combat from the day when military rule was first established in
these islands until now. I speak whereof I know when I say that the
people of these tribes have been warned, over and over again, by
those interested in re-establishing the old regime, that American
control in the Philippines will be only temporary, and that when
the government is turned over to the Filipinos the tribesmen will be
punished for their present 'insubordination' and failure tamely to
submit to injustice and oppression, as many of them formerly did."

These extracts speak for themselves. So far as is known, the report
from which they are drawn has gone unchallenged. Is it necessary any
further to consider the question of a transfer of control from the
present authorities to the Filipinos or to any other authority? Would
not any change in the present administration be singularly unwise? Of
course, the views and arguments set forth here are extremely unpopular
among the politicians of the native ruling class. But then no Filipino
likes the plain, unvarnished truth, a fact that should receive full
weight in considering any demand or request of native or racial origin,
involving questions of government.

With our own treatment of the American Indian in mind, our people
should be the last to consent to any change in the relations or
administration of the wild men of the Philippine Islands not fully
justified by the amplest necessity, not warranted by well-grounded
hopes of greater improvement. These men, for the first time in their
history, are having a chance. That chance is fair to-day, and will
continue fair so long as its administration lies in American hands.,
competent, trained, and experienced.

In taking over the Philippines, we have incidentally become responsible
for a large number of wild men. Their fate is bound up in that of
the Islands. Now, these islands may remain under our control, or
they may not. Obviously, then, the question has its political side:
we may grant full international independence to the Philippines. In
the belief of some this would be merely a signal for civil war in the
Archipelago, the issue of which no man can guess. But whether or not,
in granting independence to the Philippines, we shall be signing the
death-warrant of the highlander. Let us repeat that, this people form
one-tenth of the population of Luzon: save as we arc helping him,
he can not as yet assert himself beyond the reach of his spear. Shall
we be the ones to mark this as the limit beyond which he shall never
go? Let us not deceive ourselves: a grant of independence means the
abandonment of hundreds of thousands of people to perpetual barbarism.

What would happen if the Islands fell into alien hands of course no
one can tell. But there is strong ground for believing that Japan
would enter a mighty bid for the sovereignty of the Archipelago, if
we ever contemplate parting with it. Now, Japan in Formosa has for
years been struggling, and without success, to control or subdue
the aborigines of the mountains, a people of the same blood as
the Igorots, of the same habits and traits, savage head-hunters,
the terror of all the plainsmen of no matter what origin. It is
interesting to read [51] that "among other measures taken by the
Japanese authorities to 'control' the aborigines was the erection of
barbed wire entanglements charged with electricity," the idea being,
after surrounding a savage position by these entanglements, to have
the troops drive the savages upon them. Many people have refused to
believe that this electrical process has ever been put into effect, but
the Kobe newspaper goes on to quote the correspondent of the _Times_
in confirmation. And a correspondent from Shanghai, writing [52] to
give the truth about the state of affairs in Formosa and to defend the
Japanese against the charge of ill-treating the savages, nevertheless
admits having been shown the entanglements, which, he says, are
"as harmless as any ordinary fence wire during the day, except in
cases of serious uprising on the part of the savages. At night it
is charged, but all the savages know this grave fact." According
to the _Times_ correspondent, some three hundred miles have already
been set up, and the work will be pushed until the aborigines "are
wholly caged." Lastly, the _Chronicle_ reports the Governor-General
of Formosa as fixing a term of three years for the suppression of
the bravest and fiercest tribe of all, numbering 50,000, at a cost of
17,000,000 yen. Now, we have no interest here or elsewhere in what is,
after all, a municipal affair of Japan's. She must and will settle her
own problems as seems best to her, and, if she is driven to "suppress"
her Formosan aborigines, it is none of our business. Moreover, before
pronouncing upon the matter, we should in all fairness hear the other
side, although it does look as though the electric wire fence must be
admitted. But there is enough in what is reported from Formosa to give
us pause when we consider the possibility of parting with the control
of the Philippine Islands, whether to Japan or to any other nation.

In so far as the wild tribes of the Archipelago are concerned, we have
made a happy beginning; we owe it to our self-respect to carry on the
work to a happy end. This we can do by heeding the simplest of rules:
Leave well alone.

The Independence of the Philippines.

"Am I my brother's keeper?" _Genesis iv. 9._

"If we lose sight of the welfare of the people in a creed or a phrase
or a doctrine, we have taken leave of our intelligence, and we have
proved ourselves unfit for leadership."--_A Letter to Uncle Sam._

Shall we give their independence to the Philippines? To this question
an answer is still to be made by the American people. Not only do
we not know whether we shall give this independence or not, but we
have not yet decided whether we ought to or not. Even if we could
suppose that the country had made up its mind on the subject, it
would still be true that no competent authority has considered the
manner in which our country would translate its desires into action,
whether in one direction or another.

The reason of this state of affairs is not far to seek: our people
neither know anything about these islands, nor do they care anything
about them. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that our ignorance is
the logical result of our indifference. The Islands are far away, as
it were, inhabited by a different race, busied, on the whole, about
things that form no part of our life, whether national or private. We
have, as a people, bestowed no serious thought upon them; we have
not yet raised the disposition to be made of them to the dignity of
a national question.



The Philippines became ours by the fortune of war. On the subsidence
of the immediate questions raised by the war, we have continued
in the ownership of the Islands without concerning ourselves thus
far as to the ultimate place they are to occupy in our national
ecomony. Of this state of affairs, but one opinion can be expressed:
it is extraordinary. Even in a grossly material point of view,
our attitude is indefensible; if we regard ourselves as landlords,
we are indifferent to our tenants; if as mere owners, then are we
careless of the future of our property. We have not assumed the
responsibilities involved with any national sense of responsibility;
we have neither declared nor formed any policy. But in this fact
lies the extraordinariness of the situation. Of the soundness of our
title to the Islands at international law there is not the shadow of a
doubt; the Islands are ours. What do we intend to do with them? Why
have we not, after fourteen years' possession, found an answer
to the question, or, in other words, declared a policy? Nations,
no less than individuals, must take an interest in their property,
and society demands as a right that any property of whatever nature
shall be adjusted in respect of relations to all other property. We
have followed this course as regards Cuba and Porto Rico; but,
apart from taking the Philippines and continuing to own them, we
have made no adjustment of their case. The property, as such, has
been administered, and, on the whole, well administered; the amount
of work done, indeed, is astonishing. But that is not the issue:
however good has been the official administration of the Archipelago,
whatever the progress under our tutelage of its peoples as a whole,
no one knows to-day what relation will be permanently established
between the Archipelago and the United States, what our policy is, or
is to be, in respect of the Islands. And yet upon our declaration of a
policy hangs their future. The matter in its interest and importance is
national; equally national is the indifference we have displayed with
respect to its settlement. Both the United States and the Philippines
are entitled to a decision.



At the outset of any consideration of the question in hand, it is
obvious that we are not shut up _a priori_ to any one solution. Thus,
we may decide, to keep the Islands, or we may grant them immediate
independence, or independence at some future date; we may establish a
protectorate, or give a qualified independence, or even turn them over
to some other power--for example, England or Japan; or, finally, we
may secure an international agreement to neutralize the Islands, thus
ostensibly guarding them against the ambitions of powerful neighbors
of colonizing disposition. All of these solutions have at one time
or another been mentioned; not one of them has ever been officially
announced by the Government, or ratified by the people. Although they
are all possible, yet a moment's thought shows that they are of very
different weight: it is hard to conceive, for example, of our turning
the Islands over to England. Excluding, then, cession to any foreign
power, we may roughly arrange the various possibilities in a scale,
as it were: (_a_) absolute retention; (_b_) qualified retention; (_c_)
protectorate; (_d_) neutralization; (_e_) international independence
at some future date; (_f_) immediate international independence. On
examining this list thus arranged, certain deductions appear. The
stated various possibilities are not all independent, nor are they
all exclusive one of the others. Thus (_a_) excludes all the rest, or,
better, implies (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_), and excludes (_a_) and (_f_);
(_b_) and (_c_) between them are not independent, since a qualified
retention may pass into a protectorate. Neutralization not impossibly
may ultimately call for a protectorate. Future, independence, so
long as unaccomplished, implies (_a_), (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_), while
(_f_) is completely exclusive. It may, however, not prevent foreign
absorption, if, once out, we stay out.

We shall not here take up all of these possibilities. Whatever other
conclusion may be reached, the American people must first pass, either
tacitly or explicitly, on retention or independence. If either of these
extreme be selected, the other possibilities go by the board. If both
are rejected, the remaining four will then have their day in court.

Our immediate purpose, then, is to discuss the question with which
this investigation opens, with the definite purpose of suggesting,
if not of reaching, conclusions that may help others in forming a
decision. It is only when individual decisions have so increased in
number as in some sort to form a body of public opinion that future
action, whether for or against independence, is to be expected.



However unjustly the American people may treat its own self in respect
of tariffs and other issues deeply affecting its welfare, it may be
taken for granted, and is so taken here, that in foreign relations the
desire of the people is to do what is right. The right determined,
a duty is imposed. Clearly, then, we must first try to discover in
this case what is right--what is right for us, what is right for the
Islanders. It may be that what is theoretically right, or regarded
as theoretically right, shall turn out to be practically wrong; or
that what is right for the one shall be wrong for the other. Again,
some common standing-ground may be found, where the right of each,
converted into the rights of both, may so far overlap as substantially
to coincide.

The idea is held by a vigorous few, and incessantly expressed,
that the American people, through force of arms, is holding in
subjection and depriving of liberty another people; that this
state of affairs is wrong, bad for both sides, and should come to
an end by an immediate grant of full independence to the Filipino
people, because no one nation is good enough to hold any other
in subjection. It is pertinent to remark, that these ideas so far
have found no nation-wide expression: as already said, they are the
expression of only a few, but they may be the private opinions of
many. Taken together, they constitute what may be called the purely
abstract view of the case. This view takes no account of attendant
conditions; it asserts that the right is one and only one thing,
and can not be anything else; that is to say, it defines the right
and refuses to admit that any other definition will hold, or that
any elements can enter into the definition other than those which it
has seen fit to include. If no other aspect of the case be correct,
our duty is indeed plain. But it is conceivable that this view may
not be correct, or at least that so many other factors have to be
considered that what might be true in the abstract is subject to very
considerable modification when applied to things as they are.

Of this, no better illustration can be given here than the error
committed when it is asserted that we, one people, are holding another
people, the Filipino, in subjection. As a matter of fact, there is no
Filipino people. A certain number of persons, about eight millions,
inhabit, the Philippine Archipelago, but it is no more correct to call
these one people than it is to call the Europeans one people, because
they happen to inhabit the European continent. It is well to keep
this point in mind, because, unless a grave error is here committed,
the impression prevails that it is one single, homogeneous people
whom we are unjustly depriving of independence. At any rate, if not
categorically expressed, the connotation of the idea of homogeneity
exists. How far this is from the truth is so evident to any person
having the slightest real acquaintance with the Philippines, that
it would hardly be worth while to dwell upon the matter here, were
it not for the ignorance of our people at large. It is convenient
to speak of the Filipino people, just as it is convenient to speak
of the Danish people, or of the English; but whereas, when we say
"Danish" or "English" we mean one definite thing that exists as such,
when we say "Filipino" we should understand that the term stands
for a relatively great number of very different things. For example,
confining ourselves for the moment to the Christianized tribes, it
may be asserted that the inhabitants of the great Cagayan Valley, the
tobacco-growing country, are at least as different from those of the
Visayas, the great middle group of Islands, as are the Italians from
the Spanish. Precisely similar differences, increasing, roughly, with
the difference of latitude, may be drawn almost at random between any
other pairs of the elements constituting the Filipino population. The
Ilokanos, to give only one more illustration, have almost nothing more,
in common with the Bicols than the fact that they both probably come
from the same original stock, just as the English and the Germans have
the same ancestors. All these subdivisions speak different languages,
and the vast majority do not speak Spanish at all.

But this is not all. The Filipino peoples are divided into two
great classes, the Christian and the non-Christian. Now, these
non-Christians number over a million, and are themselves broken up into
many subdivisions, not only differing in language, customs, habits and
traditions, but until very recently bitterly hostile to one another,
and so low in the scale of political development that, unlike our
own Indians, they have never risen to any conception of even tribal
government or organization. Moreover, in Moroland, in the great island
of Mindanao with its neighbors, the situation is further complicated by
the fact that the dominant elements are Mohammedan. Over most of these
non-Christians the Spaniards had not even the shadow of control. The
appellation "Filipino people" is therefore wholly erroneous; more
than that, it is even dangerously fallacious, in that its use blinds
or tends to blind our own people to the real conditions existing in
the Archipelago. It is correct to speak of the Filipino _peoples_,
because this expression is, geographically, accurately descriptive;
but it is absolutely misleading to speak of the Filipino _people_,
because of the false political idea involved and conveyed by the use
of the singular number. Similarly, there is no objection to the term
"Filipino" or "Filipinos," so long as we understand it to mean merely
an inhabitant or the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago,
more narrowly the Christianized inhabitant or inhabitants; but it
is distinctly wrong to give to the term a political or national
color. It may be remarked now that the divisions, both Christian and
non-Christian, of which we have been speaking, determined as they are
by natural conditions, are likely to survive for many generations to
come. At any rate, the fact that many, and those the most important,
constituent elements of the proposed independent government are widely
separated by the seas, and that even those situated on the same islands
are confined by mountain ranges hitherto extremely difficult to cross,
makes it plain that the homogeneity necessary to the formation and
permanency of a strong government will be hard to secure, or, if ever
secured, to maintain.

When, therefore, it is proposed to grant independence to the
Philippine Islands, let it be recollected that this grant is to
be made not to a single homogeneous people, of one speech, of one
religion, of one state of civilization, of one degree of social and
political development, but to an aggregation of peoples, of different
speech, of different religions, of widely varying states of social
and political development, of little or no communication with one
another--to an aggregation, in short, whose elements, before 1898,
had had but one bond, the involuntary bond of inherited subjection
to Spanish authority, and all of which to-day are distinguished by
the characteristic trait of the Oriental, absence of the quality
of sympathy.



Since, at international law, our title to the Islands is unclouded,
it follows that our responsibility in the premises is complete. If,
therefore, in the administration of our responsibility, our wards
should make a request for independence, it is our duty to examine
this request, to inquire into its origin, and then to investigate
its reasonableness with the purpose of determining whether, in the
circumstances, our wards are able, prepared, or ready to undertake
the responsibilities which they pray us to discharge upon them.

That the request for independence is made, and frequently made, there
can be no doubt. It has been made in the past and it will continue
to be made in the future. One hears it in speeches, and the native
press echoes it. Regularly the Assembly closes, or used to close,
its sessions by a resolution calling upon the United States to
grant immediate independence to the Philippine Islands. Apparently
the request has some volume; in any case, it is more or less loudly
made. Now, if the demand is widespread, if it conies from all ranks of
society, from the humblest peasant in the rice-paddies to the richest
merchant of Manila, from the tobacco-planter of the Cagayan Valley
to the hemp-stripper of Davao, if it is made in full recognition of
the responsibilities involved, then, whether we are disposed to grant
it or not, it is a serious matter. It becomes serious, objectively,
because so many people arc asking for it. Even if the demand come
but from a few, the matter is nevertheless, subjectively, one of
concern, because we are responsible, and no factor or element should
be overlooked in making up our minds.

Now, it is a fact that the chief demand for independence comes from
the Tagalogs, the subdivision or tribe of the Filipinos (we are using
the word here and elsewhere as a convenience merely) inhabiting Manila
and the adjacent provinces. We speak in all kindliness when we say that
they are distinguished by a certain restlessness of disposition, by a
considerable degree of vanity. They are not so given to labor as some
others--for example, the Ilokanos, to whom they are measurably inferior
in point of trustworthiness. More numerous than any other tribe except
the Visayans, they are also wealthier and better educated. Some of
them have therefore earned and achieved distinction, but these are
exceptions, for in general they are characterized by volatility and
superficiality. They are more mixed in blood than other tribes. It is
not without significance that it was these same Tagalogs who organized
in the past the chief insurrections against the domination of Spain,
principally, as is well known, because of the misrule of the friars. It
is also a fact that the farther one removes from Manila the feebler
becomes the cry for independence. If we consider the condition of the
loudest supporters of the movement, we find them all, or nearly all,
to be politicians, _politicos_. Some of these politicians are not
Tagalogs--for example, Senor Osmena, the Speaker of the Assembly,
is a Visayan; so that it would perhaps be more accurate to say
of the entire propaganda that it is an affair of the politicians,
supported chiefly by Tagalogs. In other words, it is worth while to
ask ourselves if the demand for independence be real, arising out
of the necessities of the people, or artificial, exploited by the
politicians for ends not unfamiliar to us here in the States. It is
useless to appeal for a decision to public opinion in the Archipelago,
that shall include the whole population, for no such public opinion
exists or can exist. And if it be argued that lack of public opinion
is no disproof of the existence of a real desire for independence, the
rejoinder springs at once to the tongue, that independence would be
a sham where public opinion is impossible. There is cause to believe
that the true aspect of the case is to be found in a remark made
by a young Tagalog (to Mr. Taft himself, if we recollect aright),
that there was no reason why independence should not be established
at once, seeing that the two things needed already existed in the
Philippines, to-wit, the governed in the shape of the peasantry of
the fields, and the governors among the _gente fina,_ the _gente
ilustrada_ (the superior classes) of Manila. However this may be,
a native newspaper of Manila, distinguished by its hostility to all
things American, by its insistent demand for independence, did not
hesitate to accuse the wealthy Filipino class of being "refractory
to the spirit of association," of being "egotistical and disdainful
toward the middle and lower classes," and of refusing "to join their
interests with those of the lower classes." [53]

We do not go so far as do some, and believe that the whole agitation
is but a conspiracy to place the destinies of the Islands in the hands
of an oligarchy. But, in all probability, a Tagalog oligarchy would
be formed; for the capital, Manila, is Tagalog, the adjacent provinces
are Tagalog, the wealthy class of the Islands on the whole is Tagalog,
and there is no middle class anywhere. The mere fact that the capital
is situated in the Tagalog provinces would perhaps alone determine
the issue, apart from the fact that the Tagalogs are the dominant
element, of the native population. Before granting independence,
therefore, we should be reasonably sure that we are not in reality
placing supreme control in the hands of a few.

But let us suppose that in fact the populations of the Archipelago were
quite generally to ask for independence. We must again ask ourselves,
How genuine or real would this demand be? It is not very difficult to
answer this question. The Filipino is most easily led and influenced;
indeed, it is to be doubted if anywhere else in the world a being
can be found more easily led and influenced. [54] For example, it is
relatively not an uncommon thing, certainly in the Tagalog provinces,
for a man having a grudge against a neighbor to invite three or
four friends to join him in boloing his enemy. The invitation is
frequently accepted, although the guests may themselves have nothing
whatever against the victim-to-be. Early in 1909, a miscreant who had
been parading himself in women's clothes as a female Jesus Christ,
upon exposure by a native doctor, out of revenge got together a band
of nineteen men, and with their help proceeded to cut the doctor to
pieces. This occurred within a day's march of Manila. The example just
given suggests another Filipino trait, the readiness with which the
more ignorant will swallow any and all religious nostrums, and form
absurd sects, usually for the financial or other material benefit of
their leaders. In yet another case, a murderous bandit [55] of Tayabas
Province, a Tagalog province, whom we caught and very properly hanged,
used to promise as a reward for any deed of special villainy in which
he might be interested, a bit of _independencia_ (independence),
and then would show a box with the word painted on it, declaring that
it contained a supply sent down to him from Manila. He never failed
to find men to do his will. Our purpose in citing these examples,
whose number might be indefinitely multiplied, is not to show that
the poor, ignorant Filipino is especially criminal of disposition,
but to point out the ease with which he can be led by other men. If,
under evil influence, he will altruistically, as it were, consent to
almost any crime, obviously he can be induced to consent to almost
anything else. His consent or acquiescence can not be taken to indicate
appreciation of the issue.

If told, then, by his political leaders that he must ask for
independence, the Filipino most certainly will ask for it; and the fact
that in the majority of cases he has no idea of what he is asking for
will make no difference to him, just as this makes no difference to his
_cacique_, or boss. But it ought to make a great deal of difference
to us. We may be giving him edged tools to play with, only to find
when too late that the edge has been turned against him, a result
for which we should then be directly responsible. If a general or
universal request could be taken to show that lack of independence is
operating to deprive the Filipino of his liberty and to estop him in
the pursuit of happiness, the situation of affairs would be confessedly
acute. But it is a fact patent to all who know the country, that the
Filipino enjoys a freedom at least as great as that of the average
American citizen, and is at complete liberty to pursue happiness in
any way consistent with the law of the land and with the rights of
others. We must conclude that a request, even if universal, would not
necessarily be for us a safe guide of action. The universality shown
might prove merely that all had agreed to what had been proposed by
the leaders, and would leave untouched the merits of the case.



Intimately allied with this question of reasonableness are those of
readiness, preparedness, capacity to assume the burdens as well as
the rights and privileges of independence.

On readiness, we need not dwell; it is the readiness of acquiescence,
not of preparation: the Filipinos are ready, just as children are
ready to play with matches. But preparedness and capacity call for
more consideration, however brief.

No one will pretend that the Filipinos have had any political
training. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, only 350 years ago,
they were all uncivilized. Many of them are still semi-savages; others
are savages pure and simple. These facts are indisputable. If, then,
we turn to history for assistance, we can not find a single instance
of any real political evolution in any of the various divisions of
the inhabitants of the Archipelago. The exception furnished by the
debased Mohammedan sultanates of the great Island of Mindanao is only
apparent. The germ of fruitful growth is everywhere missing. Now,
the Spaniards assuredly took no steps to teach their new subjects
the art and science of government; there was every reason, from their
point of view, why they should not teach this art and science. On the
other hand, our own course has been totally different. We have lost
no time in putting political power into the hands of the natives,
so that to-day, after fourteen years' possession, municipal and
provincial government are almost wholly native. To crown all,
we have given the Filipinos an elective legislature, an Assembly,
all the members of which are native. Students of the subject at
first hand, impartial observers on the spot, declare freely that
we have gone much too fast, and that we have granted a measure of
political administration and government beyond the native power of
assimilation and digestion. With this opinion, sound though it be,
we are not immediately concerned: the point we wish to bring out is
that the experiment we have made is not free; that the case is one
of constrained motion, since everyone knows that the mighty power of
the United States dominates the entire situation, and that under these
conditions the Filipinos have been exercising themselves in the form of
government, rather than in responsible government itself. The Filipino
government as such has faced no crisis: behind its treasury stands
that of the metropolis. Order is assured by the garrison maintained
by us, internal police by the Constabulary, another agency of American
origin. But, even if all this were not true, it is questionable if an
experience of only eight or nine years affords sufficient ground for
the belief that a nascent government could exist and advance under
its own power alone.

Our training, ample and generous though it may have been, as it has
not, for lack of time if for no other reason, prepared the native to
govern himself, so it furnishes no real test of his capacity to govern
himself. Self-government is not a function of the mere ability to fill
certain offices, to discharge certain routine duties of administration:
it depends for its existence and maintenance on the possession of
certain qualities, and still more, perhaps, on the possession of those
qualities by a majority of the people who practice or are to practice
self-government, on an educated and inherited interest of the citizen
in the questions affecting his welfare in so far as this is conditioned
by government. Tested in this wise, the Filipino breaks down locally;
to believe that anything else will happen internationally is to blind
one's self to the teaching of experience.

But there is yet another test. If political independence is to be of
value to those who have it, if it is to endure in any useful way,
it must rest on economic independence. The state must be able to
meet its obligations, and by this we do not mean merely its current
bills, its housekeeping bills, as it were, but its obligations of
all and whatever nature, interior police, finance, administration,
dispensation of justice, communications, sanitation, education,
defense. We do not find these things too easy in our own land, and
all of us can without effort bring to mind examples of independent
societies in tropical regions, where, these things being neglected,
the resultant government is a mockery. Have we any reason to believe
that the Filipino, untrained, inexperienced, occupying an undeveloped
area of special configuration in a region where continuous effort is
disagreeable and initiative distressing, will achieve success where
others of greater original fitness have made a failure?

Evidently the possibility of obtaining an answer to this question
depends on the possibility of determining, within allowable limits of
precision, the qualities and defects of the Filipino peoples. Now,
this is a difficult thing to do, but it is not an impossible thing;
at any rate, a first approximation may be derived from the authorities
quoted in the "Census of the Philippine Islands," 1903, pp 492 _et
seq._ In time, these authorities range from Legaspi, 1565, to our
own day, and include governors, prelates, travellers, engineers,
priests, etc., among whom are found Spaniards, Englishmen, Americans,
and Filipinos, As might be expected, all sorts of qualities and defects
are reported. Classifying these, and rejecting from consideration all,
whether quality or defect, not supported by at least five authorities,
it may be concluded, so far as this induction goes, that the Filipino
is, on the one hand, hospitable, courageous, fond of music, show,
and display; and, on the other, indolent, superstitious, dishonest,
and addicted to gambling. One quality, imitativeness, is possibly
neutral. It would appear that his virtues do not especially look toward
thrift--_i.e._, economic independence--and that his defects positively
look the other way. If the witnesses testifying be challenged on the
score of incompetency, let us turn to the reports of the supervisors
of the census, contained in the volume already cited; for these
cover the entire Archipelago, and set forth actual conditions at
one and the same epoch, 1903, the date of the census. Moreover,
these supervisors, as welt as the special agents and enumerators,
were nearly all natives. When, therefore, these supervisors report
the mass of the Christianized Filipinos as simple and superstitious,
we may be sure that we have the truth; but we are also inevitably
led to the conclusion of economic unfitness. As this matter of
economic independence is one of the first importance in determining
the future of the Islands, we must look for all the light possible
on the question. A flood is thrown on it by an article entitled
"_Nulla est Redemptio_," published in the (native) _La Democracia_,
of Manila, October 10, 1910, and believed to be the production of
perhaps the ablest Filipino alive to-day. Premising that agriculture is
the chief source of Philippine wealth, and that this source failing,
all others must fail, the author points out that, although taxes are
lighter in the Archipelago than in any other country, production is
much less, and that this is the chief cause of the prevailing economic
distress. He points out further that the Assembly is wholly native,
as are all municipal and nearly all provincial officers, and that
therefore they, and the constituencies that elected them, must assume
responsibility. Now, what has been achieved? The provinces have spent
money on buildings and parks, but, with one brilliant exception, none
on roads. Nothing has been done for agriculture. Of the municipalities,
the least said the better; they are a wreck in the full extension
of the word. And, as the hope of a people must rest in its youth,
what does he find to be the case? Thousands of candidates in pharmacy,
law, medicine; as regards the Civil Service, enough candidates to fill
all the posts in the Islands for generations to come. But of farmers,
young men willing to return to the fields, their own fields, and by the
sweat of their brow to work out the salvation of the country? None:
the development of this principal element of national existence is
left to the ignorant and indolent peasantry. He draws no less gloomy
a picture in respect of capital and property. Nine-tenths of Manila,
and all important provincial real estate, is mortgaged. Capital is
furnished at exorbitant rates of interest, and usury prevails. In the
country, no security is accepted save real property, and then only
when the lender is satisfied that his debtor will be unable to pay,
and that the security will pass.

Bad as the outlook is, no remedy suggests itself. For, returning
to the theme that agriculture is recognized as vital, much energy
is spent in discussion, discourses, lectures, in writing articles,
in discovering reasons why agriculture does not flourish, but nothing
else and nothing more. [56]

The picture may be overdrawn; but it is a Filipino picture, drawn by
a Filipino hand. Let us now permit, the native press to speak again
on the subject engaging our attention. Thus _Vanguardia_ [57] a bitter
anti-American sheet, arraigns its wealthy fellow-countrymen for lack of
initiative and fondness of routine. It accuses them of a willingness to
invest in city property, to deposit money in banks, "to make loans at
usurious rates, in which they take advantage of the urgent and pressing
necessities of their countrymen," but of unwillingness "to engage
in agriculture, marine or industrial enterprise"; and says they are
"generally lacking in the spirit of progression." According to another
native newspaper, the vice of gambling has infected all classes of
society, men and women alike, rich and poor, young and old. Mere it
is almost impossible to overdraw the picture, so widespread is the
vice. Let us now couple these statements, drawn from native sources,
with the fact that the Christianized tribes, all told, number some
7,000,000; that of these but one-tenth speak Spanish; and that of
this tenth only a very few are educated in any accepted sense of the
word. Repeating here a form of summation already employed in this
discussion, let us bear in mind that, if we decide to make a grant
of independence, we shall be deciding to grant it to a population,
composed, first, of a very few educated persons; next, of a small
fraction able, through the possession of Spanish, to communicate,
with one another; and, lastly, of a remainder--the vast, the immense
majority--not only unable so to communicate, but characterized by
qualities that, however commendable in themselves, do not constitute a
foundation on which popular self-government may safely rest. Further,
we mean to grant it to a population which contains no middle class,
to one in which the poor are peculiarly at the mercy of the rich, and
in which nearly all the elements that make for economic independence
are conspicuously lacking.



What would happen if we were to grant immediate independence to
the Islands? Without having the gift of prophecy, one runs no risk
in declaring that civil war would be almost unavoidable. At least
this is the belief of some well-informed Filipinos, a belief that
appears to have some ground when we take into account, the great
probability of a Tagalog oligarchy. But, without going so far as to
predict armed strife, it would seem that any government, not held
together by some strong external power, would soon begin to break
up. Its various elements, not only differentiated from one another
by speech, but physically separated, in many cases, by the seas,
would tend to fall apart. The Visayas, for example, would refuse
sooner or later to acknowledge the Tagalog supremacy of Luzon. If
we proceed farther south still, what practicable bond can be found
to exist between Mindanao, peopled by Mohammedans and savages,
and Luzon or Panay or Negros? The consequences of such a disruption
as is here predicted must occur to everyone. The gravest of these,
gravest in that it would defeat our purpose in granting independence,
would be foreign intervention. Japan would most certainly insist on
being heard. Now, the Filipinos, as a whole, prefer our sovereignty
to that of the Japanese. England, too, would have a right to interfere
for the protection of her commercial interests in the Archipelago. It
exercised this sort of right, in 1882, by seizing Egypt in behalf of
civilization in general. In the meantime, the Moros of Mindanao and
Jolo would have resumed their piratical excursions to the northward,
burning, killing, and carrying off slaves. If this be questioned,
then let us recollect that as recently as 1897 they carried off slaves
from the Visayas, a sporadic case, probably, but giving evidence that
the disease of piracy is to-day merely latent. Given an opportunity,
it will break out again. Under independence, the large, beautiful,
and fertile island of Mindanao would be left to its own devices,
would be lost to civilization. Upon this point we need have no doubt
whatever. The issue of Filipino control of Mindanao was very clearly
raised, when Mr. Dickinson, the late Secretary of War, visited Mindanao
in August of 1910. Upon this occasion Mr. Dickinson, in response to
a Filipino plea for immediate independence, with consequent control
of the Moros, made a speech in which he declared the unwillingness
of the Government to entrust to the 66,000 Filipinos living in
Mindanao the government of the 350,000 Moros of this province. At
the close of this speech, four _datus_ (chiefs), present with 2,000
of their people, and controlling the destinies of 40,000 souls,
swore allegiance to the United States; and, requesting that, if the
Americans ever withdrew from Mindanao, the Moros should be placed
in control, firmly announced, at the same time, their intention
to fight if the Americans should ever take their departure. One of
the _datus_, Mandi by name, was outspoken in praise of the present
Government, and both he and the other chiefs declared that they were
contented with things as they are. Such testimony as is afforded by
the foregoing incident is not lightly to be brushed aside to make
way for an abstraction. If disregarded, then the efforts that we have
made to better the condition of Mindanao, to introduce some idea of
law and order, some notion of the value of peace and of industry,
will come to a sudden end; for the Christianized Filipinos can never
hope to cope with the active, warlike pirates of Moroland. So far as
this part of the Archipelago is concerned, a grant of independence
means the re-establishment of slavery, the recrudescence of piracy,
[58] the reincarnation of barbarism. How great a pity this would be
may be inferred from the fact that Mindanao forms nearly one-third
of the Archipelago in area, and exceeds Java in arable land. Now,
Java supports a population of over 25,000,000.

If we turn our attention to the other non-Christian elements of the
Islands, the case is no better. The Christianized Filipino fears
and dreads the pagan mountaineers, the head-hunters who occupy so
large a part of Luzon, the largest and most important island of the
Archipelago. He grudges every _centavo_ spent under our direction
for the betterment of these truly admirable wild men The governor,
the Christian governor, of a province bordering on the wild men's
territory, had, indeed, no other idea of the way to treat his pagan
neighbors, about 50,000 in number, than to kill them all. His argument
was that they were worse than useless, why spend any money on them,
when, by exterminating them, all questions affecting them would be
forever answered? But, under our administration, some excellent work
has been done, and is growing, to turn these as yet unspoiled peoples
to account in the destinies of the Archipelago. Independence would
mean the _end_ of this work, the restoration of the old order of
rapine, murder, and all injustice as between Christians and pagans,
and of internecine strife and warfare as between the communities of
the pagans themselves. That this result would follow is not even
questioned by those who have acquired their knowledge at first
hand. Are we willing to shoulder the responsibility of such a result?

We have at our very doors an example of the danger of independence
to a people unfilled for the burdens and responsibilities of
self-government. We have already since 1900 been compelled once
to intervene in the affairs of Cuba: the possibility of a fresh
intervention continually stares our statesmen in the face. But Cuba,
let it be observed, in contrast with the Philippines, has but one
language, one religion; it has no wild tribes, no Mohammedans; its
provinces are not separated from one another by seas of difficult
navigation, are bound together by suitable communications. The curse
of Cuba is personal politics: have we any assurance that this same
curse in a worse form would not come to blast the Philippines?



Some of the conclusions reached or hinted at in the course of this
argument must have formed themselves in the minds of at least a few
Filipinos of independent character. Otherwise how shall we account
for the fact that some declare their disbelief in the possibility of
independence? How else shall we explain what is far more significant,
the silence under this head of the really first-rate men of the
Archipelago? Is it not worthy of note that Rizal himself, the
posthumous apostle of the Philippines, never advocated or contemplated
independence? In yet other cases, the belief held finds expression
in the assertion that the Islands must be declared independent,
but only under the protection of the United States. What that would
ultimately mean is so plain to those who know the country as to
require no consideration here. It may even be asserted on the best of
authority, so far as any authority is possible in such a case, that
not even those who shout the loudest for independence arc sincere in
their clamor the Assembly itself would be seriously disturbed if its
resolution to this end should suddenly be honored by the United States.

We make bold to quote here, in full, a short editorial that appeared
in the _Weekly Times of_ Manila, December 30, 1910:

"Mr. Perry Robinson, whose articles on the Philippines are now
being published by the London _Times_, makes one point that offers
a valuable, suggestion to our ardent friends of the Nationalist
party. [59] While here, Mr. Robinson interviewed a number of the
leaders of the party and discovered that they were all afraid of
immediate independence. They admitted that the country and people would
not be ready for it for years, and, when pressed for an explanation,
said they feared, if they did not press the question now, it would not
avail them to do so later on. The inconsistency of the present position
must strike every sensible person who examines it. Let us assume that
the United States Government decides at this time to give ear to the
plea of those who are politically active in the Philippines--what will
happen? It will dispatch a commission or committee to the Islands
to examine the representations of those who make the plea. It is
admitted by even the Nationalist leaders, when speaking privately on
this question, that the people are not ready to shift for themselves
and can not be made ready for some years. Surely it is not believed
that the investigators are going to be deceived about the real truth
as to conditions in the Islands, and we are unable to see what good
is to be accomplished by having this inquiry made.

"Would it not be infinitely better for the Nationalist and other
leaders in this country to squarely face the facts and base all their
future operations on the facing of those facts? One difficulty is
that they have made a lot of promises and professions to the people
that they are incapable of fulfilling, and another is that they have
largely aided in deceiving the people themselves as to where they
really stand and as to what they are really capable of under present
conditions. But to go on means discredit and failure in the end, and a
greater work could be done for the country at large by squarely facing
the facts. It must be admitted that neither position is especially
pleasant. There has been created among the people a vanity of ability
and power that will make the blow a hard one; but unless there are
Filipino leaders capable of making the people realize the truth about
their position, there is really not much hope for them in the future.

"The truth is, that the race must be built up physically and its
numbers be enormously increased before it may seriously assume the
obligations of statehood; and, for our part, we await the statesman
who is prepared to drive this and other important lessons home to
the minds and hearts of the people.

"Assurance and pretense serve their purposes on many occasions, but
they must be set aside when it comes to the test that will be applied
to the plea that Filipino leaders now make with such persistency."

It is maintained that the matter of this short editorial deserves to
be as deeply pondered by the people of the United States as by the
Filipinos to whom it is specially addressed.

That all this talk of independence, the motions to that end
occasionally made in Congress, the circulation of so-called
anti-imperialistic literature, have so far endangered the real
interests of the Philippines, there can be no reasonable doubt. The
independence propaganda prevents, or tends to prevent, recognition of
the fact that the Philippines will be greater with the United States
than they can ever hope to be standing alone, if so be that they can
stand alone at all. It has retarded the development of the Islands
and has checked progress. It forces into the background the fact that
with an infinitude of work lying before Americans and Filipinos alike,
if the Islands are to have their full value in the world's economy,
the best way to do this work is for Americans and Filipinos to labor
together, each contributing his share to the common result. Upon this
safe ground both may stand. "The law of life is labor; the joy of
life is accomplishment." But we can not labor if the fruits of our
toil may be torn from us; accomplishment is impossible in the face
of uncertainty and dissension. If our people have the welfare of
the Philippines genuinely at heart, it must thoroughly consider the
question of permanent retention; for this course, on the one hand,
would not only clear away all misunderstanding, but, on the other,
it would meet the real responsibilities of the case. There is no
disposition here to burke the fact that these responsibilities
are serious, if not onerous; that they call for administrative
statesmanship of a very high order. But we should also recognize the
fact that these responsibilities are ours, created by us, and that our
rejection of them is sure to be followed by consequences disastrous,
not to us, but to the Filipinos themselves. If, on the other hand,
we accept these responsibilities, then sooner or later Americans and
Filipinos together could bend their energies to the development of a
country in which they would now have the same interest. And if, under
the prevailing uncertainty, so much has already been accomplished in
preventing disease, abating epidemics, building roads and bridges,
erecting telegraphs and telephones, lighting the coasts, establishing
courts of law, equalizing taxation, conserving forests, founding
schools and colleges, encouraging commerce and agriculture, what may
not unreasonably be expected if all shall feel that the foundations
of order, system, and justice are permanent, that life is secure,
liberty assured, and the pursuit of happiness possible?

Surely there is significance in the effect at once produced in
the sugar-raising islands by the passage of the Payne Bill:
idle fields were planted to cane, and the elections took an
unmistakable _americanista_ trend. There is no better peacemaker
than the pay-master. The Assembly, it is true, fulminated against
the bill: success, prosperity, contentment under its operation
might mean the dissolution of a dream. So they might; but the bill
also categorically established the possibility, and more than the
possibility, of permanently profitable relations under the aegis of
the United States. It might even ultimately greatly reduce, if not
entirely destroy, the racial issue. Here is already common ground,
limited though it be, on which Americans and Filipinos may and do
stand together. If any doubt should exist on this score, we have but
to look at Porto Rico, whose total external commerce has grown, in
round numbers, from 17 1/2 million dollars in 1901 to 79 millions in
1911. During this same interval that of the Philippines has risen from
53 million to 90 million dollars, nearly 20 millions of the increase
being due to the Payne Bill. The population of Porto Rico (census of
1910) is 1,120,000; that of the Philippines, 8,200,000: the area of
Porto Rico is 3,606 square miles; that of the Philippines, 128,000
square miles. This comparison is frankly commercial; but thriving
commerce means prosperity, and prosperity spells content. After
eliminating certain natural and social advantages enjoyed by Porto
Rico, and not by the Philippines, the vast economic difference
between the two can be accounted for only by the different relation
they respectively bear to the United States, a conclusion confirmed
by the effect of the Payne Bill. In the case of one, this relation
is defined; in that of the other, undefined. We intend to remain in
Porto Rico; we do not know what we shall do with the Philipines.



To conclude, and in part to repeat: when we took over the Philippines,
we unquestionally at the same time acquired a burden. Of this burden
we can rid ourselves by setting the Islands adrift; or we can declare
that we intend to keep the Islands, as we have kept Porto Rico. In the
light of the argument hereinbefore submitted, which of these courses
appeals to the people of the United States? May we, or may we not,
without incurring an accusation of injustice to a dependent population,
honestly ask ourselves if actual conditions should not sometimes limit
or control the application of an abstract principle? Does our duty in
the premises consist or not in merely satisfying such a principle? Is
it or is it not possible that practical considerations--and what
is practical is not always sordid--may outweigh an abstraction? Is
it or is it not conceivably our duty to use our superior knowledge,
power and experience to the best advantage of those chiefly concerned,
even if these should apparently for a time not agree with us in the
application we purpose to make of our knowledge, power, and experience?


[1] See Retana's edition, p. 183, Madrid, 1909.

[2] It is interesting to note that as late as 1889 General Weyler,
then Governor-General of the Archipelago, in establishing various
_comandancias_, drew up regulations for the treatment of the natives,
etc., as remarkable for lenity and good sense as his later measures
in Cuba were, whether justly or not, distinguished for severity.

[3] For an account of the early missions of this order, see the Manila
_Libertas_ of May 23, 1910.

[4] Report of the Secretary of the Interior, Philippine Islands,
1910; Washington Government Printing Office, 1911.

[5] See "Census of the Philippine Islands," Vol. I., p. 453 _et seq.,_
for a discussion of the non-Christian tribes.

[6] Vol. I., p. 60 _et seq_.

[7] Mr. A.H. Savage Landor, in his "Gems of the East," protests against
our practice of boiling water before drinking it, but the experience
of others is against him. He was simply fortunate in not being made
ill by the natural water.

[8] An attempt has been made to stock this river with trout, but it
has proved a failure. The fish grew and throve, but did not breed.

[9] This happened on a large scale in the spring, of this year
(1912). Landslides having occurred on both banks of the canon, and
as luck would have it, at the same point, the waters rose behind
the natural dam thus formed to a height of over one hundred feet,
and breaking through, scoured the valley in their sweep, completely
wiping out the road.

[10] For a fuller account of Padre Villaverde's labors, see the Manila
_Libertas_ of May 17, 1910. Villaverde remained at his post until his
health broke completely; he set out for Spain, but never reached it,
dying August 4, 1897, and being buried at sea a few hours only from
Barcelona. The great trail he built reduced the cost of transportation
by nine-tenths.

[11] According to the native legend, this mountain used to form part of
the Zambales range. It became, however, by reason of its quarrelsome
disposition, so objectionable to its neighbors of this range, that
they finally resolved no longer to endure its cantankerousness and
accordingly banished it to its present position in the plain of
Central Luzon, where it would have no neighbors to annoy, and where
it has stood ever since, rising solitary from the surrounding plain.

[12] Dr. Barrows, in the "Census of the Philippine Islands," Vol. I.,
p 471, says that the etymology of this word is unknown. As it seems
to mean "people of the mountains," it is not unlikely to be a form of
"Igolot," by metathesis, as it were.

[13] According to some accounts, the Highlanders, in throwing the
spear, give it a rotation around its longest axis, twirling it rapidly
in the hand as this is brought up before the throw. In other words,
they have discovered that a rotating spear has greater accuracy than
a non-rotating one. If this is true, this discovery is worthy to be
bracketed with the use of the fire-syringe by the Tinguians of the
North, and by certain other wild people of the Archipelago.

[14] These salt deposits are now (1912), to the great satisfaction
of the people of the province, being worked by the Government, and
salt has ceased to be a luxury within the reach of only the few rich.

[15] The Ilongots are so few in number and scattered over so vast
and rough a country that trail-making can never be as successful in
their territory as it has been farther north.

[16] Dampier's description of what he saw in Mindanao fits here:
"This Distemper runs with a dry Scurf all over their Bodies, and
causeth great itching in those that have it, making them frequently
scratch and scrub themselves, which raiseth the outer skin in small
whitish flakes, like the scales of little Fish, when they are raised
on end with a Knife. This makes their skin extraordinary rough,
and in some you shall see broad white spots in several parts of
their Body. I judge such have had it, but are cured; for their
skins were smooth, and I did not perceive them to scrub themselves:
yet I have learnt from their own mouths that these spots were from
this Distemper."--Dampier's "Voyages," Masefield's edition, p. 341;
New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906.

[17] On one of his first expeditions elsewhere, however, when the
women realized that they were really to receive gifts of beads, etc.,
they rushed Mr. Worcester and his assistants, upsetting them all in
their eagerness to get at the stuff.

[18] So Strong said, himself an accomplished violinist.

[19] The straw mat covering the "split bottom" of the native
bed. There is no other mattress, and the "split bottom" constitutes
the springs. Once accustomed to it, the bed is cool and comfortable.

[20] Dampier's "Voyages," p. 319, Masefield's edition.

[21] According to De Morga (p. 196, Retana's edition), the _anito_
was a representation of the devil under horrible and frightful forms,
to which fruits and fowl and perfumes were offered. Each house had and
"made" (or performed) its _anitos_, there being no temples, without
ceremony or any special solemnity. "This word," says Retana, "is
ordinarily interpreted 'idol,' although it has other meanings. There
were _anitos_ of the mountains, of the fields, of the sea. The soul of
an ancestor, according to some, became embodied as a new _anito_, hence
the expression, 'to make _anitos_. Even living beings, notably the
crocodile, were regarded as _anitos_ and worshiped. The _anito-figura_,
generally shortened to _anito_, ... was usually a figurine of wood,
though sometimes of gold." (Glossary to his edition of De Morga,
pp. 486-487.)

"The _anito_ of the Philippines is essentially a protecting
spirit." (F. Jagor, "Travels in the Philippines," p. 298. English
translation, London, Chapman & Hall, 1875; originally published in
Berlin. 1873, "Reisen in den Philippinen," Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.)

"The religion of the islands, what may be called the true religion of
Filipinos, consisted of the worship of the _anitos_. These were not
gods, but the souls of departed ancestors, and each family worshipped
its own, in order to obtain their favorable influence." (Pardo de
Tavera, "Resena Historica de Filipinas," Manila, 1906.)

[22] _Apo_ means "lord, master." In the mountains every American
is called _apo_. "Sir" in Tagalo is _po_, and the highest mountain
of the Archipelago is named Apo. The native word for fire in these
parts is something like _apo_. To distinguish Mr. Forbes from other
_apos_. he was called _apo apo_ in communicating with the natives.

[23] Now frequently called _ub-ub, i.e_., "spring," in the Ifugao
country; a change of name due to Gallman.

[24] See De Morga, "_Sucesos_," etc., p. 184, Retana's edition,
and Retana's note on the passage; see also Jagor, "Travels," etc.,
p. 162 _et seq_.

[25] _Runo_ is a stiff reed grass growing to several feet, the mountain
cousin of the _cogon_ of the plains.

[26] The _Princesa_ was the only fat person we saw in the mountains:
apparently these Highlanders all grow thin with age, and wrinkled
from head to foot.

[27] See _Philippine Journal of Science_, July, 1909, for Villaverde's
account of the Ifugaos of Kiangan, translated and edited by Worcester,
with notes and an addendum by Major Case, of the Constabulary.

[28] Gallman says they also carry their spears point down to cause
the enemy's spears to miss.--_C. De W.W._

[29] As a matter of fact, they were "the terror of the Spaniards"; they
"annihilated an entire garrison at Payoan," "exacted a heavy annual
toll of heads from the people of Ragabag, and ... made the main trail
from Nueva Vizcaya to Isabela so dangerous that three strong garrisons
were constantly maintained on it, and ... people were not allowed to
travel over it: except under military escort, and even so were often
attacked and killed." (Worcester, _The National Geographic Magazine_,
March, 1911.) Gallman's mere name now suffices to do what three strong
Spanish garrisons failed to do.

[30] This danger still exists in the case of the savages of the
Southern Islands of the Archipelago, but Mr. Worcester, if undisturbed,
will bring these in too, all in time. In the fall of this very year,
1910, his party was attacked in Palawan.

[31] Many years ago some Moros were brought to Mayoyao to work
tobacco. The Ifugaos deeply resenting this invasion, at the first
opportunity attacked and killed them all. Only one woman escaped,
covered with wounds, to Echaguee, where she was in 1910, still
alive. The fight was most desperate, three Ifugaos biting the dust
for every Moro killed.

[32] See a native account of the part played by the Igorots in this
battle, in Seidenadel's "The First Grammar of the Language Spoken by
the Bontoc Igorot"; Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1909.

[33] Sometimes also called the Caicayan.

[34] Samoki is celebrated for its pottery, sold all through this
region, and of such quality that the Igorots use vessels made here
to reduce copper ore. The potter's wheel is unknown. In regard to the
skill of the highlanders in metallurgy, see Jagor, "Travels," p. 181.

[35] So do their cousins of Formosa. Pickering, "Pioneering in
Formosa," p. 150; London, Hurst & Blackett, 1898.

[36] For a full account of the way in which the Igorots have taken
to our sports, see Mr. Worcester's article in the March, 1911, number
of the _National Geographic Magazine_.

[37] A similiar institution exists among the aborigines of
Formosa. "... the unmarried men and boys slept in a shed raised from
the ground. This building was regarded as a kind of temple, in which
the vanquished heads were hung." (Pickering, "Pioneering in Formosa,"
p. 148.)

[38] For a more or less complete account of the Bontok Igorot,
see Jenks's "The Bontoc Igorot"; Manila, Bureau of Public Printing,
1905. For the language, consult "The First Grammar of the Language
Spoken by the Bontoc Igorot," by Doctor Carl Wilhelm Seidenadel;
Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1909.

[39] Dampier mentions this drink in his "New Voyage Around the
World." He calls it _bashee_, and found it in the Batanes Islands,
just north of Luzon: "And indeed, from the plenty of this Liquor,
and their plentiful use of it, our Men call'd all these Islands,
the Bashee Islands." (Masefield's edition, p. 425.)

[40] De La Gironiere, in his "Aventures d'un Gentilhomme Breton aux
Iles Philippines," describes (Chapter V.) a feast, at which he had,
while on a visit to the Tinguianes, to drink human brains mixed
with _basi_. Whatever De La Gironiere says must be received with
considerable caution; but Pickering, a prosaic and matter-of-fact
Britisher, speaking of the Formosan savages, says that "they mixed the
brains of their enemies with wine." ("Pioneering in Formosa," p. 153).

[41] For example, this year (1912) more people "came in" to
meet Mr. Worcester then ever before. In Bontok every valley
of the sub-province was represented, and there was a time when
representatives of all the villages danced together on the plaza,
an event of importance in the history of these people as marking the
passing of old feuds and a determination to live at piece with one
another. A moving picture machine was taken along in a four-wheeled
wagon (showing incidentally that the main trails have become roads
since 1910), and created both enthusiasm and alarm: enthusiasm
when some familiar scene with known living persons was thrown upon
the screen, and alarm when a railway train, for example, was shown
advancing upon the spectators, causing many of them to flee for safety
to the neighboring hills and woods.

[42] For an account of what this Government monopoly really meant,
see Jagor, "Travels," etc., p. 324. A Spaniard of my acquaintance
told me that if a native's attention to his crop did not please
the inspectors, they would cause him to be publicly flogged on
Sunday before the church after mass; and if this course brought no
amendment, they would then cut his stand down. Jagor, who travelled
in the Philippines as long ago as 1859-60, could see no future for
them save under American control, and he predicted that this control
would come, an astonishing prophecy. "In proportion as the navigation
of the west coast of America extends the influence of the American
element over the South Sea, the captivating, magic power which the
great Republic exercises over the Spanish colonies will not fail to
make itself felt also in the Philippines. The Americans are evidently
destined to bring to a full development the germs originated by the
Spaniards." ("Travels in the Philippines," p. 369.) Jagor's work,
it may be remarked, will always remain an authority on the Philippines.

[43] The cable and popular name of the "Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas"; it owns plantations up the Grande in Isabela Province.

[44] So do the aborigines of Formosa. "These aborigines of the hills
live in villages. Their houses are built, of stone, roofed with slate,
and have a remarkably clean, home-like appearance." (Pickering,
"Pioneering in Formosa," p. 69.)

[45] The word "Filipino" is taken to mean the civilized, Christianized
inhabitant of Malay origin of the Philippine Islands. As such, it is
convenient and useful. It should be recollected, however, that there
is no such thing as a _Filipino people_. There are Tagalogs, Visayans,
Bicols, Pampangans, Ilokanos, Cagayanes, etc., etc., to say nothing
of the wild people themselves, all speaking different languages;
but these can not be said to form one people.

[46] Retana, in his edition (1909) of De Morga remarks (p. 502):
"To-day there would not be many to dare go from Manila to Aparri by
the road taken by the Spaniards in 1591."

[47] Some Igorots brought down to the Manila carnival of 1912
were forced, at the request of Filipino authorities, to put on
trousers. This was not for comfort's sake, nor yet for decency's,
for the bare human skin is no uncommon sight in Manila. Apparently,
the Filipinos of Manila were unwilling to let the world note that
their cousins of the mountains were still in the naked state.

[48] For a full discussion of this entire matter, see the Report of the
Secretary of the Interior, Philippine Islands, for 1910, Washington
Government Printing Office, 1911, from which the quotations given
above are taken.

[49] E.g. the Mountain Province.--C. De W.W.

[50] It is interesting to note, that since the foregoing report was
published, Captain Harris, Philippine Constabulary, has persuaded
the Kalingas to turn in one hundred and eighty-seven firearms in
their possession, and this without firing a shot himself. What this
means may be inferred from the fact that all over the Islands, whether
among Christians or non-Christians, the desire to have firearms is of
the keenest. The great ambition of the Ifugao is to be a policeman,
and so be authorized to carry a gun. The Moros will give $400.00 for
an Army rifle and a belt of ammunition worth, say, $18.00.--C. De W.W.

[51] _Japan Chronicle_, weekly edition, Kobe, January 5, 1911.

[52] Ibid., same date.

[53] See the weekly Manila _Times_, October 21, 1910.

[54] According to a story current some years ago, a distinguished
officer of our Army serving in the Philippines once remarked to a
justly celebrated native judge of the highest character, that he
had no opinion of the native justice, and added, that for a thousand
pesos he could procure witnesses to prove that the judge had committed
a murder in such a place, although the judge had never been in the
place in his life. "Absurd," remarked the judge. "How absurd?" "You
misunderstand me," answered the judge; "it would be absurd to spend
a thousand pesos on such a purpose when two hundred would suffice."

[55] This worthy, Ruperto Rios by name, in succession promoted
himself to brigadier and major general, and then announced himself
as generalissimo. As though this were not enough, he next proclaimed
himself pope, "Papa Rios," and then crowned his earthly glories by
calling himself Jesus Christ, and as such was hanged. Our pity for
such sell-delusion is tempered by the fact that the purpose in view
was crime.

[56] It is only fair to remark that the Government is doing every thing
in its power to develop native interest in agriculture. Of course it
is too early as yet to say whether its efforts will be rewarded.

[57] Quoted in the weekly Manila _Times_ of October 21, 1910.

[58] That piracy, even under our strong control is not dead is shown
by the following:

"_Manila_, April 15. A pirate raid, is reported trom Jolo, where a
Japanese pearl-fishing bout was found adrift and looted. The crew of
the pearler are missing, and are believed to be murdered. The Mataja
Lighthouse has also been attacked and robbed, presumably by the same
band. Gunboats have been sent to investigate." New York _Times_,
April 15, 1912.

[59] The party of immediate independence.

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