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The Common Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

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Fearnley, 8 Q.B. 919; Martin, B., in Coward v. Baddeley, 4 H.&N.
478; Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261; Bizzell v. Booker, 16
Ark. 308; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442.

107/2 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, 784;
Smith v. London & South-Western Ry. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98, 102.
Compare Campbell, Negligence, Section 1 (2d ed.), for Austin's
point of
view.

109/1 cf. Bro. Corone, pl. 6; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 442;
D. 9. 2. 5, Section 2; D. 48. 8. 12.

113/1 I Thorpe, p. 85; cf. LL. Hen. I., c. 88, Section 3.

113/2 Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176.

114/1 See 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 43 Edw. III. 33, pl.
38. The plea in the latter case was that the defendant performed
the cure as well as he knew how, without this that the horse died
for default of his care. The inducement, at least, of this plea
seems to deal with negligence as meaning the actual state of the
party's mind.

115/1 Hobart, 134.

115/2 See Knight v. Jermin, Cro. Eliz. 134; Chambers v. Taylor,
Cro. Eliz. 900.

115/3 32 Conn. 75, 89, 90.

116/1 Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII. 2 b, Pl. 2.

116/2 Keilway, 46 b.

116/3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339; L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-282; 4 H.&C. 263;
3 id. 774.

117/1 See Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 633, 634.

117/2 See Lecture I. p. 23 and n. 3.

117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136;
S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter
report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in
accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non
obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in
the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at
all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B.
N.S. 245.

118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.

118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v.
Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11,
pl. 10.

118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the
very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled.

118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.

118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co.
Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; S.C., 3 Salk. 169;
S.C., nom. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90; Smith v. Pelah, 2
Strange, 264; May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101; Card v. Case, 5 C.B.
622.

119/1 12 Mod. 335. See Andrew Baker's case, 1 Hale, P.C. 430.

119/2 Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.&F. 92.

119/3 See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 281, 282; Cox v.
Burbridge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 441; Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S.
245, 260; Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. N.S. 722; Ellis v. Loftus Iron
Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 10; 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 20 Ed. IV.
11, pl. 10; 13 Hen. VII. 15, pl. 10; Keilway, 3 b, pl. 7. Cf. 4
Kent (12th ed.), 110, n. 1, ad fin.

120/1 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 13 Am. L.R. 609.

120/2 See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P.
600, 612, 614.

120/3 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383.

121/1 L.R. 1 C.P. 300.

121/2 See Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 239, bottom.

121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487.

122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby,
2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107;
Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et
seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149.

123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17
Mich. 99, 120.

123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477,
while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as
has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children
was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p.
488.

124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197.

125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5
Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759.

125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722.

125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5
Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594.

127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873.

128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401.

128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567.

128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557.

128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465.

128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery
Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20
Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165.

135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446.

136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other
hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D.
238, 243.

138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.

141/1 Cf. Knight v. German, Cro. Eliz. 70; S.C., ib. 134.

141/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 594; Turner v. Ambler,
10 Q.B. 252, 257, 261.

142/1 Redfield, C. J. in Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 197.

142/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 595.

143/1 See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151.

144/1 Rolfe, B. in Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 540.

145/1 Supra, pp. 115 et seq.

147/1 See, e.g., Cooley, Torts, 164.

147/2 Rex v. Dixon, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 11, 15; Reg. v. Hicklin,
L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; 5 C.&P. 266, n.

148/1 Aleyn, 35; Style, 72; A.D. 1648.

149/1 1 Kent (12th ed.), 467, n. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 723-725; 7 id.
652.

149/2 2 Wm. Bl. 892, A.D. 1773; supra, p. 92; Addison on Torts
(4th ed.), 264, citing Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 37, pl. 26, which hardly
sustains the broad language of the text.

151/1 Compare Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co., 14 C.B. 255, 283;
Calye's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32; Co. Lit. 89 a, n. 7; 1 Ch. Pl. (lst
ed,), 219, (6th ed.), 216, 217; 7 Am. Law Rev. 656 et seq.

151/2 But cf. The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.

151/3 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 398, 399; Barnett v.
Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630, 665; Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym.
360.

151/4 Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132; Wegerstoffe v. Keene, 1
Strange, 214, 216, 223; Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 124.

155/1 Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 634. Cf. Austin (3d ed.), 513.

156/1 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; supra, p. 116.

156/2 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. (9 Vroom), 339; 2
Thompson, Negligence, 1234, n. 3.

157/1 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; supra, p. 117.

158/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev.
172; supra, p. 94.

158/2 Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588.

166/1 Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, Section16, pp. 108 et
seq.; Heusler, Gewere, 487, 492. These authors correct the
earlier opinion of Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section37, pp. 313 et
seq., adopted by Sohm in his Proc. d. Lex Salica, Section 9. Cf.
the discussion of sua in writs of trespass, &c. in the English
law, at the end of Lecture VI. Those who wish short accounts in
English may consult North Amer. Rev., CX. 210, and see Id.,
CXVIII. 416; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 212 et seq. Our
knowledge as to the primitive form of action is somewhat meagre
and dependent on inference. Some of the earliest texts are Ed.
Liutpr. 131; Lex Baiw., XV. 4; L. Frision. Add. X.; L. Visig.,
V.5. I; L. Burg., XLIX. I, 2. The edict of Liutprand, dealing
with housebreaking followed by theft of property left in charge
of the householder, lays down that the owner shall look to the
bailee alone, and the bailee shall hold the thief both for the
housebreaking and for the stolen goods. Because, as it says, we
cannot raise two claims out of one causa; somewhat as our law was
unable to divide the severing a thing from the realty, and the
conversion of it, into two different wrongs. Compare, further,
Jones, Bailm. 112; Exodus xxii. 10-12; LL. Alfred, 28; I Thorpe,
Anc. L., p. 51; Gaii Inst., III. Sections 202-207.

167/1 XXXI. 16.

168/1 "Peterit enim rem suam petere [civiliter] ut adiratam per
testimonium proborum hominum, et sic consequi rem suam quamvia
furatam. . . Et non refert utrum res que ita subtracta fuit
extiterit illius appellantis propria vel alterius, dum tamen de
custodia sua." Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; Britton (Nich. ed.), I.
59, 60 [23 b], De Larcyns; cf. ib. 67 [26 b]; Fleta, fol. 5i, L.
I. c. 38, Section 1.

169/1 Y.B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 466-468, noticed in North Amer. Rev.,
CXVIII. 421, n. (So Britton [26 b], "Si il puse averreer la
perte.") This is not trover. The declaration in detinue per
inventionem was called "un newfound Haliday" in Y.B. 33 Hen. VI.
26, 27; cf. 7 Hen. VI. 22, pl. 3; Isack v. Clarke, I Rolle, R.
126, 128.

169/2 Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 4, 5, pl. 9; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Bro.
Trespass, pl. 216, 295.

169/3 2 Wms. Saund. 47, n. 1. See above, p. 167.

170/1 Notes to Saunders, Wilbraham v. Snow, note (h).

170/2 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24. See, further, Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 6,
pl. 5; 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16; 20 Hen. VII.
1, pl. 1; 21 Hen. VII. 14 b, pl. 23; 13 Co. Rep. 69; 1 Roll. Abr.
4(I), pl. I; F. N. B. 86, n. a; supra, p. 167.

170/3 Fitz. Abr. Barre, pl. 130; Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 12 Am.
Law Rev. 694.

171/1 2 Steph. Comm. (6th ed.), 83, cited Dicey, Parties, 353; 2
Bl. Comm. 453; 2 Kent, 585. As the bailee recovered the whole
value of the goods, the old reason, that he was answerable over,
has in some cases become a new rule, (seemingly based on a
misunderstanding,) that the bailee is a trustee for the bailor as
to the excess over his own damage. Cf. Lyle v. Barker, 5 Binn.
457, 460; 7 Cowen, 68l, n.; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305; in
the order cited. (Thence the new rule has been extended to
insurance recovered by a bailee. 1 Hall, N. Y. 84, 91; 3 Kent's
Comm. (12th ed.), 371, 376, n. 1 (a).) In this form it ceases to
be a reason for allowing the action.

171/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl. 8; Bro. Trespass, pl. 67. Cf. 1
Britton (Nich. ed.), 67 [26 b]; Y.B. 6 Hen. VI1. 12, pl. 9; 12
Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9; 12 Am. Law Rev. 694.

172/1 Y.B. 22 Ed. IV. 5, pl. 16.

172/2 2 Rolle, Abr. 569, Trespass, 5. Cf. Y.B. 20 Hen. VII. 5,
pl. 15; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Clayton, 135, pl. 243; 2 Wms.
Saund. 47 e (3d ed.).

172/3 Bro. Trespass, pl, 67 in marg.; cf. Ed. Liutpr. 131, cited
supra, p. 166, n.

172/4 In one instance, where, against the opinion of Brian, the
bailor was allowed to sue for damage to the chattel by a
stranger, the action seems to have been case. Y.B. 12 Ed. IV. 13,
pl. 9; cf. the margin of the report.

173/1 Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9; Lord v. Price, L. IL 9 Ex. 54;
Muggridge v. Eveleth, 9 Met. 233. Cf. Clayton, 135, pl. 243.

173/2 Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v.
Williams, 4 Exch. 339, 343, 344; Morgan v. Ide, 8 Cush. 420;
Strong v. Adams, 30 Vt. 221, 223; Little v. Fosseft, 34 Me. 545.

173/3 2 Camp. 464; cf. Mears v. London & South-Western Railway
Co., 11 C.B. N.S. 849, 854.

173/4 Addison, Torts (4th ed.), 364.

174/1 Wms. Pers. Prop., 26 (5th ed.), 27 (7th ed.).

174/2 Booth v. Wilson, I B. & Ald. 59; Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl.
8; 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39; 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24, pl. 46 (Tre. "ou
d'apprompter"); 21 Hen. VII. 14b, pl. 23; Godbolt, 173, pl. 239;
Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302, 309; Burton v. Hughes, 2 Bing. 173;
Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v. Williams, 4
Exch. 339, 343, 344; 2 Wms. Saund., note to Wilbraham v. Snow; 2
Kent, 585, 568, 574; Moran v. Portland S. P. Co., 35 Me. 55. See,
further, Lecture VI. ad fin.

175/1 Cf. Lord v. Price, L.R. 9 Ex. 54, 56, supra, p. 172.

175/2 Supra, p. 167.

175/3 Lib. X. c. 13; cf. I., c. 8.

175/4 "Is qui rem commodatam accepit, ad ipsam restituendam
tenetur, vel ejus precium, si forte incendio, ruins, naufragio,
ant latronum, vel hostium incursu, consumpta fuerit vel
deperdita, substracts, vel ablata." Fol. 99 a, b. This has been
thought a corrupt text (Guterbock, Bracton, by Coxe, p. 175; 2
Twiss, Bract. Int. xxviii.), but agrees with Glanvill, supra, and
with Fleta, L. II. c. 56, Section 5.

175/5 Bract., fol. 62 b, c. 28, Section 2; Fleta, L. II. e. 59,
Section 4,
fol. 128. Cf. Just. Inst. 3. 24, Section 5; ib. 15, Section 2.

176/1 Y.B. 8 Ed. II. 275; Fitz. Detinue, pl. 59.

176/2 2 Ld. Raym. 909.

176/3 Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, pl. 5. See Lecture VI.

176/4 29 Ass. 163, pl. 28.

176/5 Cf. Ratcliff v. Davis, Yelv. 178; Cro. Jac. 244; Noy, 137;
1 Bulstr. 29.

176/6 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3. This case is cited and largely
relied on in Woodlife's Case, infra; Southcote v. Bennett, infra;
Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132 (24 Car. I., covenant on a
charter-party); and Morse v. Slue, infra; in short, in all the
leading cases on bailment.

177/1 Cf. Abbreviatio Plaeitorum, p. 343, col. 2, rot. 87, 17 Ed.
II.

178/1 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 2 Ed. IV. 15, pl. 7. It is proper
to add, that in the latter case Littleton does not seem to
distinguish between servants and bailees.

178/2 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV, 40, pl. 22. So Brian, in 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl.
10, ad fin.

178/3 Y.B. 10 Hen. VII. 25, 26, pl. 3.

178/4 Cf. L. Baiw., XV. 5; Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

178/5 Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9; Bro. Detinue, pl. 37; 10 Hen.
VI. 21, pl. 69.

178/6 Y.B. 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16. Cf. 10 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 69.

178/7 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24; 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9.

178/8 Cro. Eliz. 815; 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Co. Lit. 89; 2 BI. Comm.
452.

180/1 Savile, 133, 134. Cf. Bro. Accion sur le Case, pl. 103;
Dyer, 161 a, b.

180/2 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 19, Brett, J., at p. 28.

180/3 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 423, Cockburn, C. J., at p. 428.

181/1 Moore, 462; Owen, 57.

181/2 Dial. 2, ch. 38, A.D. 1530.

182/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); cf. ib. 77b (21 Hen.
VII.).

182/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

182/3 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Cro. Eliz. 815.

183/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2.

183/2 Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49, ad fin. Cf. Mulgrave v. Ogden, Cro.
Eliz. 219; S.C., Owen, 141, 1 Leon. 224; with Isaack v. Clark, 2
Bulstr. 306, at p. 312, Coke, J.

183/3 See Lecture VII.

184/1 Paston, J., in Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49. See, also, Rogers v.
Head, Cro. Jac. 262; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330, which will
be mentioned again. An innkeeper must be a common innkeeper, Y.B.
11 Hen. IV. 45. See further, 3 Bl. Comm. 165, where "the
transition from status to contract" will be found to have taken
place.

184/2 F. N. B. 94 D; infra, p. 203.

184/3 Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9, 10; Dyer, 22 b.

184/4 The process may be traced by reading, in the following
order, Y.B. 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, ad fin. (21 Hen.
VII.); ib. 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); Drake v. Royman, Savile,
133, 134 (36 Eliz.); Mosley v. Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); 1
Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 5; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330 (11 Jac.
I.).

185/1 Cro. Jac. 262 (8 Jac. I.). Compare Maynard's argument in
Williams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Symons v. Darknoll, ib. 523, and
other cases below; 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 3. Mosley v, Fosset,
Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); an obscurely reported case, seems to have
been assumpsit against an agistor, for a horse stolen while in
his charge, and asserts obiter that "without such special
assumpsit the action does not lie." This must have reference to
the form of the action, as the judges who decided Southcote's
Case took part in the decision. See, further, Evans v. Yeoman,
Clayton, 33.

186/1 See Symons v. Darknoll, and the second count in Morse v.
Slue infra. (The latter case shows the averment of negligence to
have been mere form.) Cf. I Salk. 18, top.

187/1 Supra, p. 179.

187/2 Boson v. Sandford, Shower, 101; Coggs v. Bernard, infra.

187/3 Symons v. Darknoll, infra.

188/1 Reg. Brev. 92b, 95a, 98a, 100b, 104a; cf. Y.B. 19 Ed. II.
624; 30 Ed. III. 25, 26; 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6; 22 Hen. VI. 21,
pl. 38; 32 & 33 Ed. I., Int., xxxiii.; Brunner, Schwurgerichte,
177; id. Franzosische, Inhaberpapier, 9, n. 1.

188/2 12 Co. Rep. 64.

188/3 See, besides the following cases, the declaration in
Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.), and note
especially the variations of statement in Morse v. Slue, set
forth below, in the text.

189/1 Hobart, 17; Cro. Jac. 330. See also George v. Wiburn, 1
Roll. Abr. 6, pl. 4 (A.D. 1638).

190/1 The use which has been made of this case in later times
shows the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between principles
of substantive law and rules relating only to procedure, in the
older books.

190/2 Y.B. 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; supra, p. 188, n. 1.

191/1 Palmer, 523.

191/2 Palmer, 548.

191/3 Aleyn, 93.

191/4 1 Sid. 36.

192/1 1 Sid. 244. Cf. Dalston v. Janson, 1 Ld. Raym. 58.

192/2 2 Keb. 866; 3 id. 72, 112, 135; 2 Lev. 69; I Vent. 190,
238; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.

193/1 2 Keb. 866. See 3 Keb. 74; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.

193/2 2 Keb. 72.

193/3 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1; supra, p. 177.

193/4 3 Keble, 73. This is the main point mentioned by Sir T.
Raymond and Levinz.

193/5 Cf. 1 Mod. 85.

194/1 1 Ventris, 238, citing Southcote's Case in the margin. Cf.
3 Keble, 135.

194/2 Aleyn, 93; supra, p. 191.

194/3 See also 1 Hale, P.C. 512, 513.

195/1 King v. Viscount Hertford, 2 Shower, 172, pl. 164; cf.
Woodlife's Case, supra.

195/2 Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101 (2 W. & M.). See above,
pp. 183,185; below, p. 197. Modern illustrations of the doctrine
will be found in "Fleming v. Manchester, Sheffield, &
Lincolnshire Railway Co., 4 Q.B.D. 81, and cases cited. In
Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B.511, 526, the reader the primitive
assumpsit, which was the inducement to a declaration in tort,
interpreted as meaning contract in the modern sense. It will seen
directly that Lord Holt took a different view. Note the mode of
dealing with the Marshal's case, 33 Hen; VI. 1, in Aleyn, 27.

196/1 See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Shower, 127 (32 Car. II.);
Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.); Boson v.
Sandford, 1 Shower, 101, citing Southcote's Case (2 W. & M.);
Upshare v. Aidee, 1 Comyns, 25 (8 W. III.); Middleton v. Fowler,
I Salk. 288 (10 W. III.).

196/2 12 Mod. 472.

196/3 2 Ld. Raym. 909.

197/1 Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5 (39 Eliz.). Cf.
Keilway, 160.

197/2 2 Ld. Raym. 919. See Lecture VII. How little Lord Holt
meant to adopt the modern view, that delivery, being a detriment
to the owner, was a consideration, may be further seen by
examining the cases put and agreed to by him from the Year Books.

199/1 2 Kent, 598; 1 C.P. D. 429.

199/2 Palmer, 523. See too Keilway, 77 b, and 160, pl. 2, where
the encroachment of case on detinue, and the corresponding
confusion in principle, may be pretty clearly seen taking place.
But see p. 175, supra.

200/1 2 Kent, 597; Forward v. _Pittard, 1 T. R. 27.

200/2 Cf. Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, 160,
pl. 2, and other cases already cited.

200/3 Y.B. 41 Ed. III. 3, pl. 8.

200/4 Y.B. 33 Hen. YI. 1, pl. 3.

200/5 Reg. Brev. 107 a, 108 a, 110 a, b; entries cited 1 T. R.
29.

200/6 See above, pp. 167, 175 et seq.; 12 Am. Law Rev. 692, 693;
Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 11, pl. 13; 42 Ass., pl. 17.

201/1 1 Wilson, 282; cf. 2 Kent (12th ed.), 596, n. 1, b.

201/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.

202/1 Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63.

202/2 Bird v. Astcock, 2 Bulstr. 280; cf. Dyer, 33 a, pl. 10;
Keighley's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 139 b, 140.

202/3 Y.B. 40 Ed. III. 5, 6, pl. 11; see also Willams v. Hide,
Palmer, 548; Shep. Touchst. 173.

203/1 See Safe Delcosit Company of Pittsburgh v. Pollock, 85
Penn. 391.

203/2 Paston, J., in Y.B. 21 Hen. VI. 55; Keilway, 50 a, pl. 4;
Hardres, 163.

203/3 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 654; 1 Salk. 18; 12 Mod.
484.

204/1 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, 83.

205/1 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19
Eq. 462, 465.

207/1 Possession, Section 6, Eng. tr., pp. 27, 28.

207/2 R. d. Besitzes, 487.

208/1 R. d. Besitzes, 490, 491.

208/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 415; Windscheid, Pand. Section 148,
n. 6.
Further Hegelian discourse may be found in Dr. J. Hutchison
Sterling's Lectures on the Philosophy of Law.

208/3 Institutionen, Sections 224, 226; Windscheid, Pand. Section
148, n. 6.

208/4 Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6.

208/5 Besitzklagen, 276, 279.

209/1 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 499.

209/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 2, pp. 5 et seq.; Puchta,
Besitz,
in Weiske, Rechtslex.; Windscheid, Pand. Section 154, pp. 461 et
seq.
(4th ed.).

209/3 D. 41.2.3, Section 20; 13.6.8 & 9. Cf. D. 41.1.9, Section
5.

210/1 But see Ihering, Geist d. Rom. R., Section 62, French tr.,
IV. p.
51.

210/2 Heusler thinks this merely a result of the English
formalism and narrowness in their interpretation of the word suo
in the writ (disseisivit de teuemento suo). Gewere, 429-432. But
there was no such narrowness in dealing with catalla sua in
trespass. See below, p. 242.

210/3 See, further, Bracton, fol. 413; Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 9, pl. 4.

211/1 Infra, p. 243.

211/2 R. d. Besitzes, 494.

212/1 Rogers v. Spence, 13 M. & W. 579, 581.

212/2 Webb v. Fox, 7 T. R. 391, 397.

212/3 Fennings v. Lord Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241; Littledale v.
Scaith, ib. 243, n. (a); cf. Hogarth v. Jackson, M. & M. 58;
Skinner v. Chapman, ib. 59, n.

212/4 Swift v. Gifford, 2 Lowell, 110.

212/5 1 Taunt. 248.

213/1 Cf. Wake, Evolution of Morality, Part I. ch. 4, pp. 296 et
seq.

215/1 Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1 Q.B.1.

215/2 People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645.

217/1 2 Kent's Comm. 349, citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines, (N.
Y.) 175; Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johnson, (N. Y.) 75.

217/2 Young v. Hichens, 6 Q.B.606.

217/3 2 Kent's Comm. 349, n. (d).

218/1 Inst. 2. 1, Section 13.

218/2 Swift v. Gifford, 2 Lowell, 110.

218/3 Savigny, R. d. Besitzes, Section 21.

218/4 II. 9, Section 4; III. 29, Section 2. Animus domini will be
used here
as shortly indicating the general nature of the intent required
even by those who deny the fitness of the expression, and
especially because Savigny's opinion is that which has been
adopted by English writers.

219/1 Cf. Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 413, and ib. 469, 474, 493, 494,
505; Windscheid, Pand. Section 149, n. 5 (p. 447, 4th ed.);
Puchta,
Inst. Section 226.

219/2 Supra, p. 207; 2 Puchta, Inst. Section 226 (5th ed.), pp.
545,
546.

221/1 15 Jur. 1079; 21 L. J. Q.B.75; 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 424.

222/1 11 Allen, 548.

223/1 Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139.

223/2 Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. 255, 257, 261; Proctor v. Adams,
113 Mass. 376, 377; 1 Bl. Comm. 297, Sharsw. ed., n. 14. Cf.
Blades v. Hiqgs, 13 C.B. N.S. 844, 847, 848, 850, 851; 11 H. L.
C. 621; Smith v. Smith, Strange, 955.

223/3 Reg. v. Rowe, Bell, C.C. 93.

224/1 See, as to treasure hidden in another's land, D. 41. 2. 44,
pr.; D. 10. 4. 15. Note the different opinions in D. 41.2. 3,
Section
3.

224/2 3 Inst. 107; 1 Hale, P.C. 504, 505; 2 Bishop, Crim. Law,
Sections
834, 860 (6th ed.).

224/3 Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 55. Cf. Halliday v.
Holgate, L.R. 3 Ex. 299, 302.

224/4 Cf. Y.B. 8 Ed. II. 275; Fitzh. Abr. Detinue, ph 59; Y.B. 13
Ed. IV. 9, pl. 5; Keilway, 160, pl. 2; Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W.
623, 630. It may not be necessary to go quite so far, however,
and these cases are not relied on as establishing the theory. For
wrong explanations, see 2 East, P.C. 696.

225/1 Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588.

225/2 Reg. v. Rowe, Bell, C.C. 93, stated above.

225/3 8 Ves. 405; 7 M. & W. 623; Stephen, Crim. Law, Art. 281,
Ill. (4), p. 197. He says, "because [the owner of the safe]
cannot be presumed to intend to act as the owner of it when he
discovers it,"--a reason drawn from Savigny, but not fitted to
the English law, as has been shown.

226/1 Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, 10, pl. 5; 21 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 21. Cf.
3 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9; Steph. Crim. Law, Art. 297, and App., note
xvii.

226/2 Steph. Crtre. Law, Art. 297, and App., note xvii. p. 882.
It may be doubted whether the old law would have sanctioned the
rule in this form. F. N. B. 91 E; Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 15, pl. 7.

226/3 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 21; 13 Co. Rep. 69.

227/1 They have been said to be a part of the family pro hac
vice. Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 250. Cf. Y.B. 2 Hen.
IV. 18, pl. 6.

227/2 Moore, 248, pl. 392; S.C., Owen, 52; F. N. B. 91 E; 2 B1.
Comm. 396; 1 H. Bl. 81, 84; 1 Chitty, Pl. 170 (1st ed.); Dicey,
Parties, 358; 9 Mass. 104; 7 Cowen, 294; 3 S. & R. 20; 13
Iredell, 18; 6 Barb. 362, and cases cited. Some of the American
cases have been denied, on the ground that the custodian was not
a servant. Cf. Holiday v. Hicks, Cro. Eliz. 638, 661, 746; Drope
v. Theyar, Popham, 178, 179.

228/1 Bracton, fol. 6 a, Section 3, 12 a, 17 a, Cap. V. ad fin.,
25 a,
b, etc.; Pucbra, Inst. Section 228.

228/2 See also 7 Am. Law Rev. 62 et seq.; 10 Am. Law Rev. 431; 2
Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 260, n. 1.

228/3 1 Comm. 427. Cf. Preface to Paley on Agency. Factors are
always called servants in the old books, see, e. g., Woodlife's
Case, Owen, 57; Holiday v. Hicks, Cro. Eliz. 638; Southcote's
Case, 4 Co. Rep. 83 b, 84 a; Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468; St.
21 Jac. I., c. 16, Section 3; Morse v. Slue, 3 Keble, 72. As to
bailiffs, see Bract. 26 b, "Reestituat domino, vel servienti,"
etc.; Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14, pl. 18.

229/1 Paley, Agency, c. 4, Section 1, citing Godbolt, 360. See,
further, F. N. B. 120, G; Fitzh. Abr. Dette, pl. 3; Y.B. 8 Ed.
IV. 11, pl. 9. These rules seem to be somewhat modern even as to
servants. The liability of a master for debts contracted by his
servant is very narrowly limited in the earlier Year Books.

230/1 I am inclined to think that this extension has been largely
due to the influence of the Roman law. See Lecture I. p. 20, n.
1, and observe the part which the precedents as to fire (e. g.,
Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6) have played in shaping the modern
doctrine of master and servant. Tuberville v. Stampe, I Ld. Raym.
264 (where Lord Holt's examples are from the Roman law); Brucker
v. Fromont, 6 T. R. 659; M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106; Patten
v. Rea, 2 C.B. N.S. 606. In Southern v. How, Popham, 143, Doctor
and Student is referred to for the general principles of
liability. Doctor and Student states Roman law. See, further,
Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101, 102.

230/2 Bac. Ahr. Master and Servant, K; Smith, Master and Servant
(3d ed.), 260, n. (t).

230/3 Clapp v. Kemp, 122 Mass. 481; Murray v. Currie, L.R. 6 C.P.
24, 28; Hill v. Morey, 26 Vt. 178.

230/4 See, e.g., Patten v. Rea, 2 C.B. N.S. 606; Bolingbroke v.
Swindon Local Board, L.R. 9 C.P. 575.

230/5 Freeman v. Rosher, 13 Q.B.780, 785; Gauntlett v. King, 3 C.
B. N.S. 59; Haseler v. Lemoyne, 28 L. J. C.P. 103; Collett v.
Foster, 2 H. & N. 356; Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L.R.
2 Ex. 259, 265, 266; Lucas v. Mason, L.R. 10 Ex. 251, 253, last
paragraph; Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L.R. 5
P.C. 394, 411, 412. So as to partners, 3 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.),
46, notes (d) & 1.

231/1 Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404, 409.

231/2 6 M. & W. 358. Cf. Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 184,
for a comment like that in the text. Other grounds for the
decision are immaterial here.

231/3 Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L.R. 5 P.C.
394; Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L.R. 2 Ex. 259; Western
Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L.R. 1 H. L. Sc. 145; 2 Kent (12th
ed.), 616, n. 1; Swift v. Jewsbury, L.R. 9 Q.B.301, overruling
S.C. sub nom. Swift v. Winterbotham, L.R. 8 Q.B.244; Weir v.
Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, 244. The objections which Baron Bramwell
mentions (L.R. 9 Q.B.815) to holding one man liable for the
frauds of another, are objections to the peculiar consequences
attaching to the relation of master and servant in general, and
have been urged in that more general form by the same learned
judge. 12 Am. Law Rev. 197, 200; 2 H. & N. 856, 361. See 7 Am.
Law Rev. 61, 62.

231/3 7 Am. Law Rev. 63 (Oct. 1872).

232/1 D. 44. 2. 4, note 17, Elzevir ed.

232/2 Hunter's Roman Law, 431.

232/3 Ancient Hist. of Inst. 235.

232/4 Cf. Gillett v. Ball, 9 Penn. St. 13; Craig v. Gilbreth, 47
Me. 416; Nickolson v. Knowles, 5 Maddock, 47; Williams v. Port,
L.R. 12 Eq. 149; Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & El. 455; Bracton, fol.
28 b, 42 b, 43. And compare with the passage cited above from
Blackstone: "Possider, cujus riomine possidetur, procurator
alienae possessioni praestat ministerium." D. 41. 2. 18, pr.

233/1 Ward v. Macaulay, 4 T. R. 489, 490. Cf. as to factors
supra, p. 228.

233/2 Berndtson v. Strang, L.R. 3 Ch. 588, 590.

233/3 Blackburn, Sale, 33; Marvin v. Wallis, 6 El. & Bl. 726.

233/4 D. 41. 2. 18, pr. "Quod meo nomine possideo, possum alieno
nomine possidere: nec enim muto mihi causam possessionis, sed
desino possidere et alium possessorem ministerio meo facio. Nec
idem est possidere et alieno nomine possidere: nam possidet,
cujus nomine possidetur, procurator alienae possessioni praestat
ministerium." Thus showing that the vendor changed possession by
holding in the name of the purchaser, as his agent to possess.
Cf. Bracton, fol. 28 b.

233/4 Windscheid, Pand. Section 155, n. 8 a; 2 Kent (12th ed.),
492, n.
1 (a). It should be kept in mind also that the Roman law denied
possession to bailees.

234/1 See, e. g., Farina v. Home, 16 M. & W. 119, 123.

235/1 McGahey v. Moore, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 35.

235/2 Reader v. Moody, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 372. Cf. Basset v.
Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 819, 820.

235/3 Browne v. Dawson, 12 A. & E. 624. Cf. D. 43. 16. 17; ib. 3,
Section 9; D. 41. 2. 18, Section 3; Clayton, 147, pl. 268.

236/1 Cf. Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 503.

237/1 Clark v. Maloney, 3 Harrington (Del.), 68. Bruns (R. d.
Besitzes, 503, 507) comes to the same conclusion on practical
grounds of convenience, although he utterly repudiates it on
theory. I must refer to what I said above touching these
conflicts between theory and convenience.

238/1 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 57, p. 486. A learned writer
of
more ancient date asks why a doctor has not a possessory action
if you cease to employ him, and answers: "Sentio actionem non
tenere, sed sentio tantum, nec si vel morte mineris, possum
dicere quare. Tu lector, si sapis, rationes decidendi suggere."
Hommel, Rhaps., qu. 489, cited, Bruns, 407.

239/1 Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. An. 732.

239/2 Bruns, 483.

240/1 2 Kent (12th ed.), 205, n. 1. Cf. Y.B. 21 Hen. VI. 8, 9,
pl. 19; American note to Scott v. Shepherd, in 1 Sm. L. C. (Am.
ed.).

240/2 Britton (Nich. ed.), I. 277 (cf. Bract., fol. 164 b; Fleta,
fol. 214; Glanv., Lib. XIII. c. 37); Littleton, Sections 237-240,
588,
589; 3 Bl. Comm. 170; 3 Cruise, Dig., tit. xxviii., Rents, ch. 2,
Section 34.

241/1 See Lecture XI.

241/2 Cf. Stockport Water Works v. Potter, 3 H. & C. 300, 318.
The language in the seventh English edition of 1 Sm. L. C., 300,
is rather too broad. If the law should protect a possessor of
land in the enjoyment of water coming to it, it would do so
because the use of the water was regarded as a part of the
enjoyment of that land, and would by no means imply that it would
do the same in the case just put of a way over land of another.

242/1 Jefferies v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 El. & B1. 802.
Cf. Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange, 505, 1 Sm. L. C.

242/2 Co. Lit. 145 b.

242/3 2 Wms. Saund. 47 b, note 1, to Wilbraham v. Snow.

242/4 Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; supra, p. 168; Y.B. 22 Ed. I.
466-468.

242/5 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20; 11 Hen. IV. 17; 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24; 21
Hen. VII. 14. The meaning of sua is discussed in Y.B. 10 Ed. IV.
1, B, by Catesby. Compare Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen,
111; Heusler, Gewere, 492 et seq., correcting Bruns, R. d.
Besitzes, 300 et seq.; Sohm, Proc. d. L. Sal., Section 6.

243/1 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39.

243/2 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 14 b, pl. 23.

243/3 Godbolt, 173, pl. 239. Cf. 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39.

243/4 Bro. Abr. Trespass, pl. 433, cit. Y.B. 13 Hen. VII. 10.

243/5 Kelyng, 89. See, further, Buller, N. P. 33.

243/6 Lecture V.; Y.B. 20 Hen. VII. 1, pl. 11.

243/7 Y.B. 21 lien. VII. 14 b, pl. 23.

243/8 1 Roll. Abr. 4, 5 (I), pl. 1. Cf. Arnold v. Jefferson, 1
Ld. Raym. 275.

244/1 29 Ass., fol. 163, pl. 28.

244/2 Southcote's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 83 b.

244/3 Mores v. Conham, Owen, 123. Cf. Ratcliff v. Davis, I
Bulstr. 29.

244/4 Doe v. Dyball, Mood. & M. 346 and note; 2 Wms. Saund. 111,
and later notes; I Ad. & El. 119; Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1
Q.B.1.

244/5 Graham v. Peat, 1 East, 244.

245/1 As to this period see Heusler, Gewere. Cf. Laveleye,
Propriete, 166.

248/1 2 Hist. du Droit Franc., pp. 146 et seq, 152.

248/2 Anciens Poetes de la France, (Guessard,) p. 71.

248/3 Page 283; cf. 284, cxviii, et seq., 44, lxix.

249/1 Sohm, Proc. d. Lex. Sal., Sections 15, 23-25, tr. Thevenin,
pp.
80, 105, 122.

249/2 Essays in A. S. Law, p. 292.

249/3 Cap. VIII., Merkel, p. 48.

249/4 Cap. LXXXIX. Section 3, Essays in A. S. Law, p. 291.

249/5 Chap. IV. Section 16.

250/1 Fitzh. Abr. Mainprise, pl. 12 (H. 33 Ed. III.);
Staundforde, P.C. 65.

250/2 Abbr. Plac., p. 343, col 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed. II.

250/3 Jacob, L. D., "Bail." Cf. I Bulstr. 45; .Hawkins, P.C., II.
ch. 15, Section 83; Abbr. Plac., p. 343, col. 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed.
II.

250/4 Highmore, Bail, p. 199; Jacob, L. D., "Bail." Cf. 2
Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Franc., p. 148.

250/5 Highmore, p. 195.

250/6 Ibid., p. 200.

252/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen.

253/1 II. c. 60, Section 25. Glanvill's "justa debendi causa"
(Lib. X.
c. 4) seems remote from consideration.

254/1 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36.

254/2 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 13, pl. 3.

254/3 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 33.

254/4 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12; Bract, fol. 400b, Section 10; 22
Ass., pl.
70, fol. 101.

255/1 Essays in A. S. Law, 187.

256/1 I. 45; III. 10.

256/2 Lib. X. e. 17. Suit, secta, was the term applied to the
persons whose oath the party tendered.

257/1 Lib. X. c. 12 (Beames, p. 262); c. 8 & c. 5 (Beames, pp.
256, 251); cf. IV. c. 6, where witnesses are tendered de visu et
auditu. Cf. Bract., 315 b, Section6 Fleta, II. c. 63, Section10,
p. 137. It
was no doubt true, as Glanvill says, Lib. X. c. 17, that the
usual mode of proof was by a writing or by duel, and that the
King's Court did not generally give protection to private
agreements made anywhere except in the Court of the King (Lib. X.
c. 8). But it can hardly be that debts were never established by
witness in his time, in view of the continuous evidence from
Bracton onwards.

257/2 But cf. Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 399. I do not go so far as
to say that they were still a living institution. However that
may be, tradition must at least have modelled itself on what had
been the function of the former official body.

257/3 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6; Britt. (Nich.) I. p. 162;
Magna
Charta, c. 38; Y.B. 21 Ed. I. 456; 7 Ed. II. 242; 18 Ed. II. 582;
3 Bl. Comm. 295, 344. Cf. 17 Ed. III. 48 b.

257/4 Cf. Glanv., Lib. IV. c. 6.

258/1 Lib. X. c. 18. It is possible that this means no more than
Glanvill's often repeated statement, that the King's Court did
not, generally speaking, take cognizance of private agreements.
The substantive law was, perhaps, still limited by traditions
from the infancy of contract. See pp. 248, 251, 259, 260. The
proposition in its broadest form may have been based on the
inability to try such agreements in any way but those which have
been specified. Cf. the requirement of aliam diracionationem and
aliis probationibus, in Lib. X. c. 12. But cf. Ibid. with Essays
in A. S. Law, pp. 189, 190.

259/1 Sharington v. Strotton, Plowden, 298, at p. 302, M. 7 & 8
Eliz.

259/2 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burrow, 1663, 1669.

260/1 1 Thorpe, Anc. Laws, 181, Oaths, 7, 8.

260/2 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 5 (Beames, p. 251); Y.B. 7 Ed. II. 242;
Novae Narr. Dette-Vers plege, Rastell's Law Tracts, p. 253, D, 2
Finl. Reeves, 376.

261/1 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 22 (Beames, p. 263); Bract., fol. 398 b,
Section 1. The favorite proof by duel was also allowed, but this
disappeared. When the inquest became general, the execution of
the deed was tried, like any other fact, by that means.

261/2 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6, 400 b; Coke, 2d Inst., 44,
45.

262/1 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12 (Beames, p. 263); Bract., fol. 100 b,
Section 9.

262/2 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 17 (Beames, p. 272).

262/3 Bract., fol. 400 b, Section 9.

262/4 Cf. Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 304, and 34 Ed. II., 150, 152; ib. 330,
332; 35 Ed. I. 546.

263/1 Bract., fol. 400 b, Section 8.

263/2 Cf. Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 304.

263/3 Cap. 28; 32 & 33 Ed. I. 516; 18 Ed. II. 582; Fleta, II. c,
63, Section 9; Coke, 2d Inst., 44; 3 Bl. Comm. 344.

263/4 Y.B. 18 Ed. II. 582; 17 Ed. III. 48 b, pl. 14.

264/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26; cf. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11; Fleta,
II. c. 60, Section 25; Glanvill, Lib. X. c. 12.

264/2 Cf. Bro..Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., 27 Hen. VIII. 24,
25, pl. 3.

264/3 Y.B. 18 Ed. III. 13, pl. 7.

264/4 Y.B. 44 Ed. III. 21, pl. 23.

264/5 F. N. B. 122, I, in margin. Cf. F. N. B. 122 K; Y.B. 43 Ed.
III. 11, pl. 1; S.C., Bro. Pledges, pl. 3; 9 Hen. V. 14, pl. 23.

265/1 Y.B. 17 Ed. III. 48 b, pl. 14. Cf. Fortescue (Amos), 67,
n.; 3 Bl. Comm. 295.

265/2 For limit, see Constit. of Clarendon, c. 15; Glanv., Lib.
X. c. 8, 12; Y.B. 22 Ass., pl. 70, fol. 101; 45 Ed. III. 24, pl.
30; 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166; 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18;
14 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 3; 15 Ed. IV. 32, pl. 14; 19 Ed. IV. 10, pl.
18; 20 Ed. IV. 3, pl. 17.

266/1 See for an illustration 2 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 451, n.
1 (b).

266/2 Repromittatur, but cf. pro servitio tuo vel pro homagio,
Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25.

267/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26. But cf. 48 Ed. III. 3, pl. 6.

267/2 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166.

267/3 Y.B. 12 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 13, ad fin.

267/4 Y.B. 9 Hen. V. 14, pl. 23.

267/5 (Cf. 13 Ed. II. 403; 17 Ed. IIL 48, pl. 14; 29 Ed. III. 25,
26.) 41 Ed. III. 7, pl. 15; 46 Ed. III. 6, pl. 16; Fitzh. Abr.
Dett, pl. 166.

267/6 Y.B. 3 Hen, VI. 36, pl. 33.

268/1 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18.

268/2 E. g., Rolfe in Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 23.

269/1 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18. Cf. Bro. Feoffements al Uses,
pl. 54; Plowden, 301.

269/2 Y.B. 15 Ed. IV. 32, pl. 14; (S.C., 14 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 3;) 17
Ed. 4, pl. 4.

269/3 Cf. Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18; 17 Ed. IV. 4, 5; Plowden,
305, 306.

269/4 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

269/5 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 13.

269/6 As to requirement of certain sum, cf. Y.B. 12 Ed. II. 375;
Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 24.

270/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26; 40 Ed. III. 24, pl. 27; 43 Ed.
II1. 2, pl. 5.

270/2 Y.B. 43 Ed. III. 2, pl. 5; 46 Ed. III. 25, pl. 10; 50 Ed.
III. 5, pl. 11.

270/3 Cf. Glanv., Lib. X. c. 8; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25.

270/4 Y.B. 35 Ed. I. 454; 12 Ed. II. 375.

272/1 Ducange, "Sigilium"; Ingulph. 901.

272/2 Big. Pl. Ang. Norm. 177.

272/3 Big. Pl. Ant. Norm. 177; Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9,
"scriptura." But cf. Y.B. 30 Ed. I. 158; Fleta, II. c. 60,
Section 25.

272/4 Y.B. 33 Ed. I. 354, 356; 35 Ed. I. 455, top; 41 Ed. III. 7,
pl. 15; 44 Ed. III. 21, pl. 23. Cf. 39 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 46.

272/5 Y.B. 7 Ed. I. 242. Cf. 35 Ed. I. 452.

272/6 Cf. Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9.

272/7 Cf. Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12; Dugdale, Antiq. Warwic. 673,
cited Ducange, "Sigillum"; Bract., fol. 396 b, Section 3; I
Britt.
(Nich.)163, Section 17; Abbrev. Plac. 8 Joh., Berk. rot. 4, pp.
55, 56;
ib. 19 Ed. I., Norf. & Surf. rot. 7, p. 284; ib. Index
"Sigillum."

272/8 Y.B. 30 Ed. I. 158; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25, p. 130.

273/1 45 Ed. III. 24, pl. 30.

273/2 Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9.

275/l Cf. 5 Co. Rep. 13 b, 14 a, with 1 Roll. Rep. 126, 128; Y.B.
43 Ed. III 30, pl. 15.

275/2 Y.B. 46 Ed. III. 19, pl. 19; S.C. Bro. Acc. sur le Case,
pl. 22.

275/3 Y.B. 22 Ass., pl. 4i, fol. 94.

276/1 Y.B. 43 Ed. III. 33, pl. 38.

277/1 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60.

277/2 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

277/3 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60. Cf. 3
Hen. VI. 36, 83.

279/1 Cf. 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5 ad fin., Newton, C. J.

280/1 Cf. Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11.

280/2 Cases supra; Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33. Cf.
3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33; 20 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 4; 2 Hen. VII. 11, pl.
9.

281/1 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11. Cf. Fitzh. Abr. Acc. sur le
case, pl. 37, 11 R. II; 14 Hen. VI. 18. But cf. 43 Ed. III. 33,
pl. 38.

282/1 Cf. Candish's reasons for allowing wager of law with Y.B.
32 & 33 Ed. I., Preface, p. xxxvi., citing the old rules of
pleading printed at the end of the tract entitled, Modus tenendi
unum Hundredum sire Curiam de Recordo, in Rastell's Law Tracts,
p. 410, E, F, G.

282/2 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

282/3 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60; 3 Hen.
VI. 36, pl. 33.

282/4 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

283/1 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 18, pl. 58.

283/2 Ibid. Cf. 48 Ed. III 6, pl. 11.

283/3 Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5. See, further, Y.B. 20 Hen. VI.
25, pl. 11.

284/1 Cf. Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

284/2 Y.B. 2 Hen. VII. 11, pl. 9. Cf. 20 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 4.

284/3 Cf. Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 18, pl. 58; 21 Hen. VII. 41, pl. 66,
Fineux, C. J.

284/4 Keilway, 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); Powtuary v. Walton, 1
Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5 (39 Eliz.); Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.
909 (2 Anne, A.D. 1703). Supra, p. 195.

285/1 Sands v. Trevilian, Cro. Car. 193, 194 (Mich. 4 Car. I.,
A.D. 1629).

285/2 Bro. Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., Y.B. 27 Hen. VIII. 24,
25, pl. 3; Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leon. 224, A.D. 1585.

285/3 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 30, pl. 5; ib. 41, pl. 66.

285/4 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.

286/1 Sharington v. Strotton, Plowden, 298 (Mich. 7 & 8 Eliz.);
ib. 309, note on "the civil law."

286/2 Hunt v. Bate, 3 Dyer, 272 a (10 Eliz., A.D. 1568).

286/3 See Lecture VIII. Mr. Langdell, Contracts, Sections 92, 94,
suggests the ingenious explanation for this doctrine, that it was
then held that no promise could be implied in fact from the
request. There may be evidence which I do not know, but the case
cited (Bosden v. Thinne, Yelv. 40) for this statement was not
decided until A.D. 1603, while the implication of Hunt v. Bate,
supra, which was the authority followed by the cases to be
explained, is all the other way.

286/4 Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leon. 224, A.D. 1585.

287/1 Read v. Baxter, 3 Dyer, 272 b, n. (26 & 27 Eliz.). Cf.
Richards and Bartlet's Case, 1 Leon. 19 (26 Eliz.).

287/2 Bro. Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., Y.B. 27 Hen. VIII. 24,
25, pl. 3; 3 Dyer, 272, n.

287/3 Marsh v. Rainsford, 3 Dyer, 272 b, n.; S.C., 2 Leon. 111,
and Cro. Eliz. 59, sub. nom. Marsh v. Kavenford.

287/4 Smith and Smith's Case, 3 Leon. 88, A.D. 1583; Riches and
Briggs, Yelv. 4, A.D. 1601; Pickas v. Guile, Yelv. 128, A.D.
1608.

288/1 Supra, p. 195. Lord Coke's caution not to rely on the
abridgments is very necessary to the proper study of the history
of consideration. The abridgments apply the doctrine to cases
which make no mention of it, and which were decided before it was
ever heard of.

290/1 Y.B. 46 Ed. III. 19, pl. 19; 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5;
Keilway, 160, pl. 2; Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5;
Coggs v. Bernaard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909.

290/2 Riches and Briggs, Yelv. 4, A.D. 1601; Pickas v. Guile,
Yelv. 128.

291/1 Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 Ad. & El. 743, A.D. 1838.

291/2 Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490, A.D. 1835; Haigh
v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & El. 309; lb. 323; Hart v. Miles, 4 C.B. N.S.
371, A.D. 1858.

291/3 Wheatley v. Low, Cro. Jac. 668, A.D. 1623. Cf. Byne and
Playne's Case, 1 Leon. 220, 221 (32 & 33 Eliz.).

291/4 Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490; Haigh v. Brooks,
10 Ad. & El. 309; Hart v. Miles, 4 C.B. N.S. 371; 6 Am. Law Rev.
47, Oct. 1871.

292/1 Supra, pp. 196, 197. See also Lecture VII.

292/2 Byles, J., in Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. C.P. 145, 149.

292/3 Shadwell v. Shadwell, ubi supra; Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen,
269, 272, 273.

292/4 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B.851.

293/1 Price v. Jenkins, 5 Ch. D. 619. Cf. Grabbe v. Moxey, 1 W.
R. 226; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B.851; Monahan, Method of Law, 141
et seq.

294/1 Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 389.

294/2 Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248, criticising Williaws v.
Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Ad. 621, where, however, it does not appear
that the plaintiff did not know of the offer of a reward, but
merely that the jury found that she was in fact actuated by other
motives, a finding wholly beside the mark.

296/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26.

296/2 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166.

296/3 Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272, A.D. 1568.

297/1 See Barker v. Halifax, Cro. Eliz. 741; S.C. 3 Dyer, 272 a,
n. 32.

297/2 Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leonard, 224; Bosden v. Thinne,
Yelv. 40; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105; Langdell, Cas. on
Contr. (2d ed.), ch. 2, Section 11, Summary, Sections 90 et seq.
See above,
Lecture VII. p. 286.

297/3 Pollock, Contr. (lst ed.), p. 6.

298/1 Canham v. Barry, 15 C.B. 597, 619; Jones v. How, 9 C.B. 1,
9; Com. Dig. Condition, D. 2; I Roll. Abr. 420 (D), pl. 1; Y.B.
22 Ed. IV. 26, pl. 6.

301/1 Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., 6 H. & N. 211,
218, Bramwell, B. Cf. Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, 4
Q.B.D. 670, 674, 676.

301/2 British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P.
499, 509, Willes, J.; Horne v. Midland Railway Co., L.R. 7 C.P.
583, 591; S.C., L.R. 8 C.P. 131.

302/1 British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P.
499, 509.

304/1 Cheale v. Kenward, 3 DeG. & J. 27.

304/2 Langdell, Contr., Sections 89, 28.

305/1 Langdell, Contr., Section 57.

305/2 Ibid., Sections 14, 15.

306/1 But see Langdell, Contr., Sections 14, 15.

FOOTNOTES

309/1 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906. Cf. Kyle v. Kavanagh,
103 Mass. 356, 357.

309/2 Cf. Cocker v. Crompton, 1 B. & C. 489.

310/1 Smith v. Hughes, L.R. 6 Q.B.597.

310/2 See Gardner v. Lane, 12 Allen, 39; S.C. 9 Allen, 492, 98
Mass. 517.

311/1 Goddard v. Monitor Ins. Co., 108 Mass. 56.

313/1 See Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 469. Cf. Reg. v.
Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 55 et seq., 62 et seq.; Reg. v.
Davies, Dearsly, C.C. 640; Rex v. Mucklow, 1 Moody, O.C. 160;
Reg. v. Jacobs, 12 Cox, 151.

313/2 "Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis." Cf. Byles,
J., in Way v. Hearne, 32 L. J. N.S.C.P. 34, 40. But cf. the
conflicting opinions in Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 45,
57. It would seem that a proper name or other identification of
an object or person as specific may have the same effect as an
actual identification by the senses, because it refers to such an
identification, although in a less direct way.

316/1 Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136.

316/2 Leake, Dig. Contr. 13, 14, 637; Hunt v. Livermore, 5 Pick.
395, 397; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 36.

316/3 Leake, Dig. Contr. 638; Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins.
Co., 1 B. & S. 782.

316/4 But cf. Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/2 Bullen & Leake, Prec. of Plead. (3d ed.), 147, "Conditions
Precedent."

319/1 Cf. Cort v. Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern
Junction Railway Co., 17 Q.B.127.

320/1 Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q.B.576 (1850).

325/1 Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 503.

325/2 Supra, p. 136.

327/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33.

328/1 See the explanation of Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P.C. 199,
in Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 760.

329/1 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751.

329/2 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 28, p. 1000.

329/3 See Lecture VIII.

330/1 Kennedy v. Panama, &c. Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B.580, 588; Lyon
v. Bertram, 20 How. 149, 153. Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 76,
nn. 6,
9.

330/2 Windscheid, Pand., Section 76(4). See, generally, Ibid.,
nn. 6,
7; Section 78, pp. 206, 207; Section 82, pp. 216 et seq.

331/1 Cr. Ihering, Geist d. Roem. Rechts, Section 48, III. p. 116
(Fr.
transl.).

331/2 See, however, the language of Crompton, J. in S.C., I B. &
S. 877. Cf. Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 479, n. 1, A (c).

331/3 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 755, 756.

334/1 Cf. Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie, L.R. 10 C.P.
271.

334/2 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

335/1 Contracts (2d Ed.), Section 106, and passim.

336/1 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, 404. Possibly Behn v.
Burness, stated above, might have been dealt with in this way.
The ship tendered was not a ship which had been in the port of
Amsterdam at the date of the contract. It was therefore not such
a ship as the contract called for.

336/2 Heyworth v. Hutchinson, L.R. 2 Q.B.447, criticised in Benj.
Sales (2d ed.), pp. 742 et seq.

336/3 See Thomas v. Cadwallader, Willes, 496; Langd. Contr. (2d
ed.), Sections 116, 140. This is put as a case of equivalence by
Mr.
Langdell (Contr., Section 116); but the above explanation is
believed
to be the true one. It will be noticed that this is hardly a true
case of condition, but merely a limitation of the scope of the
tenant's promise. So a covenant to serve as apprentice in a
trade, which the other party covenants to teach, can only be
performed if the other will teach, and must therefore be limited
to that event. Cf. Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

337/1 Langdell, Contracts (2d ed.), Section 127. Cf. Roberts v.
Brett,
11 H. L. C. 337.

339/1 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709. Cf. Lang. Contr. (2d ed.),
Section
33, p. 1004. Mr. Langdell says that a bought note, though part of
a bilateral contract, is to be treated as unilateral, and that it
may be presumed that the language of the contract relied on was
that of a bought note, and thus a condition in favor of the
defendant, who made it. I do not quite understand how this can be
assumed when the declaration states a bilateral contract, and the
question arose on demurrer to a plea, which also states that the
plaintiff "was by the agreement bound to declare" the names. How
remote the explanation is from the actual ground of decision will
be seen.

341/1 Recht des Besitzes, Section 11, p. 184, n. 1 (7th ed.),
Eng. tr.
124, n. t.

342/1 Inst. II. Section 157.

342/2 "In suis heredibus evidentius apparet continuationem
dominii eo rem perdueere, ut nulla videatur hereditas fuisse,
quasi olim hi domini essent, qui etiam vivo patre quodammodo
domini existimantur, unde etiam filius familias appellatur sicut
pater familias, sola nota hae adiecta, per quam distinguitur
genitor ab eo qui genitus sit. itaque post mortem patris non
hereditatem percipere videntur, sed magis liberam bonorum
administrationem consequuntur hac ex causa licet non sint heredes
instituti, domini sunt: nec obstat, quod licet eos exheredare,
quod et occidere licebat." D. 28.2. 11. Cf. Plato, Laws, [Greek
characters]

343/1 Laveleye, Propriety, 24, 202, 205, 211, n. 1, 232; Norton,
L.C. Hindu Law of Inheritance, p. 193.

343/2 D. 50. 16. 208.

343/3 D. 41. 1. 34. Cf. D. 41. 3. 40; Bract., fol. 8 a, 44 a.

343/4 D. 43. 24. 13, Section 5.

344/1 Germania, c. 20.

345/1 Littleton, Section 337; Co. Lit. 209, a, b; Y.B. 8 Ed. IV.
5, 6,
pl. 1; Keilway, 44 a (17 Hen. VII.); Lord North v. Butts, Dyer,
139 b, 140 a, top; Overton v. Sydall, Popham, 120, 121; Boyer v.
Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 321; Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pr. Cas. N. s.
11, 14.

345/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 2, pl. 4.

346/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen, 88, 89.

346/2 Proc. de la Lex Salica, tr. Thevenin, p. 72 and n. 1.

347/1 Ethelred, II. 9; Cnut, II. 73; Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, pp.
221 et seq.

347/2 1 Spence, Eq. 189, note, citing Hickes, Dissert. Epist., p.
57.

347/3 Glanv., Lib. VII. c. 2 (Beames, p. 150).

347/4 Ibid., c. 8 (Beames, p. 168).

347/5 Reg. Maj., Lib. II. c. 39.

348/1 Fol. 61 a.

348/2 Sachsensp., II. 60, Section 2, cited in Essays in Ang. Sax.
Law,
p. 221; Grand Cust. de Norm., c. 88.

348/3 Britt., fol. 64 b (Nich. ed. 163); Fleta, Lib. II. c. 62,
Section
10. Cf. Bract., fol. 37 b, Section 10.

348/4 Bracton, fol. 61 a, b. "Item quaero an testator legare
possit actiones suas? Et verum est quod non, de debitis quae in
vita testatoris convicta non fuerunt nec recognita, sed hujusmodi
actiones competunt haeredibus. Cum antera convicta sint et
recognita, tune sunt quasi in bonis testatoris, et competunt
executoribus in foro ecclesiastico. Si autem competant
haeredibus, ut praedictum est, in foro seculari debent terminari,
quia antequam communicantur et in foro debito, non pertinet ad
executores, ut in foro ecclesiastico convincantur."

349/1 Bracton, fol. 62a.

349/2 Y.B. 20 & 21 Ed. I. 232; cf. ib. 312.

349/3 Oates v. Frith, Hob. 130. Cf. Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12;
Popham, J., in Overton v. Sydall, Poph. 120, 121 (E. 39 El.);
Boyer v. Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 319-322; Brooker's Case, Godb.
376, 380 (P. 3 Car. I.).

349/4 Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pract. Cas. N. s. 11, 14. Cf. Y.B.
14 Hen. VIII. pl. 5, at fol. 10.

350/1 Bract., fol. 66 b, 76 b, and passim; Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 226,
200; Littleton, Section 241. The same thing was said where there
were
several executors: "They are only in the place of one person."
Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 5,pl. 1.

350/2 Comm. 385.

350/3 Cf. Glanv., Lib. VII. c. 3; F. N. B. 21 L; Dyer, 4 b, 5 a.

351/1 Cf. Bract., fol. 80 b.

351/2 Charta Divis. Reg. Franc., Art. IX. & VIII. Cf. 3
Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Francais, 408, 409.

351/3 Glanv., Lib. IX. c. 1 (Beames, pp. 218, 220); Bract., fol.
79 b.

352/1 Brooker's Case, Godbolt, 376, 377, pl. 465.

352/2 Dyer, 1 b. Cf. Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pr. C. N. s. 11, 12.

354/1 In the American Law Review for October, 1872, VII. 49, 50,
I mentioned one or two indications of this fact. But I have since
had the satisfaction of finding it worked out with such detail
and learning in Ihering's Geist des Roemischen Rechts, Sections
10, 48,
that I cannot do better than refer to that work, only adding that
for my purposes it is not necessary to go so far as Ihering, and
that he does not seem to have been led to the conclusions which
it is my object to establish. See, further, Clark, Early Roman
Law, 109, 110; Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Frang., I. 114 et seq.;
D. 1.5. 4, Section 3; Gaii Inst. IV. Section 16; ib. II. Section
69.

356/1 Erbvertraege, I. 15 et seq.

356/2 Hist. du Droit Franc., IV. 500.

357/3 "Quantum dare voluerit aut totam furtunam eui voluerit dare
. . . nec minus nec majus nisi quantum ei creditum est." Lex Sal.
(Merkel), XLVI.

357/4 Lex Sal. (Merkel), Cap. XLVI., De adfathamire; Sohm, Frank.
Reichs- u. Gerichtsverfassung, 69.

357/6 Beseler, Erbvertraege, I. 101, 102, 105.

358/1 "Omnem facultatem suam. . . seu cuicunque libet de proximis
vel extraneis, adoptare in hereditatem vel in adfatimi vel per
scripturarum seriem seu per traditionem." L. Rib. Cap. L. (al.
XLVIII.); cf. L. Thuring. XIII. So Capp. Rib. Section7: "Qui
filios non
habuerit et aliurn quemlibet heredem facere sibi voluerit coram
rege . . . traditionem faclat."

357/2 Ed. Roth., cap. 174, 157; cf. lb. 369, 388; Liutpr. III. 16
(al. 2), VI. 155 (al. 102). Cf. Beseler, Erbvertraege, I. 108 et
seq., esp. 116-118. Compare the charter of A.D. 713, "Offero . .
. S. P. ecclesia quam mihi heredem constitui." (Mem. di Lucca V.
b. No. 4.) Troya III. No. 394, cited Heusler, Gewere, 45, 46. Cf.
ib. 484. This, no doubt, was due to Roman influence, but it
recalls what Sir Henry Maine quotes from Elphinstone's History of
India (I. 126), as to sale by a member of one of the village
communities: "The purchaser steps exactly into his place, and
takes up all his obligations." Ancient Law, ch. 8, pp. 263, 264.

357/3 (Merkel) Cap. LVIII., De chrenecruda. Sohm, Frank. R. u. G.
Verf., 117.

358/1 A.D. 679: "Sicuti tibi donata est ira tene et posteri tui."
Kemble, Cod. Dip., I. 21, No. xvi. Uhtred, A.D. 767: "Quam is
semper possideat et post se cui voluerit heredum relinquat." Ib.
I. 144, cxvxi. ("Cuilibet heredi voluerit relinquat" is very
common in the later charters; ib. V. 155, MLXXXIL; lb. VI. 1,
MCCXVIIL; it). 31, MCCXXX.; lb. 38, MCCXXXIV.; and passim. This
may be broader than cui voluerit herealum.) Offa, A.D. 779: "Ut
se viverite habe . . . deat. et post se suoe propinquitatis
homini cui ipse vo . . . possidendum libera utens potestate
relinquat." Ib. I. 164, 165, CXXXVII. Aethilbald, A.D. 736: "Ita
ut quamdiu vixerit potestatem habeat tenendi ac possidendi
cuicumque voluerit vel eo vivo vel certe post obitum suum
relinquendi." Ib. I. 96, LXXX.; cf. ib. V. 53, MXIV. Cuthred of
Kent, A.D. 805: "Cuicumque hominum voluerit in aeternam
libertatem derelinquat." Ib. I. 232, CXC. "Ut habeat libertatem
commutandi vel donandi in vita sua et post ejus obiturn teneat
facultatem relinquendi cuicumque volueris." Ib. I. 233, 234,
CXCI.; cf. ib. V. 70, MXXXI. Wiglaf of Mercia, Aug. 28, A.D. 831:
"Seu vendendum ant commutandum i cuicumque ei herede placuerit
dereliaquendum." Ib. I. 294, CCXXVII.

359/1 "W. et heredibus suis, videlicet quos heredes
constituerit." Memorials of Hexham, Surtees Soc. Pub., 1864, II.
88.

359/2 Cf. Y.B. 27 Ass., fol. 135, pl. 25. Under the Welsh laws
the champion in a cause decided by combat acquired the rights of
the next of kin, the next of kin being the proper champion. Lea,
Superstition and Force (3d Ed.), 165. Cf. ib. 161, n. 1; ib. 17.

361/1 D. 38. 8. 1, pr.

361/2 "Cum is, qui ex edicto bonorum possessionem petiit, ficto
se herede agit." Gaii Inst. IV. Section 34. Cf. Ulp. Fragm.
XXVIII. Section
12; D. 37. 1. 2. So the fidei commissarius, who was a praetorian
successor (D. 41. 4. 2, Section 19; 10. 2. 24), "in similitudinem
heredis consistit." Nov. 1. 1, Section 1. Cf. Just. Inst. 2. 24,
pr.,
and then Gaius, II. Sections 251, 252.

361/3 Gaii Inst. II. Sections 102 et seq. Cf. ib. Sections 252,
35.

361/4 Gaii Inst. IV Section 35: "Similiter et bonorum emptor
ficto se
herede agit." Cf. ib. Sections 144, 145. Keller, Roemische
Civilprocess, Section 85, III. But cf. Scheurl, Lehrb. der Inst.,
Section
218, p. 407 (6th ed.).

361/5 Paulus in D. 50. 17. 128.

362/1 "In re legata in accessione temporis quo testator possedit,
legatarius quodammodo quasi heres est." D. 41. 3. 14, Section 1.

362/2 D. 41.1.62; 43. 3. 1, Section 6; Gaii Inst. II. Section 97;
Just. Inst.
2. 10, Section 11.

363/1 "[Accessiones possessionum] plane tribuuntur his qui in
locum aliorum succedunt sive ex contractu sive voluntate:
heredibus enum et his, qui successorum loco habentur, datur
accessio testatoris. Itaque si mihi vendideris servum utar
accesssione tua." D. 44.3.14, Sections 1, 2.

363/2 "Ab eo . . . in cujus locum hereditate vel emptione aliove
quo iure successi." D. 43. 19. 3, Section 2.

363/3 D. 50. 4. 1, Section 4. Cf. Cic. de Off. 3. 19. 76; Gaii
Inst.
IV. Section 34.

363/4 C. 2. 3. 21; C. 6. 16. 2; cf. D. 38. 8. 1, pr.

364/1 "In locum successisse accipimus sive per universitatem sive
in rem sit successum." D. 43. 3. 1, Section13. Cf.D.
21.3.3,Section1;D.
12.2.7&8;D. 39. 2. 24, Section 1.

364/2 D. 41.2. 13, Sections 1, 11. Other cases put by Ulpian may
stand
on a different fiction. After the termination of a precarium, for
instance, fingitur fundus nunquam fuisse possessus ab ipso
detentore. Gothofred, note 14 (Elz. ed.). But cf. Puchta, in
Weiske, R. L., art. Besitz, p. 50, and D. 41.2.13, Section7.

364/3 Inst. 2. 6, Sections 12, 13. Cf. D. 44. 3. 9. See, for a
fuller
statement, 11 Am. Law Rev. 644, 645.

365/1 Recht des Besitzes, Section11 (7th ed.), p. 184, n. 1, Eng.
tr.
124, n. t.

365/2 Paulus, D. 8. 6. 18, Section 1. This seems to be written of
a
rural servitude (aqua) which was lost by mere disuse, without
adverse user by the servient owner.

365/3 Hermogenianus, D. 21. 3. 3; Exe. rei jud., D. 44. 2. 9,
Section
2; ib. 28; ib. 11, Sections 3, 9; D. 10. 2. 25, Section 8; D. 46.
8. 16, Section I;
Keller, Roem. Civilproc., Section 73. Cf. Bracton, fol. 24 b,
Section 1 ad
fin.

365/4 "Recte a me via uti prohibetur et interdictum ei inutile
est, quia a me videtur vi vel clam vel precario possidere, qui ab
auctore meo vitiose possidet. nam et Pedius scribit, si vi aut
clam aut precario ab co sit usus, in cuius locum hereditate vel
emptione aliove quo lure suceessi, idem esse dicendum: cum enim
successerit quis in locum eorum, aequum non est nos noceri hoc,
quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cuius locum successimus." D. 43.
19. 3, Section 2. The variation actore, argued for by Savigny, is
condemned by Mommsen, in his edition of the Digest, -- it seems
rightly.

365/5 D. 12. 2. 7 & 8.

366/1 Ulpian, D. 39. 2. 24, Section1. Cf. D. 8. 5.7; D. 39. 2.
17, Section 3,
n. 79 (Elzevir ed.); Paulus, D. 2. 14. 17, Section 5.

366/2 "Cum quis in alii locum successerit non est aequum ei
nocere hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cujus locum
successit. Plerumque emptoris eadem causa esse debet circa
petendum ac defendendum, quae fuit auctoris." Ulp. D. 50. 17.
156, Sections 2, 3. "Qui in ius dominiumve alterius succedit,
iure ejus
uti debet." Paulus, D. 50. 17. 177. "Non debeo melioris
condieionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo ius in me transit."
Paulus, D. 50. 17. 175, Section 1. "Quod ipsis qui contraxerunt
obstat,
et successoribus eoturn obstabit." Ulp. D. 50. 17. 143. "Nemo
plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet." Ulp.
D. 50. 17. 54; Bract., fol. 31 b. Cf. Decret. Greg. Lib. II. Tit.
XIII. c. 18, De rest. spoliat.: "Cum spoliatori quasi succedat in
vitium." Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, p. 179. Windscheid, Pand.,
Section 162
a, n. 10.

366/3 "Ne vitiosae quidam possessioni ulla potest accedere: sed
nec vitiosa ei, quse vitiosa non est." D. 41. 2. 13, Section 13.

367/1 Hill v. Ellard, 3 Salk. 279. Cf. Withers v. Iseham, Dyer,
70 a, 70 b, 71 a; Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 59b, 60b; Y.B. 20 &
21 Ed. I 426; 205; 12 Hen. IV. 7.

368/1 Doe v. Barnard, 13 Q.B.945, 952, 953, per Cur., Patteson,
J. Cf. Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1 Q.B.1, 3, 6, 7.

368/2 See, further, Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. 241; 2 Bl. Comm.
263 et seq.; 3 Ch. Pl. 1119 (6th Am. ed.); 3 Kent, 444, 445;
Angell, Limitations, ch. 31, Section 413. Of course if a right
had
already been acquired before the disseisin different
considerations would apply. If the right claimed is one of those
which are regarded as incident to land, as explained in the
following Lecture, the disseisor will have it. Jenk. Cent. 12,
First Cent. Case 21.

370/1 Ared v. Watkin, Cro. Eliz. 637; S.C., ib. 651. Cf. Y.B. 5
Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12; Dyer, 4 b, n. (4).

370/2 Roe v. Hayley, 12 East, 464, 470 (1810).

371/1 Boyer v. Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 321.

372/1 Essays in A. S. Law, 219.

372/2 "Per medium," Bracton, fol. 37b, Section10 ad fin.

374/1 Bract., fol. 17 b. Cf. Fleta, III. c. 14, Section 6.

374/2 See, further, Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503, stated
infra, p. 379.

374/3 See also Bract., fol. 380 b, 381. "Et quod de haeredibus
dicitur, idem dici poterit de assignatis .... Et quod assignatis
fieri debet warrantia per modum donationis: probatur in itinere
W. de Ralegh in Com. Warr. circa finem rotuli, et hoc maxime, si
primus dominus capitalis, et primus feoffator, ceperit homagium
et servitium assignati." Cf. Fleta, VI. Section 6; Moore, 93, pl.
230;
Sheph. Touchst. 199, 200. As to the reason which led to the
mention of assigns, cf. Bract., fol. 20 b, Section 1; 1 Britt.
(Nich.),
223, 312.

375/1 I do not stop to inquire whether this was due to the
statute of Quia Emptores, by which the assign was made to hold
directly of the first grantor, or whether some other explanation
must be found. Cf. Bract., fol. 37 b; c. 14, Sections 6, 11; VI.
c. 28,
Section 4; 1 Britton (Nich.), 256, [100 b].

375/2 Fleta, III. c. 14, Section 6, fol. 197; 1 Britton (Nich.),
223,
233, 244, 255, 312; Co. Lit. 384 b; Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 232; Abbr.
Placit., fol. 308, 2d col., Dunelm, rot. 43; Y.B. 14 Hen. IV. 5,
6.

377/1 Fol. 67 a; cf. 54 a.

377/2 Fol. 381; supra, p. 874, n. 3.

378/1 Cf. Pincombe v. Rudge, Hobart, 3; Bro. Warrantia Carte, pl.
8; S.C., Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 14, pl. 5.

378/2 Y.B. 50 Ed. III. 12b & 13.

378/3 Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14, per Belknap, arguendo.

378/4 Noke v. Awder, Cro. Eliz. 373; S.C., ib. 436. Cf. Lewis v.
Campbell, 8 Taunt. 715; S.C., 3 J. B. Moore, 35.

379/1 Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503; S.C., ib. 505, Sir
William Jones, 406.

379/2 Harper v. Bird, T. Jones, 102 (Pasch. 30 Car. II.). These
cases show an order of development parallel to the history of the
assignment of other contracts not negotiable.

380/1 Andrew v. Pearce, 4 Bos. & Pul. 158 (1805).

383/1 Austin, Jurisprudence, II. p. 842 (3d ed.).

383/2 "Quoniam non personae, sed praedia deberent, neque adquiri
libertas neque remitti servitus per partem poterit." D. 8. 3. 34,
pr.

383/3 "Qui fundum alienum bona fide emit, itinere quod ei fundo
debetur usus est: retinetur id ius itineris: atque etiam, si
precario aut vi deiecto domino possidet: fundus enim qualiter se
habens ita, cum in suo habitu possessus est, ius non deperit,
neque refert, iuste nec ne possideat qui talem eum possidet." D.
8. 6. 12.

383/4 Elzevir ed., n. 51, ad loc. cit.; Cicero de L. Agr. 3. 2.
9.

383/5 D. 50. 16, 86. Cf. Ulpian, D. 41. 1. 20, Section 1; D. 8.
3. 23,
Section 2.

383/6 Inst. 2. 3, Section 1.

384/1 D. 8. 1. 14, pr. Cf. Elzevir ed., n. 58, "Et sic jura . . .
accessiones ease possunt corporum."

384/2 "Cum fundus fundo servit." D. 8. 4. 12. Cf. D. 8. 5. 20,
Section
1; D. 41. 1. 2O, Section 1.

384/3 Jurisprudence, II. p. 847 (3d ed.).

384/4 Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 57, n. 10 (4th ed.), p. 150.

385/1 Fol. 10b, Section 3.

385/2 Fol. 220b, Section 1.

386/1 Fol. 221.

386/2 Fol. 219a, b.

386/3 Fol. 102a, b.

386/4 Fol. 226 b, Section 13. All these passages assume that a
right
has been acquired and inheres in the land.

387/1 Fol. 53 a; cf. 59 b, ad fin., 242 b.

387/2 "Nihil praescribitur nisi quod possidetur," cited from Hale
de Jur. Maris, p. 32, in Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268,
277.

388/1 Bract., fol. 46b; cf. 17b, 18, 47 b, 48.

388/2 Fol. 81, 81 b, 79 b, 80 b.

388/3 Fol. 24 b, 26, 35 b, 86, 208 b, &c. Cf. F. N. B. 123, E;
Laveleye, Propriete, 67, 68, 116.

388/4 Abbr. Plac. 110; rot. 22, Devon. (Hen. III.}.

388/5 Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Met. (Mass.) 448.

389/1 Keilway, 130 b, pl. 104.

389/2 Keilway, 113 a, pl. 45; Dyer, 2b.

389/3 Keilway, 113a, pl. 45. Cf. Y.B. 33-35 Ed. I. 70; 45 Ed.
III. 11, 12.

389/4 Litt. Section 589.

389/5 Keilway, 2 a, pl. 2 ad fin. (12 Hen. VII.). But cf. Y.B. 6
Hen. VII. 14, pl. 2 ad fin.

389/6 4 Laferriere, Hist. du Droit. Franc. 442; Bracton, fol. 53
a.

390/1 Cf. Co. Lit. 322 b, et seq.; Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 2 ad
fin.

390/2 Daintry v. Brocklehurst, 3 Exch. 207.

390/3 Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12.

391/1 Y.B. 9 Hen. VI. 16, pl. 7.

391/2 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 26, pl. 77.

391/3 Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12.

391/4 Cf. Theloall, Dig. I. c. 21, pl. 9.

391/5 Buskin v. Edmunds, Cro. Eliz. 636.

391/6 Harper v. Bird, T. Jones, 102 (30 Car. II.).

391/7 Bolles v. Nyseham, Dyer, 254 b; Porter v. Swetnam, Style,
406; S.C., ib. 431.

391/8 3 Bl. Comm. 231, 232.

392/1 Yielding v. Fay, Cro. Eliz. 569.

392/2 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14; Prior of
Woburn's Case, 22 Hen. VI. 46, pl. 36; Williams's Case, 5 Co.
Rep. 72 b, 73 a; Slipper v. Mason, Nelson's Lutwyche, 43, 45
(top).

392/3 F. N. B. 127; Nowel v. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 709; Star v.
Rookesby, 1 Salk. 335, 336; Lawrence v. Jenkins, L.R. 8 Q.B.274.

392/4 Dyer, 24 a, pl. 149; F. N. B. 180 N.

393/1 F. N. B. 128 D, E; Co. Lit. 96 b. It is assumed that, when
an obligation is spoken of as falling upon the land, it is
understood to be only a figure of speech. Of course rights and
obligations are confined to human beings.

393/2 Keilway, 145 b, 146, pl. 15; Sir Henry Nevil's Case, Plowd.
377, 381; Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 119 b, 122 b.

393/3 F. N. B. 180 N.; Co. Lit. 385 a; Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep.
16 a, 17 b; Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14; Keilway,
145 b, 146, pl. 15; Comyns's Digest, Covenant (B, 3).

394/1 Holms v. Seller, 3 Lev. 305; Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L.
C. 348; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 180. Cf. Bro. Covenant,
pl. 2.

394/2 Y.B. 21 Ed. III. 2, pl. 5; F. N. B. 180 N.

394/3 The action is case in the Prior of Woburn's Case, Y.B. 22
Hen. VI. 46, pl. 36. In F. N. B. 128 E, n. (a), it is said that a
curia claudenda only lay upon a prescriptive right, and that if
the duty to fence was by indenture the plaintiff was put to his
writ of covenant. But see below, pp. 396, 400.

394/4 Y.B. 32 & 33 Ed. I. 430.

395/1 Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 360.

395/2 Y.B. 32 & 33 Ed. I. 516.

395/3 "Quia res cum homine [obviously a misprint for onere]
transit ad quemcunque." Fol. 382, 382 b.

395/4 Lib. VI. c. 23, Section 17.

395/5 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14.

395/6 Sugd. V. & P. (14th ed.), 587; Rawle, Covenants for Title
(4th ed.), p. 314. Cf. Vyvyan v. Arthur, 1 B. & C. 410; Sharp v.
Waterhouse, 7 El. & Bl. 816, 823.

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