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The Army of the Cumberland by Henry M. Cist

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The scope of this work precluded the entering into details as to the
minor operations of the troops in the commands named. It has even
been impossible to give the movements of troops on the battlefields
in lesser organizations than brigades. The rosters of the several
armies given in full in the appendices will enable those interested
to trace the movements of the minor commands.

The subject is too great a one to be fully and justly treated within
the limitations, both of time and space, which have necessarily
been imposed here. Still, with the hope that the future student
of history may glean something of value in this volume not found
elsewhere, it is sent forth for the favorable consideration of its

To the many friends who have kindly aided me in various ways, I
return my sincere thanks. To Col. R. N. Scott, U.S.A., I am under
special obligations for data furnished.

The maps for this volume were prepared by permission from those of
Captain Ruger in Van Horne's "History of the Army of the Cumberland,"
published by Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati.

H. M. C.


List of Maps, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Early Movements, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mill Springs, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Concentration at Nashville, . . . . . . . . 21
Morgan's and Forrest's Raids, . . . . . . . 31
Bragg's Advance into Kentucky, . . . . . . 48
Battle of Perryville, . . . . . . . . . . . 61
The Advance to Murfreesboro, . . . . . . . 87
The Battle of Stone's River, . . . . . . . 102
In Murfreesboro, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
The Advance on Tullahoma, . . . . . . . . . 154
The Movement to Chickamauga, . . . . . . . 173
The Battle of Chickamauga, . . . . . . . . 193
The Siege of Chattanooga, . . . . . . . . . 230
Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary
Ridge Battles, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Appendix, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Index, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273


General Map of the Campaign, . . . . . . . 1
Mill Springs, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Battle of Perryville, . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Battle-Map Stone's River, . . . . . . . . . 103
Chickamauga Campaign, . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Battle of Chickamauga, . . . . . . . . . . 194
Battlefield of Chattanooga, . . . . . . . . 245




In Kentucky, during the spring of 1861, every shade of opinion
prevailed, from the most pronounced Union sentiment to the most
ultra secession sympathy.

The Government at Washington wished to enlist Kentucky heartily
in support of the Union, while every effort was made by the rebel
leaders to secure the secession of the State from the Union, and
to have it join its fortunes to those of the South. These several
efforts enlisted the active support of those in the State in sympathy
with them, and Kentuckians became ultimately divided into two
sharply defined parties. Under the peculiar doctrine of "armed
neutrality" adopted by the local authorities, no serious infraction of
the peace of the State was had until the fall. With the invitation
given General Anderson to take command in Kentucky, by the State
Legislature, the doctrine of "armed neutrality" came to an end. While
it at times restrained prompt action on the part of the Union men
of Kentucky during the first six months of the war, and hampered
the Federal Government in the movement of troops in the State, still
in the end it was of immense benefit to the cause of the Union,
and enabled those in support of it in Kentucky to unite and perfect
their plans in comparative peace, unmolested by the rebels from
Tennessee and their own State. Under cover of "armed neutrality"
the Union men remained quiet until the time had arrived for prompt
and decided action, with men, and arms for their support, in the
measures they adopted to retain Kentucky in the Union.

In accordance with a general plan of operations adopted by General
Albert Sidney Johnston, on September 18th, General Buckner broke
camp with the rebel forces at Camp Boone, Tenn., near the Kentucky
line, and marching north, occupied Bowling Green, throwing out his
advance as far as Elizabethtown.

On receipt of reliable information as to Buckner's movements,
General Anderson sent General W. T. Sherman, second in command,
to Camp Joe Holt, with instructions to order Colonel Rousseau with
his entire command to report at once in Louisville. The "Home
Guards" were also ordered out, and they assembled promptly in large
force, reporting at the Nashville depot, and by midnight they were
started to the front by train. Rousseau's command followed at once,
General Sherman being in command of the entire force, amounting to
some three thousand men. The advance by train was stopped at the
Rolling Fork of the Salt River, about thirty-one miles south of
Louisville, at which point the railroad bridge had been burned by
the rebels. During the following day the troops under Rousseau
forded the stream, and pressing forward occupied Muldraugh's Hills
with its two trestles and a tunnel over fifteen hundred feet long.
The Home Guards were left in camp at Lebanon Junction, some two
or three miles in the rear, where Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Johnson
of the Third Kentucky Cavalry reported later in the day with some
additional companies of Home Guards, and, by order of General
Anderson, assumed command of the camp.

This disposition of troops caused Buckner to retire with his entire
command to Bowling Green, where he strongly fortified his position.

The Kentucky State troops were under orders for ten days' service
only, and their place was then filled by several regiments from
the States immediately north of Kentucky. These troops were placed
in camp, and there received instruction in drill, discipline, and
camp regulations, waiting for orders for the advance.

General Johnston, under his general plan of creating a defensive
line from Columbus on the west, running through Bowling Green east
to some point to be determined on, early in September sent General
Zollicoffer with a force numbering several thousand men to make an
advance into Eastern Kentucky by way of Knoxville, East Tennessee,
through Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford, threatening Camp Dick
Robinson. On the 19th of that month the advance of Zollicoffer's
command had a spirited skirmish with the "Home Guards" at Barboursville
Bridge. These troops were compelled to retire, which they did,
to Rock Castle Hills, where they were re-enforced by two Kentucky
regiments under Colonel T. T. Garrard, of the Seventh Kentucky Infantry,
who had received instructions from General Thomas to obstruct the
roads and to hold the rebels in check. Garrard established his
force at Camp Wildcat, behind temporary breastworks, where, on
October 21st, he was attacked by Zollicoffer with 7,000 troops.
Shortly after the attack General Schoepff [NOTE from Brett Fishburne
the correct spelling is "Schoepf" as I know because this is my
great-great-grandfather, but I have kept the spelling as in the
original book for subsequent references], with five regiments of
infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, re-enforced
Garrard, and after a severe fight the enemy was repulsed.

After Buckner's retreat to Bowling Green, Zollicoffer fell back to
Mill Springs, on the southern bank of the Cumberland River, and soon
afterward crossed the river to the opposite bank at Beech Grove,
fortifying this encampment with extensive earthworks.

During the month of September, General George H. Thomas, who with
General Wm. T. Sherman had been ordered to report to General Anderson
for duty in Kentucky--at General Anderson's personal request of the
President--was placed in command of Camp Dick Robinson, relieving
General Nelson. The latter then established Camp Kenton in Mason
County, three miles from Maysville, near the spot where Simon
Kenton's station was erected in 1785.

On the 7th of October General Anderson, on account of ill-health,
relinquished the command of the department, and General W.
T. Sherman on the following day succeeded him. At the same time
General A. McD. McCook was placed in command of the force that
[had] been ordered to the front under Sherman.

During the month of October the rebel Colonel J. S. Williams was
organizing a force of some two thousand troops at Prestonburg,
on the Big Sandy River, intending to operate in Central Kentucky
through McCormick's Gap. General Nelson early in the month started
with all the troops of his command to drive the rebels out of their
encampment. Nelson ordered the Second Ohio under Colonel L. A.
Harris to move from Paris, and the Twenty-first Ohio under Colonel
Norton to advance from Nicholasville to Olympia Springs, where
the entire command was concentrated. From here he advanced to
McCormick's Gap, and then divided his command, sending the Second
Ohio, a section of Captain Konkle's battery, and a company of
Ohio cavalry under Captain McLaughlin--all under the command of
Colonel Harris--through West Liberty to unite with the command at
Salyersville. Nelson then moved forward with three regiments of
infantry, two detachments of Kentucky troops, and two sections of
Konkle's battery, with a battalion of cavalry, on the road to Hazel
Green. On the 23d Harris occupied West Liberty, after a brisk
skirmish. The command united at Salyersville and followed the
enemy to Prestonburg. At this point Nelson sent the Thirty-third
Ohio, with the Kentucky troops and a section of Konkle's battery
under Colonel Sill, by a detour to the right to flank the rebel
position at Ivy Mountain. Nelson on the next day then advanced
with his command on the direct road to Piketon, and encountered the
enemy in ambush on the mountain at Ivy Creek. Pushing forward at
once with the force under his immediate command, Nelson attacked the
enemy, and after a brisk engagement, lasting over an hour, routed
them from their cover and drove them in full retreat.

Sill occupied Piketon on the 9th without much opposition. General
Nelson arrived there on the 10th, when the rebels leaving the State
and retreating through Pound Gap, he was ordered to report with
his command to General Buell at Louisville.

On the retirement of General Anderson, as the ranking officer in
the department, General Sherman assumed the command. On the 9th
of November, by general order from the headquarters of the army,
No. 97, the Department of the Ohio was created, "to consist of the
States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of
the Cumberland river, and the State of Tennessee, and to be commanded
by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, headquarters at Louisville;" and
General Sherman was relieved from command at his own request.

Nelson's command being ordered out of East Kentucky, the rebel
forces again entered, and in small bands were depredating on Union
people in the Big Sandy Valley. The Fourteenth Kentucky under Colonel
L. P. Moore was ordered to move from Catlettsburg and advance up
the valley. General Buell finding that the rebel force had been
largely re-enforced by the advance of General Humphrey Marshall, one
of the ablest rebel generals in that part of the country, ordered
the Twenty-second Kentucky under Colonel Lindsay from Maysville to
join the Fourteenth, and Lindsay was placed in command of the two
regiments. Marshall was a graduate of West Point; he had served
in the Black Hawk War and had seen service in Mexico as a Colonel
of Kentucky cavalry, winning distinction at Buena Vista. He had now
entered the State from Virginia through Pound Gap, and had reached
a strong natural position near Paintville, where he was rapidly
increasing his army, with the intention of raising a sufficient
force--already some five thousand--to operate on General Buell's
flank and to retard his advance into Tennessee. The Forty-second
Ohio, just organized, was in a camp of instruction near Columbus,
Ohio, under its Colonel, James A. Garfield. While there, in
December, he was ordered by General Buell to move his regiment at
once to Catlettsburg, at the mouth of the Big Sandy River, and to
report in person to Louisville for orders.

Starting his regiment eastward, from Cincinnati, Garfield, on the
19th of December, reported to General Buell, who informed him that
he had been selected to command an expedition to drive Marshall
and his forces from Kentucky. That evening Garfield received his
orders, which organized the Eighteenth Brigade of the Army of the
Ohio, and placed him in command. General Buell with these orders
sent a letter of instruction, giving general directions as to the
campaign, leaving all matters of detail and the fate of the expedition,
however, largely to the discretion of the brigade commander. The
latter reached his command on the 24th of December, at Louisa, some
twenty-eight miles up the Big Sandy. He then proceeded to concentrate
his troops, the main body consisting of his own regiment--the
Forty-second Ohio--the Fourteenth Kentucky, and a battalion of Ohio
cavalry under Major McLaughlin, which was with him; but these gave
only some fifteen hundred men for duty.

The next largest portion of his command was stationed at Paris,
Kentucky, under Colonel Cranor, with his regiment, the Fortieth
Ohio, 800 strong. Cranor was ordered to join the main body as
expeditiously as possible, and to bring with him that portion of
Colonel Wolford's Kentucky cavalry stationed at Stanford, consisting
of three small battalions under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, and
to report at Prestonburg. The twenty-second Kentucky was ordered
from Maysville, and some three hundred men of that command reported
before Garfield reached Paintville. He was also joined by a battalion
of west Virginia cavalry under Colonel Bolles. After a toilsome
march in mid-winter, Garfield's command, on the 7th of January,
drove Marshall's forces from the mouth of Jenny's Creek, and occupied
Paintville. On the morning of the 9th, Cranor reported with his
command, footsore and exhausted, after a march of over one hundred
miles through the mountains of Eastern Kentucky. At noon of the 9th
Garfield advanced his command to attack Marshall with his cavalry,
pressing the rebels as they fell back. Reaching Prestonburg
some fifteen miles from Paintville, he learned that Marshall was
encamped and fortified on Abbott's Creek. Pushing on to the mouth
of the creek, some three miles below Prestonburg, he there encamped
for the night, a sleety rain adding to the discomfort of the men.
Intending to force the enemy to battle, he ordered up his reserves
under Colonel Sheldon from Paintville, with every available man.
As soon as the morning light enabled the command to move, Garfield
advanced, and soon engaged the rebel cavalry, which was driven in
after a slight skirmish, falling back on the main body some two
miles in the rear, strongly posted on high ground, between Abbott's
Creek and Middle Creek, at the mouth of the latter stream. It was
impossible to tell what disposition Marshall had made for his defence,
owing to the formation of the ground at this point concealing his
troops until our forces drew his fire. Throwing several detachments
forward, the entire command was soon actively engaged. The
engagement lasted for some four hours, commending at about twelve
o'clock. At 4 P.M., the reserves under Sheldon reached the field
of battle, and the enemy was driven from his position. Night coming
on prevented pursuit.

Marshall's command fled down the valley, set fire to their stores,
and pressed forward in rapid retreat to Abington, Va. Garfield
with his command returned to Paintville, where it could receive
supplies. In February he received orders from Buell, directing
him to advance to Piketon, and drive the rebels from that place,
which he did, and later from Pound Gap. This freed Eastern Kentucky
of rebel troops, and relieved the Union men of that section of the
depredations that had been committed on them by the roving bands
of the enemy. The services of Garfield's command were recognized
by Buell, and the thanks of the Commanding General extended to
Garfield and his troops. Shortly after this Garfield received his
commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, to date from the
"Battle of Middle Creek."

In the latter part of March General Garfield was ordered to leave
a small force in the Big Sandy Valley, and to report with the rest
of his brigade to General Buell at Louisville.

Chapter II.

Mill Springs.

On September 10, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had
resigned the Colonelcy of the Second United States Cavalry to engage
in the service of the Confederacy, was assigned to the command of
the Department of the West, embracing, with a large number of the
Western States, the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. On the 18th
Johnston directed Buckner to occupy Bowling Green, and ordered
Zollicoffer to advance from Knoxville to Cumberland Gap. The rebels,
under General Polk, occupied Columbus, Ky., September 7th, and the
line of operations of the Confederates, under General Johnston,
as then formed, had the Mississippi river at its extreme left,
Cumberland Gap at its extreme right, with Bowling Green as the centre.
With the force at his command, no point in advance of Bowling Green
could have been safely taken by the Confederate general, owing to
the disposition of the Union troops in Kentucky at that time.

As we have seen, Zollicoffer with his command was driven from Rock
Castle Hills and Wildcat, and taking a new position nearer Bowling
Green, encamped at Beech Grove, where he fortified his position.

General Zollicoffer was a civilian appointment, without military
training of any kind. He had been editor of a Nashville paper,
had held a number of minor State offices, and served two terms in
Congress prior to the war. Johnston, in ordering Zollicoffer to
the Cumberland River at Mill Springs, intended that he should occupy
a position of observation merely until he should be re-enforced,
or his troops be incorporated in the main command. He could not
have been located farther west without inviting the advance of
the Federal forces into East Tennessee or to Nashville, flanking
Bowling Green. Zollicoffer had no ability as a soldier to handle
troops, and General George B. Crittenden, of Kentucky, a graduate
of West Point, who had seen service in the Mexican War, and who held
at the outbreak of the rebellion, a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel
in the regiment of Mounted Riflemen, was, in November, assigned
to the command of the district as Major-General, with headquarters
at Knoxville. Great expectations were entertained in regard to
Crittenden's military abilities; and about the first of the year
1862 he assumed command in person of the rebel forces at Beech
Grove. The fact that Zollicoffer had established his camp on the
north side of the Cumberland, "with the enemy in front and the
river behind," was known to Johnston, and information given by him
to Crittenden. General Johnston had written Zollicoffer that the
interest of the service required him simply to watch the river,
and that he could do this better from Mill Springs without crossing

Zollicoffer, however, had crossed the river before he heard from
Johnston, and replied that, while from this letter he inferred that
he should not have done so, it was now too late, as his means of
recrossing were so limited that he could hardly accomplish it in
the face of the enemy. On his reaching the Cumberland with his
command, he had sent forward his cavalry to seize the ferryboats at
Mill Springs. In this they failed, and the crossing was effected on
one ferry-boat, seized lower down, and barges built by his troops.

General Thomas was ordered in November to concentrate his command
in order to be prepared for any movement Zollicoffer might make,
and, if necessary, to attack him in his camp. General Carter with
his brigade was stationed at London, Colonel Hoskins was near
Somerset, and Colonel Bramlette at Columbia, all watching Zollicoffer's
movements, and reporting them to General Thomas, who endeavored to
stop his advance at the Cumberland River. Five hundred of Wolford's
Cavalry were ordered from Columbia to reinforce Colonel Hoskins;
and General Schoepff, with the Seventeenth Ohio, the Thirty-eighth
Ohio, and Standart's battery, to take position on the Cumberland
River at Waitsborough, where he could command the crossing. Here
he was to fortify and guard the river at this point and above and
below, to prevent the enemy from crossing, or from obtaining the
means for doing so.

On December 2d, Zollicoffer, while building his ferries, sent some
troops to shell General Schoepff's camp. A brisk cannonading was
kept up for some time, when the rebels withdrew. Schoepff regarding
this as a feint, and anticipating a movement of Zollicoffer's
troops to cross the river, ordered two companies of cavalry under
Captain Dillon to guard the ford and to give timely notice of any
attempt to effect a crossing. He also ordered the Seventeenth Ohio
with three pieces of artillery and another company of cavalry, all
under the command of Colonel Connell, to support the cavalry under
Dillon. The latter proved wholly incompetent, and failed to comply
with his orders in any particular. He went into camp two miles
in the rear from where he was ordered, and neglected even to post
his men to guard the ford, whereby Zollicoffer was enabled to occupy
the north bank of the Cumberland without opposition and without
Dillon's even knowing that the movement had been made. This was
only discovered on the 4th, when the rebels drove back the Federal
cavalry and attacked Connell, who was advancing on a reconnoissance.
Connell, in ignorance of the movement of the enemy, had reached
the vicinity of the ford and found himself confronted by a strong
force of rebels, who had crossed the river, and who being rapidly
re-enforced rendered his situation one of extreme peril. He
withdrew under cover of the night beyond Fishing Creek, without
being molested. Schoepff, finding that the advance of the rebels
was supported by reinforcements and that Zollicoffer's entire
force was slowly crossing, which would make the enemy's force in
his front largely exceed his own, asked General Carter at London to
reinforce him. He also ordered Colonel Coburn with the Thirty-third
Indiana to move from Crab Orchard to his support; and on the 6th
established his camp in a strong position three miles north of
Somerset, where he was able to command both the Stanford and the
Crab Orchard roads. Here Carter reported with two regiments on
the 9th, Colonel Van Deveer's regiment, the Thirty-fifth Ohio, with
Captain Hewitt's battery having already arrived. On the 8th, the
rebel cavalry crossed Fishing Creek and reconnoitered the Federal
camps. They were fired on by Wolford's cavalry, which then fell
back; and after a brisk skirmish with the Thirty-fifth Ohio they
were driven back with a loss of two or three men on each side.

General Buell had ordered Thomas to keep his immediate command
at Columbia, and had directed him not to send any more troops to
Schoepff at Somerset, considering that the latter had sufficient
force to drive the rebels across the Cumberland. Thomas was directed
to hold himself in readiness to make an immediate movement, when
ordered, from Columbia on the rebel General Hindman, who with some
seven thousand troops was operating in that vicinity, throwing
out his cavalry far in advance of his main column, and feeling
the position of the Federal forces. Hindman had been ordered by
General Johnston to make a diversion in favor of Zollicoffer; and
when Thomas from Columbia checked Hindman's advance, the latter
reported that the force under Thomas had not been weakened to
reinforce Schoepff, or to strengthen the main command at Bowling
Green, and that Zollicoffer was in no immediate danger.

Schoepff with his entire command on the 18th made a reconnoissance
to determine the location and purposes of the rebel force. Pushing
his command forward he drove their cavalry pickets in and found that
Zollicoffer had been intrenching his camp, his line of fortifications
extending from the river to Fishing Creek and his camp being in the
angle formed by the junction of this stream with the Cumberland.
Having accomplished this, and not intending to bring on an engagement,
Schoepff returned with his command to their encampment north of

Buell now finding that the only rebel force encamped in Eastern
Kentucky was that under Zollicoffer, and deeming it important that
he be driven from the State, modified his previous order to Thomas,
and on December 29th directed him to advance against Zollicoffer
from Columbia and attack on his left flank. He also ordered Schoepff
to attack him in front. Two days later Thomas started from Lebanon
with the Second Brigade, under command of Colonel Manson, and two
regiments of Colonel McCook's brigade, Kinney's battery of artillery,
and a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. Heavy rains, swollen streams,
and almost impassable roads impeded the movement of the troops so
that it was not until the 17th of January that they reached Logan's
Cross Roads, ten miles from the rebel encampment. At this point
Thomas halted his command and awaited the arrival of the Fourth
and Tenth Kentucky, the Fourteenth Ohio, and the Eighteenth United
States Infantry, detained in the rear by the condition of the road.
He communicated at once with Schoepff, and the same day the latter
reported in person. General Thomas directed Schoepff to send him
Standart's battery, the Twelfth Kentucky and the First and Second
Tennessee regiments, which were to strengthen the command on the
immediate front until the arrival of the regiments in the rear.
Thomas placed the Tenth Indiana, Wolford's cavalry, and Kinney's
battery on the main road leading to the enemy's camp. The Ninth
Ohio and the Second Minnesota were posted three-quarters of a mile
to the right on the Robertsport road. Strong pickets were thrown
out on the main road in the direction of the enemy, with cavalry
pickets beyond. Our pickets were fired on and had a skirmish
with the rebel pickets on the night of the 17th. On the 18th, the
Fourth Kentucky, a battalion of the Michigan Engineers and Wetmore's
Battery also reported to Thomas.

Crittenden, on learning that Zollicoffer had crossed the Cumberland,
had sent at once an order by courier, post haste, directing him to
recross; but on his arrival at Mill Springs he found Zollicoffer
still on the north bank, waiting his arrival before retiring.
Crittenden gave orders at once for the construction of boats to
take his command across the river; but they were not ready when he
heard of the approach of General Thomas on January 17th.

On the 18th, Crittenden reported to General Johnston that he was
threatened by a superior force of the enemy in his front, and that
as he found it impossible to cross the river, he should have to
make the fight on the ground he then occupied.

His weekly reports showed eight infantry regiments, four battalions
(seventeen companies) of cavalry, and two companies of artillery,
making an aggregate of 9,417 men. His circular order of the 18th,
directing the order of march in his advance to attack, shows that
his army was on the day of battle composed of the same companies,
and that his force was about the same.

At midnight, on January 18th, in a heavy winter rain, the Confederate
army marched out to battle with Bledsoe's and Saunders's independent
cavalry companies in advance. Zollicoffer's brigade of four
regiments, with Rutledge's battery of artillery, followed. Then
came General Carroll's brigade of four regiments, one in reserve,
with McClung's battery of artillery, Brauner's battalion of cavalry
on the right, and McClellan's battalion of cavalry on the left, with
Cary's battalions in the rear. After a six hours' march through
the rain and the mud, the advance struck our cavalry pickets at
six o'clock, in the early gray of a winter morning, two miles in
front of the Federal camp. Wolford's cavalry slowly fell back,
reporting the enemy's advance to Manson, who immediately formed
his regiment--the Tenth Indiana--and took position on the road to
await the attack. Manson then ordered the Fourth Kentucky, Colonel
Speed S. Fry, to support him; and reported to Thomas, in person,
the advance of the rebels in force, and the disposition he had made
of his troops to meet the attack. General Thomas directed him to
return to his brigade immediately, with orders to hold the enemy
in check until the other troops could be brought up. Orders were
given to the other commanders to form immediately, and in ten minutes
they were all marching to the battle-field, except the battalion
of Michigan Engineers and a company of the Thirty-eighth Ohio,
detailed to guard the camp.

The rebels, in their advance, opened the attack with Walthall's
Mississippi and Battle's Tennessee regiments, which as they moved
forward, forming the right of the rebel line, encountered the Fourth
Kentucky and the Tenth Indiana, formed on the first line to resist
their attack in the edge of the woods to their front. The Tennessee
regiment endeavored to flank the Fourth Kentucky on the left, while
the latter regiment was resisting the rebel attack on the front in
a most obstinate manner. Carter's Tennessee brigade was ordered
up in position to meet this flanking movement with a section of
Kinney's battery; and the attempt of Battle's regiment was checked.

Orders were sent to Colonel McCook to advance with the Ninth Ohio
and the Second Minnesota regiments. These regiments coming up
occupied the position of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, who
by that time were out of ammunition. As soon as this disposition
of these troops had been made the enemy opened a most determined and
galling fire, pressing our troops at all points. General Thomas's
command returned the fire with spirit, and holding their position
the contest was maintained for half an hour on both sides most

At this time, General Zollicoffer, being in the rear of the Nineteenth
Tennessee regiment of his command, became convinced that the Fourth
Kentucky (Federal) regiment was a part of his brigade, ordered the
Tennessee regiment to cease firing, as they were shooting their
own troops. He then rode to the front, where he met Colonel Fry,
the commanding officer of the Fourth Kentucky. Zollicoffer stated
to Fry that both commands belonged to the same side, and that firing
should stop. To this Fry assented and started to order the Fourth
Kentucky to cease firing, when one of Zollicoffer's aids coming up,
seeing that Fry was a Federal officer, opened fire upon him with
a revolver, wounding his horse. Fry returned the fire, shooting
Zollicoffer through the heart.

Shortly after, the First and Second East Tennessee regiments of
Carter's brigade and Hoskins's Kentucky regiment were placed on
the left of the Second Minnesota regiment, and opening a heavy fire
on the right flank of the rebel line caused it to give way. The
Second Minnesota regiment kept up a galling fire in the centre,
while the Ninth Ohio charged the enemy with fixed bayonets on the
left, turned that flank, and drove them from the field. The whole
rebel line then gave way, retreating in the utmost confusion and
disorder to their intrenchments at Beech Grove. Thomas ordered
an immediate advance, after supplying his troops with ammunition,
driving the rebels into their intrenchments. As these were approached
they were invested by the division deployed in the line of battle.
Cannonading was kept up until dark, firing being in the direction
of the ferry to defeat a crossing. During the night preparations
were made for an assault on the intrenchments on the following
morning. The Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, and the Tenth
Kentucky, Colonel Harlan, reported after the fight, where placed
in the front of the advance, and were the first to enter the
intrenchments. Schoepff's brigade joined the command during the
evening, and was placed in position for the attack.

At midnight Crittenden abandoned everything, and between that hour
and daylight escaped across the river by means of a steamer and
some barges at the landing, which he burned, leaving behind him
his badly wounded, all of his cannon--twelve pieces--with their
caissons packed with ammunition, a large amount of small arms,
with ammunition for the same, over one hundred and fifty wagons,
and more than one thousand horses and mules, with a large amount
of tools, stores, camp and garrison equipage.

As all the boats were destroyed, it was impossible for Thomas to
cross his command in pursuit. General Thomas in his official report
of the engagement says: "Their command was completely demoralized
and retreated with great haste and in all directions, making their
capture in any number quite doubtful if pursued. There is no doubt
but that the moral effect produced by their complete dispersion
will have a more decided effect in re-establishing Union sentiments
than though they had been captured."

The rebels suffered terribly by heavy marching through the rain,
mud, and cold, with insufficient food; frequently with nothing but
parched corn to sustain life. Crittenden finally took position at
Chestnut Mound, within reach of relief from Nashville.

In the Life of Albert Sidney Johnston, speaking of Crittenden's
retreat, the author says: "During his retreat his army became
much demoralized, and two regiments, whose homes were in that
neighborhood, almost entirely abandoned their organization and went
every man to his own house. A multitude deserted, and the tide of
fugitives filled the country with dismay."

The battle fought at Logan's Cross Roads, called by the rebels the
Battle of Fishing Creek, and by the Federals the Battle of Mill
Springs, was most disastrous to the enemy, and inflicted the most
severe blow they had up to that time experienced. The victory for
the Federal forces was the first complete success of the war, and
was hailed everywhere with joy and hope. An order was issued by
the President congratulating the troops on their success, and the
general in command conveyed his thanks to General Thomas and troops
for their brilliant victory.

Thomas's command lost in the engagement 39 killed, and 207 wounded.
He reported the rebel loss at 122 killed, and the total loss at
349. The large proportion of killed to the wounded indicates heavy
fighting at close quarters, and also a superiority of either the
arms of the Federal troops or their firing.

The body of General Zollicoffer was treated with great respect.
General Thomas had it embalmed and carried around by Lebanon. It
was then sent to General Buell through his lines under a flag
of truce. Zollicoffer's death was a very depressing event to the
Tennesseeans. He was their most popular leader, and his death was
felt by the people of Tennessee as a personal bereavement.

Crittenden's attack and defeat were a great surprise to Johnston.
This force had been ordered to Mill Springs to maintain that point
of the general military line as a corps of observation merely. With
the attack and defeat Johnston found his line broken, his position
at Bowling Green liable to be turned on that flank, and an army on
which he counted demolished. This with his losses on his left in
Western Kentucky and at Fort Henry compelled his main command at
Bowling Green to abandon that place, and retire into Tennessee.
Thomas, after the battle of Mill Springs, concentrated his command
at Somerset, awaiting orders. He was ordered to Mumfordsville,
February 15th, to take part in the general advance against Bowling
Green. These orders were countermanded by reason of the evacuation
of that place, on the 14th; and on the 22d, Thomas was ordered
with his division to proceed by forced marches to Louisville, and
there embark for Nashville. The command arrived at Nashville on
the 2d, 3d, and 4th days of March.

Chapter III.

Concentration at Nashville

Don Carlos Buell, who was placed in command of the Department
of the Ohio on Sherman's request to be relieved, had been serving
from the early summer of 1861 as Assistant Adjutant-General on the
staff of Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner, U.S.A., in command of the
Department of the Pacific. He had been promoted to the rank of
lieutenant-Colonel in the adjutant-general's department, May 11,
1861. His appointment as brigadier-general in the volunteer force
was made May 17, 1861. General Buell was a graduate of West Point,
and had been in the army all his life. He was a thoroughly trained
soldier, with great pride in his profession, a man of great integrity,
with abilities of the first order, animated by high principle. His
long training in the adjutant-general's department, added to his
natural faculty, made him a first-class organizer of an army. Under
his direction the soldiers of the Army of the Ohio received their
training in the drill of the camp, the discipline of the march,
and learned endurance under fire in the skirmishes and engagements
during his command. For all the soldierly qualities that the troops
of the later organization--the Army of the Cumberland--possessed,
they were indebted in large measure to their first commander in
the field, General Buell. He was constant in his endeavors for
the care of the troops, and insisted on their camps being carefully
selected and well drained. His highest aim was to make good
soldiers of his command, and everything that detracted from this,
as straggling, pillaging, disobedience of orders, he regarded as
unworthy of a soldier, and meriting prompt and stern punishment at
his hands. In the earlier days of the war, with the lack of the
knowledge that the stricter obedience to orders the better for the
soldier, General Buell seemed at times harsh and severe. But as
time brought hard campaigns and heavy fighting to the Army of the
Cumberland, the older soldiers who were under Buell saw that he
was actuated solely for their good and the good of the service in
all he did.

The organization of the troops into brigades and divisions first
engaged Buell's attention on assuming command. On December 2d,
an order was issued creating this organization and designating it
the "Army of the Ohio," consisting of six divisions. The brigades
were numbered consecutively throughout the army, and not as they
were formed in the divisions. General G. H. Thomas was assigned
to the command of the First Division, consisting of four brigades.
The entire force of the First Division was at Nashville on March

The Second Division was organized at Camp Nevin, a camp established
by General Rousseau, when left by Sherman in command after the
latter assumed the command of the department. General Alexander McD.
McCook, who had relieved Rousseau October 14, by order of Sherman,
was assigned to the command of this division, which consisted also
of four brigades.

The Third Division was placed under the command of General O. M.
Mitchel, who had been in Cincinnati in command at the "Military
Department of Ohio," and who was relieved November 19th, after two
months' service there, superintending the forwarding of troops to
the armies in the field. This division consisted of three brigades.

General William Nelson, on reporting at Louisville after his Eastern
Kentucky campaign, was placed in command of the Fourth Division,
consisting of three brigades.

The Fifth Division, consisting of three brigades, was placed under
the command of General Thomas L. Crittenden, a son of John J.

In January, 1862, General Buell organized the Sixth Division, and
relieving General T. J. Wood from the command of the Fifth Brigade,
assigned him as commander of this division, which consisted of
three brigades.

To each brigade was attached a battery of artillery.

In this organization of the "Army of the Ohio," as the new regiments
from the North reported, additional brigades and divisions were
formed from time to time. Thus organized, the army under Buell, in
the early spring entered upon its first campaign. There had been
some slight skirmishing during the winter with portions of the command.
A detachment of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Jones, met a body of the rebel cavalry a few miles beyond Camp
Nevin, and routed it with slight loss to the enemy.

On December 10th, General R. W. Johnson moved onward his brigade,
and occupied Mumfordsville, sending a detachment of the Thirty-second
Indiana to Green River, where a temporary bridge was constructed.
On the 17th, four companies of this regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Von Trebra, crossed and took position at Rowlett's Station. General
A. S. Johnston had sent Hindman with his brigade from Bowling Green,
with instructions to destroy the railroad as far north as Green
River. On the same day that the Thirty-second Indiana crossed the
river, Hindman reached Woodsonville. On the approach of Hindman,
Von Trebra threw out two companies as skirmishers. The enemy fell
back with the purpose of decoying the Federals to the point where
his main command of infantry and artillery was posted. The cavalry--a
squadron of the "Texas Rangers" under Colonel Terry--made a spirited
attack. The skirmishers rallied by fours to receive this charge.
After repeated charges from the cavalry, which were resisted by the
Thirty-second--in one of which Colonel Terry was killed--Colonel
Willich re-enforced Von Trebra with four additional companies. After
maintaining their position under fire for an hour and a half, the
Indiana troops repulsed the enemy in every charge, and Hindman's
force then withdrew. Colonel Willich had in the engagement only
the eight companies of his command, with Cotter's battery. The
enemy attacked with a force of 1,100 infantry, 250 cavalry, and 4
pieces of artillery. The Thirty-second Indiana lost 8 men killed
and ten wounded. After the fall of Bowling Green, the Second
Division reached Nashville on March 3d.

The Third Division in February was ordered to make a demonstration,
moving by forced marches against the enemy's position at Bowling
Green, to prevent troops being sent from there to reinforce Fort
Donelson. The rebels had commenced their retreat from this place
to Nashville prior to the arrival of Mitchel's command, but the
shells thrown by his artillery on the 14th into the city hastened
the movements of the rear guard of Johnston's army. Before their
retreat, the enemy burned both bridges over Barren River, and set
fire to a large quantity of military stores, railroad cars, and
other property. Turchin's brigade, capturing a small ferryboat,
crossed over the river, swollen above the high-water mark by the
heavy rains, entered the city at five o'clock the next morning,
and succeeded in extinguishing the fire and saving a portion of
the railroad cars. During the succeeding week Mitchel crossed the
greater part of his command over the river, and without his wagons,
reached Edgefield opposite Nashville on the evening of the 14th,
at the same time that General Buell arrived by rail, the latter
using some of the cars captured at Bowling Green. At Edgefield
Mitchel found both of the bridges into Nashville destroyed, and
his crossing was effected on the steamers that brought Nelson's
division to that place.

The Fourth Division was ordered in February to reinforce the Federal
troops at Fort Donelson. Nelson, with two brigades, moved from
Camp Wickliffe to the Ohio River on February 13th, and there took
steamer for the Cumberland River. On his arrival at Fort Donelson,
he found it in possession of the Federal troops, and he then proceeded
by the boats with his command to Nashville, arriving there on the
25th. Nelson's Third Brigade reported a few days later, having
marched direct from Bowling Green.

General Thomas L. Crittenden's command, organizing at Owensboro,
had a skirmish with a force of 500 rebels at Woodland. Colonel
Burbridge was sent with some three hundred troops of his own command
and a small force from Colonel McHenry's regiment. Attacking the
enemy, they routed him, inflicting a loss of some fifty killed,
wounded, and prisoners. On the 24th, the rebel General Breckenridge
made a demonstration with 4,000 men at Rochester, occupying Greenville
with his cavalry, Crittenden made such disposition of his troops
that the enemy, without risking an attack, returned to Bowling
Green. Early in February General Buell ordered Crittenden to send
Colonel Cruft with his brigade to report to General Grant. Cruft,
however, reached Fort Henry after the surrender, but his brigade
was incorporated into Grant's army, and rendered effective service
in the reduction of Fort Donelson. Later, the brigade was transferred
to General Halleck. Crittenden, soon after this, proceeded by
boat with the balance of his division, and reported at Nashville,
arriving there at the same time as Nelson's division.

The Sixth division, after aiding in the repair of the railroad,
arrived at Nashville March 6, 1862.

General A. S. Johnston, at no time prior to his retreat had sufficient
force to meet or to resist the advance of the Federal forces. His
long line, extending from Columbus to Knoxville, invited attack,
and wherever the attack was made his troops were not able to
successfully resist it. Concentrating his command at Bowling Green,
after Mill Springs and the fall of Fort Henry, he found that, to
save Nashville, it was necessary to make a determined stand at Fort
Donelson, and this he re-enforced with all his available troops.
The fall of Donelson compelled the evacuation of Nashville. To
the Southern people these reverses were a bitter blow to their high
hopes and boasting threats that the war was to be carried into the
North, and peace was to follow the first victories to their arms.
Duke, in his "History of Morgan's Cavalry," says: "No subsequent
reverse, although fraught with far more real calamity, ever
created the shame, sorrow, and wild consternation that swept over
the South with the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson. To some
in the South these reverses were harbingers of the final defeat
and overthrow of the Confederacy."

With the fall of Donelson, after detaching the troops at Columbus,
Johnston's force was reduced to a little over one-half of his
total effective strength as reported by him at Bowling Green. In
a report to Richmond, he gave the total of his command as barely
forty-three thousand men.

General Buell's army amounted to over seventy-five thousand men, not
all of these available for field duty, as a very large proportion
of the command was needed to maintain his line of supplies, and
the farther his advance the greater the drain on his command for
railroad guards.

With the fall of Donelson, Johnston modified his plans of operations,
and then determined to relinquish the defensive, and to concentrate
all available forces of the Confederacy in the southwest for offensive
operations. He had, as early as January, 1862, contemplated the
possibility of the disasters that had taken place, and the retreat
consequent upon them, and at that time indicated Corinth, Miss.,
as being the proper place to concentrate the troops.

On January 3d General Buell wrote at length to General Halleck,
proposing a joint campaign against the enemy in "a combined attack
on its centre and flanks," moving the troops by water under protection
of the gunboats, striking for the railroad communications of the
enemy, and destroying his bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee
Rivers, both of which were protected by batteries, the first at
Dover--Fort Donelson--and the other at Fort Henry, respectively
thirty-one and eighteen miles below the bridges. To this, on the
6th, General Halleck replied that, situated as he was, he could
render no assistance to Buell's forward movement on Bowling Green,
and advised the delay of the movement, if such co-operation by troops
sent to Cairo and Paducah should be deemed necessary to the plan
of the campaign, of which he knew nothing, and then adds: "But it
strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah or Cairo,
against an enemy at Bowling Green, is a plain case of exterior
lines, like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of
the columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine
times in a hundred."

On the 30th of January, Buell received a despatch from Halleck,
without particulars, saying that he had ordered an expedition
against Fort Henry. On the 15th of February Halleck telegraphed
Buell "to move from Bowling Green to Nashville is not good strategy.
Come and help me take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, then
move to Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and Nashville
must be abandoned precisely as Bowling Green has been." After the
fall of Fort Donelson, and the occupation of Nashville, General
Halleck directed a column of troops under General C. F. Smith to
proceed up the Tennessee River by steamer, and to operate as occasion
presented, either on Corinth, Jackson, or Humboldt, destroying the
railroad communications at these points. At this time Halleck had
no thought of the subsequent movement of the command, that Johnston
would concentrate at Corinth, or that the Armies of the Ohio and
Tennessee should unite at Pittsburg Landing. On the 15th General
Smith dropped down the river to Pittsburg Landing, and there placed
his troops in camp. On the 11th of March, President Lincoln,
by War Order No. 3, created the Department of the Mississippi,
consolidating the three departments under Generals Halleck, Hunter,
and Buell, and placed General Halleck in command. Halleck at once
ordered Buell to march his army to Savannah, and to execute the
movements that had already been agreed on by them.

Buell immediately gave his attention to the preparation of his
command to carry out these orders. He directed O. M. Mitchel to
march south, strike, and hold the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
Organizing the seventh division of his army, Buell assigned General
George W. Morgan to this command. This division was formed of four
brigades, out of a number of regiments gathered up from different
points in Kentucky. General Morgan concentrated his entire
command at Cumberland Ford, being directed to take Cumberland Gap
if possible and to occupy East Tennessee if able to enter. If not,
then to resist any advance of the rebels.

General E. Dumont was placed in command of Nashville. The Twenty-third
Brigade under Colonel Duffield, composed of four regiments, was
ordered from Kentucky to garrison Murfreesboro, and protect the
road from Shelbyville to Lavergne.

Buell designated the First Division under Thomas, the Second under
McCook, the Fourth under Nelson, the Fifth under Crittenden, and
the Sixth under Wood, to constitute the army under his personal
command, which was to join Halleck in the operations against the
enemy's position at Corinth. These divisions, with cavalry and
artillery attached made a force of 37,000 effective troops. In
addition to these, Buell had under his command 36,000 effective men
to defend his communications, maintain his line of supply, enforce
order within his lines, and to perform any special duty assigned
to them. The muster-rolls of his army showed that he had at this
time 92 regiments of infantry--not including those sent to Halleck
under Cruft. These regiments aggregated 79,334 men. He had 11
regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies of cavalry, making
a total of 11,496 men, and 28 field, and 2 siege batteries, with
3,935 men. The grand total was 94,765 men. His effective force,
however, was 73,487 men, comprising 60,882 infantry, 9,237 cavalry,
and 3,368 artillery.

Buell's army, after crossing Duck River, pressed rapidly forward.
The day before Nelson's arrival at the Tennessee River he was
informed by General Grant, to whom he had reported his movements by
courier, that he need not hasten his march, as he could not cross
the river before the following Tuesday, the 8th. Nelson's entire
division, with forced marches, reached Savannah April 5th, the other
division closely following. Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division
crossed the river on the afternoon of the 6th, and reported to Buell,
and was engaged in the battle of that day, aiding in resisting the
final attack of Chalmers on the left of Grant's command. Crittenden's
and McCook's divisions arrived on the field during the night of
the 6th, and took an active part in the fighting of the next day.
The rest of the command arrived on the field after the battle.

The movements of the troops of the "Army of the Ohio" in the battle
of Shiloh and in the operations against Corinth are treated in
Volume II. of this series, and it is not within the purview of this
volume to enter further into the narrative of their service than
to give a few brief facts as to the disposition of the troops, in
order to follow the subsequent events in which the Army of the Ohio
was the main actor.

Chapter IV.

Morgan's and Forest's Raids.

On April 11th, Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing and at once
reorganized the troops in his command, designating the divisions of
his army as the right wing, centre, left wing, reserves, and cavalry
under Major-Generals George H. Thomas, D. C. Buell, John Pope, and
J. A. McClernand and Brigadier-General A. J. Smith respectively.
Thomas's command comprised four divisions of the "Army of the
Tennessee," and his old division of the "Army of the Ohio." The
remainder of the army was under the command of Buell. After the
fall of Corinth, the enemy breaking his large force into several
smaller commands rendered necessary a similar disposition of the
Federal forces. Buell was ordered with his command to enter into a
campaign looking to the occupation of East Tennessee. One division
of his army under O. M. Mitchel left Nashville about the middle
of March under orders to proceed to Murfreesboro and repair the
railroad bridges burned by Johnston on his retreat. On Colonel
Duffield's reporting with the Twenty-third brigade, Mitchel pressed
forward to Shelbyville and from there by a rapid movement on the
7th of April he occupied Huntsville, Ala., with Turchin's brigade,
Kennett's Ohio cavalry, and Simonson's battery, capturing 170
prisoners, 15 locomotives, and 150 passenger and freight cars, and
a large amount of army stores. On the 8th, Mitchel ordered Sill
with his brigade to proceed east along the line of the railroad
to seize Stevenson, the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga,
and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, and directed Turchin with his
command to move west and take possession of Decatur and Tuscumbia.
This was successfully done, and Mitchel was in possession of over
one hundred miles of this important link connecting Corinth with
Richmond in the heart of the enemy's territory. He then posted
his troops at the more prominent points, ready to move to any place
threatened by the enemy.

On April 29th, Mitchel, hearing of the advance of the force under
Kirby Smith from Bridgeport against the command beyond Stevenson,
moved as rapidly as possible by rail from Huntsville to resist him.
He found the enemy had attacked the detachment posted five miles
west of Bridgeport, and that his troops had driven the enemy's
advance back across Widow's Creek. The bridge over this creek had
been burned by the enemy on their retreat. Mitchel strengthened
the detachment and engaged the attention of the enemy by an apparent
effort to cross this creek, while with his main force he advanced
on Bridgeport by a detour by the left and drove that portion of
the enemy in the town across the Tennessee River. In their retreat
the enemy set fire to the bridge reaching from the west bank of
the river to the Island. This bridge Mitchel succeeded in saving,
but the bridge east of the Island was completely destroyed. General
Mitchel then turned his attention to that part of the enemy's force
at Widow's Creek, which he succeeded in capturing, taking in all
some three hundred and fifty prisoners. Early in May, Mitchel,
who had been placed in command of all the troops between Nashville
and Huntsville, ordered General Negley with the Seventh Brigade,
belonging to McCook's division--who had been left at Columbia
on the advance of the main army upon Savannah--to make an advance
against General Adams with a brigade of troops at Rogersville, Ala.
At the same time Mitchel sent Colonel Lytle from Athens, Ala.,
to cooperate with Negley. On the 13th, the enemy learning of the
approach of the Federal forces, retreated across the Tennessee
River. This placed Mitchel in complete position of that portion
of Alabama north of that river. On May 29th, Mitchel concentrated
Negley's command from Columbia, Turchin's brigade from Huntsville,
and the Eighteenth Ohio under T. R. Stanley from Athens at Fayetteville
for an expedition against Chattanooga under the command of Negley.
These troops passed through Winchester, Cowen, and University Place
to Jasper. Advancing upon the latter place, the head of his column,
under Colonel Hambright, encountered a brigade of the enemy's troops
under General Adams. The enemy was driven from the place after a
sharp engagement, leaving his supply and ammunition trains. His
loss was 18 killed, 20 wounded, and 12 prisoners. Leaving Jasper,
Negley arrived on the north bank of the Tennessee, opposite
Chattanooga, on the 7th. Negley, on the evening of that day and the
morning of the next, bombarded Chattanooga, and made a demonstration
of crossing the river and attacking the town. General Duke says:
"The commandant of the place, General Leadbetter, had two or three
guns in battery and replied, when the gunners, who were the most
independent fellows I ever saw, chose to work the guns. The defence
of the place was left entirely to the individual efforts of those
who chose to defend it, and nothing prevented its capture but the
fact that the enemy could not cross the river."

Negley then withdrew and encamped his command at Shelbyville.

General G. W. Morgan, under orders from Buell, assumed command of
the forces in Eastern Kentucky early in April. Acting under his
orders he proceeded to Cumberland Ford and commenced operations at
once against Cumberland Gap. This gap is situated in the Cumberland
range on the boundary line between Kentucky and Tennessee, near the
Western Virginia line, is a deep depression in the mountain range,
making a natural roadway through it, and is the centre of all the
roads in that section of country. It is a stronghold protected by
nature with abrupt slopes on the mountains, frequently so steep as
to be almost perpendicular, with the ranges much broken by spurs,
knobs, and ravines, protected by parallel ranges of less height in
close proximity on the east and west. Morgan, after encountering
the enemy in several skirmishes, determined either to compel him
to fight or retreat. He sent General Spears with three brigades to
Pine Mountain, on the road to Big Creek Gap. General Kirby Smith,
commanding the enemy's forces in East Tennessee, placed General
Barton's command of two brigades of infantry in Big Creek Gap,
and then advanced with some eight thousand men under his immediate
command to cut Spears off, and to threaten the Federal forces at
Cumberland Ford. Morgan, under orders, withdrew Spears, but learning
a few days later from Buell of the operations of Negley's command
before Chattanooga, and that Kirby Smith had proceeded with a part
of his command to the relief of that place, resumed the advance.
Negley's movements had caused Smith to suspend his operations,
but when he heard of Negley's withdrawal he proceeded at once to
execute his plans against Morgan. On June 18th, the latter, finding
that Kirby Smith had taken his entire command away from Cumberland
Gap, marched his troops up Powell's Valley and late in the evening
of that day reached the fortifications, found the Gap empty, and
took possession. This natural stronghold had been extensively
fortified by the rebels, who regarded the position of their troops
such as to prevent the success of any attempt on the part of the
Federal forces to obtain possession without a battle. The enemy were
completely out-manœuvred, and General Morgan had the satisfaction
of occupying this fortress without the loss of any of his command.

In the early part of May, the rebel Colonel John H. Morgan's command
of some five hundred men, in the neighborhood of Pulaski, Tenn.,
captured a wagon train with about four hundred Federal troops,
mostly convalescents going to Columbia. On the night of the 5th,
Morgan reached Lebanon and quartered his entire force in houses in
the town. On the evening of the 6th, Dumont with his command from
Nashville, joined by that of Duffield from Murfreesboro, surprised
and attacked Morgan's troopers, completely routing them after
a severe engagement. Morgan with a few men under his immediate
command escaped after a chase of twenty-one miles from Lebanon,
crossing the Cumberland River on a ferry. Dumont had with him
detachments of Wynkoop's Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry, of Wolford's
First Kentucky cavalry and of Green Clay Smith's regiment of Kentucky
cavalry. Morgan's loss was 150 men captured, with the same number
of horses. The balance of his command was dispersed. Wolford
and Smith were both wounded, and the Federals lost 6 killed and 25
wounded. On the 11th, Morgan with his men that had escaped, and
two new companies, made a raid on the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad at Cave City, captured a freight train of forty-eight
cars and burned it. He also captured a passenger train, which had
a few Federal officers on it. His object was to rescue the men of
his command taken prisoners at Lebanon, but in this he failed, as
they had been sent North by boat.

From this place Morgan reported with his command at Chattanooga to
refit, prepatory to his first extended raid into Kentucky. Here
he was joined by two full companies of Texan cavalry under Captains
R. M. Gano and John Huffman, both native Kentuckians, who, on
reporting at Corinth, had asked to be ordered on duty with Morgan
and his command, enlarged from a squadron to a full regiment. After
he had obtained all the recruits he could at Chattanooga he set
out for Knoxville, to further increase his command and to re-arm.
It was at this place that he received the two mountain howitzers
which were used so effectively in the first raid into Kentucky, and
which just before his command started on the Ohio raid were taken
from it by Bragg's ordnance officers. This came near raising
a mutiny, and the only consolation that Morgan's men had was that
Bragg lost the guns within two weeks after they were taken away
from them. In the latter part of June, Colonel Hunt, of Georgia,
reported at Knoxville with a regiment of "Partisan Rangers," nearly
four hundred strong, ordered to accompany Morgan on his contemplated
raid, making the strength of his entire command 876 effective men.

Morgan set out from Knoxville on the morning of July 4, 1862,
taking the road to Sparta, one hundred and four miles due west
from Knoxville, which was reached on the evening of the third day
of this march. The Union men of East Tennessee frequently gave
these raiders medicine of their own prescription, lying in wait
for them and firing upon them from the bushes. This was a new
experience for these freebooting troopers, who wherever they went
in the South were generally made welcome to the best of everything,
being regarded as the beau-ideals of Southern chivalry. On the 8th,
Morgan's command reached the Cumberland River at the ford near the
small village of Celina, eighteen miles from Tompkinsville, where
a detachment of the Ninth Pennsylvania, 250 strong, was encamped
under command of Major Jordan. Morgan learned at Knoxville the fact
that a Federal force was at this point, and was told the particulars
of it on his arrival at Celina, and he now wished to surprise and
capture the entire command. Sending a detachment under Gano by the
right to cut off Jordan's retreat, at five o'clock in the morning
of the 9th Morgan moved to the attack. Jordan posted himself on
a thickly wooded hill and fired several volleys at the rebels as
they advanced over an open field, but being outnumbered was routed
with a loss of four killed, six wounded, and nineteen prisoners.
The enemy's loss was several wounded, among them Colonel Hunt,
who died a few days later from the effects of his wound. Morgan
paroled the prisoners and then left for Glasgow, reaching there at
one o'clock that night, where they were received with open arms by
the citizens, breakfast cooked for the entire command, and three
days' rations prepared for them. From here the command marched
all night, and at eleven o'clock next morning was within a short
distance of Lebanon. Morgan, prepatory to an attack, despatched
one of his companies to destroy the railroad north of the town
to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. The company struck the
railroad at New Hope Church, and had just commenced their work of
destruction when a train came up with a number of Federal troops
on it, who drove the rebels off in confusion, but for some unknown
cause the train then returned to Louisville, leaving Morgan
unmolested at Lebanon, who advanced to the attack and drove in
the pickets. After a slight skirmish the place was surrendered
by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson of the Twenty-eighth Kentucky, with
a small detachment of that command. Morgan destroyed some fifty
thousand dollars' worth of Government stores. He left Lebanon at
two o'clock in the afternoon, passed through Springfield without
halting the command, and pushed on for Harrodsburg, reaching
there at nine o'clock on Sunday morning. Here he sent Gano with
his squadron around Lexington to burn the railroad bridges on the
Kentucky Central Railroad, in order to prevent troops being sent
there from Cincinnati. Another detachment was sent to destroy
the bridge on the Louisville and Lexington Railroad, cutting off
reinforcements from Louisville. Morgan's design was to make it
appear that he intended to attack Frankfort, then turn suddenly to
the right and attempt the capture of Lexington. He had given out
everywhere in Kentucky that he was marching on the State Capital
with a force five thousand strong, and had succeeded in spreading
the utmost alarm. On the 15th Morgan reached Midway, captured
the telegraph operator and installed his own operator at the same
instrument, sent despatches in the name of Federal Generals, and
changed the orders for the movement of troops. He telegraphed in all
directions, without the slightest regard for truth, and succeeded
in creating the utmost confusion and alarm at Cincinnati, Louisville,
Lexington, and Frankfort. The command left Midway late in the
afternoon and started for Georgetown, which place they reached
at sundown, where they met a small force of Home Guards, who were
driven out of town. From here Morgan sent a force to burn the
bridges on the Kentucky Railroad between Lexington and Paris. Then
learning how strongly Lexington was garrisoned, he gave up all
thought of attacking it, and finding that the Federal forces were
closing in on him commenced his return south. On the 18th, Morgan
attacked Cynthiana, which was garrisoned by some five hundred men,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John J. Landrum, of the
Eighteenth Kentucky. The fighting continued for two hours, when
the Federal force was driven from the town and nearly all captured.
Landrum and a few of his command escaped. The Federals lost
16 killed and 40 wounded, and 14 of the enemy were killed and 42
wounded. The rebels claimed to have captured 420 prisoners, who
were at once paroled. The depôt, with a large amount of Government
stores, was burned. Morgan then left for Paris, where he arrived
late in the evening and rested there that night. About eight
o'clock in the morning his command was driven out of this place by
the troops under General Green Clay Smith, numbering some twelve
hundred men, who killed 2, wounded six, and captured several
prisoners. Morgan pushed through Winchester, reaching that point
about twelve o'clock, crossed the Kentucky River just at dark, and
arrived at Richmond at four o'clock in the morning. Here he rested
his command twelve hours, then marched toward Crab Orchard, arriving
about daybreak the next morning. It had been his intention to
make a stand at Richmond, but there were too many troops marching
to attack him. Besides General Smith's command, which was following
him closely, Colonel Wolford was collecting forces in the southern
part of Kentucky to intercept him, and troops were EN ROUTE from
Louisville to aid in the pursuit. Morgan left Crab Orchard at
eleven o'clock the same morning, and reached Somerset about sunset.
At these two places he captured 130 wagons, with large quantities
of Government stores, of which he loaded as much into wagons for
the use of his command as he wanted, and burned the rest. From
Somerset he marched to Stagall's Ferry on the Cumberland River,
and there crossed, reaching Monticello, twenty-one miles from the
river, that night, when all pursuit ended.

Morgan's object in making this raid was to obtain recruits
and horses, to equip and arm his men, and to prepare for his fall
raiding trip. In his official report he says: "I left Knoxville
on the 4th day of this month with about nine hundred men, and returned
to Livingston on the 28th inst. with nearly twelve hundred, having
been absent just twenty-four days, during which time I have traveled
over a thousand miles, captured seventeen towns, destroyed all
the Government supplies and arms in them, dispersed about fifteen
hundred Home Guards, and paroled nearly twelve hundred regular
troops. I lost in killed, wounded, and missing of the number that
I carried into Kentucky, about ninety."

When Buell received his orders to open the campaign in East
Tennessee, the key to that part of the State was Chattanooga, and
this was the objective point of his campaign. With the concentration
of the Southern forces in Mississippi, both Halleck and Buell thought
that a favorable time had arrived for this movement, anticipating
that no advance of the enemy's forces would be made to dispute the
occupancy of those portions of Kentucky and Tennessee already held
by the Federal forces. The great problem with Buell was to furnish
supplies to his army, now some three hundred miles away from its
base at Louisville, dependent during the greater part of the year
on one line of road, which was subject to being raided at any time,
bridges burned, the roadbed destroyed, and the entire road rendered
useless for months. To continue this line the many miles through
the enemy's country, subject to increased risks before Chattanooga
could be reached, was a matter that required a great amount of careful
thought and deliberation. Buell had tried infantry in stockades
at bridges, and was satisfied that this was not the proper solution
to the problem. He then made earnest and repeated application for
more cavalry, to protect his communications and to meet and repulse
the enemy's raiding parties before they could reach his line
of communication. If he was to move with his command into East
Tennessee, he regarded the line from Nashville to Chattanooga as
the proper road on which he should depend for his supplies, and to
which he should give his care and attention for this purpose.

Halleck considered the line from Memphis to Chattanooga the one
over which the supplies for Buell's army should pass. The latter
objected to this, by reason of that road crossing the Tennessee
River twice, thus giving two long bridges to rebuild and protect,
instead of one, and for the additional reason that this road ran
for a considerable distance parallel with the front of the enemy,
and thus invited raiding parties. While the risks attending the other
road were great enough, Buell regarded the Memphis and Charleston
road far the more objectionable. Besides, he wished to move through
Middle Tennessee to McMinnville, and thence to Chattanooga, with
Nashville as his depot of supplies. In this Halleck overruled him
and directed that he march his command on the line of the Memphis
road, repairing the track as he advanced.

While this matter was under consideration by the Federal commanders,
Bragg, who had been appointed to the position of General made vacant
by the death of General Johnston, and who had succeeded Beauregard
in the command in the West, put his columns in motion eastward to
occupy Chattanooga. Johnston, on the retreat from Nashville, sent
all surplus army stores to Chattanooga, and Bragg now regarded that
point as the proper place to refit his command, and from which to
assume the offensive, and open the campaign he had planned to free,
for a time at least, Tennessee from the control of the Federal

With the start thus made by both commands for Chattanooga,
everything was in favor of Bragg, whose movements were unimpeded,
as his route was south of the Tennessee, through his own territory,
with his lines of communication open when he arrived at that place.
With Buell, the repairs of the railroad retarded his progress,
and the advance weakened his command by the increased number of
detachments required to guard his line as it lengthened.

McCook's and Crittenden's commands were started eastward, the
first from Corinth, and the latter from Booneville. McCook reached
Florence on the 15th of June, where ferryboats had been provided by
Mitchel for the crossing of his division. A delay was occasioned
here by the report that Nelson had been attacked, but this was found
to be false; and, on the 26th, the divisions of McCook, Crittenden,
and Nelson crossed, and started at once for Athens, which place
they reached on the 29th. On the same day Buell established his
headquarters at Huntsville, Ala., and gave personal supervision to
the repair of the railroads, now extremely urgent. He placed his
troops by division upon the different sections of the line, under
orders to push repairs with all possible expedition. These troops,
as repairs were made, advanced from time to time, concentrating on
the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga road. The repairs to
this railroad were completed on July 28th, and on the Nashville
and Decatur road on August 3d. During the latter part of July the
last division of Buell's army, under Thomas, crossed the Tennessee
River, being relieved--on the line of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad--by troops from Grant's army. Thomas established his
headquarters at Dechard. It was on this march with his brigade
that General Robert L. McCook was murdered by guerillas. He was
riding in an ambulance, ill at the time, and unarmed.

Nelson's division had been sent to Murfreesboro about the middle
of July, to drive Forrest, who, with his cavalry, on the 13th,
attacked the Federal garrison in the town. The post was under the
command of General T. L. Crittenden, and the troops composting the
Twenty-third Brigade were under the command of Colonel Duffield.
There was, unfortunately, a disagreement between the ranking officers
at the post that led to the most unfortunate results. Colonel
Lester, of the Third Minnesota, during the absence of Duffield,
commanding the brigade, had, by reason of the unpleasant relations
existing between portions of the command, widely distributed them
in different parts of the town. On the return of Crittenden and
Duffield on July 11th, neither of them assumed command, and their
dignity, thinking more of their own personal importance than the
good of the service. With no one in command, there was no unity
or proper "esprit de corps" among the troops, and no disposition
for defence when Forrest made his attack. the latter had advanced
through McMinnville from Chattanooga, with about two thousand men,
and arrived at Murfreesboro about five o'clock on the morning of
the 13th, captured the pickets, and made disposition of his forces
for immediate attack. Forming his entire command into columns of
fours, with the Eighth Texas in front, Forrest moved forward on a
trot until he reached the Federal encampments, which Colonel Wharton,
with two regiments, charged. The Second Georgia dashed into the
town, captured the provost guard and all Federal officers and men
on the streets, seized and secured the supplies.

Major Smith with the Kentucky troops was sent to the rear of the
Federal command to cut off the retreat. The Texans charged into
the camp of the Ninth Michigan, and reaching the tents, roused
some of the men from sleep. A portion of that regiment, however,
rallied by the officers, made a handsome stand and drove the Texans
off. Duffield was wounded while rallying his men. The Second
Georgia charged into the public square and surrounded the Court
House, occupied by a company of the Ninth Michigan, who twice
repulsed the attacking force. Reinforcements being brought forward,
the doors of the building were battered down and the company was
forced to surrender. Forrest now attacked the Third Minnesota on
the east bank of Stone's River, about a mile and a half from town,
which had just left their camp to join the force in the town, when
Forrest with three regiments moved to the attack.

Colonel Lester formed his command in line of battle, with nine
companies of infantry and four pieces of artillery, and opened fire
on the rebels as they advanced. Forrest attempting to get to the
rear of his force, encountered the camp guard of some hundred men
left by Lester to protect his camp, posted behind a strong barricade
of wagons and some large ledges of rocks, difficult to carry.
Forrest at once ordered a charge which was twice made and repulsed.
Leading his men the third time, he succeeded in driving the guard
from their position to the main command, posted some six hundred
yards away. It was now one o'clock, and beyond the skirmishes
between the commands but little had been accomplished.

Forrest's officers urged him to withdraw with the results obtained
up to that time. This he refused to do, and made disposition of
his command for further attack on the Federal forces occupying the
camp of the Ninth Michigan, which consisted of this regiment and a
company of the Second Kentucky cavalry. He dismounted two of his
regiments and threw forward skirmishers, directed them to open
brisk firing, and sent the Second Georgia dismounted to attack on
the left. After this he brought up the Eighth Texas and placed
them in position to charge on the left.

Having made this disposition of his forces, he sent forward, under
a flag of truce, a written demand for the surrender of Duffield's
command, which was complied with at once. After this, Forrest
demanded the surrender of the Third Minnesota, which Lester, after
an interview with Duffield and a consultation with his own officers,
made, surrendering some five hundred infantry of his regiment and
two sections of Hewitt's battery of artillery. The entire forces
surrendered were seventeen hundred troops with four pieces of
artillery. Forrest captured about six hundred horses and mules,
and a very large quantity of stores and Government supplies, part
of which he carried away and the rest he destroyed, to the value
of nearly a million of dollars.

This loss occurred the day after the opening of the road from
Nashville south, and very seriously interfered with the movements
at the front. Nelson endeavored to intercept Forest, but could not
successfully "chase cavalry with infantry." Forrest on Nelson's
approach withdrew to McMinnville, and from there made a dash on
Lebanon, some fifty miles distant, where he expected to find a force
of five hundred Federal cavalry. This force escaped him, and he
then swept around to the south of Nashville, captured 150 bridge
guards and burned four bridges. Learning that Nelson was again in
pursuit of him, Forrest returned to McMinnville.

From this point he made repeated raids on the line of road south
of Nashville, leaving Morgan to operate against the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad. These raiders were able to move almost without
opposition, as Buell was without sufficient cavalry to cope with
them. The latter had been compelled to divide his cavalry into
small bands to run down the guerillas that had been operating on
his line of railroad. Now that Forrest's and Morgan's commands
had become so formidable, he was compelled to organize his cavalry
into united bodies for better defensive movements against these
raiders. The Second Indiana, Fourth and Fifth Kentucky, and
Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry regiments he formed into one brigade,
and on August 11th, he sent it under General R. W. Johnson against
Morgan, who had been ordered by Bragg to break the railroad between
Louisville and Nashville, in order to retard Buell's movement north
to Louisville as much as possible, and who was operating about
Gallatin, Tennessee, which he had captured with 200 prisoners.
Colonel Boone was in command of the Federal forces at this point.
Morgan hearing that Boone slept in the town away from the camp,
sent a small force to capture him, which was done, just as he had
dressed and was starting to camp. Morgan then destroyed a railroad
bridge south of Gallatin, and the tunnel six miles north, the roof
of which was supported with large beams on upright timbers. Running
some freight cars into the tunnel, they were set on fire and some
eight hundred feet of it destroyed, the roof caving in.

Johnson sought to attack Morgan before he could unite with Forrest,
who was on his Lebanon raid at that time, but Morgan hearing that
Johnson had infantry and artillery supports, endeavored to avoid an
engagement. Johnson forced the fight, engaged Morgan with spirit,
and although repulsed three times, after the first and second
repulse formed promptly and renewed the attack. After the third
repulse the Federal forces commenced retreating, when Morgan followed,
attacked Johnson's retreating forces and drove the Federals some
three miles. Johnson reformed his lines twice, but the enemy
broke, and drove them each time. He then reformed the remnant of
his command and fought the enemy dismounted, when the latter charged
again, and Johnson, seeing that the greater part of his command
had scattered, surrendered. The force that was with him at this
time was only a small band of some twenty-five soldiers and a few
officers. His loss was 20 killed and 42 wounded. Duke in his
"History of Morgan's Cavalry," says: "A great deal of censure was
at the time cast upon these men"--Johnson's command--"and they were
accused of arrant cowardice by the Northern press. Nothing could
have been more unjust. They attacked with spirit and without
hesitation, and were unable to close with us on account of their
heavy loss in men and horses. I have seen troops much more highly
boasted than these were before their defeat, behave not nearly so
well." And of Johnson, Duke says: "His attack was made promptly
and in splendid style; his dispositions throughout the first fight
were good, and he exhibited fine personal courage and energy."

Chapter V.

Bragg's Advance into Kentucky.

After Nelson's pursuit of Forrest on his raid around Nashville, he
was ordered by General Buell to McMinnville. Crittenden and McCook
with their divisions were at Battle Creek, Thomas and Wood were on
the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and Mitchel's
division, under the command of Rousseau, on the line of railroad
from Decatur to Columbia. Bragg had so well concealed his intention
as to his advance, that Buell was compelled to be in readiness
to meet him in the event of one of three movements, which it was
supposed he would make if he moved before Buell was ready to advance
upon him.

The latter thought Bragg would either move by the left, pass
around into Northern Alabama, cross at Decatur, and press north
for Nashville. This he regarded as the most likely movement. Or,
second, more direct, crossing the mountains, pass through McMinnville,
and so on to Nashville. Or, third, to move by way of Knoxville
into Eastern Kentucky. The latter, up to the first of September,
Buell regarded as hardly a possibility, supposing Bragg's movements
all indicated an advance on Nashville. Thomas was ordered to assume
command of the troops at McMinnville, to repair the railroad from
Tullahoma to that point as he went, and to establish posts of
observation with signal stations on the mountains to watch Bragg's
movements. Thomas assumed command at McMinnville on the 19th
of August, on the same day that Bragg sent a column of three or
four thousand troops across the river at Chattanooga. Buell, in
anticipation of this being the advance of Bragg's entire army en
route for Nashville, despatched Wood to the vicinity of McMinnville,
to aid in resisting his advance. He then ordered McCook to move
from Battle Creek to the Therman road, where he was to hold the
enemy in check until re-enforced by Thomas. Crittenden's division
was sent up the valley through Tracy City, by the Altamont road,
to be within supporting distance of McCook, and to watch the road
from there to Chattanooga. Thomas was directed to hold his command
in readiness to move at a moment's notice, either on the Therman
or Dunlap road. On the 22d, Buell learned that Bragg's whole army
was north of the Tennessee, and he then, further to concentrate his
command, moved his supplies from the depôt at Stenvson to Dechard.
Thomas on the same day telegraphed from McMinnville to Buell that
he believed Bragg's movements meant an advance of his entire army
into Kentucky. Thomas reconnoitered thoroughly the front of his
position, and ascertained that the enemy was not there and not
as yet even in Sequatchie Valley. This he reported to Buell, and
suggested that Wood's division be posted at Sparta, to intercept
Bragg's advance, if made through that place; that another division be
left at Dechard, to watch any movement in that direction, and that
the remaining portions of the command be concentrated at McMinnville,
ready to offer battle to Bragg's army if it should advance on that
front. Thomas regarded Bragg's advance either on Nashville or
Louisville as possible only through McMinnville or Sparta, and he
proposed to attack before Bragg could reach either. On the next
day Buell, under advices that he regarded as reliable, ordered the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions to concentrate
at Altamont, intending there to offer battle. He sent detailed
instructions to Thomas, in charge of the movement, as to the
disposition of his command, with orders in the event of defeat to
fall back, keeping his force between the enemy and Nashville. On
the 25th, Thomas reached Altamont, and finding no enemy nearer
than the Sequatchie Valley, and regarding Bragg's advance by way of
Altamont improbable, owing to the bad condition of the roads, and
lack of forage and water, returned to McMinnville with the Fourth
and Sixth Divisions. On the 30th, Buell gave orders concentrating
his entire command at Murfreesboro, still under the impression that
Bragg expected to strike for Nashville. The latter's movements
were so well guarded, and Buell had as yet so little reliable
information in regard to them, that he hesitated even after the
order was issued, and the next day asked Thomas's advice in regard
to it, in the light of any further information as to the movements
of the enemy. Thomas advised that the movement proceed, having
been commenced, and gave a plan of battle in the movement from
Murfreesboro. Thomas, on the 30th, captured a despatch that Bragg,
on the 27th, had sent to Van Dorn, in command in Mississippi,
conveying to him in full his plans in regard to his advance into
Kentucky, and informed him that Kirby Smith, re-enforced with two
divisions from this army, had turned Cumberland Gap, and was marching
on Lexington, Ky.

Buell's army at Murfreesboro consisted of five divisions under
his immediate command, the troops being then on the line of the
railroad. In addition he had two divisions sent to him from the
Army of the Tennessee--General J. C. Davis' division, under General
R. B. Mitchell, which arrived at Murfreesboro on the 2d of September,
and General E. A. Paine's division, under the command of General J.
M. Palmer, which reached Nashville on the 10th. This concentration
of the army at Murfreesboro of course withdrew all troops from the
mountains, leaving Bragg unhampered in the selection of his route,
either west to Nashville, or north to Louisville. He made choice
of the latter, and pushed down the valley of the Cumberland to
Carthage, where he crossed, moving through Scottsboro and Glasgow,
to strike the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Bragg entered
Kentucky with five divisions, making an army of some thirty-five
thousand men, divided between Generals Polk and Hardee. While at
Murfreesboro Buell first learned definitely of Bragg's movements,
and of his intended advance into Kentucky. The news of the movements
of Kirby Smith and of Nelson's defeat also reached him here.

On August 16th, Buell had ordered Nelson to assume command
in Kentucky, and to make such dispositions of his troops as would
resist any movement by Kirby Smith, then threatening Cumberland
Gap. The plan of the rebels in their campaign, which was intended
to free the soil of the South from the Northern armies by carrying
the war into the North, was for Kirby Smith to move through Eastern
Kentucky to Lexington and thence to Cincinnati, and for Bragg to
push through Central Kentucky to Louisville. With these two cities
in the possession of their armies it would be a short step to enter
upon the rich fields of the Northern States, and with the large
number of new recruits gained en route their armies could resist
any Northern troops that would be brought against them. This had
been Sidney Johnston's plan to be worked out after he had achieved
the victory he contemplated at Shiloh, and Bragg as his successor
endeavored to carry out Johnston's plan of campaign. One was as
much a success as the other, and in both the hour of defeat trod
so quickly on their apparent victory that the campaign in each
instance ultimately resulted in failure. So far as the advance of
Bragg and Kirby Smith into Kentucky was concerned, by it the South
suffered a loss instead of a gain, and was compelled from that
time on to act upon a steadily lessening line of defence. Bragg's
report shows he took a smaller command out than he took into the

On the same day that Nelson's orders were dated, Stevenson appeared
with his division before Cumberland Gap. George W. Morgan in command
there immediately sent out cavalry to the adjoining gaps to watch
for further movements of the enemy. When a short distance from
Roger's Gap the cavalry struck the head of Kirby Smith's army
on its advance to Kentucky. Smith's forces were those of his own
command in East Tennessee, re-enforced by the divisions of McCown
from Mississippi, sent him by Bragg, and also the two fine brigades
of Cleburne and Preston Smith, ordered to report to him from
Chattanooga. Kirby Smith moved with his main command to Barboursville,
and ordered McCown to Cumberland Ford with a large force, which cut
off Morgan, in the Gap, from his base of supplies in that direction.
Leaving Stevenson in Morgan's front to engage his attention, Kirby
Smith with his entire force advanced into Kentucky, thus entirely
cutting off re-enforcements and supplies to Morgan's command. The
latter failing in his efforts to bring on an engagement, placed
his command on half rations, and after a council of war abandoned
the Gap, dismounting his siege guns and destroying what stores and
ammunition he could not remove, marched out with his entire command,
to the east of Kirby Smith's force, to the Ohio River. John Morgan's
cavalry annoyed the command for some days, without inflicting any
material loss.

When Nelson reached Kentucky he found that a new department had
been created, with General H. G. Wright in command, embracing that
part of the State east of Louisville and the line of the Nashville
Railroad, taken from under Buell's command. Wright ordered Nelson
to proceed to Lexington and assume command of all the troops in
that locality, nearly all of them new regiments, principally from
Ohio and Kentucky, hastily gathered together, without drill or
discipline. Nelson concentrated these troops at Lexington, and
organized them into a division with Generals M. D. Manson, J. S.
Jackson, and Charles Cruft as brigade commanders. On August 23d,
Nelson sent a detachment of the Seventh Kentucky cavalry and Colonel
Child's battalion of Tennessee cavalry, under Colonel Metcalfe's
command, to Big Hill to resist the advance of the enemy. These
troops being attacked by a greatly superior force the Seventh Kentucky
broke and fled, leaving, however, about one-fourth of the command
with the Tennessee battalion, which, after fighting bravely, was
compelled to retire. Metcalfe rallied his men, but on the approach
of the enemy they again broke and ran, leaving the Tennesseeans
to resist the attack, which they so far succeeded in doing as to
secure a safe retreat to Richmond. The enemy pushed forward and
demanded the surrender of the town, but learning that re-enforcements
had arrived, retired. Nelson then ordered Manson's and Cruft's
brigades, under the command of the former, to proceed to Richmond.
On arriving there Manson went into camp south of the town and threw
out his pickets. The cavalry, on the 29th, reported an advance
of the enemy in large numbers, and that a heavy force of infantry
was driving in the pickets. Manson advanced to their support
with his own brigade, leaving Cruft with his command at Richmond.
Moving forward with his troops he drove the attacking party back
and formed his line of battle on each side of the road some two
miles from the town. The enemy attacked with infantry, artillery,
and cavalry, but was driven back with the loss of one field piece
and several men captured. Manson then occupied Rogersville, where
he remained in camp all night. In the morning he ordered Cruft to
join him, and moved out beyond the town to meet the enemy's advance.
After heavy fighting for over an hour the left of Manson's command
was fiercely assaulted, which being re-enforced, the right began
to give way in confusion.

The troops were rallied on a new line a mile to the rear, but as this
was badly posted for defense, the command was withdrawn from this
position to the line occupied the day before, and from this--the
enemy attacking in heavy force--the Federal troops were again routed
and driven back to their camps, where the last stand was made and
the heaviest fighting took place. Nelson, arriving on the ground,
assumed command and endeavored to stem the tide of defeat. The
enemy advanced in such overwhelming numbers upon the position of
the Federal forces that they were driven in complete disorder at
all points from the field. Nelson was twice wounded, but was able
to reach Louisville with several detachments of his routed troops.
Here he assumed command and bent every energy to the organization
of new troops, forming the citizens in commands for the defence
of that city. Nelson's losses in the engagement at Richmond were
two hundred and twenty-five killed, six hundred wounded, and over
two thousand captured. He also lost nine guns. His entire command
consisted of some seven thousand troops. The enemy's force was
twelve thousand men and thirty-six pieces of artillery, and he
lost over nine hundred killed and wounded. Kirby Smith then pushed
his command north, occupying Lexington, and sent out detachments
threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. On the 6th of September,
General Heth with some six thousand troops advanced and took
position a few miles south of Covington. He was ordered by Kirby
Smith not to attack, but to hold his command in readiness to move
at a moment's notice to form a junction with Bragg, then marching
north through Kentucky.

Smith, while waiting to form a junction with Bragg, was actively
employed in gathering supplies for his army in the richest part
of the State. He also sought to obtain recruits for his command,
but recruiting for the infantry service did not prove a success.
During the entire period the rebel army was in Kentucky not one
entire infantry regiment was raised. Individual enlistment was
constantly going on, but the leading officers of that army estimated
their entire gain was not over five thousand men, including three
regiments of cavalry recruited under Buford. Heth's advance alarmed
the three cities of Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati, spreading
consternation among all classes. Martial law was proclaimed, and
all able-bodied citizens were ordered to report for work on the
fortifications south of Covington. These works were manned by the
population of the surrounding country, coming to Cincinnati to
defend that city from pillage. Regiments of "Squirrel Hunters"
were formed, and a show of force was kept up until veteran troops
could be brought forward to take their place. Heth wished to attack,
but Kirby Smith would not permit this, as he anticipated a battle
with Buell, and that Bragg would have to fight his entire army, in
which event he would need every available man. Heth fell back in
a few days and on October 4th Smith reported with his command to
Bragg at Frankfort.

Bragg's movements became clearly apparent to Buell while the
latter was concentrating at Murfreesboro. On September 7th, Buell
started with Ammen's, Crittenden's, McCook's, Wood's, Rousseau's,
and Mitchell's divisions in the race between the opposing armies
for Louisville. If Bragg moved energetically and with the intent
of taking Louisville without fighting a battle in Kentucky before
he reached that city, his start in the race and the shorter line
he was moving on gave him the decided advantage in the movement.
Buell's object was to overtake Bragg, and, if necessary, force the
fighting. This would compel the latter to move his army so closely
on the one road open to him that his movements would be necessarily
slow. Failing in this, Buell's plans were to press Bragg so hard
that if he refused to fight in Kentucky he must leave the State in
possession of the Federal forces before he could gain anything by
his advance.

Buell, after reaching Nashville, crossed the river there at once
and pushed on with all possible speed. He left Thomas's, Palmer's,
and Negley's divisions, with Thomas in command, as the garrison
at this place. So important did Buell regard the holding of
Nashville, that he determined to weaken his immediate command and
leave this strong force under his most trusted subordinate, to
retain possession of that point. He considered his army in pursuit
of Bragg of sufficient strength to make the fight for the possession
of Kentucky, and in the event Bragg was driven from that State he
would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, where the battle
for that important position with Middle Tennessee would yet have to
be fought. In the happening of the latter event it was an absolute
necessity that the Federal army should hold Nashville as a point
at which to concentrate and move to the attack. If the result of
the movement in Kentucky should be the defeat of Buell, then it was
important that the general in command of the forces at Nashville
should be an officer of experience, to save the troops left there,
in their retreat to rejoin the main army. Buell regarded the
holding of Nashville by our forces as second only to the safety
of Kentucky, and made the disposition of his command accordingly.
With this view, on the 12th, he ordered R. B. Mitchell's division
to return to Nashville and form part of the garrison of that place.
Bragg, on the 8th, had reached the railroad, where he burned the
bridge at Salt River, and for some days in his northward march was
engaged in tearing up the railroad as he advanced. On the 13th,
his cavalry reached Munfordville beyond Green River.

Buell, on the 10th, learning that additional forces of Bragg's command
were crossing the Cumberland at Gainesville, at once countermanded
the order to Mitchell, and directed Thomas to place Negley in
command of Nashville, and if he regarded it best to do so, to leave
Paine's division [Palmer in command] with Negley's to hold that
place. If Paine could be spared, then Thomas was to move forward
by forced marches with his division and Paine's, and unite his
command with the main army. Thomas, knowing that Bragg had left
a large force to threaten Nashville, ordered Paine's division to
remain there, and started at once with the first division to report
to Buell.

Bragg, to reach Munfordville, had only sixty-eight miles to march
from his crossing of the Cumberland River, while Buell had one
hundred and five miles to travel before he could intercept him at
that place. Bragg's advance had reached and attacked Munfordville
before Buell's army had arrived at Bowling Green. On Bragg's
advance under General Chalmers, arriving at Munfordville, his
cavalry engaged the attention of the garrison there under Colonel
John T. Wilder, while the artillery and infantry were being placed
in position. On the 13th, demand was made of Wilder to surrender.
This he refused to do. With the early light of the next day an
assault was made by the enemy, which was repulsed with heavy loss.
Two detachments reported during the day, reinforcing Wilder's command.
One of them was under Colonel Dunham from Louisville, who, being
Wilder's senior in rank, assumed command. On the following day a
second demand for surrender was made by Chalmers, who represented
his command sufficiently large to capture the place. Dunham
refused to comply with this demand, and the enemy then withdrew,
going north. Two days later the rebels made another attack on the
works and were again repulsed. In the afternoon Bragg appeared in
person before the town, and sent, under a flag of truce, another
demand for the surrender of the command, as the garrison of the
place was surrounded by an entire army, and to assault would only
be a needless sacrifice of human life. This was declined, but with
the request from Colonel Dunham that Bragg suspend hostilities to
give time for consultation. This Bragg agreed to do until nine
o'clock in the evening. Dunham, who had succeeded in opening
communication with General Gilbert at Louisville, telegraphed him
the facts, and added that he feared he would have to surrender.
Gilbert telegraphed back an order placing Dunham in arrest, and
ordering Wilder to assume command. At the Council of War that
was held by Wilder it was determined that the place should not be
surrendered without personal inspection by the commanding officer
that Bragg's statements as to his force and situation were true.
Wilder, under Gilbert's orders, assumed command at seven o'clock in
the evening, and notified Bragg of the result of the consultation,
proposing, with Bragg's permission, to satisfy himself as to the
truth of his statements. Remarkable as it appears, this proposition
was agreed to by Bragg, and Wilder, under escort, investigated the
enemy's lines prepared for assault, and counting forty-five cannon
in position, supported by 25,000 men, he concluded it was impossible
to further successfully defend the place. He reported the facts
to the Council of War, and the demand for the surrender was acceded
to at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th. Under the terms of
the capitulation the troops marched out with the honors of war at
daylight, retained their sidearms and private property, and were
at once paroled. This attack on Munfordville by Bragg established
the fact that it was not his intention to press on to Louisville,
and the advantage Buell derived from the delay attending this attack
was in a measure some compensation for the loss of the place.

Bragg then took position at Prewitt's Knob, where Buell moved with
his entire army, Thomas having reported on the 20th. The two armies
confronted each other at this point for three days, and disposition
was made for battle. On the 21st, while the troops were being placed
in position by Thomas, under order of Buell, the enemy retreated,
marching for a short distance toward Louisville, then turned to
the right, and took position near Bardstown. Bragg claimed in his
official report that after manœuvring unsuccessfully for four days
to draw General Buell into an engagement, he found himself with
only three days' rations on hand for his troops "and in a hostile
country," that even a successful engagement would materially cripple
him, and as Buell had another route to the Ohio, to the left, he
concluded to turn to the right, send to Lexington for supplies to
meet him in Bardstown, and commenced the movement to that place.
This gave Buell an open road to Louisville, of which he immediately
availed himself, and on the 29th, the last division of the Army
of the Ohio reached that city. The place was under the command of
Gilbert, who had nothing but new levies of inexperienced troops.
These Buell incorporated with the brigades of his Army of the Ohio,
and on the morning of the 30th, after furnishing his command with
needed supplies, moved his army out of Louisville against the enemy.
The movement was delayed by a day, by Halleck's order relieving
Buell and placing Thomas in command. The latter remonstrated
against this order, and at his request it was withdrawn. The next
day Buell again assumed command, with Thomas announced in General
Orders as second in command, and commenced the advance movement of
his army in five columns.

Chapter VI.

Battle of Perryville

The main portion of the army had been organized into three corps,
designated the First, Second, and Third, under McCook, Crittenden,
and Gilbert, respectively. General Sill, in command of two divisions,
was ordered to move on the left toward Frankfort, to hold in check
the force of the enemy under Kirby Smith at that place. The other
columns marched by different routes upon roads converging upon
Bardstown, through Shepardsville, Mount Washington, Fairfield, and
Bloomfield. Each column engaged the enemy's cavalry and artillery
in a series of skirmishes from within a short distance of Louisville. As
the army approached Bardstown the resistance constantly increased,
retarding Buell's advance, and enabling Bragg to effect his withdrawal
from that place, which was accomplished eight hours before the
arrival of Buell's army. A sharp cavalry engagement occurred at
this place between Buell's advance and Bragg's rear-guard, when the
whole of Bragg's command retired, taking the road to Springfield.
At Bardstown Buell received information that a junction of Bragg's
and Kirby Smith's commands would be made at Danville. He ordered
McCook to advance from Bloomfield on the Harrodsburg road, and
directed Thomas to move with Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon road,
which passes four miles south of Perryville, with a branch to the
latter place, while he accompanied Gilbert's corps, which moved
on the direct road to Perryville. After leaving Bardstown, Buell
learned that Kirby Smith's force had crossed to the west side of
the Kentucky River, near Salvisa, and that Bragg was concentrating
either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. He at once ordered McCook
to change his line of march from the former road, and to proceed
direct to Perryville. On the afternoon of October 7th, Buell,
with Gilbert's corps, arrived in front of the rebels in strong
force three miles from Perryville, where he immediately drew his
troops up in line of battle. Advancing the cavalry and artillery,
supported by two regiments of infantry, the rear guard of the enemy
was pressed to within two miles of the town, when it was discovered
that the rebels were concentrating for battle. Orders were sent by
Buell to Crittenden and McCook to march at 3 o'clock on the morning
of the 8th, and for them to take position as early as possible on
the left and right of the centre corps respectively, the commanders
themselves to report in person their arrival, for orders, the
intention being to make the attack that day if possible.

McCook did not receive this order until 2.30 o'clock, and was on
the march at five. Owing to the difficulty of finding water for
his command where the troops were expected to encamp, Thomas, on
the night of the 7th, moved off the direct line of march some six
miles and was delayed several hours in reaching his position on
the field. During the night some pools of water were discovered
in small creek about two miles and a half from Perryville. Colonel
Dan McCook with the Thirty-sixth Brigade was ordered forward, and,
after a sharp engagement, secured possession of the pools, and a
supply of bad water for Gilbert's troops was obtained.

On October 1st, Bragg, leaving Polk in command at Bardstown, under
orders to slowly retire to Bryantsville, started for Lexington.
Here he ordered Kirby Smith with all his forces to Frankfort, to
assist in the installation services of the rebel Provisional Governor
of Kentucky at the capital of the State. At Lexington, on the 2d,
learning of Buell's movements from Louisville, Bragg ordered Polk
in writing--sending two copies to him--to advance at once, "with
his whole available force, by way of Bloomfield, toward Frankfort,
to strike the enemy in the flank and rear." Polk was informed in
the order that Kirby Smith would at the same time attack the front.

On the 3d, Polk received the orders, and, submitting them to a
council of war, decided not to obey them, but to move as originally
ordered. Of this Bragg was notified in time to prevent the attack
on Buell's front with Smith's command alone. Giving orders for
the supplies that had been accumulated in Lexington to be sent to
Bryantsville, Bragg, on the 6th, proceeded to Harrodsburg, where
he met Polk at the head of his column that had left Bardstown on
the 3d. On the 7th, Bragg ordered Polk to move Cheatham's division
back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point himself, to attack
the Federal force, immediately rout them, and move rapidly to join
Kirby Smith. These orders were given under the impression that
Buell's command was so separated that his right and left were sixty
miles apart. Bragg also sent Wither's division to Kirby Smith at
Frankfort, who reported himself threatened by a large force on his
front--the troops under Sill.

Early on the morning of the 8th an attempt was made by the enemy
to drive Colonel McCook from his position at the creek. He was
supported by Mitchell's and Sheridan's divisions, who were ordered
up and directed to hold the position until the entire army was
prepared to attack. The assault was made with great spirit on Colonel
McCook, but the enemy was handsomely repulsed. Buell anticipated
an attack on Gilbert's corps in its isolated position in the early
morning, but nothing occurred until after the arrival of McCook's
corps on the Maxville road, between 10 and 11 o'clock, when he
at once formed his command, of Rousseau's and Jackson's division,
in line of battle on the left of Gilbert, Rousseau on the right,
and sent his cavalry to the front to make a reconnoissance toward
Perryville. Thomas arrived and took position with Crittenden's
corps about twelve o'clock.

On McCook getting his command into position, he reported to General
Buell in person, who ordered him to send out a force to the Chaplin
River, and find out the position of the enemy in his front. During
McCook's absence Rousseau had advanced the right of his line a
half mile to obtain a supply of water, for which the troops were
suffering. On seeing this, the rebels opened a heavy fire with
some twenty pieces of artillery. Rousseau moved his other troops
to support his right, and, posting Simonson's and Loomis's batteries,
returned the enemy's artillery fire.

When McCook returned to his command, seeing that a good position on
high ground could be occupied by our troops on the left and front
of Rousseau's new line and near the river, he at once sent skirmishers
into the woods at that point, to find out if the enemy held the
position. He also directed Jackson to form a new line of battle
with his division nearer the stream, and sent the skirmishers
forward to the river as soon as this was done, where they obtained
the needed supply of water. On the formation of the new line, as
no heavy force of the enemy had been encountered, McCook, at about
half-past one o'clock, rode to the right of his line. About half
an hour later, Hardee, in command of three divisions, under Cheatham,
Buckner, and Anderson, some sixteen thousand strong, advanced to
the attack on McCook, driving back the skirmishers, first striking
those posted in the woods. McCook had formed his line of battle,

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