Part 18 out of 19
was not the verdict of Lee. Significant indeed was the cry of the
great Confederate, the soul of truth as of generosity, when Jackson
was wounded: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for
the good of the country, to have been disabled in your stead." It was
not the verdict of the Southern people. "No man," it was said by one
who knew them well, "had so magnificent prospect before him as
General Jackson. Whether he desired it or not, he could not have
escaped being Governor of Virginia, and also, in the opinion of
competent judges, sooner or later President of the Confederacy."* (*
Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times June 11, 1863.) Nor was it the verdict
of the foe. "Stonewall Jackson," wrote General Howard, commanding the
Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, "was victorious. Even his enemies
praise him; but, providentially for us, it was the last battle he
waged against the American Union. For, in bold planning, in energy of
execution, which he had the power to diffuse, in indefatigable
activity and moral ascendency, he stood head and shoulders above his
confreres, and after his death General Lee could not replace him."*
(* Battles and Leaders volume 3 page 202.)
It can hardly be questioned that, at the time of his death, Jackson
was the leader most trusted by the Confederates and most dreaded by
the Federals. His own soldiers, and with them the whole population of
the South, believed him capable of any task, invincible except by
fate. It never, indeed, fell to Jackson's lot to lead a great army or
to plan a great campaign. The operations in the Valley, although
decisive in their results, were comparatively insignificant, in
respect both of the numbers employed and of the extent of the
theatre. Jackson was not wholly independent. His was but a secondary
role, and he had to weigh at every turn the orders and instructions
of his superiors. His hand was never absolutely free. His authority
did not reach beyond certain limits, and his operations were confined
to one locality. He was never permitted to cross the border, and
"carry the war into Africa." Nor when he joined Lee before Richmond
was the restraint removed. In the campaign against Pope, and in the
reduction of Harper's Ferry, he was certainly entrusted with tasks
which led to a complete severance from the main body, but the
severance was merely temporary. He was the most trusted of Lee's
lieutenants, but he was only a lieutenant. He had never the same
liberty of action as those of his contemporaries who rose to historic
fame--as Lee himself, as Johnston or Beauregard, as Grant, or
Sherman, or as Sheridan--and consequently he had never a real
opportunity for revealing the height and breadth of his military
The Civil War was prolific of great leaders. The young American
generals, inexperienced as they were in dealing with large armies,
and compelled to improvise their tactics as they improvised their
staff, displayed a talent for command such as soldiers more regularly
trained could hardly have surpassed. Neither the deficiencies of
their material nor the difficulties of the theatre of war were to be
lightly overcome; and yet their methods displayed a refreshing
originality. Not only in mechanical auxiliaries did the inventive
genius of their race find scope. The principles which govern
civilised warfare, the rules which control the employment of each
arm, the technical and mechanical arts, were rapidly modified to the
exigencies of the troops and of the country. Cavalry, intrenchments,
the railway, the telegraph, balloons, signalling, were all used in a
manner which had been hitherto unknown. Monitors and torpedoes were
for the first time seen, and even the formations of infantry were
made sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of a modern
battle-field. Nor was the conduct of the operations fettered by an
adherence to conventional practice. From first to last the campaigns
were characterised by daring and often skilful manoeuvres; and if the
tactics of the battle-field were often less brilliant than the
preceding movements, not only are parallels to these tactics to be
found in almost every campaign of history, but they would probably
have escaped criticism had the opponent been less skilful. But among
the galaxy of leaders, Confederate and Federal, in none had the
soldiers such implicit confidence as in Stonewall Jackson, and than
the Southern soldiers, highly educated as many of them were, no
better judges of military capacity were ever known.
Nevertheless, the opinion of the soldiers is no convincing proof that
Jackson was equal to the command of a large army, or that he could
have carried through a great campaign. Had Lee been disabled, it
might be asked, would Jackson have proved a sufficient substitute?
It has already been explained that military genius shows itself first
in character, and, second, in the application of the grand principles
of warfare, not in the mere manipulation of armed masses. It cannot
well be denied that Jackson possessed every single attribute which
makes for success in war. Morally and physically he was absolutely
fearless. He accepted responsibility with the same equanimity that he
faced the bullets of the enemy. He permitted no obstacle to turn him
aside from his appointed path, and in seizing an opportunity or in
following up a victory he was the very incarnation of untiring
energy. He had no moments of weakness. He was not robust, and his
extraordinary exertions told upon his constitution. "My health," he
wrote to his wife in January 1863, "is essentially good, but I do not
think I shall be able in future to stand what I have already stood;"
and yet his will invariably rose superior to bodily exhaustion. A
supreme activity, both of brain and body, was a prominent
characteristic of his military life. His idea of strategy was to
secure the initiative, however inferior his force; to create
opportunities and to utilise them; to waste no time, and to give the
enemy no rest. "War," he said, "means fighting. The business of the
soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to
throw up breastworks, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and
strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in
the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of
life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be
of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property
in the end. To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the
fruits of victory is the secret of successful war."
That he felt to the full the fascination of war's tremendous game we
can hardly doubt. Not only did he derive, as all true soldiers must,
an intense intellectual pleasure from handling his troops in battle
so as to outwit and defeat his adversary, but from the day he first
smelt powder in Mexico until he led that astonishing charge through
the dark depths of the Wilderness his spirits never rose higher than
when danger and death were rife about him. With all his gentleness
there was much of the old Berserker about Stonewall Jackson, not
indeed the lust for blood, but the longing to do doughtily and die
bravely, as best becomes a man. His nature was essentially
aggressive. He was never more to be feared than when he was
retreating, and where others thought only of strong defensive
positions he looked persistently for the opportunity to attack. He
was endowed, like Massena, "with that rare fortitude which seems to
increase as perils thicken. When conquered he was as ready to fight
again as if he had been conqueror." "L'audace, l'audace, et toujours
l'audace" was the mainspring of all his actions, and the very sights
and sounds of a stricken field were dear to his soul. Nothing had
such power to stir his pulses as the rebel yell. "I remember," says a
staff-officer, "one night, at tattoo, that this cry broke forth in
the camp of the Stonewall Brigade, and was taken up by brigades and
divisions until it rang out far over field and woods. The general
came hastily and bareheaded from his tent, and leaning on a fence
near by, listened in silence to the rise, the climax, and the fall of
that strange serenade, raising his head to catch the sound, as it
grew fainter and fainter and died away at last like an echo among the
mountains. Then, turning towards his tent, he muttered in half
soliloquy, "That was the sweetest music I ever heard.""
Yet least of all was Jackson a mere fighting soldier, trusting to his
lucky star and resolute blows to pull him through. He was not,
indeed, one of those generals who seek to win victories without
shedding blood. He never spared his men, either in marching or
fighting, when a great result was to be achieved, and he was content
with nothing less than the complete annihilation of the enemy. "Had
we taken ten sail," said Nelson, "and allowed the eleventh to escape,
when it had been possible to have got at her, I could never have
called it well done." Jackson was of the same mind. "With God's
blessing," he said before the Valley campaign, "let us make thorough
work of it." When once he had joined battle, no loss, no suffering
was permitted to stay his hand. He never dreamed of retreat until he
had put in his last reserve. Yet his victories were won rather by
sweat than blood, by skilful manoeuvring rather than sheer hard
fighting. Solicitous as he was of the comfort of his men, he had no
hesitation, when his opportunity was ripe, of taxing their powers of
endurance to the uttermost. But the marches which strewed the wayside
with the footsore and the weaklings won his battles. The enemy,
surprised and outnumbered, was practically beaten before a shot was
fired, and success was attained at a trifling cost.
Yet, despite his energy, Jackson was eminently patient. He knew when
to refuse battle, just as well as he knew when to deliver it. He was
never induced to fight except on his own terms, that is, on his own
ground, and at his own time, save at Kernstown only, and there the
strategical situation forced his hand. And he was eminently cautious.
Before he committed himself to movement he deliberated long, and he
never attacked until he had ample information. He ran risks, and
great ones, but in war the nettle danger must be boldly grasped, and
in Jackson's case the dangers were generally more apparent than real.
Under his orders the cavalry became an admirable instrument of
reconnaissance. He showed a marked sagacity for selecting scouts,
both officers and privates, and his system for obtaining intelligence
was well-nigh perfect. He had the rare faculty, which would appear
instinctive, but which is the fruit of concentrated thought allied to
a wide knowledge of war, of divining the intention of his adversary
and the state of his moral. His power of drawing inferences, often
from seemingly unimportant trifles, was akin to that of the hunter of
his native backwoods, to whom the rustle of a twig, the note of a
bird, a track upon the sand, speak more clearly than written
characters. His estimate of the demoralisation of the Federal army
after Bull Run, and of the ease with which Washington might have been
captured, was absolutely correct. In the middle of May, 1862, both
Lee and Johnston, notwithstanding Jackson's victory over Milroy,
anticipated that Banks would leave the Valley. Jackson thought
otherwise, and Jackson was right. After the bloody repulse at Malvern
Hill, when his generals reported the terrible confusion in the
Confederate ranks, he simply stated his opinion that the enemy was
retreating, and went to sleep again. A week later he suggested that
the whole army should move against Pope, for McClellan, he said,
would never dare to march on Richmond. At Sharpsburg, as the shells
cut the trees to pieces in the West Wood, and the heavy masses of
Federal infantry filled the fields in front, he told his medical
director that McClellan had done his worst. At Fredericksburg, after
the first day's battle, he believed that the enemy was already
defeated, and, anticipating their escape under cover of the darkness,
he advised a night attack with the bayonet. His knowledge of his
adversary's character, derived, in great degree, from his close
observation of every movement, enabled him to predict with
astonishing accuracy exactly how he would act under given
Nor can he be charged in any single instance with neglect of
precautions by which the risks of war are diminished. He appears to
have thought out and to have foreseen--and here his imaginative power
aided him--every combination that could be made against him, and to
have provided for every possible emergency. He was never surprised,
never disconcerted, never betrayed into a false manoeuvre. Although
on some occasions his success fell short of his expectations, the
fault was not his; his strategy was always admirable, but fortune, in
one guise or another--the indiscipline of the cavalry, the
inefficiency of subordinates, the difficulties of the
country--interfered with the full accomplishment of his designs. But
whatever could be done to render fortune powerless that Jackson did.
By means of his cavalry, by forced marches, by the careful selection
of his line of march, of his camps, of his positions, of his
magazines, and lastly, by his consistent reticence, he effectually
concealed from the Federals both his troops and his designs. Never
surprised himself, he seldom failed to surprise his enemies, if not
tactically--that is, while they were resting in their camps--at least
strategically. Kernstown came as a surprise to Banks, McDowell to
Fremont. Banks believed Jackson to be at Harrisonburg when he had
already defeated the detachment at Front Royal. At Cross Keys and
Port Republic neither Fremont nor Shields expected that their flying
foe would suddenly turn at bay. Pope was unable to support Banks at
Cedar Run till the battle had been decided. When McClellan on the
Chickahominy was informed that the Valley army had joined Lee it was
too late to alter his dispositions, and no surprise was ever more
complete than Chancellorsville.
And the mystery that always involved Jackson's movements was
undoubtedly the result of calculation, He knew the effect his sudden
appearances and disappearances would have on the morale of the
Federal generals, and he relied as much on upsetting the mental
equilibrium of his opponents as on concentrating against them
superior numbers. Nor was his view confined to the field of battle
and his immediate adversary. It embraced the whole theatre of war.
The motive power which ruled the enemy's politics as well as his
armies was always his real objective. From the very first he
recognised the weakness of the Federal position--the anxiety with
which the President and the people regarded Washington--and on this
anxiety he traded. Every blow struck in the Valley campaign, from
Kernstown to Cross Keys, was struck at Lincoln and his Cabinet; every
movement, including the advance against Pope on Cedar Run, was
calculated with reference to the effect it would produce in the
Federal councils; and if he consistently advocated invasion, it was
not because Virginia would be relieved of the enemy's presence, but
because treaties of peace are only signed within sight of the hostile
It has been urged that the generals whom Jackson defeated were men of
inferior stamp, and that his capacity for command was consequently
never fairly tested. Had Grant or Sheridan, it is said, been pitted
against him in the Valley, or Sherman or Thomas on the Rappahannock,
his laurels would never have been won. The contention is fair.
Generals of such calibre as Banks and Fremont, Shields and Pope,
committed blunders which the more skilful leaders would undoubtedly
have avoided; and again, had he been pitted against a worthy
antagonist, Jackson would probably have acted with less audacity and
greater caution. It is difficult to conceive, however, that the fact
would either have disturbed his brain or weakened his resolution. Few
generals, apparently, have been caught in worse predicaments than he
was; first, when his army was near Harper's Ferry, and Fremont and
Shields were converging on his rear; second, when he lay in the woods
near Groveton, with no news from Longstreet, and Pope's army all
around him; third, when he was marching by the Brock road to strike
Hooker's right, and Sickles' column struck in between himself and
Lee. But it was at such junctures as these that his self-possession
was most complete and his skill most marked. The greater the peril,
the more fixed became his purpose. The capacity of the opponent,
moreover, cannot be accepted as the true touchstone of generalship.
"The greatest general," said Napoleon, "is he who makes the fewest
mistakes," i.e. he who neither neglects an opportunity nor offers one.
Thus tested Jackson has few superiors. During the whole of the two
years he held command he never committed a single error. At
Mechanicsville, and again at Frayser's Farm, the failure to establish
some method of intercommunication left his column isolated; this,
however, was a failure in staff duties, for which the Confederate
headquarters was more to blame than himself. And further, how sure
and swift was the retribution which followed a mistake committed
within his sphere of action! What opportunity did Jackson miss? His
penetration was unerring; and when, after he had marked his prey, did
he ever hesitate to swoop? "What seemed reckless audacity," it has
been well said by one of the greatest of Southern soldiers, "was the
essence of prudence. His eye had caught at a glance the entire
situation, and his genius, with marvellous celerity and accuracy, had
weighed all the chances of success or failure. While, therefore,
others were slowly feeling their way, or employing in detail
insufficient forces, Jackson, without for one moment doubting his
success, hurled his army like a thunderbolt against the opposing
lines, and thus ended the battle at a single blow."* (* General J.B.
Gordon, Commanding 2nd Army Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.
"Jackson," says one of his staff, "never changed an order on the
battlefield when he had once given it. I have seen Ewell, Early, A.P.
Hill, and even Lee send an aide with an order, and in a few minutes
send another messenger to recall or alter it." Letter to the author.)
But if Jackson never failed to take advantage of his opponent's
blunders, it might be said that he sometimes laid himself open to
defeat. Grant and Sheridan, had they been in place of Shields and
Fremont, would hardly have suffered him to escape from Harper's
Ferry; Sherman would probably have crushed him at the Second
Manassas; Thomas would not have been surprised at Chancellorsville.
But Jackson only pushed daring to its limits when it was safe to do
so. He knew the men he had to deal with. And in whatever situation he
might find himself he invariably reserved more than one means of
On the field of battle his manoeuvres were always sound and often
brilliant. He never failed to detect the key-point of a position, or
to make the best use of the ground. On the defensive his flanks were
always strong and his troops concealed both from view and fire; on
the offensive he invariably attacked where he was least expected. He
handled the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the
closest combination and with the maximum of effect. Except at
Kernstown, where Garnett interfered, his reserve was invariably put
in at exactly the right moment, and he so manipulated his command
that he was always strongest at the decisive point. Nor did he forget
that a battle is only half won where there is no pursuit, and
whenever he held command upon the field, his troops, especially the
cavalry, were so disposed that from the very outset the enemy's
retreat was menaced. The soldiers, sharers in his achievements,
compared his tactical leading with that of others, and gave the palm
to Jackson. An officer of his staff, who served continuously with the
Army of Northern Virginia, says: "I was engaged in no great battle
subsequent to Jackson's death in which I did not see the opportunity
which, in my opinion, he would have seized, and have routed our
opponents; "* (* Major Hotchkiss, C.S.A.) and General Lane writes
that on many a hard-fought field, subsequent to Chancellorsville, he
heard his veterans exclaim: "Oh for another Jackson!"
Until Jackson fell the Army of Northern Virginia, except when his
advice was overruled, had never missed an opening. Afterwards it
missed many. Gettysburg, which should have been decisive of the war,
was pre-eminently a battle of lost opportunities, and there are
others which fall into the same category. It is a perfectly fair
assumption, then, that Jackson, so unerring was his insight, would
not only have proved an efficient substitute for Lee, but that he
would have won such fame as would have placed him, as it placed his
great commander, among the most illustrious soldiers of all ages.
With any of his contemporaries, not even excepting Lee, he compares
more than favourably. Most obedient of subordinates as he was, his
strategical views were not always in accordance with those of his
Commander-in-Chief. If Jackson had been in charge of the operations,
the disastrous battle of Malvern Hill would never have been fought;
Pope would have been cut off from the Rappahannock; McClellan would
have found the whole Confederate army arrayed against him at South
Mountain, or would have been attacked near Frederick; and Burnside
would have been encountered on the North Anna, where defeat would
probably have proved his ruin. It is difficult to compare him with
Lee. A true estimate of Lee's genius is impossible, for it can never
be known to what extent his designs were thwarted by the Confederate
Government. Lee served Mr. Davis; Jackson served Lee, wisest and most
helpful of masters. It would seem, however, that Jackson in one
respect was Lee's superior. His courage, physical and moral, was not
more brilliant or more steadfast; his tactical skill no greater; but
he was made of sterner stuff. His self-confidence was supreme. He
never doubted his ability, with God's help, to carry out any task his
judgment approved. Lee, on the other hand, was oppressed by a
consciousness of his own shortcomings. Jackson never held but one
council of war. Lee seldom made an important movement without
consulting his corps commanders. Jackson kept his subordinates in
their place, exacting from his generals the same implicit obedience
he exacted from his corporals. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg
because he allowed his second in command to argue instead of
marching. Nor was that political courage, which Nelson declared is as
necessary for a commander as military courage, a component part of
Lee's character.* (* Lord Wolseley, Macmillan's Magazine, March,
1887.) On assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia, in spite
of Mr. Davis' protestations, he resigned the control of the whole
forces of the Confederacy, and he submitted without complaint to
interference. Jackson's action when Loring's regiments were ordered
back by the Secretary of War is sufficient proof that he would have
brooked no meddling with his designs when once they had received the
sanction of the Cabinet. At the same time, it must remain
undetermined whether Jackson was equal to the vast responsibilities
which Lee bore with such steadfast courage; whether he could have
administered a great army, under the most untoward circumstances,
with the same success; whether he could have assuaged the jealousies
of the different States, and have dealt so tactfully with both
officers and men that there should have been no friction between
Virginians and Georgians, Texans and Carolinians.
It is probable that Jackson's temper was more akin to Grant's than
Lee's. Grant had the same whole-hearted regard for the cause; the
same disregard for the individual. He was just as ready as Jackson to
place a recalcitrant subordinate, no matter how high his rank, under
instant arrest, and towards the incompetent and unsuccessful he was
just as pitiless. Jackson, however, had the finer intellect. The
Federal Commander-in-Chief was unquestionably a great soldier,
greater than those who overlook his difficulties in the '64 campaign
are disposed to admit. As a strategist he ranks high. But Grant was
no master of stratagem. There was no mystery about his operations.
His manoeuvres were strong and straightforward, but he had no skill
in deceiving his adversary, and his tactics were not always of a high
order. It may be questioned whether on the field of battle his
ability was equal to that of Sherman, or of Sherman's great
antagonist, Johnston. Elsewhere he was their superior. Both Sherman
and Johnston were methodical rather than brilliant; patient,
confident, and far-seeing as they were, strictly observant of the
established principles of war, they were without a
touch of that aggressive genius which distinguished Lee, Grant, and
Nevertheless, to put Jackson above Grant is to place him high on the
list of illustrious captains. Yet the claim is not extravagant. If
his military characteristics are compared with those of so great a
soldier as Wellington, it will be seen that in many respects they run
on parallel lines. Both had perfect confidence in their own capacity.
"I can do," said Jackson, "whatever I will to do; "while the Duke,
when a young general in India, congratulated himself that he had
learned not to be deterred by apparent impossibilities. Both were
patient, fighting on their own terms, or fighting not at all. Both
were prudent, and yet, when audacity was justified by the character
of their opponent and the condition of his troops, they took no
counsel of their fears. They were not enamoured of the defensive, for
they knew the value of the initiative, and that offensive strategy is
the strategy which annihilates. Yet, when their enemy remained
concentrated, they were content to wait till they could induce him to
disperse. Both were masters of ruse and stratagem, and the Virginian
was as industrious as the Englishman. And in yet another respect they
were alike. "In issuing orders or giving verbal instruction,
Jackson's words were few and simple; but they were so clear, so
comprehensive and direct, that no officer could possibly
misunderstand, and none dared disobey."* (* General J.B. Gordon.)
Exactly the same terms might be applied to Wellington. Again,
although naturally impetuous, glorying in war, they had no belief in
a lucky star; their imagination was always controlled by
common-sense, and, unlike Napoleon, their ambition to succeed was
always subordinate to their judgment. Yet both, when circumstances
were imperative, were greatly daring. The attacks at Groveton and at
Chancellorsville were enterprises instinct with the same intensity of
resolution as the storm of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, the passage of
the Douro, the great counterstroke of Salamanca. On the field of
battle the one was not more vigilant nor imperturbable than the
other, and both possessed a due sense of proportion. They knew
exactly how much they could effect themselves, and how much must be
left to others. Recognising that when once the action had opened the
sphere in which their authority could be exercised was very limited,
they gave their subordinates a free hand, issuing few orders, and
encouraging their men rather by example than by words. Both, too, had
that "most rare faculty of coming to prompt and sure conclusions in
sudden exigencies--the certain mark of a master-spirit in war."* (*
Napier.) At Bull Run, Jackson was ordered to support Evans at the
Stone Bridge. Learning that the left was compromised, without a
moment's hesitation he turned aside, and placed his brigade in the
only position where it could have held its ground. At Groveton, when
he received the news that the Federal left wing was retreating on
Centreville across his front, the order for attack was issued almost
before he had read the dispatch. At Chancellorsville, when General
Fitzhugh Lee showed him the enemy's right wing dispersed and
unsuspecting, he simply turned to his courier and said, "Let the
column cross the road," and his plan of battle was designed with the
same rapidity as Wellington's at Salamanca or Assaye.
It has been already pointed out that Jackson's dispositions for
defence differed in no degree from those of the great Duke. His visit
to Waterloo, perhaps, taught the American soldier the value and
importance of concealing his troops on the defensive. It was not,
however, from Wellington that he learned to keep his plans to himself
and to use every effort to mislead his adversary. Yet no general, not
even Napoleon himself, brought about so many startling surprises as
Wellington. The passage of the Douro, the storm of the frontier
fortresses, the flank attack at Vittoria, the passage of the Adour,
the passage of the Bidassoa--were each and all of them utterly
unexpected by the French marshals; and those were by no means the
only, or the most conspicuous, instances. Was ever general more
surprised than Massena, when pursuing his retreating foe through
Portugal, in full anticipation of "driving the leopards into the
sea," he suddenly saw before him the frowning lines of Torres Vedras,
the great fortress which had sprung from earth, as it were, at the
touch of a magician's wand?
The dispatches and correspondence of the generals who were opposed to
Wellington are the clearest evidence of his extraordinary skill.
Despite their long experience, their system of spies, their excellent
cavalry, superior, during the first years of the Peninsular War, both
in numbers and training, to the English, it was seldom indeed that
the French had more than the vaguest knowledge of his movements, his
intentions, or his strength. On no other theatre of war--and they
were familiar with many--had they encountered so mysterious an enemy.
And what was the result? Constantly surprised themselves, they at
length hesitated to attack even isolated detachments. At Guinaldo, in
1812, Marmont, with 30,000 soldiers, refused to assault a ridge
occupied by no more than 13,000. The morning of Quatre-Bras, when
that important position was but thinly held, even Ney was reluctant
to engage. In the judgment of himself and his subordinates, who had
met Wellington before, the fact that there were but few red jackets
to be seen was no proof whatever that the whole allied army was not
close at hand, and the opportunity was suffered to escape. Other
generals have been content with surprising the enemy when they
advanced against him; Wellington and Jackson sought to do so even
when they were confined to the defensive.
And in still another respect may a likeness be found. Jackson's
regard for truth was not more scrupulous than Wellington's. Neither
declined to employ every legitimate means of deceiving their enemies,
but both were absolutely incapable of self-deception. And this
characteristic was not without effect on their military conduct.
Although never deterred by difficulties, they distinguished clearly
between the possible and the impossible. To gain great ends they were
willing to run risks, but if their plans are carefully considered, it
will be seen that the margin left to chance was small. The odds were
invariably in their favour. In conception as in execution obstacles
were resolutely faced, and they were constitutionally unable to close
their eyes to contingencies that might prove ruinous. The promise of
great results was never suffered to cajole them into ignoring the
perils that might beset their path. Imagination might display in
vivid colours the success that might accrue from some audacious
venture, but if one step was obscure the idea was unhesitatingly
rejected. Undazzled by the prospect of personal glory, they formed "a
true, not an untrue, picture of the business to be done," and their
plans, consequently, were without a flaw. Brilliant, indeed, were the
campaigns of Napoleon, and astonishing his successes, but he who had
so often deceived others in the end deceived himself. Accustomed to
the dark dealings of intrigue and chicanery, his judgment, once so
penetrating, became blunted. He believed what he wished to believe,
and not that which was fact. More than once in his later campaigns he
persuaded himself that the chances were with him when in reality they
were terribly against him. He trusted to the star that had befriended
him at Marengo and at Aspern; that is, he would not admit the truth,
even to himself, that he had been overdaring, that it was fortune,
and fortune alone, that had saved him from destruction, and Moscow
and Vittoria, Leipsic and Waterloo, were the result.
But although there was a signal resemblance, both in their military
characters as in their methods of war, between Wellington and
Jackson, the parallel cannot be pushed beyond certain well-defined
limits. It is impossible to compare their intellectual capacity.
Wellington was called to an ampler field and far heavier
responsibilities. Not as a soldier alone, but as financier,
diplomatist, statesman, he had his part to play. While Napoleon
languished on his lonely island, his great conqueror, the
plenipotentiary of his own Government, the most trusted counsellor of
many sovereigns, the adviser of foreign Administrations, was
universally acknowledged as the mastermind of Europe. Nor was the
mark which Wellington left on history insignificant. The results of
his victories were lasting. The freedom of the nations was restored
to them, and land and sea became the thoroughfares of peace. America,
on the other hand, owes no single material benefit to Stonewall
Jackson. In the cause of progress or of peace he accomplished
nothing. The principle he fought for, the right of secession, lives
no longer, even in the South. He won battles. He enhanced the
reputation of American soldiers. He proved in his own person that the
manhood of Virginia had suffered no decay. And this was all. But the
fruits of a man's work are not to be measured by a mere utilitarian
standard. In the minds of his own countrymen the memory of Wellington
is hallowed not so much by his victories, as by his unfaltering
honesty and his steadfast regard for duty, and the life of Stonewall
Jackson is fraught with lessons of still deeper import.
Not only with the army, but with the people of the South, his
influence while he lived was very great. From him thousands and ten
thousands of Confederate soldiers learned the self-denial which is
the root of all religion, the self-control which is the root of all
manliness.* (* See Note at end of volume.) Beyond the confines of the
camps he was personally unknown. In the social and political circles
of Richmond his figure was unfamiliar. When his body lay in state the
majority of those who passed through the Hall of Representatives
looked upon his features for the first time. He had never been called
to council by the President, and the members of the Legislature, with
but few exceptions, had no acquaintance with the man who acted while
they deliberated. But his fame had spread far and wide, and not
merely the fame of his victories, but of his Christian character. The
rare union of strength and simplicity, of child-like faith and the
most fiery energy, had attracted the sympathy of the whole country,
of the North as well as of the South; and beyond the Atlantic, where
with breathless interest the parent islands were watching the issue
of the mighty conflict, it seemed that another Cromwell without
Cromwell's ambition, or that another Wolfe with more than Wolfe's
ability, had arisen among the soldiers of the youngest of nations.
And this interest was intensified by his untimely end. When it was
reported that Jackson had fallen, men murmured in their dismay
against the fiat of the Almighty. "Why," they asked, "had one so pure
and so upright been suddenly cut down?" Yet a sufficient answer was
not far to seek. To the English race, in whatever quarter of the
globe it holds dominion, to the race of Alfred and De Montfort, of
Bruce and Hampden, of Washington and Gordon, the ideal of manhood has
ever been a high one. Self-sacrifice and the single heart are the
attributes which it most delights to honour; and chief amongst its
accepted heroes are those soldier-saints who, sealing their devotion
with their lives, have won
Death's royal purple in the foeman's lines.
So, from his narrow grave on the green hillside at Lexington, Jackson
speaks with voice more powerful than if, passing peacefully away, in
the fulness of years and honours, he had found a resting-place in
some proud sepulchre, erected by a victorious and grateful
commonwealth. And who is there who can refuse to listen? His creed
may not be ours; but in whom shall we find a firmer faith, a mind
more humble, a sincerity more absolute? He had his temptations like
the rest of us. His passions were strong; his temper was hot;
forgiveness never came easily to him, and he loved power. He dreaded
strong liquor because he liked it; and if in his nature there were
great capacities for good, there were none the less, had it been once
perverted, great capacities for evil. Fearless and strong,
self-dependent and ambitious, he had within him the making of a
Napoleon, and yet his name is without spot or blemish. From his
boyhood onward, until he died on the Rappahannock, he was the very
model of a Christian gentleman:--
E'en as he trod that day to God, so walked he from his birth,
In simpleness, and gentleness, and honour, and clean mirth.
Paradox as it may sound, the great rebel was the most loyal of men.
His devotion to Virginia was hardly surpassed by his devotion to his
wife. And he made no secret of his absolute dependence on a higher
power. Every action was a prayer, for every action was begun and
ended in the name of the Almighty. Consciously and unconsciously, in
deed as in word, in the quiet of his home and in the tumult of
battle, he fastened to his soul those golden chains "that bind the
whole round earth about the feet of God." Nor was their burden heavy.
"He was the happiest man," says one of his friends, "I ever knew,"
and he was wont to express his surprise that others were less happy
But there are few with Jackson's power of concentration. He fought
evil with the same untiring energy that he fought the North. His
relations to his moral duties were governed by the same strong
purpose, the same clear perception of the aim to be achieved, and of
the means whereby it was to be achieved, as his manoeuvres on the
field of battle. He was always thorough. And it was because he was
thorough--true, steadfast, and consistent, that he reached the heroic
standard. His attainments were not varied. His interests, so far as
his life's work was concerned, were few and narrow. Beyond his
religion and the army he seldom permitted his thoughts to stray. His
acquaintance with art was small. He meddled little with politics. His
scholarship was not profound, and he was neither sportsman nor
naturalist. Compared with many of the prominent figures of history
the range of his capacity was limited.
And yet Jackson's success in his own sphere was phenomenal, while
others, perhaps of more pronounced ability, seeking success in many
different directions, have failed to find it in a single one. Even
when we contrast his recorded words with the sayings of those whom
the world calls great--statesmen, orators, authors--his inferiority
is hardly apparent. He saw into the heart of things, both human and
divine, far deeper than most men. He had an extraordinary facility
for grasping the essential and discarding the extraneous. His
language was simple and direct, without elegance or embellishment,
and yet no one has excelled him in crystallising great principles in
a single phrase. The few maxims which fell from his lips are almost a
complete summary of the art of war. Neither Frederick, nor
Wellington, nor Napoleon realised more deeply the simple truths which
ever since men first took up arms have been the elements of success;
and not Hampden himself beheld with clearer insight the duties and
obligations which devolve on those who love their country well, but
It is possible that the conflicts of the South are not yet ended. In
America men pray for peace, but dark and mysterious forces,
threatening the very foundations of civic liberty, are stirring even
now beneath their feet. The War of Secession may be the precursor of
a fiercer and a mightier struggle, and the volunteers of the
Confederacy, enduring all things and sacrificing all things, the
prototype and model of a new army, in which North and South shall
march to battle side by side. ABSIT OMEN! But in whatever fashion his
own countrymen may deal with the problems of the future, the story of
Stonewall Jackson will tell them in what spirit they should be faced.
Nor has that story a message for America alone. The hero who lies
buried at Lexington, in the Valley of Virginia, belongs to a race
that is not confined to a single continent; and to those who speak
the same tongue, and in whose veins the same blood flows, his words
come home like an echo of all that is noblest in their history: "What
is life without honour? Degradation is worse than death. We must
think of the living and of those who are to come after us, and see
that by God's blessing we transmit to them the freedom we have
Mr. W.P. St. John, President of the Mercantile Bank of New York,
relates the following incident:--A year or two ago he was in the
Shenandoah Valley with General Thomas Jordan, C.S.A., and at the
close of the day they found themselves at the foot of the mountains
in a wild and lonely place; there was no village, and no house, save
a rough shanty for the use of the "track-walker" on the railroad. It
was not an attractive place for rest, yet here they were forced to
pass the night, and to sit down to such supper as might be provided
in so desolate a spot. The unprepossessing look of everything was
completed when the host came in and took his seat at the head of the
table. A bear out of the woods could hardly have been rougher, with
his unshaven hair and unkempt beard. He answered to the type of
border ruffian, and his appearance suggested the dark deeds that
might be done here in secret, and hidden in the forest gloom. Imagine
the astonishment of the travellers when this rough backwoodsman
rapped on the table and bowed his head. And such a prayer! "Never,"
says Mr. St. John, "did I hear a petition that more evidently came
from the heart. It was so simple, so reverent, so tender, so full of
humility and penitence, as well as of thankfulness. We sat in
silence, and as soon as we recovered ourselves I whispered to General
Jordan, 'Who can he be?' To which he answered, 'I don't know, but he
must be one of Stonewall Jackson's old soldiers.' And he was. As we
walked out in the open air, I accosted our new acquaintance, and
after a few questions about the country, asked, 'Were you in the
war?' 'Oh, yes,' he said with a smile, 'I was out with Old
Stonewall.'" Southern Historical Society Papers volume 19 page 871.
LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED (EXCLUDING PRISONERS) IN GREAt BATTLES
(The victorious side is given first)
(Column headings: 1, Name of battle; 2, Number of troops; 3, Killed and wounded; 4, Total; 5, Total percentage; 6, Percentage of victor.)
Blenheim, 1704 Allies, 56,000 11,000
French, 60,000 20,000 31,000 26 19
Ramilies, 1706 Allies, 60,000 3,600
French, 62,000 8,000 11,600 9 6
Oudenarde, 1708 Allies, 85,000 10,000
French, 85,000 10,000 20,000 11 11
Malplaquet, 1709 Allies, 100,000 14,000
French, 100,000 20,000 34,000 17 14
Dettingen, 1743 Allies, 37,000 2,350
French, 60,000 7,000 9,350 9 6
Fontenoy, 1745 French, 50,000 6,000
Allies, 40,000 7,300 13,300 14 12
Prague, 1757 Prussians, 64,000 12,000
Austrians, 60,000 10,000 22,000 17 18
Kollin, 1757 Austrians, 53,000 8,000
Prussians, 34,000 11,000 19,000 21 15
Rosbach, 1757 Prussians, 22,000 541
Allies, 46,000 4,000 4,541 6 2
Leuthen, 1757 Prussians, 30,000 6,000
Austrians, 80,000 10,000 16,000 14 20
Breslau, 1757 Austrians, 80,000 5,700
Prussians, 30,000 6,000 11,700 10 7
Zorndort, 1758 Prussians, 32,760 12,000
Russians, 52,000 20,000 32,000 38 37
Hochkirch, 1758 Austrians, 90,000 6,000
Prussians, 42,000 8,000 14,000 10 8
Crefeld, 1758 Allies, 33,000 1,700
French, 47,000 4,000 5,700 7 5
Zullichau, 1759 Russians, 72,000 4,800
Prussians, 27,500 6,000 10,800 10 6
Kunnersdorf, 1759 Allies, 70,000 14,000
Prussians, 43,000 17,000 31,000 27 20
Minden, 1759 Allies, 37,000 2,800
Saxons, 52,000 7,000 9,800 11 7
Torgau, 1760 Prussians, 46,000 12,000
Austrians, 60,000 12,000 24,000 22 26
Leignitz, 1760 Prussians, 30,000 3,000
Austrians, 35,000 5,000 8,000 12 10
Lonato and French, 44,000 7,000
Castiglione, 1796 Austrians, 46,000 10,000 17,000 18 15
Rivoli, 1797 French, 18,000 4,500
Austrians, 28,000 10,000 14,500 30 25
Marengo, 1800 French, 28,000 5,000
Austrians, 30,000 8,000 13,000 22 17
Hohenlinden, 1800 French, 56,000 2,500
Austrians, 50,000 12,000 14,500 13 4
Austerlitz, 1805 French, 65,000 9,000
Allies, 83,000 16,000 25,000 16 13
Jena, 1806 French, 58,000 5,000
Prussians, 40,000 12,000 17,000 17 8
Auerstadt, 1806 French, 28,000 9,500
Prussians, 45,000 6,000 15,500 22 33
Eylau, 1807 French, 70,000 20,000
Russians, 63,500 22,000 42,000 33 28
Heilsberg, 1807 Russians, 84,000 10,000
French, 85,000 12,000 22,000 13 11
Friedland, 1807 French, 75,000 10,000
Russians, 67,000 24,000 34,000 23 18
Vimiero, 1808 English, 18,000 720
French, 14,000 2,000 2,720 8 4
Eckmuhl, 1809 French, 65,000 7,000
Austrians, 80,000 8,000 15,000 10 10
Aspern, 1809 Austrians, 75,000 20,000
French, 95,000 25,000 45,000 26 26
Wagram, 1809 French, 220,000 22,000
Austrians, 15,000 22,000 44,000 11 10
Talavera, 1809 English and
Spanish, 53,000 7,200
French, 56,000 8,300 15,500 14 13
Albuera, 1811 Allies, 32,000 6,750
French, 22,500 7,000 13,750 25 20
Salamanca, 1812 Allies, 44,000 5,000
French, 47,000 10,000 15,000 16 11
Borodino, 1812 French, 125,000 30,000
Russians, 138,000 45,000 75,000 28 24
Bautzen, 1813 French, 190,000 12,000
Allies, 83,000 12,000 24,000 8 6
Vittoria, 1813 Allies, 83,000 5,000
French, 60,000 5,000 10,000 7 6
Leipsic, 1813 Allies, 290,000 42,000
French, 150,000 50,000 92,000 20 14
Orthez, 1814 Allies, 37,000 2,250
French, 40,000 3,800 6,050 7 6
Toulouse, 1814 Allies, 52,000 4,650
French, 38,000 5,900 10,550 11 9
La Rothiere, 1814 Allies, 80,000 6,500
French, 40,000 6,000 12,500 10 8
Montmirail, 1814 French, 25,000 2,000
Allies, 39,000 3,000 5,000 7 8
Laon, 1814 Allies, 60,000 2,000
French, 52,000 7,000 9,000 8 3
Ligny, 1815 French, 73,000 12,000
Prussians, 86,000 12,000 24,000 15 16
Quatre-Bras, 1815 Allies, 31,000 4,500
French, 21,500 4,200 8,700 16 14
Waterloo, 1815 Allies, 100,000 20,000
French, 70,000 22,000 42,000 24 20
Alma, 1854 Allies, 51,000 3,400
Russians, 35,000 5,700 9,100 10 6
Inkermann, 1854 Allies, 15,700 2,287
Russians, 68,000 10,500 13,787 15 21
Magenta, 1859 Allies, 48,000 4,500
Austrians, 60,000 6,500 11,000 10 9
Solferino, 1859 Allies, 135,000 16,500
Austrians, 160,000 15,000 31,500 10 11
Bull Run, 1861 Confederates, 18,000 1,969
Federals, 18,000 1,584 3,553 9 10
Perryville, 1862 Federals, 27,000 3,700
Confederates, 16,000 3,200 6,900 16 --
Shiloh, 1862 Federals, 58,000 12,000
Confederates, 40,000 9,000 21,000 20 20
Seven Pines, 1862 Federals, 51,000 5,031
Confederates, 39,000 6,134 11,165 12 9
Gaines' Mill, 1862 Confederates, 54,000 8,000
Federals, 36,000 5,000 13,000 14 14
Malvern Hill, 1862 Federals, 80,000 2,800
Confederates, 70,000 5,500 8,300 5 3
Cedar Run, 1862 Confederates, 21,000 1,314
Federals, 12,000 2,380 3,694 11 6
Second Manassas, Confederates, 54,000 9,000
1862 Federals, 73,000 13,000 22,000 17 16
Sharpsburg, 1862 Confederates, 41,000 9,500
Federals, 87,000 12,410 21,910 17 23
Fredericksburg, 1862 Confederates, 70,000 4,224
Federals, 120,000 12,747 16,971 8 6
Chickamauga, 1863 Confederates, 71,000 18,000
Federals, 57,000 17,100 35,100 12 17
Chancellorsville, Confederates, 62,000 10,000
1863 Federals, 130,000 14,000 24,000 12 17
Gettysburg, 1863 Federals, 93,000 19,000
Confederates, 70,000 18,000 37,000 24 20
Chattanooga, 1863 Federals, 60,000 5,500
Confederates, 33,000 3,000 8,500 8 9
Stone's River, 1863 Federals, 43,000 9,000
Confederates, 37,712 9,500 18,500 24 20
The Wilderness, Confederates, 61,000 11,000
1864 Federals, 118,000 15,000 26,000 14 18
Spotsylvania Court Confederates, 50,000 8,000
House, 1864 Federals, 100,000 17,000 25,000 16 16
Cold Harbour, 1864 Confederates, 58,000 1,700
Federals, 110,000 10,000 11,700 6 3
Nashville, 1864 Federals, 55,000 3,000
Confederates, 39,000 3,500 6,500 6 5
Koeniggraetz, 1866 Prussians, 211,000 8,894
Austrians, 206,000 18,000 26,894 6 4
Woerth, 1870 Germans, 90,000 10,642
French, 45,000 8,000 18,642 13 11
Spicheren, 1870 Germans, 37,000 4,871
French, 29,000 4,000 8,871 13 13
Colombey, 1870 Germans, 34,000 5,000
French, 54,000 3,700 8,700 9 14
Vionville, 1870 Germans, 70,000 15,800
French, 98,000 17,000 32,800 19 22
Gravelotte, 1870 Germans, 200,000 20,000
French, 120,000 10,000 30,000 9 10
Noisseville, 1870 Germans, 52,000 3,078
French, 100,000 3,542 6,620 4 5
Plevna, July 20, Turks, 20,000 1,000
1877 Russians, 7,000 2,850 3,850 13 5
Plevna, July 30, Turks, 20,000 4,000
1877 Russians, 30,000 7,300 11,300 22 20
Pelishat, Aug. 31, Russians, 20,000 1,350
1877 Turks, 15,000 1,000 2,350 7 6
Lovtcha, 1877 Russians, 20,000 1,500
Turks, 5,000 2,000 3,500 14 7
Plevna, Sep. 11, Turks, 35,000 3,000
1877 Russians, 80,000 16,000 19,000 16 8
Plevna, Dec. 10, Russians, 24,000 2,000
1877 Turks, 20,000 6,000 8,000 17 8
Aladja Dagh, 1877 Russians, 60,000 1,450
Turks, 35,000 4,500 5,950 6 2
Shipka, 1878 Russians, 25,000 5,500
Turks, 80,000 -- -- -- --
Tel-el-Kebir, 1882 English, 17,000 439
Egyptians, 25,000 3,000 3,439 9 2
Although this return has been compiled from the most trustworthy sources,
it can only be taken as approximately accurate.
Strength wounded Percentage
*Dettingen, 1743 12,000 821 6
*Fontenoy, 1745 16,600 4,002 24
Alexandria, 1801 12,000 1,521 12
*�Assaye, 1803 4,500 1,566 34
Coruna, 1809 14,500 1,000 6
*Talavera, 1809 20,500 6,250 30
*Albuera, 1811 8,200 3,990 48
Barossa, 1811 4,400 1,210 27
*Salamanca, 1812 26,000 3,386 13
*Quatre-Bras, 1815 12,000 2,504 20
*Waterloo, 1815 23,991 6,932 29
�Maharajpore, 1843 6,000 790 13
�Moodkee, 1845 9,000 874 9
�Ferozeshah, 1845 16,000 2,415 15
�Aliwal, 1846 10,500 580 5
�Sobraon, 1846 15,500 2,063 13
�Chillianwalla, 1849 15,000 2,388 15
*Alma, 1854 21,500 2,002 9
*Inkermann, 1854 7,464 2,357 31
* In those marked by an asterisk the force formed part of an allied army.
� In these battles Indian troops took part.
Adour, passage of river.
Agincourt, battle of.
Albuera, battle of.
Alexander, General, U.S.A.
Allan, Colonel W., C.S.A.
American soldier (see also Northern and Southern soldier).
Anderson, Colonel G. T., C.S.A.
Anderson, General R. H., C.S.A.
Antietam. (See Sharpsburg).
Archduke Charles of Austria, quoted.
Archer, General, C.S.A.
Armament. (See under Tactics, Arms).
Armies and soldiers, regular.
Armies, Western. (See Western).
Armistead, General, C.S.A.
Army of Mexico (U.S.).
Army of Northern Virginia (strength, etc.).
Army of Prussia.
Army of the Potomac (strength, etc.).
Army of the Rappahannook, Federal, under McDowell (strength, etc.).
Army of the Shenandoah, Confederate.
Army of the Shenandoah, Federal, under Banks (strength, etc.).
Army of the Valley (strength, etc.).
Army of Virginia, Federal, under Pope, (strength, etc.).
Army of Western Virginia, Federal, under Rosecrans and Fremont,
Army, United States (strength, etc.), (see also Officers).
Ashby, General Turner, C.S.A.
Aspern, battle of.
Assaye, battle of.
Atkinson, General, C.S.A.
Austerlitz, battle of.
Averell, General, U.S.A.
Badajos, siege of.
Banks, General N.P., U.S.A. (see also Army of the Shenandoah).
Barksdale, General, C.S.A.
Barlow, General, U.S.A.
Barossa, battle of.
Bartow, General, C.S.A.
Bath, skirmish near.
Bautzen, battle of.
Bayard, General, U.S.A.
Beauregard, General, C.S.A.
Beaver Dam Creek, Virginia, engagement at.
Bee, General, C.S.A.
Benjamin, Hon. J.P.
Berry, General, U.S.A.
Bidassoa, passage of river.
Bigelow, Captain, U.S.A.
Birney, General, U.S.A.
Blenker, General, U.S.A.
Bonham, General, C.S.A.
Borcke, Major Eeros von, C.S.A.
Boswell, Captain J.K., C.S.A.
Boteler, Hon. R., Colonel, C.S.A.
Boteler's Ford, engagement at, chapter 19.
Branch, General, C.S.A.
Brandy Station, battle of.
Bristoe Station, Virginia, engagement at.
Brown, Colonel, C.S.A.
Buena Vista, battle of.
Buford, General, U.S.A.
Bull Run, battle of. (See Manassas).
Bunker's Hill, battle of.
Burks, Colonel, C.S.A.
Burns, General, U.S.A.
Burnside, General A. E., U.S.A.
Busaco, battle of.
Butterfield, General, U.S.A.
CADETS, Military Institute.
Cadets, West Point.
Campbell, Colonel, U.S.A.
Camp Lee, Virginia.
Cannae, battle of.
Carrington, Captain, C.S.A.
Carroll, General, U.S.A.
Cavaliers, the English.
Cedar Run, Virginia, battle of, chapter 15.
Cedarviile, Virginia, cavalry engagement near.
Cerro Gordo, battle of.
Chancellorsville, battle of, chapters.
Chantilly or Ox Hill, engagement at.
Chapultepec, battle of.
Chew, Captain, C.S.A.
Churubusco, battle of.
Ciudad Rodrigo, siege of.
Clyde, Field-Marshal Lord.
Cobb, General, C.S.A.
Cold Harbour, battle of. (See Gaines' Mill).
Cold Harbour, second battle of, 1864.
Colquitt, General, C.S.A.
Colston, General, C.S.A.
Columbia, district of.
Command, selections for.
Command, system of.
Comte de Paris.
Confederacy, the resources of.
Conscription Act, Southern.
Contreras, battle of.
Cooke, Colonel, C.S.A.
Couch, General, U.S.A.
Council of War.
Cox, General, U.S.A.
Crampton's Gap, engagement at.
Crawford, General, U.S.A.
Crecy, battle of.
Cross Keys, battle of, chapter xi.
Crown Prince of Prussia.
Crutchfield, Cal. S., C.S.A.
Cunningham, Cal., C.S.A.
Cutts, Colonel, C.S.A.
Dabney, Reverend Dr., Major, C.S.A.
Discipline (see also Straggling).
Doles, General, C.S.A.
Donnelly, General, U.S.A.
Doubleday, General, U.S.A.
Douglas, Cal. H. K., C.S.A.
Douro, passage of river.
Drayton, General, C.S.A.
Dresden, campaign of.
Early, General Jubal A., C.S.A.
Earthworks and intrenchments (see also under Tactics).
Eckmuhl, campaign of.
Edict of Emancipation.
Elk Run Valley, position in.
Elzey, General, C.S.A.
Evans, General N.G., C.S.A.
Ewell, General R.S., C.S.A.
Eylau, battle of.
Fair Oaks, Virginia, battle of. (See Seven Pines).
Falling Waters, Va., engagement at.
Faulkner, Colonel Charles, C.S.A.
Field, General, C.S.A.
Flodden, battle of.
Flournoy, Colonel, C.S.A.
"Fog of War, the".
Forno, Colonel, C.S.A.
Forrest, General, C.S.A.
Franklin, General, W. B., U.S.A.
Frayser's Farm, Virginia, battle of, chapter xiv.
Frederick the Great.
Fredericksburg, battle of, chapter 20.
Fremont, General John C., U.S.A.
French, General, U.S.A.
Front Royal, engagement at, chapter 10.
Fuentes d'Onor, battle of.
Fulkerson, Colonel, C.S.A.
Funsten, Colonel, C.S.A.
Gaines' Mill, Virginia, battle of, chapter 13.
Garland, General, C.S.A.
Garnett, General, C.S.A.
Garnett, Lieut.-Colonel, C.S.A.
Geary, General, U.S.A.
German soldiers in America.
Getty, General, U.S.A.
Gettysburg, battle of.
Gibbon, General John, U.S.A.
Gordon, General G. H., U.S.A.
Gordon, General J. B., C.S.A.
Graham, Rev. Dr.
Grant, General Ulysses S., U.S.A.
Gravelotte, battle of.
Green, General, C.S.A.
Greene, General, U.S.A.
Gregg, General, C.S.A.
Griffin, General, U.S.A.
Grigsby, Colonel, C.S.A.
Grover, General, U.S.A.
Groveton, battle of, chapter xvi.
Halleck, General, U.S.A.
Hampton, General Wade, C.S.A.
Hancock, General W. S., U.S.A.
Hancock, skirmish near.
Hanover Court House, Virginia, engagement at.
Harman, Colonel W. A., C.S.A.
Harman, Major, C.S.A.
Harper's Ferry, investment of, chapter xviii.
Harris, General N. G., C.S.A.
Hartsuff, Colonel, U.S.A.
Hatch, General, U.S.A.
Hawks, Major, C.S.A.
Hayes, General, U.S.A.
Hays, General, C.S.A.
Heintzleman, General S. P., U.S.A.
Hill, General A. P., C.S.A.
Hill, General D. H., C.S.A.
Hitchcock, General, U.S.A.
Hohenlinden, battle of.
Hoke, General, C.S.A.
Holmes, General, C.S.A.
Hood, General J. B., C.S.A.
Hooker, General Joseph, U.S.A.
Hotchkiss, Major J., C.S.A.
Howard, General, O. O., U.S.A.
Huger, General, C.S.A.
Humphreys, General, U.S.A.
Hundley's Corner, Virginia, engagement at.
Hunt, General, U.S.A.
Hunter, General, U.S.A.
Imboden, General, C.S.A.
Information in war. (See Intelligence, etc.).
Inkermann, battle of.
Intelligence Department and Information.
Interior lines. (See Strategy).
Irish soldiers in America.
Italy, campaign of.
Iverson, Col., C.S.A.
Jackson, Cummins, uncle of General T.J. Jackson.
Jackson family, characteristics of.
Jackson family, origin of.
Jackson, General, President of the United States.
Jackson, John, father of General T.J. Jackson.
Jackson, Julia, mother of General T.J. Jackson.
Jackson, Julia, daughter of General T.J. Jackson.
Jackson, Mary Anna, wife of General T.J. Jackson.
Jackson, Thomas Jonathan, "Stonewall", Lieut.-General, C.S.A.:
First Regiment of artillery, U.S.A.
Magruder's Field Battery.
Professorship at Military Institute.
Topographical Department, C.S.A.
Command at Harper's Ferry.
First Brigade of Army of Shenandoah.
Command of District of Shenandoah Valley.
Command of Second Army Corps.
Prince Frederick Charles.
Criticism of his manoeuvres refuted.
Devotion of his men.
Dissatisfaction with conduct of war.
President of Baltimore and Ohio Railway.
First estimate of:
Guards the camp.
Influence on his soldiers.
Influence on the Southern people.
On his travels.
On state of country.
On necessity of secrecy.
After First Manassas.
On defence of Harper's Ferry.
On battle of First Manassas.
On leave of absence.
On parting with Stonewall Brigade.
On selection of staff-officer.
On appointment of staff-officer.
On resignation of command.
On defence of Valley.
On threatening Washington.
On fighting on Sunday.
On making "thorough work" of campaign.
On attacking Banks.
On Banks' character.
On obedience of orders.
On qualities of West Virginia troops.
On surrender of Harper's Ferry.
On promotion of officers.
On giving over guns of Army Corps.
On the people of the Valley.
On birth of his daughter.
At Falling Waters.
At First Manassas.
On Romney expedition.
At Front Royal.
At Cross Keys.
At Port Republic.
At Valley Campaign.
At Gaines' Mill.
At Cedar Run.
At Second Manassas.
At Harper's Ferry.
At Boteler's Ford.
On the Rappahannock.
At Bristoe Station.
Military Maxims of.
Use of bayonet.
Cavalry in touch with the enemy.
Strategy of weaker army.
Value of time.
Mystifying and misleading.
A routed army.
Battle against odds.
Point of attack.
Vigour in attack.
Rest on the march.
Concentration of force.
Councils of War.
Reaping fruits of victory,
Meeting superior numbers.
Promotion of officers.
Example to be set by superior officers.
Secret of success in war.
Loss in forced marches.
Narrow escapes of.
Personal characteristics of:.
Absence of show and assumption.
Abstraction, power of.
Accuracy of statement.
Admiration of Lee.
Admiration of Napoleon's genius.
Admiration of Confederate soldier.
On the battlefield.
As a cadet.
At councils of war.
Literal interpretation of the.
Study of the.
Carelessness of comfort.
Careless of popular opinion.
Choice of companions.
Concentration, power of.
Consideration for others.
Coolness under fire.
Decision in emergencies.
Devotion to duty.
Devotion to Virginia.
Devotion to his wife.
Dislike of profanity.
Distaste of show.
Estimate of time.
Fearlessness of responsibility.
Freedom from cant.
Horror of war.
Industry. (See Application).
Information, range of.
Intellectual training for war.
Knowledge of military history.
Love of art.
Love of children.
Love of fighting.
Love of history.
Love of home.
Love of Nature.
Love of peace.
Love of theological discussion.
Love of truth.
Manners. (See Courtesy).
Never knew when he was beaten.
Power of drawing inferences,
Power of expression.
Pride in his soldiers.
Religion on service.
Reticence as regards his achievements.
Sense of honour.
Study, method of.
Study of, and training for, war.
Sunday, observance of.
Taste for strong liquor.
Truthfulness and sincerity.
Practice and principles of, military:.
Care for comfort of men.
Care of private rights.
Care of wounded.
Examination of officers.
Application of military code to volunteers.
Councils of War.
Courtesy to men.
Duties of commanding officers.
Employment of regular officers with volunteers.
Employment of unsuccessful officers.
Encouragement of initiative.
Recommendations for promotion.
Relations with his officers.
Relations with his soldiers.
Relations with his staff.
Scope on battlefield.
Selection of officers for the staff.
Tact and consideration.
Trusts his subordinates.
Dealing with mutiny.
Demands exact obedience.
Gives exact obedience.
Punishment of officers.
Punishment of soldiers.
Refuses to take furlough.
Strict conception of duty.
Standing orders for.