Part 2 out of 11
but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that
hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in,
and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done
in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe
that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation
from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church;
whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that
which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word
of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe,
touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true,
or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History.
For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians,
of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the
Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended;
or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a
Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy.
So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason,
than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings;
whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.
OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS
Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is
valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all
things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized.
And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes
of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves;
and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte; though the same word
Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.
Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall,
I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing
else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another,
and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues.
But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience;
without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE,
consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining,
(that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy
Direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination,
maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly
called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that
signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.
Good Wit, Or Fancy
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of
mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another:
and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another:
and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe
through their imagination. And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts,
there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either
in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be Unlike,
or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose;
Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are
but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which,
in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe
their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing,
and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case,
such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement:
and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein,
times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is
called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help
of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which
is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without
the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places,
and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an
often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say,
to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue,
will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by
illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors;
but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without Steddinesse,
and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse;
such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched
from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought,
into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that they
utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular
name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience;
whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others:
sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore
thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended
way of his discourse.
In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also
in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy
are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please
for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.
In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse
of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place,
but onely in adorning the stile.
In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour;
which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but
suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.
In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best
to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need
to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much
use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded.
For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell,
or Reasoning, were manifest folly.
And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent,
how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be
taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane,
clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame;
which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall
approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian
may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not
to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant,
and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled
into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company.
And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference.
Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company,
a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations of words;
and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy:
but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown,
or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that
will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the
want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy
that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without
Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over
a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe;
or what designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such
as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE;
and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things,
and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much
difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements;
Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall,
as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having
his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome,
are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse;
no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater
then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man
is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller
in the affaires of another man.
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means,
such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have
that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe
of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust,
or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines Call Versutia,
(translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of
a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater,
as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft,
called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie,
for the present payment of interest.
As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,)
there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech;
and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have
already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.
The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions:
and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different
Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education.
For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain,
and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be
no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses,
than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore
from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the
difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference
of customes, and education.
The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit,
are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches,
of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first,
that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but
severall sorts of Power.
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man,
as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either
a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires,
as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the
things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse
of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire,
is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have
Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction;
and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing,
than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from
the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them;
and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by
the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases
the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.
The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse,
is either great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride,
and Selfe-Conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive
desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs,
and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage:
Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration,
for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction,
and Giddinesse: the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion
of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners;
as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour;
and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe,
all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called
by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse,
he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the
Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves,
when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.
(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed
of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man,
by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion;
yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude
is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater,
than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends?
Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they
will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their
lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury.
And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every
particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive
no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured,
that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea,
as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee
perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be
well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious
roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that
bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration
to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should
entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave,
to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility;
and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect
no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.
This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit,
begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally
held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct
of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it,
though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently
admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty,
who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.
Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with
those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of
behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that
of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others laughing,
all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions:
For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation;
and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions.
For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without
care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and
Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen:
which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part
The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages,
concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving
them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good,
or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him,
and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men
use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men:
but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is,
possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is agitated,
or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi,
Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks,
at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day:
whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers,
had this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together,
that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of
Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured,
by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed
from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned
a fit of madnesse in another Graecian city, which seized onely
the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves.
This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that
suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some
Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also
their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as
so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story
sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians,
did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides,
or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods:
so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal
living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans
in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes;
For they calle mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the
spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets,
and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack,
and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases,
and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents,
were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man
was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell.
But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange.
For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession
of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream:
Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which
they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession.
When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was
in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it
for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the
Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse.
And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled with the
Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit
put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own
spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man,
when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit;
and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue
or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the
other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or,
that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream;
and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command.
How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession?
I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men;
namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their
placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of
the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto.
For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in
a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may
probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall,
they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be,
but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him:
but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he
cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser.
And that (John 10. 20.) some said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;"
whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, "These are not
the words of one that hath a Divell." So in the old Testament
he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet;
but some of the company asked Jehu, "What came that mad-man for?"
So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe
in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed
either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces,
who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were
at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;)
and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such
men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them,
as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which
I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to
those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion
of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew
unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their mindes to become
his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof,
to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason.
Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether
the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell,
(so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience,
and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the
Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease,
as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely,
as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak
to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8.26.)
to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.)
to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel.
And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ;
it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that
those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.)
speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man,
wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none;
and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse
than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man,
that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished
by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was.
So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe,
that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men;
which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely,
that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter,
by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words,
as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen
upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received,
and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity.
And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions
of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions
of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men seldome speak
Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons
counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing
correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples;
which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands,
and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point;
as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation;
Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make
the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they
were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar.
What is the meaning of these words. "The first cause does not
necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?"
They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of
Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God.
When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad,
or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of
Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say,
the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude, Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty,
all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body
of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and Ties,
to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits,
they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse
moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity,
may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse;
and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust,
they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals.
And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.
OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact:
the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another.
The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute
Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done:
And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is
called Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that,
If The Figure Showne Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through
The Centre Shall Divide It Into Two Equall Parts. And this is
the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him
that pretends to Reasoning.
The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of
such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will;
Such as are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions,
and the like. The other, is Civill History; which is the History of
the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.
The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the
diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have
divided them in the following Table.
I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY
1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.
a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima
b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined
1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined
a) By Figure, By Number
2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,
b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,
1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight
2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities
a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish
b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent
1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres
a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,
2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
Ayre, or substance aetherial.
3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial
a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables
b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals
1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
a] Consequences from Vision,
b] Consequences from Sounds,
c] Consequences from the rest of the senses
2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall
a] Consequences from Passions of Men,
b] Consequences from Speech,
i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.
ii) In Persuading,
iii) In Reasoning,
iv) In Contracting,
The Science of
JUST and UNJUST
B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY
1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.
2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means,
to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall,
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind:
as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence,
Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired
by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more:
as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God,
which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point,
like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of
heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.
The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the
Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall,
or civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will;
such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills
of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers
factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have Friends,
is Power: for they are strengths united.
Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this
case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.
Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the
adhaerance of those that need protection.
So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,)
for the same Reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many;
or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means
to have the assistance, and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome,
or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power;
because it gaineth love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power;
because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves,
more willingly than to others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.
Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth
men to the favour of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore,
not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them,
but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can
understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory,
are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science,
namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light,
by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with
the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power:
and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and
judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great
Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so.
A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace;
but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men,
not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man
(as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can;
yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which
is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at
a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him.
But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison
to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value
of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command,
Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced
for distinction of such Value.
To Honour and Dishonour
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because
a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more
difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.
To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey,
is to Dishonour.
To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying
of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts,
is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion
of the need of small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good;
also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde.
To neglect, is to Dishonour.
To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour;
being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.
To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour;
for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne,
or lesse to love or feare then he expects, is to Dishonour;
for 'tis undervaluing.
To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing
but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock,
or pitty, is to Dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend.
To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him;
signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe,
is to Dishonour.
To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever,
is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty.
To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.
To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour,
or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because
in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power
which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.
To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving
his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding
of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.
To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve.
To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.
To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.
To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour;
as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment
in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.
All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within,
as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he,
or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever
they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.
A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office,
or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe
of his will to Honour him.
The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should
be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of
the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour."
And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes,
gave him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it
as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour;
such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats,
and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having
so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.
Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.
And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.
Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable;
for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality,
Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from
the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence,
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do,
is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of
little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed
things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference
of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not,
he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from
much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable;
For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour,
Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed
on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power.
But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave,
it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the
steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later,
like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office,
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of
the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity,
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because
they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors.
On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable;
as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power.
On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be
great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,)
be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power.
Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured,
but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems,
committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts:
In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries;
nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises,
in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning,
he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the
Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths,
it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe;
but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks,
but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories
of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world,
private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull,
till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse,
and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are
many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes
Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be
effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one,
or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into
the Lists to avoyd disgrace.
Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any
eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power
consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such
thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour,
commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans.
For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes
were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans
have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went
to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased;
insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of
a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them.
The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the
Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia,
Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing.
The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived
into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they
either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne
parts of the world.
For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords,
or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another;
those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might,
when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers;
and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion,
or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put
some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets.
And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance
to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some
note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch,
the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together,
made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish
Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of
these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part
bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles,
Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War;
nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. Afterwards, not
onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of
Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it,
for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which,
by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories,
Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners,
in their times.
Titles of Honour
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron,
are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the
Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in
old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans,
some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces,
being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the
Generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and
defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones,
were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire.
Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire,
about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of
the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of
the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings,
or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons;
and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified
the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and
thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones,
and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would
know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find
it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise
of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable
government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part,
to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in
the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises,
and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command:
and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man;
and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power,
or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular
ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have
any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required
to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has
the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which
qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man,
and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches,
Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to
have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit
or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the
thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter,
when I shall speak of Contracts.
OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
What Is Here Meant By Manners
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick
his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals;
But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together
in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity
of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied.
For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum
Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old
Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires
are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand.
Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object
to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way
to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire,
is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to
assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to
the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life;
and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity
of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of
the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce
the effect desired.
A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of
all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power,
that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes
that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already
attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power:
but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well,
which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence
it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours
to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when
that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from
new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others,
of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art,
or other ability of the mind.
Love Of Contention From Competition
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth
to Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor,
to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant,
or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise,
enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living,
not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may
obscure the glory of the other.
Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey
a common Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the
protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.
From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the
same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented
with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious
of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre;
and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour
Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game,
as by causing a new shuffle.
And From Love Of Arts
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a
common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure;
and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.
Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please
them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn,
we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same.
And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us
on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the
unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme
torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have
a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the
benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though
they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure
in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.
Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall,
greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to
counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into
the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight
of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never
see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome;
which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits
from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love;
because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull
acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done
to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to
receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as
there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention
of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall;
from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting;
the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor
is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.
And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge,
or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.
Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek
ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can
secure his life and liberty.
And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition,
better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise,
or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be
circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes
in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages
of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from
subtilty of Wit.
Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves
of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men,
are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when
danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have
their insufficiency discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the
flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action,
without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves,
are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger,
or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way
of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved
with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.
Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their
wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined
to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves
Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently
to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action.
For after men have been in deliberation till the time of
action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done,
tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other,
are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion
by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.
Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to
atchieve such actions , as require the strength of many men
at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished
and kept in vigor by Reward.
Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it;
because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse.
Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere,
and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former,
having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives
them caution against danger from others.
And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others.
For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own,
must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.
And From Want Of Understanding
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the
truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more,
the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense,
can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names,
to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions:
As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they
that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more
than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish,
without study and great understanding, between one action of many men,
and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one
action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many
actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore
are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is
a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by
the perswasion of one.
Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right,
Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example
the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust
which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the
impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example,
or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice
barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have
no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction
they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children
are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown
strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason,
and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from
custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves
against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the
cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed,
both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines,
and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject
what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit,
or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary
to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that
have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall
To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been,
if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry,
suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.
Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events,
to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the
causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places,
men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their
anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors,
and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such
as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when
they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification,
fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment,
or shame of receiving pardon.
Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity,
so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know
nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable
to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love
to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that
Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe
to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.
Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the
causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men
the better able to order the present to their best advantage.
Naturall Religion, From The Same
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again,
the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought
at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause,
but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible
to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being
enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they
cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature.
For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves
by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily
conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men
call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot
imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind,
such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of
this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is
a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea,
or Image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes
of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe,
of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm,
are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds
of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations;
and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an
expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures
of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe,
that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the
naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion;
and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do,
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of
those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish,
dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own
invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which
they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make
unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.
Religion, In Man Onely
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely;
there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also
onely in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in
some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.
First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive
into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse;
but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes
of their own good and evill fortune.
From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning,
to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin,
then when it did, rather than sooner or later.
From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things
Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the
enjoying of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little,
or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation,
and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things
they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another;
and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot
assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good
and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes
causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth
to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends,
and wiser than himselfe.
The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come
The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes
of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter;
it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure
himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth,
not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that
every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate
like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted,
is, The Prudent Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of
large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured
in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man,
which looks too far before him, in the care of future time,
hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death,
poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of
his anxiety, but in sleep.
Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance
of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to
accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power,
or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of
the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare:
which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of
the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall,
Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the
desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their
severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was
to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee
seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause
thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe
profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this,
that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed)
one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things;
which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without
thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear,
and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things;
and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be
men that feigne them.
And Suppose Them Incorporeall
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed;
they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt,
but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that
the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth
in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one
that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are
nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall,
and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts;
as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them
Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents,
which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear,
and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits
were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind
of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words
of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall;
yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them:
And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the
acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God,
choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above
their understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall,
and then Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they
give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to
make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him
with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from
the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.
But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents
wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used,
in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that
we call Causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule
to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen
to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before,
without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event,
any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the
like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope
for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no
part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for
their warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in
divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their
fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken,
especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming,
and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe,
they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man,
or any thing, into any thing.
But Honour Them As They Honour Men
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,
as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission
of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words,
Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,)
by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing;
but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies,
to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.
And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events
Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men
the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially
concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or
ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally
at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come,
by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things,
after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter
ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men,
of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.
Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall
for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion;
which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions
of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different,
that those which are used by one man, are for the most part
ridiculous to another.
Made Different By Culture
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men.
One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them,
according to their own invention. The other, have done it,
by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it,
with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more
apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society.
So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques;
and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of
their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine
Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded
themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort,
were all the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers
of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses,
and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us
the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.
The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme
And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions
concerning the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing
that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles,
in one place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned
to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.
The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds,
were so many Gods.
Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion,
a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places,
with spirits called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises,
or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons,
and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name,
and with Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or Familiars;
every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall
Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time,
all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole
kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity,
and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time,
Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health,
Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against,
they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over
their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill,
for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit,
by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune;
their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies;
their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their
pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing,
which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they
did not make either a God, or a Divel.
The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the
second ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes;
and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes,
on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion
to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes,
a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause
of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty
and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus;
and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was
amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.
And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added
their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant
sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,)
thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made,
were really included, and as it were housed within them,
might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them
with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart
from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy
to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains,
and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes,
some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties,
and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust,
Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another,
to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men,
and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven,
as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge,
and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding
from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that
may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure;
and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law,
rather than against Honour.
Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally,
but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall,
divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles,
partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation,
have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination;
and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in
the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos,
Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous
by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating
vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes:
Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes
(like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant
seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books
in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique: Sometimes in
the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed
with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme;
and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy,
or Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity;
which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology:
Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage:
Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference
with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft;
and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the
Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in
the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina:
Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering
of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called
Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words,
called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses,
Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births,
and the like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because
they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come;
Sometimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive;
dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such
vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing,
from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse,
and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.
The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen
And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths
amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in
obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint
in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave
concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their
own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit;
or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls,
that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius
pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans,
from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the
Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the
children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same
things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes.
Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices,
and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of
the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War,
great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans
private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger
from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking
some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the
antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the
Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life;
which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have
in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies
more cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order
to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the
common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect,
or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to
the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors.
And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls,
and publike Gomes, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else
but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion
against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered
the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of
tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe;
unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their
Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden,
but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God)
thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King
or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the
Gentiles was a part of their Policy.
The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same
But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion;
there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes,
not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another;
and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill,
are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall,
and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true,
that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar,
and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein,
than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army,
should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own.
God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people,
he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome
of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following
discourse assigned an other place.
Chap 35 The Causes Of Change In Religion
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand
the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds,
or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers
invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished
out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made
to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such
purpose are in reputation.
For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith
which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only
to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness,
but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth
to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily,
when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have
either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love
suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token
of divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold,
must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword)
contradicted and rejected.
Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that
formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed,
is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts
of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne
the beliefe of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects
the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he
shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation
a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing
against naturall reason.
Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing,
or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what
they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves;
all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous,
because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way
of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury.
For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions,
as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such
Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall,
for lesser faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected
of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others,
conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion,
Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially.
For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought
to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others
Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling,
can be no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy,
(which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore,
to those points of Religion, which have been received from them
that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not
their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what
the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated,
have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement
require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things,
they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before
they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly
appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example
of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved
his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them
out of Egypt, was absent but 40 dayes, revolted from the worship
of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up
(Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the
Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered.
And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which
had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2 11) were dead;
another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles fayling,
Faith also failed.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted
by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly,
the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King,
in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed
out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations.
So that Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed
their God, from reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles
ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians
encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching
of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe,
may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the
Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves,
by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes.
Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same
cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome;
insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith
faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy,
and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men;
from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities,
as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance,
and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them,
either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland;
or with their will, as in England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary
for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of
the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories
of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation
of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude
all forraign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England.
For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth,
to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ,
unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest,
cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage,
or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may
be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King
be judged an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be
deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome
given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars,
in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction
of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to whose
profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory;
with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie
the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate,
and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they
have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers?
So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world,
to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests;
and those not onely amongst Catholiques , but even in that Church
that hath presumed most of Reformation.
OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind;
as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly
stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when
all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man,
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to
himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall,
and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have,
and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us;
nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,)
I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength.
For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes
on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but
a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men
think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame,
or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others
to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will
hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see
their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth
rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is
not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing,
than that every man is contented with his share.
From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the
attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire
the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy,
they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally
their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,)
endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence
it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare,
than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build,
or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected
to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him,
not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.
And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man
to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force,
or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long,
till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is
no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating
their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther
than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad
to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion
increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing
only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation
of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation,
it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale
of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to
over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should
value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all
signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours,
as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power,
to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,)
to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage;
and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes
of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety;
and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make
themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell;
the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word,
a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue,
either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred,
their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
Out Of Civil States,
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without
a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man,
against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely,
or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will
to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre;
as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather,
lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto
of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not
in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
All other time is PEACE.
The Incommodites Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every
man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength,
and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition,
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain;
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use
of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious
Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things
as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth;
no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is
worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death;
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade,
and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe,
when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well
accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even
in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes,
and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him;
what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed;
of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children,
and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much
accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us
accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man,
are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed
from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them;
which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made,
till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time,
nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so,
over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now.
For the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust,
have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner,
as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life
there would be, where there were no common Power to feare;
by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under
a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men
were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings,
and persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency,
are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators;
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of
their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours;
which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby,
the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it,
that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.
In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong,
Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no
common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.
Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues.
Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body,
nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone
in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities,
that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also
to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion,
no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he
can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for
the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in
the Passions, partly in his Reason.
The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death;
Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living;
and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth
convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.
These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature:
whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.
OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS
Right Of Nature What
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale,
is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe,
for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement,
and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification
of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments,
may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would;
but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as
his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.
A Law Of Nature What
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that,
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means
of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh
it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject,
use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be
distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do,
or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them:
so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty;
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent
Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one;
in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is
nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him,
in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth,
that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing;
even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right
of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man,
(how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time,
which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.
The Fundamental Law Of Nature
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason,
"That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he
has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it,
that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre."
The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first,
and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek Peace,
and follow it." The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature;
which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves."
The Second Law Of Nature
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded
to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence
of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men,
as he would allow other men against himselfe." For as long as
every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh;
so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men
will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no
Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were
to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than
to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell;
"Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do
ye to them." And that Law of all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis,
alteri ne feceris."
What it is to lay down a Right
To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe
of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own
Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right,
giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before;
because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature:
but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own
originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance
from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man,
by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of
impediments to the use of his own Right originall.
Renouncing A Right What It Is
Transferring Right What
Obligation Duty Justice
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by
Transferring it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not
to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING;
when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person,
or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned,
or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND,
not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned,
from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his DUTY,
not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such
hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being
before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice,
in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that,
which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity.
For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one
maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice,
and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning
he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply
Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration,
or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,
that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced,