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Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes

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Notes on the E-Text.
This E-text was prepared from the Pelican Classics edition of Leviathan,
which in turn was prepared from the first edition. I have tried to
follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the flavour
of the text that Hobbes himself proof-read, but the following differences
were unavoidable.

Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis,
for proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just because.

The original has very extensive margin notes, which are used
to show where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts, to give
in short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing with, and to
give references to his quotations, largely but not exclusively biblical.
To some degree, these margin notes seem to have been intended to serve
in place of an index, the original having none. They are all in italics.

He also used italics for words in other languages than English, and there
are a number of Greek words, in the Greek alphabet, in the text.

To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ASCII,
I have done the following in this E-text.

I have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places
where Hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which I have
fully capitalized, where Hobbes used a mixture of full capitalization
and italics.

Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is quoting,
I have introduced quotation marks. Within quotation marks I have
retained the capitalization that Hobbes used.

Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper names,
or just because, I have capitalized the initial letter of the words.
This has the disadvantage that they are not then distinguished
from those that Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but the extent
of his italics would make the text very ugly if I was to use an
underscore or slash.

Where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph subject,
or to show where he introduces word definitions, I have included them
as headers to the paragraph, again with all words having initial capitals,
and on a shortened line.

For margin references to quotes, I have included them in the text,
in brackets immediately next to the quotation. Where Hobbes included
references in the main text, I have left them as he put them,
except to change his square brackets to round.

For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted the nearest
ordinary letters that I can, and I have used initial capitals
for foreign language words.

Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had many
inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. I have tried to reproduce
both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of quotation marks.

In preparing the text, I have found that it has much more meaning
if I read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than trying
to read silently. Hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric
punctuation and construction seem then to work.

Edward White edwud@telus.net
Canada Day 2002

by Thomas Hobbes

By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury.

Printed for Andrew Crooke,
at the Green Dragon
in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651.



Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived,
was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me,
as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in
themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person.
For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the
service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society,
or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his
conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion,
but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.
Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your
selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth.
I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on
those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that
contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too
much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded.
But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should
not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending
it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak not
of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those
simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their
noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)
offending none, I think, but those without, or such within
(if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend,
are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose
than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due
submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are
the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power.
If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may
be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say that I am a man that love
my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother,
and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title
(without your knowledge) of being, as I am,


Your most humble, and most obedient servant,
Thomas Hobbes.

Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.




























































Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is
by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,
that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a
motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within;
why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves
by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life?
For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings;
and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body,
such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further,
imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH,
or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man;
though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty
is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body;
The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution,
artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat
of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi
(the Peoples Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things
needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory;
Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health;
Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and
Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made,
set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man,
pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.

Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights
and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that
Preserveth and Dissolveth it.

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late,
That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men.
Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can
give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what
they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one
another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late
understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another,
if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self:
which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either
the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors;
or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards
their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts,
and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,
whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth,
when he does Think, Opine, Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds;
he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions
of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude
of Passions, which are the same in all men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c;
not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions, which are the things
Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall,
and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept
from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and
confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting,
and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.
And though by mens actions wee do discover their designee sometimes;
yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing
all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered,
is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived,
by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads,
is himselfe a good or evill man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly,
it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few.
He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this,
or that particular man; but Man-kind; which though it be hard to do,
harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have
set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another,
will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himselfe.
For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.




Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly,
and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another.
Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence,
of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us;
which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on
the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity
of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there
is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally,
or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are
derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to
the business now in hand; and I have els-where written of
the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method,
I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which
presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly,
as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing,
and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other
strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain,
and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure,
or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour
because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this Seeming,
or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye,
in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,
in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest
of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities,
as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible,
are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions
of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in
us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions;
(for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to
us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing,
or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare,
produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce
the same by their strong, though unobserved action, For if those
Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them,
they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes
by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see,
is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at some
certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with
the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing,
the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases,
is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said)
by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things
upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome,
grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine;
and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth
on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition,
or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing.
And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth
an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen;
which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of
Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth
Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen;
which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand.
I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because
I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must
let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended
in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.



That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it,
it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of.
But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion,
unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same,
(namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to.
For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves:
and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain,
and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion,
and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether
it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find
in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say,
Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve
their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing
appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation,
(which is more than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els
hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant,
but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see
in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling
for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is
made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c.
For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain
an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.
And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made
in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses.
But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and is as proper
to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but
Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures,
as well sleeping, as waking.

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion
made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light
of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no
less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day,
than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes,
eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant
onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant,
we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being
removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain;
yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us,
the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce
of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth,
that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object,
the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body,
destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that the
distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us.
For as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme,
and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak,
and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of
the Past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of Cities wee have seen,
many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances.
This Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self,
(I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before;
But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading,
old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory,
are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience.
Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly
perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times;
The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was
presented to the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth
a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded;
as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another,
we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the
image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man;
as when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander,
(which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants)
it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.
There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking)
from the great impression made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun,
the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long
time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon
Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake)
have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of
Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not
commonly fall into mens discourse.

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams.
And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before,
either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense,
the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense,
are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action
of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination;
and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of
the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion
they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered,
do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made,
appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense
being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master
and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs
be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts.
And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many
thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming.
For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often,
nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that
I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming,
as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity
of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts;
I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not;
though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.
And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare,
and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object
(the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the
inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that as Anger
causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake;
so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger,
and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy.
In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake
causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts
of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep,
raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn.
In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations;
The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream,
at another.

Apparitions Or Visions
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts,
is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept:
which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts;
and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth,
without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes,
as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains,
and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and
exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream.
We read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius
Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,)
how at Phillipi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar,
he saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians
as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge
to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and
troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him,
slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him;
which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make
the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept,
he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision.
And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake,
if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales,
and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe
they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards;
whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons,
as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night,
to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies,
from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of
the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs,
and the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries,
Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches,
I think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that
they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can
do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can;
their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science.
And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been
on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use
of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions
of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make
unnaturall Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men need
to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change,
of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change,
is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext
that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing
when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part
of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes
that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear
of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams,
false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which,
crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much
more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),
what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise
of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly
from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man,
by God; and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are
powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell.
Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to
the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy,
and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement,
like handing of things from one to another, with many words making
nothing understood.

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued
with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes,
is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast.
For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of
his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which
is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his
conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names
of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech:
And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.



By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession
of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from
Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after,
is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought
to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination,
whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts;
so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we
never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this.
All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense:
And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense,
continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming
again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth,
by coherence of the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain
Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.
But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes
one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time,
that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what
we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something
that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts.
The first is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is
no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow,
to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion:
In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one
to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men,
that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing;
though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times,
but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld
to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this
wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it,
and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse
of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent,
than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny?
Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the
warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies;
The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ;
and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price
of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question;
and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire,
and designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire,
or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of
quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep.
From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce
the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that,
the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come
to some beginning within our own power. And because the End,
by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our
thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way:
which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men
this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice Finem; that is to say,
in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing
that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of
an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it:
and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining
any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can
by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it,
when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe,
but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the
nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall,
such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse
of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking,
or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas,
and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect,
present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.
sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time,
wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place,
and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say,
to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin
a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over
the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion
might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind:
the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning
of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof
his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell;
or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man
should run over the alphabet, to start a rime.

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then
he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof
one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions.
As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has
seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts,
The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes.
Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence,
or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture,
through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious.
But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of
things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent,
and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely
has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely,
but things To Come have no being at all; the Future being but a
fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past,
to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done
by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough.
And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation;
yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight
of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him
by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally,
proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser;
and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters
he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily,
the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have
been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed,
the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most
experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at
the Future time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more
prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to
be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit:
though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from
the Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past
taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath
seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come
into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines
of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses
have been there also. But his conjecture, has the same incertainty
almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded
onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it,
but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses.
Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which
seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and
industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline;
and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides
Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man
has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method,
the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to
distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea,
or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in
his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends,
and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing,
but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used,
not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his
greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him.
Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived
first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought,
representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore
can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place;
and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided
into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another
place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one,
and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have,
or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit
(without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers,
and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.



Originall Of Speech
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that
found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into
Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia.
A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past,
and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant
regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a
watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat,
Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences
of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable
invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or
Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts;
recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another
for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been
amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace,
no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author
of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such
creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth
no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him
to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should
give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees,
as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for;
though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of.
For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which,
directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught
the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies,
Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive,
all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality,
Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.
And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts
of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that
now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need
(the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time
grew every where more copious.

The Use Of Speech
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse,
into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words;
and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the
Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory,
and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words
as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve
for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use
the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,)
one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter;
and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for.
and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech
are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be
the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present
or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts.
Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained;
which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known
to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help
of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others,
by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech
To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses.
First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy
of the signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense
than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others.
Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature
hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns,
and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech,
to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged
to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names,
and the Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things;
as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name,
is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of
all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing
in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one
of them Individual and Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude
in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name
bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent;
the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body
is of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it;
and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending
mutually one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name
is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes
by circumlocution many words together. For all these words,
Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country,
make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of
things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences
of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech
at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,)
if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles,
(such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation
compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall
to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle
be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know
without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be
equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes,
that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides,
nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this,
that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all,
for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally,
that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever;
and register his invention in these generall termes, Every Triangle Hath
Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the consequence
found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred,
as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning,
of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind,
saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now,
to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing
so evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn
by heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three,
may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one,
one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems,
there was a time when those names of number were not in use;
and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands,
to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence
it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation,
and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that
can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe,
and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add,
and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique.
So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers;
much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things,
the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being
of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation;
as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man,
He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature,
signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation,
or consequence is True; otherwise False. For True and False are
attributes of Speech, not of things. And where Speech in not,
there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be,
as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been:
but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names
in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to
remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly;
or els he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs;
the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry,
(which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow
on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words;
which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them
in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires
to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors;
and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down;
or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply
themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into
absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning
anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours.
From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they
that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering
whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last
finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds,
know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering
over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding
themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of
a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in.
So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech;
which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions'
lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets;
which make those men that take their instruction from the authority
of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the
condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it.
For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in
the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity.
Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language;
so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible
without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or
(unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs)
excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but
reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by
the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other
Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject To Names
Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered
in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe;
or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines
called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio:
and that which we in bills or books of account call Items,
they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed,
that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in
all other things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech
and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason;
but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called
syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of
one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into
account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity)
diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be
reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names
the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some
accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved,
for Being So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of
the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name
for that accident, which we consider; and for Living put into account
Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like.
And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties,
by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another.
These are called Names Abstract; Because Severed (not from Matter, but)
from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us,
we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea
of it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not;
but the Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception
of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names,
to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall,
Speciall, Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation,
Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration,
and many other such, are names of Speeches.

Use Of Names Positive
And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man,
as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies,
the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names With Their Uses.
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like;
which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning;
and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of
any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words Insignificant
All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition;
whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations
are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body,
or (which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which
it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all.
For example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round,
the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound.
So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred,
or blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue,
are as absurd and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore
you shall hardly meet with a senselesse and insignificant word,
that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome
hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name
of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that
one is Latin, the other French.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts
which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained
and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it;
Understanding being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech.
And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,)
then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd
and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be
no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they
do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and
Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak
when I have spoken of the Passions.

Inconstant Names
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please,
and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with
the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common
discourses of men, of Inconstant signification. For seeing all names
are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections
are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently,
we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of
that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it,
in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion,
gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And therefore
in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides the
signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition,
and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues,
and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare;
and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another
Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c. And therefore
such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can
Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous,
because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.



Reason What It Is
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall,
from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction
of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,)
is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts,
to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one
part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things,
(as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other
operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same;
for Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall;
and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can.
These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to
all manner of things that can be added together, and taken
one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and
substract in Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines,
Figures (solid and superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times,
degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power, and the like; The Logicians
teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding together Two Names,
to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to make a syllogisme;
and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe,
or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition,
to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions,
to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to find what
is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what
matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction,
there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place,
there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Reason Defined
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,)
what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it
amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense,
is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the
Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and
Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon
by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our
reckonings to other men.

Right Reason Where
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors
themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any
other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most
practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions;
Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as
Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason,
nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie;
no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great
many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when
there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their
own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator,
or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided,
for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also
in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves
wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge;
yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other
mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men,
as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion,
that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els,
that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them,
to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies:
bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use Of Reason
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe,
and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first
definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin
at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can
be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those
Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred.
As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up
the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding
how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account;
nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no more,
than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every
of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of
all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors,
and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning,
(which are the significations of names settled by definitions),
loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

Of Error And Absurdity
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done
in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing,
wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely
to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow,
followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it,
hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most
prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall
signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false;
though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY,
or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming
that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past,
or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable.
But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one,
the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby
we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd,
insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should
talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese;
or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will;
or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not
say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning;
that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell
all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any
thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it,
and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other
degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the
consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes,
or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number;
but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted
from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the
priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject,
but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it,
that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth
of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be
found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest.
For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from
the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use;
which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose
Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

Causes Of Absurditie
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;
in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is,
from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account,
without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion,
and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving
of names of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies;
As they do, that say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing
can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing, but body; and that,
Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents
of Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies;
as they do that say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names,
or Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall;
that A Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches;
as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition;
A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures,
in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example)
in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither,
The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go,
nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth,
such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up,
and learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall
into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account;
wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men
by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles.
For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to
persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory,
borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is;
but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names;
and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding
from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion
of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the
Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge
of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand;
and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are
but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable;
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do,
we know how to do something els when we will, or the like,
another time; Because when we see how any thing comes about,
upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come
into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures,
for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come.
And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a
little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them
to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves,
some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience,
quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially
according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another.
For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are
so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have
thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been
taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see
how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children,
that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women,
that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition
with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning,
or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd
generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set
men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking
for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather
causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity;
Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit
of man-kind, the End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse
and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them,
is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end,
contention, and sedition, or contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience.
For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both;
yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and
Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science.
But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose
one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity
in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity,
an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by
his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of
the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to
Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that
trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly,
are like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence,
ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills,
or disgraces him.

Signes Of Science
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach
the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously
to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer
to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must.
Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience,
and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible.
But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to
proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by
generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions,
is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry.
And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth,
love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in
their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned;
having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique
they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe
of anothers businesse.



Motion Vitall And Animal
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them:
One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without
interruption through their whole life; such as are the Course
of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition,
Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination:
The other in Animal Motion, otherwise called Voluntary Motion;
as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in such manner as
is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs
and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things
we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same
Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first
and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like
Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of
Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is
the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although
unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there,
where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in,
is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder,
but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little,
that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one
is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings
of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking,
speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly

Appetite Desire
Hunger Thirst Aversion
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it,
is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name;
and the other, oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food,
namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward
something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite,
and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them
signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring.
So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme.
For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths,
which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature,
they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go,
or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they
must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but
an absurd speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall;
Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE
those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire,
and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie
the Absence of the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence
of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate,
the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food,
Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly
be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and
some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects
upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all,
or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try.
But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us;
but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne:
CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart,
in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that
the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects;
or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation;
it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him
the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent,
in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

Good Evill
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it,
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,
and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.
For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used
with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill,
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from
the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or,
(in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it;
or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by
consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

Pulchrum Turpe
Delightfull Profitable
Unpleasant Unprofitable
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach
to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same;
And those are Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that,
which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later,
that, which promiseth evill. But in our Tongue we have not so
generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in
some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant,
or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed,
Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require;
All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els,
but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill.
So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise,
that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called
Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile,
Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that
they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant,
Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Delight Displeasure
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before)
onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence;
to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill,
Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from
the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there
is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite,
or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense
of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure Offence
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion,
and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight,
were not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or
fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering,
and troubling the motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good;
and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill.
And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied
with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion,
with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasures Of Sense
Pleasures Of The Mind
Joy Paine Griefe
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present;
And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall,
as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place
till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations
of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing,
Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds
from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things
in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind
of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY.
In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE;
others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified.
As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from
the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire.
Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the
consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration
or succession it selfe.

For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same
to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY.
If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in signification
of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one
anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed,
or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in
the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of
things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

as it is liked or disliked.

Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust
Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.

Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of
Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love
Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved,
THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not
mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact

Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living
creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason;
but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the
appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable
generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any
carnall Pleasure.

Religion Superstition
True Religion
Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined
from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, superstition.
And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour
Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR;
called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them;
whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first,
some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example;
every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion
happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man,
because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory
Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability,
is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which,
if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions,
is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others,
or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,
is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing
of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident
to young men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of
Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory Laughter
Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER;
and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them;
or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison
whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them,
that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced
to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections
of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a
signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is,
to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely
with the most able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping
On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion that causeth
WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some
vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most
subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are
Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends;
Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to
their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away.
For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame Blushing
Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME,
or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth
in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men,
is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable:
in old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late,
not commendable.

The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from
the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe;
and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this
present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving
from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty;
and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think
themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which
men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation Envy
Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other
good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to
equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to
supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares,
concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good
and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded,
come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an
Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be
able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum
of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because
manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to
be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such
Deliberation vaine. But of things impossible, which we think possible,
we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called
DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had
of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares
is no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore
Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then
wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our
Appetite, or Aversion.

The Will
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately
adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that
wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing.
And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will.
The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles,
that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were,
then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act
is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead
of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from
a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I
have given here. Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating.
And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to
do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is
properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary;
because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination,
or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any action Voluntary,
then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions should make
the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action should be
both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their
beginning from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites
to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning
from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission,
are Voluntary Actions.

Formes Of Speech, In Passion
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed,
are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we
express our Thoughts. And first generally all Passions may be
expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate,
I Will, I Command: but some of them have particular expressions
by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be
when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion
they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively;
which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their
consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow;
and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that
Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part
is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion,
is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the party
is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer;
or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation,
Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know,
there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It,
When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of
the Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like,
do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not;
because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them,
have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present,
are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions,
and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

Good And Evill Apparent
And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised
by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the
action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof
dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences,
of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so
far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater
than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent
or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good,
the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience,
or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences,
Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give the
best counsel unto others.

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from
time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering,
is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life.
For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind,
while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never
be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense.
What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him,
a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are
as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical Vision,
is unintelligible.

Praise Magnification
The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and
greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the
opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much
is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the



Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last
an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of
Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Judgement, or Sentence Final
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts
that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been,
and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off
the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption
of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been.
All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite,
in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate
Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future.
And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will,
so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future,
is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him
that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate,
in the question of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole
chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False
is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact,
past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally,
Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence,
which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute,
but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that,
is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that
if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be,
That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the
consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing,
to another name of the same thing.

Science Opinion Conscience
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins
with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same
into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes,
the end or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought
of the mind by it signified is that conditional Knowledge,
or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called Science.
But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions,
or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes,
then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth
of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words,
without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men,
know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it
one to another; which is as much as to know it together.
And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another,
or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act,
for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force
another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always
hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use
of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own
secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically
said that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all,
men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never
so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those
their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they
would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them;
and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most
but that they think so.

Beliefe Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth
either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still
called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another,
of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving,
he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning
the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH:
Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of
what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of
the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In,
or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely,
an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is Said,
signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are
to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In;
and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings
of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him;
I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi:
and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this singularity of the
Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many disputes about the
right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust
in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine.
For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God,
as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it,
or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any
person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying
whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from
the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason,

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