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History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States by Edumud G. Ross

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not only a misdemeanor per se, but declared to be so by the act
itself, and the party made indictable and punishable in a
criminal proceeding. If Andrew Johnson escapes with bare removal
from office, if he be not FINED AND INCARCERATED IN THE
PENITENTIARY AFTERWARD UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, he may thank
the weakness or the clemency of Congress and not his own
innocence.

We shall propose to prove on the trial that Andrew Johnson was
guilty of misprision of bribery by offering to General Grant, if
he would unite with him in his lawless violence, to assume in his
stead the penalties and to endure the imprisonment denounced by
the law Bribery is one of the offenses specifically enumerated
for which the President may be impeached and removed from office.
By the Constitution, article two, section two, the President has
power to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to appoint all officers of the United States whose
appointments are not therein otherwise provided for and which
shall be established by law, and to fill up all vacancies that
may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting
commissions which shall expire at the end of their nest session.
Nowhere, either in the Constitution or by statute, has the
President power to create a vacancy during the session of the
Senate and fill it without the advice and consent of the Senate,
and yet, on the 21st day of February, 1868, while the Senate was
in session, he notified the head of the War Department that he
was removed from office and his successor ad interim appointed.
Here is a plain, recorded violation of the Constitution and laws,
which, if it stood alone, would make every honest and intelligent
man give his vote for impeachment. The President had persevered
in his lawless course through along series of unjustifiable acts.
When the so called Confederate States of America were conquered
and had laid down their arms and surrendered their territory to
the victorious Union the government and final disposition of the
conquered country BELONGED TO CONGRESS ALONE, according to every
principle of the law of nations.

Neither the Executive nor the judiciary had any right to
interfere with it except so far as was necessary to control it by
military rule until the SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION had
provided for its civil administration. No power but Congress had
any right to say WHETHER EVER OR WHEN they should be admitted to
the Union as States and entitled to the privileges of the
Constitution of the United States. And yet Andrew Johnson, with
unblushing hardihood, undertook to rule them by his own power
alone; to lead them into full communion with the Union: direct
them what governments to erect and what constitutions to adopt,
and to send Representatives and Senators to Congress according to
his instructions. When admonished by express act of Congress,
more than once repeated, he disregarded the warning and continued
his lawless usurpation. He is since known to have obstructed the
re-establishment of those governments by the authority of
Congress, and has advised the inhabitants to resist the
legislation of Congress. In my judgment his conduct with regard
to that transaction was a high-handed usurpation of power which
ought long ago to have brought him to impeachment and trial and
to have removed him from his position of great mischief.

I trust that when we come to vote upon this question we shall
remember that although it is the duty of the President to see
that the laws be executed, THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE NATION
RESTS IN CONGRESS, who have been placed around the executive as
muniments to defend his rights, and as watchmen to enforce his
obedience to the law and the Constitution. His oath to obey the
Constitution and our duty to compel him to do it are a tremendous
obligation, heavier than was ever assumed by mortal rulers. We
are to protect or to destroy the liberty and happiness of a
mighty people. and to take care that they progress in
civilization and defend themselves against every kind of tyranny.
As we deal with the first great political malefactor so will be
the result of our efforts to perpetuate the happiness and good
government of the human race. The God of our fathers, who
inspired them with the thought of universal freedom, will hold us
responsible for the noble institutions which they projected and
expected us to carry out.

The Clerk then read the Resolution and the House proceeded to
vote, as follows:

Resolution providing for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States:

Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be
impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.

Yeas--Messrs. Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell, Delos R. Ashley,
James M. Ashley, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Beaman, Beatty,
Benton, Bingham, Blaine, Blair, Boutwell, Bromwell, Broomall.
Buckland, Butler, Cake, Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney
Clarke, Cobb, Coburn, Cook, Cornell, Covode, Cullom, Dawes,
Dodge, Driggs, Eckley, Eggleston, Eliot, Farnsworth, Ferries.
Ferry, Fields, Gravely, Griswold, Halsy, Harding, Higby, Hill,
Hooper, Hopkins, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D. Hubbard, Hulburd,
Hunter, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Judd, Julian, Kelley, Kelsey,
Ketcham, Kitchen Laflin, George V. Lawrence, William Lawrence,
Lincoln, Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Mallory, Marvin,
McCarthy, McClurg, Mercur, Miller, Moore, Moorhead, Morrell,
Mullins, Myers, Newcomb, Nunn, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Perham,
Peters, Pike, Pile, Plants, Poland, Polsley, Price, Raum,
Robertson, Sawyer, Schenck, Scofield, Selye, Shanks, Smith,
Spalding, Starkweather, Aaron F. Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens,
Stokes, Taffe, Taylor, Trowbridge, Twitchell, Upson, Van Aernam.
Burt Van Horn, Van Wyck, Ward, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B.
Washburn, Williams, Washburn, Welker, Thomas Williams, James F.
Wilson, John T. Wilson, Stephen F. Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge and
the Speaker--126.

Nays--Messrs. Adams, Archer, Axtell, Barnes, Barnum, Beck, Boyer,
Brooks, Burr, Cary, Chanler, Eldridge, Fox, Getz, Glossbrenner,
Galladay, Grover, Haight, Holman, Hotchkiss, Richard D. Hubbard,
Morrissey, Mungen, Niblack, Nicholson, Phelps, Pruyn, Randall,
Ross, Sitgreaves, Stewart, Stone, Taber, Lawrence S. Trimble, Van
Auken, Van Trump, Wood and Woodward--47.

On motion of Mr. Stevens the following resolutions were adopted:

Resolved, That a committee of two be appointed to go to the
Senate and, at the bar thereof, in the name of the House of
Representatives and of all the people of the United States, to
impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high
crimes and misdemeanors in office, and acquaint the Senate that
the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit
particular articles of impeachment against him and make good the
same; and that the committee do demand that the Senate take order
for the appearance of said Andrew Johnson to answer to said
impeachment.

Resolved, That a committee of seven be appointed to prepare and
report articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, with power to send for persons, papers and
records, and to take testimony under oath.

The Speaker announced the following committee under these
resolutions:

Committee to Communicate to the Senate to the Senate the action
of the House ordering AN IMPEACHMENT of the of the President
of the United States.---Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, and
John A. Bingham, of Ohio.

Committee to declare articles of Articles of Impeachment against
the President of the United States.--George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts; Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania; John A.
Bingham, of Ohio; James F. Wilson, of Iowa; John A. Logan, of
Illinois; George W. Julian, of Indiana, and Hamilton Ward, of New
York.

CHAPTER VII. IMPEACHMENT REPORTED TO THE SENATE.

THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWER.

On February 25th, 1868, Messrs. Stevens and Bingham, a committee
of the House, appeared at the bar of the Senate, and Mr. Stevens
said:

Mr. President, in obedience to the order of the House of
Representatives, we appear before you, and in the name of the
House of Representatives and of all the people of the United
States, we do impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office; and we further
inform the Senate that the House of Representatives will in due
time exhibit particular articles of impeachment against hint and
make good the same; and in their name we demand that the Senate
take order for the appearance of said Andrew Johnson to answer
said impeachment.

The committee retired, and after debate the following resolution
was adopted by the Senate:

Resolved, That the Message of the House of Representatives
relating to the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. President of the
United States, be referred to a select committee of seven, to
consider and report thereon.

On the 26th, Mr. Howard, from the select committee appointed to
consider and report upon the Message of the House of
Representatives in relation to the impeachment of Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, reported the following
resolution:

Whereas, the House of Representatives. on the 25th day of the
present month, by two of their members, Messrs. Thaddeus Stevens
and John A. Bingham, at the bar of the Senate, impeached Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States. of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office, and informed the Senate that the House of
Representatives will in due time exhibit particular articles of
impeachment against him and make good the same; and likewise
demanded that the Senate take order for the appearance of said
Andrew Johnson, to answer to the said impeachment: Therefore,

Resolved, That the Senate will take proper order thereon, of
which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.

On the 28th, Mr. Howard, of the Select Committee appointed to
prepare rules for the government of trials of impeachment,
reported a series of rules, which were adopted by the Senate on
March 2nd, after a three days debate.

On the same day, the following gentlemen were elected by the
House of Representatives as Managers to conduct the prosecution
of the impeachment of the President before the Senate

Hons. Jno. A. Bingham, of Ohio; George S. Boutwell, of
Massachusetts; James F. Wilson, of Iowa; Benj. F. Butler, of
Massachusetts; John A. Logan, of Illinois; Thomas Wilson, of
Pennsylvania, and Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania.

On March 3rd it was ordered by the Senate:

That the Secretary of the Senate inform the House of
Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the managers
appointed by the House of Representatives to carry to the Senate
articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States.

In the Senate, on the 4th, the following formal proceedings were
had:

The managers of the impeachment on the part of the House of
Representatives appeared at the bar, and their presence was
announced by the Sergeant-at-Arms.

The President pro tempore: The managers of the impeachment will
advance within the bar and take the seats provided for them.

The managers came within the bar and took the seats assigned to
them in the area in front of the Vice President's Chair.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives advanced and took a
seat on the right of the President pro tempore of the Senate.

Mr. Manager Bingham:

Mr. President, the managers on the part of the House of
Representatives, by order of the House, are ready at the bar of
the Senate, whenever it may please the Senate to hear them, to
present articles of impeachment and in maintenance of the
impeachment preferred against Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, by the House of Representatives.

The President pro tempore:

The Sergeant-at-arms will make proclamation.

The Sergeant-at-arms:

Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silence, on
pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is
exhibiting to the Senate of the United States, articles of
impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States.

The managers then rose and remained standing, with the exception
of Mr. Stevens, who was too feeble to do so, while Mr. Manager
Bingham read the articles of impeachment, as follows:

Articles exhibited by the. House of Representatives of the United
States. in the name of themselves and all the people of the
United States, against Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, in maintenance and support of their impeachment against
him for high crimes and misdemeanors in ofce.

ARTICLE I.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the
21st day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred
and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia,
unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of
office, and of the requirement of the Constitution that he should
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, did unlawfully,
and in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United
States issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M.
Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War,
said Edwin M. Stanton having been theretofore duly appointed and
commissioned by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of
the United States, as such secretary, and said Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, on the twelfth day of August in
the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and during
the recess of said Senate, having suspended by his order Edwin M.
Stanton from said office, and within twenty days after the first
day of the next meeting of said Senate, that is to say, on the
twelfth day of December in the year last aforesaid having
reported to said Senate such suspension with the evidence and
reasons for his action in the case and the name of the person
designated to perform the duties of such office temporarily until
the next meeting of the Senate, and said Senate thereafterwards,
on the thirteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord
eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, having duly considered the
evidence and reasons reported by said Andrew Johnson for said
suspension, and having refused to concur in said suspension,
whereby and by force of the provisions of an act entitled "An Act
regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March
second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, said Edwin M. Stanton
did forthwith resume the functions of his office, whereof the
said Andrew Johnson had then and there due notice, and said Edwin
M. Stanton, by reason of the premises, on said 21st day of
February, being lawfully entitled to hold said office of
Secretary for the Department of War, which said order for the
removal of said Edwin M. Stanton is in substance as follows, that
is to say:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:--By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and laws of the United States you
are hereby removed from office as Secretary for the Department of
War, and your functions as such will terminate upon the receipt
of this communication.

You will transfer to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas,
Adjutant General of the army, who has this day been authorized
and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records.
books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and
charge.

Respectfully yours,
Andrew Johnson.
To the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Washington, D. C.

Which order was unlawfully issued with intent then and there to
violate the act entitled "An Act regulating the tenure of certain
civil offices," passed March 2d, 1867, and with the further
intent contrary to the provisions of said act, in violation
thereof, and contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States, and without the advice and consent of the
Senate of the United States, the said Senate then and there being
in session, to remove said Edwin M. Stanton from the office of
Secretary for the Department of War, the said. Edwin M. Stanton
being then and there Secretary for the Department of War, and
being then and there in the due and lawful execution and
discharge of the duties of said office, whereby said Andrew
Johnson. President of the United States, did then and there
commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE II.

That on the said twenty-first of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington,
in the District of Columbia, said Andrew Johnson, President of
the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office, of
his oath of office, and in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled
"An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed
March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, without the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, said
Senate then and there being in session, and without authority of
law, did, with intent to violate the Constitution of the United
States, and the act aforesaid, issue and deliver to one Lorenzo
Thomas a letter of authority in substance as follows, that is to
say:

Executive Mansion.
Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.

Sir:--The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from
office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby
authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim,
and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties
pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the
records, books, papers, and other public property now in his
custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.
To Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas. Adjutant General U. S.
Army, Washington, D. C.

Then and there being no vacancy in said offce of Secretary for
the Department of War, whereby said Andrew Johnson. President of
the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a
high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE III.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the
twenty-first day of February, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the
District of Columbia, did commit and was guilty of a high
misdemeanor in office in this, that, without authority of law,
while the Senate of the United States was then and there in
session, he did appoint one Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary for
the Department of War ad interim, without the advice and consent
of the Senate, and with intent to violate the Constitution of the
United States, and no vacancy having happened in said office of
Secretary for the Department of War during the recess of the
Senate, and no vacancy existing in said office at the time, and
which said appointment, so made by said Andrew Johnson, of said
Lorenzo Thomas, is in substance as follows, that is to say:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.
Sir:--The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from
office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby
authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim,
and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties
pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton, has been instructed to transfer to you all the
records. books, papers, and other public property now in his
custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.
To Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General, U. S.
Army, Washington, D. C

ARTICLE IV.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of
office, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United
States, on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington,
in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one
Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons to the House of
Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation and
threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then
and there the Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed
under the laws of the United Stales, from holding said office of
Secretary for the Department of War, contrary to and in violation
of the Constitution of the United States, and of the provisions
of an act entitled "An act to define and punish certain
conspiracies," approved July thirty-first, eighteen hundred and
sixty-one, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high crime
in office.

ARTICLE V.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of
office. on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, and on divers
other days and times in said year, before the second day of
March, in the year, of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did
unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other
persons to the House of Representatives unknown, to prevent and
hinder the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the
tenure of certain civil offces," passed March second, eighteen
hundred and sixty-seven, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, did
unlawfully attempt to prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there
being Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed and
commissioned under the laws of the United States, from holding
said office, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the
Unite States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high
misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE VI.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of
office, on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington,
in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one
Lorenzo Thomas by force to seize, take and possess the property
of the United States in the Department of War, and then and there
in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary for
said Department, contrary to the provisions of an act entitled
"An act to define and punish certain conspiracies," approved July
thirty-one, eighteen hundred and sixty one, and with intent to
violate and disregard an act entitled "An act regulating the
tenure of certain civil offices," passed March second, eighteen
hundred and sixty-seven, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, did then and there commit a high crime in
office.

ARTICLE VII.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of
office, on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington.
in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one
Lorenzo Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, and possess
the property of the United States in the Department of War, in
the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton Secretary for said
Department, with intent to violate and disregard the act entitled
"An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices" passed
March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, whereby said
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and
there commit a high misdemeanor in office.

ARTICLE VIII.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of
office, with intent unlawfully to control the disbursements of
the moneys appropriated for the military service and for the
Department of War, on the twenty-first day of February, in the
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at
Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully and
contrary to the provisions of an act entitled "An act regulating
the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March second,
eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, and without the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States, and while the Senate
was then and there in session, there being no vacancy in the
office of Secretary for the Department of War, and with intent to
violate and disregard the act aforesaid, then and there issue and
deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority in writing,
in substance as follows, that is to say:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 21, 1868.

Sir:--The Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from
office as Secretary for the Department of War, you are hereby
authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim,
and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties
pertaining to that office.

Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the
records, books, papers, and other public property now in his
custody and charge.

Respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.
To Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General, United
States Army, Washington, D. C.

Whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did
then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in
office.

ARTICLE IX.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States. on the
twenty-second day of February, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the
District of Columbia. in disregard of the Constitution, and the
laws of the United States duly enacted, as commander-in-chief of
the army of the United States, dial bring before himself then and
there William H. Emory, a major-general by brevet in the army of
the United States, actually in command of the department of
Washington and the military forces thereof, and did then and
there, as such commander-in-chief, declare to and instruct said
Emory that part of a law of the United states, passed March
second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven entitled "An act making
appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending
June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight and for other
purposes," especially the second section thereof, which provides,
among other things, that "all orders and instructions relating to
military operations. issued by the President or Secretary of War,
shall be issued through the General of the army, and, in case of
his inability, through the next in rank," was unconstitutional,
and in contravention of the commission of said Emory, and which
said provision of law had been theretofore duly and legally
promulgated by General Orders for the government and direction of
the army of the United States, as the said Andrew Johnson then
and there well knew. with intent thereby to induce said Emory, in
his official capacity as commander of the department of
Washington, to violate the provisions of said act, and to take
and receive, act upon, and obey such orders as he, the said
Andrew Johnson, might make and give, and which should not be
issued through the General of the army of the United States,
according to the provisions of said act, and with the further
intent thereby to enable him, the said Andrew Johnson, to prevent
the execution of the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure
of certain civil offices," passed March second eighteen hundred
and sixty-seven and to unlawfully prevent Edwin M. Stanton then
being Secretary for the Department of War, from holding said
office and discharging the duties thereof, whereby said Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there
commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And the House of Representatives by protestation saving to
themselves the liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter any
further articles, or other accusation or impeachment against the
said Andrew Johnson, President or the United States, and also of
replying to his answers which he shall wake unto the articles
herein preferred against him, and of offering proof to the same,
and every part thereof, and to all and every other article,
accusation, or impeachment which shall be exhibited by them, as
the case shall require, do demand that the said Andrew Johnson
may be put to answer the high crimes and misdemeanors in office
herein charged against him, and that such proceedings,
examinations, trials, and judgments may be thereupon had and
given as may be agreeable to law and justice

ARTICLE X.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office, and the dignity and
proprieties thereof, and of the harmony and courtesies which
ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and
legislative branches of the government of the United States,
designing and intending to set aside the rightful authority and
powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule,
hatred, contempt and reproach, the Congress of the United States,
and the several branches thereof, to impair and destroy the
regard and respect of all the good people of the United States
for the Congress and legislative powers thereof, (which all
officers of the government ought inviolably to preserve and
maintain.) and to excite the odium and resentment of all the good
people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it
duly and constitutionally enacted; and in pursuance of his said
design and intent, openly and publicly, and before divers
assemblages of the citizens of the United States, convened in
divers parts thereof to meet and receive said Andrew Johnson as
the Chief Magistrate of the United States, did, on the eighteenth
day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-six, and on divers other days and times, as well before
as afterward, make and deliver, with a loud voice, certain
intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues, and did
therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces. as well against
Congress as the laws of the United States duly enacted thereby,
amid the cries, jeer, and laughter of the multitudes then
assembled and in hearing.

ARTICLE XI.

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
unmindful of the high duties of his office, and of his oath of
offce, and in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, did, heretofore, to wit, on the eighteenth day of
August, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-six, at the City of
Washington, and the District of Columbia, by public speech,
declare and affirm, in substance, that the thirty-ninth Congress
of the United States was not a Congress of the United States
authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power
under the same. but, on the contrary, was a Congress of only part
of the States, thereby denying, and intending to deny, that the
legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory upon him,
the said Andrew Johnson, except in so far as he saw fit to
approve the same, and also thereby denying, and intending to
deny, the power of the said thirty-ninth Congress to .propose
amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and, in
pursuance of said declaration, the said Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, afterwards, to-wit, on the twenty first day
of February, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, at the city
of Washington, in the District of Columbia, did, unlawfully, and
in disregard of the requirements of the Constitution that he
should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, attempt to
prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the
tenure of certain civil offices," passed March second, eighteen
hundred and sixty-seven, by unlawfully devising and contriving,
and attempting to devise and contrive means by which he should
prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of
the office of Secretary for the Department of War,
notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the
suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of said Edwin
M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of
War; and, also, by further unlawfully devising and contriving,
and attempting to devise and contrive means, then and there, to
prevent the execution of an act entitled "An act making
appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year
ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and for
other purposes," approved March second, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven; and also, to prevent the execution of an act
entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of
the rebel States," passed March second, eighteen hundred and
sixty-seven, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, did then, to wit, on the twentyfirst day of
February, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, at the city of
Washington, commit, and was guilty of, a high misdemeanor in
office.

Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Attest: Edward McPherson, Clerk of the House of Representatives.

At the conclusion of the reading of the Articles of Impeachment,
the President of the Senate responded that "the Senate will take
order upon the subject of impeachment, of which proper notice
will be given to the House of Representatives."

In addition to the Speaker and Managers, a large number of the
members of the House of Representatives were present to witness
the extraordinary and impressive proceedings, and at its close
all withdrew and the Senate resumed the routine business of the
day's session.

On Monday, March 23rd, 1868, the President, by his attorneys,
appeared at the bar of the Senate and made answer to the several
Articles of Impeachment, as follows:

(Answer to only the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 11th Articles, are here
given, as the 2nd, 3rd and 11th were the only Articles put to
vote--all others being abandoned, and as the 1st Article, though
never put to vote, contained practically all there was of the
impeachment.)

ANSWER TO ARTICLE I.

For answer to the first article he said: That Edwin M. Stanton
was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day
of January, A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the
United States, during the first term of his presidency, and was
commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the
United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the
President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of
War was created by an act of the first Congress in its first
session, passed on the 7th day of August, A.D. 1789, and in and
by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary
for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties
as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by
the President of the United States, agreeably to the
Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of said
department; and furthermore, that the Secretary shall conduct
the business of the said department in such a manner as the
President of the United States shall, from time to time, order
and instruct.

And this respondent further answering, says that by force of the
act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said
Stanton became the principal officer in one of the executive
departments of the government within the true, intent and meaning
of the second section of the second article of the Constitution
of the United States, and according to the true intent and
meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United
States: and, in accordance with the settled and uniform practice
of each and every President of the United States, the said
Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold
the said office of Secretary for the Department of War must
continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the
United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and
represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or entrusted
to him by the President touching the department aforesaid, and
for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President,
the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, made responsible.

And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the
office of President of the United States upon, and by reason of,
the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United
States, on the 13th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was
then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of
War under and by reason of the appointment and commission
aforesaid; and, not having been removed from the said office by
this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same
under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure
of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly
mentioned: and at no time received any appointment or commission
save as above detailed.

And this repondent, further answering, says that on and prior to
the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President
of the United States. responsible for the conduct of the
Secretary for the Department of War, and having the
constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person
holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult
public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not
allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of
Secretary for the Department of War without hazard of the public
interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the
President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for
advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely
responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of
War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and
instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the
President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the
business of that executive department of the government, and by
reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did
necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton
ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the
Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power
and authority vested in him as President of the United States by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to
such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of
August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which
the following is a true copy:

Sir:--Public considerations of a high character constrain me to
say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

War Department, Washington, August 5, 1867.

Sir:-Your note of this day has been received, stating that public
considerations of a high character constrain you "to say that my
resignation its Secretary of War will be accepted."

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a
high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the
head of this department, constrain me not to resign the office of
Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress.

Very respectfully yours. Edwin M. Stanton.

This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon
of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official
relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War
to the President of the United States according to the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to
the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said
Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority
of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently
with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue
to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War;
and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as
President of the United States, to consider and decide what act
or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of
the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the
said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was
practically settled by the first Congress of the United States,
and had been so considered and uniformly and in great numbers of
instances acted on by each Congress and President of the United
States, in succession, from President Washington to, and
including President Lincoln, and from the first Congress to the
thirty-ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the United States
conferred on the President, as part of the executive power and as
one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the
executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at
any and all times of removing from office all executive officers
for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent
had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of
each principal officer of the executive departments, upon this
question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been
advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary
for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the
United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the
President of the United States, and that consequently, it could
be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive
him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of
the United States, and because in that capacity he was both
enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question,
did. in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the
truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same
known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a
message dated on the 2nd day of March, 1867, that the power last
mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it, in fit
cases, was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the
United States, and that the President could not be deprived of
this, power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be
vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in
part or whole.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of
"An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed
March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both houses of
Congress, it was enacted as follows:

"That every person holding any civil office to which he has been
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office,
and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be
entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in
like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein
otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of
the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the
Postmaster General, and the Attorney General shall hold their
offices respectively for and during the term of the President by
whom they may have been appointed, and one month thereafter,
subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate."

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and
intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by
which that act was passed, that the power to remove executive
officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President and
vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this
respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above
expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes, that the
said first section of the last mentioned act was and is wholly
inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the
Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had
been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two
houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be
proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the
said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was
within or without the terms of that first section of the act; or,
if within it, whether the President had not the power, according
to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the
office of Secretary for the Department of War, and having, in his
capacity of President of the United States, so examined and
considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said
Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first
section of the last-named act.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that although a
case thus existed which, in his judgment as President of the
United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to
remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the
Department of War, and although this respondent was of the
opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the
United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said
office was vested in the President of the United States; and also
this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that
the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first
section of the last named act, and although each of the said
opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case,
requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States.
to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this
respondent, as President of the United States, desired and
determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the
construction and effect of the said first section of the last
named act, and also the broader question of the executive power
conferred on the President of the United States, by the
Constitution of the United States, to remove one of the principal
officers of one of the executive departments for cause seeming to
him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined
that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it
should become absolutely necessary to raise and have, in some
way, determined either or both of the said last named questions,
it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States,
and was required of the President thereby, that questions
of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and
executive departments of the government had disagreed, which
involved powers considered by all branches of the government,
during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been
confided by the Constitution of the United States to the
President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper
execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper
way submitted to that judicial department of the government
instrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by
it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction
of and effect of all acts of Congress. but of comparing them with
the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them
inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law
which the people have enacted for the government of all their
servants. And to these ends, first, that, through the action of
the Senate of the United States, the absolute duty of the
President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton
as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer
whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful
right to control, might, if, possible. be accomplished without
the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and,
second, if this duty could not be so performed then that these
questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be
judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end
or purpose, this respondent. as President of the United States,
on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception
of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August,
hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order
following namely:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 12, 1867.

Sir:--By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you
are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will
cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has
this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War
ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property
now in your custody and charge.
To Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:

War Department, Washington City, August 12, 1867.

Sir:--Your note of this date has been received, informing me
that, by virtue of the powers vested in you as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, I am suspended from
office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and
all functions pertaining to the same, and also directing me at
once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day
been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad
interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property
now in my custody and charge. Under a sense of public duty I am
compelled to deny your right, under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, without the advice and consent of the senate,
and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary
of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the
same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer
to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in
my custody as Secretary, But inasmuch as the General commanding
the Armies of the United has been appointed ad interim and has
notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no
alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force.

To the President.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that it is provided
in and by the second section of "An act to regulate the tenure of
certain civil offices," that the President may suspend an officer
from the performance of the duties of the office held by him, for
certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the
Senate, and until the case shall be acted on by the senate; that
this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised,
and he verily believed and still believes, that the executive
power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution
as aforesaid includes the power of suspension from office at the
pleasure of the President, and this respondent, by the order
aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until
the next meeting of the Senate, or until the Senate should have
acted upon the case, but by force of the power and authority
vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President, and the order,
in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United
States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more
fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in and by the
act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided
and enacted that, in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary
for the Department of War, it shall be lawful for the President,
in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to
perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed
or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months;
and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law
was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12,
1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the
armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the
Department of War ad interim, in the form in which similar
authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting
of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at
the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of
six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy
of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the
United States on the 12th day of December, 1867, as will be
hereinafter more fully stated: and in pursuance of the design and
intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary to submit the
said question to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or
near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such
his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said question,
or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in further
pursuance of his intention and design, if possible, to perform
what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said
Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the
Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible,
any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from
executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of
the United States, and any question respecting the construction
and effect of the first section of the said "act regulating the
tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not, by any act
of his, abandon and relinquish, either a power which he believed
the Constitution had conferred on the President of the United
States, to enable him to perform the duties of his office, or, a
power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of
Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of
December, 1867, transmit to the senate of the United States a
message a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein
he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had
induced the same. so far as this respondent then considered it
material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and
reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of
removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views
concerning the construction of the said first section of the last
mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove
the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the
Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus
perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his
imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton, without
derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were
confided to the President, by the Constitution and laws, and
without the necessity of raising, judicially, any questions
respecting the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that this hope not
having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow
the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein
contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as
aforesaid respecting the powers confided to him and the duties
required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and
contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first
section of the last mentioned act did not affect the case of the
said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President
that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible
for the said Stanton, for the said office of Secretary for the
Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as
might, in the judgment of the President, be lawful and necessary
to raise, for a judicial decision, the questions affecting the
lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or
the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the
said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the
same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did,
on the 21st day of February, 1868 issue the order for the removal
of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set
forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to
act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article
set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each
substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies
that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was
lawfully in possession of the said ofce of Secretary for the
Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day
last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office
against the will of the President of the United States. He denies
that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was
unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with
intent to violate the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure
of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a
violation of the last mentioned act. He denies that the said
order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States,
or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that
the said order was issued with an intent to violate the
Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or this
respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully, but earnestly.
insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of
what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the
performance of what this honorable court will consider was.in
point of fact. an imperative official duty. And he denies that
any and all substantive matters, in the said first article
contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and
set forth, do, by law, constitute a high misdemeanor in office,
within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the
United States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE II.

And for answer to the second article, this respondent says that
he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the
said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at
Washington, District of Columbia, February 21, 1868, addressed to
Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General United
States army, Washington, District of Columbia, and he further
admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent
of the Senate of the United States, then in session; but he
denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United
States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to
violate the Constitution of the United States or the provisions
of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer
to said first articles for a full statement of the purposes and
intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same
as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that
there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of
Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and
there commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and
this respondent maintains and will insist:

1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a
vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department
of War.

2. That notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then
in session, it was lawful and according to long and well
established usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act
as Secretary of War ad interim.

3. That if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be
held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by
the issuing of said order or by the designation of said Thomas to
act as Secretary of War ad interim.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE III.

And for answer to said third article, this respondent says that
he abides by his answer to said first and second articles in so
far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in
the said third article, and, without here again repeating the
same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third
article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to
the new allegation contained in said third article, that this
respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the
Department of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave
any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said
written authority set out in said article, by which he authorized
and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department
of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an
appointment, and insists that it is only a designation of an
officer of that department to act temporarily as Secretary for
the Department of War ad interim, until an appointment should be
made. But whether the said written authority amounts to an
appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this
respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to
violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby
intended to give the said order the character or effect of an
appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He
further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of
Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said
written authority.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE XI.

And in answer to the eleventh article, this respondent denies
that on the 18th day of August, in the year 1866, at the City of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, he did, by public speech
or otherwise, declare or affirm, in substance or at all, that the
thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of
the United States authorized by the constitution to exercise
legislative power under the same, or that he did then and there
declare or affirm that the said thirty-ninth Congress was a
Congress of only part of the States in any sense or meaning other
than that ten States of the Union were denied representation
therein; or that he made any or either of the declarations or
affrmations in this behalf, in the said article alleged, as
denying or intending to deny that the legislation of said
thirty-ninth Congress was valid or obligatory upon this
respondent, except so far as this respondent saw fit to approve
the same; and as to the allegation in said article, that be did
thereby intend or mean to be understood that the said Congress
had not power to propose amendments to the Constitution, this
respondent says that in said address he said nothing in reference
to the subject of amendments of the Constitution. nor was the
question of the competency of the said Congress to propose such
amendments, without the participation of said excluded States. at
the time of said address in any way mentioned or considered or
referred to by this respondent. nor in what he did say had he any
intent regarding the same, and he denies the allegation so made
to the contrary thereof. But this respondent, in further answer
to, and in respect of, the said allegations of the said eleventh
article hereinbefore traversed and denied, claims and insists
upon his personal and official right of freedom of opinion and
freedom of speech, and his duty in his political relations as
President of the United States to the people of the United States
in the exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech,
in the same manner, form and effect as he has in this behalf
stated the same in his answer to the said tenth article, and with
the same effect as if he here repeated the same; and he further
claims and insists, as in said answer to said tenth article he
has claimed and insisted, that he is not subject to question,
inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation, in any form or manner,
of or concerning such rights of freedom of opinion or freedom of
speech or his alleged exercise thereof.

And this respondent further denies that on the 21st day of
February, in the year 1868, or at any other time, at the City of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, in pursuance of any such
declaration as is in that behalf in said eleventh article
alleged, or otherwise, he did unlawfully, and in disregard of the
requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the
laws should be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the
execution of an act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of
certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully
devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive,
means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith
resuming the functions of Secretary for the Department of War,
or by lawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or
contrive, means to prevent the execution of an act entitled "An
act making appropriations for the support of the army for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,"
approved March 2, 1867, or to prevent the execution of an act
entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of
the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article,
says that he has, in his answer to the first article, set forth
in detail the acts, steps, and proccedings done and taken by this
respondent to and toward or in the matter of the suspension or
removal of the said Edwin M. Stanton in or from the office of
Secretary for the Department of War, with the times, modes,
circumstances, intents, views, purposes, and opinions of official
obligation and duty under and with which such acts, steps, and
proceedings were done and taken; and he makes answer to this
eleventh article of the matters in his answer to the first
article, pertaining to the suspension or removal of said Edwin M.
Stanton, to the same intent and effect as if they were here
repeated and set forth.

And this deponent, further answering the said eleventh article,
denies that by means or reason of anything in said article
alleged, this respondent, as President of the United States, did,
on the 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other day or time.
commit, or that he was guilty of, a high misdemeanor in office.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article,
says that the same and the matters therein contained do not
charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this
respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor
the omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation
or duty in his office of President of the United States; nor does
the said article nor the matters therein contained name
designate, describe, or define any act or mode or form of
attempt, device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device,
contrivance or means, whereby this respondent can know or
understand what act or mode or form of attempt, device,
contrivance or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance, or
means are imputed to or charged against this respondent, in his
office of President of the United States, or intended so to be,
or whereby this respondent can more fully or definitely make
answer unto the said article than he hereby does.

And this respondent, in submitting to this honorable court this
his answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him,
respectfully reserves leave to amend and add to the same from
time to time, as may become necessary or proper, and when and as
such necessity and propriety shall appear.
Andrew Johnson
Henry Stanbery, B. R. Curtis, Thomas A. R. Nelson, William M.
Evarts. W. S. Groesbeck. Of Counsel.

CHAPTER VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL

On Thursday, March 5th, 1868, the Senate of the United States was
organized for the trial of the charges brought against Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, by the House of
Representatives--Honorable Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the
United States, presiding.

The following gentlemen appeared as managers of the prosecution
on the part of the House:

Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio; Hon. George S. Boutwell, of
Massachusetts; Hon. James F. Wilson, of Iowa; Hon. John A. Logan,
of Illinois; Hon. Thomas F. Williams, of Pennsylvania; Hon.
Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts; and Hon. Thaddeus Stevens,
of Pennsylvania.

The following gentlemen appeared as counsel for the President:

Messrs. Henry Stanbery, of Kentucky; Benjamin R. Curtis, of
Massachusetts; Thomas A. R. Nelson, of Tennessee; William M.
Evarts, of New York, and William S. Groesbeck, of Ohio.

The following gentlemen comprised the United States Senate,
sitting for the trial of the President:

California-Cornelius Cole, (R)-John Conness, (R).
Connecticut-James Dixon, (D)-Orris S. Ferry, (R).
Delaware-Willard Saulsbury, (D)-James A. Bayard, (D).
Illinois-Lyman Trumbull, (R)-Richard Yates, (R).
Indiana-Oliver P. Morton, (R)-Thomas A. Hendricks, (D).
Iowa-James W. Grimes, (R)-James Harlan, (R).
Kansas-Samuel C. Pomeroy, (R)-Edmund G. Ross, (R).
Kentucky-Thomas C. McCreary, (D)-Garrett Davis, (D).
Massachusetts-Charles Sumner, (R)-Henry Wilson, (R).
Maine-William Pitt Fessenden, (R)-Lot M. Morrill, (R).
Maryland-Reverdy Johnson, (D)-George Vickers, (D).
Michigan-Zachariah Chandler, (R)-Jacob M. Howard, (R).
Missouri-John B. Henderson, (R)-Charles D. Drake, (R).
Minnesota-Alexander Ramsay, (R)-Daniel S. Norton, (D).
New York-Roscoe Conkling, (R)-Edwin D. Morgan, (R).
Nevada-James W. Nye, (R)-William M. Stewart, (R).
Nebraska-Thomas W. Tipton, (R)-John M. Thayer, (R).
New Jersey-Alexander G. Cattell, (R)-F. T. Frelinghuysen, (R).
New Hampshire-Alexander H. Craigin, (R)-Jas. W. Patterson, (R).
Ohio-John Sherman, (R)-Benjamin F. Wade, (R).
Oregon-Henry W. Corbett, (R)-Geo. H. Williams, (R).
Pennsylvania-Simon Cameron, (R)-Charles R. Buckalew, (D).
Rhode Island-Henry B. Anthony, (R)-William Sprague, (R).
Tennessee--David T. Patterson, (D)-Joseph S. Fowler, (R).
Vermont-George F. Edmunds, (R)-Justin S. Morrill, (R).
West Virginia-W. T. Willey,(R)-Peter (3. Van Winkle, (R).
Wisconsin-James R. Doolittle, (D)-Timothy O. Howe, (R).
[Forty-two Republicans and twelve Democrats.]

The House bringing the Impeachment was three-fourths
Republican--the Senate that tried it was more than threefourths
Republican-the managers on the part of the House were all
Republicans--the counsel for the President were three Democrats
and one Republican--the President on trial was a Democrat--the
interrogatories propounded to witnesses were generally received
or rejected, according as their probable answers would make for
or against the President--the people of the country at large
were, as a rule, rigidly divided on party lines relative to the
case, Republicans demanding the conviction of the President and
Democrats urging his acquittal. The Chief Justice presiding in
the trial was the only strictly nonpartisan factor in the case.

The answer of the President to the Articles of Impeachment having
been presented on the 23rd of March, 1868--the replication of the
House duly made, and all the preliminary steps completed, the
proceedings in the actual trial commenced on the 30th day of
March, 1868. Gen. Butler, one of the managers on the part of the
House, made the opening argument for the prosecution, from which
the following extracts are taken:

The first eight articles set out in several distinct forms the
acts of the respondent removing Mr. Stanton from office, and
appointing Mr. Thomas, ad interim, differing in legal effect in
the purposes for which and the intent with which, either or both
of the acts were done, and the legal duties and rights infringed,
and the acts of Congress violated in so doing.

All the articles allege these acts to be in contravention of his
oath of office, and in disregard of the duties thereof.

If they are so, however, the President might have the POWER to do
them under the law; still, being so done, they are acts of
official misconduct, and as we have seen, impeachable.

The President has the legal power to do many acts which, if done
in disregard of his duty, or for improper purposes, then the
exercise of that power is an official misdemeanor.

Ex. gr: he has the power of pardon; if exercised in a given case
for a corrupt motive, as for the payment of money, or wantonly
pardoning all criminals, it would be a misdemeanor. Examples
might be multiplied indefinitely.

Article first, stripped of legal verbiage, alleges that, having
suspended Mr. Stanton and reported the same to the Senate, which
refused to concur in the suspension, and Stanton having
rightfully resumed the duties of his office, the respondent, with
knowledge of the facts, issued an order which is recited for
Stanton's removal, with intent to violate the act of March 2,
1867, to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices, and with
the further intent to remove Stanton from the office of Secretary
of War, then in the lawful discharge of its duties, in
contravention of said act without the advice and consent of the
Senate, and against the Constitution of the United States.

Article 2 charges that the President, without authority of law,
on the 21st of February, 1868, issued letter of authority to
Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, the Senate
being in session, in violation of the tenure-of-office act, and
with intent to violate it and the Constitution, there being no
vancancy in the office of Secretary of War.

Article 3 alleges the same act as done without authority of law,
and alleges an intent to violate the Constitution.

Article 4 charges that the President conspired with Lorenzo
Thomas and divers other persons, with intent, by INTIMIDATION AND
THREATS, to prevent Mr. Stanton from holding the office of
Secretary of War, in violation of the Constitution and of the act
of July 31, 1861.

Article 5 charges the same conspiracy with Thomas to prevent Mr.
Stanton's holding his office, and thereby to prevent the
execution of the civil tenure act.

Article 6 charges that the President conspired with Thomas to
seize and possess the property under the control of the War
Department by FORCE, in contravention of the act of July 31,
1861, and with intent to disregard the civil tenure-of-office
act.

Article 7 charges the same conspiracy, with intent only to
violate the civil tenure-ofoffice act.

Articles 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th may all be considered
together, as to to the proof to support them.

It will be shown that having removed Stanton and appointed
Thomas, the President sent Thomas to the War Office to obtain
possession; that having been met by Stanton with a denial of his
rights, Thomas retired, and after consultation with the
President, Thomas asserted his purpose to take possession of the
War Office by force, making his boast in several public places of
his intentions so to do, but was prevented by being promptly
arrested by process from the court.

This will be shown by the evidence of Hon. Mr. Van Horn, a member
of the House, who was present when the demand for possession of
the War office was made by General Thomas, already made public.

By the testimony of the Hon. Mr. Burleigh, who, after that, in
the evening of the twenty-first of February, was told by Thomas
that he intended to take possession of the War Office by force
the following morning, and invited him up to see the performance.
Mr. Burleigh attended, but the act did not come off, for Thomas
had been arrested and held to bail.

By Thomas boasting at Willard's hotel on the same evening that he
should call on General Grant for military force to put him in
possession of the office, and he did not see how Grant could
refuse it. Article 8 charges that the appointment of Thomas was
made for the purpose of getting control of the disbursement of
the moneys appropriated for the military service and Department
of War.

In addition to the proof already adduced, it will be shown that,
after the appointment of Thomas, which must have been known to
the members of his cabinet, the President caused a formal notice
to be served on the Secretary of the Treasury, to the end that
the Secretary might answer the requisitions for money of Thomas,
and this was only prevented by the firmness with which Stanton
retained possession of the books and papers of the War office.
It will be seen that every fact charged in Article 1 is admitted
by the answer of the respondent; the intent also admitted as
charged; that is to say, to set aside the civil tenure-of-office
act, and to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of the Secretary
for the Department of War without the advice and consent of the
Senate, and, if not justified, contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution itself.

The only question remaining is, does the respondent justify
himself by the Constitution and laws?

On this he avers, that by the Constitution, there is "conferred
on the President as a part of the executive power, the power at
any and all times of removing from office all executive officers
for cause, to be judged of by the President alone, and that he
verily believes that the executive power of removal from office,
confided to him by the Constitution, as aforesaid, includes the
power of suspension from office indefinitely."

Now, these offices, so vacated, must be filled, temporarily at
least, by his appointment, because government must go on; there
can be no interregnum in the execution of the laws in an
organized government; he claims, therefore, of necessity, the
right to fill their places with appointments of his choice, and
that this power can not be restrained or limited in any degree by
any law of Congress, because, he avers, "that the power was
conferred, and the duty of exercising it in fit cases was imposed
on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and
that the President could not be deprived of this power, or
relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the
President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole."

This, then, is the plain and inevitable issue before the Sehate
and the American people:

Has the President, under the Constitution, the more than kingly
prerogative at will to remove from office and suspend from office
indefinitely, all executive officers of the United States, either
civil, military or naval, at any and all times, and fill the
vacancies with creatures of his own appointment, for his own
purposes, without any restraint whatever, or possibility of
restraint by the Senate or by Congress through laws duly enacted?

The House of Representatives, in behalf of the people join this
issue by affirming that the exercise of such powers is a high
misdemeanor in office.

If the affirmative is maintained by the respondent, then, so far
as the first eight articles are concerned--unless such corrupt
purposes are shown as will of themselves make the exercise of a
legal power a crime--the respondent must go, and ought to go quit
and free.

Therefore, by these articles and the answers thereto, the
momentous question, here and now, is raised whether the
PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE ITSELF (IF IT HAS THE PREROGATIVES AND POWER
CLAIMED FOR IT) OUGHT, IN FACT, TO EXIST AS APART OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF A FREE PEOPLE, while by the last
three articles the simpler and less important inquiry is to be
determined, whether Andrew Johnson has so conducted himself that
he ought longer to held any constitutional office whatever. The
latter sinks to merited insignificance compared with the grandeur
of the former.

If that is sustained, then a right and power hitherto unclaimed
and unknown to the people of the country is engrafted on the
Constitution most alarming in its extent, most corrupting in its
influence, most dangerous in its tendencies, and most tyrannical
in its exercise.

Whoever, therefore, votes "not guilty" on these articles votes to
enchain our free institutions, and to prostrate them at the feet
of any man who, being President, may choose to control them.

A few days after this, Judge Curtis, of the President's counsel,
spoke on behalf of the President. The first and principal
Goverment of the Articles of Impeachment against Mr. Johnson was
violation of the Office-Tenure Act, which had been passed the
year before for the undisguised purpose of restricting the
President's power to remove his Cabinet officers, particularly,
his War Minister, Mr. Stanton. It was apparent that Mr. Butler
had been embarassed in his plea by the proviso of that Act, that
members of the Cabinet should hold "during the term of the
President by WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED and for one month
longer."

Mr. Butler had asked--By whom was Mr. Stanton appointed? By Mr.
Lincoln. Whose presidential term was he holding tinder when the
bullet of Booth became a proximate cause of this trial? Was not
this appointment in full force at that hour. Had any act of the
respondent up to the 12th day of August last vitiated or
interfered with that appointment? Whose Presidential term is the
respondent now serving out? His own, or Mr. Lincoln's. If his
own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the
murder, because each presidential term is four years by the
Constitution, and the regular recurrence of those terms is fixed
by the Act of May 8, 1792. If he is serving out the remainder of
Mr. Lincoln's term, then his term of office expires on the 4th of
March, 1869, if it does not before.

Judge Curtis struck his first blow at the weak point of General
Butler's speech. He said:

There is a question involved which enters deeply into the first
eight Articles of Impeachment and materially touches two of the
others; and to that question I desire in the first place to
invite the attention of the court, namely--whether MR. STANTON'S
CASE COMES UNDER THE TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACTS? * * * I must ask
your attention therefore to the construction and application of
the first section of that act, as follows: "that every person
holding an official position to which he has been appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person
who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall
become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to
hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner
appointed and duly qualified, except as herein OTHERWISE
PROVIDED." Then comes what is otherwise provided. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and
Interior Departments, the Postmaster General and Attorney
General, shall hold their offices respectively for AND DURING THE
TERM OF THE PRESIDENT BY WHOM THEY MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED."

The first inquiry which arises on this language, is as to the
meaning of the words "for and during the term of the President."
Mr. Stanton, as appears by the commission which has been put in
the case by the Honorable Managers, was appointed in January,
1862, during the first term of President Lincoln. Are the words
"during the term of the President," applicable to Mr. Stanton's
case? That depends upon whether an expounder of this law,
judicially, who finds set down in it as a part of the descriptive
words, "DURING THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT," HAS ANY RIGHT TO ADD,
"AND DURING ANY OTHER TERM FOR WHICH HE MAY BE AFTERWARDS
ELECTED."

I respectfully submit no such judicial interpretation can be put
on the words. Then, if you please, take the next step: "During
the term of the President by whom he was appointed, "At the time
when this order was issued for the removal of Mr. Stanton, was he
holding the term of the President by whom he was appointed? The
Honorable Managers say yes; because, as they, say, Mr. Johnson is
merely serving out the residue of Mr. Lincoln's term. But is that
so under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States?
* * Although the President, like the Vice President, is elected
for a term of four years, and each is elected for the same term,
the President is not to hold the office absolutely during four
years. The limit of four years is not an absolute limit. Death is
a limit. "A conditional limitation," as the lawyers call it, is
imposed on his tenure of office. And when the President dies his
term of four years, for which he was elected and during which he
was to hold provided he should so long live, terminates, and the
office devolves upon the Vice President. For what period of time?
FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM FOR WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS
ELECTED. And there is no more propriety, under the provisions of
the Constitution of the United litates, in calling the term
during which Mr. Johnson holds the office of President, after it
was devolved upon him, a part of Mr. Lincoln's term. then there
would be propriety in saying that one sovereign who succeeded
another sovereign by death, holds his predecessor's term.** They
(the Cabinet officers) were to be the advisers of the President;
they were to be the immediate confidential assistants of the
President, for whom he was to be responsible, but in whom he was
expected to repose a great amount of trust and confidence; and
therefore it was that this Act has connected the tenure-of-office
of these Secretaries to which it applies with the President by
whom they were appointed. It says, in the description which the
Act gives of the future tenure-of-office of Secretaries, that a
controlling regard is to be had to the fact that the Secretary
whose tenure is to be regulated was appointed by some particular
President; and during the term of that President he shall
continue to hold his office; but as for Secretaries who are in
office, not appointed by the President, we have nothing to say;
we leave them as they heretofore have been. I submit to Senators
that this is the natural, and, having regard to the character of
these officers, the necessary conclusion, that the
tenure-of-office of a Secretary here described is a tenure during
the term of service of the President by whom he was appointed;
that it was not the intention of Congress to compel a President
of the United States to continue in office a Secretary not
appointed by himself. * * *

Shortly after this, occurred one of the most amusing and
interesting incidents of the trial. Mr. Boutwell, who was
altogether a matter-of-fact man, though at times indulging in the
heroics, ventured, in the course of his argument, upon a flight
of imagination in depicting the punishment that should be meted
out to Mr. Johnson for venturing to differ with Congress upon the
constitutionality of an act of that body. He said:

Travelers and astronomers inform us that in the Southern heavens,
near the Southern cross, there is a vast space which the
uneducated call the "hole in the sky," where the eye of man,
with the aid of the powers of the telescope, has been unable to
discover nebulae, or asteroid, or comet, or planet, or star, or
sun. In that dreary, cold, dark region of space, which is only
known to be less infinite by the evidences of creation elsewhere,
the great author of celestial mechanism has left the chaos which
was in the beginning. If this earth were capable of the
sentiments and emotions of justice and virtue which in human
mortal beings are the evidences and pledge of our divine origin
and immortal destiny, it would heave and throb with the energy of
the elemental forces of nature, and project this enemy (referring
to President Johnson) of two races of men into that vast region,
there forever to exist in a solitude eternal as life or as the
absence of life, emblematical of. if not really, that outer
darkness of which the Savior of mankind spoke in warning to those
who are enemies to themselves and of their race and of God.

Mr. Evarts followed Mr. Boutwell, and in the course of his
argument referred to this paragraph in Mr. Boutwell's speech in
the following humorously sarcastic vein, during the delivery of
which, the Senate was repeatedly convulsed with laughter. Mr.
Evarts said:

I may as conveniently at this point of the argument as at any
other pay some attention to the astronomical punishment which
the learned and honorable manager Mr. Boutwell, thinks should
be applied to this novel case of impeachment of the President.
Cicero, I think it is, who says that a lawyer should know
everything, for sooner or later, there is no fact in history,
science or human knowledge that will not come into play in his
arguments. Painfully sensitive of my ignorance, being devoted to
a profession which "sharpens and does not enlarge the mind," I
yet can admire without envy the superior knowledge evinced by the
honorable manager. Indeed, upon my soul, I believe he is aware
of an astronomical fact which many professors of the science are
wholly ignorant of; but nevertheless, while some of his
colleagues were paying attention to an unoccupied and
unappropriated island on the surface of the seas, Mr. Manager
Boutwell, more ambitious, had discovered an untenated and
unappropriated region in the skies, reserved, he would have us
think, in the final councils of the Almighty as the place of
punishment for deposed and convicted American Presidents.

At first, I thought that his mind had become so enlarged that it
was not sharp enough to observe that the Constitution has limited
the punishment, but on reflection I saw that he was as legal and
logical as he was ambitious and astronomical; for the
Constitution has said "remove from office," and has put no limit
to the distance of removal so that it may be without the shedding
of a drop of his blood or taking a penny of his property, or
confining his limbs. Instant removal from office and
transportation to the skies. Truly this is a great undertaking,
and if the learned manager can only get over the obstacle of the
laws of nature, the Constitution will, not stand in his way.

He can contrive no method but that of a convulsion of the earth
that shall project the deposed President to this indefinitely
distant space; but a shock of nature of so vast an energy and for
so great a result on him might unsettle even the footing of the
firm members of Congress. We certainly need not resort to so
perilous a method as that. How shall we accomplish it? Why, in
the first place, nobody knows where that space is but the learned
manager himself, and he is the necessary deputy to execute the
judgment of the court. Let it then be provided that, in case of
your sentence of deposition and removal from office, the
honorable and astronomical manager shall take into his own hands
the execution of the sentence. With the President made fast to
his broad and strong shoulders, and having already assayed the
flight by imagination, better prepared than anybody else to
execute it in form, taking the advantage of ladders as far as
ladders will go to the top of this great capitol, and spurning
there with his foot the crest of Liberty, let him set out upon
his flight while the two houses of Congress and all the people of
the United States shall shout--"Sic itur ad astra!" But here a
distressing doubt strikes me. How will the manager get back. He
will have got far beyond the reach of gravitation to restore him,
and so ambitious a wing as his should never stoop to a downward
flight. Indeed, as he passes through the constellations, the
famous question of Carlyle (by which he derides the littleness of
human affairs upon the scale of the measure of the heavens,)
"What thinks Bootes as he drives his hunting dogs up the zenith
in their leash of sidereal fire?" will force itself on his
notice. What, indeed, will Bootes think of this new
constellation? Besides, reaching this space beyond the power of
Congress ever to send for persons and papers, how shall he
return, and how decide in the contest there become personal and
perpetual--the struggle of strength between him and the
President? In this new revolution thus established forever, who
shall decide which is the sun and which is the moon? Who
determine the only scientific test, which reflects hardest upon
the other?"

Gen. Logan, one of the managers, appeared for the prosecution,
upon the close of the examination of witnesses. The following is
a brief extract from his very long and labored argument, and
relates to the Tenure-of-Office Act:

It is a new method of ascertaining the meaning of a law, plain
upon its face, by resorting to legislative discussions, and
giving in evidence opinions affected by the law. As a matter of
fact; it is well known the act was intended to prevent the very
thing Mr. Johnson attempted in the matter of Mr. Stanton's
removal. I think this manner of defense will not avail before the
Senate. The law must govern in its natural and plain intendment,
and will not be frittered away by extraneous interpretation. The
President in his veto message admits substantially this
construction.

The proviso does not change the general provisions of the Act,
except by giving a more definite limit to the tenure-of-office,
but the last paragraph of the Act puts the whole question back
into the hands of the Senate according to the general intention
of the Act, and provides that even the Secretaries are subject to
removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Act first provides that all persons holding civil offices at
the date of its passage appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall only be removed in the same manner.
This applies to the Secretary of War. This proviso merely gives a
tenure running with the term of the President and one month
thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The law clearly gives Mr. Stanton a right to the
office from the 4th of March, 1865, till one month after the 4th
of March, 1869, and he can only be disturbed in that tenure by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Yet, although Mr. Stanton was appointed by Mr. Lincoln in his
first term, when there was no tenure-of-office fixed by law, and
continued by Mr. Lincoln in his second term, it is argued that
his term expired one month after the passage of the
Tenure-of-Office Act, March 2nd, 1867, for the reason that Mr.
Lincoln's term expired at his death. This is false reasoning; the
Constitution fixed the term of the President at four years, and
by law the commencement of his term is the 4th of March. Will it
be said that when Mr. Johnson is deposed by a verdict of the
Senate, that the officer who will succeed him will serve for four
years? Certainly not. Why? Because he will have no Presidential
term, and will be merely serving out a part of the unexpired term
of Mr. Lincoln, and will go out of office on the 4th of March,
1869, at the time Mr. Lincoln would have retired by expiration of
his term, had he lived. * * *

The only question, then, which remains, is simply this: Has the
accused violated that (Tenure-of-Office) Act? No one knows better
than this accused the history of, and the purpose to be secured
by, that Act. It was ably and exhaustively discussed on both
sides, in all aspects. In the debates of Congress it was
subsequently reviewed and closely analyzed in a Veto Message of
the respondent. No portion of that Act escaped his remark, and no
practical application which has been made of it since did he fail
to anticipate. He knew before he attempted its violation that
more than three-fourths of the Representatives of the people in
Congress assembled had set their seal of disapprobation upon the
reasons given in the Veto Message and had enacted the law by more
than the constitutional number of votes required. Nay, more; he
was repeatedly warned, by investigations made looking toward just
such a proceeding as now being witnessed in this court, that the
people had instructed their Representatives to tolerate no
violation of the laws constitutionally enacted.

Mr. Groesbeck, in behalf of the defense, said in closing his
argument:

What is to be your judgment, Senators, in this case? Removal from
office and perpetual disqualification? If the President has
committed that for which he should be ejected from office it were
judicial mockery to stop short of the largest disqualifications
you can impose. It will be a heavy judgment. What is his crime in
its moral aspects, to merit such a judgment? Let us look to it.

He tried to pluck a thorn out of his very heart, for the
condition of things in the War Department, and consequently in
his Cabinet, did pain him as a thorn in his heart. You fastened
it there, and you are now asked to punish him for attempting to
extract it. What more? He made an ad interim appointment to last
for a single day. You could have terminated it whenever you saw
fit. You had only to take up the nomination which he had sent to
you, which was a good nomination, and act upon it and the ad
interim vanished like smoke. He had no idea of fastening it upon
the department. He had no intention of doing anything of that
kind. He merely proposed that for the purpose, if the opportunity
should occur, of subjecting this law to a constitutional test.
That was all the purpose it was to answer. It is all for which it
was intended. The thing was in your hands from the beginning to
the end. You had only to act upon the nomination, and the matter
was settled. Surely that was no crime.

I point you to the cases that have occurred--of ad interim
appointment after ad interim appointment; but I point especially
to the case of Mr. Holt, where the Senate in its legislative
capacity examined it, weighed it, decided upon it, heard the
report of the President and received it as satisfactory. That is,
for the purpose of this trial, before the same tribunal, res
adjudicate, I think, and it will be so regarded.

What else did he do? He talked with an officer about the law.
That is the Emory Article. He made intemperate speeches, though
full of honest, patriotic sentiments; when reviled, he should not
revile again; when smitten upon one cheek he should turn the
other.

"But," the gentleman who spoke last on the part of the managers,
"he tried to defeat pacification and restoration." I deny it in
the sense in which he presented it--that is, as a criminal act.
Here, too, he followed precedent and trod the path in which were
the footsteps of Lincoln, and which was bright with the radiance
of his divine utterance, "charity for all, malice toward none."
He was eager for pacification. He thought that the war was ended.
The drums were all silent--the arsenals were all shut; the roar
of the canon had died away to the last reverberation; the armies
were disbanded; not a single army confronted us in the field. Ah,
he was too eager, too forgiving, too kind. The hand of
conciliation was stretched out to him and he took it? It may be
he should have put it away; but was it a crime to take it?
Kindness, forgiveness a crime! Kindness a crime! Kindness is
omnipotent for good, more powerful than gunpowder or canon.
Kindness is statesmanship. Kindness is the highest statesmanship
of heaven itself. The thunders of Sinai do but terrify and
distract; alone they accomplish little; it is the kindness of
Calvary that subdues and pacifies.

What shall I say of this man? He is no theoriest; he is no
reformer; I have looked over his life. He has ever walked in
beaten paths, and by the light of, the Constitution. The mariner,
tempest-tossed in mid-sea, does not more certainly turn to his
star for guidance than does this man in trial and difficulty to
the star of the Constitution. He loves the Constitution. It has
been the study of his life. He is not learned and scholarly like
many of you; he is not a man of many ideas or of much speculation
but by a law of the mind he is only the truer to that he does
know. He is a patriot, second to no one of you in the measure of
his patriotism. He loves his country; he may be full of error; I
will not canvass now his views; but he loves his country; he has
the courage to defend it, and I believe to die for it if need be.
His courage and patriotism are not without illustration. My
colleague (Mr. Nelson) referred the other day to the scenes which
occurred in this Chamber when he alone of twenty-two Senators
remained; even his State seceded, but he remained. That was a
trial of his patriotism, of which many of you, by reason of your
locality and of your life-long associations, know nothing. How
his voice rang out in this hall in the hour of alarm for the good
cause, and in denunciation of the rebellion! But he did not
remain here; it was a pleasant, honorable, safe, and easy
position; but he was wanted for a more difficult and arduous and
perilous service. He faltered not, but entered upon it. That was
a trial of his courage and patriotism of which some of you who
now sit in judgment on more than his life, know nothing. I have,
often thought that those who, dwelt at the North, safely distant
from the collisions and strifes of the war, knew little of its
actual, trying dangers. We who lived on the border know more. Our
horizon was always red with flame; and it sometimes burned so
near us that we could feel its heat upon the outstretched hand.
But he was wanted for a greater peril, and went into the very
furnace of the war, and there served his country long and well.
Who of you have done more? Not one. * * * It seems cruel,
Senators, that he should be dragged here as a criminal, or that
any one who served his country and bore himself well and bravely
through that trying ordeal, should be condemned upon miserable
technicalities.

If he has committed any gross crime, shocking alike and
indiscriminately the entire public mind, then condemn him; but he
has rendered services to the country that entitle him to kind and
respectful consideration. He has precedents for everything he has
done, and what excellent precedents! The voices of the great dead
come to us from the grave sanctioning his course. All our past
history approves it. How can you single out this man, now in this
condition of things, and brand him before the world, put your
brand of infamy upon him because he made an ad interim
appointment for a day, and possible may have made a mistake in
attempting to remove Stanton? I can at a glance put my eye on
Senators here who would not endure the position he occupied. You
do not think it is right yourselves. You framed this civil tenure
law to give each President his own Cabinet, and yet his whole
crime is that he wants harmony and peace in his.

Senators, I will not go on. There is a great deal that is
crowding on my tongue for utterance, but it is not from my head;
it is rather from my heart; and it would be but a repetition of
the vain things 1 have been saying the past half hour But I do
hope you will not drive the President out and take possession of
his office. I hope this, not merely as counsel for Andrew
Johnson, for Andrew Johnson's administration is to me but as a
moment, and himself as nothing in comparison with the possible
consequences of such an act. No good can come of it, Senators,
and how much will the heart of the nation be refreshed if at last
the Senate of the United States can, in its judgment upon this
case, maintain its ancient dignity and high character in the
midst of storms, and passion, and strife.

A somewhat startling incident, which for the moment threatened
unpleasant results, occurred in the course of the trial. In his
opening speech for the prosecution, Mr. Manager Boutwell used
this language, speaking of the President:

The President is a man of strong will, of violent passions, of
unlimited ambition, with capacity to employ and use timid men,
adhesive, subservient men, and corrupt men, as the instruments of
his designs. It is the truth of history that he has injured every
person with whom he has had confidential relations, and many have
escaped ruin only by withdrawing from his society altogether. He
has one rule of his life: he attempts to use every man of power,
capacity, or influence within his reach. Succeeding in his
attempts, they are in time, and usually in a short time, utterly
ruined. If the considerate flee from him, if the brave and
patriotic resist his schemes or expose his plans, he attacks
them with all the energy and patronage of his office, and
pursues them with all the violence of his personal hatred. He
attacks to destroy all who will not become his instruments, and
all who become his instruments are destroyed in the use. He
spares no one. * * * Already this purpose of his life is
illustrated in the treatment of a gentleman who was of counsel
for the respondent, but who has never appeared in his behalf.

The last paragraph of the above quotation manifestly referred to
a disagrement between the President and Judge Black, which led to
the retirement of that gentleman from the Management of the
Defense of the President, a few days prior to the beginning of
the trial.

To this criticism of the President, Judge Nelson, of Counsel for
Defense, responded a few days later, with the following
statement:

It is to me, Senators, a source of much embarassment how to speak
in reply to the accusation which has thus been preferred against
the President of the United States. * * *

In order that you may understand what I have to say about it I
desire to refer the Senate to a brief statement which I have
prepared on account of the delicacy of the subject; and, although
I have not had time to write it out as I would have desired to
do, it will be sufficient to enable you to comprehend the facts
which I am about to state. You will understand, Senators, that I
do not purport to give a full history of what I may call the Alta
Vela case, as to which a report was made to the Senate by the
Secretary of State upon your call. A mere outline of the case
will be sufficient to explain what I have to say in reference to
Judge Black:

Under the guano act of 1856, William T. Kendal on the one side,
and Patterson and Marguiendo on the other, filed claims in the
Secretary of State's office to the island which is claimed by the
government of St. Domingo.

On the 17th of June, 1867, the examiner of claims submitted a
report adverse to the claim for damages against the Dominican
government. On the 22d of July, 1867, Mr. Black addressed a

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