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Hellenica by Xenophon

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[2] Or, "having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians."

[3] See Thuc. ii. 68.

The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was no alternative
but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign against the Acarnanians.
Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus with two divisions and the proper
complement of allies. The Achaeans none the less marched out in full
force themselves. No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there
was a general flight of the population from the country districts into
the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into remote
districts that they might not be captured by the troops. Being now
arrived on the frontier of the enemy's territory, Agesilaus sent to
the general assembly of the Acarnanians at Stratus,[4] warning them
that unless they chose to give up their alliance with the Boeotians
and Athenians, and to take instead themselves and their allies, he
would ravage their territory through its length and breadth, and not
spare a single thing. When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the
other proceeded to do what he threatened, systematically laying the
district waste, felling the timber and cutting down the fruit-trees,
while slowly moving on at the rate of ten or twelve furlongs a day.
The Acarnanians, owing to the snail-like progress of the enemy, were
lulled into a sense of security. They even began bringing down their
cattle from their alps, and devoted themselves to the tillage of far
the greater portion of their fields. But Agesilaus only waited till
their rash confidence reached its climax; then on the fifteenth or
sixteenth day after he head first entered the country he sacrificed at
early dawn, and before evening had traversed eighteen miles[5] or so
of country to the lake[6] round which were collected nearly all the
flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so captured a vast quantity
of cattle, horses, and grazing stock of all kinds, besides numerous

[4] "The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai
as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation"
(see Thuc. iii. 105). "But in Thucydides' own time Stratos had
attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania, and
probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there" (Thuc.
ii. 80). "In the days of Agesilaos we find Stratos still more
distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting."--Freeman,
"Hist. Fed. Gov." ch. iv. p. 148 foll., "On the constitution of
the League."

[5] Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

[6] See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106.

Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole of the
following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the captured
property by public sale. While he was thus engaged, a large body of
Arcarnanian light infantry appeared, and availing themselves of the
position in which Agesilaus was encamped against the mountain side,
assailed him with volleys of sling-stones and rocks from the
razor-edge of the mountain, without suffering any scathe themselves.
By this means they succeeded in dislodging and forcing his troops down
into the level plain, and that too at an hour when the whole camp was
engaged in preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the
Acarnanians retired; sentinels were posted, and the troops slept in

Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the plain and
meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture through a close
encircling range of hills. In occupation of this mountain barrier the
Acarnanians, from the vantage-ground above, poured down a continuous
pelt of stones and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes,
dogged and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer able to
proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies from the main
line they did no harm to their assailants, for the Acarnanians had
only to retire and they had quickly gained their strongholds. It was
too severe a task, Agesilaus thought, to force his way through the
narrow pass so sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge
that portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these were
pretty numerous. The range of hills on this side was more accessible
to heavy infantry and horse alike. During the interval needed for the
inspection of victims, the Acarnanians kept plying them with javelins
and bullets, and, coming into close proximity, wounded man after man.
But presently came the word of command, "Advance!" and the fifteen-
years-service men of the heavy infantry[7] ran forward, accompanied by
the cavalry, at a round pace, the general himself steadily following
with the rest of the column. Those of the Acarnanians who had crept
down the mountain side at that instant in the midst of their
sharpshooting turned and fled, and as they climbed the steep, man
after man was slain. When, however, the top of the pass was reached,
there stood the hoplites of the Acarnanians drawn up in battle line,
and supported by the mass of their light infantry. There they steadily
waited, keeping up a continuous discharge of missiles the while, or
launching their long spears; whereby they dealt wounds to the cavalry
troopers and death in some cases to the horses. But when they were all
but within the clutches of the advancing heavy infantry[8] of the
Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them; they swerved and fled, and
there died of them on that day about three hundred. So ended the

[7] I.e. "the first two ranks." See above, IV. v. 14.

[8] See "Ages." ii. 20, for an extraordinary discrepancy.

Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards making a tour of
the country, he visited it with fire and sword.[9] Occasionally, in
obedience to pressure put upon him by the Achaeans, he would assault
some city, but did not capture a single one. And now, as the season of
autumn rapidly approached, he prepared to leave the country; whereupon
the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, seeing that
not a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as yet been detached
from their opponents, begged him, as the smallest service he could
render them, at any rate to stay long enough in the country to prevent
the Acarnanians from sowing their corn. He answered that the course
they suggested ran counter to expediency. "You forget," he said, "that
I mean to invade your enemies again next summer; and therefore the
larger their sowing now, the stronger will be their appetite for peace
hereafter." With this retort he withdrew overland through Aetolia, and
by roads, moreover, which no army, small or great, could possibly have
traversed without the consent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians,
however, were only too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage,
cherishing hopes as they did that he would aid them to recover
Naupactus. On reaching Rhium[10] he crossed the gulf at that point and
returned homewards, the more direct passage from Calydon to
Peloponnesus being effectually barred by an Athenian squadron
stationed at Oeniadae.

[9] Or lit. "burning and felling."

[10] Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called).


B.C. 389-388.[1] On the expiration of winter, and in fulfilment of his
promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out the ban once more with
early spring to invade the Acarnanians. The latter were apprised of
his intention, and, being persuaded that owing to the midland
situation of their cities they would just as truly be blockaded by an
enemy who chose to destroy their corn as they would be if besieged
with entrenchments in regular form, they sent ambassadors to
Lacedaemon, and made peace with the Achaeans and alliance with the
Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page of history concerning the
affairs of Arcarnania.

[1] According to others, B.C. 390.

To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of the
Lacedaemonians[2] that no expedition against Athens or Boeotia would
be safe so long as a state so important and so close to their own
frontier as Argos remained in open hostility behind them. Accordingly
they called out the ban against Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that
the duty of leadership devolved on him, and, moreover, that the
sacrifices before crossing the frontier were favourable, he went to
Olympia and consulted the will of the god. "Would it be lawful to
him," he inquired, "not to accept the holy truce, on the ground that
the Argives made the season for it[3] depend not on a fixed date, but
on the prospect of a Lacedaemonian invasion?" The god indicated to the
inquirer that he might lawfully repudiate any holy truce which was
fraudulently antedated.[4] Not content with this, the young king, on
leaving Olympia, went at once to Delphi, and at that shrine put the
same question to Apollo: "Were his views in accordance with his
Father's as touching the holy truce?"--to which the son of Zeus made
answer: "Yea, altogether in accordance."[5]

[2] Or, "It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians."

[3] I.e. "the season of the Carneia."

[4] Or, "wrongfully put forward." See below, V. i. 29; iii. 28; Paus.
III. v. 8; Jebb. "Att. Or." i. p. 131; Grote, "H. G." ix. 494
foll.; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 315; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3.

[5] Grote; cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 33.

Then without further hesitation, picking up his army at Phlius (where,
during his absence to visit the temples, the troops had been
collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the enemy's territory. The
Argives, on their side, perceiving that they would be unable to hinder
his advance, in accordance with their custom sent a couple of heralds,
garlanded, and presented their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis
answered them curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice
of their plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward,
causing thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the
rural districts and the capital itself.

But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening in the
Argive territory--just at the moment when the after-dinner libation
had been poured out--the god sent an earthquake; and with one consent
the Lacedaemonians, beginning with the officers of the royal quarters,
sang the sacred hymn of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected
to retreat, arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once
before, Agis had retired from Elis. But Agesipolis held another view:
if the god had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was
meditating invasion, he should have understood that the god forbade
his entrance; but now, when the invasion was a thing effected, he must
needs take it as a signal of his approval.[6] Accordingly next morning
he sacrificed to Poseidon, and advanced a short distance further into
the country.

[6] Or, "interpret the signal as a summons to advance."

The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos[7] was still fresh in
men's minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the soldiers
how close his predecessor had advanced to the fortification walls; or
again, how far he had gone in ravaging the open country--not unlike a
competitor in the pentathlon,[8] eager to cap the performance of his
rival in each event. On one occasion it was only the discharge of
missiles from the towers which forced him to recross the trenches
round the walls; on another, profiting by the absence of the majority
of the Argives in Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates
that their officers actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on
the point of entering, in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might pour
into the town in company, and these Boeotian troopers were forced to
cling, like bats to a wall, under each coign of vantage beneath the
battlements. Had it not been for the accidental absence of the
Cretans,[9] who had gone off on a raid to Nauplia, without a doubt
numbers of men and horses would have been shot down. At a later date,
while encamping in the neighbourhood of the Enclosures,[10] a thunder-
bolt fell into his camp. One or two men were struck, while others died
from the effect of the concussion on their brains. At a still later
period he was anxious to fortify some sort of garrison outpost in the
pass of Celusa,[11] but upon offering sacrifice the victims proved
lobeless,[12] and he was constrained to lead back and disband his army
--not without serious injury inflicted on the Argives, as the result
of an invasion which had taken them wholly by surprise.

[7] See above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

[8] The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of
five contests, in the following order--(1) leaping, (2) discus-
throwing, (3) javelin-throwing, (4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf.
Simonides, {alma podokeien diskon akonta palen}, where, "metri
gratia," the order is inverted. The competitors were drawn in
pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round or heat
was called the "ephedros." The successful athletes of the pairs,
that is, those who had won any three events out of five, would
then again be drawn against each other, and so on until only two
were left, between whom the final heat took place. See, for an
exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy Gardner, "The
Pentathlon of the Greeks" ("Journal of Hellenic Studies," vol. i.
9, p. 210 foll. pl. viii.), from whom this note is taken.

[9] See Thuc. vii. 57.

[10] {peri tas eirktas}--what these were no one knows, possibly a
stone quarry used as a prison. Cf. "Cyrop." III. i. 19; "Mem." II.
i. 5; see Grote, "H. G." ix. 497; Paus. III. v.. 8.

[11] Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382.

[12] I.e. "hopeless." See above, III. iv. 15.


394 B.C. Such were the land operations in the war. Meanwhile another
series of events was being enacted on the sea and within the seaboard
cities; and these I will now narrate in detail. But I shall confine my
pen to the more memorable incidents, and others of less account I
shall pass over.

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the
Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement of Cnidus, commenced a tour of
inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from
them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan
governors.[1] Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the
citizens that they had no intention of establishing fortress citadels
within their walls, or in any way interfering with their self-
government.[2] Such words fell soothingly upon the ears of those to
whom they were addressed; the proposals were courteously accepted; all
were eager to present Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and
hospitality. The satrap, indeed, was only applying the instructions of
his master Conon on these matters--who had taught him that if he acted
thus all the states would be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed
any intention to enslave them, the smallest of them would, as Conon
insisted, be capable of causing a world of trouble, and the chances
were, if apprehensions were once excited, he would find himself face
to face with a coalition of united Hellas. To these admonitions
Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

[1] Lit. "the Laconian harmosts."

[2] See Hicks, 70, "Honours to Konon," Inscript. found at Erythrae in
Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84.

Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented Conon with a
fleet of forty sail,[3] and having further instructed him to meet him
at Sestos,[4] set off himself by land along the coast to visit his own
provinces. For here it should be mentioned that his old enemy
Dercylidas happened to be in Abydos at the time of the sea-fight;[5]
nor had he at a later date suffered eclipse with the other
governors,[6] but on the contrary, had kept tight hold of Abydos and
still preserved it in attachment to Lacedaemon. The course he had
adopted was to summon a meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a
speech as follows: "Sirs, to-day it is possible for you, who have
before been friends to my city, to appear as benefactors of the
Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove faithful to his friends in the
heyday of their good fortune is no great marvel; but to prove
steadfast when his friends are in misfortune--that is a service
monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. It does not follow
that, because we have been defeated in a great sea-fight, we are
therefore annihilated.[7] Certainly not. Even in old days, you will
admit, when Athens was mistress of the sea, our state was not
powerless to benefit friends or chastise enemies. Moreover, in
proportion as the rest of the cities have joined hands with fortune to
turn their backs upon us, so much the more certainly will the grandeur
of your fidelity shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that
we may find ourselves blockaded by land and sea?--let him consider
that at present there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the seas, and if
the barbarian attempts to clutch the empire of the sea, Hellas will
not sit by and suffer it; so that, if only in self-defence, she must
inevitably take your side."

[3] See Diod. xiv. 83.

[4] See above, "Hell." II. i. 27 foll.

[5] See above, "Hell." IV. iii. 3.

[6] Lit. "harmosts."

[7] Or, "we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us."

To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather responded with
willingness approaching enthusiasm--extending the hand of fellowship
to the ex-governors, some of whom were already flocking to Abydos as a
harbour of refuge, whilst others they sent to summon from a distance.

So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had been collected,
Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos--lying, as it does, not
more than a mile[8] distant, directly facing Abydos. There he not only
set about collecting those who held lands in the Chersonese through
Lacedaemonian influence, but extended his welcome also to the
governors[9] who had been driven out of European states.[10] He
insisted that, if they came to think of it, not even was their case
desperate, reminding them that even in Asia, which originally belonged
to the Persian monarch, places were to be found--such as the little
state of Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administering their
affairs, unsubjected to the king of Persia. "But," he added, "if you
want a strong impregnable position, I cannot conceive what better you
can find than Sestos. Why, it would need a combined naval and military
force to invest that port." By these and such like arguments he
rescued them from the lethargy of despair.

[8] Lit. "eight stades."

[9] Lit. "harmosts."

[10] See Demos. "de Cor." 96.

Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so conditioned, he gave
them to understand that unless they chose to eject the Lacedaemonians,
he would bring war to bear upon them; and when they refused to obey,
having first assigned to Conon as his business to keep the sea closed
against them, he proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the
men of Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer the fulfilment of
his object--which was their reduction--he set off home himself and
left it to Conon the while so to conciliate the Hellespontine states
that as large a naval power as possible might be mustered against the
coming spring. In his wrath against the Lacedaemonians, in return for
the treatment he had received from them, his paramount object was to
invade their territory and exact what vengeance he could.

B.C. 393. The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but
with the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet
fully manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their
way through the islands to Melos.[11] This island was to serve as a
base of operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he
sailed down to Pherae[12] and ravaged that district, after which he
made successive descents at various other points on the seaboard, and
did what injury he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless
character of the coast, coupled with the enemy's facility of
reinforcement and his own scarcity of supplies, he very soon turned
back and sailed away, until finally he came to moorings in the harbour
of Phoenicus in Cythera. The occupants of the city of the Cytherians,
in terror of being taken by storm, evacuated the walls. To dismiss
these under a flag of truce across to Laconia was his first step; his
second was to repair the fortress in question and to leave a garrison
in the island under an Athenian governor--Nicophemus. After this he
set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he delivered an exhortation
to the allies begging them to prosecute the war vigorously, and to
show themselves faithful to the Great King; and so, having left them
all the moneys he had with him, set off on his voyage home.

[11] See Lys. xix. "de bon. Arist." 19 foll.; and Hicks, 71, "Honours
to Dionysios I. and his court"; Grote, "H. G." ix. 453.

[12] Mod. Kalamata.

But Conon had a proposal to make:--If Pharnabazus would allow him to
keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first place, to support it
free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his
own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild
their long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus. No heavier
blow, he insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. "In this
way, I can assure you," he added, "you will win the eternal gratitude
of the Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians,
since at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they
have bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so far weighed
with Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and
further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus
it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a
large portion of the walls--partly by lending his own crews, and
partly by giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all
the necessary expenses. There were other portions of the walls which
the Athenians and Boeotians and other states raised as a joint
voluntary undertaking.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the funds left
them by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet--the command of which they
entrusted to their admiral Agathinus--and so were undisputed masters
of the sea within the gulf round Achaia and Lechaeum.

B.C. 393-391. The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted out a fleet
under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in an attack of no great
moment, lost his life, and Pollis,[13] his second in command, was
presently in his turn obliged to retire, being wounded, whereupon
Herippidas took command of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus
the Corinthian, who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the
Lacedaemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias succeeded
to Herippidas's fleet, and it was then the turn of that admiral to
dominate the gulf.[14]

[13] See "Hell." I. i. 23.

[14] According to Grote ("H. G." ix. 471, note 2), this section
summarises the Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian
Gulf from the late autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of
Teleutias in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of
the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, "Hell." IV. iv. 19.

B.C. 392. The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the proceedings of
Conon. They knew that he was not only restoring the fortifications of
Athens by help of the king's gold, but maintaining a fleet at his
expense besides, and conciliating the islands and seaboard cities
towards Athens. If, therefore, they could indoctrinate Tiribazus--who
was a general of the king--with their sentiments, they believed they
could not fail either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at
any rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon's navy. With this
intention they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus:[15] his orders were to
carry out this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace between
Lacedaemon and the king. The Athenians, getting wind of this, sent a
counter-embassy, consisting of Hermogenes, Dion, Callisthenes, and
Callimedon, with Conon himself. They at the same time invited the
attendance of ambassadors from the allies, and there were also present
representatives of the Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they
had arrived at their destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus
the object of his visit: he wished, if possible, to cement a peace
between the state he represented and the king--a peace, moreover,
exactly suited to the aspirations of the king himself; in other words,
the Lacedaemonians gave up all claim to the Hellenic cities in Asia as
against the king, while for their own part they were content that all
the islands and other cities should be independent. "Such being our
unbiassed wishes," he continued, "for what earthly reason should [the
Hellenes or] the king go to war with us? or why should he expend his
money? The king is guaranteed against attack on the part of Hellas,
since the Athenians are powerless apart from our hegemony, and we are
powerless so long as the separate states are independent." The
proposals of Antalcidas sounded very pleasantly in the ears of
Tiribazus, but to the opponents of Sparta they were the merest talk.
The Athenians were apprehensive of an agreement which provided for the
independence of the cities in the islands, whereby they might be
deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The Thebans, again, were
afraid of being compelled to let the Boeotian states go free. The
Argives did not see how such treaty contracts and covenants were
compatible with the realisation of their own great object--the
absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to pass that this
peace[16] proved abortive, and the representatives departed each to
his own home.

[15] See Plut. "Ages." xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27); and for the date
B.C. 392 (al. B.C. 393) see Grote, "H. G." ix. 498.

[16] See Andoc. "de Pace"; Jebb, "Attic Or." i. 83, 128 foll. Prof.
Jebb assigns this speech to B.C. 390 rather than B.C. 391. See
also Grote, "H. G." ix. 499; Diod. xiv. 110.

Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with his own
safety to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians without the
concurrence of the king--a scruple which did not prevent him from
privately presenting Antalcidas with a sum of money, in hopes that
when the Athenians and their allies discovered that the Lacedaemonians
had the wherewithal to furnish a fleet, they might perhaps be more
disposed to desire peace. Further, accepting the statements of the
Lacedaemonians as true, he took on himself to secure the person of
Conon, as guilty of wrongdoing towards the king, and shut him up.[17]
That done, he set off up country to the king to recount the proposals
of Lacedaemon, with his own subsequent capture of Conon as a
mischievous man, and to ask for further guidance on all these matters.

[17] See Diod. xiv. 85; and Corn. Nep. 5.

On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent down Struthas
to take charge of the seaboard district. The latter, however, was a
strong partisan of Athens and her allies, since he found it impossible
to forget the long list of evils which the king's country had suffered
at the hands of Agesilaus; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting the
hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves with his
friendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with him by force
of arms.

B.C. 391.[18] That general crossed over and established his base of
operations in Ephesus and the towns in the plain of the Maeander--
Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilleum--and proceeded to harry the king's
territory, sparing neither live nor dead chattels. But as time went
on, Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed
recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian brought up his
supports on each occasion, despatched a body of cavalry into the
plain. Their orders were to gallop down and scour the plain, making a
clean sweep[19] of all they could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it
befell, had just finished breakfast, and was returning to the mess
with Thersander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good
flute-player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim to
personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly advance of the
supports and the paucity of the vanguard, appeared suddenly at the
head of a large body of cavalry, all in orderly array. Thibron and
Thersander were the first to be cut down, and when these had fallen
the rest of the troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in
which man after man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived to
escape into the friendly cities; still larger numbers owed their
safety to their late discovery of the business on hand. Nor, indeed,
was this the first time the Spartan commander had rushed to the field,
without even issuing a general order. So ends the history of these

[18] Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390.

[19] See "Hell." VII. i. 40; "Cyrop." I. iv. 17; III. iii. 23; "Anab."
VI. iii. 3.

B.C. 390.[20] We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a party of
Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They insisted that it
was not equitable to allow the Athenians to subjugate Rhodes and thus
build up so vast a power. The Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact
that the fate of Rhodes depended on which party in the state
prevailed: if the democracy were to dominate, the whole island must
fall into the hands of Athens; if the wealthier classes,[21] into
their own. Accordingly they fitted out for them a fleet of eight
vessels, and put Ecdicus in command of it as admiral.

[20] Grote, "H. G." ix. 504; al. B.C. 391.

[21] Or, "the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole
island of Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of
Athens or of themselves, according as the democracy or the
wealthier classes respectively dominated."

At the same time they despatched another officer on board these
vessels named Diphridas, on a separate mission. His orders were to
cross over into Asia and to secure the states which had received
Thibron. He was also to pick up the survivors of Thibron's army, and
with these troops, aided by a second army which he would collect from
any other quarter open to him, he was to prosecute the war against
Struthas. Diphridas followed out his instructions, and amongst other
achievements was fortunate enough to capture Tigranes,[22] the son-in-
law of Struthas, with his wife, on their road to Sardis. The sum paid
for their ransom was so large that he at once had the wherewithal to
pay his mercenaries. Diphridas was no less attractive than his
predecessor Thibron; but he was of a more orderly temperament,
steadier, and incomparably more enterprising as a general; the secret
of this superiority being that he was a man over whom the pleasures of
the body exercised no sway. He became readily absorbed in the business
before him--whatever he had to do he did it with a will.

[22] See "Anab." VII. viii. 9 for a similar exploit.

Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the democracy in
Rhones were entirely masters of the situation. They were dominant by
land and sea; indeed they possessed a fleet twice the size of his own.
He was therefore content to keep quiet in Cnidus until the
Lacedaemonians, perceiving that his force was too small to allow him
to benefit their friends, determined to relieve him. With this view
they ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed his
squadron (at present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and Lechaeum),[23]
and to feel his way round to Ecdicus: that officer he was to send
home. For himself, he was to undertake personally to protect the
interests of all who cared to be their friends, whilst injuring the
enemy by every possible means.

[23] See above, IV. viii. 11.

So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added some vessels
to his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point Ecdicus returned home,
and Teleutias, continuing his voyage, reached Rhodes, at the head now
of seven-and-twenty vessels. It was during this portion of the voyage
that he fell in with Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was
sailing from Athens to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally
Evagoras.[24] The whole flotilla fell into the Spartan's hands--a
curious instance, it may be added, of cross purposes on the part of
both belligerents. Here were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly
terms with the king, engaged in sending an allied force to support
Evagoras, who was at open war with him; and here again was Teleutias,
the representative of a people at war with Persia, engaged in
crippling a fleet which had been despatched on a mission hostile to
their adversary. Teleutias put back into Cnidus to dispose of his
captives, and so eventually reached Rhodes, where his arrival brought
timely aid to the party in favour of Lacedaemon.

[24] See Diod. xiv. 98; Hicks, 72; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p. 397;
Isoc. "Evag." 54-57; Paus. I. iii. 1; Lys. "de bon. Ar." 20; Dem.
p. 161.

B.C. 389.[25] And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the belief
that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy,
despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, with a fleet of
forty sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from bringing aid to
Rhodes, and for good reasons. In Rhodes the Lacedaemonian party had
hold of the fortress, and would be out of reach of his attack,
especially as Teleutias was close at hand to aid them with his fleet.
On the other hand, his own friends ran no danger of succumbing to the
enemy, as they held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and
they had established their superiority in the field. Consequently he
made for the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any rival power, he
hoped to achieve some stroke of good fortune for his city. Thus, in
the first place, having detected the rivalries existing between
Medocus,[26] the king of the Odrysians, and Seuthes,[27] the rival
ruler of the seaboard, he reconciled them to each other, and made them
friends and allies of Athens; in the belief that if he secured their
friendship the Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show
greater proclivity to Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs
not only in Europe but as regards the states in Asia also, thanks to
the friendly attitude of the king to his fellow-citizens, he sailed
into Byzantium and sold the tithe-duty levied on vessels arriving from
the Euxine. By another stroke he converted the oligarchy of Byzantium
into a democracy. The result of this was that the Byzantine demos[28]
were no longer sorry to see as vast a concourse of Athenians in their
city as possible. Having so done, and having further won the
friendship of the men of Calchedon, he set sail south of the
Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities devoted to
Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He was therefore loth to
attack any of the former until he had organised a force within the
latter. This force consisted of four hundred hoplites, furnished from
his own vessels, and a corps of exiles from the different cities who
had sought shelter in Mytilene; to which he added a stout contingent,
the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred the ardour
of the several contingents by suitable appeals: representing to the
men of Mytilene that by their capture of the cities they would at once
become the chiefs and patrons of Lesbos; to the exiles he made it
appear that if they would but unite to attack each several city in
turn, they might all reckon on their particular restoration; while he
needed only to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos
meant not only the attachment of a friendly city, but the discovery of
a mine of wealth. The exhortations ended and the contingents
organised, he advanced against Methymna.

[25] Grote, "H. G." ix. 507.

[26] Al. Amedocus.

[27] For Seuthes, see above, "Hell." III. ii. 2, if the same.

[28] For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408
B.C. and 405 B.C., see above, "Hell." I. iii. 18; II. ii. 2); for
the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. "c. Lept." 475; for
the admission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378
B.C., see Hicks, 68; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 19; and for B.C. 363,
Isocr. "Phil." 53; Diod. xv. 79; and for its commercial
prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47.

Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian governor at the time,
on hearing of the meditated attack of Thrasybulus, had taken a body of
marines from his vessels, and, aided by the citizens of Methymna
themselves, along with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that
place, advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was
fought and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of the
exiles of his party.

As a result[29] of his victory the Athenian general succeeded in
winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, where adhesion was
refused, he could at least raise supplies for his soldiers by
freebooting expeditions, and so hastened to reach his goal, which was
the island of Rhodes. His chief concern was to support as powerful an
army as possible in those parts, and with this object he proceeded to
levy money aids, visiting various cities, until he finally reached
Aspendus, and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money was
safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work completed, when,
taking occasion of some depredations[30] of the soldiers on the
farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit of irritation burst into
the general's quarters at night and butchered him in his tent.

[29] According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached.

[30] See Diod. xiv. 94.

So perished Thrasybulus,[31] a good and great man by all admission. In
room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius,[32] who was despatched to
take command of the fleet. And now the Lacedaemonians--alive to the
fact that the sale of the Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in
Byzantium by Athens; aware also that as long as the Athenians kept
hold on Calchedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was
secured to them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their friend)
--felt that the state of affairs demanded their serious attention.
They attached no blame indeed to Dercylidas. Anaxibius, however,
through the friendship of the ephors, contrived to get himself
appointed as governor, on a mission to Abydos. With the requisite
funds and ships, he promised to exert such hostile pressure upon
Athens that at least her prospects in the Hellespont would cease to be
so sunny. His friends the ephors granted him in return for these
promises three ships of war and funds to support a thousand
mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his mission. Reaching
Abydos, he set about improving his naval and military position. First
he collected a foreign brigade, by help of which he drew off some of
the Aeolid cities from Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot a series of
retaliatory expeditions against the states which attacked Abydos,
marching upon them and ravaging their territories; and lastly, manning
three vessels besides those which he already held in the harbour of
Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all the merchant ships of
Athens or of her allies which he could lay hands on.

[31] "Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than any one else,
Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise,
generous, and harmonious working, after renovation."--Grote, "H.
G." ix. 509.

[32] For this statesman, see Demosth. "c. Timocr." 742; Andoc. "de
Myst." 133; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 41, and Mr. Kenyon's notes ad
loc.; Aristoph. "Eccles." 102, and the Schol. ad loc.; Diod. xiv.
99; Curtius, "H. G." Eng tr. iv. 280.

Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing lest the
fair foundation laid for them by Thrasybulus in the Hellespont should
be ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight vessels and twelve hundred
peltasts. The majority of them[33] consisted of troops which he had
commanded at Corinth. In explanation it may be stated that the
Argives, when once they had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it
with Argos, gave out they had no further need of Iphicrates and his
troops; the real fact being that he had put to death some of the
partisans of Argos.[34] And so it was he turned his back on Corinth
and found himself at home in Athens at the present crisis.

[33] Or, "The mass of them."

[34] See Grote, "H. G." ix. p. 491 note. The "Argolising" or philo-
Argeian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above,
"Hell." IV. iv. 6.

B.C. 389-388. When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and
Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of
guerilla or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on,
information reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus,
accompanied by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and
two hundred Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won
the friendly adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after
establishing a garrison in that place he would make the best of his
way back, if only to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore
crossed in the night, selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast,
from which he scaled the hills above the town and planted himself in
ambuscade within their folds. The triremes which brought him across
had orders at break of day to coast up northwards along the
Chersonese, which would suggest the notion that he was only out on one
of his customary voyages to collect money. The sequel more than
fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began his return march, and if
report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding that the victims were
against his marching that day; contemptuously disregarding the
warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along through a friendly
country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides which, those whom
he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage to Proconnesus:
hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march. On his side
Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of Anaxibius
lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his lair,
waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van was
safely landed in the plain of Cremaste, at the point where the gold
mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and
Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that
instant Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the
Spartan at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no
hope of escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his
attenuated column. The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would
never be able to come back to his aid up the face of that acclivity;
besides which, he observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at
sight of the ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and
spoke as follows: "Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where
honour bids me; but for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and
save yourselves[35] before the enemy can close with us." As the words
died on his lips he took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer
his heavy shield, and there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and
fell; not quite alone, for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite
youth, and of the Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos
from their several cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the
pair. The rest fled, dropping down one by one as the army pursued them
to the walls of the city. The death-roll amounted to something like
fifty hoplites of the Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After
this exploit Iphicrates returned to the Chersonese.[36]

[35] Or, "sauve qui peut."

[36] See Hicks, 76; and below, "Hell." V. i. 31.



B.C. 388. Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at
least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in
Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up
to this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was
plainly to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the
concurrence of the ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to
plunder Attica.[1] The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of
hoplites under their general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against
the Aeginetans,[2] and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with
ten warships. Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the
islands in question of contributions, had chanced to reach a point
where he received information of the turn in affairs with regard to
the construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of
the beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the
enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the
offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.

[1] Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war;" or, more
prosaically, "issued letters of marque." See Grote, "H. G." ix.

[2] I.e. in Aegina as an {epiteikhisma}.

After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval
force was transferred into his successor's hands, and under the
happiest auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the
seashore to start on his homeward voyage there was not one among his
soldiers who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral.
Here one presented him with a crown, and there another with a victor's
wreath; and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed
anchor, threw garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing
with prayerful lips. I am well aware that in the above incident I have
no memorable story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but
in all sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in
the inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in
his subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man's
work more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure.[3]

[3] See Grote, "H. G." ix. 518: "The ideal of government as it
presented itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or
something like it," {to ethelonton arkhein}. Cf. "Cyrop." passim,
"Heiro," and his various other compositions.

The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the
fleet, set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve
vessels in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now
installed as governor of that island. In consequence of this chance
the Athenian troops inside the fortres were more blockaded than the
Aeginetans themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the
Athenian assembly, in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and
the garrison, after four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back.
But this was no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas
and the privateers again. To operate aganst these they fitted out
thirteen vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was
still in Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral,
Antalcidas; they believed that they could not find a better mode of
gratifying Tiribazus. Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in
order to pick up the vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At
this point he sent back Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and
appointed his vice-admiral Nicolochus to command the remainder of the

Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the
course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the
territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The
Athenian generals[4] on their side, collecting from Samothrace,
Thasos, and the fortresses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of
Tenedos; but, finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to
Abydos, they selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to
blockade him and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-
and-thirty vessels under their joint command.

[4] And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, S. 25;
above, IV. viii. 39.

Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian
admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought
shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at
once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst
Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed
away. Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light
to prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness.
Gorgopas instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern
for his guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a
little space, so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his
presence. In place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by
a clink of stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the
waves[5]; and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the
coast, off Cape Zoster[6] in Attica, the Spartan sounded the
bugle-note for the charge. Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act
of discharging their crews, others were still getting to their
moorings, whilst others were as yet only bearing down to land. The
engagement was fought by the light of the moon, and Gorgopas captured
four triremes, which he tied astern, and so set sail with his prizes
in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian squadron made their
escape into the harbour of Piraeus.

[5] Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding
motion of the oars."

[6] I.e. "Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, "Geog. of
Greece," pp. 78, 372.

It was after these events that Chabrias[7] commenced his voyage to
Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of
eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased
by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus
reinforced, the admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and
secreted himself in ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground
some way beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as
prearranged, the Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command
of Demaenetus, and began mounting up between two and three miles[8]
beyond the Kerakleion at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon
reached Gorgopas, who sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans
and the marines of his vessels, being further accompanied by eight
Spartans who happened to be with him. Not content with these he issued
orders inviting any of the ships' crews, who were free men, to join
the relief party. A large number of these sailors responded. They
armed themselves as best they could, and the advance commenced. When
the vanguard were well past the ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang
up from their hiding-place, and poured a volley of javelins and stones
upon the enemy. At the same moment the hoplites, who had
disembarked,[9] were advancing, so that the Spartan vanguard, in the
absence of anything like collective action, were speedily cut down,
and among them fell Gorgopas with the Lacedaemonians. At their fall
the rest of course turned and fled. One hundred and fifty Aeginetans
were numbered among the slain, while the loss incurred by the
foreigners, metics, and sailors who had joined the relief party,
reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athnenians sailed the
sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would anything
induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus--even under
pressure--since he had no pay to give.

[7] According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in
Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24.

[8] Lit. "about sixteen stades."

[9] Or, reading {oi anabebekotes}, "who had scaled the height." See
Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 364.

Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to
take command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who
had come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed
them thus: "Soldiers, I am back again, but I bring with me no money.
Yet if God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to
supply you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as
I find myself in command of you, I have but one prayer--that your
lives may be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of
existence, perhaps it would astonish you if I said I would rather you
should have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two
days' starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in
old days to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it
shall be; where your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark
the luxury of your general; but if at other times you see him bearing
up against cold and heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the
lesson to yourselves and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you
do aught of this for self-mortification's sake, but that you may
derive some after-blessing from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own
mother-city, be to you an example. Her good fortune is reputed to
stand high. That you know; and you know too, that she purchased her
glory and her greatness not by faint-heartedness, but by choosing to
suffer pain and incur dangers in the day of need. 'Like city,' I say,
'like citizens.' You, too, as I can bear you witness, have been in
times past brave; but to-day must we strive to be better than
ourselves. So shall we share our pains without repining, and when
fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the sweetest thing of all
surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian, for the sake of
hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source to which honour
pre-eminently invites us; since, I need not remind you, abundance won
from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutrition only, but a
feast of glory the wide world over."

So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what
orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The
general's sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then,
my men; go now, as doubtless you were minded, and take your evening
meal, and next provide yourselves, please, with one day's food. After
that repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand,
whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, when the men
returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of
night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers
rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he
pushed forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one
supposes that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition--with
but twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a large fleet--he
should consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm
persuasion that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their
navy in the harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of
finding warships riding at anchor--even so, there was less danger, he
conjectured, in attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten
elsewhere; for, whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors
would certainly be quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine
that the captains and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and
the crews located here and there in different quarters.

This minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs[10]
distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the
first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral's
orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any
merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging[11] their own
vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings
they must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had
got their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the
harbour; those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they
could and capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the
Deigma quay,[12] where they seized hold of various traders and pilots
and deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral
carried out his programme.

[10] Lit. "five or six stades."

[11] See Hartman, "Anal. Xen." pp. 365, 366.

[12] See Grote ("H. G." ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of
Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote
"H. G." ix. 351. See below, "Pol. Ath." i. 17; "Rev." iii. 13.

As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was
happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant,
others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were
off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the
rescue at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the
apprehension being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off
the captured vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his
triremes to convoy them thither; with the rest he followed along the
coast of Attica, and emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the
harbour, captured a number of fishing smacks, and passage boats laden
with passengers crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on
reaching Sunium he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other
merchandise. After these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where
he sold his prizes, and with the proceeds was able to provide his
troops with a month's pay, and for the future was free to cruise about
and make what reprisals chance cast in his way. By such a procedure he
was able to support a full quota of mariners on board his squadron,
and procured to himself the prompt and enthusiastic service of his

B.C. 388-387. Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with
Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the
alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the
Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the
king dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolochus,
was being blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus[13] in
Abydos, he set off at once by land for that city. Being come thither
he took the fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a
story that he had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a
matter of fact he came to anchorage in Percote and there kept quiet.
Meanwhile the Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and
Leontichus and Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot
pursuit towards Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the
Spartan veered round and returned to Abydos, trusting to information
brought him of the approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan[14] and
Italian squadron of twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and
incorporate with his own.

[13] See above; Lysias, "de bon. Arist." (Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 327).

[14] See below, VI. ii. 4 foll; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.

A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus[15] (of Collytus) was making
his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect a
junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the
approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his
marines on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered
them to make up their full complements, where defective, from the
remaining vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all
possible secrecy. As soon as the enemy's vessels came sailing past he
gave chase; and they catching sight of him took to flight. With his
swiftest sailors he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering
his vanguard to let these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But
when the foremost had fallen into his clutches, the enemy's hinder
vessels, seeing their leaders taken one by one, out of sheer
despondency fell an easy prey to the slower sailors of the foe, so
that not one of the eight vessels escaped.

[15] His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian
confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 17;
Demos. "de. Cor." p. 301; Arist. "Rhet." ii. 23; Demos. "c.
Timocr." 742.

Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and
again another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district
as lay under the control of Tiribazus. The full quota of the
contingent was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes
(which whom Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the
absence of Pharnabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up
country on the occasion of his marriage with the king's daughter. With
this fleet, which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more
than eighty sail, Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not
only to cut off the passage of vessels bound to Athens from the
Euxine, but to convoy them into the harbours of Sparta's allies.

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's
fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture. To
be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote
possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the
person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a
state of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from
Aegina. On all these grounds the Athenians became passionately
desirous of peace.[16] The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour
with the war for various reasons--what with their garrison duties, one
mora at Lechaeum and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of
keeping watch and ward on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if
disaffected to prevent their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity
of annoyance[17] of which Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives
had a strong appetite for peace; they knew that the ban had been
called out against them, and, it was plain, that no fictitious
alteration of the calendar would any longer stand them in good stead.
Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons calling on all who were willing
to listen to the terms of peace sent down by the king[18] to present
themselves, the invitation was promptly accepted. At the opening of
the conclave[19] Tiribazus pointed to the king's seal attached to the
document, and proceeded to read the contents, which ran as follows:

[16] See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens
and the "Theorikon," "H. G." ix. 525.

[17] Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks."

[18] See Hicks, 76.

[19] At Sardis, doubtless.

"The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the
islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest
of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both
small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros,
which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the
parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war
against him or them with those who share my views. This will I do by
land and by sea, with ships and with money."

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the
several states proceeded to report the same to their respective
governments. One and all of these took the oaths[20] to ratify and
confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans, who
claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim
Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise
conformity with the words of the king's edict, which insisted on "the
future autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit
them. To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that
the instructions they had received were different. "Pray go, then,"
Agesilaus retorted, "and ask the question; and you may inform your
countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from
the treaty." The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of
hatred to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the
consent of the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings
for crossing the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea.
From Tegea he despatched some of the knights right and left to vist
the perioeci and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent
commanders of foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar
errand. But before he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes
arrived; the point was yielded, they would suffer the states to be
independent. Under these circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned
home, and the Thebans were forced to accept the truce unconditionally,
and to recognise the autonomy of the Boeotian cities.[21] But now the
Corinthians were by no means disposed to part with the garrison of the
Argives. Accordingly Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the
former he said, "if they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives," and
to the latter, "if they did not instantly quit Corinth," he would
march an army into their territories. The terror of both was so great
that the Argives marched out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again
left to herself;[22] whereupon the "butchers"[23] and their
accomplices in the deed of blood determined to retire from Corinth,
and the rest of the citizens welcomed back their late exiles

[20] At Sparta, doubtless.

[21] See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.

[22] See "Ages." ii. 21; Grote, "H. G." ix. 537.

[23] {oi sphageis}, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents
narrated above, "Hell." IV. iv. 2). See below, {ton bareon
demagogon}, "Hell." V. ii. 7; {oi kedomenoi tes Peloponnesou},
"Hell." VII. v. 1; above, {oi sphageis}, "Hell." III. ii. 27, of
the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. "c. Lept." 473.

Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by
their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the
immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces
being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of
peace for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to
the demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during
the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their
antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle of
glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas,[24] so called. As
guarantors of the peace presented by Hellas to the king, and as
administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had
added Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence of
the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes,[25] which meant the
gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out the ban
in case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they had put a stop
to the appopriation of that city by the Argives.

[24] Or, more correctly, the peace "under," or "at the date of," {ep
'Antalkidou}. See Grote, "H. G." x. 1, note 1.

[25] Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes."
See Grote, "H. G." x. 44.


B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in
conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, that they determined
to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had
borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves
less favourable to Lacedaemon than to her enemies.[1] Chastisement was
not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as
should render the like disloyalty impossible again.[2] As the first
step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the
Mantinaeans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole
ground that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their
enemies. Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to
time, had not escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn
to the Argives while at war with Lacedaemon; at other times their
refusal to furnish contingents during a campaign, on the pretext of
some holy truce or other;[3] or if they did reluctantly take the field
--the miserable inefficiency of their service. "But, more than that,"
they added, "we note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune
which may betide our state; the extravagant pleasure[4] you exhibit at
the sudden descent of some disaster."

[1] See Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 367 foll.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 129

[2] Or, "they determined to chastise . . . and reduce to such order
that disloyalty should be impossible."

[3] See above, "Hell." IV. ii. 16.

[4] Ib. IV. v. 18.

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said,[5] saw the expiration,
as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce,
consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore,
to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them.
Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war
on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to his
father[6] in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the
expedition--in spite of the cordial relations of his father
Pausanias[7] with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

[5] As to this point, see Curtius, "H. G." V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng.
trans.) There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v.
81, "When the Argives deserted the alliance [with Mantinea,
Athens, and Elis, making a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon
for fifty years] the Mantineans held out for a time, but without
the Argives they were helpless, and so they came to terms with the
Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims to supremacy over the
cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them. . . . These
changes were effected at the close of winter [418 B.C.] towards
the approach of spring [417 B.C.], and so ended the fourteenth
year of the war." Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the
Lacedaemonians attacked Mantinea within two years after the Peace
of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. According to Thuc. v. 82,
and "C. I. A." 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance
with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by
long walls was made," certain other states in Peloponnese being
privy to the project" (Thuc. v. 83)--an attempt frustrated by
Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of
alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was
formally signed in B.C. 416?

[6] I.e. Archidamus.

[7] See above, "Hell." III. v. 25.

B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's
territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to
raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round
the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching
parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As
soon as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty
in building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of
a huge supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful
harvest of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out
the city of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit
upon the expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size.[8] By erecting a barrier at
its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements
of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification
walls. Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and
refused their support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and
soon to totter to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop
it with pieces of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent
ruin of their tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water,
and in dread lest the fall at some point or other of the circular
wall[9] might deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they
signified their consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians
now steadily refused any form of truce, except on the further
condition that the Mantineans would suffer themselves to be broken up
and distributed into villages. They, looking the necessity in the
face, consented to do even that. The sympathisers with Argos among
them, and the leaders of their democracy, thought their fate was
sealed. Then the father treated with the son, Pausanias with
Agesipolis, on their behalf, and obtained immunity for them--sixty in
number--on condition that they should quit the city. The Lacedaemonian
troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning from the gates,
and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in their hands, in
spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less difficulty than
the Mantineans of the better classes themselves--a weighty testimony
to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In conclusion, the
wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts,[10] assuming
once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants. The first
feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down their
present houses and erecting others, yet when the owners[11] found
themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the
villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of
"those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn
which affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them,
not one commander of contingents,[12] but four, one for each village;
and the zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were
furnished from the several village centres, was far greater than it
had been under the democratic system. So the transactions in
connection with Mantinea were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one
lesson of wisdom was taught mankind--not to conduct a river through a
fortress town.

[8] I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, "Morea," III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan.
"Arcad." 8; Grote, "H. G." x. 48, note 2.

[9] Or, "in the circuit of the wall."

[10] See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and
Grote, "H. G." x. 51.

[11] Or, "holders of properties." The historian is referring not to
the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e.
the {Beltistoi}, and is not so partial as Grote supposes ("H. G."
x. 51 foll.)

[12] Technically {zenagoi}, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the
contingents of the several allies. See above, "Hell." III. v. 7;
Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold's note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, "ap.
Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities," s.v.; Muller, "Dorians,"
ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 125.

B.C. 384-383. To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius, seeing the
severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon
during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity
had come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the
fact that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home,
"their city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her
citizens flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner
had they been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of
Phlius now flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the
Lacedaemonians, alone of all men living, must not be admitted within
their gates." After listening to their story, the ephors agreed that
the matter demanded attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a
message to this effect; the Phliasian exiles were friends of
Lacedaemon; nor did it appear that they owed their exile to any
misdoing. Under the circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall
from banishment, not by force, but as a concession voluntarily
granted. When the matter was thus stated, the Phliasians were not
without alarm that an army might much upon Phlius, and a party inside
the town might admit the enemy within the walls; for within the walls
of Phlius were to be found many who, either as blood relations or for
other reasons, were partisans of the exiles, and as so often happens,
at any rate in the majority of states, there was a revolutionary party
who, in their ardour to reform, would welcome gladly their
restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a formal decree was
passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore to them all
undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being indemnified from
the treasury of the state; and in the event of any ambiguity or
question arising between the parties, the same to be determined before
a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs in connection
with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.

B.C. 383.[13] And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at
Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two
largest and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The
ephorate, after learning from them the object of their visit,
presented them to the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom
Cleigenes of Acanthus made a speech to this effect:

[13] Al. B.C. 382.

"Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, "are you aware
of a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas?[14] Few
here need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands
at the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the
citizens of Olynthus had already brought over several states by the
bribe of joint citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly
annexed some of the larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have
taken in hand further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the
king of the Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours
had shown compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more
distant communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither,
we left them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella
itself, the capital of Macedonia. Amyntas,[15] we saw plainly, must
ere long withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in
name an outcast from Macedonia.

[14] Or, "are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"

[15] For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr.
"Panegyr." 126, "Archid." 46.

"The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of
Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us
if we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military
contingent. Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing
better than to abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be
free and independent citizens; but if aid from without is going to
fail us, we too must follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians.
Why, even now they muster no less than eight hundred[16] heavy
infantry and a considerably larger body of light infantry, while their
cavalry, when we have joined them, will exceed one thousand men. At
the date of our departure we left embassies from Athens and Boeotia in
Olynthus, and we were told that the Olynthians themselves had passed a
formal resolution to return the compliment. They were to send an
embassy on their side to the aforesaid states to treat of an alliance.
And yet, if the power of the Athenians and the Thebans is to be
further increased by such an accession of strength, look to it," the
speaker added, "whether hereafter you will find things so easy to
manage in that quarter.

[16] See Grote, "H. G." x. 72; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. 12 (ch. xxxvii).

"They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore,
you can well believe, they can command the states within that
peninsula. If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those
states, you have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred
which they bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send
ambassadors along with us to apprise you of these matters.

"Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the
unification of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidifying of
a far larger power--a power destined, moreover, to become formidable
not on land only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil
itself supplies timber for shipbuilding,[17] and there are rich
revenues derived from numerous harbours and commercial centres?--it
cannot but be that abundance of food and abundance of population will
go hand in hand. Nor have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian
expansion; there are their neighbours to be thought of--the kingless
or independent Thracians. These are already to-day the devoted
servants of Olynthus, and when it comes to their being actually under
her, that means at once another vast accession of strength to her.
With the Thracians in her train, the gold mines of Pangaeus would
stretch out to her the hand of welcome.

[17] See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians,
B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III.,
father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds
us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis
were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her
dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, "P. E. A." p.
250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see
Hicks, 77; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 397, 423.

"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand
times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident
spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know,
who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the
proud thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of
Lacedaemon and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have
played our parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you
it is left to determine whether what we have described is worthy of
your concern. One only thing further you ought to recognise: the power
we have spoken of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states
which are involuntary participants in the citizenship of Olynthus
will, in prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily
fall away. On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded
together by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of
holding property in land--which have already become enactments; let
them discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of
conquerors (just as the Arcadians,[18] for instance, find it
profitable to march in your ranks, whereby they save their own
property and pillage their neighbours'); let these things come to
pass, and perhaps you may find the knot no longer so easy to unloose."

[18] For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov."
ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and
note 2, p. 197; also Grote, "H. G." x. 67 foll., 278 foll.

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the
allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best
course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies.
Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify the
Lacedaemonians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was
resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a
total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any
state, so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three
Aeginetan obols[19] a day per man; or where the contingent consisted
of cavalry, the pay given for one horseman was to be the equivalent to
that of four hoplites; while, in the event of any defaulting in
service, the Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state
of a stater per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the
deputies from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent,
these resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into
effect. Would it not be better, they asked, pending the mobilisation
of the troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force
from Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start
immediately. The effect would be instantaneous, for the states which
had not yet given in their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a
standstill, and those already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in
their alliance. These further resolutions being also passed, the
Lacedaemonians despatched Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of
neodamodes, with perioeci and Sciritae,[20] to the number of two
thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time in setting out, having obtained
leave from the ephors for his brother Phoebidas to follow later with
the remainder of the troops assigned to him. Pushing on himself to the
Thracian territory, he set about despatching garrisons to various
cities at their request. He also secured the voluntary adhesion of
Potidaea, although already a member of the Olynthian alliance; and
this town now served as his base of operations for carrying on war on
a scale adapted to his somewhat limited armament.

[19] I.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two
shillings for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196
grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided
into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols
of about 16 grains each." See Percy Gardner, "Types of Greek
Coins," "Hist. Int." p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol.
i. pp. 201, 202.

[20] Or, "new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae."

Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother's forces was duly
mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On
reaching Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the
gymnasium. Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in
office, Ismenias and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed,[21] being
the respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was
that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians,
would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the
other hand, was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient
intimacy was established between them, he made a proposal as follows:
"You have it in your power," he said, addressing Phoebidas, "this very
day to confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your
hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you
may rest assured Thebes will be completely under the thumb of
Lacedaemon and of us, your friends. At present, as you see, there is a
proclamation forbidding any Theban to take service with you against
Olynthus, but we will change all that. You have only to act with us as
we suggest, and we shall at once be able to furnish you with large
supplies of infantry and cavalry, so that you will join your brother
with a magnificent reinforcement, and pending his proposed reduction
of Olynthus, you will have accomplished the reduction of a far larger
state than that--to wit, this city of Thebes."

[21] See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 80: "We have little or no
information respecting the government of Thebes," etc. The "locus
classicus" seems to be Plut. "de Genio Socratis." See Freeman, op.
cit. ch. iv. S. 2, "Of the Boeotian League," pp. 154-184; and, in
reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170.

The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened to the
tempting proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far dearer to him than
life;[22] on the other hand, he had no reasoning capacity, and would
seem to have been deficient altogether in sound sense. The consent of
the Spartan secured, Leontiades bade him set his troops in motion, as
if everything were ready for his departure. "And anon, when the hour
is come," added the Theban, "I will be with you, and show you the way

[22] Or, "Renown was his mistress." See Grote, "H. G." x. 84.

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since
the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the
Thesmophoria.[23] It was noon of a hot summer's day; scarcely a soul
was stirring in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He
mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. He turned
him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having
posted Phoebidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the
gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel
without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to the
senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs, the
Lacedaemonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no cause
for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile
intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for
war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers
the polemarch to apprehend all persons suspected of capital crimes, I
hereby seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-formenter of war. I
call upon you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are
ranked with them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and
lead him away to the place appointed."

[23] An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and
Persephone ({to Thesmophoro}), who gave the first impulse to civil
society, lawful marriage, etc. See Herod. ii. 171; Diod. v. 5.

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented
themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in
the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge
at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest,
albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found that
Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed
dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the
views of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about
three hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen
in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedaemon.
There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly
incensed agaisnt Phoebidas, "who had failed to execute the orders
assigned to him by the state." Against this general indignation,
however, Agesilaus protested.[24] If mischief had been wrought to
Lacedaemon by this deed, it was just that the doer of it should be
punished; but, if good, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full
scope for impromptu acts of this character. "The sole point you have
to look to," he urged, "is whether what has been done is good or
evil." After this, however, Leontiades presented himself to the
assembly[25] and addressed the members as follows: "Sirs,
Lacedaemonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards you, before the
occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on your lips, since
time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness her friendly
bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your friends. Can
it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in the campaign
against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and balanced that
lukewarmness by on onslaught on the Phocians, whose sole crime was
cordiality to yourselves?[26] Nor is that all. In full knowledge that
you were likly to be engaged in war with Olynthus, she proceeded at
once to make an alliance with that city. So that up to the last moment
you were in constant expectation of hearing that the whole of Boeotia
was laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all is
changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief despatch[27] in
cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience to your every
wish in that quarter, provided only you will take as kindly an
interest in us as we in you."

[24] See "Ages." vii.

[25] "Select Committee." See "Hell." II. iv. 38; and below, VI. iii.

[26] See above, "Hell." III. v. 4.

[27] Lit. "scytale."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedaemonians[28] resolved
formally, now that the citadel had been taken, to keep it, and to put
Ismenias on his trial. In consequence of this resolution a body of
commissioners[29] was despatched, three Lacedaemonians and one for
each of the allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry
thus constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was
preferred against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the hands
of the barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persians to the detriment
of Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes from the king; and,
finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, the prime cause of the
whole intestine trouble to which Hellas was a prey. Each of these
charges was met by the defendant, but to no purpose, since he failed
to disabuse the court of their conviction that the grandeur of his
designs was only equalled by their wickedness.[30] The verdict was
given against him, and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades
thus possessed the city; and went beyond the injunctions given them in
the eager performance of their services.

[28] See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 85; Diod. xv. 20; Plut. "Pelop."
vi.; ib. "de Genio Socratis," V. vii. 6 A; Cor. Nep. "Pelop." 1.

[29] Lit. "Dicasts."

[30] Or, "that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, "H. G."
vol. ix. p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for
Cromwell); Plato, "Meno." 90 B; "Republic," 336 A, "a rich and
mighty man." See also Plut. "Ages." xxxii. 2, Agesilaus's
exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, {o tou megalopragmonos

B.C. 382. As a result of these transactions the Lacedaemonians pressed
on the combined campaign against Olynthus with still greater
enthusiasm. They not only set out Teleutias as governor, but by their
united efforts furnished him with an aggregate army of ten thousand
men.[31] They also sent despatches to the allied states, calling upon
them to support Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the
allies. All the states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias,
and to do him service, since he was a man who never forgot a service
rendered him. Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a
brother of Agesilaus? Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending
her contribution of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted
his march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid injuring
his friends, and to collect as large a force as possible. He also sent
a message in advance to Amyntas, begging him, if he were truly
desirous of recovering his empire, to raise a body of mercenaries, and
to distribute sums of money among the neighbouring kings with a view
to their alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler
of Elimia, pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid at
their feet the great power of Macedonia, would certainly not suffer
his lesser power to escape unless they were stayed up by force in arms
in their career of insolence. Proceeding thus, by the time he had
reached the territory of the allied powers he was at the head of a
very considerable army. At Potidaea he halted to make the necessary
disposition of his troops, and thence advanced into the territory of
the enemy. As he approached the hostile city, he abstained from
felling and firing alike, being persuaded that to do so was only to
create difficulties in his own path, whether advancing or retreating;
it would be time enough, when he retired from Olynthus, to fell the
trees and lay them as a barrier in the path of any assailant in the

[31] Lit. "sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand
men," in ref to S. 20 above.

Being now within a mile or so[32] of the city he came to a halt. The
left division was under his personal command, for it suited him to
advance in a line opposite the gate from which the enemy sallied; the
other division of the allies stretched away to the right. The cavalry
were thus distributed: the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians
present were posted on the right. With his own division he kept Derdas
and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he did partly out of
genuine admiration for this body of horse, and partly as a mark of
courtesy to Derdas, which should make him not regret his coming.

[32] Lit. "ten stades."

Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line opposite, under
cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed in close order and
commenced the attack. Dashing down upon the Laconians and Boeotians
they dismounted Polycharmus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general,
inflicting a hundred wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut
down others, and finally put to flight the cavalry on the right wing.
The flight of these troopers infected the infantry in close proximity
to them, who in turn swerved; and it looked as if the whole army was
about to be worsted, when Derdas at the head of his cavalry dashed
straight at the gates of Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the
troops of his division. The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were
going, and in dread of finding the gates closed upon them, wheeled
round and retired with alacrity. Thus it was that Derdas had his
chance to cut down man after man as their cavalry ran the gauntlet
past him. In the same way, too, the infantry of the Olynthians
retreated within their city, though, owing to the closeness of the
walls in their case, their loss was trifling. Teleutias claimed the
victory, and a trophy was duly erected, after which he turned his back
on Olynthus and devoted himself to felling the fruit-trees. This was
the campaign of the summer. He now dismissed both the Macedonians and
the cavalry force of Derdas. Incursions, however, on the part of the
Olynthians themselves against the states allied to Lacedaemon were
frequent; lands were pillaged, and people put to the sword.


B.C. 381. With the first symptoms of approaching spring the Olynthian
cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped into the territory of
Apollonia--about the middle of the day--and dispersing over the
district, were employed in pillaging; but as luck would have it,
Derdas had arrived that day with his troopers, and was breakfasting in
Apollonia. He noted the enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his
time; his horses were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-a-
pied. As the Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only
into the suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his
opportunity, and with his compact and well-ordered squadron dashed
out; whereupon the invaders took to flight. Having once turned them,
Derdas gave them no respite, pursuing and slaughtering them for ten
miles or more,[1] until he had driven them for shelter within the very
ramparts of Olynthus. Report said that Derdas slew something like
eighty men in this affair. After this the Olynthians were more
disposed to keep to their walls, contenting themselves with tilling
the merest corner of their territory.

[1] Lit. "ninety stades."

Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another expedition
against the city of Olynthus. His object was to destroy any timber[2]
still left standing, or fields still cultivated in the hostile
territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, who, stealthily
advancing, crossed the river which washes the walls of the town, and
again continued their silent march right up to the adversary's camp.
At sight of an audacity which nettled him, Teleutias at once ordered
Tlemonidas, the officer commanding his light infantry division, to
charge the assailants at the run. On their side the men of Olynthus,
seeing the rapid approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly
retired until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on, who
followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to themselves the
position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not hesitate to cross
the river which stood between them and their prey. Then the Olynthian
cavalry, choosing a favourable moment, when those who had crossed
seemed easy to deal with, wheeled and attacked them, putting
Tlemonidas himself to the sword with more than a hundred others of his
company. Teleutias, when he saw what was happening, snatched up his
arms in a fit of anger and began leading his hoplites swiftly forward,
ordering at the same time his peltasts and cavalry to give chase and
not to slacken. Their fate was the fate of many before and since, who,
in the ardour of pursuit, have come too close to the enemy's walls and
found it hard to get back again. Under a hail of missiles from the
walls they were forced to retire in disorder and with the necessity of
guarding themselves against the missiles. At this juncture the
Olynthians sent out their cavalry at full gallop, backed by supports
of light infantry; and finally their heavy infantry reserves poured
out and fell upon the enemy's lines, now in thorough confusion. Here
Teleutias fell fighting, and when that happened, without further pause
the troops immediately about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to
make a stand, but the flight became general, some fleeing towards
Spartolus, others in the direction of Acanthus, a third set seeking
refuge within the walls of Apollonia, and the majority within those of
Potidaea. As the tide of fugitives broke into several streams, so also
the pursuers divided the work between them; this way and that they
poured, dealing death wholesale. So perished the pith and kernel of
the armament.

[2] I.e. fruit-trees.

Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson they are
meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a general sense one
ought not to punish any one, even one's own slave, in anger--since the
master in his wrath may easily incur worse evil himself than he
inflicts--so, in the case of antagonists in war, to attack an enemy
under the influence of passion rather than of judgment is an absolute
error. For wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight, whereas
to the penetrating eye of reason a blow parried may be better than a
wound inflicted.[3]

[3] See, for the same sentiment, "Horsemanship," vi. 13. See also
Plut. "Pel." and "Marc." (Clough, ii. p. 278).

When the news of what had happened reached Lacedaemon it was agreed,
after due deliberation, that a force should be sent, and of no
trifling description, if only to quench the victors' pride, and to
prevent their own achievements from becoming null and void. In this
determination they sent out King Agesipolis, as general, attended,
like Agesilaus[4] on his Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans.[5]
Volunteers flocked to his standard. They were partly the pick and
flower of the provincials,[6] partly foreigners of the class called
Trophimoi,[7] or lastly, bastard sons of Spartans, comely and
beautiful of limb, and well versed in the lore of Spartan chivalry.
The ranks of this invading force were further swelled by volunteers
from the allied states, the Thessalians notably contributing a corps
of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of becoming known to
Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal of service outdid
themselves. With this promise of success Agesipolis marched forward
against Olynthus.

[4] See above, "Hell." III. iv. 2.

[5] Lit. "Spartiates." The new army was sent out B.C. 380, according
to Grote.

[6] Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci."

[7] Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class.
See Grote, "H. G." x. 91.

Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis on the
amount of the funds contributed by them to his expedition and the
celerity with which the money had been raised, and in full belief that
while one king was in the field they were secure against the hostile
attack of the other (since it was hardly to be expected that both
kings should be absent from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted
from doing justice by her lately reinstated citizens. On the one hand,
these exiles claimed that points in dispute should be determined
before an impartial court of justice; the citizens, on the other,
insisted on the claimants submitting the cases for trial in the city
itself. And when the latter demurred to that solution, asking "What
sort of trial that would be where the offenders were also the judges?"
they appealed to deaf ears. Consequently the restored party appealed
at Sparta, to prefer a complaint against their city. They were
accompanied by other members of the community, who stated that many of
the Phliasians themselves besides the appellants recognised the
injustice of their treatment. The state of Phlius was indignant at
this manouvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine on all who had
betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate from the state.
Those who incurred the fine hesitated to return home; they preferred
to stay where they were and enforce their views: "It is quite plain
now who were the perpetrators of all the violence--the very people who
originally drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon Lacedaemon;
the confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless opponents of
its restoration the next. Who else but they have now brought it about
that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon? and for what
purpose but to deter any one else for the future from venturing to
expose the proceedings at Phlius?" Thus far the appellants. And in
good sooth the conduct of the men of Phlius did seem to savour of
insolence; so much so that the ephors called out the ban against them.

B.C. 380. Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied with this
decision, not only on the ground of old relations of friendly
hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party of Podanemus,
who were numbered among the restored exiles at this time, but because
personally he was bound by similar ties himself towards the adherents
of Procles, son of Hipponicus. The border sacrifices proving
favourable, the march commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after
embassy met him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion.
But the king answered that the purpose of his march was not to commit
wrongdoing, but to protect the victims of injustice. Then the
petitioners offered to do anything, only they begged him to forgo
invasion. Again he replied--How could he trust to their words when
they had lied to him already? He must have the warrant of acts, not
promises. And being asked, "What act (would satisfy him)?" he answered
once more, saying, "The same which you performed aforetime, and
suffered no wrong at our hands"--in other words, the surrender of the
acropolis.[8] But to this they could not bring themselves. Whereupon
he invaded the territory of Phlius, and promptly drawing lines of
circumvallation, commenced the siege. Many of the Lacedaemonians
objected, for the sake of a mere handful of wretched people, so to
embroil themselves with a state of over five thousand men.[9] For,
indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius met
regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But Agesilaus was
not to be beaten by this move. Whenever any of the townsmen came out,
drawn by friendship or kinship with the exiles, in every case the
king's instructions were to place the public messes[10] at the service
of the visitors, and, if they were willing to go through the course of
gymnastic training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All
members of these classes were, by the general's strict injunctions,
further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised for the
purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents of this branch of
the service were able to turn out a detachment of over a thousand men,
in the prime of bodily perfection, well disciplined and splendidly
armed, so that in the end the Lacedaemonians affirmed: "Fellow-
soldiers of this stamp are too good to lose." Such were the concerns
of Agesilaus.

[8] See above, IV. iv. 15.

[9] See Grote, "H. G." x. 45, note 4; and below, V. iv. 13.

[10] See "Pol. Lac." v.

Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced straight upon
Olynthus and took up a strategical position in front of the town.
Finding that no one came out to oppose him, he occupied himself for
the present with pillaging any remnant of the district till intact,
and with marching into the territory allied with the enemy, where he
destroyed the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by storm.
But while he was so engaged, in the height of mid-summer he was
attacked by a burning fever. In this condition his mind reverted to a
scene once visited, the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing
for its cool and sparkling waters and embowered shades[11] seized him.
To this spot accordingly he was carried, still living, but only to
breathe his last outside the sacred shrine, within a week of the day
on which he sickened. His body was laid in honey and conveyed home to
Sparta, where he obtained royal sepulchre.

[11] Lit. "shady tabernacles."

When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the satisfaction
which might possibly have been expected at the removal of an
antagonist. On the contrary, he wept and pined for the companionship
so severed, it being the fashion at Sparta for the kings when at home
to mess together and to share the same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis
was admirably suited to Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth
in tales of the chase and horsemanship and boyish loves;[12] while, to
crown all, the touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not
wanting in their common life. In place of Agesipolis, the
Lacedaemonians despatched Polybiades as governor to Olynthus.

[12] See "Ages." viii. 2.

B.C. 379. Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during which the
supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. The difference, in
fact, between self-command and mere appetite is so great that the men
of Phlius had only to pass a resolution to cut down the food
expenditure by one half, and by doing so were able to prolong the
siege for twice the calculated period. But if the contrast between
self-restraint and appetite is so great, no less startling is that
between boldness and faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a
real hero, it would seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians,
and not only succeeded in preventing the peace-party from carrying out
their wishes, but was equal to the task of incarcerating and keeping
safely under lock and key those whom he mistrusted. Nor did his
ability end there. He succeeded in forcing the mob of citizens to
perform garrison duty, and by vigorous patrolling kept them constant
to the work. Over and over again, accompanied by his personal
attendants, he would dash out of the walls and drive in the enemy's
outposts, first at one point and then at another of the beleaguering
circle. But the time eventually came when, search as they might by
every means, these picked defenders[13] could find no further store of
food within the walls, and they were forced to send to Agesilaus,
requesting a truce for an embassy to visit Sparta, adding that they
were resolved to leave it to the discretion of the authorities at
Lacedaemon to do with their city what they liked. Agesilaus granted a
pass to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was so angry at their
setting his personal authority aside, that he sent to his friends at
home and arranged that the fate of Phlius should be left to his
discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded to tighten the cordon of
investment, so as to render it impossible that a single soul inside
the city should escape. In spite of this, however, Delphion, with one
comrade, a branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity in
relieving the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night.
Presently the deputation returned with the answer from Lacedaemon that
the state simply left it entirely to the discretion of Agesilaus to
decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him best. Then Agesilaus
announced his verdict. A board of one hundred--fifty taken from the
restored exiles, fifty from those within the city--were in the first
place to make inquisition as to who deserved to live and who to die,
after which they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new
constitution. Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left
a detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, with pay
for that period. After this he dismissed the allied forces, and led
the state[14] division home. Thus the transactions concerning Phlius
were brought to a conclusion, having occupied altogether one year and
eight months.

[13] See below, "Hell." VII. i. 19.

[14] {to politokon}, the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19; "Pol.
Lac." xi.

Meanwhile Polybiades had reducd the citizens of Olynthus to the last
stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply themselves with corn
from their own land, or to import it by sea, they were forced to send
an embassy to Lacedaemon to sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on
their arrival accepted articles of agreement by which they bound
themselves to have the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon,
to follow her lead, and to be enrolled among her allies; and so,
having taken an oath to abide by these terms, they returned home.

On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally prospered: Thebes
and the rest of the Boeotian states lay absolutely at her feet;

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