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Dio's Rome by Cassius Dio

Part 4 out of 6

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voice, was glad to retire. This speech which is now supposed to have
been delivered at that time in behalf of Milo he wrote some time later
and at leisure, when he had recovered his courage. There is also the
following story about it. When Milo, in banishment, made the
acquaintance of the speech sent to him by Cicero, he wrote back saying
that it was lucky for him those words had not been spoken in that form
in the court; for he would not be eating such fine mullets in Massilia
(where he was passing his exile), if any such defence had been made.
This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his circumstances,--he
made many ventures to secure his return,--but as a joke on Cicero,
because after saying nothing important at the time of the defence he
later both practiced and sent to him these fruitless words, as if they
could now be of any service to him.

[-55-] In this way Milo was convicted; and so were Rufus and Plancus, as
soon as they had finished their term of office, together with numerous
others on account of the burning of the senate-house. Plancus was not
even benefited by Pompey, who was so earnest in his behalf that he sent
to the court a volume containing both a eulogy of the prisoner and a
supplication for him. Marcus Cato, who was eligible to sit as a juryman,
said he would not allow the eulogizer to destroy his own laws. But he
got no opportunity to cast his vote; for Plancus rejected him, feeling
sure that he would give his voice for condemnation: (by the laws of
Pompey each of the parties to a suit was allowed to set aside five out
of the number that were to judge him;) the other jurors, however, voted
against him, especially as it did not seem right to them after they had
condemned Rufus to acquit Plancus, who was on trial on the same charge.
And when they saw Pompey cooeperating with him, they showed the more zeal
against him, for fear they might be thought to be absolute slaves of his
rather than jurymen. It should be said that on this occasion, too,
Cicero accused Plancus no better than he had defended Milo: for the
appearance of the courtroom was the same, and Pompey in each case was
planning and acting against him,--a circumstance that naturally led to a
second collision between them.

[-56-] After attending to these matters Pompey revived the law about
elections (which had fallen somewhat into disuse) commanding those who
seek an office to present themselves without fail before the assembly,
so that no one who is absent may be chosen. He also confirmed the
ordinance, passed a short time previously, that those who had held
office in the city should not be allotted to foreign governorships
before five years had passed. He was not ashamed at this time to record
such measures, although a little later he himself took Spain for five
years more and granted Caesar, whose friends were in a terrible state of
irritation, the right to canvass for the consulship (as had been
decreed), even in his absence. He amended the law to read that only
those should be permitted to do it who were granted the privilege by
name and without disguise; but of course this was no different from its
not being prohibited at all, for men who had any influence were
certainly going to manage to get the right voted to them.

[-57-] Such were the political acts of Pompey. Scipio without enacting
any new laws abolished the measures emanating from Clodius, with regard
to the censors. It looked as though he had done this out of favor to
them since he restored to them the authority which they formerly had:
but it turned out to be the opposite. For in view of the fact that there
were many worthless men both in the equestrian and in the senatorial
orders, so long as it had not been permitted them to expel any one,
either accused or convicted, no fault was found with them on account of
those whose names were not expunged. But when they got back their old
power and were allowed to do this and to examine the life of each man
separately, they had not the hardihood to come to an open break with
many and did not wish to incur any censure for not expelling those
guilty of improper conduct, and for this reason no sensible person had
any desire for the office any longer.

[-58-] This was the vote passed with regard to the censors. Cato on the
whole did not wish any office, but seeing Caesar and Pompey outgrowing
the system of government, and surmising that they would either get
control of affairs between themselves or would quarrel with each other
and create a mighty strife, the victor in which would be sole ruler, he
wished to overthrow them before they became antagonists, and hence
sought the consulship to use it against them, because as a private
citizen he was likely to wield no influence.

[B.C. 51 (_a.u._ 703)]

His designs were guessed, however, by the adherents of the two men and
he was not appointed, but instead Marcus Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus
were chosen, the one on account of his acquaintance with the law and the
other for his ability in speaking. One special reason was that they,
even if they did not employ bribes or violence, yet showed deference to
all and were wont to exhort people frequently, whereas Cato was
deferential to no one. He never again became a candidate for the office,
saying that it was the duty of an upright man not to avoid the
leadership of the commonwealth if any person wished him to enjoy it, nor
yet to pursue it beyond the limits of propriety. [-59-] Marcellus at
once directed all his efforts to compass the downfall of Caesar,--for he
was of Pompey's party,--and among the many measures against him that he
proposed was one to the effect that a successor to him should be sent
before the appointed time. He was resisted by Sulpicius and some of the
tribunes,--by the latter out of good will toward Caesar. Sulpicius made
common cause with them and with the multitude, because he did not like
the idea of a magistrate who had done no wrong being stopped in the
middle of his term. Pompey was starting from the city with the avowed
intention of leading an expedition into Spain, but he did not at this
time even leave the bounds of Italy, and after assigning to his
lieutenants the entire business abroad he himself kept close watch on
the city. Now when he heard how things were going, he pretended that the
plan of having Caesar detached from his command did not please him
either, but he arranged matters so that when Caesar should have served
out the time allowed him, an event not of the distant future, but due to
occur the following year,--he should lay down his arms and return home
to be a private citizen. In pursuance of this object he made Gaius
Marcellus, a cousin of Marcus,[67] or a brother (both traditions are
current), obtain the consulship, because although allied to Caesar by
marriage he was hostile to him; and he made Gaius Curio, who was also an
oldtime foe of his rival, receive the tribuneship.

[B.C. 50 (_a.u._ 704)]

[-60-] Caesar was on no account inclined to become a private citizen
after so great a command and one of such long standing, and was afraid
that he might fall into the power of his enemies. Therefore he made
preparations to stay in office in spite of them, collected additional
soldiers, gathered money, manufactured arms, and conducted himself to
please all. Meanwhile, desiring to settle matters at home somewhat
beforehand, so as not to seem to be gaining all his ends by violence,
but some by persuasion, he decided to effect a reconciliation with
Curio. For the latter belonged to the family of the Curiones, had a keen
intelligence, was eloquent, was greatly trusted by the populace and
absolutely unsparing of money for all purposes by which he could either
benefit himself or hoped to gain benefit for others. So, by buoying him
up with many hopes and releasing him from all his debts which on account
of his great expenditures were numerous, Caesar attached him to himself.
In view of the present importance of the objects for which he was
working he did not spare money, since he could collect it from the
people themselves, and he also promised various persons large sums, of
which he was destined to give them not the smallest particle. He courted
not only the free but the slaves who had any influence whatever with
their masters, and as a result a number of the knights and the senators,
too, joined his party.

[-61-]Thus Curio began to espouse Caesar's cause; not immediately,
however, did he begin to show open activity, because he was seeking an
excuse of fair semblance and was trying to appear to have transferred
his allegiance not willingly, but under compulsion. He also took into
consideration that the more he should associate with his patron's
enemies in the guise of their friend the more and the greater secrets of
theirs he would learn. For these reasons he dissimulated for a very long
time, and to prevent any suspicion of his having changed sides and not
maintaining and representing still at this time an attitude of
unqualified opposition to Caesar as one of the leading spirits in the
movement, he even made a public harangue against him, as a result of
which he gained the tribuneship and prepared many unusual measures. Some
bills he offered against the senate and its most powerful members, who
were especially active in Pompey's behalf, not because he either wished
or expected that any one of them would be passed, but in order that, as
they did not accept them, so no measure might be passed against Caesar
(for many motions to his detriment were being offered by many persons),
and that he himself might transfer his support on this excuse.

[-62-]After this, having used up considerable time at various occasions
on various pretexts, not a single one of which met with favor, he
pretended to be vexed and asked that another month be inserted for the
legislation that resulted from his measures. This practice was followed
at regular periods, established by custom, but not for any such reason
as his, and he himself, being pontifex, understood that fact.
Nevertheless he said that it ought to be done and made a fine show of
forcing his fellow-priests. At last not being able to persuade them to
assent to his proposal (of which he was very glad), he would not permit
any other matter for this reason to voted upon. On the contrary he
already began openly to justify Caesar's actions, since, as he said, he
was unable to accomplish anything against him, and brought forward every
possible proposition which was sure of not being accepted. The chief of
these was that all persons in arms must lay these down and disband their
legions, or else they should not strip Caesar of his weapons and expose
him to the forces of his rivals. This he said, not because he wished
Caesar to do it, but because he well understood that Pompey would not
yield obedience to it, and thus a plausible excuse was offered the
former for not dismissing his soldiers.

[-63-] Pompey, accordingly, as he could effect nothing in any other way,
proceeded without any further disguise to harsh measures and openly said
and did everything against Caesar. He failed, however, to accomplish
aught. Caesar had many followers, among them Lucius Paulus, colleague of
Marcellus, and Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, who was censor. For at
this time Appius Claudius and Piso (though the latter did not desire
it), were made censors. So Piso on account of his relationship belonged
to Caesar, while Claudius opposed him, espousing Pompey's cause, yet
quite involuntarily he rendered Caesar very efficient aid. He expelled
very many both of the knights and the senators, overpowering his
colleague, and in this made them all favor Caesar's aspirations. Piso on
every account wished to avoid trouble and to maintain friendship with
his son-in-law paid court to many people, being himself responsible for
none of the above acts, but he did not resist Claudius when he drove
from senate all the freedmen and numbers of the real nobility, among
them Sallustius Crispus who wrote the History. When Curio, however, was
about to have his name expunged, Piso, with the help of Paulus (whose
kinsman he was), did beg him off. [-64-] Consequently Claudius did not
expel him but made public in the senate the opinion that he had of him,
so that he, indignant, rent his clothes. Marcellus followed him, and
thinking that the senate would pass some severe vote against Curio and,
because of him, against Caesar, brought forward propositions about him.
Curio at first opposed any decision being rendered regarding him; but on
coming to realize that of the majority of the senators then present some
really were attached to Caesar's cause and others thoroughly feared him,
he allowed them to decide, saying incidentally only this: "I am
conscious of doing what is best and most advantageous for my country: to
you, however, I surrender both my body and soul to treat as you please."
Marcellus accordingly accused him, thinking that he would certainly be
convicted, and then when he was acquitted by the majority the accuser
took it greatly to heart: rushing out of the assembly he came to Pompey,
who was in the suburbs, and on his own responsibility, without the
formality of a vote, gave him charge to keep guard over the city along
with two legions of civilians. These soldiers were then present, having
been collected in the following way and for the following purpose.
[-65-] Pompey before this, while he was still on friendly terms with
Caesar, had given him one legion composed of those troops which according
to the register belonged to him, inasmuch as he was not conducting any
war and Caesar had need of soldiers. When they fell out with each other,
in his desire to get this back from him and to deprive him of yet
another he delivered a speech, stating that Bibulus required soldiers
against the Parthians; and in order that no new levies should be
raised,--for the matter was urgent, he said, and they had an abundance
of legions,--he got it voted that each of them, himself and Caesar, must
send one to him. Thereupon he failed to despatch any of those engaged in
warfare under his own command, but ordered those whose business it was
to demand that legion which he had given to Caesar. So nominally both of
them contributed, but in reality Caesar alone sent the two. He knew what
was being done, but complied with the demand, not wishing to incur the
charge of disobedience, particularly because on this excuse he intended
to raise in turn many more soldiers.

[-66-] These legions, therefore, were apparently made ready to be sent
against the Parthians, but when there proved to be no need of them,
(there was really no use to which they could be put,) Marcellus, fearing
that they might be restored to Caesar, at first declared that they must
remain in Italy, and then, as I have said, gave them into Pompey's
charge. These proceedings took place near the close of the year and were
destined not to be in force for long, since they had been approved
neither by the senate nor by the populace: accordingly, he brought over
to Pompey's side Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius, who were to hold
the consulship the next year, and caused them to issue the same
commands. Since they were allowed to give out letters to men appointed
to office and to perform even so early some other functions belonging to
the highest post in the state before they assumed it, they believed that
they had authority also in this matter. And Pompey, although he was very
exact in all other details, nevertheless on account of his need of
soldiers did not investigate this action at all, nor the sources from
which he was getting them, nor in what way, but accepted them very
gratefully. Yet no such result was accomplished as one would have
expected to come from so great a piece of audacity: they merely
displayed their enmity toward Caesar, as a consequence of which they
could not gather any further formidable equipment, and furnished to him
a plausible excuse for retaining the troops that were with him. For
Curio using the acts mentioned as his text delivered before the populace
a violent arraignment both of the consuls and of Pompey, and when he had
finished his term he at once set out to join Caesar.



The following is contained in the Forty-first of Dio's Rome.

How Caesar came into Italy, and how Pompey, leaving it, sailed across to
Macedonia (chapters 1-17).

How Caesar subjugated Spain (chapters 18-37).

How Caesar sailed across to Macedonia to encounter Pompey (chapters

How Caesar and Pompey fought at Dyrrachium (chapters 47-51).

How Caesar conquered Pompey at Pharsalus (chapters 52-63).

Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following
magistrates, here enumerated.

L. Cornelius P.F. Lentulus, C. Claudius M.F. Marcellus. (B.C. 49 =
a.u. 705.)

C. Iulius C.F. Caesar (II), P. Servilius P.F. Isauricus. (B.C. 48 =
a.u. 706.)


[B.C. 49 (_a.u._ 705)]

[-1-] This is what he (sc. Curio) did then: later he came to Rome with a
letter to the senate from Caesar on the very first day of the month on
which Cornelius Lentulus and Gains Claudius entered upon office; and he
would not give it to the consuls until they reached the senate-house,
for fear that if they received it outside they might conceal it. Even as
it was they waited a long time, not wishing to read it, but at last they
were compelled by Quintus Cassius Longinus and Mark Antony, the
tribunes, to make it public. Now Antony for the favor he did Caesar at
the time in this matter was destined to receive a great return and to be
raised himself to heights of power. In the letter was contained a list
of the benefits which Caesar had conferred upon the commonwealth and a
defence of the charges which were brought against him. He promised that
he would disband his legions and give up his office if Pompey would also
do the same: for while the latter bore arms, he said, it was not just
for him to be compelled to part with his and so be exposed to his

[-2-] The vote on this proposition was taken not individually for fear
that through having respect to others or some element of fear the
senators might express the opposite of their true opinion; but it was
done by their taking their stand on this side or on that of the
senate-chamber. No one voted that Pompey should cease to bear arms (for
he had his troops in the suburbs), but all, except one Marcus Caelius and
Curio, who had carried his letter, decided that Caesar must. About the
tribunes I say nothing because no necessity was laid upon them to
separate into two different groups; for they had authority to contribute
their vote if they wished, or otherwise not. This, then, was the
decision made, but Antony and Longinus did not allow any point in it to
be ratified either on that day or the next. [-3-] The rest, indignant at
this, voted to change their garb, but through the intervention of the
same men did not obtain ratification of this measure either. Their
opinion, however, was recorded and the appropriate action followed:
namely, all straightway left the senate-house, and after changing their
clothes came in again and proceeded to deliberate about vengeance to be
taken on the obstructionists. They, seeing this, at first resisted but
later became afraid, especially when Lentulus advised them to get out of
the way before the votes should be cast: hence after many remarks and
protestations they set out with Curio and with Caelius to Caesar, little
heeding that they had been expelled from the senate. This was the
determination reached at that time, and the care of the city was
committed to the consuls and to the other magistrates, as had been the
custom. Afterward the senators went outside the pomerium to Pompey
himself, declared that there was a state of disorder, and gave to him
both the money and soldiers. They voted that Caesar should surrender his
office to his successors and send away his legions by a given day, or
else be considered an enemy, because acting contrary to the interests of
the country.

[-4-] When he was informed of this he came to Ariminum, then for the
first time overstepping the confines of his own province, and after
collecting his soldiers he bade Curio and the others who had come with
him relate what had been done by them. After this was finished he
inspirited them by adding such words as the occasion demanded. Next he
set out and marched straight upon Rome itself, taking possession of all
the intervening cities without a conflict, since the garrisons of some
abandoned them by reason of weakness and others espoused his cause.
Pompey, perceiving this, was frightened, especially when he learned all
his intentions from Labienus. The latter had abandoned Caesar and come as
a deserter, and he announced all the latter's secrets to Pompey. One
might feel surprise that after having always been honored by Caesar in
the highest degree, to the extent of governing all the legions beyond
the Alps whenever their head was in Italy, he should have done this. The
reason was that when he had clothed himself with wealth and fame he
began to conduct himself more haughtily than his position warranted, and
Caesar, seeing that he put himself on the same level with his master,
ceased to be so fond of him. As he could not endure this changed
attitude and was at the same time afraid of suffering some harm, he
transferred his allegiance.

[-5-]Pompey as a result of what was told him about Caesar and because he
had not yet prepared a force to cope with him changed his plans: for he
saw that the dwellers in the city, yes, the members of the sedition
themselves, even more than the others, shrank from the war through
remembrance of the deeds of Marius and Sulla and wished to escape it in
safety. Therefore he sent as envoys to Caesar, Lucius Caesar, a relative
of his, and Lucius Roscius, a praetor,--both of them volunteering for the
service,--to see if he could avoid his open attack and then make an
agreement with him on some fair terms. The other replied to the same
effect as in his letter, previously forwarded, and said also that he
wished to converse with Pompey: but the people were displeased to hear
this, fearing that some measures might be concerted against them. When,
however, the envoys uttered many words in praise of Caesar, and finally
promised besides that no one should suffer any harm at his hands and
that the legions should immediately be disbanded, they were pleased and
sent the same envoys to him again, and besought both of the opposing
leaders with shouts, calling upon them everywhere and always to lay down
their arms at the same time. [-6-] Pompey was frightened at this,
knowing well that he would be far inferior to Caesar if they should both
have to depend on the clemency of the populace, and betook himself to
Campania before the envoys returned, with the idea that there he could
more easily make war. He also commanded the whole senate together with
those who held the offices to accompany him, granting them permission by
a decree of absence, and telling them in advance that whoever remained
behind he should regard as equal and alike to those were working against
him. Furthermore he enjoined them to vote that all the public moneys and
the votive offerings in the city be removed, hoping that from this
source he could gather a vast number of soldiers. For practically all
the cities of Italy felt such friendliness for him that when a short
time before they had heard he was dangerously ill, they vowed they would
offer public sacrifices for his preservation. That this was a great and
brilliant honor which they bestowed upon him no one could gainsay; there
is no one in whose behalf such a vote has been passed, except those who
later assumed absolute sovereignty: nevertheless he had not a sure
ground of confidence that they would not abandon him under the influence
of fear of a stronger power. The recommendation about the moneys and the
votive offerings was allowed, but neither of them was touched; for
having ascertained meanwhile that Caesar's answer to the envoys had been
anything but peaceful and that he also reproached them with having made
some false statements about him, that his soldiers were many and bold
and liable to do any kind of mischief (such reports, tending to greater
terror, as are usually made about such matters), the senators became
frightened and hastily took their departure before they could lay a
finger on any of the objects.

[-7-] For reason their removal was equally in all other respects of a
tumultuous and confused appearance. The departing citizens, practically
all of whom were the foremost men of the senate and of the knights and
of the populace, nominally were setting out for war, but really were
undergoing the experiences of captives. They were terribly distressed at
being compelled to abandon their country and their pursuits there, and
to consider foreign walls more native than their own. Such as removed
with their entire household said farewell to the temples and their
houses and their paternal threshold with the feeling that these would
straightway become the property of their opponents: they themselves, not
being ignorant of Pompey's intention, had the purpose, in case they
should survive, of establishing themselves in Macedonia or Thrace. And
those who left behind on the spot their children and wives and their
other most valued possessions appeared to have some little hope of their
country but really fared much worse than the others, since being
sundered from their dearest treasures they exposed themselves to a
double and most hostile fortune. For in delivering their closest
interests to the power of their bitterest foes they were destined to
play the coward and yet themselves encounter danger, to show zeal and
yet to be deprived of what they prized: moreover they would find a
friend in neither rival, but an enemy in both,--in Caesar because they
themselves did not remain behind, and in Pompey because they did not
take the others with them. Hence they assumed a twofold attitude in
their decisions, in their prayers, and in their hopes: with their bodies
they were being drawn away from those nearest to them, and their souls
they found cleft in twain.

[-8-] These were the feelings of the departing throng: and those left
behind had to face a different, but equally unpleasant situation. Bereft
of the association of their nearest relatives, deprived, as it were, of
their guardians and far from able to defend themselves, exposed to the
enemy and about to be subject to the authority of him who should make
himself master of the city, they were themselves distressed by fear both
of outrages and of murders as if they were already taking place. In view
of these same possibilities such as were angry at the fugitives, because
they themselves had been left in the lurch, cursed them for it, and
those who condoned their action because of the necessity still felt
consequent fears. The rest of the populace entire, even if they
possessed not the least kinship with those departing, were nevertheless
grieved at their fate, some expecting that their neighbors, and others
that their comrades would go far away from them and do and suffer many
unusual things. Most of all they bewailed their own lot, seeing the
magistrates and the senate and all the rest who had any power,--they
were not sure whether a single one of them would be left behind,--cast
out of their country and away from them. They reflected how those men,
had not many altogether dreadful calamities fastened themselves upon the
State, would never have wished to flee, and they likened themselves,
made destitute of allies, in every conceivable respect to orphaned
children and widow women. Being the first to await the wrath and the
lust of the oncoming foe, they remembered their former sufferings, some
by experience and others by hearing it from the victims, all the
outrages that Marius and Sulla had committed, and they therefore did not
look to Caesar for moderate treatment.[68] On the contrary, because his
army was constituted very largely of barbarians, they expected that
their misfortunes would be far more in number and more terrible than
those of yore.

[-9-] Since, then, all of them were in this condition, and no one except
those who appeared to be good friends of Caesar made light of the
situation, and even they, in consideration of the change of character to
which most men are subject according to their circumstances, were not
courageous enough to think that the source of their confidence was
reliable, it is not easy to conceive how great confusion and how great
grief prevailed at the departure of the consuls and those who set out
with them. All night they made an uproar in packing up and going about,
and toward dawn great sorrow fell upon them, induced by the action of
the priests, who went about offering prayers on every side. They invoked
the gods, showered kisses on the floors, enumerated how many times and
from what perils they had survived, and lamented that they were leaving
their country,--a venture they had never made before. Near the gates,
too, there was much wailing. Some took fond leave at once of each other
and of the city as if they were beholding them for the last time: others
bewailed their own lot and joined their prayers to those of the
departing: the larger number, on the ground that they were being
betrayed, uttered maledictions. The whole population, even those that
stayed behind, were there with all the women and all the children. Then
the one group set out on their way and the other group escorted them.
Some interposed delays and were detained by their acquaintances: others
embraced and clung to each other for a long time. Those that remained
accompanied those setting out, calling after them and expressing their
sympathy, while with invocations of Heaven they besought them to take
them, too or to remain at home themselves. Meanwhile there were shrill
sounds of wailing over each one of the exiles even from outsiders, and
insatiate floods of tears. Hope for the best they were scarcely at all
inclined to entertain in their condition; it was rather suffering which
was expected, first by those who were left and subsequently by those who
were departing. Any one that saw them would have guessed that two
peoples and two cities were being made from one and that one was being
driven out and was fleeing, whereas the other was being left to its fate
and was being captured.

[-10-] Pompey thus left the city drawing many of the senators after him;
some remained behind, either attached to Caesar's cause or maintaining a
neutral attitude toward both. He hastily raised levies from the cities,
collected money, and sent garrisons to almost every point. Caesar, when
he learned this, did not hurry to Rome: it, he knew, was offered as a
prize to the victors, and he said that he was not marching against that
place as hostile to him but against his political opponents in its
behalf. And he sent a letter throughout all Italy in which he summoned
Pompey to a kind of trial, encouraged all to be of good cheer, bade them
remain in their places, and made them many promises. He set out next
against Corfinium, which, being occupied by Lucius Domitius, had not
joined his adherents, and after conquering in battle a few who met him
he shut up the rest in a state of siege. Pompey, inasmuch as these
citizens were being besieged and many of the others were falling off to
Caesar, had no further hope of Italy but resolved to cross over into
Macedonia, Greece, and Asia. He derived much encouragement from the
remembrance of what he had achieved there and from the friendship of the
people and the princes. (Spain was likewise devoted to him, but he could
not reach it safely because Caesar had possession of both the Gauls.)
Moreover he calculated that if he should sail away, no one would pursue
him on account of the lack of boats and on account of the winter,--the
late autumn being far advanced,--and meanwhile he would at leisure amass
both money and troops, much of them from subject and much from allied
territory. [-11-] With this design, therefore, he himself set out for
Brundusium and bade Domitius abandon Corfinium and accompany him. In
spite of the large force that Domitius had and the hopes he reposed in
it--for he had courted the favor of the soldiers in every way and had
won some of them by promises of land (having belonged to Sulla's
veterans he had acquired a large amount in that reign)--he nevertheless
obeyed orders. Meanwhile Pompey proceeded with his preparations to
evacuate the country in safety: his associates learning this shrank from
the journey abroad, because it seemed to them a flight, and attached
themselves to Caesar. So these joined the invader's army: but Domitius
and the other senators after being censured by Caesar for arraying
themselves in opposition, were released and came to Pompey.

[-12-]Caesar now was anxious to join issue with him before he sailed
away, to fight it out with him in Italy, and to overtake him while he
was still at Brundusium; for since there were not sufficient boats for
them, Pompey had sent forward the consuls and others, fearing that they
might begin some rebellion if they stayed on the spot. Caesar, seeing the
difficulty of capturing the place, urged his opponent to accede to some
agreement, assuring him that he should obtain both peace and friendship
again. When Pompey made no further response than that he would
communicate to the consuls what Caesar said, the latter, inasmuch as they
had decided to receive no citizen in arms for a conference, assaulted
the city. Pompey repelled him for some days until the boats came back.
Having meanwhile barricaded and obstructed with fortifications the roads
leading to the harbor so that no one should attack him while sailing
off, he then set sail by night. Thus he crossed over to Macedonia in
safety and Brundusium was captured as well as two boats full of men.

[-13-] Pompey accordingly deserted in this way his country and the rest
of Italy, choosing and carrying out quite the opposite of his former
course, when he sailed back to it from Asia; wherefore he obtained the
reverse fortune and the reverse reputation. Formerly he broke up his
legions at Brundusium, in order not to cause the citizens any
solicitude, but now he was leading away through the town to fight
against them other forces gathered from Italy. Whereas he had brought
the wealth of the barbarians to Rome, he had now conveyed away from it
all that he possibly could to other places. And of all those at home he
was in despair, but purposed to use against his country foreigners and
the allies once enslaved by him, and he put far more hope in them both
of safety and of power than in those who had been benefited. Instead of
the brilliance, therefore, which, acquired in those wars, had marked his
arrival, he set out with humiliation as his portion in return for his
fear of Caesar: and instead of fame which he had had for exalting his
country, he became most infamous for his desertion of her.

[-14-] At the very moment of coming to land at Dyrrachium he learned
that he should not obtain a prosperous outcome. Thunderbolts destroyed
soldiers even as the ships were approaching; spiders occupied the army
standards; and after he had left the vessel serpents followed and
obliterated his footprints. These were the portents which he encountered
in person, but before the whole capital others had occurred both that
year and a short time previously. For there is no doubt about the fact
that in seditions the state is injured by both parties. Hence many
wolves and owls were seen in the City itself and continual earthquakes
with bellowings took place, fire shot down from the west to the east,
and other fires burned both the temple of Quirinus and a second. The
sun, too, suffered a total eclipse, and thunderbolts damaged a sceptre
of Jupiter, a shield and a helmet of Mars that were votive offerings on
the Capitol, and furthermore the tablets which contained the laws. Many
animals brought forth creatures outside of their own species, certain
oracles purporting to be those of the Sibyl were made known, and some
men becoming inspired practiced numerous divinations. No praefectus urbi
was chosen for the Feriae, as had been the custom, but the praetors, at
least according to some accounts, performed all his duties; others say
they did this only in the next year. If the former are right it happened
twice; and the first season Perperna who had once been censor with
Philippus died, being the last, as I stated, of all the senators who had
been alive in his censorship. This event, too, seemed likely to cause
political confusion. The people were, then, naturally disturbed at the
portents, but as both sides thought and hoped that they could lay them
all on their opponents, they offered no expiatory sacrifices.

[-15-] Caesar at this time did not even attempt to sail to Macedonia,
because he was short of boats and had fears for Italy, dreading that the
lieutenants of Pompey from Spain might assail and occupy it. He put
Brundusium under guard for the purpose that no one of those departed
should sail back again, and went to Rome. There the senate had been
assembled for him outside the pomerium by Antony and Longinus: they, who
had been expelled from it, now convened that body. He accordingly made a
speech of some length and of a temperate character, so that they might
experience good-will toward him at the present and feel an excellent
hope for the future. And since he saw them displeased at what was going
on and suspicious of the multitude of soldiers, he wished to encourage
and to conciliate them somewhat, to the end that quiet might prevail in
their quarter while he was conducting the war. Therefore he censured no
one and delivered no threat against any person, but made an attack not
without imprecations upon those who wished to war against citizens, and
at last moved that ambassadors be sent immediately in behalf of peace
and harmony to the consuls and to Pompey. [-16-] He made these same
statements also to the populace, when that body had likewise assembled
outside the pomerium, and he sent for corn from the islands and promised
each one of them seventy-five denarii. He hoped to tempt them with this
bait. The men, however, reflected that those who are pursuing certain
ends and those who have attained them do not think or act alike: at the
start of their operations they make all the most delightful offers to
such as can work against them in any way, but when they succeed in what
they wish, they remember nothing at all about it and use against those
very persons the power which they have received from them. They
remembered also the behavior of Marius and Sulla,--how many kind things
they had often told them, and then what treatment they had given them in
return for their confidence,--and furthermore perceiving Caesar's
necessity and seeing that his armed followers were many and were
everywhere in the city, they were unable either to trust or to be
cheered by his words. On the contrary, as they had fresh in their memory
the fear caused by former events, they suspected him also, particularly
because the ambassadors apparently intended to initiate a reconciliation
were chosen, to be sure, but did not go out. Indeed, for even making
mention of them once Piso, his father-in-law, was severely rebuked.
[-17-] The people, far from getting at that time the money which he had
promised them, had to give him all the rest that remained in the public
coffers for the support of his soldiers, whom they feared. Amid all
these happenings, as being favorable, they wore the garb of peace, which
they had not as yet put off. Lucius Metellus, a tribune, opposed the
proposition about the money, and when his efforts proved ineffectual
went to the treasury and kept watch of its doors. The soldiers, paying
little heed to either his guarding or his outspokenness, cut through the
bar,--for the consuls had the key, as if it were not possible for
persons to use axes in place of it,--and carried out all the money. In
fact, Caesar's other projects also, as I have often stated, he both
brought to vote and carried out in the same fashion, under the name of
democracy,--the most of them being introduced by Antony,--but with the
substance of despotism. Both men named their political rivals enemies of
their country and declared that they themselves were fighting for the
public interests, whereas each really ruined those interests and
increased only his own private possessions.

[-18-] After taking these steps Caesar occupied Sardinia and Sicily
without a battle, as the governors there at that time withdrew.
Aristobulus he sent home to Palestine to accomplish something against
Pompey. He also allowed the children of those proscribed by Sulla to
canvass for office, and arranged everything else both in the city and in
the rest of Italy to his own best advantage, so far as circumstances
permitted. Affairs, at home he now committed to Antony's care and
himself set out for Spain which distinctly chose to follow Pompey and
caused him some uneasiness lest his rival should induce the Gallic
countries to revolt. Meantime Cicero and other senators did not appear
in Caesar's sight, but retired to join Pompey, who, they believed, had
more justice on his side and would conquer in the war. For the consuls
before setting sail and Pompey using the authority of proconsul had
ordered them all to accompany him to Thessalonica on the general ground
that the capital was being held by certain enemies but that they
themselves were the senate and would maintain the form of the government
wherever they should be. For this reason most of the senators and the
knights, some of them immediately and others later, and all the cities
that were not subdued by Caesar's arms, embraced his cause.

[-19-]The Massilians, however, alone of the peoples who dwell in Gaul,
refused to cooeperate with Caesar, and would not receive him into their
city, but made a noteworthy answer to him. They said they were allies of
the Roman people and were favorably disposed toward both generals, and
they could not go into details and were not competent to judge which of
the two was in the wrong: consequently, in case of friendly overtures
being made they would receive them both, they said, without their arms,
but on a war basis neither of them. On being placed in a state of siege
they repulsed Caesar himself and held out for a very long time against
Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, who subsequently besieged them. Caesar
contended stoutly for some time, thinking to capture them easily, and
regarding it as ridiculous that after vanquishing Rome without a battle
he was not received by the Massilians; but later, when their resistance
proved stubborn, he committed them to the care of others and himself
hastened to Spain. [-20-] He had sent thither already Gaius Fabius, but
fearing he would fail while contending by himself, he too began a
campaign. Afranius and Petreius at this time had charge of affairs in
the vicinity of the Iber and had posted a guard over the pass in the
mountains, but chiefly they had gathered their forces in Ilerda, and
there awaited the attackers. Fabius repulsed the hostile garrison at the
Pyrenees but as he was crossing the river Sicoris they fell upon him
suddenly and killed many of his men who were cut off. The bridge
assisted them materially by breaking before all had crossed. When Caesar
came up not much later, he crossed the river by another bridge and
challenged them to battle; but they did not dare to try conclusions with
him for a very considerable number of days, and remained quietly
encamped opposite him. Encouraged from this cause he undertook to seize
the ground, a strong position, between their rampart and the city, with
the intention of shutting them off from the walls. Afranius and his
followers on perceiving this occupied it first, repulsed their
assailants, and pursued them when they fled. Then when others came out
against them from the fortress they first resisted, then yielded
purposely, and so enticed the sallying party into positions which ere
favorable to themselves, where they slew many more of them. After this
they took courage, attacked Caesar's foraging parties and harassed the
scattered members. And on one occasion when some soldiers had crossed to
the other side of the river and meantime a great storm had come up and
the bridge which they had used was destroyed, they crossed over also by
the other bridge, which was near the city, and annihilated them all, as
no one was able to come to their assistance.

[-21-] Caesar, when this continued to happen, fell into desperate
straits: none of his allies rendered him assistance, for his opponents
met and annihilated[69] them as fast as they heard that each one was
approaching, and it was with difficulty that he managed to obtain
provisions, inasmuch as he was in a hostile territory and unsuccessful
in his operations. The Romans at home, when they ascertained it,
renounced all hopes of him, and believing that he would survive but a
short time longer fell off to Pompey. Some few senators and others set
out to join the latter even so late as this. It happened just at this
time that the Massilians were defeated in a naval battle by Brutus
through the size of his ships and the strength of his marines, although
they had Domitius as an ally and surpassed in their experience of naval
affairs; they were subsequently shut in entirely. But for this nothing
would have prevented Caesar's projects from being ruined. As it was,
however, the victory by preconcerted arrangement was announced to the
Spaniards with so many embellishments that it led some of them to change
and follow the fortunes of Caesar. When he had obtained these as
adherents, he secured plenty of food, constructed bridges, harassed his
opponents, and once intercepted suddenly a number of them who were
wandering about the country and destroyed them.

[-22-] Afranius was disheartened at these results, and seeing that
affairs in Ilerda were not safe or satisfactory for a prolonged delay,
he determined to retire to the Iber and to the cities there. He set out
on this journey by night, intending to escape the enemy's notice or at
least get the start of them. His departure proved no secret, yet he was
not immediately pursued, for Caesar did not think it safe in the darkness
to follow up with men who were strangers to the place an enemy that was
well acquainted with the country. When, however, day dawned, he hastened
forward and overtaking them in the middle of their journey he
encompassed them suddenly on all sides from a distance; for he was much
superior in numbers and found the bowl-shaped character of the country a
help. He did not wish to come into close quarters with the enemy, partly
because he was afraid that they might become frenzied and accomplish
some desperate undertaking, and partly again because he hoped to win
them over without conflict. This also took place. They tried to break
through at many points, but were unable to do so anywhere: they were
wearied from loss of sleep and from their march; they had no food,
since, expecting to finish their journey the same day, they had brought
none, and were not well supplied with water, for that region is notably
waterless: for these reasons they surrendered themselves, on condition
that they should not be maltreated nor compelled to join his expedition
against Pompey. [-23-]Caesar kept each of his promises to them
scrupulously He killed not a single man captured in this war in spite of
the fact that his foes had once, during a kind of truce, destroyed some
of his own men who were in an unguarded position; and he did not force
them to fight against Pompey, but released the most eminent and employed
the rest as voluntary allies induced by the prospect of gains and
honors. By this act he grew very greatly both in reputation and
prosperity, and attached to his cause all the cities in Spain and all
the soldiers who were in them (some of whom were in Baetica and others,
quite a number, with Marcus Terentius Varro, the lieutenant). [-24-] In
taking charge of these and arranging their affairs he pursued his course
as far as Gades, injuring no one except so far as a collection of money
was concerned,--for of this he levied very large amounts. Many of the
natives he honored both privately and publicly and to all the people of
Gades he granted citizenship, in which the people of Rome later
confirmed them. This kindness he did them in return for the vision of
his dream at the time that he was quaestor there, wherein he seemed to
have intercourse with his mother and had received the hope of sole
rulership, as I have stated.[70] After this act he assigned that nation
to Cassius Longinus because the latter was accustomed to the inhabitants
from his quaestorship which he had served under Pompey. Caesar himself
proceeded by boat to Tarraco. Thence he advanced across the Pyrenees,
but did not set up any trophy on their summits because he understood
that not even Pompey was well spoken of for so doing; but he erected a
great altar constructed of polished stones not far from his rival's

[-25-] While this was going on the Massilians, as ships had again been
sent them by Pompey, faced danger afresh. They were defeated, to be
sure, on this occasion also, but held their ground even though they
learned that Caesar was already master of Spain. All attacks they
vigorously repulsed and made a truce, pretendedly for the purpose of
arranging terms with Caesar, when he should come. Then they sent out
Domitius secretly and wrought such havoc among the soldiers who had
attacked them in the midst of the truce and by night, that these
ventured to make no further attempts. With Caesar, however, when he came
himself, they made terms: he at that time deprived them of their arms,
ships and money, and later of everything else except the name of
freedom. To counterbalance this misfortune Phocaea, their mother city,
was made independent by Pompey.

[-26-] At Placentia some soldiers mutinied and refused to accompany
Caesar longer, under the pretext that they were exhausted, but really
because he did not allow them to plunder the country nor to do all the
other things on which their minds were set; they were hoping to obtain
anything whatever of him, inasmuch as he stood in such tremendous need
of them. Yet he did not yield, but, with a view to being safe from them
and in order that after listening to his address and seeing the persons
punished they should feel no wish in an way to transgress the
established rules, he called together both the mutinous body and the
rest, and spoke as follows:--[-27-] "Fellow soldiers, I desire to have
your love, and still I should not choose on that account to participate
in your errors. I am fond of you and should wish, as a father might for
his children, that you should be preserved, be prosperous, and have a
good repute. Do not think it is the duty of one who loves to assent to
things which ought not to be done, and for which it is quite inevitable
that dangers and ill-repute should fall to the lot of his beloved, but
rather he must teach them the better way and keep them from the worse,
both by advising and by disciplining them. You will recognize that I
speak the truth if you do not estimate advantage with reference to the
pleasure of the moment but instead with reference to what is continually
beneficial, and if you will avoid thinking that gratifying your desires
is more noble than restraining them. It is disgraceful to take pleasure
temporarily in something of which you must later repent, and it is
outrageous after conquering the enemy to be vanquished by some pleasure
or other.

[-28-] "To what do the words I speak apply? To the fact that you have
provisions in abundance,--I am going to speak right out with no
disguise: you do get your pay in full and on time and you are always and
everywhere supplied with plenty of food--that you endure no inglorious
toil nor useless danger; furthermore that you gather many great prizes
for your bravery and are rebuked little or not at all for your errors,
and yet you do not see fit to be satisfied with these things. I am
speaking not of all of you, for you are not all such men, but only to
those who for their own gain are casting reproach on the rest. Most of
you obey my orders very scrupulously and satisfactorily, abide by your
ancestral customs, and in that way have acquired so much land and wealth
and glory; some few, however, are attaching much disgrace and disrespect
to all of us. Though I understood clearly before this that they were
that sort of persons,--for there is none of your interests that I fail
to notice,--still I pretended not to know it, thinking that they might
become better if they believed they were not observed in some of their
evil deeds and had the fear that if they ever presumed too far they
might be punished for the guilt of which they were conscious. Since
they, however, proceeding on the ground that they may do whatever they
wish because they were not brought to book at the very start, are
overbold and are trying to make the rest of you, who are guilty of no
irregularity, likewise mutinous, it becomes necessary for me to devote
some care to them and to give them my attention. [-29-] In general, no
society of men can preserve its unity and continue to exist, if the
criminal element be not disciplined: if the part afflicted does not
receive proper medicine, it causes all the rest, as in fleshly bodies,
to be sick at the same time. And least of all in armies can discipline
be relaxed, because when the wrongdoers have strength they become more
daring and corrupt the excellent also by causing them to grow dejected
and to believe that they will obtain no benefit from right behavior.
Wherever the insolent element has the advantage, there inevitably the
decent element has the worst of it: and wherever injustice is
unpunished, there uprightness also goes without reward. What is there
you could assert is doing right, if these men are doing no wrong? How
could you logically desire to be honored, if these men do not endure
their just punishment? Are you ignorant of the fact that if one class is
freed from the fear of retribution and the other is deprived of the hope
of prizes, no good is brought about, but only numberless ills? Hence if
you really practice valor and excellence, you should detest these men as
enemies. What is friendly is not distinguished from what is hostile by
any characteristic of birth, but is determined by habits and actions,
which if they are good can make the alien intimate, but if they are bad
can alienate everything, even kindred. [-30-] And you should speak in
your own defence, because by the behavior of these few we must all
inevitably fall into disrepute, even if we have done no wrong. Every one
who is acquainted with our numbers and progress refers the errors of the
few to us all; and thus though we do not share in their gains, we bear
an equal share of their reproach. Who would not be indignant at hearing
that we had the name of Romans, but did deeds of the Celtae? Who would
not lament the sight of Italy ravaged like Britain? Is it not outrageous
for us to cease injuring the possessions of the Gauls, because they are
subdued, and then to devastate the property of dwellers south of the
Alps, as if they were some Epirots, or Carthaginians, or Cimbi? Is it
not disgraceful for us to give ourselves airs and say that we were the
first of the Romans to cross the Rhine and to sail the ocean, and then
to plunder our native land which is safe from harm at the hands of foes
and to receive blame instead of praise, dishonor in place of honor, loss
instead of gain, punishment instead of prizes?[-31-] Do not think that
because you are in the army, that makes you stronger than the citizens
at home. You are both Romans, and they like you both have been and will
be soldiers. Nor yet again that because you have arms, it is permitted
you to injure. The laws have more authority than you, and some day you
will without fail lay down these weapons. Do not, again, rely on your
numbers. Those capable of being wronged are, if they unite, more than
you. And they will unite, if you do wrong. Do not, because you have
conquered the barbarians, despise these citizens also, from whom you
differ not the slightest either in birth or in education, in the matter
of food or in customs. Instead, as is proper and advantageous for you,
use no violence and wrong no one of them, but receive provisions from
their willingness to provide, and accept rewards from their willing
hands. [-32-] In addition to what I have just said and other
considerations that one might cite who should enter upon a long
discussion of such questions, you must also take account of the
following fact,--that we have come here now to assist our country under
oppression and to ward off those that are harming her. If she were in no
danger, we should neither have come into Italy with arms,--since it is
unlawful,--nor should we have left unfinished the business of the Celts
and Britons, when we might have subjugated those regions too. Then is it
not remarkable if we who are here for vengeance upon the evildoers
should show ourselves no less greedy of gain than they? Is it not
inconceivable that when we have arrived to aid our country we should
force her to require other allies against us? And yet I think my claims
so much better warranted than Pompey's that I have often challenged him
to a trial; and since he by reason of his guilty conscience has refused
to have the questions peaceably decided, I hope by this act of his to
attach to my cause all the allies and the entire people. But now, if we
also shall take up a course similar to his, I shall not have any decent
excuse to offer nor be able to charge my opponents with any unbecoming
conduct. You must also look ahead very carefully to the justice of your
cause. If you have this, the strength that arms afford is full of hope,
but without it nothing remains sure, though for the moment a man may be

[-33-] "That nature has ordained this most of you understand, and you
fulfill all your duties without urging. That is why I have convened
you,--to make you both witnesses and spectators of my words and acts.
But you are not of such a character as some men I have been mentioning
and therefore it is that you receive praise. Only some few of you
observe how, in addition to working many injuries and paying no penalty
at all for them hitherto, these malcontents are also threatening us.
However, as a general principle, I do not think it well for any ruler to
be subdued by his subjects, nor do I believe that any safety could
possibly result, if the class appointed to assist a person should
attempt to overcome him. Consider what sort of order could exist in a
house where those in the prime of youth should despise their elders, or
what order in schools, if the students should pay no heed to their
instructors? What health would there be for the sick, if those
indisposed should not obey their physicians in all points, or what
safety for the navigators if the sailors should turn a deaf ear to their
pilots? It is by a natural law both necessary and salutary that the
principle of ruling and again that of being ruled have been placed among
men, and without them it is impossible for anything to continue to exist
for ever so short a time. Now it belongs to him who is stationed over
another both to think out and to command the requisite course, and to
him who is made subservient to obey without questioning and to put the
order into action. By this the sensible element is distinguished from
the senseless and the understanding element from the ignorant in all

[-34-] "Since these things are so I would never under compulsion assent
to these brawlers nor give them my permission perforce. Why am I sprung
from Aeneas and Iulus, why have I been praetor, why consul, for what end
have I led some of you out from home and gathered others later, for what
end have I received and held the authority of a proconsul now for so
long a time, if I am to be a slave to any one of you and conquered by
any one of you here in Italy and near to Rome,--I, to whom you owe your
subjection of the Gauls and your conquest of Britain? What should I fear
or dread? That some one of you will kill me? Nay, but if you all had
this mind, I would voluntarily choose to die rather than to give up the
dignity of my position as leader or to abandon the attitude of mind
befitting the head of an enterprise. For a far greater danger than the
unjust death of one man confronts the city, if the soldiers shall become
accustomed to issue orders to their generals and to take the justice of
the law into their own hands.[-35-] No one of them, however, has so much
as made this threat: if he had, I am sure he would have been slain
forthwith by the rest of you. But they are withdrawing from the campaign
on the pretence of being wearied and are laying down their arms because
(they say) they are worn out, and certainly if they do not obtain my
consent to this wish of theirs, they will leave their ranks and go over
to Pompey: some of them make this perfectly evident. Who would not be
glad to be deprived of such men, and who would not pray that such
soldiers might belong to his rival, seeing that they are not content
with what is given and are not obedient to orders, but that simulating
old age in the midst of youth and in strength simulating weakness they
claim the right to lord it over their rulers and to tyrannize over their
leaders? I had ten thousand times rather be reconciled with Pompey on
any terms whatever or suffer any other conceivable fate than do anything
unworthy of my native thought or of my own deliberate policy. Are you
unaware that it is not sovereignty or gain that I desire and that I am
not bent upon accomplishing anything absolutely, an at any cost, so that
I would lie and flatter and fawn upon people to this end? Will you give
up, then, for these reasons the campaign, O what can I call you? Yet
still it shall be not as you yourselves desire and say but as is
profitable for the commonwealth and for myself."

After this speech he distributed lots among them for the infliction of
the death penalty, and the most audacious,--for these, as was previously
arranged, drew the lots,--he condemned, and the rest he dismissed,
saying he had no further need of them. And they repented of what they
had done and were ready to renew the campaign.

[-36-] While he was still on the way Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the man who
later became a member of the triumvirate, in his capacity of praetor took
counsel with the people to elect Caesar dictator and immediately moved
his nomination, contrary to ancestral custom. The latter accepted the
office as soon as he entered the city, but committed no act of terror
while in it. On the contrary he granted a return to all the exiles
except Milo, and filled the offices for the ensuing year: at that time
they had chosen no one temporarily in place of the absentees, and
whereas there was no aedile in town, the tribunes exercised all the
functions pertaining to the aedileship: moreover he set up priests in the
places of those who were lost (though not observing all the detailed
ceremonies that were customary for them at such a juncture), and to the
Gauls who live this side of the Alps and beyond the Po he gave
citizenship because he had once governed them. After effecting this he
resigned the name of dictator, for he had quite all the power and
functions of the position constantly in his grasp. He employed the
strength that is afforded by arms, and also got in addition a
quasi-legal authority from the senate that was on the spot; for he was
permitted to do with impunity whatever he might wish.

[-37-] Having obtained this he at once set aright an affair of great
moment and necessity. The money lenders had exacted money quite
relentlessly from some, who needed large funds on account of the
political disputes and the wars. Many of the debtors by reason of the
same events were not able, even if they wished it, to pay back anything;
for they did not find it easy to sell anything or to borrow more. Hence
the mutual dealings of the two classes were ofttimes marked by deceit
and ofttimes by treachery, so that there was fear of the matter
progressing till it became an incurable evil. Certain modifications in
regard to interest had been made even before this by some of the
tribunes, but since even so payment was not secured, but the one class
kept forfeiting its securities and the other demanding the principal in
money, Caesar now came to the aid of both so far as he could. He ordered
that securities should have a fixed valuation according to their worth,
and to decide that point he assigned arbiters to be allotted to persons
disputing any point. [-38-] Since also many were said to possess large
properties but to be concealing all their wealth, he forbade any one to
have more than fifteen thousand denarii in silver or gold: this law, he
alleged, he did not enact himself, but he was simply enforcing a measure
some time previously introduced. His object was either that those who
owed should make good some of their debt to the lenders and the rest
lend to such as needed, or else that the well-to-do might be clearly
apparent and no one of them keep his property all together, for fear
some political change might take place in his absence. When the
populace, elated at this, asked that in addition to it rewards be
offered to servants for information against their masters, he refused to
add such a clause to the law and furthermore called down dire
destruction upon himself if he should ever trust a slave speaking
against his master.

[-39-] Caesar after doing this and removing all the Capitoline offerings
and others hastened to Brundusium toward the close of the year and
before entering upon the consulship to which he had been elected. And as
he was attending to the details of his departure a kite in the Forum let
fall a sprig of laurel upon one of his companions. Later, while he was
sacrificing to Fortuna, the bull escaped before being wounded, rushed
out of the city, and coming to a kind of pond swam across it. As a
consequence he continued his preparations with greater courage and
especially because the soothsayers declared that destruction should be
his if he remained at home, but if he crossed the sea salvation and
victory. When he had gone, the boys in the city spontaneously divided
into two classes, one side calling itself Pompeiians and the other
Caesarians, and they fought one another after a fashion without arms, and
those conquered who used Caesar's name.

[-40-] While such was the progress of events in Rome and in Spain,
Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo by using Pompey's fleet
expelled from Dalmatia Publius Cornelius Dolabella, who was there
attending to Caesar's interests. After this they shut up Gaius Antonius,
who was desirous of aiding him, in a little islet and there, abandoned
by the natives and oppressed by hunger, they captured him with all his
force save a few; some of them had escaped in season to the mainland,
and others who were sailing across on rafts and were caught made away
with themselves. [-41-] Curio had meanwhile reduced Sicily without a
battle; for Cato, the governor of it, being no match for him and not
wishing idly to expose the cities to danger, withdrew beforehand to
Pompey; afterward, however, the conqueror passed over to Africa and
perished. At his approach by sea Lucius Caesar abandoned the city of
Aspis in which he merely happened to be staying, and Publius Attius
Varus, then in charge of the affairs of that region, was defeated by him
and lost many soldiers and a few cities. Juba, however, son of Hiempsus
and king over the Numidians, esteemed the interests of Pompey as those
of the people and the senate, and hated Curio both for this reason and
because the latter when tribune had attempted to take away his kingdom
from him and confiscate the land: therefore he vigorously prosecuted the
war against him. He did not wait for him to invade his home country of
Numidia but assailed him with something less than his entire force at
the siege of Utica, for fear that the Roman, being previously informed,
might retire; and he was rather more anxious to take vengeance on him
than to repulse him. Accordingly, Juba sent forward a few men who
reported that the king had departed in some other direction and to a
distance: he himself followed after these and did not miss the results
he had hoped for. [-42-] Before this Curio with the idea that his enemy
was approaching had transferred his men to the camp near the sea and had
framed an intention, in case he were hard pushed, of embarking on the
ships and leaving Africa altogether. But when he ascertained that only a
few men were arriving and these without Juba, he took courage and
started out that very night as if to a victory waiting for him, and
fearing only that they should escape him. In his advance he destroyed
some of the van who were sleeping on the road and became much
emboldened. Next, about dawn, he encountered the rest who had started
out ahead from the camp; and without any delay, in spite of the fact
that his soldiers were exhausted both by the march and by loss of sleep,
he at once joined battle with them. At this juncture, while matters were
at a standstill and they were fighting rather evenly, Juba suddenly
appeared upon the scene and by his unexpected coming as well as by his
numbers overwhelmed him. Curio and most of the others he killed on the
spot by means of this surprise, and the rest he pursued as far as the
ditch, after which he confined them to their ships and in the midst of
the confusion got possession of large amounts of money and destroyed
many men. Numbers of them perished when they seemed to have escaped,
some being knocked down in the melee while boarding the boats, and
others drowned while in the ships themselves by the overloading of the
vessels. During these occurrences some being afraid they might suffer
the same fate went over to Varus expecting that their lives would be
spared, but received no benefit from it. For Juba asserted that it was
he who had conquered them and so slaughtered them all except a few. Thus
Curio died after rendering most valuable assistance to Caesar upon whom
he had founded many hopes. Juba found honors at the hands of Pompey and
the senators who were in Macedonia and was saluted as king: but on the
part of Caesar and those in the city he was censured and declared an
enemy, while Bocchus and Bogud were named kings because they were
hostile to him.

[B.C. 48 (_a.u._ 706)]

[-43-] The ensuing year the Romans had two sets of magistrates, contrary
to custom, and a mighty conflict was engendered. The people of the city
had chosen as consuls Caesar and Publius Servilius, together with
praetors, and everything else according to law: the party in Thessalonica
had made no such preparations although they had by some accounts about
two hundred of the senate and the consuls and had appropriated a small
piece of land for divinations to the end that their proceedings might
seem to take place under a certain form of law. Wherefore they regarded
the people and the entire city as present there (the reason being that
the consuls had not introduced the lex curiata), and they employed those
same officials as formerly, only changing their names and calling some
proconsuls, others propraetors, and others pro-quaestors. For they were
very careful about ancestral customs even though they had raised their
arms against their country and abandoned their native shores, and were
anxious to perform all necessary acts not merely with a view to
temporary demands or contrary to the exact wording of the ordinances. It
is quite time that nominally these officials ruled the two parties, but
in reality it was Pompey and Caesar who were supreme, bearing, for the
sake of good repute, the legal titles,--one that of consul and the other
that of proconsul,--and doing not what the magistrates allowed but
whatever they themselves pleased.

[-44-] Under these conditions, with the government divided in twain,
Pompey wintered in Thessalonica and did not keep a very careful guard of
the coast. He did not think that Caesar had yet arrived in Italy from
Spain, and even if he were there he did not suspect that his rival, in
winter, at least, would venture to cross the Ionian sea. Caesar was in
Brundusium, waiting for spring, but when he ascertained that Pompey was
some distance off and that Epirus just opposite was rather heedlessly
guarded, he seized the opportunity of the war to attack him while in a
state of relaxation. When the winter was about half gone he set out with
a portion of his army,--there were not enough ships to carry them all
across at once,--escaped the attention of Marcus Bibulus to whom the
guarding of the sea had been committed, and crossed to the so-called
Ceraunian Headlands, a point in the confines of Epirus, near the opening
of the Ionian gulf. Having reached there before it became noised abroad
that he would sail at all, he despatched the ships to Brundusium for the
rest: but Bibulus damaged them on the return voyage and actually took
some in tow, so that Caesar learned by experience that he had enjoyed a
more fortunate than prudent voyage.

[-45-]During this delay, therefore, he acquired Oricum and Apollonia and
other points there which had been abandoned by Pompey's garrisons. This
"Corinthian Apollonia" is well situated as regards the land and as
regards the sea, and excellently in respect to rivers. What I have
remarked, however, above all else is that a huge fire issues from the
ground near the Aoeus river and neither spreads to any extent over the
surrounding land nor sets on fire that very place where it is located
nor even makes the ground dry and brittle, but leaves the grass and
trees flourishing very near it. In pouring rains it increases and rises
high. For this reason it is called Nymphaeum[71] and affords a kind of
oracle. You take a grain of incense and after making whatever prayer you
wish throw it carrying the prayer. At this the fire, if your wish is to
be fulfilled, receives it very readily and in case the grain falls
somewhere outside, darts forward, snatches it up and consumes it. But if
the wish is not to be fulfilled, the fire does not go to it, and if it
is carried into the flame, the latter recedes and flees before it. These
two actions it performs in this way in all matters save those of death
and marriage: about these two it is not granted any one to learn
anything whatever from it.

[-46-] Such is the nature of this marvel. Now as Antony, to whom had
been assigned the duty of conveying those that remained at Brundusium,
proved slow, and no message came about them on account of the winter and
of Bibulus, Caesar suspected that they had adopted a neutral attitude and
were watching the course of events, as often happens in political
disputes. Wishing therefore, to sail himself to Italy, and alone, he
embarked on a small boat as some one else, saying that he had been sent
by Caesar; and he forced the captain, although there was a wind, to set
sail. When, however, they were away from land, the gale came sweeping
violently down upon them and the billows rocked them terribly, so that
the captain not even under compulsion dared any longer sail on, but
undertook to return even without his passenger's consent. Then the
latter revealed himself, as if by this act he should stop the storm, and
said, "Be of good cheer: you carry Caesar." Such a disposition and such a
hope he had, either accidentally or as the result of some oracle, that
he felt a secure trust in safety even contrary to the appearance of
things. Nevertheless, he did not get across, but after struggling for a
long time in vain sailed back.

[-47-]After this he encamped opposite Pompey, near Apsus. The latter as
soon as he had heard of his rival's advent had made no delay, but hoping
to quell him easily before he secured the presence of the rest who were
with Antony, he marched in haste and in some force toward Apollonia.
Caesar advanced to meet him as far as the river, thinking that even as he
was he would prove a match for the troops then approaching: but when he
learned that he was actually far inferior in numbers, he halted. In
order that this action should not seem due to fear, and he not be
thought to be opening the war, he submitted some conciliatory proposals
to the opposing body and continued his abode in that place. Pompey,
knowing this, wished to try conclusions with him as soon as possible and
for this reason undertook to cross the river. But the bridge on
receiving the weight broke down and some of the advance guard being
isolated, perished. Then he desisted in dejection that he had failed in
his first recourse to hostile action. Meanwhile Antony had arrived, and
Pompey in fear retired to Dyrrachium. [-48-] While Bibulus lived,
Caesar's lieutenant had not dared even to set out from Brundusium, so
close was the guard kept over it. But when that officer, worn out by
hard work, had died and Libo succeeded him as admiral, Antony despised
him and set sail with the evident intention of forcing the passage.
Driven back to land he repelled the other's vigorous attack upon him and
later, when Libo was anxious to disembark somewhere, he allowed him to
find anchorage nowhere near that part of the mainland. The admiral being
in need of anchorage and water, since the little island in front of the
harbor, which was the only place he could approach, is destitute of
water and harbor alike, sailed off to some distant point where he was
likely to find both in abundance. In this way Antony was enabled to set
sail, and later when the foe attempted to assail them on the high seas
he suffered no damage at his hands: a violent storm came up which
prevented the attack, but caused injuries to both sides.

[-49-] When the soldiers had come safely across, Pompey, as I have said,
retired to Dyrrachium, and Caesar followed him, encouraged by the fact
that he had survived his previous experiences with the number of
followers he now had. Dyrrachium is situated in the land formerly
belonging to the tribe of Illyrians called Parthini, but now and even at
that time regarded as a part of Macedonia; and it is very favorably
placed, whether it be the Epidamnus of the Corcyraeans or some other.
Those who record this fact also refer its founding and its name to a
hero Dyrrachus. The other authorities have declared that the place was
renamed by the Romans with reference to the difficulties of the rocky
shore, because the term Epidamnus has in the Latin tongue the meaning
"loss," and so seemed to be very ill-omened for their crossing over to

[-50-] Pompey after taking refuge in this Dyrrachium built a camp
outside the city and surrounded it with deep ditches and stout
palisades. Caesar encamped over against it and made assaults, in the hope
of shortly capturing the palisades by the number of his soldiers: when,
however, he was repulsed, he attempted to wall it off. While he was at
that work, Pompey fortified some points by stakes, cut off others by a
wall, and fortified still others with a ditch, establishing towers and
guards on the high places, so as to render the circuit of the
encompassing wall necessarily infinite and to render an approach
impossible to the foe, even if they conquered. There were meanwhile many
battles between them, but brief ones, in which now one party, now the
other, was victorious or beaten, so that a few were killed on both sides
alike. Upon Dyrrachium itself Caesar made an attempt by night, between
the marshes and the sea, in the expectation that it would be betrayed by
its defenders. He passed inside the narrows, but at that point was
attacked by many in front and many behind, who were conveyed along the
shore in boats and suddenly fell upon him; thus he lost numerous men and
very nearly perished himself. After this occurrence Pompey took courage
and concerted a plan for a night assault upon the circumvallation; as he
was unexpected he captured a portion of it by storm and caused a great
slaughter among the men encamped near it.

[-51-] Caesar in view of this event and because the grain had failed
him,--the entire sea and land in the vicinity being hostile,--and
because for this reason some had deserted, feared that he might either
be overcome while watching his adversary or be abandoned by his other
followers. Therefore he leveled all the works that had been constructed,
destroyed also all the parallel walls, and thereupon made a sudden start
and set out for Thessaly. During this same time that Dyrrachium was
being besieged Lucius Cassius Longinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus had
been sent by him into Macedonia and into Thessaly. Longinus was
disastrously defeated by Scipio and by Sadalus, a Thracian; Calvinus was
repulsed from Macedonia by Faustus, but on receiving accessions from the
Locrians and Aetolians he invaded Thessaly with these troops, and after
being ambushed and then again laying counter-ambuscades conquered Scipio
in battle, and by that act gained a few cities. Thither, accordingly,
Caesar hastened, thinking that by combining with these officers he could
more easily get an abundance of food and continue the prosecution of the
war. When no one would receive him, because he had had bad luck, he
reluctantly held aloof from the larger settlements, but assaulted
Gomphi, a little city of Thessaly, took it, killed many and plundered
all its inhabitants in order that by this act he might inspire the rest
with terror. Metropolis, at any rate, another town, would have no
conflict with him but forthwith capitulated without a struggle: and as
he did no harm to its citizens he more easily won over some other places
by his display of equal readiness in opposite contingencies.

[-52-] So he became strong again. Pompey did not institute an immediate
pursuit, for his antagonist had withdrawn suddenly by night and had
hastily crossed the Genusus river: however, he was strongly inclined to
think that he had subdued him completely. Consequently he assumed the
name of imperator, though he made no boast of it and did not even wind
laurel about his fasces, disliking to show such exultation over the
downfall of citizens. Consistently with this same attitude he neither
sailed to Italy himself nor sent any others there, though he might
easily have reduced the whole peninsula. As regards a fleet he was
absolute master, for he had five hundred swift ships and could touch at
many points at once: and the sentiment of that country was not opposed
to him, nor, if it had been ever so hostile, could the people have been
a match for him in war. But he wished to remain at a distance, so as to
get the reputation of fighting for his land, and did not see fit to
cause any fear to the persons who then in Rome. Hence he made no attempt
on Italy, not even sending to the government any despatch about his
successes. But after this he set out against Caesar and came to Thessaly.

[-53-] As they lay opposite each other the appearance of the camps bore,
indeed, some resemblance of war, but the use of arms was suspended as in
time of peace. As they reviewed the greatness of the danger and foresaw
the obscurity and uncertainty of the issue, and still stood in some awe
of their common ancestry and kinship, they were led to delay. Meanwhile
they exchanged propositions about friendship and appeared to some likely
to become reconciled without accomplishing anything. This was due to the
fact that they were both reaching out for supreme dominion and were
influenced by a great deal of native ambition and a great deal of
acquired rivalry,--for men can least endure to be outdone by their
equals and intimates; they were not willing to make any concessions to
each other, since each felt that he might win, nor could they feel any
confidence, if they did come to terms, that they would not be always
yearning for the advantage and fall into strife again over complete
control. [-54-] In temper they differed from each other to this
extent,--that Pompey desired to be second to no man and Caesar to be
first of all, and the former was anxious to be honored by willing
subjects and to preside over and be loved by a people fully consenting,
whereas the latter cared not at all if he ruled over an unwilling nation
and issued orders to men that hated him, and bestowed the honors with
his own hand upon himself. The deeds, however, through which they hoped
to accomplish all that they wished, were perforce common to both alike.
For it was impossible that either one of them should succeed without
fighting against his countrymen, leading foreigners against kindred,
obtaining much money by unjust pillage, and killing unlawfully many of
his dearest associates. Hence, even though they differed in their
desires, yet in their acts, by which they hoped to fulfill those
desires, they were alike. Consequently they would not yield to each
other on any point, in spite of the many just grounds that they alleged,
and finally came into collision.

[-55-] The struggle proved a mighty one, and resembled no other
conflict. The leaders believed themselves to be the most skilled in all
matters of warfare and clearly the most distinguished not only of the
Romans but also of the remainder of mankind then in existence. They had
practiced those pursuits from boyhood, had constantly been connected
with them, had exhibited deeds worthy of note, had been conspicuous for
great valor and great good fortune, and were therefore most worthy of
commanding and most worthy of victory. As to forces, Caesar had the
largest and the most genuinely Roman portion of the citizen-army and the
most warlike men from the rest of Italy, from Spain, and the whole of
Gaul and the islands that he had conquered: Pompey had attracted many
from the senatorial and the equestrian order and from the regular
enrollment and had gathered a vast number from subject and pacified
peoples and kings. Aside from Pharnaces and Orodes,--the latter, indeed,
although an enemy because of his having killed the Crassi, he tried to
win over,--all the rest who had ever had even the smallest dealings with
Pompey gave him money and either sent or led auxiliaries. The Parthian
king promised to be his ally if he should take Syria: but as he did not
get it, the prince did not help him. While Pompey decidedly excelled in
numbers, Caesar's followers were equal to them in strength, and so, the
advantage being even, they just balanced each other and were equally
prepared for danger.

[-56-] In these circumstances and by the very cause and purpose of the
war a most notable struggle took place. The city of Rome and the entire
dominion over it, even then great and mighty, lay before them as a
prize: it was clear to all that it would become the slave of him who
conquered. When they reflected on this fact and furthermore recalled
their former deeds,--Pompey, Africa and Sertorius and Mithridates and
Tigranes and the sea: Caesar, Gaul and Spain and the Rhine and
Britain,--they were excited to frenzy, thinking that they were facing
danger for those conquests too, and each was eager to acquire the
other's glory. For the renown of the vanquished no less than his other
possessions becomes the property of the victors. The greater and more
powerful the antagonist that a man overthrows, to the greater heights is
he raised. [-57-] Therefore they delivered to the soldiers also many
exhortations, but very much alike on both sides, saying all that is
fitting to be mentioned on such occasions with reference both to the
immediate nature of the danger and to its future results. As they both
came from the same state and were talking to the same subjects and
calling each other tyrants and themselves liberators from tyranny, they
had nothing of different kinds to say, but stated that it would be the
lot of the one party to die, of the other to be preserved, of the one
party to be captives, of the other to enjoy the master's lot, to possess
everything or to be deprived of everything, to suffer or to inflict a
most terrible fate. After giving some such exhortations to the citizens
and furthermore leading the subject and allied contingents into hopes
for the better and fears for the worse, they hurled at each other
kinsmen, sharers of the same tent, those who had eaten together, those
who had drunk together. Why should any one then lament the fate of
others involved, when those very men, who were all these things to each
other, and had shared many secret words, many similar exploits, who had
once been concerned in a marriage and loved the same child, one as a
father, the other as grandfather, nevertheless fought? All the ties that
nature by mingling their blood had created, they now, directed by
insatiate lust of power, hastened to break, tear, and cleave asunder.
Because of them Rome was forced to encounter danger for herself against
herself, and though victor to be worsted.

Such was the struggle in which they joined. [-58-] They did not,
however, immediately come to close quarters. Sprung from the same
country and from the same hearth, with almost identical weapons and
similar formation, each side shrank from beginning the battle, shrank
from slaying any one. There was great silence then, and dejection on the
part of both; no one went forward nor moved at all: but with heads bowed
they stood motionless, as if devoid of life. Caesar and Pompey,
therefore, fearing that if they remained quiet any longer their
animosity might be dulled or they might even become reconciled,
hurriedly commanded the trumpeters to blow the signal and the men to
raise the war cry in unison. Both orders were obeyed, but the
contestants were so far from being imbued with courage, that at the
similar sound of the trumpeter's call and at their own outcry in the
same language, they felt their affinity and were impressed with their
kinship, and so fell into tears and wailing. [-59-] At length the allied
troops began the battle, and the rest joined in combat, fairly beside
themselves at what they were doing. Those whose part in the conflict was
a distant one were less sensible of the horror; they threw, shot, hurled
javelins, discharged slings, without knowing whom they hit: but the
heavy-armed and the cavalry had a fearful experience, as they were close
to each other and could even speak a little back and forth; at the same
moment they would recognize their vis-a-vis and would wound him, would
call to him and slaughter him, would remember their country and despoil
the slain. These were the actions and the sufferings of the Romans and
the rest from Italy who were joined with them in the campaign, wherever
they happened upon each other. Many sent messages home through their
very destroyers. The subject force fought both zealously and
unflinchingly, showing much alertness as once for their own freedom, so
now to secure the slavery of the Romans; they wanted, since they were
inferior to them at all points, to have them as fellow-slaves.

[-60-] It was a very great battle and full of diverse incidents, partly
for the reasons mentioned and partly on account of the numbers and the
variety of the armaments. There were vast bodies of heavy-armed
soldiers, vast bodies of cavalry, others that were archers and still
others that were slingers, so that they occupied the whole plain and
when scattered often fought with their own men, because similarly
arrayed, and often promiscuously with others. Pompey surpassed in his
body of horse and archers; hence they surrounded troops from a distance,
employed sudden assaults, and after throwing them into confusion
retired; then again and still again they would attack them, changing now
to this side and now to that. The Caesarians were on their guard against
this, and by deploying their ranks always managed to face those
assailing them, and when they came into close quarters with them readily
laid hold of both men and horses in the contest; light-armed infantry
had, in fact, been drawn up with their cavalry for this very purpose.
And all this took place, as I said, not in one spot but in many places
at once, scattered about; and with some contending from a distance and
others fighting at close quarters, this body smiting its opponents and
that group getting struck, one detachment fleeing, and a second
pursuing, many infantry battles and many cavalry battles as well were to
be seen. Under these conditions many unexpected things happened. One man
having routed another was himself turned to flight, and another who had
forced a man out of line was in turn attacked by him. One soldier who
had struck another was himself wounded and a second, who had fallen,
killed the enemy who stood over him. Many died without being wounded,
and many when half dead caused more slaughter. Some exulted and sang the
paean, while others were grieved and lamented, so that all places were
filled with cries and groans. The majority were thrown into confusion by
this fact, for the mass of words which were unintelligible to them,
because belonging to different nations and languages, alarmed them
greatly, and those who could understand one another suffered a calamity
many times worse; in addition to their private misfortunes they saw and
heard at the same time those of near neighbors.

[-61-] At last, after they had struggled evenly for a very long space of
time and many on both sides alike had fallen or been wounded, Pompey,
since the larger part of his army was Asiatic and untrained, was
defeated, even as had been made clear to him before the action.
Thunderbolts had fallen into his camp, a fire had appeared in the air
over Caesar's ditch and then fell up his own, bees had swarmed upon his
military standards, and many of the victims after being led up close the
very altar had run away. And so far did the effects of that contest
extend to the rest of mankind that on the very day of the battle
collisions of armies and the clash of arms occurred in many places: in
Pergamum a kind of noise of drums and cymbals rose from the temple of
Dionysus and spread throughout the city; in Tralles a palm tree grew up
in the temple of Victory and the goddess herself turned about toward an
image of Caesar located beside her; in Syria two young men (as they
seemed) announced the result of the battle and vanished; and in
Patavium, which now belongs to Italy but was then still a part of Gaul,
certain birds not only brought news of it but even acted it out to some
extent, for one Gaius Cornelius drew from them accurate information of
all that had taken place, and narrated it to the bystanders. These
things happened separately on that very same day and were naturally
distrusted at the time; but when news was brought of the engagement,
astonishment was felt.

[-62-] Of Pompey's followers who were not destroyed on the spot some
fled whithersoever they could, and others changed their allegiance.
Those of them who were solders of the line Caesar enrolled among his own
troops, exhibiting no resentment. Of the senators and knights all those
whom he had captured before and pitied he killed, unless his friends
begged some of them off; for he allowed each of these on this occasion
to save one man. The rest who had then for the first time fought against
him he released, saying: "Those have not wronged me who have advanced
the interests of Pompey, their friend, and had received no benefit from
me." This same attitude he adopted toward the potentates and peoples who
joined his cause. He pardoned them all, bearing in mind that he himself
was acquainted with none or almost none of them, whereas from his rival
they had previously obtained many favors. These he praised far more than
such as had previously received some kindness from Pompey but in the
midst of dangers had left him in the lurch: the former he could
reasonably expect would be favorably disposed to him also, but as to the
latter, no matter how anxious they seemed to be to please him in
anything, he believed that inasmuch as they had betrayed a friend in
this crisis they would not spare him either on occasion. [-63-] A proof
of his feeling is that he spared Sadalus the Thracian and Deiotarus the
Gaul, who had been in the battle, and Tarcondimotus, who was ruler of a
portion of Cilicia and had very greatly assisted Caesar's opponent in the
way of ships. What need is there of listing the rest who sent
auxiliaries, to all of whom he granted pardon and merely exacted money
from them? He did them no other damage and took from them nothing else,
though many had frequently received great gifts from Pompey, some long
ago and some just at that time. A certain portion of Armenia that had
belonged to Deiotarus he did give to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia,
yet in this he did not injure Deiotarus at all, but rather conferred an
additional favor upon him. He did not sunder the territory his domains,
but after occupying all of Armenia before occupied by Pharnaces he
bestowed one part of it on Ariobarzanes and another part upon Deiotarus.
Pharnaces made a plea that he had not assisted Pompey and therefore, in
view of his behavior, deserved to obtain pardon: Caesar, however, gave
him no satisfactory response, and furthermore reproached him with the
very fact that he had proved himself base and impious toward his
benefactor. Such humaneness and uprightness did he afterward show in
every case to all those who had fought against him. Moreover, all the
letters that were found filed away in Pompey's chests which convicted
any persons of good-will toward the latter or ill-will toward himself he
neither read nor had copied but burned them immediately, in order not to
be forced by what was in them to take severe measures; and for this
reason if no other any one ought to hate the men that plotted against
him. This is not a mere random remark, but may serve to call attention
to the fact that Marcus Brutus Caepio, who afterward killed him, was
captured by him and preserved from harm.



The following is contained in the Forty-second of Dio's Rome.

How Pompey, defeated in Thessaly, took to flight and perished in Egypt
(chapters 1-5).

How Caesar, following Pompey, came into Egypt (chapters 6-16).

How the news about Caesar and Pompey was announced at Rome, and what
decrees were passed in honor of Caesar (chapters 17-20).

How in the absence of Caesar the population of Rome revolted (chapters

How Caesar fought and subdued the Egyptians and showered favors upon
Cleopatra (chapters 34-44).

How Caesar conquered Pharnaces (chapters 45-48).

How Caesar returned to Rome and reconciled the interests there (chapters

How Caesar led an expedition into Africa (chapters 56-58).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Julius Caesar (II)
and Publius Servilius Isauricus, together with one additional year, in
which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

C. Iulius C.F. Caesar, Dictator (II), M. Antonius M.F., Master of Horse,
and the two consuls C. Fufius C.F. Calenus and P. Vatinius P.F. (B.C. 47
= a.u. 707.)


[B.C. 48 (_a.u._ 706)]

[-1-] The general nature of the battle has, accordingly, been described.
As a result of it Pompey straightway despaired of all his undertakings
and no longer made any account of his own valor or of the number of his
remaining soldiers or of the fact that Fortune often restores the
vanquished in the shortest space of time; yet in former times he had
always possessed the greatest cheerfulness and the greatest hopefulness
on all occasions of failure. The reason for this was that in the cases
just mentioned he had usually been evenly matched with the foe and hence
had not discounted a victory in advance; but by reflecting beforehand on
the dual possibilities of the outcome of the engagement, while he was
still coolheaded and before being involved in any alarm, he had not
neglected to prepare for the worst. In this way he had not been
compelled to yield to disasters and was able with ease to renew the
conflict: but this time as he had expected to far surpass Caesar he had
foreseen nothing. For instance, he had not put the camp in proper
condition nor provided a refuge for himself if defeated. And whereas he
might have delayed action and so have conquered without a battle,--for
his army kept increasing every day and he had abundant provisions
because he was in a country for the most part friendly and because he
was lord of the sea,--nevertheless, whether of his own accord and
thinking he would conquer in any event, or because he was forced by his
associates, he brought on an engagement. Consequently as soon as he was
defeated he was terribly alarmed and had no opportune plan or sure hope
ready to enable him to face the danger anew Whenever any event befalls a
man unexpectedly and most contrary to what seemed reasonable, it humbles
his mind and drives out the faculty of calculation, so that he becomes
the poorest and weakest judge of what must be done. Calculation cannot
live in the midst of fears; if it occupies the ground first, it thrusts
them out very effectively, but if it be a second comer, it gets the
worst of the encounter.

[-2-] Hence Pompey, also, having considered none of the chances
beforehand, was found naked and defenceless, whereas, had anything been
foreseen, he might, perhaps, without trouble have quickly recovered all
his losses. Large numbers of the combatants had survived and he had
other forces that were considerable. Above all, he had gotten into his
possession large amounts of money and was master of the entire sea, and
the cities both there and in Asia were fond of him even in his
misfortune. But, as it turned out, since he had fared so ill where he
felt most encouraged, in the temporary seizure of fear he made no use of
any one of these resources, but left the fortifications at once and fled
with a few companions toward Larissa. He did not enter the city although
the Larissaeans invited him, because he feared that by so doing he might
incur some blame. Bidding them make terms with the victor, he himself
took provisions, embarked on the sea, and sailed away to Lesbos on a
merchantman, to his wife Cornelia and his son Sextus. After taking
charge of them he did not even enter Mitylene but started for Egypt,
hoping to secure an alliance with Ptolemy, the king of that country.
This was the son of that Ptolemy who, through the agency of Gabinius,
had received back the kingdom at his hands, and he had as an
acknowledgment of that service sent a fleet to Pompey's assistance. I
have heard that Pompey thought also of fleeing to the Parthians, but I
cannot credit the report. For that race so hated all the Romans ever
since Crassus had led his expedition against them, and Pompey
especially, because related to him, that they imprisoned his envoy who
came with a request for aid, though he was a senator. And Pompey would
have never endured in his misfortune to become a suppliant of a most
hostile nation for what he had failed to obtain while enjoying success.
[-3-]However,--he proceeded to Egypt for the reasons mentioned, and
after coasting along the shore as far as Cilicia went across from there
to Pelusium, where Ptolemy, just then engaged in a war with his sister
Cleopatra, was encamped. Bringing the ships to anchor he sent some men
to remind the prince of the favor shown his father and to ask that he be
permitted to land on definite and secure conditions: he did not venture
to disembark before obtaining some guarantee of safety. Ptolemy made him
no answer, for he was still a mere child, but some of the Egyptians and
Lucius Septimius, a Roman who had made campaigns with Pompey but was a
relative of Gabinius and had been left behind by him to keep guard over
Ptolemy, came in the guise of friends: for all that they impiously
plotted against him and by their act brought guilt upon themselves and
all Egypt. They themselves perished not long after and the Egyptians for
their part were first delivered to be slaves of Cleopatra (this they
particularly disliked) and later were enrolled among the Roman subjects.
[-4-] Now at this time Septimius and Achillas, the commander-in-chief,
and others who were with them declared they would readily receive
Pompey,--to the end, of course, that he might be the more easily
deceived and ensnared. Some of them sent on his messengers ahead,
bidding them be of good cheer, and the natives themselves next embarked
on some small boats and sailed out to him. After many friendly greetings
they begged him to come over to their vessels, saying that by reason of
its size and the shallow water a trireme could not closely approach
their land and that they were very eager to see Pompey himself more
quickly. He thereupon changed ships, although all his fellow voyagers
urged him not to do it, trusting in his hosts and saying merely:

"Whoever to a tyrant wends his way, His slave is he, e'en though his
steps be free." [72]

Now when they drew near the land, fearing that if he even met Ptolemy he
might be saved, by the king himself or by the Romans who dwelt with him
or by the Egyptians, who regarded him with great affection, they killed
him before sailing into harbor. He said not a word and uttered no
complaint, but as soon as he perceived their plot and recognized that he
would not be able to ward them off nor escape, he veiled his face.

[-5-] Such was the end of the famous Pompey the Great, wherein once more
the weakness and the strange fortune of the human race are proved. He
was no whit deficient in foresight, but was deceived by having been
always absolutely secure against any force of harmful potency. He had
won many unexpected victories in Africa, and many in Asia and Europe,
both by land and by sea ever since boyhood; and was now in the
fifty-eighth year of his age defeated without good reason. He who had
subdued the entire Roman sea perished on it: and whereas he had once, as
the story goes, been master of a thousand ships, he was destroyed in a
tiny boat near Egypt and really by that same Ptolemy whose father he had
once restored from exile to that land and to his kingdom. The man whom
at that time Roman soldiers were still guarding, soldiers left behind by
Gabinius as a favor to Pompey and on account of the hatred felt by the
Egyptians for the young prince's father, seemed now to have put him to
death by the hands of those Romans and those Egyptians. Pompey, who was
previously considered the dominant figure among the Romans so that he
even had the nickname of _Agamemnon_, was now slain like any of the
lowest of the Egyptians themselves, near Mount Casius and on the
anniversary of the day on which he had celebrated a triumph over
Mithridates and the pirates. Even in this point, therefore, there was
nothing similar in the two parts of his career. Of yore on that day he
had experienced the most brilliant success, whereas he now suffered the
most grievous fate: again, following a certain oracle he had been
suspicious of all the citizens named Cassius, but instead of being the
object of a plot by any man called Cassius he died and was buried beside
the mountain that had this name. Of his fellow voyagers some were
captured at once, while others fled, among them his wife and child. The
former under a safe conduct came later safely to Rome: the latter,
Sextus, proceeded to Africa to his brother Gnaeus; these are the names by
which they are distinguished, since they both bore the appellation

[-6-] Caesar, when he had attended to pressing demands after the battle
and had assigned to certain others Greece and the remainder of that
region to win over and administer, himself pursued after Pompey. He
hurried forward as far as Asia in quest of news about him, and there
waited for a time since no one knew which way he had sailed. Everything
turned out favorably for him: for instance, while crossing the
Hellespont in a kind of ferryboat, he met Pompey's fleet sailing with
Lucius Cassius in command, but so far from suffering any harm at their
hands he terrified them and won them to his side. Next, meeting with no
resistance any longer he took possession of the rest of that district
and regulated its affairs, levying a money contribution, as I said, but
otherwise doing no one any harm and even conferring benefits on all, so
far as was visible. He did away with the taxgatherers, who abused the
people most cruelly, and he converted the product of the taxes into a
payment of tribute.

[-7-] Meanwhile, learning that Pompey was sailing to Egypt, he was
afraid that his rival by occupying it in advance might again acquire
strength, and he set out with, all speed. Him he found no longer alive.
Then with a few followers he sailed far in advance of the others to
Alexandria itself before Ptolemy came from Pelusium. On discovering that
the people of the city were in a tumult over Pompey's death he did not
at once venture to disembark, but put out to sea and waited till he saw
the head and finger-ring of the murdered man, sent him by Ptolemy.
Thereupon he approached the land with some courage: the multitude,
however, showed irritation at the sight of his lictors and he was glad
to make his escape into the palace. Some of his soldiers had their
weapons taken from them, and the rest accordingly put to sea again until
all the ships had reached harbor. [-8-] Caesar at the sight of Pompey's
head wept and lamented bitterly, calling him countryman and son-in-law,
and enumerating all the kindnesses they had shown each other. He said at
he owed no reward to the murderers, but heaped reproaches upon them, and
the head he commanded to be adorned and after proper preparation to be
buried. For this he received praise, but for his pretences he was made a
laughing stock. He had from the outset been thoroughly set upon
dominion; he had always hated Pompey as his antagonist and adversary;
besides all his other measures against him he had brought on this war
with no other purpose than to secure his rival's ruin and his own
leadership; he had but now been hurrying to Egypt with no other end in
view than to overthrow him completely if he should still be alive: yet
he feigned to miss his presence and made a show of vexation over his

[-9-] Under the belief that now that Pompey was out of the way there was
no longer any spot left that was hostile to him, he spent some time in
Egypt collecting money and adjudicating the differences between Ptolemy
and Cleopatra. Meanwhile other wars were being prepared for him. Egypt
revolted, and Pharnaces had begun, just as soon as he learned that
Pompey and Caesar were at variance, to lay claim to his ancestral domain:
he hoped that they would consume much time in their disputes and use up
their own powers upon each other. He was at this time still clinging to
the districts mentioned, partly because he had once asserted his claim
and partly because he understood that Caesar was far off; and he had
occupied many points in advance. Meanwhile Cato and Scipio and the rest
who were of the same mind with them set on foot in Africa a war that was
both a civil and a foreign conflict.

[-10-] It was this way. Cato had been left behind at Dyrrachium by
Pompey to keep an eye upon reinforcements from Italy, in case any one
should cross, and to repress the Parthini in case they should cause any
disturbance. At first he carried on war with the latter, but after
Pompey's defeat he abandoned Epirus and proceeding to Corcyra with those
of the same mind as himself he there received the men who escaped from
the battle and the rest who had the same interests. Cicero and a few
other senators had set out for Rome at once: but the majority, together
with Labienus and Afranius, since they had no hope in Caesar,--the one
because he had deserted, the other because after having been pardoned by
him he had again made war on him,--went to Cato, put him at their head
and continued the war. [-11-] Their number was later increased by the
addition of Octavius. The latter after sailing into the Ionian sea and
arresting Gaius Antonius conquered several places but could not take
Salonae though he besieged it for a very long time. Having Gabinius to
assist them they repulsed him vigorously and finally along with the
women made a sortie which was eminently successful. The women with hair
let down and robed in black garments took torches, and after arraying
themselves wholly in the most terrifying manner assaulted the besieging
camp at midnight: they threw the outposts, who thought they were
spirits, into panic and then from all sides at once hurled the fire
within the palisade and following on themselves slew many in confusion
and many who were asleep, occupied the place without delay, and captured
at the first approach the harbor in which Octavius was lying. They were
not, however, left at peace. He escaped them somehow, gathered a force
again, and after defeating them in battle invested their city. Meanwhile
Gabinius died of sickness and he gained control of the whole sea in that
vicinity, and by making descents upon the land did the inhabitants much
harm. This lasted until the battle near Pharsalus, after which his
soldiers at the onset of a contingent from Brundusium changed sides
without even making a resistance. Then, destitute of allies he retired
to Corcyra.

[-12-] Gnaeus Pompey first sailed about with the Egyptian fleet and
overran Epirus, so-called, almost capturing Oricum. The commander of the
place, Marcus Acilius,[73] had blocked up the entrance to the harbor by
boats crammed with stones and about the mouth of it had raised towers on
both sides, on the land, and on ships of burden. Pompey, however, had
submarine divers scatter the stones that were in the vessels and when
the latter had been lightened he dragged them out of the way, freed the
passage, and next, after putting heavy-armed troops ashore on each half
of the breakwater, he sailed in. He burned all the boats and most of the
city and would have captured the rest of it, had he not been wounded and
caused the Egyptians to fear that he might die. After receiving medical
attendance he no longer assailed Oricum but journeyed about pillaging
various places and once vainly made an attempt upon Brundusium itself,
as some others had done. This was his occupation for awhile. When his
father had been defeated and the Egyptians on receipt of the news sailed
home, he betook himself to Cato. [-13-] And his example was followed by
Gaius Cassius, who had done very great mischief both in Italy and in
Sicily and had overcome a number of opponents in many battles by sea and
by land.

Many simultaneously took refuge with Cato because they saw that he
excelled them in uprightness, and he, using them as comrades in struggle
and counselors to all matters, sailed to the Peloponnesus with the
apparent intention of occupying it, for he had not yet heard that Pompey
was dead. He did seize Patrae and there received among other accessions
Petreius and Pompey's son-in-law[74] Faustus. Subsequently Quintus
Fufius Calenus led an expedition against them, whereupon they set sail,
and coming to Cyrene there learned of the death of Pompey. Their views
were now no longer harmonious: Cato, loathing the thought of Caesar's
sovereignty, and some others in despair of getting pardon from him,
sailed to Africa with the army, added Scipio to their number, and were
as active as possible against Caesar; the majority scattered, and some of
them retired to make their peace as each one best might, while the rest,
among them Gaius Cassius, went to Caesar forthwith and received assurance
of safety.

[-14-] Calenus had been sent by Caesar into Greece before the battle, and
he captured among other places the Peiraeus, owing to its being unwalled.
Athens (although he did a great deal of damage to its territory) he was
unable to take before the defeat of Pompey. The inhabitants then
capitulated voluntarily and Caesar without resentment released them
altogether, making only this remark, that in spite of their many
offences they were saved by the dead. This speech signified that it was
on account of their ancestors and on account of the latter's glory and
excellence that he spared them. Accordingly Athens and most of the rest
of Greece then at once made terms with him: but the Megarians in spite
of this resisted and were captured only at a considerably later date,
partly by force and partly by treachery. Wherefore a great slaughter of
the people was instituted and the survivors sold. Calenus had so acted
that he might seem to have taken a merited vengeance upon them. But
since he feared that the city might perish utterly, he sold the dwellers
in the first place to their relatives, and in the second place for a
very small sum, so that they might regain their freedom.

[-15-] After these achievements Caesar marched upon Patrae and occupied it
easily, as he had frightened out Cato and his followers in advance.
While these various troubles were being settled, there was an uprising
in Spain, although the country was at peace. The Spaniards were at the
time subject to many abuses from Quintus Longinus, and at first some few
banded together to kill him. He was wounded but escaped, and after that
proceeded to wrong them a great deal more. Then a number of Cordubasians
and a number of soldiers who had formerly belonged to the Pompeian party
rose against him, putting at their head Marcus Marcellus Aeserninus, the
quaestor. He did not accept their appointment with his whole heart, but
seeing the uncertainty of events and admitting that they might turn out
either way, he straddled the issue. All that he said or did was of a
neutral character, so that whether Caesar or Pompey should prevail he
would seem to have fought for the cause of either one. He favored Pompey
by receiving those who transferred their allegiance to him and by
fighting against Longinus, who declared he was on Caesar's side: at the
same time he did a kindness to Caesar because he assumed charge of the
soldiers when (as he would say) Longinus was guilty of certain
irregularities, and kept these men for him, while not allowing their
commander to be alienated. And when the soldiers inscribed the name of
Pompey on their shields he erased it so that he might by this act offer
to the one man the deeds done by the arms and to the other their reputed
ownership, and by laying claim to one thing or the other as done in
behalf of the victor and by referring the opposite to necessity or to
different persons he might continue safe.[-16-] Consequently, although
he had the opportunity of overthrowing Longinus altogether by mere
numbers, he refused, but while extending his actions over considerable
time in the display and preparation of what he desired, he put the
responsibility for doubtful measures upon other persons. Therefore both
in his setbacks and the advantages he gained he could make the plea that
he was acting equally in behalf of the same person: the setbacks he
might have planned himself or might not, and for the advantages others
might or might not be responsible. He continued in this way until Caesar
conquered, when, having incurred the victor's wrath, he was temporarily
banished, but was later brought back from exile and honored. Longinus,
however, being denounced by the Spaniards in an embassy, was deprived of
his office and while on his way home perished near the mouth of the

These events took place abroad. [-17-] The population of Rome while the
interests of Caesar and Pompey were in a doubtful and vacillating state
all professedly espoused the cause of Caesar, influenced by his troops
that were in their midst and by his colleague Servilius. Whenever a
victory of his was reported, they rejoiced, and whenever a reverse, they
grieved,--some really, some pretendedly in each case. For there were
many spies prowling about and eavesdroppers, observing what was being
said and done on such occasions. Privately the talk and actions of those
who detested Caesar and preferred Pompey's side were the very opposite of
their public expressions. Hence, whereas both parties made a show of
receiving any and all news as favorable to their hopes, they in fact
regarded it sometimes with fear and sometimes with boldness, and
inasmuch as many diverse rumors would often be going the rounds on the
same day and in the same hour their position was a most trying one. In
the briefest space of time they were pleased, were grieved, grew bold,
grew fearful. [-18-] When the battle of Pharsalus was reported they were
long incredulous. Caesar sent no despatch to the government, hesitating
to appear to be rejoicing publicly over such a victory, for which reason
also he celebrated no triumph: and again, there seemed little likelihood
of its being true, in view of the relative equipment of the two forces
and the hopes entertained. When at last they gave the story credence,
they took down the images of Pompey and of Sulla that stood upon the
rostra, but did nothing further at that time. A large number did not
wish to do even that, and an equally large number fearing that Pompey
might renew the strife regarded this as quite enough for Caesar and
expected that it would be a fairly simple matter to placate Pompey on
account of it. Moreover, when he died, they would not believe this news
till late, and until they saw his signet that had been sent. (On this
were carved three trophies, as on that of Sulla.) [-19-] But when he
appeared to be really dead, at last they openly praised the winner and
abused the loser and proposed that everything in the world which they
could devise be given to Caesar. In the course of it all there was a
great rivalry among practically all of the foremost men who were eager
to outdo one another in fawning upon him and voting pleasing measures.
By their shouts and by their gestures all of them as if Caesar were
present and looking on showed the very greatest zeal and deemed that in
return for it they would get immediately,--as if they were doing it to
please him at all and not from necessity,--the one an office, another a
priesthood, and a third some pecuniary reward. I shall omit those honors
which had either been voted to some others previously,--images, crowns,
front seats, and things of that kind,--or were novel and proposed now
for the first time, which were not also confirmed by Caesar: for I fear
that I might become wearisome, were I to enumerate them all. This same
plan I shall adopt in my later narrations, adhering the more strictly to
it, as the honors proposed grew more in number and more universal. Only
such as had some special and extraordinary importance and were then
confirmed will be set down. [-20-] They granted him, then, permission to
do whatever he liked to those who had favored Pompey's cause; it could
not be said that he had not already received this right from himself,
but it was intended that he might seem to be acting with some show of
legal authority. They appointed him lord of wars and peace (using the
confederates in Africa as a Pretext) in regard to all mankind, even
though he should make no communication on the subject to the people or
the senate. This was also naturally in his power before, inasmuch as he
had so large a force; and the wars he had fought he had undertaken
himself in nearly every case: nevertheless, because they wished still to
appear to be free and independent citizens, they voted him these rights
and everything else which it was in his power to have even against their
will. He received the privilege of being consul for five consecutive
years and of being chosen dictator not for six months but for an entire
year, and could assume the tribunician authority practically for life.
He was enabled to sit with the tribunes upon the same benches and to be
reckoned with them for other purposes,--a right commonly accorded to no
one. All the elections except those of the people were put in his hands
and for this reason they were delayed till after his arrival and were
carried on only toward the close of the year.[75] The governorships in
subject territory the citizens themselves of course allotted to the
consuls, but they voted that Caesar might give them to the praetors
without the casting of lots: for they had gone back to consuls and
praetors again contrary to their decrees. And another practice which had
the sanction of custom, indeed, but in the corruption of the times might
justly be deemed a cause of hatred and resentment, formed the matter of
one of their resolutions. Caesar had at that time heard not a word of the
mere inception of the war against Juba and against the Romans who had
fought on his side, and yet they assigned a triumph for him to hold, as
if he had been victor.

[-21-] In this way these votes and ratifications took place. Caesar
entered upon the dictatorship at once, though he was outside Italy, and
chose Antony, who had not yet been praetor, as his master of the horse:
and the consul proposed his name, although the augurs most strongly
opposed him with the declaration that no one was allowed to be master of
the horse for more than six months. They incurred, however, a great deal
of laughter for this,--deciding that Caesar should be chosen dictator for
a year contrary to all ancestral precedent, and then splitting hairs
about the master of the horse. [-22-]Marcus Caelius[76] actually perished
because he dared to break the laws laid down by Caesar regarding loans of
money, as if their propounder was defeated and ruined, and because he
had therefore stirred up to strife Rome and Campania. He had been very
prominent in carrying out Caesar's wishes, for which reason moreover he
had been appointed praetor; but he became angry because he had not also
been made praetor urbanus, and because his colleague Trebonius had been
preferred before him for this office, not by lot as had been the custom,
but by Caesar's choice. Hence he opposed his colleague in everything and
would not let him perform any of the duties that belonged to him. He
would not consent to his executing judgments according to Caesar's laws,
and furthermore gave notice to such as owed any sum that he would assist
them against the money-lenders, and to all who dwelt in other peoples'
houses that he would release them from payment of rent. Having by this
course won the attachment of many he set upon Trebonius with their aid
and would have killed him, had he not managed to change his robe and
escape in the crowd. After this failure Caelius privately issued a law in
which he gave to all the use of houses free and annulled debts. [-23-]
Servilius consequently sent for some soldiers who chanced to be going by
on the way to Gaul and after convening the senate under their protection
he presented a proposition about the matter in hand. No ratification was
reached, since the tribunes prevented it, but the sense of the meeting
was recorded and Servilius then ordered the court officers to take down
the offending tablets. When Caelius drove them away and acted in a
disorderly manner toward the consul himself, they convened again, still
protected by the soldiers, and delivered to Servilius the "care of the
city," a phrase I have often used previously in regard to it. After this
he would not permit Caelius, even in his capacity as praetor, to do
anything, but assigned the duties pertaining to his office to some other
praetor, debarred him from the senate, dragged him from the rostra in the
midst of some vociferation, and broke to pieces his chair.

[-24-]Of course Caelius was violently angry at him for each of these
acts, but since Servilius had a rather respectable body of troops in
town he was afraid that he might suffer chastisement, and therefore
decided to set out for Campania to join Milo, who was instituting a kind
of rebellion. The latter, when it proved that he was the only one of the
exiles not restored by Caesar, had come to Italy, where he gathered a
number of men, some in want of a livelihood and others fearing some
punishment, and ravaged the country, assailing Capua and other cities.
It was to him that Caelius wished to betake himself, in order that with
his aid he might do Caesar all possible harm. He was watched, however,
and could not leave the city openly; and he did not venture to escape
secretly because (among other motives) he hoped to accomplish a great
deal more by possessing the attire and the title of praetor. At last,
therefore, he approached the consul and obtained from him leave of
absence, saying that he wished to proceed to Caesar. The other, though he
suspected his intention, still allowed him to do this, particularly
because he was very insistent, invoking Caesar's name and pretending that
he was eager to submit his defence. Servilius sent a tribune with him,

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