Dio’s Rome, Vol VI. by Cassius Dio (page 3)

with pollution.

Thus arrayed they entered the city, having at the head of the procession the spoils and trophies and in images the captured forts displayed, cities and mountains and rivers, lakes, seas,–everything that they had taken. If one day sufficed for the exhibition of these things in procession, well and good: otherwise, the celebration was held during a second and a third. When these adjuncts had gone on their way the triumphator reached the Roman Forum and after commanding that some of the captives be led to prison and put to death he rode up to the Capitol. There, when he had fulfilled certain rites and had brought offerings and had dined in the buildings on the hill, toward evening he departed homeward, accompanied by flutes and pipes.

Such were the triumphs in old times. Factions and powerful cliques attempted very frequently revolutionary movements on those occasions.

All the matters pertaining to the triumphal, the curule chair the letter contains. What need to write again? How after anointing with cinnabar or else Sinopian earth the man who held a triumph they put him on a chariot and placed upon his head a golden crown bearing plainly marked all he had accomplished: in the man’s hand they lay a laurel sprig; armlets they clasp about his arms: they crown all who had gained distinction with crowns made out of silver material inscribed with the feats of daring; and how upon the chariot a public slave stands behind him holding up the crown and saying in his ear: “see also what comes after”–all things important the letter contains. (Tzetzes, Hist. 13, 41-54.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 395 (_a.u._ 359)] 2. ¶ The Romans after fighting many battles against the Falisci, [Footnote: Perhaps Dio wrote _Fidenates_ or _Veientes_ (Livy, IV, 32), and _Falisci_ is due to the copyist, although, to be sure, there were wars with the last named (Livy, IV, 18). Whether the transference of Juno from Veii to Rome (Livy, V, 22) or the lectisternia just established about this time (Livy, V, 13) constitutes the topic discussed is a matter respecting which scholars differ.] and after many sufferings and achievements as well, despised their ancestral rites and took up with foreign ones in the idea that the latter would suffice them. Human nature is for some reason accustomed in trouble to scorn what is usual even though it be divine, and to admire the untried. Thinking, as men do, that they are not helped by it at the present, they expect no benefit in the future, but from what is strange they hope to accomplish whatever they may wish, by means of its novelty. (Mai, p. 153.)

3. ¶ The Romans, who were besieging the city of the Falisci would have consumed much time encamped before it, had not an incident of the following nature occurred. A school teacher of the place who instructed a number of children of good family, either under the influence of anger or through hope of gain led them all outside the wall, supposedly for some different purpose from his real one. They had so great an abundance of courage that they followed him even then. And he took them to Camillus, saying that in their persons he surrendered to him the whole city: for the inhabitants would no longer resist them when those dearest to them were held prisoners. However, he [Sidenote: B.C. 393 (_a.u._ 361)] to accomplish aught; for Camillus, filled with a sense of the conduct proper for Romans and also of the liability to failure of human plans, would not agree to take them by treachery: instead, he bound the traitor’s hands behind his back and delivered him to the children themselves to lead home again.

After this episode the Falisci held out no longer, but in spite of the fact that they were securely entrenched and had ample resources to continue the war nevertheless came to terms voluntarily. They felt sure it would be no ordinary friendship that they would enjoy at the hands of one, whom, as an enemy even, they had found so just. (Valesius, p. 578. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

4. Accordingly Camillus became on this account an object of even greater jealousy to the citizens, and he was indicted by the tribunes on the charge of not having benefited the public treasury with the plunder of the Veii; and before the trial he voluntarily withdrew. (Valesius, ib. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

5. In Dio’s 7th Book: “When he had ended his term of office they indicted him and imposed a money fine, not bringing him into danger of his life.” [Footnote: Boissevain believes that this fragment does not refer to Camillus, and that the number of the Book is possibly a corruption. He would locate it earlier.](Bekker, Anecd. p. 146, 21.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 393 (_a.u._ 361)]6. To such a degree did not only the populace nor all those who were somewhat jealous of his reputation merely, but his best friends and his relatives, too, feel envy toward him that they did not even attempt to hide it. When he asked some of them for support in his case, and others to deposit the money for his release, they refused to assist him in regard to the vote but simply promised, if he were convicted, to estimate the proper money value and to help him pay the amount of the fine. This led him to take an oath in anger that the city should have need of him; and he went over to the Rutuli before accusation was brought against him. [Footnote: Very likely the copyist erred here. The sense requires “before sentence was passed upon him.”] (Mai, p. 154. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

[Frag. XXIV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 391 (_a.u._ 363)] 1. ¶ The cause of the Gallic expedition was this. The Clusini had endured hard treatment in the war from the Gauls and fled for refuge to the Romans, having considerable hope that they could obtain certainly some little help in that quarter, from the fact that they had not taken sides with the people of Veii, though of the same race. When the Romans failed to vote them aid, but sent ambassadors to the Gauls and negotiated peace for them, they came very near accepting it (it was offered them in return for a part of the land); however, they attacked the barbarians after the conference and took the Roman envoys into battle along with them. The Gauls, vexed at seeing them on the opposite side, at first sent men to Rome, preferring charges against the envoys. Since, however, no punishment was visited upon the latter, but they were all, on the contrary, appointed consular tribunes, they were filled with wrath–being naturally quick to anger–and, as they held the Clusini in contempt, started for Rome. (Ursinus, p.373. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 364 (_a.u._ 390)] 2. ¶ The Romans after withstanding the inroads of the Gauls had no time to recover breath, but went immediately from their march into battle, just as they were, and lost. Panic-stricken by the unexpectedness of the invaders’ hostile expedition, by their numbers, their physical dimensions, and their voices uttering some foreign and terrifying sound they forgot their training in military science and after that lost possession of their valor. A good comprehension contributes very largely to bravery, because when present it confirms the strength of a man’s resolution and when lacking destroys the same more thoroughly by far, than if such a thing had never existed at all. Many persons without experience often carry things through by the violence of their spirit, but those who fail of the discipline which they have learned lose also their strength of purpose. This caused the defeat of the Romans. (Mai, p.154. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

3. Coclius Horatius was by race a Roman. He, when on one occasion the army of the Romans had been routed, so that there was danger of their opponents occupying Rome, alone withstood them all at the wooden bridge, while Marcus cut it down behind Minucius. When it had been cut down, Coclius too crossed the Tiber, having saved himself and Rome by the cutting of the bridge. Yet, as he swam, he might have been struck by a spear of the enemy. To him the senate presents lands (as a reward for his excellent bravery) as much as he could mark out in a day with cattle fastened to a plow. He was called Coclius in the Roman tongue because he had lost one of his eyes before he fought. (Tzetzes, Hist. 3, 818-830. Cp. Haupt, _Hermes_ XIV.)

[Sidenote: B. C 364 (_a.u._ 390)] 4. ¶ The Romans who were on the Capitol under siege had no hope of safety unless from heavenly powers. So scrupulously did they observe the mandates of religion, although in every extremity of evil, that when it was requisite for one of the sacred rites to be performed by the pontifices in another part of the city Caeso [Footnote: Very likely the copyist erred here. The sense requires “before sentence was passed upon him.”] Fabius, who exercised the office of priest, descended for the purpose from the Capitol after receiving his charge, as he had been accustomed to do, and passing through the enemy performed the customary ceremony and returned the same day. I am led to admire the barbarians on the one hand because either on account of the gods or his bravery they spared him: and far more do I feel admiration for the man himself for two reasons, that he dared to descend alone among the enemy, and that when he might have withdrawn to some place of safety he refused and instead voluntarily returned up the Capitol again to a danger that he foresaw: he understood that they hesitated to abandon the spot which was the only part of their country they still held but saw at the same time that no matter how much they desired to escape it was impossible to do so by reason of the multitude of the besiegers. (Valesius, p.581.)

5. ¶ Camillus, being urged to let the leadership be entrusted to him, would not allow it because he was an exile and could not take the position according to time-honored usage. He showed himself so law-abiding and exact a man that in so great a danger to his native land he made precedent a matter of earnest thought and did not think it right to hand down to posterity an example of lawlessness. (Valesius, p.582. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

6. When Rome had been sacked by the Gauls, Brennus being at the head of that expedition of theirs, as the Gauls were on the point of capturing the Capitol by ascending secretly to the Acropolis at night, a great outcry of geese arose in that quarter; and one Marcus Manlius roused from sleep saw the enemy creeping up, and by striking some with his oblong shield and slaying others with his sword he repulsed them all and saved the Romans. For this they gave him the title of Capitolinus, and in honor of the geese they have door-keepers as guards in the palace in remembrance of their watch at that time, just as earlier the Greeks in Athens called Pelargikon Geraneia (Crane-ry) from such creatures. (Tzetzes, His. 830-842. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

[Frag. XXV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 384 (_a.u._ 370)] 1. ¶ The populace passed sentence against Capitolinus, his house was razed to the ground, his money confiscated, and his name and even likeness, if such anywhere existed, were erased and destroyed. At the present day, too, all these punishments, except the razing to the ground, are visited upon those who conspire against the commonwealth. They gave judgment also that no patrician should dwell upon the height because Capitolinus happened to have had his house there. And his kinsmen among the Manlii prohibited any one of their number from being named Marcus, since that appellation had been his.

Capitolinus at any rate underwent a great reversal, both in his character and in his fortune. Having made a specialty of warfare he did not understand how to remain at peace; the Capitol he had once saved he occupied for the purpose of establishing a tyranny; although a patrician he became the prey of a house-servant; and whereas he was deemed a warrior, he was arrested after the manner of a slave and hurled down the very rock from which he had repulsed the Gauls. (Valesius, p.582. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

2. ¶ Capitolinus was thrown headlong down the rock by the Romans. So true it is that nothing in the affairs of men,–generally speaking,–remains at it was; and success, in particular, leads many people on into catastrophes equally serious. It raises their hopes, makes them continually strive after like or greater results and, if they fail, casts them into just the opposite condition. (Mai, p. 155. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

3. This Marcus Manlius, who was once termed also Capitolinus, and fell through seeking the tyranny, when about to be put to death by vote of all the jurors was saved by their looking just then at the Capitol, where he himself had performed famous deeds of valor,–until the one who spoke against him, perceiving the cause, transferred the assembly to another court-house from which the Capitol could not be seen at all and so a remembrance spring up of his trophies. Then they kill him. But on the other hand, even so, through the whole period the populace of Rome wore black, recompensing the graces of his valor and the inimitable manner of his distinguished behavior. (Tzetzes, Hist. 3, 843-855. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

[Frag. XXVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 381 (_a.u._ 373)] 1. ¶ Camillus made a campaign against the Tusculans, but thanks to the astonishing attitude that they adopted they suffered no harm. For just as if they themselves were guilty of no offence and the Romans entertained no anger toward them, but were either coming to them as friends to friends or else marching through their territory against some other tribes, they changed none of their accustomed habits and were not in the least disturbed: instead, all without exception remaining in their places, at their occupations and at their other work just as in time of peace, received the army within their borders, gave them hospitable gifts, and in other ways honored them like friends. Consequently the Romans so far from doing them harm enrolled them subsequently among the citizens. (Valesius, p.582.)

[Frag. XXVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 376 (_a.u._ 378)] 2. In Dio’s 7th Book: “Tusculans did not raise their hands against him.” (Bekker, Anecd. p. 123, 32.)

1. ¶ The wife of Rufus, while he was military tribune and engaged in public service in the Forum was visited by her sister.[Footnote: Livy and Valerius Maximus give his name as _Gaius_.] When the husband arrived and the lichtor, according to some ancient custom, knocked at the door, the visitor was alarmed at this having never previously had any such experience and was startled. She was consequently the subject of hearty laughter on the part of her sister and the rest alike and she was made a butt for jests as one not at home in an official atmosphere because her husband had never proved his capacity in any position of authority. She took it terribly to heart, as women, from their littleness of soul, usually do, and would not give up her resentment until she had thrown all the city in an uproar. Thus small accidental events become, in some cases, the cause of many great evils, when a person receives them with jealousy and envy. (Mai, p.155. Zonaras, 7, 24)

2. ¶ In the midst of evils expectation of rescue has power to persuade one to trust even in what is beyond reason. (Mai, p.156.)

3. For by their disputes they kept constantly enfeebling in one way or another the good order of their government; consequently, all these objects so to speak for which they were formerly accustomed to wage the greatest wars they gained in time–not without factional quarrels, to be sure, but still with small difficulty. (Mai, ib.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 368 (_a.u._ 386)] 4. ¶ Publius,[Footnote: The gap existing from the word “Forum” to the end of the sentence is supplied by Bekker’s conjecture.] when the citizens of Rome were quarreling with one another, nearly reconciled them. For he chose as master of the horse Licinius Stolo, who was merely one of the populace.[Footnote: This is Publius Manlius, the dictator (Livy, VI, 39).] This innovation grieved the patricians, but conciliated the rest so much that they no longer laid claim to the consulship for the following year, but allowed the consular tribunes to be chosen. As a result of this they in turn yielded some points one to the other, and perhaps would have made peace with each other had not Stolo the tribune made such utterance as that they should not drink unless they could eat and so persuaded them to relinquish nothing, but to perform as inevitable duties all that they had taken in hand. (Valesius, p.585.)

[Frag. XXVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 362 (_a.u._ 392)] 1. Dio Cassius Cocceianus, the compiler of Roman history, states that as a result of the wrath of Heaven a fissure opened in the ground round about Rome and would not close. An oracular utterance having been obtained to the effect that the fissure would close if they should throw into it the mightiest possession of the Romans, one Curtius, a knight of noble birth, when no one else was able to understand the oracle, himself interpreted it to mean a horse and man together. Straightway he mounted his horse and, just as he was, dashed heroically forward and passed down into that frightful pit. No sooner had he rushed down the incline than the fissure closed; and the rest of the Romans from above scattered flowers. From this event the name of Curtius was applied also to a cellar. (Io. Tzetzes, Scholia for the Interpretation of Homer’s Iliad, p. 136, 17, Cp. Zonaras, 7, 25.)

2. There is no mortal creature either better or stronger than man. Do you not see that all the rest go downwards and look forever toward the earth and accomplish nothing save what is closely connected with eating and the propagation of their species? So they have been condemned to these pursuits even by Nature herself. We alone gaze upwards and associate with heaven itself and despise those things that are on the earth, while we dwell with the gods themselves, believing them to be similar to us inasmuch as we are both their offspring and creations, not earthly but heavenly: for which reason we paint and fashion those very beings according to our forms. For, if one may speak somewhat boldly, man is naught else than a god with mortal body, and a god naught else than a man without body and consequently immortal. That is why we surpass all other creatures. And there is nothing afoot which we do not enslave, overtaking it by speed or subduing it by force or catching it by some artifice, nor yet aught that lives in the water or travels the air: nay, even of these two classes, we pull the former up from the depths without seeing them and drag the latter down from the sky without reaching them. (Mai, p. 532. Zonaras, 7, 25.)

[Frag. XXIX]

¶ Dio says: “Wherefore, although not accustomed to indulgence in digressions, I have taken pains to make mention of it and have stated in addition the Olympiad, in order that when most men forget the date of the migration,[Footnote: This last clause is a conjecture by Reimar.] it may, from the precaution mentioned, become less doubtful.” (Mai, p. 156.)

[Frag. XXX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 353 (_a.u._ 401)] ¶ The Agyllaeans, when they ascertained that the Romans wished to make war on them, despatched ambassadors to Rome before any vote was taken, and obtained peace on surrender of half their territory. (Ursinus, p. 374.)

[Frag. XXXI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 349 (_a.u._ 405)] Marcus Corvinus received the name of Corvinus because when once engaged with a barbarian in single combat, he had a savage crow as his ally in the battle, that flew at the eyes of the barbarian until this Marcus killed him at that time. (Tzetzes, Hist. 3, 862-866. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 25.)

[Frag. XXXII]

1. These proposals and a few others of similar nature they put forward not because they expected to carry any of them into effect,–for they, if anybody, understood the purposes of the Romans,–but in order that failing to obtain their requests they might secure an excuse for complaints, on the ground that wrong had been done them. (Mai, p. 156.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 2. Dio in Book 7: “And for this reason I shall execute you, in order that even as you obtain the prize for your prowess, so you may receive the penalty for your disobedience.” [Footnote: The migration of Alexander(?). See Livy, VIII, 3, 6.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133, 19. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

3. The statement is made by Douris, Diodorus and Dio that when the Samnites, Etruscans and other nations were warring against the Romans, Decius, a Roman consul and associated with Torquatus in command of the troops, gave himself to be slain, and of the opposite side there were slaughtered a hundred thousand that very day.[Footnote: Words of Torquatus to his son.] (Io. Tzetzes, on Lycophr. 1378. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 4. ¶Dio says: “I am surprised that his (Decius’s) death should have set the battle right again, should have defeated the side that was winning and have given victory to the men who were getting worsted: I can not even comprehend what brought about the result. When I reflect what some have accomplished,–for we know that many such chances have befallen many persons before,–I can not disbelieve the tradition: but when I come to calculate the causes of it, I fall into a great dilemma. How can you believe that from such a sacrifice of one man so great a multitude of human beings were brought over at once to safety and to victory? Well, the truth of the matter and the causes that are responsible shall be left to others to investigate.” (Mai, p.157. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

5. It was evident to every one that they had considered the outcome of the event [Footnote: At the battle of Sentinum (295 B.C.).] and had ranged themselves on the victorious side. Torquatus did not, however, question them about it for fear they might revolt, since the affair of the Latins was still a sore point with them. He was not harsh in every case nor in most matters the sort of man he had shown himself toward his son: on the contrary, he was admitted to be good at planning and good in warfare, so that it was said by the citizens and by their adversaries alike that he held success in war subservient to him, and that if he had been leader of the Latins, he would certainly have made them conquer. (Mai, p.157, and Valesius, p.585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 6. ¶The Romans, although vexed at Torquatus on account of his son to such an extent that deeds remarkable for their cold-blooded indifference [Footnote: The phrase after “deeds” is supplied from the general sense. The MS. shows a superlative ending of adjective form, but the root portion of the word is lost.] are called “Manliana,” after him, and angry furthermore that he had celebrated the triumph in spite of the death of that youth, in spite of the death of his colleague, nevertheless when another war threatened them elected him again to a fourth consulship. He, however, refused to hold their chief office longer, and renounced it, declaring: “I could not endure you nor you me.” (Mai, p.157. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 338 (_a.u._ 416)] 7. ¶The Romans by way of bringing the Latins in turn to a condition of friendliness, granted them citizenship so that they secured equal privileges with themselves. Those rights which they would not share with that people when it threatened war and for which they underwent so many dangers, they voluntarily voted to it now that they conquered. Thus they requited some for their allegiance and others because they had taken no steps of a revolutionary character. (Mai, p.158.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 328 (_a.u._ 426)] 8. ¶With reference to the inhabitants of Privernum the Romans made no enquiry, asking them what they deserved to suffer for such conduct. The others answered boldly: “Whatever is suitable for men who are free and desire so to continue.” To the next question of the consul: “And what will you do if you obtain peace?” they replied: “If we are granted it on [Sidenote: B.C. 426 (_a.u._ 426)] fairly moderate terms, we will cease from disturbance, but if unendurable burdens are placed upon us, we will fight.” Admiring their spirit they not only made a much more favorable truce with them than with the rest [lacuna] (Mai, p.158.)

[Frag. XXXIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] 1. [From the address of the father of Rullus.] Be well assured that penalties most unfitting in such cases, while they destroy the culprits under sentence, who might have been made better, are of no avail in correcting the rest. Human nature refuses to leave its regular course for any threats. Some pressing fear or violence of audacity together with courage born of inexperience and rashness sprung from opportunity, or some other combination of circumstances such as often occurs unexpectedly in the careers of many persons leads men to do wrong. And these men are of two classes,–such as do not even think of the punishments but heedless of them rush into the business before them, and such as esteem them of no moment in comparison with the attainment of the ends for which they are striving.

Consistent humanity, however, can produce an effect quite the opposite of that just now mentioned. Through the influence of a seasonable pardon the criminals frequently change their ways, especially when they have acted from brave and not from wicked motives, from ambition and not from baseness. For it should be noted that a reasonable humanity is a mighty force for subduing and correcting a noble soul. As for the rest, they are, without resistance, brought [Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] into a proper frame of mind by the sight of the rescue. Every one would rather obey than be forced, and prefers voluntary to compulsory observance of the law. He who submits to a measure works for it as if it were his own invention, but what is imposed upon him he rejects as unfitting for a freeman. Furthermore it is the part of the highest virtue and power alike not to kill a man,–this is often done by the wickedest and weakest men,–but to spare him and to preserve him; yet no one of us is at liberty to do that without your consent.

It is my wish at length to cease from speaking. What little spirit I have is weary, my voice is giving way, tears check my utterance and fear closes my mouth. But I am at a loss how to close. For my suffering, appearing to me in no doubtful light, does not allow me (unless you decide otherwise) [Footnote: A clause that in the MS. has faded out is represented here by Boissevian’s conjecture.] to be silent, but compels me, as if the safety of my child were going to be in accord with whatever I say last, to speak even further as it were in prayers. (Mai, p.159.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] 2. The name and form of the office with which he was invested he shrank from changing, and when he was intending to spare Rullus,–for he observed the zeal of the populace,–he wished to resist him somewhat before granting the favor and to alter the attitude of the young men, so as to have his pardon come unexpectedly. Therefore he contracted his face, and darting a harsh frowning look at the populace, he raised his voice and spoke. The talking ceased, but still they were not quiet: instead, as generally happens in such a case, what with groaning over his fate and whispering one to another, in spite of their not uttering a single word they gave the impression that they desired the rescue of the cavalry commander. Papirius seeing this, in fear of their possibly taking hostile action, relaxed the extremely domineering manner which he had assumed (for purposes of their correction) in an unusual degree, and by showing moderation in the rest of his actions brought them once more to friendship and enthusiasm for him, so that they proved themselves men when they met their opponents. (Mai, p.160. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

3. ¶The Samnites after their defeat at the hands of the Romans, made proposals for truce to the Romans in the city. They sent them all the Roman captives that they held, together with the property of a man named Papius, [Footnote: _Papius Brutulus_.] who was esteemed among the foremost of his race and bore the entire responsibility for the war; his bones, since he anticipated them in committing suicide, they scattered abroad. Yet they did not obtain their peace; for they were regarded as untrustworthy and had the name of making truces according to events merely for the purpose of cheating any power that conquered them: hence they not only failed to obtain terms, but even brought a relentless war upon themselves. The Romans while accepting their prisoners voted to make war upon them without announcement. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 321. (_a.u._ 433)] 4. Among the many events of human history that might give one cause for wonder must certainly be reckoned what occurred at this time. The Romans, who were so extremely arrogant as to vote that they would not again receive a herald from the Samnites in the matter of peace and hoped moreover to capture them all at the first blow, succumbed to a terrible disaster and incurred disgrace as never before; the others, who to begin with were badly frightened and thought the refusal to make peace a great calamity, seized their camp and entire force, and sent them all under the yoke. So great a reverse of fortune did they suffer. (Mai, p.161. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

5. Benefits lie rather within the actual choice of men and are not brought about by necessity, or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily by a willing and eager condition of spirit. And for this reason it is proper to pity, admonish, instruct those who commit any error and to admire, love, reward those who do right. Whenever men act in both of these two ways, it is decidedly more befitting our characters to remember their better than their less correct deeds. [Footnote: Sections 5, 6, and 7 appear to come from various speeches delivered at the Caudine Forks; section 8, however, is from the speech of Herennius Pontius.] (Mai, p.535.)

6. ¶Quarrels are checked by kindness. The greater the pitch of enmity to which a man has come when he unexpectedly obtains safety instead of severity, the more readily does he hasten voluntarily to abandon the quarrel and to acknowledge gladly the influence of kindness. B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433) As in a random host of persons at variance from divers causes those who have passed from friendship to enmity hate each other with the more intense hatred, so in a random host of persons kindly treated do those who receive this considerate treatment after a state of strife love their benefactors the more. Romans, accordingly, are very anxious to surpass in war and at the same time they honor virtue; for this reason, compelled in both regards by their nobility of spirit, they verily earn the right to surpass, since they take pains to recompense fair treatment fairly, and even beyond its value. (Mai, p.161.)

7. For it is right to pride one’s self upon requiting those who have done some wrong, but to feel more highly elated over recompensing such as have conferred some benefit. (Mai, p.536.)

8. ¶All men are by nature so constituted as to grieve more over any insults offered them than they rejoice over benefits conferred upon them: therefore they show hostility to persons who have injured them with less effort than they require for aiding in return persons who have shown them kindness; hence also they make no account, when their own advantage is concerned, of the ill reputation they will gain by not taking a friendly attitude toward their preserver, but indulge a spirit of wrath even when such behavior runs counter to their own interest.

Such was the advice he gave them out of his own inherent good sense and experience acquired in a long life, not looking to the gratification of the moment but to the possible regret of the future. (Mai, p.162.)

9. ¶The people of Capua, when the Romans after [Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] their defeat arrived in that city, were guilty of no bitter speech or outrageous act, but on the contrary gave them both food and horses and received them like victors. They pitied in their misfortune the men whom they would have not wished to see conquer on account of the treatment those same persons had formerly accorded them. When the Romans heard of the event they were altogether possessed by doubt whether to be pleased at the survival of their soldiers or whether to continue displeased. When they thought of the depth of the disgrace their grief was extreme; for they deemed it unworthy of them to have met with defeat, and especially at the hands of the Samnites, so that they could wish that all had perished; when they stopped to reflect, however, that if such a calamity had befallen them all the rest as well would have incurred danger, they were not sorry to hear that the men had been saved. (Mai, p.162. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 10. ¶It is requisite and blameless for all men to plan for their own safety, and if they get into any danger to do anything whatsoever so as to be preserved. (Mai, p.163.)

11. ¶Pardon is granted both by gods and by men to such as have committed any act involuntarily. (Ib. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

12. Dio in Book 8: “I both take to myself the crime and admit the perjury.” (Bekker, Anecd. p.165, 13.)

13. Dio in Book 8: “For in all such matters he was quite all-sufficient to himself.” [Footnote: This is thought to refer to L. Papirius Cursor or possibly to Q. Fabius Maximus. Cp. Livy, X, 26.] (Ib. p.124, 1.)

14.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Samnites, seeing that neither were the oaths observed by them nor gratitude for favors manifested in any other way, and that few instead of many were surrendered, thus making void the oaths, became terribly angry and loudly called upon the gods in respect to some of these matters: moreover, they brought the pledges to their attention, demanded the captives, and ordered them to pass naked under the same yoke where through pity they had been released, in order that by experience they might learn to abide by terms which had been once agreed upon. The men that had been surrendered they dismissed, either because they did not think it right to destroy guiltless persons or because they wished to fasten the perjury upon the populace and not through the punishment of a few men to absolve the rest. This they did, hoping as a result to secure decent treatment. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 15. ¶The Romans so far from being grateful to the Samnites for the preservation of the surrendered soldiers, actually behaved as if they had in this suffered some outrage. They showed anger in their conduct of the war, and, being victorious, treated the Samnites in the same way. For the justice of the battle-field does not fit the ordinary definition of the word, and it is not inevitable that the party which has been wronged should conquer: instead, war, in its absolute sway, adjusts everything to the advantage of the victor, often causing something that is the reverse of justice to go under that name. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

16.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Romans after vanquishing the Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as satisfactory to their honor a repayment of similar disgrace. So did Fortune for both parties in the briefest time reverse her position and by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of their outraged foes show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme. (Mai, p. 164. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 319 (_a.u._ 435)] 17. ¶ Papirius made a campaign against the Samnites and having reduced them to a state of siege entrenched himself before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive use of wine, whereupon he replied: “That I am not intoxicated is clear to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I take a little wine to lull me to rest.” (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶ The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison became angry on not finding the general from Praeneste at his post. He summoned him and bade him hand the axe to the lictor. Alarm and consternation at this was evident on the part of the general, and his fear sufficed. Papirius harmed him no further but merely gave orders to the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they should not injure passers-by. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶ In numerous cases instances of good fortune are not at all constant, but lead many aside into paths of carelessness and ruin them.[Footnote: Cp. Livy, IX, 18, 8.] (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 310 (_a.u._ 444)] 20. ¶ The men of the city put forward Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they sent for him and begged him to put the common weal before a private grudge. And he gave the envoys, indeed, no response, but when night had come (according to ancient custom it was quite necessary that the dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius and secured by this act the greatest renown.(Valesius, p. 585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._)] 21. ¶ Appius the Blind and Volumnius became at variance each with the other: and it was owing to this that Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the assembly with showing no gratitude for the progress he had made in wisdom through Appius’s instruction, answered that he had indeed grown wiser and was likewise ready to admit it, but that Appius had not advanced at all in matters pertaining to war. (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._ 458)] 22. ¶ As regards the prophecy the multitude was not capable for the time being of either believing or disbelieving him.[Footnote: I.e., Manius, an Etruscan.] It neither wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely painful position, as it were between confusion and fear. As each single event occurred they applied the interpretation to it according to the actual result, and the man himself undertook to assume some reputation for skill with regard to the foreknowledge of the unseen. (Mai, p. 165. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 293 (_a.u._ 461)] 23. ¶ The Samnites, enraged at what occurred and deeming it highly disgraceful to be defeated, resorted to extreme daring and folly with the intention of either conquering or being utterly destroyed. They assembled all their men that were of military age, threatening with death all that should remain at home, and they bound themselves with frightful oaths to the effect that no man should flee from the contest but should slaughter any person that might undertake to do so. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 292 (_a.u._ 462)] 24. ¶ The Romans on hearing that their consul Fabius had been worsted in the war became terribly angry and summoned him to stand trial. A vehement denunciation of the man was made before the people,–and, indeed, he was depressed by the injury to his father’s reputation even more than by the complaints,–and no opportunity was afforded the object of the attack for reply. Nor did the elder man make a set defence of his son, but by enumerating his own services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that his son would do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people’s wrath, especially since he urged his son’s youth. Moreover, he joined him at once in the campaign, overthrew the Samnites in battle, though they were elated by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The Romans therefore extolled him and ordered that his son also should command for the future with consular powers, and still employ his father as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him, sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily assisted the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. He made it clear, however, that he was not executing the business on his own responsibility, but he associated with his son as if actually in the capacity of counselor and under-officer, while he moderated his temperament and assigned to him the glory of the exploits. (Valesius, p. 585. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 291 (_a.u._ 463)] 25. ¶ The soldiers with Junius who took the field along with Postumius fell sick on the way, and thought that their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. He was recalled for these reasons, but showed contempt for them even at this juncture, declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of the senate [lacuna] Envio [lacuna] and the [lacuna] men much [lacuna] ambition [lacuna] [Words of Postumius Megillus: Cp. Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 16, [Footnote: The famous Apollonius of Tyana.]. (Mai, p. 167.)

[Frag. XXXIV]

¶ Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on that account did not please Rufinus, but was always at variance with him. Yet the latter chose Fabricius, thinking that he was a most proper person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the commonwealth.

[Frag. XXXIV]

As a result he gained some reputation for having shown himself above jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a thorough patriot and did not practice virtue for a show he thought it a matter of indifference whether the State were benefited by him or through some other man, even if that man should be an opponent. (Valesius, p.586.)

[Frag. XXXV]

¶Cornelius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to his foe, [lacuna][Footnote: See Niebuhr, Rh. Mus., 1828, p.600, or _Kleine Schriften_, 2, p.241.] the general excellence of Rufius and added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being bought and sold by the enemy. [This anecdote concerns Fabricius Luscinus, mentioned by Cicero, de orat. 2, 66, 268; Quintilian 12, 1, 43; Gellius 4, 48.]

[Frag. XXXVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 290 (_a.u._ 464)] ¶Curius, in defence of his conduct in the popular assembly, said that he had acquired so much land [lacuna] and had hunted for so many men [lacuna] country [lacuna] [The person referred to is Manius Curius Dentatus. Cp. Auct. de Viris. Illustr., c. 33.

¶After Niebuhr, Rh. Mus. 1828, p.579.]

[Frag. XXXVII]

¶When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law was often proposed without avail, since the lenders were by no means willing to accept it and the tribunes granted the nobles the choice of either putting this law to the vote or following that of Stolo, by which they were to reckon the previous interest toward the principal and receive the remainder in triennial payments. [Footnote: The opening portion of this fragment is based largely on conjectures of Niebuhr (Rhein. Mus., 1828, p.579ff.)] And for the time being the weaker party, dreading lest it might lose all, paid court to them, and the wealthier class, encouraged to think it would not be compelled to adopt either course, maintained a hostile attitude. But when the revolted [Footnote: A doubtful reading.] party proceeded to press matters somewhat, both sides changed their positions. The debtors were no longer satisfied with either plan, and the nobles thought themselves lucky if they should not be deprived of their principal. Hence the dispute was not decided immediately, but subsequently they prolonged their rivalry in a spirit of contentiousness, and did not act at all in their usual character. Finally the people made peace in spite of the fact that the nobles were unwilling to remit much more than they had originally expected; however, the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more were they emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and consequently they regarded the various concessions almost as matters of course and strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone to that end the fact that they had already obtained something. (Mai, p.167. Zonaras, 8,2.)

[Frag. XXXVIII]

¶When the opposite side [Footnote: The Tuscans, Senones, and Gauls appear to be meant.] saw also another general approaching, they ceased to heed the common interests of their force but each cast about to secure his individual safety, as a common practice of those who form a union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common grievances, or who have not one commander. While good fortune attends them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one sees before him only matters of individual concern. They betook themselves to flight as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them to force their way out or for their defection to pass unnoticed, but if they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone, they would more easily escape. And so, to his own party,–each one of them [lacuna] they will think that accomplishing their flight with the greatest security [lacuna] (Mai, p.167.)

[Frag. XXXIX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 1. The Romans had learned that the Tarentini and some others were making ready to war against them, and had despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent them from committing any revolutionary act: but they had him arrested, and by sending men to the Etruscans and Umbrians and Gauls they caused a number of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later. (Ursinus, p.375. Zonaras, 8, 2-Vol. II, p.174, 4 sq.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 2. ¶The Tarentini, although they had themselves initiated the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know it on account of temporary embarrassments. Hereupon the Tarentini, thinking that they either could mock [Footnote: Verb adopted from Boissevain’s conjecture [Greek: _diasilloun_] (cp. the same word in Book Fifty-nine, chapter 25). at Rome or were entirely unobserved because they were receiving no complaints behaved still more insolently and involved the Romans even contrary to their own wishes in a war. This proved the saying that even good fortune, when a disproportionately large portion of it falls to the lot of any individuals, becomes the cause of disaster to them; it entices them on to a state of frenzy (since moderation refuses to cohabit with vanity) and ruins their greatest interests. So these Tarentini, too, after rising to an unexampled height of prosperity in turn met with a misfortune that was an equivalent return for their wantonness. (Mai, p.168 and 536.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (_a.u._ 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: “Lucius Valerius, [Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on some errand by them.” (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

4. ¶Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them,–they were still celebrating the festival, which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, rendered them still more wanton,–and finally a man planted himself in the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous anapaests upon the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: “Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood.” (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. ¶Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, spoke: “Now it is yours both to be drunken and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be slaves.” (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] ¶King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The AEtolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. ¶Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans: and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him. (Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. ¶King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,–the only one in fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man’s fondness for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces. (Valesius, p.586.)

4. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the expedition. And a response having come to him: “You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer,” he construed it according to his wish (for desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. ¶The Rhegians had asked of the Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of the excess of supplies and general easy habits,–for they enjoyed a far less strenuous existence than they had known at home,–through the persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius, purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk (the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly. The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus’s fleet had anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers,–save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. ¶Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)

7. ¶The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. ¶The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large force by no means despicable as an adversary,–the sort of information, of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras, 8,3.)

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from the speech made by Laevinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).] (Mai, p. 537.)

10. ¶Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. ¶Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men, contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that is of weight without persons to cooeperate and to aid in its administration. (Mai, p.171.)

12. ¶When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

13. ¶When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: “I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans.” (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

14. ¶Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands. For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

15. ¶Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however, they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)

16. ¶The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,–a kind of beast that they had never before seen,–had fallen into dismay, still, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)

17. ¶The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him, on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them than his promises. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

20. ¶The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army of Laevinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn, but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)

21. ¶Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city, entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

22. ¶When Fabricius made this statement merely: “The Romans sent us to bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us,” he was quite dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management, whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

23 [lacuna]. “to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence, if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program.” By this speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors: “Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make a treaty of peace.” Privately, also, he did them favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed as follows: “Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two words “and reputable” are a conjecture of Bossevain’s. Some ten letters in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general.” Fabricius replied: “I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things, because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he could not live without it.

“Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate [Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the MSS. give.] rather than by one’s own baseness. In the former instance a man’s body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased advantages.” (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)

26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)

27. ¶Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it [i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would repulse the one of them [Footnote: “They” are C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of the question. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him, than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else’s [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. ¶As the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth, despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)

32. ¶All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: “We should have said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn’t failed us,” he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] ¶Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]¶Though the Romans were faring in this manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors. The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)

[Frag. XLIII]

1. ¶The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were–on the side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentini, on the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

2. ¶The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying, as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] 3. ¶Gaius Claudius came to the meeting, and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear) opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians, especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin and on account of the request for assistance they had made. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8,8.)

4. ¶Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. ¶Hanno, who was in no wise disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

6. ¶When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

7. ¶Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an assembly of their number and made the statement: “I have no need of arms but will leave it with you to decide everything.” By this means he persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

8. ¶The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpassed the skill of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained in a brief space by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man’s nature, could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)

9. ¶ The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition. [Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this section.] (Mai, p. 539.)

11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it irretrievably.

Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing, as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)

12. ¶ The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were equally matched in the number of ships and readiness to serve. [Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain the latter. One side surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due consideration. (Mai, p.181.)

13. ¶The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who failed in an enterprise.

He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: “I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the battle.” (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (_a.u._ 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: “When the storm continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal’s defeat through the agency of some deserters.” (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they [Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force. For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have the contest in the Carthaginians’ own land. If they failed, they would lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was, indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and children should be furnished their support from the public treasury. (Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

17. ¶ Hanno had been sent to the Romans by Hamilcar, as was pretended, in behalf of peace, but in reality for the sake of delay. And he, when some clamored for his arrest, because the Carthaginians by fraud [lacuna] Cornelius [lacuna] [Mai, p. 183.] Four pages of the MS. are lacking. (Zonaras, 8, 12.)

18. Dio the Roman, who wrote a history about the Empire and the Republic of Rome and describes the far-famed Carthaginian war, says that when Regulus,

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] consul for Rome, was warring against Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile and having flayed it sent its skin, a great prodigy, to the Roman senate. And when measured by the same senate (as the same Dio says) it was found to have a length of one hundred and twenty feet. In addition to its length its thickness was also notable. (Ioannes Damascenus, On Serpents, vol. I, p. 472, A.B. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

19. ¶ The Carthaginians in fear of capture sent heralds to the consul to the end that by some satisfactory arrangement they might turn aside the danger of the moment, and so escape. But since they refused to withdraw from both Sicily and Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by the Romans for the war and besides to pay more as tribute each year, they accomplished nothing. And in addition to the above mentioned, there were the following commands which displeased them: that they should make neither war nor treaties without the consent of the Romans, that they should employ not more than one warship but the Romans would come to their aid with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them, and that they would not be on an equal footing in conducting some other kinds of business. Considering these points they decided that the truce would mean their utter subjugation, and preferred rather to fight with the Romans. (Ursinus, p. 376. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

20. Dio in Book 11: “The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money.” (Bekker, Anecd. p. 131, 12. Zonaras, 8, 14.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 21. ¶ They say the Carthaginians sent heralds to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives (among other causes), and most of all to see if they would be inclined to make peace on some moderate terms; if this could not be effected, their purpose still held to get back the captives. They say that Regulus, too, had been sent among the envoys because of his reputation and valor. The people assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever in the hope of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives. Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return without fail in case neither of their objects should be accomplished, and they despatched him as an envoy with others.

And he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, not a Roman; for he did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him nor did he enter the city, although he was invited: instead, when the senate assembled outside of the walls, as their custom was in treating with the envoys of the enemy, he asked for permission to approach with the others–at least, so the story goes, [lacuna] (Ursinus, p. 377. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

22. Dio in Book 11: “Regulus paid no heed to them until the Carthaginians permitted him to do so.” (Bekker, Anecd. p. 140, 20. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 23. Dio in Book 11: “For it is neither my duty nor that of any other upright man to give up aught that pertains to the public welfare.” (Ib. p. 165, 23.)

24. In Book 11: “Any one else, wishing to console himself for the disaster which had happened in his own case, would have exalted the prowess of the enemy.” (Ib. p. 165, 30.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (_a.u._ 505)] 25. The second part of the augury is transmitted to us by Dio Cassius Cocceianus, who says that they keep tame birds which eat barley, and put barley grains in front of them when they seek an omen. If, then, in the course of eating the birds do not strike the barley with their beaks and toss it aside, the sign is good; but if they do so strike the grain, it is not good. (Io. Tzetzes, Exegesis of Homer’s Iliad, p. 108, 2.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 244 (_a.u._ 510)] 26. He [sc. Mamilcar] thought it was requisite for a man who wished to accomplish anything by secret means not to make the matter known to anyone at all. There was no one, he believed, so self-possessed as to be willing, when he had heard, merely to observe operations and be silent. Just the reverse was true: the more strongly a man might be forbidden to mention anything, the greater would be his desire to speak of it, and thus one man learning the secret from another with the understanding that he was the only person to know it would reveal the story. [Footnote: Section 26 may refer to Hamilcar Barca’s plans for seizing Mount Eryx.] (Mai, p. 540. Cp. Diodorus, 24, 7.)

27. In Book 11 of Dio: “He feasted the populace.” [Footnote: Boissevain thinks that No. 27 may concern the banqueting of the populace during Metellus’s triumph. Others have other opinions.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133, 24.)

28. In Book 11 of Dio: “You attack even such friends as have been guilty of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies.” (Ib. p.171, 29.)

29. In Book 12 of Dio: “By the one process [Footnote: Perhaps from the speech of Regulus to the senators.] he might have become to a certain extent estranged from you.” (Ib. p.124, 4.) 30. In Book 12 of Dio: “Some are dead, and others who were deserving of some notice, have been captured.” [Footnote: This may be likewise from the speech of Regulus and be said of the Carthaginian leaders.] (Ib. p. 133,25.)

[Frag. XLIV]

1. For the Ligurians occupy the whole shore from Etruria up to the Alps and as far as Gaul, according to Dio’s statement. (Isaac Tzetzes, on Lycophron, 1312.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 236 (_a.u._ 518)] 2. The Romans at first sent Claudius to the Corsicans and gave him up. This was after he had made terms with them, but his countrymen, who claimed that the fault in breaking the compact rested on him and not on themselves, had waged war upon them and subdued them. When the Corsicans refused to receive him, the Romans drove him out. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

[Frag. XLV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 235 (_a.u._ 519)] 1. ¶The Romans after exacting also money from the Carthaginians, renewed the truce. And at first when an embassy from the latter arrived, they returned no proper answer, because they were aware of the state of their own equipment and because they were themselves still busied at that time with the war against the neighboring tribes. After this, however, Hanno, a man of youthful years who employed striking frankness of speech, was sent. He touched unreservedly on a number of other subjects and finally his appeal–“If you don’t want to be at peace, restore to us both Sardinia and Sicily; for with these we purchased not a temporary respite but eternal friendship”–caused them to become milder and ashamed [lacuna] (Ursinus, p.378. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

2[lacuna] lest [Footnote: Preceding this fragment four pages of the MS. are missing.] they might suffer the same injuries in return, so that they were very glad to delay,–the one side choosing to preserve the prosperity that was an inheritance of the past, and the other to cling to the possessions which were still theirs. To judge by their threats they were no longer maintaining peace, but in fact they still deliberated about the matter, so that all could see that whichever of the two found it to his advantage to create the first disturbance would also be the one to begin war. Most men abide by their agreements just so long as suits their own convenience. If they have in view a greater resultant benefit to themselves, they deem it safe even to break some compact. (Mai, p.184.)

[Frag. XLVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 231 (_a.u._ 523)] ¶Once in the consulship of Marcus Pomponius and Gaius Papirius they despatched envoys to investigate affairs in Spain, although none of the Spanish States had ever yet belonged to them. He, [Footnote: A reference to some previous proper name, outside this fragment.] besides showing them other honors, addressed them in suitable words, declaring that he was obliged to fight against the Spaniards in order that the money which was still owing to the Romans on the part of the Carthaginians might be paid; for it was impossible to obtain it from any other source. The envoys were consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him. (Mai, p.184)

[Frag. XLVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 1. ¶The island of Issa surrendered itself voluntarily to the Romans. This was the first time the islanders were about to make the acquaintance of the latter, but they judged them more friendly and faithful than the powers which they then dreaded. Calculation caused them to place more dependence on the unknown than on the evident; for while the latter had aroused irritation through the dealings already had with it, the former afforded good hope, because its actions were as yet only matters of expectation. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 2. When the Issaeans had attached themselves to the Romans, the latter, being ready and anxious to do them some favor in return forthwith, so as to get the reputation of aiding such as espoused their cause and also for the purpose of restraining the Ardiasans, who were annoying those that sailed from Brundusium,–for these reasons they sent messengers to Agro, who were to ask clemency for the Issaeans and censure the king in that he was wronging them without previous cause. Now these men found Agro no longer in existence: he had died, leaving behind a child named Pineus. Teuta, Agro’s wife and stepmother of Pineus, held the power over the Ardiaeans,[lacuna] Being [lacuna] by boldness, she made no moderate response to their requests, but woman-like she showed a vanity (due to innate recklessness as well as to the power that she was holding) by casting some of the ambassadors into prison and killing others for speaking frankly. Such was her action at that time, and she actually took pride in it as if she had displayed some strength by her facile cruelty. In a very short space, however, she proved the weakness of the female sex, for as she had quickly flown into a passion through short-sightedness of judgment, so through cowardice she was quickly terrified. As soon as she learned that the Romans had voted for war against her she was panic-stricken, and promised to restore their men whom she held, while she tried to defend herself for the death of the others, declaring that they had been slain by some robbers. When the Romans were thus led to cease temporarily their campaign and demand the surrender of the murderers, she showed contempt again, because the danger was not yet at her doors, and declaring that she would not give anybody up despatched an army against Issa. When she learned that the consuls were at hand she grew terrified again, gave over her high spirit, and became ready to heed them in every minutest detail. She had not yet, however, been fully brought to her senses, for when the consuls had crossed over to Corcyra she felt imbued with new courage, revolted, and despatched an army against Epidamnus and Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued the cities and at the news of their capture of ships and treasures of hers she was on the point of again yielding obedience. Meanwhile in the course of scaling certain heights overlooking the sea they were worsted near the Atyrian hill and she now waited, hoping, in view of the fact that it was really winter already, for their withdrawal. But on perceiving that Albinus remained where he was and Demetrius as a result of her caprice as well as from fear of the Romans had transferred his allegiance, besides persuading some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and gave up her sovereignty. (Ursinus, p. 378. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 228 (_a.u._ 526)] In the time of Fabius Maximus Berucosus (“full of warts”) the Romans did this, after burying in the middle Of the Forum a Greek and a Gallic couple, man and woman: they were frightened by a certain oracle which said that Greek and Gaul should occupy the city. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603, 1056. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLIX]

1. ¶ The Romans were being frightened by an oracle of the Sibyl which urged the necessity of guarding against the Gauls when a thunderbolt should fall upon the Capitol near the temple of Apollo. (Mai, p. 185.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 225 (_a.u._ 529)] 2. ¶ The Gauls became dejected on seeing that the Romans had taken beforehand the most favorable locations. All men if they obtain the object of their first aim proceed more readily toward their subsequent goals, but if they miss it, lose interest in everything else. They, however, after the Gallic fashion and more than is usual with the rest of mankind, lay hold very eagerly of what they desire and cling most tenaciously to any success, but if they meet with the slightest obstacle have no hope left for the future. Folly makes them inclined to expect whatsoever they wish, and their spirited temperament ready to carry out whatsoever they undertake. They are given to violent anger and dash headlong into enterprises, and for that reason they have within themselves no quality of endurance (since it is impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time), and if they once suffer any setback they are unable (especially by reason of the fear to which they then fall a prey) to recover themselves: they are plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless daring. In a brief period they rush vehemently to the most opposite extremes, since they can furnish no motive based on calculation for either action. (Mai, p. 185.)

3. ¶ AEmilius on conquering the Insubres celebrated a triumph and in it conveyed the foremost captives clad in armor up to the Capitol, making jests upon them because he had heard that they had sworn not to remove their breastplates before they had ascended the Capitol. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. L]

¶ If any of the details, even the smallest, that were customary in festivals had been missed, they renewed the ceremonial proceedings at any rate a second and a third time, and even more times still, so far as was possible in one day, till everything seemed to them to have been done faultlessly. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (_a.u._ 535)] ¶ Demetrius, elated by his position as guardian of Pineus and by the fact that he had married the latter’s mother Triteuta (Teuta was dead), was hateful to the natives and injured the property of neighboring tribes. So they summoned him before them (since it appeared that it was by misusing the friendship of the Romans that he was able to wrong those peoples) as soon as they heard of it. When he refused compliance and actually assailed their allies, they made a campaign against Issa, where he was. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LII]

1. ¶The Romans were at their prime in equipment for war and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Whereas the majority of persons are led by unmixed good fortune to audacity but by a tremendous fear to proper behavior, they had quite a different experience at that time in those matters. The more successes they had the more sober it made them; against their enemies they displayed the kind of boldness that partakes of bravery, while toward one another they employed that right dealing which is closely connected with good order. [Footnote: The word for “good order” is conjectured by van Herwerden.] They held their power with a view to the practice of moderation and kept their orderliness for the acquirement of a true bravery: they did not allow their good fortune to develop into wantonness, nor their right dealing into cowardice. They believed that in case of such laxity temperance might be ruined by bravery and boldness by boldness; but that when people exercised care, as they did, moderation was made more secure by bravery and good fortune rendered surer by discipline. This was the reason for their vast superiority over the enemies that encountered them and for their excellent administration of both their own affairs and those of the allies. (Mai, p. 186.)

2. ¶ All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the Romans as leaders, but because they hated the force that ruled them and were for welcoming the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but Hannibal was worth nearly all of them. He could comprehend matters very quickly and plan the details of every project that he laid to heart, notwithstanding the fact that generally sureness is the product of slowness and only rash decisions result from hastiness of disposition. He was most [lacuna] when given the smallest margin of time, and most enduring with a very great degree of reliability. He managed in a safe way the affair of the moment and showed skill in considering the future beforehand: he proved himself a most capable counselor in ordinary events and a very accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he handled the issue immediately confronting him very readily and in the shortest time, while by calculation he anticipated the future afar off and considered it as though it were actually present. Consequently he, more than any man, met each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he made no distinction between what he possessed and what he hoped for. He was able to conduct matters so for the reason that in addition to his natural capacity he was well versed in much Phoenician learning, common to his country, and likewise much Greek, and furthermore he understood divination by inspection of entrails. (Mai, p. 187 and Valesius, p. 593.)

3. With such intellectual qualities he had brought his body to a state of equal perfection, partly by nature, partly by practice, so that he could carry out easily everything that he took in hand. It was nimble and at the same time heavy to the utmost degree, and he could, therefore, run, fight, and ride safely at full speed. He never burdened himself with overmuch food, nor suffered annoyance by lack of it, but took more or less with equal grace, feeling that either was satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew strong.

Having these advantages of mind and body he universally administered affairs in a fashion now to be described. Since he saw that most men were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself dealt with them in this manner and expected the same treatment of them, so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom failed by being the object of a plot. He regarded as hostile every force that could gain an advantage both among foreigners and among kinsmen alike, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but handled them quite unsparingly, assuming that they were anxious to commit a wrong when they could: he thought it better to be the first to act than the first to suffer, and resolved that the rest of the world should be dependent on him, and not he upon other persons. In fine, he paid attention to the nature of things, rather than to their reputed good points, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. He also, however, prized extravagantly whatever he needed. Slaves, most of them, he esteemed in that way, and beheld them willing to encounter danger for him even contrary to their own advantage. For these reasons he often himself refrained from opportunities for gain and other most delightful pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get them to be not unwilling partners in hard work. He subjected himself not only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same dangers and was the first to accomplish every task that he demanded of them. Likewise he was confident that they, too, without pretexts and with zeal,–since he showed his care for them not in words only,–would help him effect his projects.

Toward the rest he always behaved quite proudly; and the whole multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him because of their similar conditions of life, on the one hand, and because of his haughtiness on the other. Accordingly, he was fully able to bring low the towering head, to exalt humility, and to inspire all whom he pleased, in the shortest period, one with hesitation, another with boldness, with hope also and despair regarding most important matters.

And that this information about him is not false, but is truthful tradition, his works are proof. Much of Spain he won over in a short time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by force and others by persuasion. This, however, he achieved by himself without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any considerable assistance from them. While they were on the eve of enjoying the greatest glory and benefit through his efforts, they wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to cooeperate effectively in any enterprise. (Valesius, p. 593.)

[Frag. LIII]

Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses _Bebruces_, writing this: “To those who of old were Bebruces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul.” (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 516. Zonaras, 8, 21.)

[Frag. LIV]

1. ¶ Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and 2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war; and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p. 188.)

2. ¶Every human being is so constituted as to desire to lord it over such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune’s scale against voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)

3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must treat in a gentle and politic fashion; if one be preserved unexpectedly, he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)

4. ¶War both preserves men’s own possessions and wins the property of others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)

[Frag. LIV]

5. ¶It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,–that to heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us is very easy–any man can do it–whereas, to say what is advantageous for the State, not in anger over other men’s deeds, but with a view to the State’s benefit, is really the duty of the advising class? Do not irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)

6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to set one’s face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave, even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)

7. It is imperative to be on one’s guard against any similar experience again,–that being the only benefit that can come from disasters. Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)

8. ¶For securing the favor of the gods or a good reputation among men it is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)

9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well; otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

10. ¶When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was _Quintus_. Willems suggests emending to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding them with palms upward said: “Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish.” Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

[Frag. LV]

¶The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)

[Frag. LVI]

1. ¶From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness, renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted. (Mai, p.191.)

2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards’ refusing, at the start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of the multitude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal’s army, and some one on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

4. ¶Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the conflict he said: “Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being subservient to others,–yes, and ruling them besides?” (Mai, p.192. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well assured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape. The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)

6. ¶To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage. (Mai, p. 192.)

7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy. (Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)

8. ¶Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]

Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)

9. ¶ The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor [lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they made sure of the former’s safety through fear that they might change sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8, 25.)

10. ¶ Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

11. ¶ The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)

13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p. 543.)