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Dio's Rome, Vol VI. by Cassius Dio

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with pollution.

Thus arrayed they entered the city, having at the head of the
procession the spoils and trophies and in images the captured forts
displayed, cities and mountains and rivers, lakes, seas,--everything
that they had taken. If one day sufficed for the exhibition of these
things in procession, well and good: otherwise, the celebration was
held during a second and a third. When these adjuncts had gone on
their way the triumphator reached the Roman Forum and after commanding
that some of the captives be led to prison and put to death he rode up
to the Capitol. There, when he had fulfilled certain rites and had
brought offerings and had dined in the buildings on the hill, toward
evening he departed homeward, accompanied by flutes and pipes.

Such were the triumphs in old times. Factions and powerful cliques
attempted very frequently revolutionary movements on those occasions.

All the matters pertaining to the triumphal, the curule chair the
letter contains. What need to write again? How after anointing with
cinnabar or else Sinopian earth the man who held a triumph they put
him on a chariot and placed upon his head a golden crown bearing
plainly marked all he had accomplished: in the man's hand they lay a
laurel sprig; armlets they clasp about his arms: they crown all who
had gained distinction with crowns made out of silver material
inscribed with the feats of daring; and how upon the chariot a public
slave stands behind him holding up the crown and saying in his ear:
"see also what comes after"--all things important the letter contains.
(Tzetzes, Hist. 13, 41-54.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 395 (_a.u._ 359)] 2. ¶ The Romans after fighting many
battles against the Falisci, [Footnote: Perhaps Dio wrote _Fidenates_ or
_Veientes_ (Livy, IV, 32), and _Falisci_ is due to the copyist,
although, to be sure, there were wars with the last named (Livy, IV,
18). Whether the transference of Juno from Veii to Rome (Livy, V, 22) or
the lectisternia just established about this time (Livy, V, 13)
constitutes the topic discussed is a matter respecting which scholars
differ.] and after many sufferings and achievements as well, despised
their ancestral rites and took up with foreign ones in the idea that the
latter would suffice them. Human nature is for some reason accustomed in
trouble to scorn what is usual even though it be divine, and to admire
the untried. Thinking, as men do, that they are not helped by it at the
present, they expect no benefit in the future, but from what is strange
they hope to accomplish whatever they may wish, by means of its novelty.
(Mai, p. 153.)

3. ¶ The Romans, who were besieging the city of the Falisci would have
consumed much time encamped before it, had not an incident of the
following nature occurred. A school teacher of the place who instructed
a number of children of good family, either under the influence of anger
or through hope of gain led them all outside the wall, supposedly for
some different purpose from his real one. They had so great an abundance
of courage that they followed him even then. And he took them to
Camillus, saying that in their persons he surrendered to him the whole
city: for the inhabitants would no longer resist them when those dearest
to them were held prisoners. However, he [Sidenote: B.C. 393 (_a.u._
361)] to accomplish aught; for Camillus, filled with a sense of the
conduct proper for Romans and also of the liability to failure of human
plans, would not agree to take them by treachery: instead, he bound the
traitor's hands behind his back and delivered him to the children
themselves to lead home again.

After this episode the Falisci held out no longer, but in spite of the
fact that they were securely entrenched and had ample resources to
continue the war nevertheless came to terms voluntarily. They felt sure
it would be no ordinary friendship that they would enjoy at the hands of
one, whom, as an enemy even, they had found so just. (Valesius, p. 578.
Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

4. Accordingly Camillus became on this account an object of even
greater jealousy to the citizens, and he was indicted by the tribunes
on the charge of not having benefited the public treasury with the
plunder of the Veii; and before the trial he voluntarily withdrew.
(Valesius, ib. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

5. In Dio's 7th Book: "When he had ended his term of office they
indicted him and imposed a money fine, not bringing him into danger of
his life." [Footnote: Boissevain believes that this fragment does not
refer to Camillus, and that the number of the Book is possibly a
corruption. He would locate it earlier.](Bekker, Anecd. p. 146, 21.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 393 (_a.u._ 361)]6. To such a degree did not only the
populace nor all those who were somewhat jealous of his reputation
merely, but his best friends and his relatives, too, feel envy toward
him that they did not even attempt to hide it. When he asked some of
them for support in his case, and others to deposit the money for his
release, they refused to assist him in regard to the vote but simply
promised, if he were convicted, to estimate the proper money value and
to help him pay the amount of the fine. This led him to take an oath in
anger that the city should have need of him; and he went over to the
Rutuli before accusation was brought against him. [Footnote: Very likely
the copyist erred here. The sense requires "before sentence was passed
upon him."] (Mai, p. 154. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 22.)

[Frag. XXIV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 391 (_a.u._ 363)] 1. ¶ The cause of the Gallic
expedition was this. The Clusini had endured hard treatment in the war
from the Gauls and fled for refuge to the Romans, having considerable
hope that they could obtain certainly some little help in that
quarter, from the fact that they had not taken sides with the people
of Veii, though of the same race. When the Romans failed to vote them
aid, but sent ambassadors to the Gauls and negotiated peace for them,
they came very near accepting it (it was offered them in return for a
part of the land); however, they attacked the barbarians after the
conference and took the Roman envoys into battle along with them. The
Gauls, vexed at seeing them on the opposite side, at first sent men to
Rome, preferring charges against the envoys. Since, however, no
punishment was visited upon the latter, but they were all, on the
contrary, appointed consular tribunes, they were filled with
wrath--being naturally quick to anger--and, as they held the Clusini
in contempt, started for Rome. (Ursinus, p.373. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 364 (_a.u._ 390)] 2. ¶ The Romans after withstanding
the inroads of the Gauls had no time to recover breath, but went
immediately from their march into battle, just as they were, and lost.
Panic-stricken by the unexpectedness of the invaders' hostile
expedition, by their numbers, their physical dimensions, and their
voices uttering some foreign and terrifying sound they forgot their
training in military science and after that lost possession of their
valor. A good comprehension contributes very largely to bravery, because
when present it confirms the strength of a man's resolution and when
lacking destroys the same more thoroughly by far, than if such a thing
had never existed at all. Many persons without experience often carry
things through by the violence of their spirit, but those who fail of
the discipline which they have learned lose also their strength of
purpose. This caused the defeat of the Romans. (Mai, p.154. Cp. Zonaras,
7, 23.)

3. Coclius Horatius was by race a Roman. He, when on one occasion the
army of the Romans had been routed, so that there was danger of their
opponents occupying Rome, alone withstood them all at the wooden
bridge, while Marcus cut it down behind Minucius. When it had been cut
down, Coclius too crossed the Tiber, having saved himself and Rome by
the cutting of the bridge. Yet, as he swam, he might have been struck
by a spear of the enemy. To him the senate presents lands (as a reward
for his excellent bravery) as much as he could mark out in a day with
cattle fastened to a plow. He was called Coclius in the Roman tongue
because he had lost one of his eyes before he fought. (Tzetzes, Hist.
3, 818-830. Cp. Haupt, _Hermes_ XIV.)

[Sidenote: B. C 364 (_a.u._ 390)] 4. ¶ The Romans who were on the
Capitol under siege had no hope of safety unless from heavenly powers.
So scrupulously did they observe the mandates of religion, although in
every extremity of evil, that when it was requisite for one of the
sacred rites to be performed by the pontifices in another part of the
city Caeso [Footnote: Very likely the copyist erred here. The sense
requires "before sentence was passed upon him."] Fabius, who exercised
the office of priest, descended for the purpose from the Capitol after
receiving his charge, as he had been accustomed to do, and passing
through the enemy performed the customary ceremony and returned the same
day. I am led to admire the barbarians on the one hand because either on
account of the gods or his bravery they spared him: and far more do I
feel admiration for the man himself for two reasons, that he dared to
descend alone among the enemy, and that when he might have withdrawn to
some place of safety he refused and instead voluntarily returned up the
Capitol again to a danger that he foresaw: he understood that they
hesitated to abandon the spot which was the only part of their country
they still held but saw at the same time that no matter how much they
desired to escape it was impossible to do so by reason of the multitude
of the besiegers. (Valesius, p.581.)

5. ¶ Camillus, being urged to let the leadership be entrusted to him,
would not allow it because he was an exile and could not take the
position according to time-honored usage. He showed himself so
law-abiding and exact a man that in so great a danger to his native
land he made precedent a matter of earnest thought and did not think
it right to hand down to posterity an example of lawlessness.
(Valesius, p.582. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

6. When Rome had been sacked by the Gauls, Brennus being at the head
of that expedition of theirs, as the Gauls were on the point of
capturing the Capitol by ascending secretly to the Acropolis at night,
a great outcry of geese arose in that quarter; and one Marcus Manlius
roused from sleep saw the enemy creeping up, and by striking some with
his oblong shield and slaying others with his sword he repulsed them
all and saved the Romans. For this they gave him the title of
Capitolinus, and in honor of the geese they have door-keepers as
guards in the palace in remembrance of their watch at that time, just
as earlier the Greeks in Athens called Pelargikon Geraneia (Crane-ry)
from such creatures. (Tzetzes, His. 830-842. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 23.)

[Frag. XXV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 384 (_a.u._ 370)] 1. ¶ The populace passed sentence
against Capitolinus, his house was razed to the ground, his money
confiscated, and his name and even likeness, if such anywhere existed,
were erased and destroyed. At the present day, too, all these
punishments, except the razing to the ground, are visited upon those who
conspire against the commonwealth. They gave judgment also that no
patrician should dwell upon the height because Capitolinus happened to
have had his house there. And his kinsmen among the Manlii prohibited
any one of their number from being named Marcus, since that appellation
had been his.

Capitolinus at any rate underwent a great reversal, both in his
character and in his fortune. Having made a specialty of warfare he
did not understand how to remain at peace; the Capitol he had once
saved he occupied for the purpose of establishing a tyranny; although
a patrician he became the prey of a house-servant; and whereas he was
deemed a warrior, he was arrested after the manner of a slave and
hurled down the very rock from which he had repulsed the Gauls.
(Valesius, p.582. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

2. ¶ Capitolinus was thrown headlong down the rock by the Romans. So
true it is that nothing in the affairs of men,--generally
speaking,--remains at it was; and success, in particular, leads many
people on into catastrophes equally serious. It raises their hopes,
makes them continually strive after like or greater results and, if
they fail, casts them into just the opposite condition. (Mai, p. 155.
Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

3. This Marcus Manlius, who was once termed also Capitolinus, and fell
through seeking the tyranny, when about to be put to death by vote of
all the jurors was saved by their looking just then at the Capitol,
where he himself had performed famous deeds of valor,--until the one
who spoke against him, perceiving the cause, transferred the assembly
to another court-house from which the Capitol could not be seen at all
and so a remembrance spring up of his trophies. Then they kill him.
But on the other hand, even so, through the whole period the populace
of Rome wore black, recompensing the graces of his valor and the
inimitable manner of his distinguished behavior. (Tzetzes, Hist. 3,
843-855. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 24.)

[Frag. XXVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 381 (_a.u._ 373)] 1. ¶ Camillus made a campaign against
the Tusculans, but thanks to the astonishing attitude that they adopted
they suffered no harm. For just as if they themselves were guilty of no
offence and the Romans entertained no anger toward them, but were either
coming to them as friends to friends or else marching through their
territory against some other tribes, they changed none of their
accustomed habits and were not in the least disturbed: instead, all
without exception remaining in their places, at their occupations and at
their other work just as in time of peace, received the army within
their borders, gave them hospitable gifts, and in other ways honored
them like friends. Consequently the Romans so far from doing them harm
enrolled them subsequently among the citizens. (Valesius, p.582.)

[Frag. XXVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 376 (_a.u._ 378)] 2. In Dio's 7th Book: "Tusculans did
not raise their hands against him." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 123, 32.)

1. ¶ The wife of Rufus, while he was military tribune and engaged in
public service in the Forum was visited by her sister.[Footnote: Livy
and Valerius Maximus give his name as _Gaius_.] When the husband arrived
and the lichtor, according to some ancient custom, knocked at the door,
the visitor was alarmed at this having never previously had any such
experience and was startled. She was consequently the subject of hearty
laughter on the part of her sister and the rest alike and she was made a
butt for jests as one not at home in an official atmosphere because her
husband had never proved his capacity in any position of authority. She
took it terribly to heart, as women, from their littleness of soul,
usually do, and would not give up her resentment until she had thrown
all the city in an uproar. Thus small accidental events become, in some
cases, the cause of many great evils, when a person receives them with
jealousy and envy. (Mai, p.155. Zonaras, 7, 24)

2. ¶ In the midst of evils expectation of rescue has power to persuade
one to trust even in what is beyond reason. (Mai, p.156.)

3. For by their disputes they kept constantly enfeebling in one way or
another the good order of their government; consequently, all these
objects so to speak for which they were formerly accustomed to wage
the greatest wars they gained in time--not without factional quarrels,
to be sure, but still with small difficulty. (Mai, ib.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 368 (_a.u._ 386)] 4. ¶ Publius,[Footnote: The gap
existing from the word "Forum" to the end of the sentence is supplied by
Bekker's conjecture.] when the citizens of Rome were quarreling with one
another, nearly reconciled them. For he chose as master of the horse
Licinius Stolo, who was merely one of the populace.[Footnote: This is
Publius Manlius, the dictator (Livy, VI, 39).] This innovation grieved
the patricians, but conciliated the rest so much that they no longer
laid claim to the consulship for the following year, but allowed the
consular tribunes to be chosen. As a result of this they in turn yielded
some points one to the other, and perhaps would have made peace with
each other had not Stolo the tribune made such utterance as that they
should not drink unless they could eat and so persuaded them to
relinquish nothing, but to perform as inevitable duties all that they
had taken in hand. (Valesius, p.585.)

[Frag. XXVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 362 (_a.u._ 392)] 1. Dio Cassius Cocceianus, the
compiler of Roman history, states that as a result of the wrath of
Heaven a fissure opened in the ground round about Rome and would not
close. An oracular utterance having been obtained to the effect that the
fissure would close if they should throw into it the mightiest
possession of the Romans, one Curtius, a knight of noble birth, when no
one else was able to understand the oracle, himself interpreted it to
mean a horse and man together. Straightway he mounted his horse and,
just as he was, dashed heroically forward and passed down into that
frightful pit. No sooner had he rushed down the incline than the fissure
closed; and the rest of the Romans from above scattered flowers. From
this event the name of Curtius was applied also to a cellar. (Io.
Tzetzes, Scholia for the Interpretation of Homer's Iliad, p. 136, 17,
Cp. Zonaras, 7, 25.)

2. There is no mortal creature either better or stronger than man. Do
you not see that all the rest go downwards and look forever toward the
earth and accomplish nothing save what is closely connected with
eating and the propagation of their species? So they have been
condemned to these pursuits even by Nature herself. We alone gaze
upwards and associate with heaven itself and despise those things that
are on the earth, while we dwell with the gods themselves, believing
them to be similar to us inasmuch as we are both their offspring and
creations, not earthly but heavenly: for which reason we paint and
fashion those very beings according to our forms. For, if one may
speak somewhat boldly, man is naught else than a god with mortal body,
and a god naught else than a man without body and consequently
immortal. That is why we surpass all other creatures. And there is
nothing afoot which we do not enslave, overtaking it by speed or
subduing it by force or catching it by some artifice, nor yet aught
that lives in the water or travels the air: nay, even of these two
classes, we pull the former up from the depths without seeing them and
drag the latter down from the sky without reaching them. (Mai, p. 532.
Zonaras, 7, 25.)

[Frag. XXIX]

¶ Dio says: "Wherefore, although not accustomed to indulgence in
digressions, I have taken pains to make mention of it and have stated in
addition the Olympiad, in order that when most men forget the date of
the migration,[Footnote: This last clause is a conjecture by Reimar.] it
may, from the precaution mentioned, become less doubtful." (Mai, p.

[Frag. XXX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 353 (_a.u._ 401)] ¶ The Agyllaeans, when they ascertained
that the Romans wished to make war on them, despatched ambassadors to
Rome before any vote was taken, and obtained peace on surrender of half
their territory. (Ursinus, p. 374.)

[Frag. XXXI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 349 (_a.u._ 405)] Marcus Corvinus received the name of
Corvinus because when once engaged with a barbarian in single combat, he
had a savage crow as his ally in the battle, that flew at the eyes of
the barbarian until this Marcus killed him at that time. (Tzetzes, Hist.
3, 862-866. Cp. Zonaras, 7, 25.)

[Frag. XXXII]

1. These proposals and a few others of similar nature they put forward
not because they expected to carry any of them into effect,--for they,
if anybody, understood the purposes of the Romans,--but in order that
failing to obtain their requests they might secure an excuse for
complaints, on the ground that wrong had been done them. (Mai, p.

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 2. Dio in Book 7: "And for this
reason I shall execute you, in order that even as you obtain the prize
for your prowess, so you may receive the penalty for your disobedience."
[Footnote: The migration of Alexander(?). See Livy, VIII, 3, 6.]
(Bekker, Anecd. p. 133, 19. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

3. The statement is made by Douris, Diodorus and Dio that when the
Samnites, Etruscans and other nations were warring against the Romans,
Decius, a Roman consul and associated with Torquatus in command of the
troops, gave himself to be slain, and of the opposite side there were
slaughtered a hundred thousand that very day.[Footnote: Words of
Torquatus to his son.] (Io. Tzetzes, on Lycophr. 1378. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 4. ¶Dio says: "I am surprised that
his (Decius's) death should have set the battle right again, should have
defeated the side that was winning and have given victory to the men who
were getting worsted: I can not even comprehend what brought about the
result. When I reflect what some have accomplished,--for we know that
many such chances have befallen many persons before,--I can not
disbelieve the tradition: but when I come to calculate the causes of it,
I fall into a great dilemma. How can you believe that from such a
sacrifice of one man so great a multitude of human beings were brought
over at once to safety and to victory? Well, the truth of the matter and
the causes that are responsible shall be left to others to investigate."
(Mai, p.157. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

5. It was evident to every one that they had considered the outcome of
the event [Footnote: At the battle of Sentinum (295 B.C.).] and had
ranged themselves on the victorious side. Torquatus did not, however,
question them about it for fear they might revolt, since the affair of
the Latins was still a sore point with them. He was not harsh in every
case nor in most matters the sort of man he had shown himself toward his
son: on the contrary, he was admitted to be good at planning and good in
warfare, so that it was said by the citizens and by their adversaries
alike that he held success in war subservient to him, and that if he had
been leader of the Latins, he would certainly have made them conquer.
(Mai, p.157, and Valesius, p.585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 340 (_a.u._ 414)] 6. ¶The Romans, although vexed at
Torquatus on account of his son to such an extent that deeds remarkable
for their cold-blooded indifference [Footnote: The phrase after "deeds"
is supplied from the general sense. The MS. shows a superlative ending
of adjective form, but the root portion of the word is lost.] are called
"Manliana," after him, and angry furthermore that he had celebrated the
triumph in spite of the death of that youth, in spite of the death of
his colleague, nevertheless when another war threatened them elected him
again to a fourth consulship. He, however, refused to hold their chief
office longer, and renounced it, declaring: "I could not endure you nor
you me." (Mai, p.157. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 338 (_a.u._ 416)] 7. ¶The Romans by way of bringing the
Latins in turn to a condition of friendliness, granted them
citizenship so that they secured equal privileges with themselves.
Those rights which they would not share with that people when it
threatened war and for which they underwent so many dangers, they
voluntarily voted to it now that they conquered. Thus they requited
some for their allegiance and others because they had taken no steps
of a revolutionary character. (Mai, p.158.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 328 (_a.u._ 426)] 8. ¶With reference to the inhabitants
of Privernum the Romans made no enquiry, asking them what they deserved
to suffer for such conduct. The others answered boldly: "Whatever is
suitable for men who are free and desire so to continue." To the next
question of the consul: "And what will you do if you obtain peace?" they
replied: "If we are granted it on [Sidenote: B.C. 426 (_a.u._ 426)]
fairly moderate terms, we will cease from disturbance, but if
unendurable burdens are placed upon us, we will fight." Admiring their
spirit they not only made a much more favorable truce with them than
with the rest [lacuna] (Mai, p.158.)

[Frag. XXXIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] 1. [From the address of the father
of Rullus.] Be well assured that penalties most unfitting in such cases,
while they destroy the culprits under sentence, who might have been made
better, are of no avail in correcting the rest. Human nature refuses to
leave its regular course for any threats. Some pressing fear or violence
of audacity together with courage born of inexperience and rashness
sprung from opportunity, or some other combination of circumstances such
as often occurs unexpectedly in the careers of many persons leads men to
do wrong. And these men are of two classes,--such as do not even think
of the punishments but heedless of them rush into the business before
them, and such as esteem them of no moment in comparison with the
attainment of the ends for which they are striving.

Consistent humanity, however, can produce an effect quite the opposite
of that just now mentioned. Through the influence of a seasonable pardon
the criminals frequently change their ways, especially when they have
acted from brave and not from wicked motives, from ambition and not from
baseness. For it should be noted that a reasonable humanity is a mighty
force for subduing and correcting a noble soul. As for the rest, they
are, without resistance, brought [Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] into
a proper frame of mind by the sight of the rescue. Every one would
rather obey than be forced, and prefers voluntary to compulsory
observance of the law. He who submits to a measure works for it as if it
were his own invention, but what is imposed upon him he rejects as
unfitting for a freeman. Furthermore it is the part of the highest
virtue and power alike not to kill a man,--this is often done by the
wickedest and weakest men,--but to spare him and to preserve him; yet no
one of us is at liberty to do that without your consent.

It is my wish at length to cease from speaking. What little spirit I
have is weary, my voice is giving way, tears check my utterance and fear
closes my mouth. But I am at a loss how to close. For my suffering,
appearing to me in no doubtful light, does not allow me (unless you
decide otherwise) [Footnote: A clause that in the MS. has faded out is
represented here by Boissevian's conjecture.] to be silent, but compels
me, as if the safety of my child were going to be in accord with
whatever I say last, to speak even further as it were in prayers. (Mai,

[Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] 2. The name and form of the office with
which he was invested he shrank from changing, and when he was intending
to spare Rullus,--for he observed the zeal of the populace,--he wished
to resist him somewhat before granting the favor and to alter the
attitude of the young men, so as to have his pardon come unexpectedly.
Therefore he contracted his face, and darting a harsh frowning look at
the populace, he raised his voice and spoke. The talking ceased, but
still they were not quiet: instead, as generally happens in such a case,
what with groaning over his fate and whispering one to another, in spite
of their not uttering a single word they gave the impression that they
desired the rescue of the cavalry commander. Papirius seeing this, in
fear of their possibly taking hostile action, relaxed the extremely
domineering manner which he had assumed (for purposes of their
correction) in an unusual degree, and by showing moderation in the rest
of his actions brought them once more to friendship and enthusiasm for
him, so that they proved themselves men when they met their opponents.
(Mai, p.160. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

3. ¶The Samnites after their defeat at the hands of the Romans, made
proposals for truce to the Romans in the city. They sent them all the
Roman captives that they held, together with the property of a man named
Papius, [Footnote: _Papius Brutulus_.] who was esteemed among the
foremost of his race and bore the entire responsibility for the war; his
bones, since he anticipated them in committing suicide, they scattered
abroad. Yet they did not obtain their peace; for they were regarded as
untrustworthy and had the name of making truces according to events
merely for the purpose of cheating any power that conquered them: hence
they not only failed to obtain terms, but even brought a relentless war
upon themselves. The Romans while accepting their prisoners voted to
make war upon them without announcement. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 7,

[Sidenote: B.C. 321. (_a.u._ 433)] 4. Among the many events of human
history that might give one cause for wonder must certainly be reckoned
what occurred at this time. The Romans, who were so extremely arrogant
as to vote that they would not again receive a herald from the Samnites
in the matter of peace and hoped moreover to capture them all at the
first blow, succumbed to a terrible disaster and incurred disgrace as
never before; the others, who to begin with were badly frightened and
thought the refusal to make peace a great calamity, seized their camp
and entire force, and sent them all under the yoke. So great a reverse
of fortune did they suffer. (Mai, p.161. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

5. Benefits lie rather within the actual choice of men and are not
brought about by necessity, or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or
anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily by a willing and
eager condition of spirit. And for this reason it is proper to pity,
admonish, instruct those who commit any error and to admire, love,
reward those who do right. Whenever men act in both of these two ways,
it is decidedly more befitting our characters to remember their better
than their less correct deeds. [Footnote: Sections 5, 6, and 7 appear to
come from various speeches delivered at the Caudine Forks; section 8,
however, is from the speech of Herennius Pontius.] (Mai, p.535.)

6. ¶Quarrels are checked by kindness. The greater the pitch of enmity to
which a man has come when he unexpectedly obtains safety instead of
severity, the more readily does he hasten voluntarily to abandon the
quarrel and to acknowledge gladly the influence of kindness. B.C. 321
(_a.u._ 433) As in a random host of persons at variance from divers
causes those who have passed from friendship to enmity hate each other
with the more intense hatred, so in a random host of persons kindly
treated do those who receive this considerate treatment after a state of
strife love their benefactors the more. Romans, accordingly, are very
anxious to surpass in war and at the same time they honor virtue; for
this reason, compelled in both regards by their nobility of spirit, they
verily earn the right to surpass, since they take pains to recompense
fair treatment fairly, and even beyond its value. (Mai, p.161.)

7. For it is right to pride one's self upon requiting those who have
done some wrong, but to feel more highly elated over recompensing such
as have conferred some benefit. (Mai, p.536.)

8. ¶All men are by nature so constituted as to grieve more over any
insults offered them than they rejoice over benefits conferred upon
them: therefore they show hostility to persons who have injured them
with less effort than they require for aiding in return persons who have
shown them kindness; hence also they make no account, when their own
advantage is concerned, of the ill reputation they will gain by not
taking a friendly attitude toward their preserver, but indulge a spirit
of wrath even when such behavior runs counter to their own interest.

Such was the advice he gave them out of his own inherent good sense
and experience acquired in a long life, not looking to the
gratification of the moment but to the possible regret of the future.
(Mai, p.162.)

9. ¶The people of Capua, when the Romans after [Sidenote: B.C. 321
(_a.u._ 433)] their defeat arrived in that city, were guilty of no
bitter speech or outrageous act, but on the contrary gave them both food
and horses and received them like victors. They pitied in their
misfortune the men whom they would have not wished to see conquer on
account of the treatment those same persons had formerly accorded them.
When the Romans heard of the event they were altogether possessed by
doubt whether to be pleased at the survival of their soldiers or whether
to continue displeased. When they thought of the depth of the disgrace
their grief was extreme; for they deemed it unworthy of them to have met
with defeat, and especially at the hands of the Samnites, so that they
could wish that all had perished; when they stopped to reflect, however,
that if such a calamity had befallen them all the rest as well would
have incurred danger, they were not sorry to hear that the men had been
saved. (Mai, p.162. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 10. ¶It is requisite and blameless
for all men to plan for their own safety, and if they get into any
danger to do anything whatsoever so as to be preserved. (Mai, p.163.)

11. ¶Pardon is granted both by gods and by men to such as have committed
any act involuntarily. (Ib. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

12. Dio in Book 8: "I both take to myself the crime and admit the
perjury." (Bekker, Anecd. p.165, 13.)

13. Dio in Book 8: "For in all such matters he was quite all-sufficient
to himself." [Footnote: This is thought to refer to L. Papirius Cursor or
possibly to Q. Fabius Maximus. Cp. Livy, X, 26.] (Ib. p.124, 1.)

14.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Samnites, seeing that neither
were the oaths observed by them nor gratitude for favors manifested in
any other way, and that few instead of many were surrendered, thus
making void the oaths, became terribly angry and loudly called upon the
gods in respect to some of these matters: moreover, they brought the
pledges to their attention, demanded the captives, and ordered them to
pass naked under the same yoke where through pity they had been
released, in order that by experience they might learn to abide by terms
which had been once agreed upon. The men that had been surrendered they
dismissed, either because they did not think it right to destroy
guiltless persons or because they wished to fasten the perjury upon the
populace and not through the punishment of a few men to absolve the
rest. This they did, hoping as a result to secure decent treatment.
(Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 15. ¶The Romans so far from being grateful
to the Samnites for the preservation of the surrendered soldiers,
actually behaved as if they had in this suffered some outrage. They
showed anger in their conduct of the war, and, being victorious, treated
the Samnites in the same way. For the justice of the battle-field does
not fit the ordinary definition of the word, and it is not inevitable
that the party which has been wronged should conquer: instead, war, in
its absolute sway, adjusts everything to the advantage of the victor,
often causing something that is the reverse of justice to go under that
name. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

16.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Romans after vanquishing the
Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as
satisfactory to their honor a repayment of similar disgrace. So did
Fortune for both parties in the briefest time reverse her position and
by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of their
outraged foes show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme. (Mai, p.
164. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 319 (_a.u._ 435)] 17. ¶ Papirius made a campaign against
the Samnites and having reduced them to a state of siege entrenched
himself before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive
use of wine, whereupon he replied: "That I am not intoxicated is clear
to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down
to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my
mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I
take a little wine to lull me to rest." (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶ The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison
became angry on not finding the general from Praeneste at his post. He
summoned him and bade him hand the axe to the lictor. Alarm and
consternation at this was evident on the part of the general, and his
fear sufficed. Papirius harmed him no further but merely gave orders to
the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they
should not injure passers-by. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶ In numerous cases instances of good fortune are not at all
constant, but lead many aside into paths of carelessness and ruin
them.[Footnote: Cp. Livy, IX, 18, 8.] (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 310 (_a.u._ 444)] 20. ¶ The men of the city put forward
Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name
him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they
sent for him and begged him to put the common weal before a private
grudge. And he gave the envoys, indeed, no response, but when night had
come (according to ancient custom it was quite necessary that the
dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius and secured by this
act the greatest renown.(Valesius, p. 585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._)] 21. ¶ Appius the Blind and Volumnius
became at variance each with the other: and it was owing to this that
Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the assembly with showing no
gratitude for the progress he had made in wisdom through Appius's
instruction, answered that he had indeed grown wiser and was likewise
ready to admit it, but that Appius had not advanced at all in matters
pertaining to war. (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._ 458)] 22. ¶ As regards the prophecy the
multitude was not capable for the time being of either believing or
disbelieving him.[Footnote: I.e., Manius, an Etruscan.] It neither
wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see
everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points
inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely
painful position, as it were between confusion and fear. As each single
event occurred they applied the interpretation to it according to the
actual result, and the man himself undertook to assume some reputation
for skill with regard to the foreknowledge of the unseen. (Mai, p. 165.
Cp. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 293 (_a.u._ 461)] 23. ¶ The Samnites, enraged at what
occurred and deeming it highly disgraceful to be defeated, resorted to
extreme daring and folly with the intention of either conquering or
being utterly destroyed. They assembled all their men that were of
military age, threatening with death all that should remain at home, and
they bound themselves with frightful oaths to the effect that no man
should flee from the contest but should slaughter any person that might
undertake to do so. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 292 (_a.u._ 462)] 24. ¶ The Romans on hearing that their
consul Fabius had been worsted in the war became terribly angry and
summoned him to stand trial. A vehement denunciation of the man was
made before the people,--and, indeed, he was depressed by the injury to
his father's reputation even more than by the complaints,--and no
opportunity was afforded the object of the attack for reply. Nor did the
elder man make a set defence of his son, but by enumerating his own
services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that
his son would do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people's wrath,
especially since he urged his son's youth. Moreover, he joined him at
once in the campaign, overthrew the Samnites in battle, though they were
elated by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The
Romans therefore extolled him and ordered that his son also should
command for the future with consular powers, and still employ his father
as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him,
sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily assisted
the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. He made it clear,
however, that he was not executing the business on his own
responsibility, but he associated with his son as if actually in the
capacity of counselor and under-officer, while he moderated his
temperament and assigned to him the glory of the exploits. (Valesius, p.
585. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 291 (_a.u._ 463)] 25. ¶ The soldiers with Junius who took
the field along with Postumius fell sick on the way, and thought that
their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. He was recalled for
these reasons, but showed contempt for them even at this juncture,
declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of
the senate [lacuna] Envio [lacuna] and the [lacuna] men much [lacuna]
ambition [lacuna] [Words of Postumius Megillus: Cp. Dionys. Hal. Ant.
Rom. 16, [Footnote: The famous Apollonius of Tyana.]. (Mai, p. 167.)

[Frag. XXXIV]

¶ Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in
incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on
that account did not please Rufinus, but was always at variance with
him. Yet the latter chose Fabricius, thinking that he was a most proper
person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal
enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the

[Frag. XXXIV]

As a result he gained some reputation for having shown himself above
jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by
reason of emulation. Since he was a thorough patriot and did not
practice virtue for a show he thought it a matter of indifference
whether the State were benefited by him or through some other man, even
if that man should be an opponent. (Valesius, p.586.)

[Frag. XXXV]

¶Cornelius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to
his foe, [lacuna][Footnote: See Niebuhr, Rh. Mus., 1828, p.600, or
_Kleine Schriften_, 2, p.241.] the general excellence of Rufius and
added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being bought
and sold by the enemy. [This anecdote concerns Fabricius Luscinus,
mentioned by Cicero, de orat. 2, 66, 268; Quintilian 12, 1, 43; Gellius
4, 48.]

[Frag. XXXVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 290 (_a.u._ 464)] ¶Curius, in defence of his conduct in
the popular assembly, said that he had acquired so much land [lacuna]
and had hunted for so many men [lacuna] country [lacuna] [The person
referred to is Manius Curius Dentatus. Cp. Auct. de Viris. Illustr., c.

¶After Niebuhr, Rh. Mus. 1828, p.579.]

[Frag. XXXVII]

¶When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law was often
proposed without avail, since the lenders were by no means willing to
accept it and the tribunes granted the nobles the choice of either
putting this law to the vote or following that of Stolo, by which they
were to reckon the previous interest toward the principal and receive
the remainder in triennial payments. [Footnote: The opening portion of
this fragment is based largely on conjectures of Niebuhr (Rhein. Mus.,
1828, p.579ff.)] And for the time being the weaker party, dreading lest
it might lose all, paid court to them, and the wealthier class,
encouraged to think it would not be compelled to adopt either course,
maintained a hostile attitude. But when the revolted [Footnote: A
doubtful reading.] party proceeded to press matters somewhat, both sides
changed their positions. The debtors were no longer satisfied with
either plan, and the nobles thought themselves lucky if they should not
be deprived of their principal. Hence the dispute was not decided
immediately, but subsequently they prolonged their rivalry in a spirit
of contentiousness, and did not act at all in their usual character.
Finally the people made peace in spite of the fact that the nobles were
unwilling to remit much more than they had originally expected; however,
the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more were they
emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and
consequently they regarded the various concessions almost as matters of
course and strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone to that end
the fact that they had already obtained something. (Mai, p.167. Zonaras,


¶When the opposite side [Footnote: The Tuscans, Senones, and Gauls
appear to be meant.] saw also another general approaching, they ceased
to heed the common interests of their force but each cast about to
secure his individual safety, as a common practice of those who form a
union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common
grievances, or who have not one commander. While good fortune attends
them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one sees before
him only matters of individual concern. They betook themselves to flight
as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another
their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them
to force their way out or for their defection to pass unnoticed, but if
they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone,
they would more easily escape. And so, to his own party,--each one of
them [lacuna] they will think that accomplishing their flight with the
greatest security [lacuna] (Mai, p.167.)

[Frag. XXXIX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 1. The Romans had learned that the
Tarentini and some others were making ready to war against them, and had
despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent them
from committing any revolutionary act: but they had him arrested, and by
sending men to the Etruscans and Umbrians and Gauls they caused a number
of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later.
(Ursinus, p.375. Zonaras, 8, 2-Vol. II, p.174, 4 sq.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 2. ¶The Tarentini, although they had
themselves initiated the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For
the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know
it on account of temporary embarrassments. Hereupon the Tarentini,
thinking that they either could mock [Footnote: Verb adopted from
Boissevain's conjecture [Greek: _diasilloun_] (cp. the same word in Book
Fifty-nine, chapter 25). at Rome or were entirely unobserved because
they were receiving no complaints behaved still more insolently and
involved the Romans even contrary to their own wishes in a war. This
proved the saying that even good fortune, when a disproportionately
large portion of it falls to the lot of any individuals, becomes the
cause of disaster to them; it entices them on to a state of frenzy
(since moderation refuses to cohabit with vanity) and ruins their
greatest interests. So these Tarentini, too, after rising to an
unexampled height of prosperity in turn met with a misfortune that was
an equivalent return for their wantonness. (Mai, p.168 and 536.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (_a.u._ 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: "Lucius Valerius,
[Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as
Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on
some errand by them." (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

4. ¶Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini
were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the
theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an
enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their
intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his
part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and
sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of
this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field
against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not
to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means
render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them
decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable,
at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of
their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use
in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of
stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would
cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers
accordingly jeered at them,--they were still celebrating the festival,
which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior,
rendered them still more wanton,--and finally a man planted himself in
the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down
and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who
praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they
sang many scurrilous anapaests upon the Romans, accompanied by applause
and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may!
For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this
garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8,

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing
towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to
themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the
ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. ¶Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in
hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put
garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a
flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they
gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and
hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after
reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and
to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be
slaves." (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] ¶King Pyrrhus was not only king of the
district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world
his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The AEtolians, who at
that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of
Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and
the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and
force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as
to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those
of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589.
Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. ¶Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his
powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans:
and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who
had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the
same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he
received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair
pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been
considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from
taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him.
(Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. ¶King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by
his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch,
Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,--the only one in
fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a
sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the
folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule
the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own
possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness
for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of
Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy,
after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces.
(Valesius, p.586.)

4. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the
expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into
Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for
desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the
coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. ¶The Rhegians had asked of the
Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the
leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of
the excess of supplies and general easy habits,--for they enjoyed a far
less strenuous existence than they had known at home,--through the
persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and
occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform
whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied
with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to
persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the
Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to
garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the
natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they
were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius,
purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view
to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read
these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk
(the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly.
The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had
been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had
anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the
traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and
shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm
happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would
find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing
places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great
numbers,--save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were
slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. ¶Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians,
ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar
nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He
was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some
common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of
lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)

7. ¶The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such
time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied
with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did
seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. ¶The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of
him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large
force by no means despicable as an adversary,--the sort of information,
of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons
unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras,

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same
institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same
things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one
another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from
the speech made by Laevinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).]
(Mai, p. 537.)

10. ¶Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is
inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is
distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a
similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the
same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only
forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these
conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but
find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. ¶Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men,
contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of
victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other
profession that is of weight without persons to cooeperate and to aid in
its administration. (Mai, p.171.)

12. ¶When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle
took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by
his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their
fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the
other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since
they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of
the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable
results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai,
p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

13. ¶When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted
the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again
in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of
him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them
superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered
the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171.
Zonaras, 8, 3.)

14. ¶Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great
reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing
neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been
watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly
display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he
rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them
kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared,
their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings
at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his
simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be
suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them
either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to
the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands.
For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to
them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

15. ¶Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who
were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however,
they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not
put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to
restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city
without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)

16. ¶The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,--a kind of beast that
they had never before seen,--had fallen into dismay, still, by
reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no
beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show
inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to
understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)

17. ¶The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the
allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie
ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation
that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting
nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the
Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him,
on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike,
withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them
than his promises. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he
was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he
told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a
difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory
of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive
agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been
so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever
been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

20. ¶The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to
wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army
of Laevinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman
troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not,
however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn,
but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)

21. ¶Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were
approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as
far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the
hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city,
entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting
that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a
defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

22. ¶When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to
bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size
for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite
dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to
treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the
friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the
return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management,
whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are
lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the
outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence,
if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence
for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since
Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be
enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this
speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this
course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely
to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors:
"Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would
not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to
become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives
without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them
favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any
rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed
as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer,
and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and
came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly,
then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I
see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two
words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters
in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in
getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a
campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius
replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring
peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our
advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to
uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an
adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I
have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things,
because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I
would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a
reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me
worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you
bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have
many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I
feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you
believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would
not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest
of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been
reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no
limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he
longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and
with the idea that he could not live without it.

"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford
you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable
than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace
nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it,
the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In
using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were
inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they
contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to
many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure
could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely
necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence
rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree
of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of
gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate
[Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the
MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a
man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as
well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the
slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be
content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire
for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest
zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the
overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus,
chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)

26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led
even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place
respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his
gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)

27. ¶Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit,
suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling
him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it
[i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he
were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls
answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a
proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to
conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would
repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and
Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them
both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than
that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one
of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of
the question. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general
toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for
his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him,
than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an
injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who
held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This
was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of
their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State
through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them
and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over
to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. ¶As the allies were unwilling to
contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the
treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth,
despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men
almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were
cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)

32. ¶All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet
had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court
and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have
said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us,"
he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] ¶Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus,
king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that
the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The
Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away
should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn.
From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had
offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus,
p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]¶Though the Romans were faring in this
manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no
haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the
Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus
Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors.
The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him
home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)

[Frag. XLIII]

1. ¶The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were--on the
side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentini, on
the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of
friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as
those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their
own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth
is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been
powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing
each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the
desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the
majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and
partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for
her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had
been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two
nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each
other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of
voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each
other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they
had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras,
8, 8.)

2. ¶The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but
in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger
threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying,
as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a
safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras,
8, 8.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] 3. ¶Gaius Claudius came to the meeting,
and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the
object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no
need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he
should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also
either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit
to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear)
opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the
city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the
silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the
invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have
justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the
part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been
quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians,
especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he
promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin
and on account of the request for assistance they had made. (Mai, p.179.
Zonaras, 8,8.)

4. ¶Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached
safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented
from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been
worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary
course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think
that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an
omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element
with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and
did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the
disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. ¶Hanno, who was in no wise
disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was
particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce
upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was
taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and
the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him
besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

6. ¶When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and
reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the
Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea
but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

7. ¶Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an
assembly of their number and made the statement: "I have no need of arms
but will leave it with you to decide everything." By this means he
persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he
chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had
even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference
with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180.
Zonaras, 8, 9.)

8. ¶The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good
cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He
instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the
better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpassed the skill
of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of
seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have
bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained
in a brief space by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered
by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man's nature,
could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)

9. ¶ The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not
through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied
out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out
of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a
result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their
precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of
forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition.
[Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this
section.] (Mai, p. 539.)

11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them
after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against
nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily
destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it
grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far
from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it

Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may
expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it
resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its
own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or
presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the
midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing,
as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance
event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)

12. ¶ The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were
equally matched in the number of ships and readiness to serve.
[Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in
which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that
it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the
prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved
not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain
the latter. One side surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews
of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the
other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness
and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience
in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make
exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their
judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them
unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due
consideration. (Mai, p.181.)

13. ¶The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the
sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of
practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims
to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their
leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who
failed in an enterprise.

He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of
them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him
risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he
had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a
superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then,
have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes
as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the
battle." (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (_a.u._ 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: "When the storm
continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal's defeat
through the agency of some deserters." (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26.
Zonaras, 8, 12.)

15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the
acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they
[Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force.
For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of
their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it
involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held
fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both
points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at
a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have
the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. If they failed, they would
lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides
hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they
took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and
Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was,
indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that
account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and
children should be furnished their support from the public treasury.
(Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

17. ¶ Hanno had been sent to the Romans by Hamilcar, as was pretended,
in behalf of peace, but in reality for the sake of delay. And he, when
some clamored for his arrest, because the Carthaginians by fraud
[lacuna] Cornelius [lacuna] [Mai, p. 183.] Four pages of the MS. are
lacking. (Zonaras, 8, 12.)

18. Dio the Roman, who wrote a history about the Empire and the Republic
of Rome and describes the far-famed Carthaginian war, says that when

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] consul for Rome, was warring against
Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army
and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile and having
flayed it sent its skin, a great prodigy, to the Roman senate. And when
measured by the same senate (as the same Dio says) it was found to have
a length of one hundred and twenty feet. In addition to its length its
thickness was also notable. (Ioannes Damascenus, On Serpents, vol. I, p.
472, A.B. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

19. ¶ The Carthaginians in fear of capture sent heralds to the consul to
the end that by some satisfactory arrangement they might turn aside the
danger of the moment, and so escape. But since they refused to withdraw
from both Sicily and Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of
cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by
the Romans for the war and besides to pay more as tribute each year,
they accomplished nothing. And in addition to the above mentioned, there
were the following commands which displeased them: that they should make
neither war nor treaties without the consent of the Romans, that they
should employ not more than one warship but the Romans would come to
their aid with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them,
and that they would not be on an equal footing in conducting some other
kinds of business. Considering these points they decided that the truce
would mean their utter subjugation, and preferred rather to fight with
the Romans. (Ursinus, p. 376. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

20. Dio in Book 11: "The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships
homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money." (Bekker,
Anecd. p. 131, 12. Zonaras, 8, 14.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 21. ¶ They say the Carthaginians sent
heralds to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives
(among other causes), and most of all to see if they would be inclined
to make peace on some moderate terms; if this could not be effected,
their purpose still held to get back the captives. They say that
Regulus, too, had been sent among the envoys because of his reputation
and valor. The people assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever
in the hope of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up
alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives.
Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return
without fail in case neither of their objects should be accomplished,
and they despatched him as an envoy with others.

And he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, not a Roman; for he
did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him nor did he enter
the city, although he was invited: instead, when the senate assembled
outside of the walls, as their custom was in treating with the envoys of
the enemy, he asked for permission to approach with the others--at
least, so the story goes, [lacuna] (Ursinus, p. 377. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

22. Dio in Book 11: "Regulus paid no heed to them until the
Carthaginians permitted him to do so." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 140, 20.
Zonaras, 8, 15.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 23. Dio in Book 11: "For it is neither
my duty nor that of any other upright man to give up aught that pertains
to the public welfare." (Ib. p. 165, 23.)

24. In Book 11: "Any one else, wishing to console himself for the
disaster which had happened in his own case, would have exalted the
prowess of the enemy." (Ib. p. 165, 30.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (_a.u._ 505)] 25. The second part of the augury is
transmitted to us by Dio Cassius Cocceianus, who says that they keep
tame birds which eat barley, and put barley grains in front of them when
they seek an omen. If, then, in the course of eating the birds do not
strike the barley with their beaks and toss it aside, the sign is good;
but if they do so strike the grain, it is not good. (Io. Tzetzes,
Exegesis of Homer's Iliad, p. 108, 2.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 244 (_a.u._ 510)] 26. He [sc. Mamilcar] thought it was
requisite for a man who wished to accomplish anything by secret means
not to make the matter known to anyone at all. There was no one, he
believed, so self-possessed as to be willing, when he had heard, merely
to observe operations and be silent. Just the reverse was true: the more
strongly a man might be forbidden to mention anything, the greater would
be his desire to speak of it, and thus one man learning the secret from
another with the understanding that he was the only person to know it
would reveal the story. [Footnote: Section 26 may refer to Hamilcar
Barca's plans for seizing Mount Eryx.] (Mai, p. 540. Cp. Diodorus, 24,

27. In Book 11 of Dio: "He feasted the populace." [Footnote: Boissevain
thinks that No. 27 may concern the banqueting of the populace during
Metellus's triumph. Others have other opinions.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133,

28. In Book 11 of Dio: "You attack even such friends as have been guilty
of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies." (Ib. p.171, 29.)

29. In Book 12 of Dio: "By the one process [Footnote: Perhaps from the
speech of Regulus to the senators.] he might have become to a certain
extent estranged from you." (Ib. p.124, 4.) 30. In Book 12 of Dio: "Some
are dead, and others who were deserving of some notice, have been
captured." [Footnote: This may be likewise from the speech of Regulus
and be said of the Carthaginian leaders.] (Ib. p. 133,25.)

[Frag. XLIV]

1. For the Ligurians occupy the whole shore from Etruria up to the Alps
and as far as Gaul, according to Dio's statement. (Isaac Tzetzes, on
Lycophron, 1312.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 236 (_a.u._ 518)] 2. The Romans at first sent Claudius
to the Corsicans and gave him up. This was after he had made terms with
them, but his countrymen, who claimed that the fault in breaking the
compact rested on him and not on themselves, had waged war upon them and
subdued them. When the Corsicans refused to receive him, the Romans
drove him out. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

[Frag. XLV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 235 (_a.u._ 519)] 1. ¶The Romans after exacting also
money from the Carthaginians, renewed the truce. And at first when an
embassy from the latter arrived, they returned no proper answer, because
they were aware of the state of their own equipment and because they
were themselves still busied at that time with the war against the
neighboring tribes. After this, however, Hanno, a man of youthful years
who employed striking frankness of speech, was sent. He touched
unreservedly on a number of other subjects and finally his appeal--"If
you don't want to be at peace, restore to us both Sardinia and Sicily;
for with these we purchased not a temporary respite but eternal
friendship"--caused them to become milder and ashamed [lacuna] (Ursinus,
p.378. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

2[lacuna] lest [Footnote: Preceding this fragment four pages of the MS.
are missing.] they might suffer the same injuries in return, so that
they were very glad to delay,--the one side choosing to preserve the
prosperity that was an inheritance of the past, and the other to cling
to the possessions which were still theirs. To judge by their threats
they were no longer maintaining peace, but in fact they still
deliberated about the matter, so that all could see that whichever of
the two found it to his advantage to create the first disturbance would
also be the one to begin war. Most men abide by their agreements just so
long as suits their own convenience. If they have in view a greater
resultant benefit to themselves, they deem it safe even to break some
compact. (Mai, p.184.)

[Frag. XLVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 231 (_a.u._ 523)] ¶Once in the consulship of Marcus
Pomponius and Gaius Papirius they despatched envoys to investigate
affairs in Spain, although none of the Spanish States had ever yet
belonged to them. He, [Footnote: A reference to some previous proper
name, outside this fragment.] besides showing them other honors,
addressed them in suitable words, declaring that he was obliged to fight
against the Spaniards in order that the money which was still owing to
the Romans on the part of the Carthaginians might be paid; for it was
impossible to obtain it from any other source. The envoys were
consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him. (Mai, p.184)

[Frag. XLVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 1. ¶The island of Issa surrendered
itself voluntarily to the Romans. This was the first time the islanders
were about to make the acquaintance of the latter, but they judged them
more friendly and faithful than the powers which they then dreaded.
Calculation caused them to place more dependence on the unknown than on
the evident; for while the latter had aroused irritation through the
dealings already had with it, the former afforded good hope, because its
actions were as yet only matters of expectation. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8,

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 2. When the Issaeans had attached
themselves to the Romans, the latter, being ready and anxious to do them
some favor in return forthwith, so as to get the reputation of aiding
such as espoused their cause and also for the purpose of restraining the
Ardiasans, who were annoying those that sailed from Brundusium,--for
these reasons they sent messengers to Agro, who were to ask clemency for
the Issaeans and censure the king in that he was wronging them without
previous cause. Now these men found Agro no longer in existence: he had
died, leaving behind a child named Pineus. Teuta, Agro's wife and
stepmother of Pineus, held the power over the Ardiaeans,[lacuna] Being
[lacuna] by boldness, she made no moderate response to their requests,
but woman-like she showed a vanity (due to innate recklessness as well
as to the power that she was holding) by casting some of the ambassadors
into prison and killing others for speaking frankly. Such was her action
at that time, and she actually took pride in it as if she had displayed
some strength by her facile cruelty. In a very short space, however, she
proved the weakness of the female sex, for as she had quickly flown into
a passion through short-sightedness of judgment, so through cowardice
she was quickly terrified. As soon as she learned that the Romans had
voted for war against her she was panic-stricken, and promised to
restore their men whom she held, while she tried to defend herself for
the death of the others, declaring that they had been slain by some
robbers. When the Romans were thus led to cease temporarily their
campaign and demand the surrender of the murderers, she showed contempt
again, because the danger was not yet at her doors, and declaring that
she would not give anybody up despatched an army against Issa. When she
learned that the consuls were at hand she grew terrified again, gave
over her high spirit, and became ready to heed them in every minutest
detail. She had not yet, however, been fully brought to her senses, for
when the consuls had crossed over to Corcyra she felt imbued with new
courage, revolted, and despatched an army against Epidamnus and
Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued the cities and at the news of
their capture of ships and treasures of hers she was on the point of
again yielding obedience. Meanwhile in the course of scaling certain
heights overlooking the sea they were worsted near the Atyrian hill and
she now waited, hoping, in view of the fact that it was really winter
already, for their withdrawal. But on perceiving that Albinus remained
where he was and Demetrius as a result of her caprice as well as from
fear of the Romans had transferred his allegiance, besides persuading
some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and gave up her
sovereignty. (Ursinus, p. 378. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 228 (_a.u._ 526)] In the time of Fabius Maximus
Berucosus ("full of warts") the Romans did this, after burying in the
middle Of the Forum a Greek and a Gallic couple, man and woman: they
were frightened by a certain oracle which said that Greek and Gaul
should occupy the city. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603, 1056. Cp.
Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLIX]

1. ¶ The Romans were being frightened by an oracle of the Sibyl which
urged the necessity of guarding against the Gauls when a thunderbolt
should fall upon the Capitol near the temple of Apollo. (Mai, p. 185.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 225 (_a.u._ 529)] 2. ¶ The Gauls became dejected on
seeing that the Romans had taken beforehand the most favorable
locations. All men if they obtain the object of their first aim proceed
more readily toward their subsequent goals, but if they miss it, lose
interest in everything else. They, however, after the Gallic fashion and
more than is usual with the rest of mankind, lay hold very eagerly of
what they desire and cling most tenaciously to any success, but if they
meet with the slightest obstacle have no hope left for the future. Folly
makes them inclined to expect whatsoever they wish, and their spirited
temperament ready to carry out whatsoever they undertake. They are given
to violent anger and dash headlong into enterprises, and for that reason
they have within themselves no quality of endurance (since it is
impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time), and if they
once suffer any setback they are unable (especially by reason of the
fear to which they then fall a prey) to recover themselves: they are
plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless
daring. In a brief period they rush vehemently to the most opposite
extremes, since they can furnish no motive based on calculation for
either action. (Mai, p. 185.)

3. ¶ AEmilius on conquering the Insubres celebrated a triumph and in it
conveyed the foremost captives clad in armor up to the Capitol, making
jests upon them because he had heard that they had sworn not to remove
their breastplates before they had ascended the Capitol. (Mai, p. 186.
Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. L]

¶ If any of the details, even the smallest, that were customary in
festivals had been missed, they renewed the ceremonial proceedings at
any rate a second and a third time, and even more times still, so far as
was possible in one day, till everything seemed to them to have been
done faultlessly. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (_a.u._ 535)] ¶ Demetrius, elated by his position as
guardian of Pineus and by the fact that he had married the latter's
mother Triteuta (Teuta was dead), was hateful to the natives and injured
the property of neighboring tribes. So they summoned him before them
(since it appeared that it was by misusing the friendship of the Romans
that he was able to wrong those peoples) as soon as they heard of it.
When he refused compliance and actually assailed their allies, they made
a campaign against Issa, where he was. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8,

[Frag. LII]

1. ¶The Romans were at their prime in equipment for war and enjoyed
absolute harmony among themselves. Whereas the majority of persons are
led by unmixed good fortune to audacity but by a tremendous fear to
proper behavior, they had quite a different experience at that time in
those matters. The more successes they had the more sober it made them;
against their enemies they displayed the kind of boldness that partakes
of bravery, while toward one another they employed that right dealing
which is closely connected with good order. [Footnote: The word for
"good order" is conjectured by van Herwerden.] They held their power
with a view to the practice of moderation and kept their orderliness for
the acquirement of a true bravery: they did not allow their good fortune
to develop into wantonness, nor their right dealing into cowardice. They
believed that in case of such laxity temperance might be ruined by
bravery and boldness by boldness; but that when people exercised care,
as they did, moderation was made more secure by bravery and good fortune
rendered surer by discipline. This was the reason for their vast
superiority over the enemies that encountered them and for their
excellent administration of both their own affairs and those of the
allies. (Mai, p. 186.)

2. ¶ All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the
Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the
Romans as leaders, but because they hated the force that ruled them and
were for welcoming the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the
Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but Hannibal was
worth nearly all of them. He could comprehend matters very quickly and
plan the details of every project that he laid to heart, notwithstanding
the fact that generally sureness is the product of slowness and only
rash decisions result from hastiness of disposition. He was most
[lacuna] when given the smallest margin of time, and most enduring with
a very great degree of reliability. He managed in a safe way the affair
of the moment and showed skill in considering the future beforehand: he
proved himself a most capable counselor in ordinary events and a very
accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he handled the issue
immediately confronting him very readily and in the shortest time, while
by calculation he anticipated the future afar off and considered it as
though it were actually present. Consequently he, more than any man, met
each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he made no
distinction between what he possessed and what he hoped for. He was able
to conduct matters so for the reason that in addition to his natural
capacity he was well versed in much Phoenician learning, common to his
country, and likewise much Greek, and furthermore he understood
divination by inspection of entrails. (Mai, p. 187 and Valesius, p.

3. With such intellectual qualities he had brought his body to a state
of equal perfection, partly by nature, partly by practice, so that he
could carry out easily everything that he took in hand. It was nimble
and at the same time heavy to the utmost degree, and he could,
therefore, run, fight, and ride safely at full speed. He never burdened
himself with overmuch food, nor suffered annoyance by lack of it, but
took more or less with equal grace, feeling that either was
satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew

Having these advantages of mind and body he universally administered
affairs in a fashion now to be described. Since he saw that most men
were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself
dealt with them in this manner and expected the same treatment of them,
so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom
failed by being the object of a plot. He regarded as hostile every force
that could gain an advantage both among foreigners and among kinsmen
alike, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but
handled them quite unsparingly, assuming that they were anxious to
commit a wrong when they could: he thought it better to be the first to
act than the first to suffer, and resolved that the rest of the world
should be dependent on him, and not he upon other persons. In fine, he
paid attention to the nature of things, rather than to their reputed
good points, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. He also,
however, prized extravagantly whatever he needed. Slaves, most of them,
he esteemed in that way, and beheld them willing to encounter danger for
him even contrary to their own advantage. For these reasons he often
himself refrained from opportunities for gain and other most delightful
pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get
them to be not unwilling partners in hard work. He subjected himself not
only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same
dangers and was the first to accomplish every task that he demanded of
them. Likewise he was confident that they, too, without pretexts and
with zeal,--since he showed his care for them not in words only,--would
help him effect his projects.

Toward the rest he always behaved quite proudly; and the whole
multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him
because of their similar conditions of life, on the one hand, and
because of his haughtiness on the other. Accordingly, he was fully able
to bring low the towering head, to exalt humility, and to inspire all
whom he pleased, in the shortest period, one with hesitation, another
with boldness, with hope also and despair regarding most important

And that this information about him is not false, but is truthful
tradition, his works are proof. Much of Spain he won over in a short
time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of
the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but
actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we
know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign
against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by
force and others by persuasion. This, however, he achieved by himself
without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in
the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any
considerable assistance from them. While they were on the eve of
enjoying the greatest glory and benefit through his efforts, they
wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to
cooeperate effectively in any enterprise. (Valesius, p. 593.)

[Frag. LIII]

Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses _Bebruces_, writing this: "To those
who of old were Bebruces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees
range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul." (Isaac
Tzetzes on Lycophron, 516. Zonaras, 8, 21.)

[Frag. LIV]

1. ¶ Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it
and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment
seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and
2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the
eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war;
and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p.

2. ¶Every human being is so constituted as to desire to lord it over
such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against
voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)

3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that
propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you
regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by
stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for
paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never
reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but
toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must
treat in a gentle and politic fashion; if one be preserved unexpectedly,
he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall
save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by
our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)

4. ¶War both preserves men's own possessions and wins the property of
others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war
but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)

[Frag. LIV]

5. ¶It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have
been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to
have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and
if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time
when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,--that to
heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us
is very easy--any man can do it--whereas, to say what is advantageous
for the State, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to
the State's benefit, is really the duty of the advising class? Do not
irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us
that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though
there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is
not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)

6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them
wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that
very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable
portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses
or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to
set one's face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not
possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not
able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave,
even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of
happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)

7. It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience
again,--that being the only benefit that can come from disasters.
Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base
their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas
failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for
the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)

8. ¶For securing the favor of the gods or a good reputation among men it
is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to
be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)

9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to
prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but
determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if
the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would
arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his
shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well;
otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

10. ¶When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and
instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According
to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was _Quintus_. Willems suggests emending
to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding
them with palms upward said: "Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both
war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish."
Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither
but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he
declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

[Frag. LV]

¶The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter
declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or
received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one
or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the
Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)

[Frag. LVI]

1. ¶From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that
source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they
had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of
the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness,
renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that
they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and
despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted.
(Mai, p.191.)

2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed
to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of
the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards' refusing, at the
start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of
the multitude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but
ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the
hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach
the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of
gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten
it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in
any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they
esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been
offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be
sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal's army, and some one
on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh
of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared
that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to
eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

4. ¶Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers
and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of
the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to
endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another
on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the
second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the
conflict he said: "Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these
men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be
eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from
incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being
subservient to others,--yes, and ruling them besides?" (Mai, p.192.
Zonaras, 8, 23.)

5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by
the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well
assured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I
mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape.
The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it
hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays
any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)

6. ¶To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them
forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage.
(Mai, p. 192.)

7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and
cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face
of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a
panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians
will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy.
(Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)

8. ¶Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some
of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle
talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously
frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to
them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former
phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]

Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies
were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure
of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the
race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of
improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger
awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still
they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)

9. ¶ The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could
themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor
[lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they
made sure of the former's safety through fear that they might change
sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8,

10. ¶ Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in
dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled
in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great
circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no
disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one
to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of
their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once
defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he
calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this
would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to
the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men
with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most
dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by
the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk
and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a
hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he
further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the
hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

11. ¶ The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to
Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he
was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes
he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did
not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army
sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds
from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor
because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many
soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a
triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always
exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)

13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in
enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set
upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to
conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p.

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