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A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta

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enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds
of asravas, bhavasrava and karmasrava. Bhavasrava means the
thought activities of the soul through which or on account of
which the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra
says that bhavasrava is that kind of change in the soul (which
is the contrary to what can destroy the karmasrava), by which
the karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmasrava, however, means the
actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These
bhavasravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion
(_mithyatva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramada_),
the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions
(_ka@sayas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekanta_
(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed),
_viparita_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_
(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit),
_sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajnana_ (want of any
belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers).
Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msa_), falsehood (_an@rta_),
stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have
things which one does not already possess (_parigrahaka@nk@sa_).
Pramada or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation
(_vikatha_), passions (_ka@saya_), bad use of the five senses
(_indriya_), sleep (_nidra_), attachment (_raga_) [Footnote ref 3].

Coming to dravyasrava we find that it means that actual influx
of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners
in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight
different kinds, namely jnanavara@niya, dars'anavara@niya, vedaniya,
mohaniya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya. These actual
influxes take place only as a result of the bhavasrava or the reprehensible
thought activities, or changes (_pari@nama_) of the soul.
The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas
is called bhavabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the
actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called
dravyabandha. It is on account of bhavabandha that the actual
connection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4].
The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking


[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29.]

[Footnote 2: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, edited
by S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]

[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30.]

[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamanapura@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by


of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with
oil. Thus Gunaratna says "The influx of karma means the
contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the
particular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of
dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of
the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes
so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked
at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a
material body during its sa@msara stage [Footnote ref 1]." From one
point of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _papa_
(good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is of
four kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration of
bondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubhaga_) and extension (_prades'a_).
The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already
mentioned, namely the jnanavaraniya karma which obscures the
infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail,
dars'anavara@niya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge
of the soul, vedaniya karma which produces the feelings of
pleasure and pain in the soul, mohaniya karma, which so infatuates
souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from
what is wrong, ayu karma, which determines the tenure of any
particular life, nama karma which gives them personalities, gotra
karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding
for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance
of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay
of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be
intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle
of division, anubhaga. Prades'a refers to the different parts of
the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The
duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due
to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the
different classification of karmas as jnanavaraniya, etc., are due to
the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnote
ref 3].

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhavasrava and
dravyasrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush,
by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the
actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are
respectively called bhavasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4].


[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33.]

[Footnote 4: _Varddhama@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_
S'I. 35.]


The bhavasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness,
abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects
of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order
to avoid injury to insects (_irya_), gentle and holy talk (_bha@sa_),
receiving proper alms (_e@sa@na_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints of
body, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness,
humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint,
penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss,
and supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@sa_ consisting of
meditation about the transient character of the world, about our
helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence,
about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the
difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness
of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx
of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those
karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter
and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining
true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles
of the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _pari@sahajaya_ consisting of the
conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and
of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _caritra_ or right

Next to this we come to nirjara or the purging off of the
karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjara also is of two
kinds bhavanirjara and dravyanirjara. Bhavanirjara means that
change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are
destroyed. Dravyanirjara means the actual destruction of these
karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by
penances before their time of fruition, called savipaka and avipaka
nirjaras respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@sa
or liberation is effected.


The _ajiva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgalastikaya, dharmastikaya,
adharmastikaya, akas'astikaya, kala, pu@nya, papa_. The word _pudgala_
means matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astikaya_
in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms


[Footnote 1: _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]

[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the
Buddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]


which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two
states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such
as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things
are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The
smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_).
The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell,
and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the
different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination
of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement
and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic
space (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place by
simple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades'a_) whereas
in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive
force (_oja@hprades'a_) (_Prajnapanopa@ngasutra_, pp. 10-12).
Two atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscous
and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or
dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that
there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded
the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These
compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce
the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to
constant change (_pari@nama_) by which they lose some of their
old qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are four
elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these
are alike in character. The perception of grossness however
is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the
atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the
perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise
(as the Sa@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of
a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined
atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given
in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing
appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have
all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the
dars'anavara@niya and jnanavara@niya veil, there arises in the soul
the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness
(_samana-rupata_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of
atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow)
is technically called _tiryaksamanya_. This samanya or generality
is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity


(as maintained by the Naiyayikas) but represents only the accession
of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities
of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of
qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and
to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing
to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the
developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the
relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to
the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of
some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as
a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This
sameness of qualities in time is technically called _urdhvasamanya_
[Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of
view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be
regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from
the point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal.

Dharma, Adharma, Akas'a.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is
absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of
Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell,
sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe
(_lokakas'a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astikaya_
is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying
circumstance or cause which makes motion possible,
like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition
or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent
or passive (_udasina_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_)
cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if
the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its
motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but
if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of
dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_)
in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the
liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there
because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2].
Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which


[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamarta@n@da_, pp. 136-143;
_Jainatarkavarttika_, p. 106.]

[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]


helps jivas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance
could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if
there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two
categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on
account of their notion that the inner activity of the jiva or the
atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other
extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed
into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jivas
were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be
found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which
was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required
for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent
in the region of the liberated souls.

The category of akas'a is that subtle entity which pervades
the mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region of
liberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all other
substances such as dharma, adharma, jiva, pudgala. It is not a
mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness,
but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate
it. On account of its pervasive character it is called
_akas'astikaya_ [Footnote ref 1].

Kala and Samaya.

Time (_kala_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles
which never mix with one another, but which help the happening
of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change
of qualities of the atoms. Kala does not bring about the changes
of qualities, in things, but just as akas'a helps interpenetration
and dharma motion, so also kala helps the action of the transformation
of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments,
hours, days, etc., is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of the
unchangeable kala in so many forms. Kala thus not only aids the
modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as
moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments,
hours, etc., are its paryayas. The unit of samaya is the time
required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.


[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]


Jaina Cosmography.

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning
or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced
as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts,
_urdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and
_adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe
(_lokakas'a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement
possible. Beyond the lokakas'a there is no dharma and therefore
no movement, but only space (_akas'a_). Surrounding this lokakas'a
are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over
the urdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakas'a and (there being
no dharma) remains motionless there.

Jaina Yoga.

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation).
This yoga consists of jnana (knowledge of reality as it is), s'raddha
(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from
doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@msa_ (not
taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _sun@rta_
(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_
(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya
(abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and
body), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnote
ref 1].

These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent
on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary
householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra,
that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should
follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from
a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so
forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and


[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra.
These are: _Iryya_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and
illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken
while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which
may be lying on the way), _bhasa_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all
beings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner),
_danasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions
when taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily
refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_
(to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold
all people to be the same in mind), _vaggupti_ (absolute silence), and
_kayagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds
of caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]


honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon
the virtues of ahi@msa, sun@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the
root of all these is ahi@msa. The virtues of sun@rta, asteya and
brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries
of ahi@msa. Ahi@msa may thus be generalized as the fundamental
ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be
passed in accordance with the standard of ahi@msa; sun@rta, asteya
and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression
leads to hi@msa (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice
of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this
is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling
for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues
according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called
mahabrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a
householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere
cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahabrata it would
be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts.
Ahi@msa according to a householder, according to anubrata,
would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according
to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to
prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to
any living being in any way.

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all
of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@msa. These
are (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted area
and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places),
(2) _bhogopabhogamana_ (to desist from drinking liquors, taking
flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and
vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding
time and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of
(a) _apadhyana_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries,
killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) _papopades'a_ (desisting from
advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing
of so many insects), (c) _hi@msopakaridana_ (desisting from
giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead
to the injury of insects), (d) _pramadacara@na_ (to desist
from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading
sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) _s'ik@sapadabrata_
consisting of (a) _samayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beings
equally), (b) des'avakas'ikabrata (gradually to practise
the _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_


(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibhagabrata (to
make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called
_aticara_, should be carefully avoided.

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to
know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the
soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can
be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is
pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on
account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are
burnt (_dhyanagnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. The
soul is itself the sa@msara (the cycle of rebirths) when it is
overpowered by the four ka@sayas (passions) and the senses. The four
ka@sayas are _krodha_ (anger), _mana_ (vanity and pride), _maya_
(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed).
These ka@sayas cannot be removed except by a control of the
senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind
(_mana@hs'uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one can
proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when
the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should
make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism
(_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment
and antipathy (_ragadvc@sa_) can be removed only by the
purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that
man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin
(sage) that he should be free from them and become independent
in the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon
all beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquest
over raga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictest
asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this
samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of
meditation (_bhavana_):

We should think of the transitoriness (_anityata_) of all things,
that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day,
what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are
transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure,
wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles
in a whirlwind.

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will
by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of
misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in


whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we
find that it fails us. This is called as'ara@nabhavana (the meditation
of helplessness).

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits
of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one
another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and
by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate
on these aspects is called ekatvabhavana and anyatvabhavana.

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh,
blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as'ucibhavana
(meditation of the impurity of the body).

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal
friendship and compassion and the passions are removed,
then only will good {_s'ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contrary
I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil
will befall me, is called asravabhavana (meditation of the befalling
of evil). By the control of the asrava (inrush of karma)
comes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the
destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nirjara
(decay and destruction of karma matter).

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas
(virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_sun@rta_), purity
(_s'auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_akincanata_),
asceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks'anti_), mildness
(_mardava_), sincerity (_@rjuta_), and freedom or emancipation from
all sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of the
highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can
look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also
of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the
diverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabhavana_
and _bodhibhavana_.

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man
becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings,
and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a
mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should
take to the performance of dhyana or meditation by deep concentration.
The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyana
are interdependent, so that without dhyana there is no samatva


and without samatva there is no dhyana. In order to make the
mind steady by dhyana one should think of _maitri_ (universal
friendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of
men), _karu@na_ (universal compassion) and _madhyastha_ (indifference
to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any
note of sinners). The Jaina dhyana consists in concentrating
the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The
dhyana however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to
making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed
towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the
final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete
course of moral discipline which leads to the purification
of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu
yoga of Patanjali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1].

Jaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2].

The Naiyayikas assert that as the world is of the nature of
an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and
this agent is Is'vara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What does
the Naiyayika mean when he says that the world is of the nature
of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made
up of parts (_savayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a
non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as
having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vikaritvam_).
Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it
means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_samanya_)
existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence
destructible, but these the Naiyayikas regard as being partless and
eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space"
(_akas'a_) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyayika regards
it as eternal.

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a
thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one
could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the
elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as


[Footnote 1:_Yogas'astra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in
_Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874,
and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]

[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadipika_.]


having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when
a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in
the hollow which he dug.

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could
suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require
another creator to create him and he another, and so on _ad
infinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to
change with reference to his creative activity.

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some
time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects."
But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things
contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then
that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and
thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these
are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue
of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo
changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a
whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the
cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is
argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human
causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human
beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly
an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings
but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because
water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in
inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.
If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the
inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce
such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing
old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced
by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which
we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects,
and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is
said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been
made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer
the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having
been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have
a vicious circle (_anyonyas'raya_).


Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by
an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have
never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held
that we should consider the general condition of agency only,
namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that
this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind
of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such
as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that
these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it
is said that these are also made by God, then you have an
argument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter which
you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists.
Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in
that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the
world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does
he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible,
for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a
body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any
other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there
cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that
he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that
he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless
God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take
to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would
be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it
in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then
he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it
through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose
there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing
else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they
suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious
actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such
a blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took
to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things
without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain
people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism
on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took
place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of


admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came
into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help
of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create
this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists,
you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has
no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production
of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied
a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then
there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction.
Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one
unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character
of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which
knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not
aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is
omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any
knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any
perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot
have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition
of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this
also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions
also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain
all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of
karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods
too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be
quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of
a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and
wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can
co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if
there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate
that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think
his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever
way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it
is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense
with the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].


[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp.


Mok@sa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) is
the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the
state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is
also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantajnana_) and infinite
perception (_anantadars'ana_). In the sa@msara state on account
of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn
out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and
that time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s'ruta_),
supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hparyaya_).
In the state of release however there is omniscience
(_kevala-jnana_) and all things are simultaneously known to the
perfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@msara stage the soul always
acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though
remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage
the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus
it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance
as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change
meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the
karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways
yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action
(_anantavirya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and
infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time
by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this
power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated.
If man had not this anantavirya in him he might have been eternally
under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured
his bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of this
indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and
produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his
highest good.




A Review.

The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of
Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince
us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in
circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain
practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the
wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some
of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nastika schools
of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the
point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nastika schools
appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial
disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with
the K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the
taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals
at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination
of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical
power of producing the desired effect--a shower of rain, the
birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices
were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as
for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas
were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate
a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a
certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses
in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired
by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define
truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic
culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with
which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth
of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our


[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published
by the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority.
The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]


objects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends upon
the test of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though
probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial
creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental
principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at
least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see
that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being
due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that
which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme
did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in
formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2].
Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of
knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what
is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an
account of things that on proceeding according to its directions
we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct
estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good
and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes
were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not
carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in
the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so
far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent
soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute
view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening
of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true
only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense,
which we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions,
which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the
assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new
qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this
common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary
experience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands for
finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but
absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism


[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mima@msa of
Kumarila and Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them
is determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior
to the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva._ But the later Buddhists sought
to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of


would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but
untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such
a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer
cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement,
an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism
from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to
formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of
sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was
busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles
or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances
of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean
sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions
were here considered bad or good according as they brought
about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial
creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal
degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth
should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The
sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the
other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned
their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and
unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever
dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken,
was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for
the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial
creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed
only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of
karma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its
fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit
of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of
sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however,
karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were
taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or
absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no
narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness
or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not
sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions
performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth
or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads


which had anticipated the new systems in all these
directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew
their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the
Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own
rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were
thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas,
it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp
such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to
harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial
creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent
and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are
indeed fulfilled in the Sa@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may
be discovered in the Upani@sads.

The Germs of Sa@mkhya in the Upani@sads.

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number
of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the
infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing
forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the
earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice,
and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result
[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears
as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived
their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages
for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of
development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level
in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored,
and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the
only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the
monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was
another line of thought which was developing alongside of it,
which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made
up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara
and particularly in Maitraya@ni from which it appears
that the Samkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and
many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the
date of Maitraya@ni has not yet been definitely settled, and the details


[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This
has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]


found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion
of the Sa@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is
not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave
some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sa@mkhya-Yoga
philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all
the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it
unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the
doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of
relativism of the Jains.

Sa@mkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sa@mkhya and Yoga in
this section has been based on the _Sa@mkhya karika_, the _Sa@mkhya
sutras_, and the _Yoga sutras_ of Patanjali with their commentaries
and sub-commentaries. The _Sa@mkhya karika_ (about
200 A.D.) was written by Is'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sa@mkhya
given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and
this has been treated separately. Vacaspati Mis'ra (ninth century
A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudi_. But
before him Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the
_Sa@mkhya karika_ [Footnote ref 1]. Narayanatirtha wrote his _Candrika_ on
Gaudapada's commentary. The _Sa@mkhya sutras_ which have been commented
on by Vijnana Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabha@sya_) of the
sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author
after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the
fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the
_Sa@mkhya sutras_. Vijnana Bhiksu wrote also another elementary
work on Sa@mkhya known as _Sa@mkhyasara_. Another short work
of late origin is _Tattvasamasa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two
other works on Sam@khya, viz Simananda's _Samkhyatattvavivecana_
and Bhavaga@nes'a's _Sa@mkhyatattvayatharthyadipana_ (both later
than Vijnanabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been
freely consulted. Patanjali's _Yoga sutra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.)
was commented on by Vaysa (400 A.D.) and Vyasa's bhasya
commented on by Vacaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'aradi_,
by Vijnana Bhik@su _Yogavarttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century
_Bhojav@rtti_, and by Nages'a (seventeenth century) _Chayavyakhya_.


[Footnote 1: I suppose that Raja's commentary on the _Karika_ was the same
as _Rajavarttika_ quoted by Vacaspati. Raja's commentary on the _Karika_
has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyayamanjari_, p. 109. This book
is probably now lost.]


Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may
mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories
of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_
by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published
by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation
to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published,
and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication
with the Calcutta University.

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sa@mkhya works,
viz. _Ma@tharabha@sya_ and _Atreyatantra_. Of these the second is
probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sa@mkhya, for we know
that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it
was called Atreyasa@mhita or Atreyatantra. Nothing is known
of the Matharabhasya [Footnote ref 1].

An Early School of Sa@mkhya.

It is important for the history of Sa@mkhya philosophy that
Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been
dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sa@mkhya, should
be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.
According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhatus_), viz. the
five elements such as akas'a, vayu etc. and cetana, called also
puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to
be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five
conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold
prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkara and the five elements)[Footnote ref
2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence
is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses
there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with
them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate
sensing (_uha_) and conceiving (_vicara_) before definite understanding
(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the
combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with
a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance


[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sa@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following
three sections at the time of first reading.]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapa@ni, the
commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested,
the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktancodasina@m
puru@samavyaktatvasadharmyat avyaktayam prak@rtaveva prak@sipya
avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nati._ Harinatha Vis'arada's edition of
_Caraka, S'arira_, p. 4.]


of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with
a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance
of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmatras at all [Footnote ref 1].
The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyartha_) or gross matter,
the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhutas and prak@rti, mahat
and aha@mkara taking place through rajas make up what we call
man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases.
All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance,
life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also
the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death,
bondage, or salvation. If the atman were not regarded as cause,
all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one
others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _paramatman_,
is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in
itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it
through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By
ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa
and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action,
cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects
are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but
all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which
is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the
avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category.
The vikara or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra,
whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajna
(_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajnam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta
and cetana are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested
prak@rti or cetana is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is
derived the ego (_aha@mkara_) and from the aha@mkara the five
elements and the senses are produced, and when this production
is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time
of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return
back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the
time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_),
all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkara,


[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter,
is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having
eight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhatuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat,
aha@mkara, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming
part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects
which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]


etc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of
dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and
tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer
this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in
association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself
takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish,
undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will
and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive,
yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are
associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains
are felt by the conglomeration (_ras'i_), and not by the atman presiding
over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and
pain comes desire (_t@r@s@na_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and
from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete
cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association
of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the
manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when
there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns
that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves,
but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do
not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last
renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally
extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence
of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote
ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this
state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any
characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sa@mkhyas as their
goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are
rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be
enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,


[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary
previous to Cakrapa@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve
back into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth they
become manifest again. See Cakrapa@ni on s'arira, I. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any
sense like the Brahman of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like
absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_),
resembling Nagarjuna's Nirva@na. Thus Caraka
writes:--_tasmi@ms'caramasannyase samulah@hsarvavedana@h
asa@mjnajnanavijnana niv@rtti@m yantyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m
brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhavebhya@h cihna@m
yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavida@m brahma taccak@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka,
S'arira_ 1. 98-100.]


the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours
in the shape of association with good people, abandoning
of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed
attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)
thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and
this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self.
As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or
character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation
(_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sa_).

The main features of the Sa@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka
are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera
of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed
which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are
not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of
the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of
emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute
existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is
no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the
conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkara etc.
6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).

This account of Sa@mkhya agrees with the system of Sa@mkhya
propounded by Pancas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of
Asuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the
Mahabharata XII. 219. Pancas'ikha of course does not describe
the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what
little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sa@mkhya
he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pancas'ikha
speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all
Sa@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa
(_purusavasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination
of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases
with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a
discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as
the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility.
The same discussion occurs in Pancas'ikha also, and the proofs


[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:
(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,
(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty
in accepting Pancas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sa@mkhya doctrine.
This may probably be due to the fact that the Sa@mkhya doctrines sketched
in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]


for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again
Pancas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these
phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pancas'ikha are the different
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose
themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any
characteristic)--a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sa@mkhya.
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation
which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sa@mkhya, the
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these
the doctrine of the Maulikya Sa@mkhya is said to be that which
believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman
(_maulikyasa@mkhya hyatmanamatmanam prati p@rthak pradhanam
vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sa@mkhya doctrine
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sa@mkhya.

In _Mahabharata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sa@mkhya are
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five
(the well-known orthodox Sa@mkhya system) and those who
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a
supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the
form of Sa@mkhya advocated in the _Mahabharata_. The schools of
Sa@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of
Sa@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the


[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 99.]


other chapters of the _Mahabharata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self
apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon
day; it is said that as Rahu (the shadow on the sun during an
eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be
seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'ariri@na@h_) are spoken of as
manifesting from prak@rti.

We do not know anything about Asuri the direct disciple
of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of
Sa@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same
form in the _Mahabharata_ and has been attributed there to Pancas'ikha
is probably the earliest form of Sa@mkhya available to us
in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the
school of Maulikya Sa@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka
(78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sa@mkhya as described by Is'varak@r@s@na
and referred to in other parts of _Mahabharata_ is a definite
proof that Is'varak@r@s@na's Sa@mkhya is a later modification, which
was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as
an authoritative old Sa@mkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavasin altered
the Sa@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks
that Vindhyavasin was a title of Is'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe
holds that the date of Is'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a
very plausible view that Is'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his karikas to
another work, which was probably written in a style different
from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Karika_ seems to
be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the


[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gu@naratna
(_Tarkarahasyadipika,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when
buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience.
It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," _J.
R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be
extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Is'varak@r@s@na and
Vindhyavasin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadipika,_
pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in
anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Is'varak@r@s@na. It
appears that Is'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sa@mkhya
karika_ and another an independent work on Sa@mkhya, a line from which,
quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

"_Pratiniyatadhyavasaya@h s'rotradisamuttha adhyak@sam_" (p. 108).

If Vacaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumana in his
_Tattvakaumudi_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sa@mkhya
karika_ then Is'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavasin
whose views on anumana as referred to in _S'lokavarttika,_ p. 393, are
altogether different. But Vacaspati's own statement in the
_Tatparyya@tika_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not


_Mahabhasya_ of Patanjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1].
The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which
frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned
with the strictly technical part of Sa@mkhya, and it is just possible
that the book from which Patanjali quoted the passage, and which
was probably paraphrased in the Arya metre by Is'varak@r@s@na
was not a Sa@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the
verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sa@mkhya, yet
since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of
Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard
against certain objections against the Sa@mkhya doctrine of
prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the
verse of a Sa@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Is'varak@r@s@na.

The earliest descriptions of a Sa@mkhya which agrees with
Is'varak@r@s@na's Sa@mkhya (but with an addition of Is'vara) are to be
found in Patanjali's _Yoga sutras_ and in the _Mahabharata;_ but we
are pretty certain that the Sa@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched
here was known to Patanjali, for in _Yoga sutra_ I. 19 a reference is
made to a view of Sa@mkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sa@mkhya
of Caraka and Pancas'ikha is very important; for it shows a
transitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and
the orthodox Sa@mkhya doctrine as represented by Is'varak@r@s@na.
On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and
that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that
the puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyaya,
and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer
than the orthodox Sa@mkhya.

We hear of a _Sa@s@titantras'astra_ as being one of the oldest Sa@mkhya
works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ as
containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote
ref 2]. A quotation from _Rajavarttika_ (a work about which there is no
definite information) in Vacaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sa@mkhya
karika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra because
it dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference
from puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of
puru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of


[Footnote 1: Patanjali's Mahabha@sya, IV. I. 3.
_Atisannikar@sadativiprakar@sat murttyantaravyavadhanat
tamasav@rtatvat indriyadaurvalyadatipramadat,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]

[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita,_ pp. 108, 110.]


the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_,
nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the
eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].

But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya
Sa@mhita_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sa@mkhya
of the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ was of
a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pancaratra
Vai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ says that Kapila's
theory of Sa@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijnana Bhiksu, the
greatest expounder of Sa@mkhya, says in many places of his work
_Vijnanam@rta Bha@sya_ that Sa@mkhya was originally theistic, and that
the atheistic Sa@mkhya is only a _prau@dhivada_ (an exaggerated
attempt to show that no supposition of Is'vara is necessary to
explain the world process) though the _Mahabharata_ points out
that the difference between Sa@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the
former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy
between the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original
_Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ was
subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is
corroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among
the important Sa@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddhara_


[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs,
and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karika_ of Is'varakr@sna, but I
have omitted them in my account of Samkhya as these have little
philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five,
viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa
(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo,
moha, mahamoha, tamisra_, and _andhatamisra_. These are of nine kinds
of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti
will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary
to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's
life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time
(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhagya_), and
the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of
causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of
protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things
earned by enjoyment (_parapara_), increase of desires leading to greater
disappointments (_anuttamambhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others
(_uttamambhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations
with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The
siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of
scriptures (_tara_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutara_),
(3) proper reasoning (_taratara_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas
with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field
(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice
(_sadamudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and
modamana lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a.
The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses
and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the
absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis
and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the
achievement of the Sa@mkhya goal.]


(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the
earlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vacaspati's time.

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya
Sa@mhita_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was
composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it
has to be assumed that Kapila's Sa@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It
seems probable that his disciple Asuri tried to popularise it. But it
seems that a great change occurred when Pancas'ikha the disciple of
Asuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It
is said in _Sa@mkhya karika_ (70) that the literature was divided by
him into many parts (_tena bahudhak@rtam tantram_). The exact
meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that
the original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises.
It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas
accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential
parts as the Sa@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption
that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are
a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the
Patanjala Sa@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may
be ventured is that Pancas'ikha probably modified Kapila's
work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this
supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of
Sa@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but
which is kept in a modified form by the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya,
second an atheistic one as represented by Pancas'ikha, and
a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sa@mkhya system.
An important change in the Sa@mkhya doctrine seems to have
been introduced by Vijnana Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his
treatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this
interpretation of Sa@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical
one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system
of the accepted Kapila and the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya. But
it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was
applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then
they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase
and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the


[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 109.]

[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam prahah s'ariramth manavah sa@mkhyam
sa@mkhyatmakatvacca kapiladibhirucyate. Matsyapurana_, IV. 28.]


totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation
of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijnana Bhik@su
and the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga
philosophy compiled by Patanjali and commented on by Vyasa,
Vacaspati and Vijn@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sa@mkhya doctrine
as explained by Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhik@su in most points I
have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Patanjala schools
of Sa@mkhya and have treated them together--a principle which
was followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_.

The other important Sa@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapada
are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanatana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is
known about their historicity or doctrines.

Sa@mkhya karika, Sa@mkhya sutra, Vacaspati Mis'ra and
Vijnana Bhik@su.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation
of the Sa@mkhya-Yoga system. The _Sa@mkhya karika_ is
the oldest Sa@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by
later writers. The _Sa@mkhya sutra_ was not referred to by any
writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth
century A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who
made allusions to a number of Sa@mkhya works, did not make any
reference to the _Sa@mkhya sutra_, and no other writer who is known
to have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any
reference to the _Sa@mkhya sutra_. The natural conclusion therefore
is that these sutras were probably written some time after
the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to
prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is
said at the end of the _Sa@mkhya karika_ of Is'varak@r@s@na that the
karikas give an exposition of the Sa@mkhya doctrine excluding
the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the
parables attached to the original Sa@mkhya works--the
_@Sa@s@titantras'astra_. The _Sa@mkhya sutras_ contain refutations
of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable
that these were collected from some earlier Sa@mkhya work which is
now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition
of the _@Sa@s@titantras'astra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddhara_ as mentioned by


[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume
of the present work.]


Gu@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to
suppose that the Sa@mkhya doctrine found in the sutras differs in
any important way from the Sa@mkhya doctrine as found in the
_Sa@mkhya karika_. The only point of importance is this, that the
_Sa@mkhya sutras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute
pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved
in the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of
the gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence,
they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form
the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some
sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in
the _Sa@mkhya karika_. This is, however, a case of omission and not
of difference. Vijnana Bhik@su, the commentator of the _Sa@mkhya
sutra_, was more inclined to theistic Sa@mkhya or Yoga than
to atheistic Sa@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in
his _Samkhyapravacanabha@sya, Yogavarttika_, and _Vijnanam@rtabhasya_
(an independent commentary on the Brahmasutras of
Badarayana on theistic Sa@mkhya lines). Vijnana Bhiksu's own
view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he
agreed more with the views of the Sa@mkhya doctrine of the
Pura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said
to be merged in the end in Is'vara, by whose will the creative
process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya.
He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the
_Sa@mkhya sutras_, but he remarked that these were used only with
a view to showing that the Sa@mkhya system gave such a rational
explanation that even without the intervention of an Is'vara it could
explain all facts. Vijnana Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sa@mkhya
differed on many points from those of Vacaspati, and it is difficult
to say who is right. Vijnana Bhik@su has this advantage that
he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points
on which Vacaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the
nature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most
important thing in Sa@mkhya. Vijnana Bhik@su described the
gu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vacaspati and
Gau@dapada (the other commentator of the _Sa@mkhya karika_)
remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their
interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of
Vijnana Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite
explanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely


came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation
of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any
other work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter
may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka
nor the _Mahabharata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. But
Bhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known
of the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early
documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su
in giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _Karika_
speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as
being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and
causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati
merely paraphrases this statement of the _Karika_ but does not enter
into any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in well
with all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible
that this view might not have been known before, and when the
original Sa@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness
as to the conception of the gu@nas.

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation
differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may
be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of
the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vacaspati holds that there is
no contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that
a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by
virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed
into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection
that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the
experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection
in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience
(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any
actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of
Vacaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space
and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific
kind of fitness (_yogyata_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi,
and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed
to a person. Vijnana Bhik@su differs from Vacaspati and says that
if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no


reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time
of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all,
for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it,
and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in
the buddhi for ever. Vijnana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a
real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive
state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on
account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change
means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers
changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there
is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when
the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears
as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between
Vacaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual
process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the
determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas,
whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the
sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate
sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is
the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at
the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association
by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified
by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the
indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and
conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.
Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is
directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate
position to manas as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are
one or two passages in Vacaspati's commentary on the _Sa@mkhya
karika_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mkara_)
as producing the subjective series of the senses and the
objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will,
but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not
necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view
with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat;
for contrary to the view of _Vyasabha@sya_ and Vijnana Bhik@su etc.
Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkara and


from aha@mkara the tanmatras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijnana Bhik@su however
holds that both the separation of aha@mkara and the evolution of the
tanmatras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more
reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some
other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between
Vacaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical

Yoga and Patanjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such
as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection,
and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the
other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was
used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as
the S'atapatha Brahmana and the B@rhadara@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2].
The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature
[Footnote ref 3].

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the
@Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very
much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow
of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues
and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force
of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of
a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally
applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control
of the senses [Footnote ref 5].

In Pa@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical
meaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samadhau_" (_yuj_
in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ in
the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as
a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological
derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].


[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.
9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German
Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10;
Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brah, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;
S'atap. Brah. XI. 5. 8. 1.]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriya@ni hayanahu@h vi@sayate@sugocaran_.
The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.
Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriya@nyasya haya@h_ the conative senses are its

[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from
_yuja samadhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam,"
V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which
passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time
(Pa@nini as Goldstucker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with
these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by
the name of Yoga.]


In the _Bhagavadgita_, we find that the word yoga has been
used not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samadhau_" but
also with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusion
to the readers of the _Bhagavadgita._ "Yogin" in the sense
of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded
with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of
this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgita_ tried to mark out a
middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction
on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action
of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently
from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the
best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet
abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kau@tilya in his _Arthas'astra_ when enumerating the philosophic
sciences of study names Sa@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata. The
oldest Buddhist sutras (e.g. the _Satipa@t@thana sutta_) are fully
familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus
infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical
method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sa@mkhya, as we find
it in the _Yoga sutras_ of Patanjali, it is indeed difficult to come to
any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted
notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not
probably developed any systematic form of pra@nayama (a system
of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we
come to Maitraya@ni that we find that the Yoga method had attained
a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in
which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetas'vatara and
the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three
Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga
methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to
the Sa@mkhya tenets, though the Sa@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not
appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of
the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the
Maitraya@ni in the conversation between S'akyayana and B@rhad
ratha where we find that the Sa@mkhya metaphysics was offered


in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the
Sa@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently
systematized by Patanjali. Thus S'akyayana says: "Here some
say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief,
certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating
he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man
stand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness.
All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a
verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called
the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'a@n@dilya, Yogatattva,
Dhyanabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanada, Varaha, Ma@n@dala
Brahma@na, Nadabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalu, shows that the Yoga
practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but
none of these show any predilection for the Sa@mkhya. Thus the
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the


[Footnote 1: Vatsyayana, however, in his bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, I. i 29,
distinguishes Sa@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sa@mkhya holds
that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any
change in the pure intelligence (_niratis'aya@h cetana@h_). All changes
are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects.
Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa.
Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma.
The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non
being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last
view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyasabha@sya,_ It is
closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana's statement is correct,
it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in
creation was borrowed by Sa@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the
same sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sa@mkhya
and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika._" Curiously
enough Vatsyayana quotes a passage from _Vyasabha@sya,_ III. 13, in his
bha@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]


S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;
they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which
was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through
constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also
associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The
Yogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the
Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Rajayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some
cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedantism
with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in
the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also
very great, but we have to leave out these from our present
consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as
they are not connected with our present endeavour.

Of the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya, which forms the subject of
the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patanjali was probably
the most notable person for he not only collected the different
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which
were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all
on the Sa@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which
they have been handed down to us. Vacaspati and Vijnana
Bhik@su, the two great commentators on the _Vyasabha@sya_, agree
with us in holding that Patanjali was not the founder of Yoga,
but an editor. Analytic study of the sutras brings the conviction
that the sutras do not show any original attempt, but a
masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented
by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also
in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition
and classification shows that the materials were already in
existence and that Patanjali systematized them. There was
no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of
other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of
explaining the system. Patanjal is not even anxious to establish
the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts
as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists
occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are
described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated
from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are


[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigi@savya wrote "_Dharanas'astra_" which
dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patanjali.
He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the
nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory
where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati's _Tatparya@tika_ or
Vatsyayana's bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, III. ii. 43.]


criticized; the putting of an "_iti_" (the word to denote the conclusion
of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course
another "_iti_" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a
hand other than that of Patanjali who was anxious to supply
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last
chapter as compared with the style of the other three.

The sutras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the
topics introduced are such that they could well have been
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sutras,
whereas the average number of sutras in other chapters is between
51 to 55.

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date
of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect
him with Kapya Pata@mchala of S'atapatha Brahma@na [Footnote ref l]; in
Katyayana's _Varttika_ we get the name Patanjali which is explained
by later commentators as _patanta@h anjalaya@h yasmai_ (for
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of
names. There is however another theory which identifies the
writer of the great commentary on Pa@nini called the _Mahabha@sya_
with the Patanjali of the _Yoga sutra_. This theory has been
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of
some Indian commentators who identified the two Patanjalis.
Of these one is the writer of the _Patanjalicarita_ (Ramabhadra
Dik@sita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth
century. The other is that cited in S'ivarama's commentary on
_Vasavadatta_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century.
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and Cakrapa@nidatta,


[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]


the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh
century A.D. Thus Cakrapa@ni says that he adores the Ahipati
(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech
and body by his _Patanjala mahabha@sya_ and the revision of
_Caraka._ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of
that illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his
grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patanjala and by
producing a treatise on medicine called _Rajam@rga@nka_ has like the
lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech,
mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyasa (which is considered
to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also
based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that
the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion
between the three Patanjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor,
and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as
_Patanjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivadasa in his
commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of

Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore
in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian
and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these
commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great
commentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta,
Vamana, Jayaditya, Nages'a, etc. are silent on this point.
This is indeed a point against the identification of the two
Patanjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later
age. And if other proofs are available which go against such
an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the
Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patanjali's grammatical work contains anything
which may lead us to think that he was not the same
person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the
philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patanjalis
differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that
dravya is described in _Vyasabha@sya_ in one place as being the
unity of species and qualities (_samanyavis'e@satmaka_), whereas
the _Mahabha@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also
specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on
either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally
antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by


Vya@di and Vajapyayana (Vya@di holding that words denoted
qualities or dravya and Vajapyayana holding that words denoted
species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pa@nini had these two different ideas in
"_jatyakhyayamekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyam_" and
"_sarupanamekas'e@samekavibhaktau_," and Patanjali the writer of
the _Mahabha@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show
that he opposes the view of _Vyasabha@sya_, though we must remember
that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard
to the writer of the sutras. Moreover, when we read that dravya
is spoken of in the _Mahabha@sya_ as that object which is the
specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is
of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat
sasnala@ngulakakudakhuravi@sa@nyartharupam_," we are reminded of
its similarity with "_ayutasiddhavayavabhedanugata@h samuha@h dravyam_"
(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the
_Vyasabhasya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahabha@sya_ I have
not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us
in holding that the two Patanjalis cannot be identified. There
are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even
in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians
that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable
for us to judge anything about the personal views
of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the
writer of the _Mahabha@sya_ knew most of the important points of
the Sa@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer
to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sa@mkhya dictum of ex
nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the
idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of
change _vikara_ as production of new qualities _gu@nantaradhana_
(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133).
We may add to it that the _Mahabha@sya_ agrees with the Yoga
view as regards the Spho@tavada, which is not held in common
by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this
external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin
their works in a similar manner (_atha yoganus'asanam_ and
_athas'abdanus'asanam_)--"now begins the compilation of the
instructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sutra_)--and "now begins the compilation
of the instructions of words" (_Mahabha@sya_).

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments


[Footnote 1: Patanjali's _Mahabha@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]


which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the
_Yoga sutra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive,
as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patanjalis
cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the
Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed
Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which,
as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they
were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because
Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijnana-vadi
type, we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or
even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras
had been developing long before the time of Nagarjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators
may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two
Patanjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative
critical study of the _Yoga sutras_ and the text of the _Mahabha@sya,_
which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga
sutras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patanjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patanjali the Yoga
editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing
the other work _Kitab Patanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for
our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous
one and he translates it along with another book called _Sanka_
(Sa@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the
form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that
this book was not the present _Yoga sutra_ of Patanjali, though it
had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation

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